Don Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba, or a robbery on 1,5 million pounds
Great Britain has existed de jure for more than two centuries, and de facto, in the format of the English state - even more so. And throughout their stories one trait is observed, which is characteristic, perhaps, for all nations and states of the world, but it is most clearly manifested in the inhabitants of Misty Albion: they really do not like to remember their own punctures. Even if they remember it, it is only within the framework of glorifying their positive qualities, as in the case of Bismarck: the enemy was dangerous and powerful, and therefore it was not a sin to lose such a Huda in battle, because in the end “ Bismarck "they are utopias. But they don’t like punctures that cannot be sweetened in any way. Especially that small puncture, when the seventy-year-old grandfather, a thunderstorm seignior of the French city of Brest, led away from under the nose of the Royal fleet a whole convoy with a bunch of government property, including one and a half million pounds of gold and silver ....
Our hero was born by the name of Louis in 1706 in a very simple family with short surnames and a modest origin. His father's name was Juan de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega and Puente Verastegui, he was a knight of the Order of Calatrava and came from a very old surname, albeit untitled. The young Luis mother was his father a close relative, daughter of the 1 marquise Vado del Maestre, and her name was Clemensia de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega and Ventimiglia. On the father’s side, Louis’s ancestors were sailors, and he himself was no exception to the rule - in 11 years, having first come aboard his father’s ship, by 13 years he had already made two trips to America and felt at home at sea.
By 1721, he was already a midshipman; in 1723 he became midshipman of a frigate (alferez de fragata). Both in training and in battle, he showed himself courageously, skillfully, and sometimes, in a fair wind - also initiatively, thanks to which the young man quickly began to move up the career ladder and earned the special attention of King Felipe V. In 1730, Cordoba became one of elected nobles who were supposed to accompany the infante Carlos de Bourbon (future Carlos III), and became, if not his friend, then certainly a good acquaintance, which later came in handy during the service. In 1731, Louis already bears the rank of midshipman of the ship (alferez de navio), and in 1732 - lieutenant of the frigate (teniente de fragata), participating in the siege of Oran and the capture of Naples and Sicily in the turbulent years when the first Spanish Bourbons returned the recently lost lands in Italy into the crown of the state.
By the 1740 year, Cordoba already bears the title of captain of a frigate (capitan de fragata), commands his frigate and fights with the Berber corsairs, and in 1747, being the captain of the ship (capitan de navio) and standing on the bridge of the 60-gun “America”, he participates in the legendary for Spain at that time, the battle between two Spanish battleships ("America" and "Dragon", the general command of Pedro Fitz-James Stuart, both 60 guns) and two Algerian (60 and 54 guns). In total, the battle took about 30 hours for four days, after which the Algerians surrendered. Fifty Christian captives were released, Cordoba was made a knight of the Order of Calatrava as a reward.
After that, Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba moves to the western direction, and he is entrusted with an important task - the fight against smuggling in the West Indies, and in case of war with the British, also counteracting it. Apparently, he did not do very well with the second, but in the first he achieved significant success, smuggling through Cartagena de Indias was practically stopped. Following this, he became the commander of the colonial squadron at 9 for many years - from 1765 to 1774 and performs various tasks in the waters of North and South America. Finally, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general when he was already 68 years old. It seemed that the old man’s career was going to sunset - but it wasn’t there ...
In 1775, the war for the independence of the Thirteen Colonies from Great Britain began, and Spain and France, of course, did not miss the opportunity to strike at the eternal enemy at such an uncomfortable moment for him. After resolving their questions and waiting for the British to get bogged down in the conflict, the allies declared war on the British in 1779 and launched an offensive on all fronts. At sea, however, at first it turned out to be a complete zilch - gathering enormous forces on land and at sea, which became known as the Other Armada, the Allies received tremendous superiority, including at sea (66 battleships versus 38 English). However, two fossils were appointed to command the single fleet - the 73-year-old Cordoba under the supervision of the 69-year-old Frenchman, Count d'Orville. With the same success, one could dig out the ashes of Alvaro de Bazana and put it on the bridge of Santisima Trinidad .... And instead of active, decisive, daring actions, timid campaigns came out, it was not clear where and why.
Time passed, and the greatest success was the capture of the ship “Ardent” and a small luger, which did not go into any gate with respect to the efforts expended. Having such a clear superiority at sea, the Allies even managed to defend the merchant convoys from the English colonies, which was worthy of a separate sarcastic ovation in those conditions. The Allied fleet got into repair after four months of “active” actions, and the enterprise, in fact, was completed. There are legends about the reasons for these modest results. Luis de Cordoba, of course, blamed everything on his boss, Count d'Orville, and the youngest flagship of Cordoba, José de Masarredo, was not enthusiastic about both old men. However, despite the modesty of real achievements, the Spanish admiral earned praise from the French Louis XVI, who sent him a box richly decorated with jewelry, with the inscription "From Louis to Louis."
The seat in Brest, while the ships of the Allied fleet were being repaired, was delayed, and even the highest ranks were already concerned about this. Floridablanca, Secretary of State of Spain, wrote in 1780 that while Cordoba is based in Brest, local senorites are in great danger, hinting that there is still plenty of gunpowder in the flocks of the 73-year-old man. However, there were positive results - the French Admiral Guichen drew attention to how the Spaniards are attentive to weather warnings, and how accurately they predict the onset of storms at sea. The reason was the usual barometer, which the Armada has long been actively and universally used, and which was absent on French ships. Cordoba shared such barometers with an ally, after which they found distribution on all French warships. In the end, in the 1780 year, it was decided to start to nightmare the supply routes between Great Britain and America, for which a solid fleet was allocated, consisting of 36 battleships (27 Spanish and 9 French) under the single command of the Spaniards. Just at that time, a large convoy was gathering in the UK to transport strategically important cargoes and replenishment to America, where some goods, materials and money were sorely lacking.
The expedition was planned, to put it mildly, through the sleeves - having decided that these continental sissies were incapable of anything, the British insured all merchant ships in full, and allocated for the protection of 60 armed transports (including 5 large East Indians) the entire 1 battleship and 2 frigate led by Captain John Moutrei. The Canal fleet escorted this convoy literally “to the gates” of Britain, not even diving into the Bay of Biscay, but then the ships' path lies along the coast of Portugal, following the winds and currents, and - straight to America. The route ran along the Iberian Peninsula and further to the Azores. On one of them there was Cape Santa Maria, next to which the convoy was to pass at full speed at night. The British knew that the coast of friendly Portugal would be nearby, that there would be a long hassle ahead of them in the ocean, that the Spaniards and the French could organize a light raid on the convoy if they found it, and therefore all the "merchants" went right behind the navigation lights of the Ramillis battleship ". But what they didn’t know was that the large forces of the Allied fleet (36 battleships!) Were on the open sea, hunting convoys, and, most importantly, they would be on that very night at Cape Santa Maria ... .
Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba established effective reconnaissance, and he learned in advance from a large convoy from the patrol frigate. The opinions of the officers subordinate to him were divided - Cordoba himself thought that this was the linear fleet of the Metropolis, and intended to act with all caution, and Masarredo, on the contrary, was sure that the Channel Fleet would not leave his native waters, and that all these were merchant ships. In the end, Cordob managed to dodge the attack, but further descriptions of what happened are very different. According to the first version, which is very boring in content, the Spaniards and the French, using the tailwind, fell in broad daylight on the convoy, drove off the weak guards, and chased the British merchants throughout the district until the next morning.
The second version is much more interesting, although it is much less common. According to intelligence, realizing where the squadron's military guard is located, and learning that it was far away from the convoy itself, in the twilight of Cordoba, on its Santisima Trinidad, hung navigation lights, while the rest extinguished them. As soon as the sun went down over the horizon, Santisima began to draw closer to the convoy, and in the dark they mistook her for Ramillis, getting into her wake and walking that way all night. Only five "merchants" did not see the lights of the Spanish flagship, and followed the lights of the British ship that were better visible from their place. And in the morning, as soon as it began to dawn, something began that very much resembled a pack of foxes caught in a poultry farm: the British unexpectedly found themselves in tight formation with the Spanish-French fleet, which immediately began their quick capture and compulsion to surrender. Only three guard ships escaped, led by John Moutrei, who decided not to heroize himself with his small forces, but five ships, which at night mated to his Ramillis. The victory was complete, and, more importantly, bloodless.
When calculating the trophies, the officials of Spanish and French nationality were clearly shaking hands. In addition to 55 ships, of which 5 were large East Indians, production at Cape Santa Maria amounted to:
- 3144 prisoners, including the entire personnel of the 90 infantry regiment;
- 80 thousand muskets for colonial troops;
- 3 thousand barrels of gunpowder;
- A complete set of supplies (uniforms, equipment, tents, etc.) for 12 infantry regiments;
- 1,5 million pounds sterling silver and gold, including 1 million in gold bars;
- materials and components for the repair of the colonial squadrons of the Royal Navy;
Of the 36 merchant ships that the Spaniards got after the division of the trophies, 32 were later converted into frigates and patrol ships, which simply indecently raised the strength of the cruising armada. Of the 1,5 million pounds, the Spaniards took about a million, which amounted to approximately 40 million reais. Of these, 6 millions were distributed to ship crews, and a little less than 34 millions went to the royal treasury, which amounted to the approximate total cost of building ten 74-gun battleships. With the prisoners, among whom were members of the families of the British military, the Spaniards behaved extremely respectfully and carefully, as the norms of the "Gallant Age" demanded.
Great Britain at once collapsed into a severe crisis. The army in the colonies lost many supplies critical to it, resulting in a series of defeats. Not having received the necessary materials and components for repair, the British colonial squadrons were temporarily paralyzed, which turned into the surrender of the Cornwallis army in Yorktown. The state lost one and a half million pounds of money, which was an indecently large sum. Not only that - insurance companies that so easily insured convoy ships before leaving, barely scrapped funds for payments, many of them went bankrupt. Rates on military insurance skyrocketed, and the government crisis, in addition to everything else, strengthened in the country. The stock exchange closed and did not work for several weeks. As if deciding to “finish off” the British, nature sent storms to the usual trade routes to America, as a result of which a large number of merchant ships perished in a year.
In terms of the magnitude of the consequences, the defeat of the convoy at Cape Santa Maria surpassed everything that the British had experienced at that time, and that they had yet to survive, including the defeat of the convoy PQ-17. And, of course, a catastrophe of this magnitude could not but affect the outcome of the war in America - so a Spanish admiral was one of the creators of US independence. As for the fate of Moutrei, who left without a fight, he was harsher than he should have been, but softer than he could have been, given under pressure from the merchants to the tribunal and dismissed from service, although he had no way to save the convoy. Nevertheless, a year later he returned to service, and later remained at it until his death. What is interesting - among his friends, among others, was a certain Horatio Nelson ....
After such a victory, Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba for some time even more perked up, and began to look for new reasons to make a feat both in Brest with local seigneurs and at sea. Without burdening himself with the French command and working perfectly with his younger flagship Masarreda, he continued to act on British communications. In 1781, a large British convoy was again captured, consisting of 24 West Indian merchant ships, sailing from colonies with a cargo of various goods. The only relief for the British was that the ships were not 55, and they did not carry one and a half million pounds in precious metals. At this time, his squadron becomes a place where naval science is developing rapidly - under his leadership Masarredo and Escagno build and test their theories (separate articles will be devoted to both), if Cordoba himself does not participate in their theoretical research, then at least not bothers them. In the end, the Spanish naval theory, probably composed by some of its best commanders, is born in raids on the Canal.
In 1782, Spanish ships under the command of Cordoba left Brest and set off for the Gulf of Algeciras, where the Great Siege of Gibraltar has been going for a year. A general assault was being prepared there, and the presence of the Armada’s linear fleet nearby was clearly not superfluous. However, the general assault on the fortress failed, no technical tricks of the French engineers were able to provide sufficient survivability of the floating batteries, on which the main stake was made. After this, the blockade continued, but its effectiveness was very conditional - soon the British Admiral Howe led a large convoy to Gibraltar, led by a squadron of 34 battleships. It was then that Cordoba’s entire enthusiasm began to disappear - his indecisive actions did not allow to intercept Admiral Howe’s convoy on the way to Gibraltar, and only on the way back, at Cape Espartel, the two fleets met each other. The Spaniards had an advantage in the number of ships (46 pieces), but the number of weapons was equal. This time, Masarrede was not able to sufficiently stir up his boss, and therefore the battle was hesitant and ended almost to no avail. Even the losses were insignificant - with a huge number of ships only one and a half hundred dead and five hundred wounded on both sides.
In January 1783, a peace treaty was signed, and the war ended. Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba immediately withdrew from direct service in the active fleet. The king granted him honor and the post of Director General of Armada, although after the battle Espartel had a number of questions for him from junior officers who believed that he was excessively passive and slow, and if it weren’t for that, the British would have been broken by the first number. As CEO, in 1786, he solemnly laid the foundation stone for the future Pantheon of Outstanding Sailors in San Fernando. In this position, Louis remained until the 1796 year, when he, having lived a long 90-year life, died. He got into the Pantheon laid by him only in the 1870 year.
Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba was married to Maria Andrea de Romay, had a son, Antonio de Cordoba and Romay, who followed in his father's footsteps, enlisted in the Armada, and died in 1786 with the rank of foreman. The town of Cordoba in Alaska, founded in the XVIII century by the researcher Salvador Fidalgo, is named after him. The whole history of the life and service of this person can serve as a clear illustration of several aspects of human activity. Brave, skillful and successful in his youth, Cordoba kept his nature alive for a long time, but even with this in mind, demanding too much from the 73-year-old man was not only excessive, but also stupid. Yes, it was enough for some time for active military operations (at least he was more active than the French), but in the end he nevertheless turned into an old man not only in body but also in mind, which was clearly demonstrated by the battle at Cape Espartel. Despite all this, Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba can be called an outstanding person, and quite a successful commander of the Armada, who had both great victories and missed opportunities.
To be continued ....
Youth
Our hero was born by the name of Louis in 1706 in a very simple family with short surnames and a modest origin. His father's name was Juan de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega and Puente Verastegui, he was a knight of the Order of Calatrava and came from a very old surname, albeit untitled. The young Luis mother was his father a close relative, daughter of the 1 marquise Vado del Maestre, and her name was Clemensia de Cordoba Lasso de la Vega and Ventimiglia. On the father’s side, Louis’s ancestors were sailors, and he himself was no exception to the rule - in 11 years, having first come aboard his father’s ship, by 13 years he had already made two trips to America and felt at home at sea.
By 1721, he was already a midshipman; in 1723 he became midshipman of a frigate (alferez de fragata). Both in training and in battle, he showed himself courageously, skillfully, and sometimes, in a fair wind - also initiatively, thanks to which the young man quickly began to move up the career ladder and earned the special attention of King Felipe V. In 1730, Cordoba became one of elected nobles who were supposed to accompany the infante Carlos de Bourbon (future Carlos III), and became, if not his friend, then certainly a good acquaintance, which later came in handy during the service. In 1731, Louis already bears the rank of midshipman of the ship (alferez de navio), and in 1732 - lieutenant of the frigate (teniente de fragata), participating in the siege of Oran and the capture of Naples and Sicily in the turbulent years when the first Spanish Bourbons returned the recently lost lands in Italy into the crown of the state.
By the 1740 year, Cordoba already bears the title of captain of a frigate (capitan de fragata), commands his frigate and fights with the Berber corsairs, and in 1747, being the captain of the ship (capitan de navio) and standing on the bridge of the 60-gun “America”, he participates in the legendary for Spain at that time, the battle between two Spanish battleships ("America" and "Dragon", the general command of Pedro Fitz-James Stuart, both 60 guns) and two Algerian (60 and 54 guns). In total, the battle took about 30 hours for four days, after which the Algerians surrendered. Fifty Christian captives were released, Cordoba was made a knight of the Order of Calatrava as a reward.
After that, Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba moves to the western direction, and he is entrusted with an important task - the fight against smuggling in the West Indies, and in case of war with the British, also counteracting it. Apparently, he did not do very well with the second, but in the first he achieved significant success, smuggling through Cartagena de Indias was practically stopped. Following this, he became the commander of the colonial squadron at 9 for many years - from 1765 to 1774 and performs various tasks in the waters of North and South America. Finally, he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general when he was already 68 years old. It seemed that the old man’s career was going to sunset - but it wasn’t there ...
Case at Cape Santa Maria
In 1775, the war for the independence of the Thirteen Colonies from Great Britain began, and Spain and France, of course, did not miss the opportunity to strike at the eternal enemy at such an uncomfortable moment for him. After resolving their questions and waiting for the British to get bogged down in the conflict, the allies declared war on the British in 1779 and launched an offensive on all fronts. At sea, however, at first it turned out to be a complete zilch - gathering enormous forces on land and at sea, which became known as the Other Armada, the Allies received tremendous superiority, including at sea (66 battleships versus 38 English). However, two fossils were appointed to command the single fleet - the 73-year-old Cordoba under the supervision of the 69-year-old Frenchman, Count d'Orville. With the same success, one could dig out the ashes of Alvaro de Bazana and put it on the bridge of Santisima Trinidad .... And instead of active, decisive, daring actions, timid campaigns came out, it was not clear where and why.
Time passed, and the greatest success was the capture of the ship “Ardent” and a small luger, which did not go into any gate with respect to the efforts expended. Having such a clear superiority at sea, the Allies even managed to defend the merchant convoys from the English colonies, which was worthy of a separate sarcastic ovation in those conditions. The Allied fleet got into repair after four months of “active” actions, and the enterprise, in fact, was completed. There are legends about the reasons for these modest results. Luis de Cordoba, of course, blamed everything on his boss, Count d'Orville, and the youngest flagship of Cordoba, José de Masarredo, was not enthusiastic about both old men. However, despite the modesty of real achievements, the Spanish admiral earned praise from the French Louis XVI, who sent him a box richly decorated with jewelry, with the inscription "From Louis to Louis."
The seat in Brest, while the ships of the Allied fleet were being repaired, was delayed, and even the highest ranks were already concerned about this. Floridablanca, Secretary of State of Spain, wrote in 1780 that while Cordoba is based in Brest, local senorites are in great danger, hinting that there is still plenty of gunpowder in the flocks of the 73-year-old man. However, there were positive results - the French Admiral Guichen drew attention to how the Spaniards are attentive to weather warnings, and how accurately they predict the onset of storms at sea. The reason was the usual barometer, which the Armada has long been actively and universally used, and which was absent on French ships. Cordoba shared such barometers with an ally, after which they found distribution on all French warships. In the end, in the 1780 year, it was decided to start to nightmare the supply routes between Great Britain and America, for which a solid fleet was allocated, consisting of 36 battleships (27 Spanish and 9 French) under the single command of the Spaniards. Just at that time, a large convoy was gathering in the UK to transport strategically important cargoes and replenishment to America, where some goods, materials and money were sorely lacking.
The expedition was planned, to put it mildly, through the sleeves - having decided that these continental sissies were incapable of anything, the British insured all merchant ships in full, and allocated for the protection of 60 armed transports (including 5 large East Indians) the entire 1 battleship and 2 frigate led by Captain John Moutrei. The Canal fleet escorted this convoy literally “to the gates” of Britain, not even diving into the Bay of Biscay, but then the ships' path lies along the coast of Portugal, following the winds and currents, and - straight to America. The route ran along the Iberian Peninsula and further to the Azores. On one of them there was Cape Santa Maria, next to which the convoy was to pass at full speed at night. The British knew that the coast of friendly Portugal would be nearby, that there would be a long hassle ahead of them in the ocean, that the Spaniards and the French could organize a light raid on the convoy if they found it, and therefore all the "merchants" went right behind the navigation lights of the Ramillis battleship ". But what they didn’t know was that the large forces of the Allied fleet (36 battleships!) Were on the open sea, hunting convoys, and, most importantly, they would be on that very night at Cape Santa Maria ... .
Santisima Trinidad in Cadiz
Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba established effective reconnaissance, and he learned in advance from a large convoy from the patrol frigate. The opinions of the officers subordinate to him were divided - Cordoba himself thought that this was the linear fleet of the Metropolis, and intended to act with all caution, and Masarredo, on the contrary, was sure that the Channel Fleet would not leave his native waters, and that all these were merchant ships. In the end, Cordob managed to dodge the attack, but further descriptions of what happened are very different. According to the first version, which is very boring in content, the Spaniards and the French, using the tailwind, fell in broad daylight on the convoy, drove off the weak guards, and chased the British merchants throughout the district until the next morning.
The second version is much more interesting, although it is much less common. According to intelligence, realizing where the squadron's military guard is located, and learning that it was far away from the convoy itself, in the twilight of Cordoba, on its Santisima Trinidad, hung navigation lights, while the rest extinguished them. As soon as the sun went down over the horizon, Santisima began to draw closer to the convoy, and in the dark they mistook her for Ramillis, getting into her wake and walking that way all night. Only five "merchants" did not see the lights of the Spanish flagship, and followed the lights of the British ship that were better visible from their place. And in the morning, as soon as it began to dawn, something began that very much resembled a pack of foxes caught in a poultry farm: the British unexpectedly found themselves in tight formation with the Spanish-French fleet, which immediately began their quick capture and compulsion to surrender. Only three guard ships escaped, led by John Moutrei, who decided not to heroize himself with his small forces, but five ships, which at night mated to his Ramillis. The victory was complete, and, more importantly, bloodless.
When calculating the trophies, the officials of Spanish and French nationality were clearly shaking hands. In addition to 55 ships, of which 5 were large East Indians, production at Cape Santa Maria amounted to:
- 3144 prisoners, including the entire personnel of the 90 infantry regiment;
- 80 thousand muskets for colonial troops;
- 3 thousand barrels of gunpowder;
- A complete set of supplies (uniforms, equipment, tents, etc.) for 12 infantry regiments;
- 1,5 million pounds sterling silver and gold, including 1 million in gold bars;
- materials and components for the repair of the colonial squadrons of the Royal Navy;
Of the 36 merchant ships that the Spaniards got after the division of the trophies, 32 were later converted into frigates and patrol ships, which simply indecently raised the strength of the cruising armada. Of the 1,5 million pounds, the Spaniards took about a million, which amounted to approximately 40 million reais. Of these, 6 millions were distributed to ship crews, and a little less than 34 millions went to the royal treasury, which amounted to the approximate total cost of building ten 74-gun battleships. With the prisoners, among whom were members of the families of the British military, the Spaniards behaved extremely respectfully and carefully, as the norms of the "Gallant Age" demanded.
Great Britain at once collapsed into a severe crisis. The army in the colonies lost many supplies critical to it, resulting in a series of defeats. Not having received the necessary materials and components for repair, the British colonial squadrons were temporarily paralyzed, which turned into the surrender of the Cornwallis army in Yorktown. The state lost one and a half million pounds of money, which was an indecently large sum. Not only that - insurance companies that so easily insured convoy ships before leaving, barely scrapped funds for payments, many of them went bankrupt. Rates on military insurance skyrocketed, and the government crisis, in addition to everything else, strengthened in the country. The stock exchange closed and did not work for several weeks. As if deciding to “finish off” the British, nature sent storms to the usual trade routes to America, as a result of which a large number of merchant ships perished in a year.
In terms of the magnitude of the consequences, the defeat of the convoy at Cape Santa Maria surpassed everything that the British had experienced at that time, and that they had yet to survive, including the defeat of the convoy PQ-17. And, of course, a catastrophe of this magnitude could not but affect the outcome of the war in America - so a Spanish admiral was one of the creators of US independence. As for the fate of Moutrei, who left without a fight, he was harsher than he should have been, but softer than he could have been, given under pressure from the merchants to the tribunal and dismissed from service, although he had no way to save the convoy. Nevertheless, a year later he returned to service, and later remained at it until his death. What is interesting - among his friends, among others, was a certain Horatio Nelson ....
Senile care
After such a victory, Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba for some time even more perked up, and began to look for new reasons to make a feat both in Brest with local seigneurs and at sea. Without burdening himself with the French command and working perfectly with his younger flagship Masarreda, he continued to act on British communications. In 1781, a large British convoy was again captured, consisting of 24 West Indian merchant ships, sailing from colonies with a cargo of various goods. The only relief for the British was that the ships were not 55, and they did not carry one and a half million pounds in precious metals. At this time, his squadron becomes a place where naval science is developing rapidly - under his leadership Masarredo and Escagno build and test their theories (separate articles will be devoted to both), if Cordoba himself does not participate in their theoretical research, then at least not bothers them. In the end, the Spanish naval theory, probably composed by some of its best commanders, is born in raids on the Canal.
In 1782, Spanish ships under the command of Cordoba left Brest and set off for the Gulf of Algeciras, where the Great Siege of Gibraltar has been going for a year. A general assault was being prepared there, and the presence of the Armada’s linear fleet nearby was clearly not superfluous. However, the general assault on the fortress failed, no technical tricks of the French engineers were able to provide sufficient survivability of the floating batteries, on which the main stake was made. After this, the blockade continued, but its effectiveness was very conditional - soon the British Admiral Howe led a large convoy to Gibraltar, led by a squadron of 34 battleships. It was then that Cordoba’s entire enthusiasm began to disappear - his indecisive actions did not allow to intercept Admiral Howe’s convoy on the way to Gibraltar, and only on the way back, at Cape Espartel, the two fleets met each other. The Spaniards had an advantage in the number of ships (46 pieces), but the number of weapons was equal. This time, Masarrede was not able to sufficiently stir up his boss, and therefore the battle was hesitant and ended almost to no avail. Even the losses were insignificant - with a huge number of ships only one and a half hundred dead and five hundred wounded on both sides.
In January 1783, a peace treaty was signed, and the war ended. Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba immediately withdrew from direct service in the active fleet. The king granted him honor and the post of Director General of Armada, although after the battle Espartel had a number of questions for him from junior officers who believed that he was excessively passive and slow, and if it weren’t for that, the British would have been broken by the first number. As CEO, in 1786, he solemnly laid the foundation stone for the future Pantheon of Outstanding Sailors in San Fernando. In this position, Louis remained until the 1796 year, when he, having lived a long 90-year life, died. He got into the Pantheon laid by him only in the 1870 year.
Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba was married to Maria Andrea de Romay, had a son, Antonio de Cordoba and Romay, who followed in his father's footsteps, enlisted in the Armada, and died in 1786 with the rank of foreman. The town of Cordoba in Alaska, founded in the XVIII century by the researcher Salvador Fidalgo, is named after him. The whole history of the life and service of this person can serve as a clear illustration of several aspects of human activity. Brave, skillful and successful in his youth, Cordoba kept his nature alive for a long time, but even with this in mind, demanding too much from the 73-year-old man was not only excessive, but also stupid. Yes, it was enough for some time for active military operations (at least he was more active than the French), but in the end he nevertheless turned into an old man not only in body but also in mind, which was clearly demonstrated by the battle at Cape Espartel. Despite all this, Luis de Cordoba and Cordoba can be called an outstanding person, and quite a successful commander of the Armada, who had both great victories and missed opportunities.
To be continued ....
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