The reason for the collapse of the USSR - fear of war
I outlined my concept of the causes of the collapse of the USSR in my small book "Treason. The collapse of the USSR and Putin's Russia." But now I’ll talk about the root cause of this crash and all the attendant phenomena. This root cause, in my opinion, was the fear of a war with the capitalist world.
Fear arose after the end of World War II. One of its main outcomes was that the capitalist world was consolidated and united under the leadership of the United States, economic and military. In 1949, a phenomenon arose that did not exist before: a common military bloc, uniting all the largest, most developed and strong capitalist countries - NATO. The United States stood at the head of the bloc, at that time possessing a strong army and economy, which gave 60% of world production. The United States very quickly eliminated the sharp contradictions between the countries, and then quite quickly dragged into its recently defeated and defeated opponents: Germany and Japan, with subsequent and also quite quick remilitarization. Suffice it to say that already in the 1960's, the Bundeswehr accounted for more than 60% of the NATO grouping in Western Europe, was equipped with the latest weapons, including American ones.
The USSR emerged from the war greatly weakened. The war with Germany was bloody and destructive, costing tens of millions of people killed (they still argue how many people died, it is clear that there are many), and in the loss of 30% of fixed assets in the economy. And all his allies were the same. The countries of Eastern Europe also suffered enormous damage and themselves were in dire need of economic assistance. China had just emerged from a long war, civil, then with Japan, then again civil, and was utterly ruined.
The Soviet leadership knew all this well and in detail, and in my opinion, they had no doubts about the situation. Apparently, there were two points of view on what to do next. First: to recover and prepare for a new round of power confrontation with the capitalists. This point of view was held by Stalin. Second: to abandon the war with the capitalists completely and use the available forces only for defense, intimidation of the enemy and for maintaining the power of the party. This point of view, apparently, was held by many in the top leadership, most likely, by the majority.
The origin of their point of view is clear and obvious. All of them participated in the war, led and knew perfectly well what it was. For example, political instructor L.I. Brezhnev personally participated in the battles on Malaya Zemlya, one of the most stubborn and fierce battles in the Great Patriotic War. I am sure that his demonstrative peacefulness was connected precisely with this military experience.
The bet on the continuation of the armed confrontation with the capitalists promised a head-on battle with the enemy, who was superior to the USSR and its allies in everything. Most importantly, the enemy now had military-technical and military-economic superiority, and he had at his disposal most of the world's resources. The result was not difficult to predict. The USSR would enter into a fierce and protracted war, in which it would most likely suffer a complete defeat due to the exhaustion of human and economic resources. The capitalists would also have fallen, but their chances of standing on their feet were immeasurably higher. Having won, they would have torn seven skins from the defeated enemy. So it is not surprising that the top Soviet leadership began to incline to abandon the war, to avoid direct force confrontation and frontal combat.
But this also meant a rejection of communist ideology: the class struggle on a global scale, the support of revolutions, and the liberation of workers from the yoke of capital. All this was to become only words, a figure of speech for propaganda use.
Yes, it was an ideological betrayal. What else can you call it? The betrayal, however, was greatly extended in time and went in parts. The first and starting point, the first betrayal, so to speak, was the assassination of Stalin. The fact that Stalin was killed, personally, I have no doubt, and P.G. Balaev also explained how exactly this was done. Indeed, Stalin, with plans for preparing for the next round, posed a very serious danger to them.
The assassination attempt on Stalin, and indeed the very idea that it is possible to encroach on Stalin, emanating from those whom he put forward and who have worked with him for many years, is extremely unbelievable. This was an attempt not only on a person and on a leader, but also on a symbol, on a political banner. There had to be a very good reason for them to decide on this, and such a reason could only be a struggle for their own survival and self-preservation. Moreover, Stalin was killed twice. Once physically, and a second time politically, by the famous report to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU.
This is so that his ideas will never be revived, so that they are completely discredited. This was subsequently reinforced by rewriting stories and its comprehensive mythologization, with Stalin being crossed out everywhere.
I must say that the people silently supported all this. And for an elementary reason. Nobody then had to be convinced that the war could be brutal, bloody and destructive.
Since then, in the 1950's, party leaders could not openly abandon communism, since this would be the end of the CPSU and their personal power, they took the path of totally emasculating the official ideology, and planting another ideology, actual. I call it ersatz ideology (since it really was a substitute for a real political ideology), and its essence consisted of only two points. Firstly, if only there was no war. Secondly, one must live well. And it is not difficult now to see that the whole post-war life in the USSR, in essence, revolved around these two postulates. It is also turning now, since the collapse of the USSR, the ban of the CPSU and the final rejection of communism were only a dumping of the verbal shell, but the essence remained unchanged.
Many people had to pay for this rejection of a real political ideology, including economic inhibition, which in the USSR became one of the strong preconditions for its inglorious end (the deficit came into conflict with the principle of "one must live well"). The fact is that, in my opinion, economic development requires precisely political ideology. Development is not a pleasant walk at all, but additional work, much beyond what is required for life. This is true both for individuals and for the economy as a whole. Political ideology explains and justifies why you need to work more and more, why you need to give priority to investment, rather than consumption. Replacing communism with its ersatz ideology, the CPSU cut down the very root of the country's economic development.
The same can be said about the war. It is impossible to fight without a political ideology explaining why you need to expose yourself to serious risk and hardship. With an ersatz ideology like: “if only there was no war” and “one must live well”, the USSR became very internally weak and a large-scale war with the exchange of nuclear strikes would undoubtedly collapse for him.
We can talk a lot about this, but I will emphasize one more, the most important moment for today and tomorrow. If an adversary in the person of NATO imposes us, or an ally in the person of China draws us into a large-scale war, then we with such an ersatz ideology, which is still valid today, find ourselves in a very bad position.
- Dmitry Verkhoturov
- https://ru.depositphotos.com
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