21 June 1941 year. Intelligence about the German group against Zapovo

In the previous parts, intelligence materials (Goals Difference) on enemy groupings located against the troops of Pribovo (Part 1, Part 2) and Cova. In accordance with the Republic of Moldova and with the presented maps with the situation on the enemy, as of June 21, near the border of Pribovo it was stationed until 8,5 divisions from 29discovered by intelligence. Near the border there was a small amount tanks as part of one tank regiment (Suwalki) and three battalions near Memel. In the Lublin-Krakow region near the KOVO border, there were slightly more troops: up to 14-15 divisions from 35-36 discovered by intelligence. There were also more tanks here: a tank division and two tank regiments.

Most of the enemy troops were located at a distance from the border, and some of them even over many tens of kilometers. When making decisions in Moscow on the eve of the war, they should be guided by the RM coming from intelligence. In Moscow, they could not but believe the most detailed reports of scouts, which were repeatedly duplicated and double-checked ...

The main problem of our intelligence was that there were no scouts and informants in the headquarters of the ground forces at all levels and around the command staff from these headquarters. There were no sources of information in circles that had at least some weight. There were no informants near the leaders who could know about planned events at the border. Most RMs were based on personal observations and rumors.

Without a detailed analysis of the Republic of Moldova, one cannot understand the events in Moscow in the evening of June 21. Indeed, at that time no one in the world knew that it was possible to prepare a huge enemy army for an attack in just 1,5-2 days!

At that time, Moscow did not know that, for various reasons, reconnaissance groups were not found by the intelligence, which included large associations of tank and motorized formations.

Moscow believed that they were in control, and intelligence was working well ...

For the two military districts examined, the RM data did not contradict the situation on the maps at the district headquarters. The situation on the maps and the pre-war RMs are in good agreement with each other and with the operational reports of the first day of the war, with the actions of the spacecraft command and with the intelligence number 1, released on the evening of 22 on June reconnaissance by the General Staff of the spacecraft.

In two parts, we will consider the RM on the enemy grouping, concentrated against the ZAPOV. We will understand why in this group there are units that are fighting in Libya, and there are many exact numbers of non-existent units and divisions.

Intelligence data on German troops against ZAPOVO

In accordance with the Intelligence on the grouping of German troops at 1.6.41, it was noted:

In the Warsaw direction (against ZAPOVO) 30 divisionsincluding: twenty-four infantry, one motorized, one tank and six tank regiments (total four tank divisions), one cavalry division and eight cavalry regiments ...

During the observation by the reconnaissance of enemy troops until May 31, only one full-fledged tank division was discovered! True, there are six more tank regiments that can be given to army corps. Similar information was also about enemy troops concentrated against PribOVO. Only one full-fledged tank division was also found there.

Based on the information of the General Staff Intelligence Directorate, the figure shows the dependence of the change in the number of German divisions at the border. The words “Near the border” no need to take it verbatim, since most of the enemy’s troops were located tens or even hundreds of kilometers from the state border.

In accordance with the Republic of Moldova, from May 15 to June 20-21 against the Zapovo troops, the enemy group did not increase.

In the report No.1 of the General Staff Intelligence as of 22-00 on 22 on June it was said:

... The total number of groups in front of the Western Front in the Warsaw region 31 Division, of which 21 infantry, 1 motorized, 4 tank and 1 cavalry division ...

At the end of the day on June 22, reconnaissance recorded an increase of the German group against the forces of the Western Front (ZAPOVO) by only one division. Some troops are not identified by affiliation by type of divisions. Therefore, in the summary, the list of the number of divisions does not coincide with the total number. In fact, on June 22 in the zone of responsibility of the ZAPOVO (taking into account the reserves of the armies and the army group) was until 40 divisions enemy, but not all of them were discovered by our intelligence.

The figure shows a diagram with the deployment of enemy troops on the eve of the war, close to the actual. The figure shows the detected advancing enemy groupings in accordance with the information from the report No.1 of the Intelligence Directorate.

The SC still does not know about the presence of a strike force in the Brest area by 22-00 on 22 in June at the Intelligence Directorate and at the General Staff. According to pre-war data and information received on June 22 about the situation in the Brest area, the summary indicates the grouping of three infantry divisions and one tank.

On the Bialystok two strikes are carried out by an enemy grouping with a total number of 11 infantry divisions and one motorized one.

On the Grodno there comes a group of three infantry divisions and one tank.

Grouping from the area Suwalki - Augustow - Sejny strikes in two directions: towards Pribovo and towards ZAPOVO.

According to report No.1, the Germans on June 22 threw only two tank divisions against the ZAPOVO troops! New in the summary is the mention of two SS armored divisions with a total number of 500 tanks. Since before the war, intelligence could not find full-fledged tank divisions, it was necessary to somehow explain the unexpected appearance of new tank formations. In this situation, the rumors quickly turned into two SS armored divisions ...

About SS armored divisions

To understand one of the ways to obtain intelligence information, let us consider the RM on the appearance of two armored divisions in more detail. The first mention of these divisions appears in intelligence Arnold November 30.5.41, XNUMX

Special message to the intelligence department of the headquarters of ZapOVO:

On the basis of information obtained from two sources: 1) an employee of the county government (landrat) in Mlawa, who is constantly in the midst of the German military; 2) former officer The Polish army, having relations with the Germans, the Germans concentrated in the vicinity of Suwalki 2 selected armored divisions of SS units, which should strike at Kovno, Vilnius and Grodno, as well as 2 armored divisions of the same units in the vicinity of Przemysl, and their direction to Lviv, Kiev ...

None of the reconnaissance personnel and equipment of these divisions saw and no other sources confirmed the presence of SS divisions in the specified area before the outbreak of war. In fact, the report only speaks of rumors.

At present, we know that the SS Panzer Divisions in Germany did not exist before the war, much less “Selected armored divisions from SS units”. On the Suvalkinsky ledge there were not even motorized SS divisions. On 22 June, only the only part of the SS connection is noted - “SS Verb.”.

In the area of ​​Przemysl also there were neither SS divisions nor tank divisions. The information in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft could only say: “This is misinformation!” The information from the above special message was included in the Summary of the intelligence department of the ZapOVO headquarters from 4.6.41 (registered and sent out on June 6):

... Based on a number of verified intelligence data, the recent military training of Germany against the USSR, especially since May 25, has been carried out more intensively and is characterized by the following data: During the second half of May, the Germans increased their troop groupings by 2-3, two SS armored divisions, mainly in the area of ​​Ostroleka, Prasnysh, Mlava, Tsekhanov. SS Division - in Suwalki (data needs verification) ...

The report was also sent to the General Staff Reconnaissance and information on SS armored divisions ended up in Reconnaissance No. 5 (released on June 15): “In the Suwalki region, there are allegedly two SS armored divisions (data needs verification) ... " However, in the summary, these divisions were not included in the total number of enemy units concentrated against the ZAPOV. The information was not verified and could be misinformation ...

A report from the ZAPOVO from June 4 and a report from the Intelligence Agency from June 15 were also received at the headquarters of PribOVO. However, in the intelligence report of the headquarters of Pribovo from June 18, there is no mention of these SS armored divisions. The summary refers only to the only tank division that has long been featured against the district troops - the 20-th Armored Division:

On 17.6.41, against Pribovo, in the strip: on the left - Suwalki, Likk, Allenstein and in depth - Koenigsberg, Allenstein: army headquarters - 2, army corps headquarters - 6, infantry divisions - 12, motorized divisions - 5, Armored Divisions - 1, tank regiments - 5, and up to nine separate tank battalions - no less than a tank division ...

They did not find in the intelligence department of the headquarters of PribOVO and in the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff information about the arrival of two SS tank divisions plausible. No new information was received about the arrival of these divisions until the outbreak of war. On June 21, information on armored divisions is no longer included in the prepared summary of the reconnaissance department of the ZapOVO headquarters “On the Grouping of German Forces in 20.6.41,” since this information could not be confirmed or disproved.

On the evening of June 21, in the intelligence department of the ZAPOVO headquarters, a new report was prepared on the grouping of German troops on the 21.6.41. Since the intelligence of the ZNOVO 21 on June detected a massive movement of German troops to the border, and in the evening it found them returning to their original positions near the border, they again noted the presence of SS divisions:

... presumably two SS divisions ...

In Moscow, this information, which did not state anything new, became a lifesaver. In June 22 Intelligence, they tried to somehow explain the unexpected appearance of armored divisions on all fronts. Therefore, the phrase appeared in Intelligence No. 1:

The general increase in the density of direct concentration of German troops in front of the front is emphasized. Specifically, additional data for June 20 and 21 established: a) the strengthening of the Suvalka group into two SS tank divisions...

As shown above, these divisions did not exist on the Suvalka ledge ...

Conflicting information in RM

At our headquarters, it was difficult to isolate important and truthful information from the flow of incoming RMs, many of which were clear misinformation.

Special message 9.6.41 of the chief of the Belsky operational point as of 25.5.41:

In Warsaw, the headquarters of the 4 army continues to be deployed in the palace of Bril, the headquarters of the 9 AK, headed by General Donensmark and the headquarters of the 4 tank division bearing the army number, continue to be deployed. The commander of the 4 Panzer Division is General Raucher Oscar, and his chief of staff is Major Fritz. 4 Panzer Division includes up to 6000 various vehicles, of which up to 2000 light and heavy tanks, up to 2000 motorcycles and up to 2000 other vehicles like armored vehicles, trucks and others ...

The ZapOVO headquarters intelligence department “knew for sure” that only one headquarters of the tank division was stationed in Warsaw and its number was not 4. The ZAPOVO intelligence department and the Intelligence Directorate knew that in the Wehrmacht’s tank divisions there couldn’t be such a huge number of tanks - 2000 units. On May 28, in the intelligence report of the chief of the Brest Operational Point as of 24.5.41, it was indicated:

... Recently, the arrival of tank units in the eastern garrisons of the Governor General has been noted. Arrival tank corps commander in Radia, characterizes that in this area there is a grouping of up to one tank corps ... It is required to establish the location of the headquarters of the corps ...

Before the war, it was not possible to establish the presence of the indicated headquarters of the tank corps and formations from its composition using all the intelligence services of the Soviet Union. In general, it was not possible to find a single headquarters of motorized corps and most of the divisions from their composition ...

В Special messages intelligence department of the headquarters ZAPOVO according to 20.6.1941 data slips information:

During 1-8.6.41, through Warsaw in the direction of Terespol, the movement of the 18 tank division was noted, at the forefront was the 11 tank regiment ... 4-10.6. in the Warsaw district, Prague focused 38 tank divisions ...

In fact, the 18th Panzer Division was concentrated near Brest, but the 11th Panzer Regiment was not in its composition. Also, there was no 22.6.41th Panzer Division in the Wehrmacht on 38. It is interesting that the German military drove around in equipment and in the shoulder straps of a non-existent unit and division ... In the following parts, we will take a closer look at how the RM for our intelligence was prepared by the German military command. These facts are practically not considered in all memoirs, books about the war and historical research ...

Map with the deployment of German troops

In the memoirs of the chief of staff of the 4 Army General L.M. Sandalova says:

... At the end of the first week of June, the headquarters of our 4 Army, located in Kobrin, received information from the district headquarters that by 5 of June more than 40 German divisions had concentrated on the border of Belarus and that 15 infantry, 5 tank, 2 motorized and 2 cavalry divisions focused on the Brest direction ...

According to the intelligence report of ZAPOVO headquarters, on 20-00 on 21 in June against the district, up to 49 divisions are concentrated.

On the official website "Electronic Exhibitions of the Ministry of Defense" posted map “Position of the troops of the Western Front on the first day of the war. Script". In accordance with the annotation posted to this document, the map shows the position of the troops of the Western Front and German units on the first day of World War II. The blue color indicates the locations of the German units.

On the map, the author on RM additionally indicates the areas of responsibility of PribOVO and ZAPOVO. Due to the intersection of the zones, the data on enemy troops in the intelligence reports of the ZAPOVO headquarters headquarters are inflated with respect to information in the Republic of Moldova Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft.

On the map there is an inscription with a list of troops on 5.6.41: “29-30 infantry divisions, 2-4 motor divisions, armored division, tank brigade and above the mtp, cavalry division, two cavalry brigades, 4 anti-aircraft artillery regiments, three auto regiments, presumably two SS armored divisions. Total up to 36,5 ... 39,5 divisions, of which no one saw two SS tank divisions from sources, but someone heard about it ...

The inscription refers to all connections on the card. Among the troops listed there are compounds that the Intelligence Directorate attributed to the troops concentrated against PribOVO.

On the map in the area of ​​responsibility of PribOVO (with the exception of the disputed zone) only the headquarters of associations are indicated. AT Tilsit the headquarters of the 7 Army Corps (AK) is indicated, and in Insterburg - headquarters of the 12 AK.

The intelligence report of the headquarters of PribOVO as of 20-00 21.6.41 says:

To Tilsit: headquarters of the 7 AK, headquarters of the 1 infantry division, 216, 43, 45 infantry regiments, ... 202, 204, 227 motorized regiments, 505 motorized heavy artillery regiment ...

The situation is the same with other cities: Koenigsberg, Insterburg and Lublin (in the KOVO area of ​​responsibility): there are troops there, but only headquarters are shown on the map.

В Königsberg marked: headquarters of the 18 Army, headquarters of the 8 Army, headquarters of the 1 Military District (according to the PribOVO report of the 1 Air District). The indicated data are also given in the summary of the headquarters of PribOVO from 18.6.41. The summary of the headquarters of PribOVO from 21.6.41 refers to the headquarters of the 3 AK (the data need verification). Therefore, an empty rectangle on the map is an unknown headquarters. In this case, the AK icon and a question mark behind it were indicated on the KOVO map.

В Lublin marked: headquarters of the 3 Army, headquarters of the 32 Army and headquarters of the 14 Army Infantry Division.

Consider a German group in the area of ​​Allenstein.

В Allenstein (to the Soviet-German border 119 km) marked: headquarters of the 9 Army, the headquarters of the AK, the headquarters of the 7 and 251 infantry divisions, 301 and 413 infantry regiments, 206 artillery regiment, anti-tank regiment. On the map there is a mark near the city of Allenstein: "over the infantry division, anti-tank regiment". AT Ortelsburg marked the headquarters of AK.

Grouping in the Warsaw area.

Warsaw (145 km): headquarters of the 8 Army, headquarters of the 9 Army, headquarters of the 509 and 525 Infantry Divisions, headquarters of the 1 Army, headquarters of the 8 Army Division, 1 and 14 Army Regiments, 1th and 8th tank regiments, 28th and 531th infantry regiments, 8th, 105th and 106th artillery regiments, heavy artillery regiment, 1th and 3th anti-aircraft artillery regiments, 25th chemical regiment , 28-th communication regiment, railway regiment.

Otwock (133 km): large headquarters, artillery regiment.

Rembertov (138 km): parachute regiment.

Minsk-Mozovetsky (115 km): artillery regiment, 28-th railway regiment, infantry regiment, armored train.

Maslenitsa (123 km): Headquarters of the 215th Infantry Division.

Grouping in the area of ​​Suwalki, Sejny, Lucc, Aris.

A tank battalion was marked at the border.

Seyns (to the border about 9 km): 70 infantry and 480 motorized regiments, artillery battery.

Suwalki (to the north-east to the border - 26 km, to the east - 37 km): supposedly two SS armored divisions, headquarters of the 34 and 37 motorized divisions, headquarters of the motorized division, 94th artillery regiment, 70 motorized regiment and 84 th regiment.

Letzen (58 km): 35-th AK, 2-th tank and 115-th infantry regiments, cavalry regiment, artillery regiment.

Aris (30 km): headquarters of the infantry division, 143 and 151 regiments, 14 artillery regiment.

Lykk (19 km): headquarters of the 39-th Infantry Division, 215-th Infantry Regiment, 37-th Artillery Regiment, tank regiment, anti-aircraft regiment, armored train.

In the area of ​​the grouping there is a note: “Over 4's infantry divisions, three tank companies, two motorized divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, two SS armored divisions”.

Grouping in the area of ​​Myshynets, Ostroy-Mazowiecki, Mlawa.

Muscle (21 km): headquarters of the infantry division, 345 and 365 infantry regiments.

Ostroleka (10 km): headquarters of the infantry division, 108, 119, 276 infantry regiments, infantry regiment, 91 and 903 motorized regiments, artillery regiment, artillery battery, armored train. Mark that in the Ostrozhenka area there are up to two infantry divisions.

In accordance with the RM Headquarters ZapOVO from 30.5.41 g. “In the Ostroleka area there are about three infantry divisions, a battalion of tanks”. It turns out that by the beginning of the war an infantry division and a tank battalion disappeared from the Ostroleka area, located near the border.

Ostrow Mazowiecki (12 km): two headquarters of infantry divisions, artillery regiment, 315 and 478 infantry regiments, 615 motorized regiment, 60 tanks and artillery battery.

Rojan (35 km): Headquarters of the 302th Infantry Division, 7th and 10th Artillery Regiments, 203th, 474th and 479th Infantry Regiments.

Mlawa (88 km): 103th artillery regiment, 4th, 6th, 11th and 13th infantry regiments, cavalry regiment, 19th SS regiment, armored train, two artillery batteries, two tank companies.

Ciechanow (95 km): headquarters of the 6th AK, 239th infantry regiment, 104th artillery regiment, 300 armored vehicles, tank company. There is a note: "to the infantry division."

Prasnysh (56 km): 108 and 109th artillery regiments, tank company.

Grouping Sedlec, Malkinia.

Sedlec (63 km): headquarters of the 22 and 292 infantry divisions, 3 and 537 cavalry regiments.

Falcons (to 70 km): headquarters of the 208-th Infantry Division.

Kossov (to 80 km): headquarters of the motorized division.

Lochow (106 km): headquarters of the infantry division, artillery regiment, armored train.

Grouping Wlodawa, Terespol, Miedzyrzec, Lukow.

Terespol (1,5 km): headquarters of the cavalry brigade.

Biala Podlaska (35 km): AK headquarters, headquarters of the 17-th Infantry Division.

Lomazy (30 km): 12 th regiment.

Miedzyrzec (59 km): AK headquarters, cavalry brigade headquarters, 27th artillery regiment.

Bows (88 km): motorized regiment, cavalry regiment, artillery regiment, armored train, 300 vehicles.

Dombrowo (97 km): headquarters of the tank brigade.

Radzyn (68 km): Headquarters of the 40th Infantry Division, 28th Regiment, 355th Infantry Regiment.

Headquarters of the infantry division (probably 161 from Radzyn).

Wlodawa (less than 1 km): infantry regiment, artillery regiment, cavalry regiment, artillery battery.

Mark in the area of ​​the grouping: “Up to the 3-x infantry divisions, a tank brigade, two (probably cavalry border brigades), two tank regiments”.

In the RM of the headquarters of ZAPOVO 20.6.41, it was noted that in the Kodeni area there are up to 100 tanks, but these tanks are not on the map. Tanks are probably included in the total number of tank units concentrated in the area.

Total on the map: two army headquarters, one large headquarters, seven AK headquarters (not a single motorized one!), 18 headquarters of infantry divisions, one headquarters of a motorized, tank and cavalry division. The headquarters of the tank brigade (which did not exist), two headquarters of the cavalry brigades. There are also three motorized divisions, two tank divisions (presumably), 28 infantry regiments, 7 motorized, 4 tank, 11 cavalry regiments. To 30 artillery regiments, anti-aircraft regiments and anti-aircraft regiments. One tank brigade, more than a tank regiment in bulk and one parachute regiment.

If there are division headquarters, then somewhere the regiments of these divisions should be located. Counting the headquarters of the divisions, brigades, divisions and brigades discovered, we get the number of about 30 divisions. The author failed to reach the number of divisions indicated in the inscription on the map ... Perhaps some of the divisions were located to the west. On June 7, the Intelligence Agency said: "The Poznan district is literally a military camp ..." The distance from Poznan to the border is about 430 km.

According to the map, on June 21, at a distance of 10-12 km from the Soviet-German border, the ZapOVO is located before 6 divisions excluding troops stationed near the city of Sejny, which the SC General Staff Reconnaissance assigned to the area of ​​responsibility of PribOVO. The situation is very similar to the situations in PribOVO and KOVO.

It should be noted that ZAPOVO intelligence is the only intelligence service of the four western border districts that has detected and recorded in the intelligence report the German troops exit to the border to their original positions before the attack:

Conclusion: According to reports, which are being verified, the main part of the German army in the strip against the Western Special Military District took its original position.
In all directions, there is a pull-up of parts and means of strengthening the border ...

To be continued ...

Comments

[Alex013]

What to say, the Fritz were masters of misinformation ...

[To be or not to be]

Special communication of the Intelligence Division of the ZAPOV headquarters to the commander of the ZapOV troops "On the preparation by Germany of the war against the USSR"


June 4, 1941

No. 5995 Sov. secretly

Ex. No. 1
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues-doc/1002054
document in a very reliable source
Section 7. PREPARATION OF A NAZI GERMANY TO ATTACK THE USSR (January - June 1941)
https://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issues/parts/73220/1001635

[andr327]

For several years in a row on August 21, on the eve of State Flag Day, a significant number of people in our country have been celebrating Russian Officer’s Day.
Happy holiday comrades officers! I have the honor!

[Doliva63]

Quote: andr327

For several years in a row on August 21, on the eve of State Flag Day, a significant number of people in our country have been celebrating Russian Officer’s Day.
Happy holiday comrades officers! I have the honor!

Comrade officers, by tradition, annually celebrate their graduation - the day we became officers. In different schools - at different times. And a single day for everyone, it's like ... I can’t even find a decent word. Ugh, damn it. In general, I will drink for the company, but I do not approve. Like tractor day or land reclamator.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

The main problem of our intelligence was that there were no scouts and informants in the headquarters of the ground forces at all levels and around the command staff from these headquarters.

It’s even ridiculous to comment on this enchanting nonsense - no one could have done this in that situation. Even if you have ONE of our scouts in the large headquarters of the Wehrmacht, then under it you need to create a residency with a radio operator and radio station, and this in the conditions of a strict counterintelligence regime in the border strip cannot be carried out. It seems that the author has too low-key ideas about conducting intelligence of that period, which is why such pearls no longer surprise me.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

no one could have done that in that situation.

At the same time, German officers, starting with platoon commanders, had excellent topographic maps of Soviet territory with the location of all units, airfields, headquarters, and Red Army depots. In the German headquarters they knew the ranks, surnames, family composition of Soviet commanders starting from the regiment!
Our intelligence almost throughout the war was the Achilles heel of the Soviet headquarters at all levels! Here you have the enchanting nonsense!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

At the same time, German officers, starting with platoon commanders, had excellent topographic maps of Soviet territory with the location of all units, airfields, headquarters, and Red Army depots.

First, German intelligence was much better equipped with radio intelligence because of Germany’s technical superiority in the development of the radio industry. Not only that, they already had radio intelligence regiments, and we only had divisions - this tells the experts a lot.
Secondly, they took the opportunity to constantly violate the air border for reconnaissance, and we were limited in this, because did not want to provoke Hitler at the beginning of the war. Even German civilian planes flying to Moscow were piloted by intelligence pilots - this is a fact.
Thirdly, German agents were technically better equipped with radio communications, which allowed them to quickly report intelligence.
But all this does not mean that with the beginning of the war, our intelligence was inferior to the Germans in all respects. On the contrary, the release of the "Sever" agent stations was urgently set up, reconnaissance and sabotage units were created and the headquarters of the partisan movement was created. So there is no need to talk about the whole war - during the war, for example, main forces brigades were already created.

Quote: Serg65

In the German headquarters they knew the ranks, surnames, family composition of Soviet commanders starting from the regiment!

Yes, and in our headquarters they knew the names of German commanders - study:

And such a huge amount of data came from our intelligence.

Quote: Serg65

Here you have the enchanting nonsense!

Of course nonsense - you are simply clearly not in the subject.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

Of course nonsense - you are simply clearly not in the subject.

Of course not in the subject
From the first days of the war, the headquarters had a complete lack of information on the forces and directions of movement of the German troops! Okay, 41, take the 42, the two most tragic episodes of Crimean + Sevastopol tragedy and Kharkov tragedy and the participation of intelligence in this !!!!!
However, I do not blame the scouts themselves, I blame the command of the Red Army! Reconnaissance is not as beautiful as tank and air armada ... HOW ANYWAY interrupt!
By the way, Ustinov suffered the same!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

From the first days of the war, the headquarters had a complete lack of information on the forces and directions of movement of the German troops!

This was a consequence of the loss of communication, and not the fact that intelligence did not have information.

Quote: Serg65

However, I do not blame the scouts themselves, I blame the command of the Red Army!

The command of the Red Army could not jump out of the pants - the general development of the country did not allow us to have the most advanced intelligence systems at that time.

Quote: Serg65

By the way, Ustinov suffered the same!

Do not tell. Ustinov, of course, is not the figure who was supposed to take the post of Defense Ministry, but surprisingly, he lobbied for the interests of our military-industrial complex, and this led to the fact that technically our intelligence became the best in the world. And not only in terms of technology, but also in terms of conducting it from different positions on the globe. A simple example - in some army regiments of the Special Forces in the GSVG there appeared stationary RER centers - this is generally unique to our armed forces. So Ustinov was not so bad in this regard.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

This was a consequence of the loss of communication, and not the fact that intelligence did not have information.

The chief of reconnaissance of the regiment sends a reconnaissance group in search, the reconnaissance group, having taken the "tongue", deploys the radio and ... the commander, they took the language ... what does he say ... but the devil knows him, we will not understand cheto petting ... in an hour on the air go out, I'll tell you where to lead the language!
Cool, isn't it?
The regiment headquarters in the regiment also had no connection?

Quote: ccsr

stationary centers of RER appeared in the GSVG - this is generally unique to our armed forces.

Oh yeah! Ustinov, the whole Union would be let under the knife for the defense industry!
Speak unique ... at the same time, the military-industrial marshal destroys the unique 105 Vienna Red Banner Airborne Forces, the uniqueness of this division is that it was imprisoned in China and Afghanistan, the officers were fluent in Chinese and Farsi, and repeatedly carried out special missions to Afghanistan. long before the introduction of troops. Three months before the trip across the river, Ustinov disbanded the division!

Quote: ccsr

So Ustinov was not so bad in this regard.

Well, I have seen enough of this "good" stuff!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

The chief of reconnaissance of the regiment sends a reconnaissance group in search, the reconnaissance group, having taken the "tongue", deploys the radio and ... the commander, they took the language ... what does he say ... but the devil knows him, we will not understand cheto petting ...

Actually, there were full-time translators at intelligence agencies, although sometimes these positions were vacant. But in extreme cases there was a phrase book.
.

Quote: Serg65

. After an hour go on the air, I will tell you where to lead the language!

Why fence a garden - there were couriers in the reconnaissance battalion who could deliver the interrogation data to the division’s intelligence chief.

Quote: Serg65

The regiment headquarters in the regiment also had no connection?

But this was all the time - had to use the delegates of communications or messengers.

Quote: Serg65

Three months before the trip across the river, Ustinov disbanded the division!

This is not a tragedy - the tragedy was that he did not insist that troops should not be brought into Afghanistan at all, because that region was too complicated for the use of line troops.
By the way, I am not a fan of Ustinov’s personality as Minister of Defense - I think his appointment was erroneous.

Quote: Serg65

Well, I have seen enough of this "good" stuff!

I started at Grechko, and ended the service at Grachev, so I’ve seen enough of no less than yours. But I do not think that you need to bring everything together.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

Why fence a garden - there were couriers in the reconnaissance battalion who could deliver the interrogation data to the division’s intelligence chief.

Those. should the courier walk around the front line back and forth?
I suspect that you did not understand the meaning of my improvisation ... the search group took the language and comes back without any walkie-talkie !!!!!!!

Quote: ccsr

But this was all the time - had to use the delegates of communications or messengers.

And this was a normal, familiar and proven method in those days ... how did it prevent the delivery of information from a platoon-company-battalion-regiment?

Quote: ccsr

This is not a tragedy

This is still a tragedy, my friend !!! The division was mountainous and adapted to combat and reconnaissance and sabotage operations in China and Afghanistan!

Quote: ccsr

the tragedy was that he did not insist that troops not enter Afghanistan at all

But how could he not insist, if he, along with Andropov, were the most active organizers of the troop deployment !!!

Quote: ccsr

I do not think that you need to bring everything together.

I am not a currency ... I bring you facts

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Those. should the courier walk around the front line back and forth?

Actually, the courier is needed to deliver documents from the reconnaissance commander to the division’s intelligence chief — for example, the protocol for interrogating an enemy soldier captured by the reconnaissance group.

Quote: Serg65

the search group took the language and comes back without any walkie-talkie !!!!!!!

At the beginning of the war, we didn’t have any radio intelligence groups in the intelligence agencies.

Quote: Serg65

And this was a normal, familiar and proven method in those days ... how did it prevent the delivery of information from a platoon-company-battalion-regiment?

Distances interfered. And the unknown location of the headquarters in connection with the dramatically changing situation of the first days of the war, as well as the actions of enemy sabotage groups, destroying single military personnel.

Quote: Serg65

This is still a tragedy, my friend !!!

I participated in the withdrawal of the Group of Forces - there were tragedies when no less famous divisions went under the knife.

Quote: Serg65

But how could he not insist, if he, along with Andropov, were the most active organizers of the troop deployment !!!

No, this is not entirely true - Varennikov directly pointed out that Ustinov supported the opinion of the highest military, that we would get bogged down there, and tried to convince Brezhnev not to send troops. The main culprits were Suslov and Andropov, who promised Brezhnev that this would be no more than a few months or six months.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

Varennikov directly pointed

Varennikov ......

On 12 of December 1979 of the year, a narrow circle of members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU — Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov — invited Brezhnev to send troops to Afghanistan in a written report at the request of the leadership of this country and taking into account the aggravation of the situation in the region. Brezhnev agreed. As expected, all other members of the Politburo, having examined this document in working order, also agreed with it and endorsed it, with the exception of Kosygin.

IN AND. Varennikov, "The Unique" Chapter 4, p. 832
My friend, you constantly lie and dodge, I'm tired of you ..
Happily stay!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

IN AND. Varennikov, "The Unique" Chapter 4, p. 832

In addition to these memoirs, there are other materials where Varenikov sets out in a different way the version of the Politburo's decision-making, which he did not personally attend. I recommend reading Kikshenov's book Get Up and Go, where Varennikov outlines in more detail the essence of the disagreements in the Politburo.

Quote: Serg65

My friend, you constantly lie and dodge, I'm tired of you ..

What is the point of me doing this for your sake, if you have no idea why there were couriers in reconnaissance battalions, that’s why they go behind the front line.

Quote: Serg65

Happily stay!

And you do not get sick, you are our tired!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Varennikov ......

Varennikov himself was against the entry of troops into Afghanistan, along with all the military leaders of the Moscow Region:

In early December 1979, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal D.F. Ustinov informed a narrow circle of proxies that a decision could be made on the use of the army in Afghanistan in the near future. The objections of the Chief of the General Staff N.V. Ogarkov were not taken into account. On December 12, 1979, at the proposal of the Politburo Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which included Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko and Ponomarev, L. I. Brezhnev decided to render military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan "by introducing the contingent of Soviet troops on its territory." The leadership of the General Staff, headed by its chief N.V. Ogarkov, his first deputy army general S.F. Akhromeev and the head of the Main Operations Directorate, Army General V.I. Varennikov, as well as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Army General I. G. Pavlovsky opposed this decision.

https://topwar.ru/21969-12-dekabrya-1979-g-politbyuro-ck-kpss-oficialno-prinyalo-reshenie-o-vvode-sovetskih-voysk-v-afganistan.html
So one should not assume that Ustinov did not express the opinion of the entire top military leadership of the Defense Ministry on the commission. He simply signed the decision - he had nothing left to do, these were the orders.

[AsmyppoL]

Hello! I posted a comment below that you were absolutely right.
Unfortunately, since intelligence errors have led to huge human losses ....

[strannik1985]

Tasks of a different order, "fog" during the war and preparation of an attack. For the Reich in the spring and summer of 1941, peacetime would have been much easier.

[AsmyppoL]

why the name of the commander of the German 257 division with an error? You would not be dishonored like that! If the source gives the last name with an error, and the commentator presents it as the height of awareness, then this is definitely an expert with a sofa

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

why the name of the commander of the German 257th division with an error?

Yes, if only because the typist could make a mistake when typing the summary. It happens, "enlightened" you are our ...

Quote: AsmyppoL

If the source gives the last name with an error,

Do not smack nonsense - an error of a surname could be given not only by a source of information, but also during information processing they could reproduce it incorrectly.

[kloss]

I understand that giving an answer you can’t even imagine how to print the reports in the intelligence department?
What kind of specialist are you after that?
After the intelligence report is printed, it is verified by the draft contractor with a draft. Further, his boss carefully examines for inaccuracies. The boss has, like other employees, a cancellation memory.
Further down the chain and the last is the head of the intelligence agency.
The document arrived at another authority, where it is verified by the contractor or referral from another authority. Since the above scan does not contain a word about possible inaccuracies, the information has been double-checked.
The reference to the typist is an indicator of the amateurism of the respondent!
Eugene, what was the real last name?

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

I understand that giving an answer you can’t even imagine how to print the reports in the intelligence department?

You don’t understand a damn thing, because I know how typists print documents.

Quote: kloss

The reference to the typist is an indicator of the amateurism of the respondent!

You are definitely illiterate, because you do not know in what situation sometimes already printed documents rule.

Quote: kloss

Eugene, what was the real last name?

And you, wise guy, didn’t get the idea that these are two different commanders with similar pronunciation and spelling surnames - for example, in Russian the surname Yeltsin and Yeltsin sounds almost the same.

[kloss]

As usual, a lot of text, many versions and all are not true ...

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

As usual, a lot of text, many versions and all are not true ...

Give a faithful "expert", especially considering your "military knowledge".

[AsmyppoL]

Kostya I answer your question.
During the period indicated in the Summary, General von Webcker was not the commander of the 257 Infantry Division. This is probably German misinformation)))

Since 1.9.39, the commander was Infantry General Max Viban.
In March 1941, he was succeeded as commander of the 257 1st General (sapper) Karl Sachs.
The next division commander in May 1942 will be appointed Lieutenant General Karl Gumbel.

Therefore, only a complete ignoramus can talk about a typist’s mistake!)) This should be how the typist should get drunk to completely distort the name, and the entire command staff of the intelligence agency should be drunk in the insole to make a mistake in the draft summary intended for typographical reproduction. This is possible in the only case when our scouts did not know the surname of the commander of the 257 pd !!

The following error in the same place: did not have as part of 257 257th Infantry Regiment! From the word - at all! Was the 257th artillery regiment and his commander in 1941-1942. was not Colonel Futsich, but Lieutenant Colonel Wilhelm Wiebig!

457-th paragraph, noted in the summary, was part of the division.
In the summary, two existing regiments of this division are not marked: 466-th pp and 477-th pp.
The division did not include the 55-th light artillery regiment and the 15-th heavy artillery regiment. Only the 257th artillery regiment, consisting of three divisions, was included.

Therefore, we can state that Ser65 opinion is absolutely true, and Milchakov’s opinion is at the expert level from the couch

[kloss]

Very interesting. Do not dump the site address in PM?

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

Very interesting. Do not dump the site address in PM?

And why is the author afraid to give a link to his texts right here?
I place scans from books, and nobody can check the refutation of the homegrown historian - is it not strange?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

During the period indicated in the Summary, General von Webcker was not the commander of the 257 Infantry Division. This is probably German misinformation)))

Most likely, you cannot confirm your conjectures with anything, and therefore you have provided information about the division commander who commanded her in France.

Quote: AsmyppoL

This is possible in the only case when our scouts did not know the surname of the commander of the 257th front !!

They may even know the exact name of the division commander, but you are simply lying unprovenly. I have not yet seen a single fact from you that the commander on May 20 was another person.

Quote: AsmyppoL

It was as if the typist should get drunk to completely distort the surname, and the entire command staff of the intelligence agency should lie drunk in the insole to make a mistake in the draft summary, intended for typographical reproduction.

Only an illiterate does not know that a typist sometimes prints text from several different pages with edits at once, and there are errors.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The next mistake was in the same place: there was no part of the 257th infantry regiment of the 257th infantry regiment!

But this is not indicated in the summary either - they do not write about accessories there, you are our amateur, they simply list the parts located in Sanok on May 20, 1941. Why are you lying, even if you can’t read the document correctly?

Quote: AsmyppoL

In the summary, two existing regiments of this division are not marked: 466-th pp and 477-th pp.

477 pp and could not be located in the city of Sanok, which is written in the summary, because on June 1, 1941 he was in the village Krosno. And 466 pp was in the village N. Sonch - this is also reflected in the summary No. 5 of June 15.
Why are you lying all the time, even if you cannot figure out two reports, but present your illiterate accusations without even bothering to check the facts contained in them?
You are just a small thimble trying to trick the readers of the forum, and don't be ashamed of it. It is strange that local rotozeys still believe you, and even give you advantages for your lies. For example, you claim that:

Quote: AsmyppoL

The division did not include the 55th light artillery regiment and the 15th heavy artillery regiment.

Where did you find in the summary that these regiments are part of 257 pd? In general, they could have been not of divisional subordination, so there is no need to lie that they were part of the division.

[AsmyppoL]

Considered that they are from the same group. Was wrong...

I will not give links - look for yourself - I found it)))
Here is a link to the commander of the 257 pd (type in the search engine and it will open)))

General karl sachs

The 257-th submission presented in the report was never included not only in the 257-th pd, but was also not on the Eastern Front in the 1941-year ... It is from the 83-pd. Information on this pp - disa.

There was no working regiment of the 442-th subordinate to the 257-th division.
There was only the 442-th PP from the 168-th PD.

In the summary of the West No. 5 in the same locality, the 305 and 402 points are mentioned.

402-th pp never existed in parts of the Wehrmacht.
305-th PP was part of the 198-th PD. 198 I was in southern France and in April arrived in Romania where it was before the outbreak of war. Therefore, 305-th pp could not be in Sanka.
38-th artillery regiment with 15.5.41 is part of the 20-th army corps and also can not be in Sanka as of June 1.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I will not give links - look for yourself - I found it)))

So they lied, as usual.

Quote: AsmyppoL

The 257th paragraph presented in the summary has never been included not only in the 257th paragraph,

The summary does not indicate that he was part of 257 pd.

Quote: AsmyppoL

but he was not on the Eastern Front in 1941 ... He is from the 83rd front. Information on this pp - desa.

Complete bullshit - quartermasters or the operational group of this regiment could arrive at the place indicated in the intelligence report, which served as the basis for including this information in the intelligence report.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Therefore, the 305th pp could not be in Sanka.

This is a lie - the regiment could calmly arrive at a new place of deployment, so that in case of emergency it should be used to strengthen the group.

Quote: AsmyppoL

38-th artillery regiment with 15.5.41 is part of the 20-th army corps and also can not be in Sanka as of June 1.

You are a complete ignoramus in military affairs, because the artillery regiment, as an independent unit, can be located in the reserve of the corps, and, according to the plan of the command, be used in certain situations. Similar regiments of RGC reserve existed in the Red Army, being in the districts, and the use of which was allowed only by decision of the rate.

Quote: AsmyppoL

402-th pp never existed in parts of the Wehrmacht.

This is an unproven lie, which is not supported by anything, as usual.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Considered that they are from the same group. Was wrong...

It would be better if they didn’t take it to talk about what you have no idea about - then you wouldn’t have to apologize for the lie ...

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

At that time, Moscow did not know that, for various reasons, reconnaissance groups were not found by intelligence. including large tank associations and motorized connections.

The author is confused about three pines - there were no "large associations of tank and motorized formations" in the tank groups because the UNION, according to military science, is a corps and an army, and German tank groups consisted of formations. It was these groups that later became the German tank armies.
http://armedman.ru/stati/sostav-nemetskih-tankovyih-grupp-v-1941-godu-pri-napadenii-na-sssr.html#1-__Panzergruppe1

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Author:
Eugene

At that time, Moscow did not know that, for various reasons, reconnaissance groups were not found by intelligence. including large tank associations and motorized connections.

The author is confused about three pines - there were no "large associations of tank and motorized formations" in the tank groups because the UNION, according to military science, is a corps and an army, and German tank groups consisted of formations. It was these groups that later became the German tank armies.
http://armedman.ru/stati/sostav-nemetskih-tankovyih-grupp-v-1941-godu-pri-napadenii-na-sssr.html#1-__Panzergruppe1

I am purely "getting to the bottom". The body is not a union, but a connection, though. Our corps corps commander of the 55th AK was the corps commander, and, for example, in the 20GVOA was the commander. Well that's it, after an excess of beer

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

The case is not a union, but a connection nevertheless.

The compound is a brigade and division. And unification is a corps and an army, as Soviet military science taught.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

The case is not a union, but a connection nevertheless.

The compound is a brigade and division. And unification is a corps and an army, as Soviet military science taught.

I, like, served in the army, studied Soviet military science. Indicate the source where the enclosure is a union.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

I, like, served in the army, studied Soviet military science. Indicate the source where the enclosure is a union.

Here is what modern sources from the Russian Defense Ministry write:

AN ASSOCIATION
military formation opera. (strateg.) scale and purpose, unifying under the general direction of several. conn. or smaller associations.

http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=7377%40morfDictionary
The corps just includes several compounds - this was the case on the eve of the war.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

I, like, served in the army, studied Soviet military science. Indicate the source where the enclosure is a union.

Here is what modern sources from the Russian Defense Ministry write:

AN ASSOCIATION
military formation opera. (strateg.) scale and purpose, unifying under the general direction of several. conn. or smaller associations.

http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=7377%40morfDictionary
The corps just includes several compounds - this was the case on the eve of the war.

Understood thanks This is how technical schools called colleges, institutes, academies, and corps associations.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

This is how technical schools called colleges, institutes, academies, and corps associations.

Come on, you have always thought so in the Soviet Army, it is strange that you forgot it.
TSB

OPERATIONAL ASSOCIATION
association, a large organizational unit in the types of armed forces, consisting of formations and units of various branches of the armed forces (forces), special forces, command and control agencies, rear services and various services.

[kloss]

Connection is the connection of individual parts. For example, the airborne assault brigade of the Red Army of 1940 or April 1941 is a unit, like a regiment or a separate battalion (division). Therefore, the airborne corps of the same time - this is a connection

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

Connection is the connection of individual parts. For example, the airborne assault brigade of the Red Army of 1940 or April 1941 is a unit, like a regiment or a separate battalion (division). Therefore, the airborne corps of the same time - this is a connection

Be educated dilettante, how the word "connection" is interpreted by military science:

Compound - a military formation consisting of several units or formations of a smaller composition, usually of various types of troops (forces), special troops (services) or separate units (subunits) of support and service. Unlike associations, the composition of compounds is usually constant; connections have a permanent staff and organization. Depending on the type of armed forces, composition and tasks to be accomplished, formations are divided into operational, operational-tactical (higher tactical) and tactical [1].
The control units (headquarters) from the brigade level and above (division, corps) and the corresponding ones in the branches of the armed forces (forces) and types of armed forces are military units. Example - military unit 51852 - command (headquarters) of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Division [1] or military unit 55523 - command (headquarters) of the 105th Guards Airborne Division [2]

Moreover, you are brazenly lying about the Airborne Forces corps in 1941:

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, by their decree No. 1112-459ss of April 23, 1941 "On new formations as part of the red army" [1], approved the creation of 5 airborne corps, each consisting of:
Housing control
3 airborne brigades
Tank battalion
Air Link
Platoon connection

So the corps consisted of three compounds and separate parts - learn the materiel, verbiage.

[Doliva63]

"Commands of formations (headquarters) from the brigade level and above (division, corps) ..."
Well, what did I say? Case - connection. The first association is the army. Here, I compare my native 20 GvOA and my native 55 AK - there is 3 times the difference in capabilities! And the iron argument is that the commander commands the association, and the commander commands the connection.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Well, what did I say? Case - connection.

A case is a combination of connections and parts. You are not saying that — at least study the structure of the rifle or mechanized corps of the Red Army on the eve of the war.

Quote: Doliva63

"Commands of formations (headquarters) from the brigade level and above (division, corps) ..."

Do you at least understand that we are talking about the "management" structure from BRIGADE LEVEL and above? Above the brigade are the division, corps, army, front, district, types and branches of the armed forces and the Central Office of the Ministry of Defense. They are all above the level of the brigade, and they all have a body called "management". The text you quoted does not talk about what relates to connections, and what to unions - do you even understand that?

[Doliva63]

No. The specified list specifically states - brigade, division, corps. True, again, this is about the Second World War. Wikipedia insists that the housing is a mix. And for a long time I have not had access to BUSV, except for part 3.

[Doliva63]

By the way, the structure of the headquarters of the corps is a copy of the headquarters of the division. For example, no, as in the army, intelligence department - there is only the beginning, his deputy and assistant. The same applies to the opera department. In short, when I served in the corps, it was called a compound. This is the beginning of the 90s. What is the argument about?

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

By the way, the structure of the headquarters of the corps is a copy of the headquarters of the division.

This does not mean anything, if only because the rifle division has a full-time structure in 1941 consisting of five regiments, three of which are rifle, and a headquarters of 70 troops.
http://www.rkka.ru/org/str/rd.html
But the corps could have in its composition from 2 to 4 divisions according to military science. And then the headquarters would change.

Quote: Doliva63

In short, when I served in the corps, it was called a compound. This is the beginning of the 90s. What is the argument about?

What kind of armed forces? If the air defense, then do not equate them to the army corps, because the air defense corps consisted of regiments and not divisions - this was the case in the Moscow Air Defense District, if my memory serves me right, in the 60-80s.
They simply raised the bar, given that there was growth for senior officers, and no more. And the country's air defense was located on stationary objects - how can they be compared with field forces, the same air defense of the ground forces?

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

By the way, the structure of the headquarters of the corps is a copy of the headquarters of the division.

This does not mean anything, if only because the rifle division has a full-time structure in 1941 consisting of five regiments, three of which are rifle, and a headquarters of 70 troops.
http://www.rkka.ru/org/str/rd.html
But the corps could have in its composition from 2 to 4 divisions according to military science. And then the headquarters would change.

Quote: Doliva63

In short, when I served in the corps, it was called a compound. This is the beginning of the 90s. What is the argument about?

What kind of armed forces? If the air defense, then do not equate them to the army corps, because the air defense corps consisted of regiments and not divisions - this was the case in the Moscow Air Defense District, if my memory serves me right, in the 60-80s.
They simply raised the bar, given that there was growth for senior officers, and no more. And the country's air defense was located on stationary objects - how can they be compared with field forces, the same air defense of the ground forces?

Specifically, 55 AK, Borzya. 2 divisions and parts of corps subordination. About one and a half divisions of the same GSVG.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Specifically, 55 AK, Borzya. 2 divisions and parts of corps subordination. About one and a half divisions of the same GSVG.

I looked at the history of this 55 AK, and it turns out that he appeared after the reduction of the army. But it was still a union, because AK included two connections - this is how they write on the wiki:

Of the existing formations and military units two formations: the 37th separate motorized rifle and the 5th separate tank brigade are the successors of tradition and bear the honorary names of the 5th and 2nd tank divisions, respectively.

So 55 AK is a full-fledged association, not a combination, because even in military language "the connection consists of connections ..." looks clumsy and brings confusion.
By the way, in the GSVG, the army had five divisions before the withdrawal, then they became four divisions. I don’t know about you, but with us all the divisions were staffed in peacetime and the entire army infrastructure was also fully equipped.

[Doliva63]

“I don’t know about you, but all our divisions were staffed in peacetime and the entire infrastructure of the army was also fully staffed.”
"According to the state of peacetime" and "also fully staffed" - sounds strange somehow. Completely - this is in wartime, the rest is a "state" of one degree or another. In my time in the GSVG, it seems, everything was according to wartime. For example, in our reconnaissance company there was one "zashtatnik" - a member of the SKA GSVG team, whom we had to pick up from there in 24 hours. But even without him, 87 people would have done it. And no part of the GSVG required any additional deployment.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

"According to the state of peacetime" and "also fully staffed" - sounds strange somehow.

There is nothing strange - the division is on a state of peacetime and has, for example, staffing on 90% equipment, on l / s - 85 and it is considered combat ready according to the requirements of the MO orders.

Quote: Doliva63

Completely - this is in wartime, the rest is a "state" of one degree or another.

Nothing of the kind - when a report on staffing is being carried out, according to the time-table of urgent reports, the combat readiness for both states is separately indicated - both peacetime and wartime.

Quote: Doliva63

In my time in the GSVG, everything seemed to be in wartime.

You just forgot a little - they put a large number of freelings "under the gun" for 2 hours and they had a supply of NZ for all types of allowance.

Quote: Doliva63

For example, in our reconnaissance company there was one "zashtatnik" - a member of the SKA GSVG team, whom we had to pick up from there in 24 hours. But even without him, 87 people would have done it.

The orders of the Ministry of Defense in the definition of "combat readiness" part or not determine the percentage tolerance of the shortage of equipment and weapons. Your "zashtatnik" was just in your full-time position to receive money in the company, but in the club itself he was out of staff and was listed as a secondment.

Quote: Doliva63

And not a single part of the GSVG required any additional deployment.

This is not so - freeloaders were the mobile reserve for the GSVG units, and they were urgently put into operation when the unit was raised. Not all of them, of course, but a lot - this was the case in all parts where they worked under the contract.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

"According to the state of peacetime" and "also fully staffed" - sounds strange somehow.

There is nothing strange - the division is on a state of peacetime and has, for example, staffing on 90% equipment, on l / s - 85 and it is considered combat ready according to the requirements of the MO orders.

Quote: Doliva63

Completely - this is in wartime, the rest is a "state" of one degree or another.

Nothing of the kind - when a report on staffing is being carried out, according to the time-table of urgent reports, the combat readiness for both states is separately indicated - both peacetime and wartime.

Quote: Doliva63

In my time in the GSVG, everything seemed to be in wartime.

You just forgot a little - they put a large number of freelings "under the gun" for 2 hours and they had a supply of NZ for all types of allowance.

Quote: Doliva63

For example, in our reconnaissance company there was one "zashtatnik" - a member of the SKA GSVG team, whom we had to pick up from there in 24 hours. But even without him, 87 people would have done it.

The orders of the Ministry of Defense in the definition of "combat readiness" part or not determine the percentage tolerance of the shortage of equipment and weapons. Your "zashtatnik" was just in your full-time position to receive money in the company, but in the club itself he was out of staff and was listed as a secondment.

Quote: Doliva63

And not a single part of the GSVG required any additional deployment.

This is not so - freeloaders were the mobile reserve for the GSVG units, and they were urgently put into operation when the unit was raised. Not all of them, of course, but a lot - this was the case in all parts where they worked under the contract.

I'm talking about those parts of the GSVG in which I served. We did not have "vacancies", that is, empty cells in the SDK. That is, "if what," then no "freebies" or anyone else we were expecting. Both the equipment and weapons were exactly for the regular personnel. And all the tasks "for the war" were spelled out based on the number of units and l / s in them. However, there was one nuance. We have a lot of soldiers who wanted to stay after an urgent unit - some as a "cricket", some as an ensign. But, of course, there weren't many places and they were pushed into any parts nearby. We counted on them. And when we had serious classes, exercises or some kind of military organizational special events, by agreement with their command, they "pulled out" to ourselves, that is, we tried to keep them in shape - nevertheless, "if what," a trained warrant officer , to put it mildly, not worse than a full-time conscript sergeant. It was all semi-legal, of course, but no one objected, which we used.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

I'm talking about those parts of the GSVG in which I served. We did not have "vacancies", that is, empty cells in the SDK. That is, "if what," then no "freebies" or anyone else we were expecting.

There is one caveat that you may not know about. There is a difference between the state of wartime and the state of peace, and although it is small, it nevertheless exists in terms of number of military personnel and in armament. That is why in large parts (your unit did not belong to them), the appeal of freebies reached dozens of people - believe me, I am aware of what I’m talking about, because I myself checked how it was done when lifting the units.

Quote: Doliva63

And the equipment and weapons were exactly on the staff.

If you were in the reconnaissance battalion, then your NS could be stored in a divisional warehouse, and your commander and NS knew who would receive it from the invoices prepared in advance.

Quote: Doliva63

But, of course, there were few places and they were shoved to any parts nearby. Here we counted on them.

This is a reserve for the VUS - by the decision of the division commander or NS division they could be transferred to you by order. This was done for complex specialties, where it takes a long time to prepare a soldier. That's why they were on your account, because there were no military commissariats in the GSVG.

Quote: Doliva63

It was all semi-legal, of course, but no one objected, which we used.

This is not entirely true - this was not only with you, it was features of military groups where it is impossible to quickly find a replacement for certain categories of military personnel.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

No. The specified list specifically states - brigade, division, corps.

This is just a listing of the SUPREME structures, not their division.

Quote: Doliva63

Wikipedia insists that the housing is a mix.

Not everything written in it can be perceived as truth.

Quote: Doliva63

And access to BUSV,

Take the military dictionary or the military encyclopedia of the Soviet period - there is given a detailed description of what the connection is and what the association is.

Association - a military formation, including several formations or associations of a smaller composition, and (or) individual units and institutions. Unlike military units and formations, the composition of associations is usually variable and in each individual case it is determined taking into account its own mission, the tasks it performs and the nature of the theater of operations, the theater of war.

If for simple reasons - the brigade and division usually have a full-time structure in all branches of the armed forces, but the corps does not have their own permanent composition. That's why they relate to associations.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

The compound is a brigade and division. And unification is a corps and an army, as Soviet military science taught.

Not a valid explanation! The team is not always a connection - it can be a part!
Let's look on the Internet for an additional explanation, do not be lazy to take the first thing that was found ... Do not jail)))

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Not a valid explanation! The team is not always a connection - it can be a part!

A part is any military structure that is assigned a number. Even the main directorates of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff have unit numbers, and their chiefs in correspondence with civilian organizations are referred to when signing documents as "The commander of a military unit ...". So you are clearly not in the subject, since you are confusing the concept of part and the connection of parts.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Let's look on the Internet for an additional explanation, do not be lazy to take the first thing that was found ... Do not jail)))

In this case, you are a crook because you are trying to compensate for your ignorance by impudent lies.

[Doliva63]

"June 21, 1941. Reconnaissance on the German group against the Western Military District."
The beginning of the war showed the extreme weakness of military and especially military intelligence - neither strength, nor means, nor experience. Hence the result. After the Second World War, for a long time, the border districts relied not only on reconnaissance "from above", but also actively conducted their own, incl. undercover. During the threatened period, they could have sent a brigade / battalion of special forces to adjacent territories from the district, from armies - by a company of special forces, from divisions - by a company of deep reconnaissance. In 41m, there were simply no such reconnaissance forces and means. But the war taught. Now I do not know how things are there, but whatever it was, it still needs better.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

The outbreak of war showed the extreme weakness of military and especially military intelligence - neither strength, nor means, nor experience.

Well, this is quite extreme, because the intelligence kit of the border districts on the eve of the war included, in addition to undercover intelligence agencies, a separate radio division of the OsN, a separate radio center of the intelligence chief, which intercepts important encrypted messages. Not only that, the border strip was monitored by divisional reconnaissance battalions, as well as reconnaissance aircraft from the district air force. True, they were forbidden to cross the border with Germany, but nevertheless, having circled the border, they collected intelligence information in the interests of the intelligence department of the district headquarters. But in general, our intelligence, like the entire army, was weaker than the Wehrmacht - no one disputes this fact.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

The outbreak of war showed the extreme weakness of military and especially military intelligence - neither strength, nor means, nor experience.

Well, this is quite extreme, because the intelligence kit of the border districts on the eve of the war included, in addition to undercover intelligence agencies, a separate radio division of the OsN, a separate radio center of the intelligence chief, which intercepts important encrypted messages. Not only that, the border strip was monitored by divisional reconnaissance battalions, as well as reconnaissance aircraft from the district air force. True, they were forbidden to cross the border with Germany, but nevertheless, having circled the border, they collected intelligence information in the interests of the intelligence department of the district headquarters. But in general, our intelligence, like the entire army, was weaker than the Wehrmacht - no one disputes this fact.

Yeah, but there weren't those who walked, looked, identified, and counted with their legs. I wrote about this.
I will add. OsNaz found a communications center. Is it real or "phony"? The reconnaissance is in the area. And he says, according to intelligence, "he is not channeling." It makes no sense to take "language" here, only the group will be found. So, we are looking for a real communication center. And we went to such "applications" in 2 groups - one "at the address", the second "in free search". In 41st there was no such reconnaissance, alas.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Yeah, but there weren't those who walked, looked, identified, and counted with their legs. I wrote about this.

In principle, this could not be — only highly professional reconnaissance officers could do this, rather than ordinary reconnaissance officers from army structures. Yes, and this is prohibited in peacetime, so as not to provoke an international scandal - only those who have agent training could cross the border.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

Yes, and this is prohibited in peacetime, so as not to provoke an international scandal - only those who have agent training could cross the border.

Well, then the question is to the intelligence intelligence Border Troops of the NKVD!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Well, then the question is to the intelligence intelligence Border Troops of the NKVD!

They worked according to their tasks, and the speed of submitting information suffered from them due to the lack of radiopharmaceutical agents. So the role of intelligence of the border troops is greatly exaggerated, if only because the entire number of the Belarusian PO, for example, was less than 20 thousand people - what serious intelligence work can we talk about?

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

suffered from a lack of radiopharmaceutical agents.

I look, are you fixated on radio?
The eastern regions of Poland before the war were like a passage yard, couriers could deliver information on a schedule!
Here, efficiency is the tenth thing, the intelligence intelligence zone is only 200-300 km from the Soviet border!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

I look, are you fixated on radio?

It was because of the lack of radio communications in the first months of the war and until the spring of 1942 that the entire intelligence network of the RU and the NKVD in Germany could not transmit information to the Center.

Quote: Serg65

The eastern regions of Poland before the war were like a passage yard, couriers could deliver information on a schedule!

This is more from the field of legends.

Quote: Serg65

Here, efficiency is the tenth thing, the intelligence intelligence zone is only 200-300 km from the Soviet border!

The point is not even in the operational depth of intelligence, but in how quickly the received information can be delivered.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

Yeah, but there weren't those who walked, looked, identified, and counted with their legs. I wrote about this.

In principle, this could not be — only highly professional reconnaissance officers could do this, rather than ordinary reconnaissance officers from army structures. Yes, and this is prohibited in peacetime, so as not to provoke an international scandal - only those who have agent training could cross the border.

But in SA it was. It is on the basis of errors in underestimating the intelligence of that time.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

But in SA it was.

How do you imagine it? I would recommend you to read the book "GRU in Germany" by Y. Pushkin - everything is described in detail, including the arrest of Colonel Zherdev.

Quote: Doliva63

It is on the basis of errors in underestimating the intelligence of that time.

Of course, the Second World War radically changed the attitude towards intelligence, but there were no miracles in the Soviet Union, so intelligence was conducted so that there were no scandals of international level.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

But in SA it was.

How do you imagine it? I would recommend you to read the book "GRU in Germany" by Y. Pushkin - everything is described in detail, including the arrest of Colonel Zherdev.

Quote: Doliva63

It is on the basis of errors in underestimating the intelligence of that time.

Of course, the Second World War radically changed the attitude towards intelligence, but there were no miracles in the Soviet Union, so intelligence was conducted so that there were no scandals of international level.

Thank you, I'll look at the book. But that’s how I myself served there, saw a lot of things, and participated in a lot. And at the expense of scandals - this is a separate song. I'll get drunk like a thread, tell you how they arose there

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

But that’s how I myself served there, saw a lot of things, and participated in a lot.

And I served there for almost five years, so I know how some career officers ended not only with secondment, but also with dismissal from the armed forces, as soon as the issue reached the level of the Foreign Ministries.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

But that’s how I myself served there, saw a lot of things, and participated in a lot.

And I served there for almost five years, so I know how some career officers ended not only with secondment, but also with dismissal from the armed forces, as soon as the issue reached the level of the Foreign Ministries.

If you are talking about the GRU, then I did not serve there, I had in mind army intelligence - from the battalion to a separate army company, and then - in the reconnaissance of the corps.
Well, the truth is, somehow he almost "betrayed" the intelligence - from half a year in the special propaganda department he was drinking as a translator.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

from half a year he drank in the special propaganda department.

The special propaganda was subordinated to the intelligence department after the dissolution of political agencies in 1991.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

from half a year he drank in the special propaganda department.

The special propaganda was subordinated to the intelligence department after the dissolution of political agencies in 1991.

No, I still drank there in those years.
But even then she was tightly connected with intelligence. I don’t know, perhaps it has always been like this, I did not delve into their history.
And Thuringia on the GRU - is it Dresden or Leipzig?

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

And Thuringia on the GRU - is it Dresden or Leipzig?

And not only them. Read the book of Pushkin, there he mentions these cities.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

I will add. OsNaz found a communications center. Is it real or "phony"?

For this, on the eve of the war, a group for training radio intelligence officers existed in the communications academy, who, by DIFFERENT signs, could quite accurately identify the affiliation of enemy radio nodes with a sufficiently accurate location finding for that time. You can read the book "The Golden Ear of Military Intelligence" by M. Boltunov, there are many authentic materials on the training of radio intelligence officers on the eve of the war.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

there are a lot of genuine materials about the training of radio intelligence on the eve of the war.

It makes no difference, intelligence at all levels missed the final period of concentration!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

It makes no difference, intelligence at all levels missed the final period of concentration!

And on the basis of what, then, the Directive was sent on June 21 at 23h45m. to the border districts and to the NKVMF, where the date of the attack is directly indicated - June 22-23?
Did they get this information from the ceiling?

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

And on the basis of what then the Directive was sent

Based on the testimony of the defectors ...

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Based on the testimony of the defectors ...

Don't be ridiculous, the defectors could have been disinformation. There were two significant events on June 21 that finally convinced the Soviet leadership of the inevitability of the outbreak of war on June 22 - an intercepted Dortmund signal at 14.00 and an agent meeting with an employee of the German embassy at about 19:22, after which the final conclusion was made that the war would begin on XNUMX June.

[AsmyppoL]

I would suggest that based on Kegel’s announcement of the outbreak of war in the morning of June 22, which was delivered to Stalin after 20-00 21 on June 1941

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

I will add. OsNaz found a communications center. Is it real or "phony"?

For this, on the eve of the war, a group for training radio intelligence officers existed in the communications academy, who, by DIFFERENT signs, could quite accurately identify the affiliation of enemy radio nodes with a sufficiently accurate location finding for that time. You can read the book "The Golden Ear of Military Intelligence" by M. Boltunov, there are many authentic materials on the training of radio intelligence officers on the eve of the war.

Dear, you are just not in the subject. Even in our time (I'm talking about the 80s) OsNaz could not give anything 100%. Only with a high degree of probability. This is not enough for making a decision. Therefore, special forces or RDR go to the indicated area to "see with their own eyes."

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Dear, you are simply not in the subject. Even in our time (I'm talking about the 80s), Osnaz could not give out anything 100%.

At 100%, only the Almighty can know, so do not speculate with this figure, because a probability of 90% or even lower is already sufficient to make a decision.

Quote: Doliva63

Therefore, special forces or RDR go to the indicated area to "see with their own eyes."

I don’t remember that in Soviet times, at least one of the Special Forces groups from the GSVG crossed the border of the NATO bloc, and yet we knew what was going on with them, up to the number of battalions being on the exercises. I don’t even mention about troop transfers - all this was monitored right up to the landing of American troops from Europe in Iraq during the first war in the Gulf. Maybe you have other data, tell me ...

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

Dear, you are simply not in the subject. Even in our time (I'm talking about the 80s), Osnaz could not give out anything 100%.

At 100%, only the Almighty can know, so do not speculate with this figure, because a probability of 90% or even lower is already sufficient to make a decision.

Quote: Doliva63

Therefore, special forces or RDR go to the indicated area to "see with their own eyes."

I don’t remember that in Soviet times, at least one of the Special Forces groups from the GSVG crossed the border of the NATO bloc, and yet we knew what was going on with them, up to the number of battalions being on the exercises. I don’t even mention about troop transfers - all this was monitored right up to the landing of American troops from Europe in Iraq during the first war in the Gulf. Maybe you have other data, tell me ...

I do not speculate in numbers. There is such a concept - reliability, there are no high-likes in intelligence. And the command must make a decision, for example, on a missile-bomb strike, knowing that after it you can forget about the enemy’s military unit N ... and if it suddenly comes out tomorrow, and this military unit is a squadron of Lance's thread? It will be bad, don’t you?
In my memory, too, no one crossed the border. This was not done by the troops, but by other people who carried out reconnaissance in our interests.
And it has always been so during the exercises. The slightest doubt about the data of OsNaz, they walked there with their feet. Here in my memory there are 2 cases when the "enemy" substituted a "linden" instead of communication centers and command posts.
And yes, about the mistakes of OsNaz - have you heard the thread about the "Crystal War"?

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

There is such a concept - reliability, there are no high-likes in intelligence.

Many intelligence documents explicitly indicate that information requires double-checking - this is evidence that the reliability of the information is in doubt, but nevertheless, such information is reported to the command so that it has an idea of ​​all possible scenarios.

Quote: Doliva63

In my memory, too, no one crossed the border. This was not done by the troops, but by other people who carried out reconnaissance in our interests.

This is not entirely true - three communication missions conducted legal reconnaissance in their areas of responsibility and presented data to the intelligence chief of the GSVG.

Quote: Doliva63

And yes, about the mistakes of OsNaz - have you heard the thread about the "Crystal War"?

No, I have not heard. And errors can be in all types of intelligence, no one is safe from this.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

There is such a concept - reliability, there are no high-likes in intelligence.

Many intelligence documents explicitly indicate that information requires double-checking - this is evidence that the reliability of the information is in doubt, but nevertheless, such information is reported to the command so that it has an idea of ​​all possible scenarios.

Quote: Doliva63

In my memory, too, no one crossed the border. This was not done by the troops, but by other people who carried out reconnaissance in our interests.

This is not entirely true - three communication missions conducted legal reconnaissance in their areas of responsibility and presented data to the intelligence chief of the GSVG.

Quote: Doliva63

And yes, about the mistakes of OsNaz - have you heard the thread about the "Crystal War"?

No, I have not heard. And errors can be in all types of intelligence, no one is safe from this.

Are you celebrating November 5?

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Are you celebrating November 5?

Celebrate.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

Are you celebrating November 5?

Celebrate.

Let's take 3 mm for a holiday, then we will discuss the reliability, legal missions, illegal immigrants and the "crystal war"!

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

the army was weaker than the Wehrmacht

And what do you see the weakness of the Red Army?

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Quote: ccsr

the army was weaker than the Wehrmacht

And what do you see the weakness of the Red Army?

The first and most important thing is the lack of combat experience. There is also a second, third, fourth, etc.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

First and foremost, the lack of combat experience

Lack of combat experience? Most of the commanders of divisions, corps, armies and districts passed Khalkhin Goal, Spain and Finland!
The main reason for the weakness of the Red Army, in my opinion, was the fear of initiative, resulting from the fear of accusations of alarmism and sabotage! Lead Pavlov Western District into combat condition on June 18-19, and on 20 he would already be sitting in front of the NKVD investigator!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Lack of combat experience? Most of the commanders of divisions, corps, armies and districts passed Khalkhin Goal, Spain and Finland!

Do not fantasize, there was none. In Spain there were only about two (by some estimates, less than 3) thousand of our troops, on Halkin Gol, the entire number of troops barely exceeded 50 thousand, and Finnish was led by one district, and not the most numerous — where did the experience come from?

Quote: Serg65

Bring Pavlov Western District into combat condition on June 18-19,

In fact, he did not have the right to do this without instructions from the top military leadership and government.

Quote: Serg65

Yes, on the 20th, he would already be sitting in front of the NKVD investigator!

For some reason, Zakharov did not sit in front of the investigators, although he did not have the Directive b / n in his hands, he began to lift the troops at his discretion even before it was received.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

Do not fantasize, there was none.

Well, yes ..... the names of Pavlov, Kirponos, Malinovsky, Meretskov, Kuznetsov, Zhukov, Batov, Rotmistrov tell you anything?

Quote: ccsr

In fact, he did not have the right to do this without instructions from the top military leadership and government.

Then why was he shot?

Quote: ccsr

For some reason, Zakharov did not sit in front of the investigators, although he did not have the Directive b / n in his hands,

began the rise of troops at its discretion even before it was received

.

So he still had the right? Zakharov’s testicles were stronger than Pavlov’s, and all the more after a few hours there was nothing to sit on.

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Well, yes ..... the names of Pavlov, Kirponos, Malinovsky, Meretskov, Kuznetsov, Zhukov, Batov, Rotmistrov tell you anything?

Actually, the troops are fighting on the battlefield, and not the generals who go on the attack, so that victory was ensured by those who occupied the level of company-battalion-regiment, and from which the fate of all battles was decided.

Quote: Serg65

Then why was he shot?

For the fact that he could not organize resistance to the German troops and mediocrely killed a huge number of our troops.

Quote: Serg65

Zakharov's testicles were stronger

I think he had more leadership talents, and he was not afraid for his career, like some.

[Serg65]

Quote: ccsr

Actually, the troops are fighting on the battlefield, and not the generals who go on the attack, so that victory was ensured by those who occupied the level of company-battalion-regiment, and from which the fate of all battles was decided.

Sorry, but I'm starting to doubt your great military experience, well, or you walked along the line of political management ..
Those. the battalion commander, in principle, does not need a regiment, divisional commander, commander, and even more so supreme ?????

Quote: ccsr

For the fact that he could not organize resistance to the German troops and mediocrely killed a huge number of our troops.

Oh, this party-nkvdeshnaya fairy tale, fed up already !!!!
Why, then, Kozlov, Eremenko, Timashenko, Khrushchev, Kuznetsov, Oktyabrsky, Kulakov, Petrov, Tributs weren’t shot because their fault was no less painful?
Pavlov became a screen for which Stalin, Beria, Tymoshenko and Zhukov with pleasure hid their flaws!

Quote: ccsr

he was not afraid for his career, like some.

Here you are right, but not everyone has been given it, but there were so many of those who were not given at the beginning of the war in the Red Army!

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

Sorry, but I'm starting to doubt your great military experience, well, or you walked along the line of political management ..

Doubt your health.

Quote: Serg65

Those. the battalion commander, in principle, does not need a regiment, divisional commander, commander, and even more so supreme ?????

Do not engage in verbiage - this is a technique of illiterate people, when any discussion is brought to absurd statements.

Quote: Serg65

Why, then, Kozlov, Eremenko, Timashenko, Khrushchev, Kuznetsov, Oktyabrsky, Kulakov, Petrov, Tributs weren’t shot because their fault was no less painful?

Ask the Supreme - the measure of punishment of this or that guilty military leader depended on him.

Quote: Serg65

Pavlov became a screen for which Stalin, Beria, Tymoshenko and Zhukov with pleasure hid their flaws!

No, Pavlov turned out to be just a bad commander, whose career take-off was not connected with his military talents, so he paid for it.

[Serg65]

Oh, I'm directing you from me !!!

Quote: ccsr

Do not engage in verbiage - this is a technique of illiterate people, when any discussion is brought to absurd statements.

But this is yours

Quote: ccsr

Victory was ensured by those who occupied the level of company-battalion-regiment, and from which the fate of all battles was decided.

And who's verbiage here ???

Quote: ccsr

Pavlov turned out to be just a poor commander, whose career take-off was not connected with his military talents, so he paid for it.

And which of the pre-war generals, and even more so the marshals, had a career associated with talent ????

[ccsr]

Quote: Serg65

And who's verbiage here ???

And who do you think won the war in an era of lack of nuclear weapons? It is those who fought on the battlefield as part of companies, battalions, regiments as it was only from their training and fortitude that the fate of the thousand-kilometer front was decided, and not from how our generals planned operations. What the hell would they do if they didn’t have military experience in our army at the level of battalions-regiments.

Quote: Serg65

And which of the pre-war generals, and even more so the marshals, had a career associated with talent ????

At least for those who were not shot in 1941 or were not removed from their posts following the results of hostilities during the war.
As for personalities, in my opinion the example of Rokossovsky best shows what a talented commander should be like.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Generally courier-teller needed to deliver documents from the reconnaissance commander to the division’s intelligence chief — for example, the protocol for interrogating an enemy soldier captured by the reconnaissance group.

This is already something ...
So to speak: ku-ku is resting

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

This is already something ...
So to speak: ku-ku is resting

And you try to refute, wise guy ...

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AsmyppoL

This is already something ...
So to speak: ku-ku is resting

And you try to refute, wise guy ...

From my experience, the division's chief reconnaissance officer does not come out of the reconnaissance battalion during the "tension". The entire reconnaissance of the division worked at the PC RTRR, what for to send someone else to him? But if somewhere in the regiment they brought a "language" to the PPD, then the paper will be sent with a soldier from the reconnaissance company. But again, nobody is brought home. Interrogation on the spot. And if suddenly the NATO Commander-in-Chief is caught, then they will be interrogated already in the front reconnaissance department, the division's intelligence chief will be informed only in the part concerning him.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

From my experience, the division's chief reconnaissance officer does not come out of the reconnaissance battalion during the "tension".

This is in today's peacetime. But he is obliged to report the situation to the chief of staff of the division at least twice a day, and he certainly will not come to the reconnaissance battalion. So he will have to dangle, especially since he himself must sign the summary.

Quote: Doliva63

The whole reconnaissance division worked at the RRTR HRC, what for send someone else to it?

There was no such company in reconnaissance battles in the pre-war time. That is why they kept the courier in the state so that they could quickly deliver new instructions, orders or documents to the reconnaissance battalion commander or intelligence chief.

Quote: Doliva63

then the paper will be sent with the reconnaissance fighter.

You can’t trust the ordinary fighter to receive stamped correspondence, that’s why the list of persons is strictly limited by order, and you can’t give them stamps and registers so that they do not spoil the same packages when handing over. Who will then be responsible for the loss of correspondence if errors are made in transmitting it?

Quote: Doliva63

What if the NATO Commander-in-Chief is caught

This is from the realm of fiction - this option is not considered.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

From my experience, the division's chief reconnaissance officer does not come out of the reconnaissance battalion during the "tension".

This is in today's peacetime. But he is obliged to report the situation to the chief of staff of the division at least twice a day, and he certainly will not come to the reconnaissance battalion. So he will have to dangle, especially since he himself must sign the summary.

Quote: Doliva63

The whole reconnaissance division worked at the RRTR HRC, what for send someone else to it?

There was no such company in reconnaissance battles in the pre-war time. That is why they kept the courier in the state so that they could quickly deliver new instructions, orders or documents to the reconnaissance battalion commander or intelligence chief.

Quote: Doliva63

then the paper will be sent with the reconnaissance fighter.

You can’t trust the ordinary fighter to receive stamped correspondence, that’s why the list of persons is strictly limited by order, and you can’t give them stamps and registers so that they do not spoil the same packages when handing over. Who will then be responsible for the loss of correspondence if errors are made in transmitting it?

Quote: Doliva63

What if the NATO Commander-in-Chief is caught

This is from the realm of fiction - this option is not considered.

Damn, colleague, Fercaen Zee world, Bitte, I spoke for our (then) time!

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Damn, colleague, Fercaen Zee world, Bitte, I spoke for our (then) time!

I realized that you are talking about our time, but the question of the pre-war actions of military intelligence is discussed here, and some small-town authors are engaged in outright falsification of the results of its work.
Although any competent professional, reading intelligence reports and other documents of those years, and knowing the technical equipment and the level of general literacy in the country, will involuntarily take off his hat to those who were then engaged in intelligence and were able to present such vast materials in different areas of intelligence.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: Doliva63

Damn, colleague, Fercaen Zee world, Bitte, I spoke for our (then) time!

I realized that you are talking about our time, but the question of the pre-war actions of military intelligence is discussed here, and some small-town authors are engaged in outright falsification of the results of its work.
Although any competent professional, reading intelligence reports and other documents of those years, and knowing the technical equipment and the level of general literacy in the country, will involuntarily take off his hat to those who were then engaged in intelligence and were able to present such vast materials in different areas of intelligence.

For the then scouts - I agree, they plowed more than they seemed to be able to. But here the general intelligence organization, in my opinion, was limping. Yes, and in the Union, I suspect, too. Until there is a single intelligence agency, departmental intelligence agencies can compete to an unacceptable result. And in the Russian Federation as well. Remember, there was such an Intelligence Community in the USA? Right now they went even further. And I'm not sure that our intelligence works better. I’m not about those who get information, but about those who manage it.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Eugene
The main problem of our intelligence was that there were no scouts and informants in the headquarters of the ground forces at all levels and around the command staff from these headquarters.

It’s even ridiculous to comment on this enchanting nonsense - no one could have done this in that situation. Even if you have ONE of our scouts in the large headquarters of the Wehrmacht, then under it you need to create a residency with a radio operator and radio station, and this in the conditions of a strict counterintelligence regime in the border strip cannot be carried out. It seems that the author has too low-key ideas about conducting intelligence of that period, which is why such pearls no longer surprise me.

What idea does the couch expert have))) Our scouts in the German headquarters were not needed, since it is impossible to transmit information
Ku-ku is resting

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Our scouts in the German headquarters were not needed, since it is impossible to transmit information
Ku-ku is resting

You yourself "cuckoo", a teapot - scouts are always needed, that's just the point from him if there is no connection with him. Learn what smart people have to say about it:

“The issue of intelligence communications is a matter of life and death. What do we mean without communication? Zero without a stick. Empty place. We for the command no longer exist ... "

I. Berezhnoy, military intelligence

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AsmyppoL

Our scouts in the German headquarters were not needed, since it is impossible to transmit information
Ku-ku is resting

You yourself "cuckoo", a teapot - scouts are always needed, that's just the point from him if there is no connection with him. Learn what smart people have to say about it:

“The issue of intelligence communications is a matter of life and death. What do we mean without communication? Zero without a stick. Empty place. We for the command no longer exist ... "

I. Berezhnoy, military intelligence

That is yes. The most protected people in the group are the commander and radio operators. In the event of their death, the work of the group practically loses its meaning. And she turns into nameless paratrooper heroes.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Yes, the most protected people in the group are the commander and radio operators.

This is understood by those who really have an understanding of intelligence, and not verbiage, like AsmyppoL, which has wild ideas about intelligence, but undertakes to discuss whether it was conducted correctly or not in the pre-war period. Not only that, he still has the audacity to discuss intelligence, giving them an assessment, understanding them like a pig in oranges - as they say, they have come ...

[VS]

Quote: Serg65

German officers, starting with platoon commanders, had excellent topographic maps of Soviet territory with the location of all the units, airfields, headquarters, and warehouses of the Red Army

stupid things. Open the lessons and conclusions - there is appendix 10 and take a look - WHAT are there really the Germans thought of our troops)))

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: AsmyppoL

Not a valid explanation! The team is not always a connection - it can be a part!

A part is any military structure that is assigned a number. Even the main directorates of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff have unit numbers, and their chiefs in correspondence with civilian organizations are referred to when signing documents as "The commander of a military unit ...". So you are clearly not in the subject, since you are confusing the concept of part and the connection of parts.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Let's look on the Internet for an additional explanation, do not be lazy to take the first thing that was found ... Do not jail)))

In this case, you are a crook because you are trying to compensate for your ignorance by impudent lies.

Probably, the comrade had in mind the corps, which consisted of brigades. That is, the same division, only a side view. A little more l / s, a little more technology, a little wider tasks to be solved. They entered the army along with divisions. For example, 10 Guards Ural-Lviv volunteer. When he became the 10th GVTD, there for a long time more regiments were considered brigades).