Air fighters over the ocean waves. On the role of helicopters in the war at sea
However, decked aviation, firstly, requires aircraft carrier ships, and, secondly, it costs a lot of money. And it is not known what is more expensive - planes fight, pilots die and retire, and maintaining deck aviation “in good shape” requires really large funds, even without regard to the cost of aircraft carriers.
Fleets, limited in financing or limited by the capabilities of the shipbuilding industry and unable to build a full-fledged aircraft carrier ship (or at least a universal landing ship with the ability to base aircraft), do not have the ability to have their own deck aircraft or it is limited.
Alas, this applies to Russia fully. Our ship aviation is experiencing frankly bad times - the only aircraft carrier in repair, the completion dates of which are very vague, the intensity of combat training leaves much to be desired, and the rate of renewal of the aircraft fleet is insufficient. As a class, there are no naval AWACS aircraft, ship transport and anti-submarine aircraft.
And, most importantly, there are almost no ships for this.
In general, such a pile of problems is simply physically impossible to solve quickly even with the necessary money, which is not and will not be in the foreseeable future. And this means that we must either abandon ship aviation altogether or look for some way out that will allow us to “close” this direction at a low cost, to look for some “asymmetric” solution.
Currently, there is a technical opportunity to partially compensate for the lack of full-fledged naval aviation in Russia by the widespread use of special naval combat helicopters that could carry out their tasks based on the surface ships included in the ship’s strike groups.
Can helicopters aboard URF ships and landing ships available to the Russian Navy take on some of the tasks that are supposed to be accomplished in a comprehensive manner by forces based on full-fledged aircraft carrier ships - both ship planes and helicopters?
Answer: yes, they can. And this is confirmed not only by various theoretical studies and teachings, but also relatively “fresh” by historical by the standards of combat experience. It makes sense to analyze this experience and, through its “prism," evaluate what capabilities the Russian Navy possesses, or rather, can possess, if a decision is made on the widespread use of different types of helicopters during naval operations (and not just on occasional anti-submarine Ka-27 flights with BOD, corvettes and cruisers). First, a little theory and technical details.
Rotorcraft fighters and their capabilities.
Combat instructions of the US Navy OPNAV (Operation Planning, Naval - the American analogue of our General Staff of the Navy) oblige helicopter aviation of the Navy to be able to carry out more than two hundred types of combat missions, which can be summarized in the following groups:
1. Air operations against sea mines (see article “Death from nowhere. About the mine war at sea. " 2 part).
2. Attacks on surface targets
3. Anti-submarine warfare.
4. Transport tasks
5. Search and rescue operations.
6. Performing combat missions during special operations (Direct action - direct action. For example, the evacuation of a special forces group under fire).
7. Evacuation and transportation of the wounded and sick (including during the "Operations other than war", for example during emergency natural actions).
8. Evacuation of personnel from hazardous areas (no search)
9. Exploration above the sea
10. Attacks on ground targets.
As you can see, this does not include the conduct of landing operations, which in the US Navy carry out helicopters of the Marine Corps.
In general, it is worth agreeing with the Americans that such a "gentleman's set" should be able to carry out naval helicopter aviation, if its development is maximized in combat capabilities. Consider how this is technically carried out and immediately stipulate what limitations the Navy will encounter when trying to acquire the same capabilities.
Let's start with mine action.
In the US Navy, there are two helicopters oriented to combat sea mines. The first is the MN-53Е, which is mainly used as a towing helicopter mine trawl, and the second is the MH-60S equipped with anti-mine weapons, which is part of the anti-mine “module” for LCS ships. The latter carries on board disposable mine destroyers, discharged into the sea directly from the air and controlled from the helicopter itself. As a means of detecting mines, a laser system should be used, capable of “viewing” the water column in search of mines at the bottom. Alas for the Americans, but so far the system has not reached combat readiness. MN-60S can be based on absolutely any warship, and MN-53E - only on the UDC, DVKD or aircraft carriers in general, however, the latter is not entirely typical of a mine helicopter. Someone may notice that we can do without basic helicopters, but this is not so.
In addition to war, the Navy should be ready to carry out humanitarian operations in any part of the planet, including mine clearance. Thus, ship helicopters are definitely needed.
What limitations do we have?
Firstly, the Ka-27PS is the only serial platform on the basis of which you can quickly create a towing vehicle with the possibility of ship-based. In the future, perhaps, the Lamprey will take its place, but so far this is more of a project than a real helicopter.
Secondly, the only ships on which mine-based aircraft can be based without claims from other personnel regarding habitability are the 11711 BDKs, which have a hangar and sufficient internal volumes to accommodate crews and various equipment. There are two such ships in the Navy. Two more completely different ships, but with the same project number, were laid on April 22 of 2019 of the year. While they are enveloped in the "fog of the unknown." It is known that the project is not completed, there is no clarity as to which power plant will be used on ships, and in general, this tab was a profanity. The joy was somewhat premature. Alas, these are the facts that have already become known today. Therefore, while these ships are not worth taking into account. Let them begin to build at least at first.
However, it is important for Russia to have anti-mine forces outside of any operations offshore. This means that we need to do trawl towing helicopters in any case, and make them much more than can be placed on ships.
Thus, the combat use of helicopters as part of anti-mine forces based on surface ships will simply need to be worked out on actual BDKs. They have already been built, and helicopters - in any case, build.
With striking surface targets, everything is somewhat more complicated.
On the one hand, Russia has a very good specialized attack helicopter Ka-52K Katran. This is, without exaggeration, a unique machine; moreover, its potential is not revealed at all. So that these helicopters can be used in a war at sea against a more or less serious enemy, they need to replace the radar. There is a project to integrate the Zhuk-AE based N010 radar into this helicopter, it was generally conceived with it, and these developments will need to be implemented, otherwise the role of the Ka-52K as a strike machine will be seriously limited. If the helicopter modernization is completed, it will become a truly deadly “player” in the naval warfare. Especially considering the possible use of the X-35 missile from this helicopter. However, the use of combat attack helicopters in naval battles will be considered separately.
However, there is a problem along the way.
Since we almost do not have aircraft carriers, we will have to use combat helicopters on combat ships on surface ships with guided missile weapons (URO). Moreover, taking into account the fact that it will not always be possible to use the BDK together with the URO ships (if there is no need for operations against the coast or clearance, it is undesirable to include the BDK as part of the operational connection - it cannot tear itself away from the enemy with the URO ships due to the low speed and worse seaworthiness). And each place in the hangar occupied by a specialized attack helicopter will mean that there will be one less anti-submarine helicopter in the connection - and indeed, submarines today are considered in most countries as the main means of fighting surface ships.
Is this acceptable?
Not in vain in the US Navy (if America has a variety of attack helicopters) on the URO ships are based almost exclusively on SН / MH-60 of various modifications. When the Americans needed a means to attack small-sized weakly protected targets, such as motorboats with terrorists, it was precisely these helicopters that the Hellfire ATGMs "got up." When the US Navy needed the ability to deliver air strikes from armed helicopters on armed surface ships, it was on these helicopters that the AGM-114 Penguin anti-ship missiles were installed. Why is that?
Because there is no one to rely on at sea, and a universal helicopter is more useful than a specialized attack helicopter. So, the same anti-submarine Ka-27 can, if necessary, transport people lying on the wounded, a spare part from ship to ship. At the same time, there is no urgent need for armor, a gun and ejection seats for a “purely” marine helicopter. Ka-52K, with all its potential, will not be able to carry out transport tasks and will not be able to perform PLO tasks. While armed with missiles and having the corresponding on-board radio-electronic equipment, the Ka-27 version can do everything. And this is not an exaggeration.
Ka-27 was used to test the RCC X-35. This helicopter is systematically involved in solving transport and even landing tasks during the exercises of the Navy. And it’s not worth talking about anti-submarine missions - this is its direct purpose, although, frankly, its GAS in modern conditions is worthless even with the modernized version. The helicopter needs to be redone, but the trick is that the domestic aviation industry is quite capable of it. There are all technologies and developments, the problem is of an administrative nature common to the Navy.
This does not mean that Ka-52K is not applicable in operations in the far sea zone, it means that most often there will be no place for it. But, firstly, sometimes there will still be, secondly, there are still joint operations with the near sea zone, and in the coastal zone, where helicopters can be rotated on ships in the same corvettes. There is a threat of submarines - on board the Ka-27, there is no threat of submarines, we change it to the Ka-52K, which is used to strike enemy ships and along the coast. Then we change again.
One way or another, but in order to gain full-fledged capabilities to destroy surface targets, it is necessary to modernize the Ka-52K, and create a new modification of the Ka-27 capable of carrying both anti-submarine weapons, ASGs, buoys for searching for submarines, and guided missiles of various types, especially anti-ship, and perhaps anti-radar, machine guns in the door, and even better - in the doors facing both sides.
For transport and rescue tasks, you need a winch for lifting goods and the ability to place a stretcher, you need a thermal imager that can detect a person on the surface of the water and a television viewing system that works at low light levels. Modern electronics makes it possible to “pack” all this into an 12 ton helicopter. It may be worthwhile to mount a spotlight.
In an amusing way, the same thermal imager, winch, pylons for rocket weapons and machine guns are needed to use the helicopter in the interests of special forces. Of course, infrared jamming systems will also be needed to protect against heat-guided missiles and radio jamming systems, but this is a priori needed on any military helicopter, moreover, it is already used in the aerospace complex, mastered by industry, produced and does not weigh very much. The defense system "Vitebsk" for example, showed itself very well in Syria. During the battles for Palmyra, Anna-News reports contained footage of how fighters launched missiles from our MANPADS on our helicopters, but they simply flew by without capturing a helicopter equipped with a defense system. There is no problem equipping the Ka-27 helicopter with the same.
Of the remaining tasks, separate mention is only reconnaissance and strikes on the ground.
Reconnaissance missions over the sea cannot be solved without an airborne radar. Moreover, for a naval strike group, as a reconnaissance vehicle, it’s far more “interesting” not to use the Ka-27, even if equipped with a modern radar (presumably the same as the hypothetical modernized Ka-52K), but a Ka-31 AWACS or some kind of its further development.
It is the AWACS helicopter that may not be enough for a naval strike group to, for example, detect in advance the work of enemy air reconnaissance or the enemy’s helicopter at low altitude, preparing to launch anti-ship missiles from ships at a safe distance, and most importantly - it’s much easier to hit an air attack with it. Although he unmasks the connection, he often can’t do without such a tool.
There are nothing new on board our surface ships of AWACS helicopters. In 1971, the Ka-25Ts helicopter was put into service with the aviation of the USSR Navy, capable of detecting a large surface ship at a distance of up to 250 kilometers from the helicopter by combining flight altitude and a powerful radar. And these helicopters were based both on Soviet cruisers and on the BOD, providing the naval strike or search-strike groups of the Navy the opportunity to “look beyond the horizon,” and it is very far away even by today's standards. Ka-25Ts provided not only reconnaissance, but also targeted launches of heavy Soviet anti-ship missiles fleet long distances.
At present, the Ka-35 helicopter tested in Syria is ready for mass production in Russia. Its combat capabilities are incomparably higher than that of the old Ka-25TS or even Ka-31, used from the Admiral Kuznetsov. Such a helicopter is necessary for any naval strike group, which leaves to "work" in a distant sea or ocean zone. And not in a single quantity.
Attacks on ground targets are also not easy. For them, the Ka-52K suits much better than the unarmored and flimsy Ka-27, or any of its modifications, for example the old Ka-29, which is still stored in the Navy.
But, as already mentioned, this helicopter is too specialized and there will not always be the opportunity to sacrifice a place in the hangar that could be occupied by a modernized Ka-27, capable of fulfilling missile defense tasks and striking surface targets, carrying people and cargo, saving those in distress and to land special forces in secluded corners of enemy territory. In principle, Ka-27 can be used for strikes along the coast. But for this, you will have to equip it with the Hermes long-range ATGM and ensure interaction with UAVs, for example, the Orlan type, the military use of which the Navy has already worked out.
Otherwise, you should abandon helicopter attacks on coastal targets, and use naval artillery and cruise missiles, if possible. Although, if the operation will involve landing ships capable of carrying helicopters, it will be quite possible to use them. Then the search and rescue tasks will be assigned to the Ka-27, which are based on other surface ships, and the drums - to the Ka-52K from the landing ships. Currently, without taking into account the possible participation in the operations of Admiral Kuznetsov, the Navy can provide combat use of four such helicopters from landing ships of the Ivan Gren type, of which two can take off simultaneously. Everyone else will have to fly from warships or patrol ships.
It is of interest to give the combat group from the BDK also patrol ships of the 22160 project. Not being useful in anything, these ships, however, can provide the basing of helicopters and UAVs "Horizon". True, there are no conditions for storing significant quantities of aviation weapons on board, so they will have to fly to some other ship to suspend weapons, which is, of course, terribly inconvenient, and to some extent shameful, but we have other ships the right amount is not, so ...
It is a completely different matter when you need to attack targets on the coast near your territory. Then, the naval warships operating near the coast will in fact be for Ka-52K helicopters a kind of analogue of reserve airfields or jump airfields. To practice this kind of action, everything is now.
Let's sum up.
In order for ship helicopters to take on part of the tasks of ship aviation based on an aircraft carrier when this aircraft carrier itself is not there, the Navy needs to:
1. Upgrade the Ka-52K, bringing its performance characteristics to the initially desired (full radar).
2. Create a new version of the Ka-27 helicopter, similar in its capabilities to the American Sea Hawk helicopter - anti-aircraft missiles, attacks on surface and coastal targets using anti-tank systems, attacks on surface targets using anti-ship missiles, transport and search and rescue missions, delivery of SP groups to shore and back. Such helicopters should be equipped with modern defensive systems and sighting and search systems.
3. Create a modification of the trawl towing helicopter based on the Ka-27, and the trawl for it.
4. Produce enough AWACS helicopters.
5. Work out the main possible scenarios for the combat use of ship helicopters in naval warfare and fix this practice in charters.
All these tasks do not seem to be unsolvable.
Carriers of various purposes in operations in the DMZ will be URO ships, landing ships and patrol (if any) ships.
In general, the Black Sea Fleet today is able to deploy helicopters in full-fledged URO ships in the distant sea and ocean zones of the 4 (one on the cruiser Moscow and one each on three frigates of the 11356 project). Defective and non-combat 22160 project patrol ships can carry a couple more helicopters, and in a few years there will be six of them. Unfortunately, due to problems with speed, the “patrolmen” cannot operate together with full-fledged warships, but, nevertheless, we will fix an emergency opportunity for the Black Sea Fleet to deploy ten helicopters in the DMZ.
There are also five helicopter carriers in the Baltic Fleet - TFR “Yaroslav the Wise and the 20380 project corvettes. The destroyer "Persistent", which will soon be out of repair, can only be listed as a helicopter carrier, although in an emergency you can deploy a helicopter on it if there is temporary shelter. After the TFR “Undaunted” comes out of repair, one more carrier will be added, and approximately by the end of 2022 there will be two more corvettes, in total there will be eight warships capable of carrying helicopters and providing for their combat use, and one ship that is limited for this purpose. Provided, of course, that one of the listed ships will not be in the next long-term repair.
In the Northern Fleet, the Peter the Great nuclear-powered cruiser (2 helicopters), RKR Marshal Ustinov (1 helicopters), two BODs (generally 4 helicopters), and the frigate Admiral Gorshkov (1 helicopters) are in operation. Soon, Admiral Kasatonov will be added to them, with another helicopter. Two more BODs are under repair, one of which, however, got stuck in the repair for a very long time, and the nuclear-powered cruiser Admiral Nakhimov with a couple of places.
After one BOD and Nakhimov go out of repair, it is possible to increase the total number of helicopter seats to 13 units, with the BDK of the 11711 project, which can already be considered a fait accompli, 17, if Chabanenko is repaired by some miracle, then 2, in total 19. Naturally, this is without Kuznetsov, who, in theory, when bringing ship regiments to the required level of combat capability, will solve the aviation problem much more efficiently.
In the Pacific Ocean there is a Varyag RKR, three BODs and two corvettes, which in total gives 9 helicopters; this year, the Thundering one will give another helicopter, only 10. After the modernization of the Marshal Shaposhnikov BOD, a couple more places will be added, all 13, and by the end of the 2022 of the year three more corvettes will be added, this is another 3 helicopter and all 16 machines. Plus “conditional medium” - EM “Fast”.
We do not consider the auxiliary fleet, although there are also ships with hangars there.
Много это или мало?
The KMG, which has 16 helicopters, can provide continuous combat duty for one or two helicopters in readiness 1 number or in the air around the clock. As you can see, from the composition of the Navy it is quite possible to form a compound with such a number of helicopters and deploy it on any possible theater of operations.
How many ship-based helicopters can fight in a modern war? The American experience of using helicopters from the decks of large ships, such as UDC or aircraft carriers, is not applicable to us - we do not have such ships as they have, and will not be in the foreseeable future. But there is another experience. Deck helicopters based on URO ships quite successfully fought. And even though this experience is also American, but here it is quite applicable to us. Let's take it apart.
Persian Gulf - 91
In preparation for repelling the Allied air attack, the Iraqis decided to forward their air defense assets to the sea, thus creating a defense line extended over Iraqi territory. The bulk of the air defense systems that were used for this task was concentrated on eleven offshore oil production platforms of the Ad-Daura oil field southeast of Bubiyan Island, which, as it were, “closes” the sea approaches to the Iraqi city of Umm Qasr. Part of the air defense system was also located on two small islands south of Bubiyan - Karu and Umm al-Maradim.
Iraqis captured these islands at the very beginning of their invasion of Kuwait. In addition to the fact that Iraqi intelligence posts and air defense positions were located on islands and oil production platforms, the channels between the Arabian Peninsula and Bubiyan Island were used by the Iraqi fleet for relatively safe and secretive movement of their ships. The Iraqi command planned that at the end of January 1991 of the year, tactical amphibious assault forces from the ducts to the rear of the coalition forces defending Ras Khavji would contribute to a successful ground attack on this city. Several medium landing ships and high-speed boats were ready to carry out landing operations. Their cover, in addition to air defense systems on platforms and islands, was carried out by Soviet-built missile and torpedo boats, minesweepers and German high-speed patrol boats that the Iraqis armed with Exoset missiles.
For additional protection of their fleet, on the shore of the Iraqis, launchers of SilkWorm Chinese anti-ship missiles were deployed, with well-prepared calculations. According to the Iraqi military, coalition ships could not do much harm to coastal defense without entering the missile strike zone.
In order for the plans of the Allies to land in Iraq to be realized, and the plans of the Iraqis to land near Ras Khawji and to keep coalition forces away from the Iraqi shore, remained only plans, it was necessary to destroy all these forces.
Further actions in a sense are “model” for us. Should the Navy fight somewhere far away from its native coast, such decisions will be the only ones that are available to us because of our technical equipment. Of course, only if the type of helicopters and their performance characteristics are brought to the required level, and the pilots, technicians, crews of ships and staffs are properly trained.
On 18 of January 1991, coalition forces began launching massive bombing attacks on Iraq. Immediately “spoke” air defense systems installed by Iraqis on two oil platforms and islands. They did not succeed in knocking anyone down, but it completely worked out and the problem had to be solved as quickly as possible.
On the same day, the OH-58D Kaiowa Warrior US Army reconnaissance and forward guidance helicopter flew to the Oliver Perry class Nicholas (USS FFG-47 “Nicholas”) frigate, where it was ready for a combat mission against the coastal target SH -60B. At night, Nicholas approached the oil platforms at a distance allowing artillery fire. Both helicopters were lifted into the air. The Kiowa provided guidance and used two ATGMs, and the Sea Hock carrier launched several accurate strikes on the platforms with guided missiles. Several hits led to explosions of ammunition on the platforms and the flight of Iraqi soldiers in a rubber boat.
Nicholas, meanwhile, approached the platforms even closer, maintaining complete radio silence and opened artillery fire on the Iraqis already "softened" by attack from helicopters. While the frigate was firing, helicopters with Navy SEALs on board, which soon landed on platforms, took off from several other ships. After several hours of gunfire, followed by shelling from the frigate, the Iraqis surrendered.
Next came the turn of the smallest island of Iraq captured - Karu.
During the combat mission of the A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft, the latter managed to sink an Iraqi mine-layer, minesweeper and patrol boat near the island. Another minesweeper in the course of this attack was able to evade the attack aircraft, but “flew” into the Iraqi minefield and was blown up.
Soon, helicopters were lifted into the air to lift the survivors from the American frigate “Kurtz” (USS “Curts”) out of the water, but they were fired from the island and they could not get anyone out of the water. The Kurtz then began shelling the coast from its 76 graph paper, while maneuvering in such a way that getting it back with fire from the island was as difficult as possible. While this continued, a helicopter with another group of Navy SEALs was lifted from another ship, the Lefthvich destroyer of the Spruance class, which, as was the case with the platforms, was landed under cover of artillery fire from the frigate. Soon, the Iraqis surrendered on this island.
The third island - Umm al-Maradim, was captured by the Marines, who were on the ships of the landing force going to Iraq.
Realizing that tactically the Iraqi forces could not resist the combined attacks of special forces and naval artillery, the Iraqis made an attempt to save their ships. Iraqi fleet leaked to Umm Qasr. Later, the Iraqis planned to flee to Iran, while the KFOR had to set up new minefields to protect the fleeing and then leave behind them.
On the night of 28 on January 29, the A-6 Intruder carrier-based attack aircraft and the E-2С Hokai airborne aircraft detected the passage of many small targets northwest of Bubiyan along the southern edge of the marshes in the Shatt al-Arab Delta. Goals moved towards Iran. Subsequently, aviation identified them as Iraqi patrol boats. In reality, these boats were indeed there, but not only they - the entire Iraqi fleet escaped to Iran.
The commander of the “surface combat operations” of the coalition forces deployed a force of forces against the Iraqis, which mainly consisted of Westland Link helicopters.
With some external fragility, this is a very serious fighting vehicle. It was Link, even if it was equipped, that was the first serial helicopter in the world whose speed exceeded 400 km / h. He was one of the first to complete the “dead loop”.
It was Link that became the first combat helicopter in the world to use anti-ship missiles against a surface ship - on 3 on May 1982, such a helicopter damaged a Argentinean patrol ship Alferez Sobral, hit by a Sea Skew missile.
For hunting the Iraqi fleet, helicopters armed themselves with the same anti-ship missiles. Thus began one of the most famous naval events of the Gulf War - the Battle of Bubiyan, also sometimes called the "Hunting of Turkeys under the Bubiyan." For 13 hours, British helicopters took off from ships, carrying anti-ship missiles on pylons.
Using guidance from airplanes and American aircraft R-3С "Orion" and helicopters SH-60В, the British went to the right line of launch and used their anti-ship missiles against Iraqi ships. During the 13-hour operation, they delivered an 21 strike on the Iraqi fleet. These helicopter attacks damaged the impossibility of reconstructing 14 Iraqi ships of various types: 3 minesweeper, 2 minzag, 3 speed boats armed with Exoset missiles, 2 Soviet-built patrol boats, 2 KFOR, 2 rescue ships. Canadian CF-18 fighter bombers also contributed, which also damaged (and actually destroyed) several missile boats.
At the end of the battle, only a couple of Iraqi ships reached Iran - one KFOR and one missile boat. Iraqi Navy ceased to exist. And the main role in their destruction was played by helicopters.
In general, helicopters proved to be the main force in the war at sea in the Persian Gulf. The commander of the “surface combat operations” usually could count 2-5 British Helicopters during the day, the main task of which was missile attacks on surface targets, from 10 to 23 American SH-60B which were mainly used for reconnaissance, and as a secondary missiles were aimed at guided missiles at surface targets and offshore platforms, as well as army OH-58D in the amount of 4 units that were used for night attacks of coastal targets (mainly on islands) and platforms.
Despite the fact that these helicopters belonged to the US Army, they, thanks to the folding rotor blades (like all army helicopters in the USA), were based on URO ships, like the rest of the helicopters. URO ships, besides being carried by helicopters, were themselves used in military operations.
After the rout at Bubiyan, helicopter operations from URO ships continued. Throughout February, the Kiowa and SiHoki carried out combat sorties from ships for reconnaissance and attack of the identified coastal anti-ship missile launchers. Once, the SH-60B was able to give target designation for the use of anti-ship missiles to a Kuwaiti boat that successfully destroyed an Iraqi ship. The English Link helicopters also continued their sorties. Only on February 8 of 1991 of the year were five Iraqi boats attacked and damaged or destroyed.
By the end of February, the Iraqi Navy was completely destroyed. The total number of ships, ships, boats and boats that were hit by coalition Navy reached 143 units. A significant share in these losses was inflicted on the Iraqis by helicopters launched to URO ships, and they also caused the highest instantaneous losses.
Comparing the forces and means that the Allies used in the naval war in the Persian Gulf in the 1991 year, we can say that the tasks of the same scale to destroy surface forces and stationary objects of the Russian Navy would be easily fulfilled even in its current state. Subject to the availability of competent command, and helicopters, modernized as described above.
Helicopters against the shore. Libya
The 2011 Libyan War of the year, during which NATO crushed and brought down this once prosperous state into chaos and savagery, also became a landmark for combat helicopters. The NATO military helicopters deployed at sea on landing ships made a certain contribution to the defeat of the Libyan government forces. France deployed an 4 Tiger helicopter to the Tonner DVKD (Mistral class), from which they made regular sorties.
In the same way, the United Kingdom deployed five Apaches on the landing helicopter carrier Ocean. All sources note the modest contribution of helicopters to this war, if we give them an estimate of the size of the damage done to the enemy.
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Sources, however, are cunning.
The fact is that one of the objectives of attack helicopters in Libya was to support "their" special forces. While the whole world watched the staged popular uprising in Tripoli by Al-Jazeera, in the real Tripoli and around there were short-lived, but fierce battles between the defenders of Libyan statehood and NATO special forces. And the support of attack helicopters was important for the NATO “specialists”. In addition, statistics do not take into account attacks on dispersed infantry, on enemy units conducting battle, taking into account only the number of sorties against such targets, but without saying much about the damage done.
Evidence that the actions of helicopters in Libya were successful is that after this war, interest in coastal strikes from attack helicopters based on ships increased sharply.
Moreover, unlike the battles in the Persian Gulf in 1991, in Libya, NATO organizedly used specialized helicopters with army pilots against the “coast”. They were based on special landing ships, but on the scale in which they were used there, they could also fly from URO ships, which means that we also have the right to consider such operations as some model for study.
Little future
Britain intends to integrate Link16, an American system of mutual exchange of information, in its army helicopters, and increase the frequency of Apache army exercises from aircraft carriers. Even before the invasion of Libya, the British tried to conduct exercises to destroy high-speed boats, going in a massive attack against a British surface ship. It turned out that Apache was extremely successful in carrying out such a task, now Britain is intensifying interactions between the fleet and army helicopters.
France does not lag behind either, which also quite successfully used its Tigers in Libya.
The participants in the operation are closely watched by Australia. The Australians have already begun training flights of military attack helicopters from the UDC supplied by Spain. It is to be expected that the range of their application will be wider and wider.
Currently, in the combat use of army helicopters from ships, there are tendencies to more and more increase the share of combat helicopters in performing the entire volume of strike missions along the coast. Also the trend is the use of more and more advanced missile weapons, as well as the integration of UAVs and helicopters into a single strike complex.
And do not underestimate its capabilities.
As for the use of helicopters against surface combat ships, with the exception of Russia, this has become standard practice even for not very large and strong navies, not to mention developed fleets.
The Royal Navy of Great Britain, for example, received a significantly improved version of the Link helicopter - Wildcat, a very dangerous attack sea helicopter, which also has a perfect search and sighting radar, and an optical-electronic sighting system with a thermal imaging channel that can carry and use as small-sized multipurpose rockets with LMM Martlet with combined laser and infrared guidance, and Sea Venom anti-ship missiles, replacing Sea Skew.
The British, therefore, do not forget about their combat experience and continue to develop specialized anti-ship helicopters.
They are not alone. Many countries are developing the capabilities of their marine and anti-submarine helicopters to attack surface targets with missiles. We cannot be left behind.
Helicopters versus airplanes
Separately, it is worth dwelling on the issue of air defense of a ship’s formation and the role of helicopters in it. About AWACS helicopters have already been said, but it does not come down to them, and that's why.
Until now, the detection and classification of a helicopter hovering above the ground remains a huge problem for any radar. Over water, this effect is even stronger and makes it impossible to detect such a target in advance.
The reason is simple - the oscillating surface of the sea gives such a chaotic signal “in response” that the fighter radar cannot distinguish any stationary radio-reflecting object in the chaos of interference. A helicopter hovering above water at low altitude is naturally invisible for a while, until the fighter plane gets too close to it. And then, the fighter will be able to detect a helicopter by the reflected signal from its rotating blades. The speed of movement of the helicopter blade at each moment of time is large enough to cause a “Doppler shift” and the radar signal reflected from the blades comes back at a different frequency than the one reflected from the waves.
The trouble with the fighter is that a helicopter equipped with a modern radar will detect it much earlier. And this cannot be overcome.
At present, there is no aircraft radar in the world that would be located on a small fighter plane and would be able to detect a helicopter hovering above the water at low altitude from at least 45-50 kilometers.
And it is not clear how it can be created, in any case, not one of the radar manufacturers in the world has come close to solving the issue. At the same time, the detection of aircraft at the same and long ranges is not a problem for most radars, even outdated ones, and many of them can be used in helicopters too. For example, the one that was originally planned for Ka-52K.
In fact, under these conditions, it becomes possible to create an air defense barrier remote from the ship’s group based on helicopters. The combination of a full-fledged AWACS helicopter and combat helicopters carrying air-to-air missiles will allow relatively safe attack on enemy aircraft going to the KMG, and the helicopters will be guaranteed to launch the missiles first, and then the maneuverable machine equipped with defense complexes against missiles with IR or RL- guidance, it will be able to evade a missile launched. And if the combat helicopters themselves are equipped with full-fledged radar (which must be done), then they will do without the data of the AWACS helicopter, just a warning that the enemy is “on the way” will be enough, and they are guaranteed to catch him in a “missile ambush” - put in a situation where a drummer loaded with rockets and hanging tanks suddenly a swarm of missiles will fall from the "shadow".
Naturally, this requires armament of helicopters and air-to-air missiles. I must say that in the West they are actively engaged in this. For example, Eurocopter AS 565 also carries Air-to-Air missiles, and the Americans have long been equipping Marine Cobras with Sidewinder missiles.
In comparison with advanced countries, we behave as always: we have good helicopters, we have good missiles, we have experience in using P-60 air-to-air missiles from helicopters, we have experience in including Mi-24 helicopters in the country's air defense system, and even according to a number of rumors, the only helicopter victory over a jet fighter in aerial combat was achieved on the Mi-24. But we can’t connect everything together. Full-fledged radar separately, Ka-52K separately, air-to-air missiles separately. And so everywhere and in everything. Just some kind of tragedy ...
Of course, it may turn out that launching missiles from the hovering mode upwards will prove to be difficult. But this problem is being solved - we are not the first and not the last, the creation of a two-stage rocket with an accelerator based on an air-to-air missile is not Bean Newton, and this has already been done in the world. There is no reason why Russia could not repeat this. Technical, at least, definitely not.
It is also clear that multi-purpose helicopters for the Navy should be able to use air-to-air missiles. After all, as was previously said, the ability to take Katrana with you on a military campaign will not always be.
One can only hope that common sense will prevail. Given the virtual absence of its carrier fleet and the absence of at least large landing ships such as the Mistral, betting on helicopters is uncontested, as it is uncontested, and there are no others based on URO ships; patrol and landing can only be used in conditions where no one will have to come off, and guaranteed. Nobody promised us such a naval war and does not promise.
So, first you have to learn to act at the same level at which the West acted in its naval wars, and then surpass it.
Technically, we have everything for this, and the question is exclusively in desire.
However, we always have everything, and not just helicopters, rests against this.
- Alexander Timokhin
- Henry Jones, Globalsecurity.org, The Telegraph, militarynews.co.uk, fine art America, Alexey Mikheev from Rise, Magazine No. 7 / 2005, Air Recognition, Kamov OJSC, Aviation and Time No. 1 / 2011 , Wikipedia Commons, MBDA, https://www.maritimequest.com, seaforces.org, Lockheed Martin, ammokor.ucoz.ru, airwar.ru,
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