Military Review

Before the war. Intelligence information about the German group against KOVO

39
In the previous parts, we examined intelligence materials (RM) about the enemy’s grouping, concentrated against the forces of PribOVO (Part 1 и Part 2) In accordance with the Republic of Moldova, on June 21, German troops were located at a sufficiently large distance from the Soviet-German border.


Before the war. Intelligence information about the German group against KOVO


At the end of the topic about PribOVO, we consider a graph of the change in the number of groups, built according to the RM. It should be noted that in accordance with the Republic of Moldova received in the autumn of the 1940 of the year, the number of troops concentrated against PribOVO included also units located on the right flank of ZapOVO.



The German group did not take into account the 7 cavalry regiments that our intelligence "discovered". The indicated units will additionally comprise at least one more division ...

Intelligence data on German troops against KOVO


Consider the territories of neighboring countries, in which, in accordance with the RM, German formations were deployed against the KOVO troops. The zone of responsibility of the KOVO on the right passed along the line of Wlodawa (exclusively) - Demblin (lawsuit) - Radom (lawsuit), and on the left was limited to Art. Sticks.



In accordance with Intelligence Report No.5 at 1.6.41 against KOVO, the following German groups are listed:
"... In the Lublin-Krakow region ... - 35-36 divisions...;
in Slovakia (in the area of ​​Duplin, Presov, Michalovce) - 5 divisions...;
in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions... »


On the southern flank of the district, part of the Romanian troops are deployed.

Based on the RM in the figures, the dependences of the change in the number of German divisions in the above directions are plotted.



In accordance with the RM, from the beginning of April until mid-May there is an increase in the German group in the Lublin-Krakow region. The maximum number of German divisions has remained unchanged since 15.5.41!



The number of German troops in Slovakia (in the Duplin region (57 km in a straight line from the border) - Presov (98 km) - Michalovce (67 km)) remains unchanged from the 5 of May 1941. The border area in this area is mountainous and, due to the limited number of roads in the direction of the border, the above-mentioned distances may increase significantly when troops are advanced.

In the figure, the increase to 7 divisions is related to their increase in the reconnaissance of the General Staff of the SC on 22-00 22.6.41. When it was during the period from 19 to 22 on June that reconnaissance "discovered" an increase in German divisions - it is not known ...



We see the same thing in the Carpathian Ukraine (direction Uzhhorod - Mukachevo). Since the beginning of May, the number of German divisions in the Republic of Moldova has remained unchanged. The increase in the number of divisions after June 19 is due to their increase in the Intelligence Agency summary on June 22.

In preparing the material, the author examined two German maps, on which the situation with the deployment of troops on the eve of the 22.6.41 was plotted. Five German divisions in Slovakia (in the Duplin-Presov-Mikhalovce region) and four in the Carpathian Ukraine are missing on these maps ...

The presence of these nine divisions in the Republic of Moldova can only be explained by targeted German disinformation, when small units of German troops could pass as whole regiments or divisions. It may also be the result of misinformation by the special services of Germany, Hungary and Slovakia. In this case, the Hungarian and Slovak units were presented as German ... There is no other way to explain the constant mention in the RM in these areas of nine German divisions for a long period of time, which were not there ...

Thus, in accordance with the Republic of Moldova, from the beginning – mid-May to 19-20 on June 1941, the number of the German group against the KOVO troops practically did not change. With a high degree of probability, we can say that this number was also unchanged on June 21. However, this statement cannot be verified due to the lack of intelligence in the period from 20 to 21 on June ...

Data on the location of enemy troops on the KOVO map


Consider the situation on the eve of the war, which is printed on the map of the headquarters of the KOVO (SWF).





Above the line of differentiation of responsibility between ZapOVO and KOVO, we see information about the presence at the border of a group of three infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades, tank brigades and two tank battalions. The map shows the location zone of this grouping depth from 45 to 67 km from the border. Therefore, it cannot be argued that all of these troops were located directly at the border.

The presence of two cavalry brigades can be identified as existing cavalry division. The two infantry divisions discovered by intelligence can be identified as the 167 and 255 infantry divisions. The third infantry division is either the 10th motor division (which is unlikely), or the rifle regiments of tank divisions, or the 34th infantry division located behind the 3th tank.

The tank brigade and two tank battalions can be identified as tank regiments of tank divisions.

With such an interpretation, the data presented on the map are fairly accurate RM ... The only major drawback is the failure to detect the 24 motorized body itself!

Of its composition, only the following were presumably discovered: tanks of two tank regiments (there were actually a regiment in each division), a cavalry and infantry division. No motorized rifle and artillery regiments of tank divisions, motorized reconnaissance, sapper and motorcycle battalions, as well as other divisions, were found. No motorized division found. Not found in depth 46-th motorized body.

Scattered two tank battalions and a tank brigade can only be:
- or attached to infantry divisions;
- or included in the mobile group of these parts and two cavalry brigades.

Infantry formations with attached tanks will advance slowly, and a small mobile group will not be able to make a deep breakthrough. The breakthrough of a small mobile group is not terrible, since it is possible to quickly concentrate in this direction parts of the 14 mechanized corps, which are not far away.

Two infantry divisions located along the line of demarcation of districts, 22 June were not there. It was not possible to establish whether they were there earlier.

Four infantry divisions and one motorized division are located directly at the KOVO border. Opposite them is the 15th Infantry Corps and units of the 87th Infantry Division.

In the depths are the headquarters of the army, the headquarters of the rifle corps, two unknown headquarters of the army corps, two unknown headquarters (perhaps this is the headquarters of the divisions), two infantry, one armored and four motorized divisions. The indicated seven divisions are located at a distance from 48 ... 52 to 106 km from the border. It will take from one to two days to concentrate these troops to the border! The headquarters of only infantry associations were found that could not organize a quick and deep breakthrough by infantry formations deep into the territory of the KOVO. Everything, as was considered at the team games in 1941 by the military commanders of the spacecraft: advancing the enemy on 200-250 km in 10-14 days ...



In the new drawing, there are more German troops at the border: up to 6 infantry divisions and up to two tank regiments. A little further there are three more infantry, and one tank and motorized divisions.

In the depths of the territory are two headquarters of army corps, two infantry, two armored and one motorized divisions, a tank regiment. There is a grouping of enemy troops, which can be identified as a shock in the headquarters of the corps, two armored and one motorized divisions, a tank regiment. This grouping is deployed quite far from the border: from 94 to 116 km. On the roads, this distance will be slightly larger ...

On the map fragment we see the concentration of small groups of infantry troops in the directions of Sokal - Krystnopol (up to 2 infantry divisions in the upper right corner of the map), Rawa Ruska (two divisions located one after another) and a small strike group from a motorized division, two tank regiments at Przemysl. To the right, this grouping is supported by one infantry division. Are these forces enough to start a full-scale war on June 22? Of course they are not enough ...

There are other German troops on the map that are located outside the map fragments presented:
- in the city of Piotrkow (west of the city of Radom, 190 km from the Soviet-German border) - infantry division;
- in the city of Bochnia (west of the city of Tarnow, 218 km from the border) - unknown headquarters and 2-3 infantry divisions;
- in the city of Krakow (232 km from the border) - the unknown headquarters of the army corps;
- in the city of New Tarz (194 km from the border) - an infantry division.

We can draw the following conclusions on the Republic of Moldova, available on the eve of the war at our headquarters, on the grouping of German troops concentrated in the Lublin-Krakow region:
- in accordance with the Republic of Moldova in the specified area there are 35-36 divisions. Therefore, it can be said that near the 21 division it is focused on moving away from the border;
- As part of a concentrated grouping, there is one army headquarters and four headquarters of army corps. Based on this, the headquarters of the KOVO and the General Staff could conclude that there were no large mobile groups in the area in the form of a tank army or motorized corps.



The figure shows a fairly large grouping of enemy troops: two army corps, about six divisions (of which up to 1,5 are tank). Another misinformation thrown to our intelligence. In fact, in this area near the border there was the 8th Army Corps consisting of four Hungarian brigades (up to two divisions).



In the figure, the pink bar corresponds to the line of demarcation of KOVO and OdVO. More than six infantry, two motorized, tank, cavalry, mountain infantry divisions, cavalry and mountain infantry brigades are concentrated near the border with the KOVO. In total, up to 12 divisions, 8 of which are deployed quite far from the border. In fact, in this area there were up to five divisions of German and Romanian troops. One tank and two motorized divisions in the area have never been. Again, we see incorrect information that fell into the RM.

Summing up the consideration of the presented fragments of the map and the Republic of Moldova relating to the KOVO, it can be stated that the intelligence information and the actual deployment of enemy troops at the border are very different. Directly on the eve of the war, there are not enough enemy troops to start a war with the USSR. According to the author, information from the Republic of Moldova could not alarm the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union until the evening of June 21 on 1941.

The summary of the reconnaissance department of the KOVO headquarters of 20.6.41 refers to the movement of German troops to our borders, but the wrong conclusion is made: “... a major movement of all arms and transport south of Tomashov is pursuing some kind of demonstrative purpose or related to exercises... ». It is possible that such a conclusion led to the fact that the information in the report did not cause concern at the Intelligence Directorate and at the General Staff. There was no reaction ... There was also no reaction in Moscow even after the arrival in the morning of June 21 from the ZAPOVO of the alarm message about the advance of German troops to the Suvalka ledge.

First Military Intelligence Data


Below is the data from Summary No.1 of the Reconnaissance Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft on 22: 00 on June 22. The figure shows three directions of German attacks on the troops of the district and analyzes the groupings of enemy troops discovered on June 22. Everything is the same as it was before the war: intelligence data diverge from the actual distribution of enemy forces.



Based on the pre-war knowledge of the composition and deployment of enemy troops on June 22, Intelligence summary No.1 of the South-Western Front is being prepared:
...Lutsk direction. The enemy conducts active hostilities throughout the day; its main groupings: in the direction of Lyuboml, an infantry division is advancing; in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky - the infantry division and the tank division; in the direction of Preck-Uvolvonek - infantry division; from the direction of Sokal, Krystynopol - infantry division ...

Rava-Russian-Lviv direction. At the Makhnov, Lyubych Krulevsk sector, in the direction of Rav Ruska, two infantry divisions, a cavalry regiment and a tank regiment advance. From the area of ​​Lubaczów Oleszyce, Stare Selo ... for 12 hours in the south, there were over infantry divisions supported by small tank divisions ...

Przemysl-Lviv direction. At the Yaroslav, Medyka section, in 14 hours, 45 minutes in the direction of Krakovets, Mosciska advanced to the infantry division and the cavalry unit. In the area of ​​Przemysl, it operates up to the infantry division ...

Hungarian direction. The enemy in small parts tried to cross the border in the area of ​​Kereshmese, Vorokhta, attempts were repulsed.

Chernivtsi direction. ... Altogether, four Romanian infantry divisions operate on the Lipcani, Radauti section. The Germans are probably acting in this direction, since some of the captured prisoners turned out to be German soldiers ...

Conclusions: ... The enemy crossed the state border on the front of Wlodawa, Przemysl and Lipkany, Vikoverkhnya (10 km northwest of Radauti) consisting of:
- Lutsk direction - four to five infantry divisions and a tank division;
- Rava-Russian-Lviv direction - three to four infantry divisions with tanks;
- Przemysl-Lviv direction - two or three infantry divisions;
- Chernivtsi direction - four romanian infantry divisions...


According to reconnaissance reports, mainly infantry divisions are supported by one armored division, tank and cavalry regiments, as well as small tank divisions. The only large mobile group found by intelligence in the Tarn area (two armored and motorized divisions, a tank regiment) is not recorded in the report and, therefore, has not yet been put into battle. It's not as serious as it really was ...

The information from the first SWF report is in good agreement with the situation on the map and the intelligence information that was reflected in other pre-war documents.

Information about incomplete data provided in the Republic of Moldova on the eve of the war is also reflected in the memoirs of war veterans. THEIR. Baghramyan (Chief of Operations, KOVO Headquarters):
... One infantry division is advancing in the Lyuboml area, one infantry and one tank division in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky, and two more German infantry divisions to the south, to the very border with the 6 Army. Given that close to the border we had four rifle divisions, the situation, of course, didn’t seem so threatening...
It was not yet known that a German motorized corps surged from Sokal to Radziechow in a region free of our troops and that the same corps was trying to break through from Ustilug to Lutsk...


A.V. Vladimirsky (head of the operations department of the headquarters of the 5 Army):
The composition, numbering and location of the enemy’s formations by our intelligence were not revealed precisely and incompletely. So, before the 5 Army, the presence of only 15 enemy divisions was noted, including only two tank divisions. In reality, there was an 21 division, including five tank divisions. The concentration of the 1th Panzer Group in front of the 5th Army ... was not noted at all...


We saw that information about the concentration of German motorized corps against KOVO was absent in the RM as well as against PribOVO.

To be continued ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
On the eve of the Great Patriotic. Reports intelligence about the German group against the troops PribOVO
39 comments
Ad

Subscribe to our Telegram channel, regularly additional information about the special operation in Ukraine, a large amount of information, videos, something that does not fall on the site: https://t.me/topwar_official

Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. cavl
    cavl 6 August 2019 18: 26
    +6
    Thanks for the interesting stuff!
    Please reset the links to the maps for the Baltic and Belarusian districts.
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 7 August 2019 05: 00
      +2
      I also liked it. Thank you Author
    2. AsmyppoL
      7 August 2019 18: 55
      0
      I can’t put a link to the map. I suggest you enter the site “Memory of the people”, select the section “Documents of parts” and enter the text in the query line

      Report card of the situation of the parties to the start of hostilities of the 21.6.1941 year

      The PribOVO map will be the topmost. There it is possible to bring a fragment of the map to the limit and consider the inscriptions. The following query will allow you to consider the second map

      Map of the position of the KOVO and SWF troops from 19 to 23 on June 1941
  2. vladcub
    vladcub 6 August 2019 18: 38
    0
    "again we see incorrect information in the RM" of course now, when the factual materials are well known, it is easy to say correct and some, but then. It's good too
    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 7 August 2019 04: 55
      +3
      I understand that the goal of Eugene is not to show intelligence errors. He confirms the main idea of ​​the Victoria cycle that Stalin, Tymoshenko and Zhukov did not expect a Hitler attack on June 22.

      If there are no strike groups for a breakthrough to greater depths. If from half to two-thirds of the infantry and motorized infantry divisions are located in camps and at permanent deployment points far from the border. If there was not enough enemy aircraft. If there is not a single parachute division out of 8. Only one regiment.

      How in such a situation to wait for an attack across the border without knowing the future? It is a mistake to talk about the events of the beginning of the war without analyzing intelligence information
      1. Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko
        Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko 7 August 2019 09: 56
        +4
        After reviewing all of the possible situations and so on (RM), and putting myself in the place of Stalin on June 20-21, I admit that I too would have missed the German attack! Still, the Germans were excellently misinformed !!!
  3. bubalik
    bubalik 6 August 2019 21: 52
    +6
    ,,, maybe someone will be interested hi
    The table of the correlation of forces at the front 8 A on 21.06.1941g.


    Information on the grouping of forces and means of German troops in East Prussia, Pribovo



    1. RuSFr
      RuSFr 7 August 2019 05: 00
      +3
      I have not seen such archival materials. Thanks you.
      Again, the analysis of this information I met only in the materials of the cycle. It seems to be the 16th part about intelligence. In the materials in the part of the tank units is not correct intelligence information. In addition, during the same period, the Intelligence Department issued an intelligence report with the deployment of units far from the Soviet-German border
  4. Olgovich
    Olgovich 7 August 2019 09: 18
    0
    The map shows the location zone of this grouping with depth from 45 to 67 km from the border. therefore cannot be arguedthat all these troops were located directly at the border.

    It can be argued: how many HOURS are needed for redeployment, even if in the conditions of fighting, the Nazis attacked with speed 70 km / day (to Minsk)?

    The summary of the intelligence department of the KOVO headquarters on 20.6.41 speaks of the movement of German troops towards our borders, but the wrong conclusion is made: "... a large movement of all the military branches and vehicles south of the Tomashov has some demonstrative purpose or is connected with the exercises ...". It is possible that such output led to the fact that the information of the report did not cause concern in the Intelligence Directorate and in the General Staff. No reaction ...

    1. The General Staff itself was able to conclude.

    2. The General Staff should be well aware that no RM can be the ultimate truth and plan their actions precisely on the basis of the worst-case scenario.

    3. The famous fact was that from Yugoslavia transferred to the owls border shock parts and it doesn’t matter-50 or 100 km to it, because everything changes within a day.
    1. AsmyppoL
      7 August 2019 19: 09
      -1
      RќR SЃS,SѓRїR ° ° ° S,SЊ RїRѕ RґRѕSЂRѕRіR Rј RѕRґRЅRѕR№-RґRІSѓRјSЏ RґRoRІRoR · RoSЏRјRo, RoRјRμSЋS ‰ RoRјRo P ± RѕR "SЊS € SѓSЋ RїRѕRґRІRoR¶RЅRѕSЃS,SЊ C ‡ RμRј RїRμS ... RѕS,RЅS <Rμ SЃRѕRμRґRoRЅRμRЅRoSЏ RјRѕR¶ RЅRѕ SЃ F ± RѕR "SЊS € RѕR№ SЃRєRѕSЂRѕSЃS,SЊSЋ ... RќRѕ RґRѕSЂRѕRі RґR" SЏ RІS <RґRІRoR¶RμRЅRoSЏ Rє RіSЂR ° RЅRoS † Rμ RґRѕ 2 / 3 RІRѕR№SЃRє, SЃSЂRμRґRo RєRѕS,RѕSЂS <C ... RїRѕRґR ° RІR »СЏСЋС ‰ Р ° СЏ РјР ° СЃСЃР ° РїРµС ... отР° - СЃ СѓРєР ° Р · Р ° РЅРЅС‹ Рј Р'Р ° РјРё темпом невоР· можно. R 'RџSÖRÖR ± R ° R »С‚РёРєРµ РїРµСЂРµРјРµС ‰ ение тол СЊРєРѕ РѕРґРЅРёС… моториР· РѕРІР …Р …Р …Р …Р …Р …Р …Р… РёСЋРЅСЏ (Р ± еР· СЗ Р ° стей СѓСЃРёР »РµРЅРёСЏ, Р ° ртил Р »РµСЂРёРё Рё Р ± еР· РјРЅРѕРіРѕР ° СР Р °СРѓС °С Р °С °Р °С °ѓ RIPR »RёRЅRёRІС € Р ° СЏСЃСЏ Р ± СЂРёРіР ° РґР ° РЎРЎ. Рђ РІ СЂР ° Р · РІРµРґРёРЅС „РѕСЂРјР ° С † РёРё тР° РЅРєРѕРІС‹ С ... С З Р ° стей СЂРѕСЃСЃС ‹РІСЊСЋ Рё мотоСРёР …РёРёРёРЕРЕР ·РёРёРЕРЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РёРЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·РЕР ·Р ·Р ·РЕР ·РёРЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР ·РЕР · РЕР ·РёР · No. РЅРµ РјР ° Р »Рѕ. РњРЅРµ РєР ° жется РѕРїС ‹‹ С ‚РњРёРЅСЃРєР ° неуместен ...

      РќРѕ 19, 20 Рё 22 РёСЋРЅСЏ РІ советских С € тР° Р ± Р ° С ... РµС ‰ Рµ РЅРµ Р · РЅР ° Р »Рё РсР ± темпакх… ( ) RїSЂRѕRґRІRoR¶RμRЅRoSЏ RЅRμRјRμS † RєRoS RІRѕR№SЃRє Rє RњRoRЅSЃRєSѓ ...))) RќR SЃRѕRІRμS ° F ‰ ° RЅRoRo RІS <SЃS € RμRіRѕ RєRѕRјSЃRѕSЃS,R ° RІR ° PI RґRμRєR ° F ± SЂRμ 70 RіRѕRґR ° C ± P <P "Ryo RѕR · ‡ RІSѓS RμRЅS <RґSЂSѓRіRoRμ S,RμRјRїS <RїSЂRѕRґRІRoR¶RμRЅRoSЏ, RєRѕS,RѕSЂS <Rμ RЅRμRѕRґRЅRѕRєSЂR ° S,RЅRѕ PI RїRѕSЃR "‰ RμRґSѓSЋS RμRј RoSЃRїRѕR" SЊR RѕRІR · ° F "RoSЃSЊ RїSЂRo RїSЂRѕRІRμRґRμRЅRoRo RљRORЈ Ryo RoRіSЂ.

      P.V. Levers (РЅР ° С ‡ Р ° Р »СЊРЅРёРє Р“ РЈ Р'Р'РЎ РљРђ): In the "P" R "SѓR ± RoRЅR SЃRѕRІSЂRμRјRμRЅRЅRѕR№ ° C" SЂRѕRЅS,RѕRІRѕR№ RѕRїRμSЂR ° C ± P † RoRo SѓRґRμS, RїSЂRoRјRμSЂRЅRѕ SЂR ° RІRЅR ° 300 RєRј. РўРµРјРІС ‹РїСЂРѕРґРІРёР¶РµРЅРёСЏ РІ среднем РЅР ° РІСЃСЋ РіР» СѓР ± РёРЅСѓ РспераІР°Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °С ° R ”R” RyoS‚RµR »SЊRЅРѕСЃС‚СЊ оперР° С † РёРё РЅР ° РіР» СѓР ± РёРЅСѓ 12 РєРј РїСЂРё темпе продвижения 12-15 РєРј Р ± СѓРґРµС ‚25-30 дней... ».
      1. AsmyppoL
        7 August 2019 19: 16
        0
        S.K.Timoshenko. "RћRїS <C SЃRѕRІSЂRμRјRμRЅRЅS <C ... RІRѕR№RЅ RїRѕRєR ° F · C <RІR ° RμS,vЂ| S,RμRјRї RЅR ° SЃS,SѓRїR "RμRЅRoSЏ PI RѕRїRμSЂR ° C † RoSЏS ... RґRѕSЃS,RoRіR ° P" 10-15 Ryo Р ± РѕР »РµРµ РєРј РІ сутки...
        Historical experience
        [РІРѕР№РЅР ° РІРѕ ФрР° РЅС † РёРё] Ryo S,RμRѕSЂRμS,RoS ‡ RμSЃRєRoRμ RoSЃSЃR "RμRґRѕRІR ° RЅRoSЏ RїRѕRєR ° F · C <RІR ° SЋS, C ‡ S,Rѕ SЃSЂRμRґRЅSЏSЏ SЃRєRѕSЂRѕSЃS,SЊ RїSЂRѕRґRІRoR¶RμRЅRoSЏ SЃRѕRІSЂRμRјRμRЅRЅRѕR№ SѓRґR SЂRЅRѕR№ ° F ° SЂRјRoRo RѕRєRѕR" of the PS 10-15 РєРј РІ сутки (Р ± С ‹РІР ° ет Рё 40-50 РєРј)... ».

        Р 'РјР ° териР° Р »Р ° С ... СЃРѕРІРµС ‰ Р ° РЅРёСЏ РІС‹ СЃС € его РєРѕРјСЃРѕСЃРёРёРРРРРРРРРРРРРПРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРПРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р Р Р Р Р РРРРРРРПРПРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р Р Р РРРРРРРР Р Р Р РёРёРПРРР ° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С ... Р ° СЂРјРёСЏС .... P R ° P · PIRPґRґRєRsR№ тР° РєРёРµ РѕР ± ъединения РЅРµ РѕР ± РЅР ° СЂСѓР¶РµРЅС ‹...
        P "RѕRІRѕSЂRoR" RѕSЃSЊ of the PS RїSЂRoRјRμRЅRμRЅRoRo PI RїSЂRѕRјRμR¶SѓS,RєR ° C ... RјRμR¶RґSѓ SѓRґR ° SЂRЅS <RјRo RіSЂSѓRїRїRoSЂRѕRІRєR ° RјRo RґRμSЃR ° RЅS,RЅS <C ... RґRoRІRoR · RoR№. РќР ° всей РіСЂР ° РЅРёС † Рµ СЂР ° Р · ведкой Р · Р ° С
        РњС ‹РјРѕР¶РµРј РІРѕРЅРёРјР °Р ° ть РІСЃРµ, С З С‚Рѕ СѓРіРѕРґРЅРѕ, РЅРѕ РІС‹ СЃС € РёР№ РєРѕРјСЃРѕСЃСРР ° РІ ° жено РІ РґРѕРєР »Р ° РґР ° С .... RћR ± этом же РїРёСЃР ° Р »Рё Р – СѓРєРѕРІ Рё Р'Р ° СЃРёР» евский, СЗ С‚Рѕ введенРЕР… Р ...РЕР ... · РёСЂРѕРІР ° РЅРЅС ‹С ... РіСЂСѓРїРїРёСЂРѕРІРѕРє СЃ первого РґРЅСЏ РІРѕР№РЅС‹ Р ± С ‹Р» Рс неожидЌґЅ ° ° ° ° ° РєРѕРјР ° РЅРґРѕРІР ° РЅРёСЏ РѕРєСЂСѓРіРѕРІ. P ”P ° PЅRЅS‹ Pµ СЂР ° Р · ведки Рё РѕР ± стР° РЅРѕРІРєР ° РЅР ° РєР ° ртР° С ... это тоже водтвеЀГндЂкрупны С ... СѓРґР ° СЂРЅС ‹С ... РіСЂСѓРїРїРёСЂРѕРІРѕРє.

        P "P" SЏ S,RμRјRїRѕRІ RїSЂRѕRґRІRoR¶RμRЅRoSЏ RїRѕSЂSЏRґRєR ° 40-50 RєRј / SЃSѓS,RєRo RЅSѓR¶RЅS <RїRѕRґRІRoR¶RЅS <Rμ RіSЂSѓRїRїRoSЂRѕRІRєRo: RїRѕR "RЅRѕS † RμRЅRЅS <Rμ S,R ° RЅRєRѕRІS <Rμ RґRoRІRoR · RoRo, моториР· РѕРІР ° РЅРЅС ‹Рµ РєРѕСЂРїСѓСЃР °, тР° РЅРєРѕРІС‹ Рµ Р ° СЂРЂРёРё. РћР ± ъединения СЂР ° Р · ведкой РЅРµ РѕР ± РЅР ° СЂСЂР¶РµРЅС ‹. R ”Р ° же РИРѕСЃР» Рµ Р Рњ Рѕ РїСЂРёР ± С ‹С‚РёРё РєРѕРјР ° РЅРґРёРёСЂР ° моториР· РѕРІР ° РЅРЅРѕР °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р °Р ° ‚РєРѕСЂРїСѓСЃ Р ± С‹ Р »РЅРµ РѕР ± РЅР ° ружен.
        R ”RIRP R ± S'RsRЅRµRґRёRIRРRёR · RёRё RЎРЎ RІ R — R ° РїРћР'Рћ РІРѕРѕР ± С ‰ Рµ Р ± С‹ Р »Рё определ РµРЅС ‹РїРѕ RЅР ° С °Р ° Р °Р ° Р °Р ° С °Р ° С †Р ° С †Р ° С †Р ° С Ryo RґRѕ RЅR ° C ° F ‡ P "P ° RІRѕR№RЅS <RЅR ° F» ‡ RoRμ Roes Roes ... RЅRμ C ± F <R "of the PS RїRѕRґS,RІRμSЂR¶RґRμRЅRѕ RЅRo RѕRґRЅRѕR№ SЂR ° F · RІRμRґRєRѕR№. Рћ РЅР ° Р »РёС ‡ РёРё РЅРµРјРµС † РєРёС… С З Р ° стей СЃСѓРґРёР» Рё РїРѕ номерР° Рј РЅР ° РІРѕРіРѕРЅР ° РЕРѕР °РРРРРРРРРР ‡ то это РЅРµ РґРѕСЃС‚РѕРІРµСЂРЅС ‹Рµ РґР ° РЅРЅС‹ Рµ СЂР ° Р · ведки ...

        P'P ° C € Ryo S,SЂRo SѓS,RІRμSЂR¶RґRμRЅRoSЏ SЏ RЅRμ F ± SѓRґSѓ RєRѕRјRјRμRЅS,RoSЂRѕRІR ° S,SЊ, S,R ° Rє RєR ° Rє RoRј RЅRμS, RЅRo RѕRґRЅRѕRіRѕ RґRѕRєSѓRјRμRЅS,R ° F "SЊRЅRѕRіRѕ RїRѕRґS, верждения РёР »Рё СѓРїРѕРјРёРЅР ° РЅРёР№ РІ мемуР° СЂР ° С ....
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 8 August 2019 08: 26
          -1
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Р 'РјР ° териР° Р »Р ° С ... СЃРѕРІРµС ‰ Р ° РЅРёСЏ РІС‹ СЃС € его РєРѕРјСЃРѕСЃРёРёРРРРРРРРРРРРРПРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРПРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р Р Р Р Р РРРРРРРПРПРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р Р Р РРРРРРРР Р Р Р РёРёРПРРР ° РЅРєРѕРІС ‹С ... Р ° СЂРјРёСЏС .... P R ° P · PIRPґRґRєRsR№ тР° РєРёРµ РѕР ± ъединения РЅРµ РѕР ± РЅР ° СЂСѓР¶РµРЅС ‹...
          P "RѕRІRѕSЂRoR" RѕSЃSЊ of the PS RїSЂRoRјRμRЅRμRЅRoRo PI RїSЂRѕRјRμR¶SѓS,RєR ° C ... RјRμR¶RґSѓ SѓRґR ° SЂRЅS <RјRo RіSЂSѓRїRїRoSЂRѕRІRєR ° RјRo RґRμSЃR ° RЅS,RЅS <C ... RґRoRІRoR · RoR№. РќР ° всей РіСЂР ° РЅРёС † Рµ СЂР ° Р · ведкой Р · Р ° С
          We can understand anything, but the higher command thought as it was reflected in the reports.

          This is all THEORETICAL reasoning, and practical conclusions can be drawn only by analyzing the operational situation at the time of the enemy attack on a particular sector of the front.

          .
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Intelligence data and the situation on the maps also confirm this - there are no large strike groups.

          This is a lie, because the Wehrmacht formations for June 22 are quite accurately indicated on the maps and in the reports, and the formation of shock groups can be inferred from the concentration of certain formations in different sectors of the front. This is precisely what the operational department of the district headquarters is doing, which knows the theater of operations and the state of its troops in order to predict where the enemy will be able to achieve his goals, and where he will get bogged down and fail to fulfill the assigned tasks. But all this is FORECASTED, and not accepted as a law - is your "enlightened" mind able to master it?
        2. Olgovich
          Olgovich 8 August 2019 09: 55
          -1
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          Historical experience [war in France] and theoretical studies show that the average advancement speed of a modern strike army is about 10-15 km per day (sometimes 40-50 km) ... ”

          the speed of defeat is the speed of 50 km / day. 14 km / day is already finishing the rest.
          Therefore, it’s logical to focus on 50km
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          No intelligence reconnaissance found.

          But TASS knew perfectly ... June 13:
          occurring in the last time the transfer of German troops freed from operations in the Balkans, в eastern and northeastern regions of Germany ...
          , i.e. to Poland.

          WHAT is not clear when everything is clearly and clearly written WHERE are the shock parts? And tens of kilometers are not a distance for them.
          Quote: AsmyppoL
          P'P ° C € Ryo S,SЂRo SѓS,RІRμSЂR¶RґRμRЅRoSЏ SЏ RЅRμ F ± SѓRґSѓ RєRѕRјRјRμRЅS,RoSЂRѕRІR ° S,SЊ, S,R ° Rє RєR ° Rє RoRј RЅRμS, RЅRo RѕRґRЅRѕRіRѕ RґRѕRєSѓRјRμRЅS,R ° F "SЊRЅRѕRіRѕ RїRѕRґS, верждения РёР »Рё СѓРїРѕРјРёРЅР ° РЅРёР№ РІ мемуР° СЂР ° С ....

          TASS statement of June 13, 1941 to help you.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 8 August 2019 10: 46
            0
            Quote: Olgovich
            Therefore, it’s logical to focus on 50km

            This is not so, because a rifle regiment with full equipment without fighting can overcome 50 km per day, and even then if weather conditions allow. And if you engage in battles, constantly unfolding, then you won’t overcome fifty kilometers per day, unless of course you transfer it by road along roads where there is no enemy. That's why a value of 10-15 km per day is taken, based on the fact that you have to fight, i.e. the value for the worst offensive scenario is laid in advance.
            Quote: Olgovich
            WHAT is not clear when everything is clearly and clearly written WHERE are the shock parts?

            Absolutely accurately written, and understood by any commander unambiguously.
            Quote: Olgovich
            TASS statement of June 13, 1941 to help you.

            Not to mention the many internal documents of NPOs that began to appear and which will still appear later.
            1. Olgovich
              Olgovich 8 August 2019 11: 16
              0
              Quote: ccsr
              That's why a value of 10-15 km per day is taken from the calculation that it will be necessary to fight pre-set value for the worst case scenario offensive.


              15 km / day is the BEST offensive option. But it was necessary to prepare for the Worst - 50 km / day
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 8 August 2019 11: 52
                -1
                Quote: Olgovich
                15 km / day is the BEST offensive option.

                In fact, our military science believed that the Red Army would not allow the Germans to carry out such a pace of advancement in our territory, which is why the cover plans also provided for the readiness, under favorable conditions, to transfer hostilities to enemy territory. For example, in the direction of Lublin.
                I do not think that at that time we could seriously take the German advance of 50 km per day - this was not even considered anywhere.
                1. Olgovich
                  Olgovich 8 August 2019 12: 00
                  0
                  Quote: ccsr
                  In fact, our military science believed that the Red Army would not allow the Germans to carry out such a pace of advancement in our territory, which is why the cover plans also provided for the readiness, under favorable conditions, to transfer hostilities to enemy territory. For example, in the direction of Lublin.

                  this is understandable ....
                  Quote: ccsr
                  I do not think that at that time we could seriously take the German advance of 50 km per day - this was not even considered anywhere.

                  But the campaigns of 1939-40 gave the most serious reason to think about it ....
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 8 August 2019 14: 42
                    -1
                    Quote: Olgovich
                    But the campaigns of 1939-40 gave the most serious reason to think about it ....

                    Apparently, some commanders firmly rooted in their heads that "the Red Army is the strongest of all," and they lost reality in assessing the capabilities of the Wehrmacht, which were completely unexpected for them in the first months of the war. There are, of course, other objective reasons, but underestimation of the training of the Wehrmacht is clearly visible.
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 8 August 2019 08: 18
        -2
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        But on June 19, 20 and 22 in the Soviet headquarters they did not yet know about the pace (70 km / day) of the advance of German troops to Minsk)))

        And how could they know about the pace of advancement of German troops if the introduction of a cover plan in many formations was disrupted, and the Germans were not bogged down in border battles at least for the first day or two?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        At a meeting of the highest command staff in December 1940, other rates of advancement were announced,

        This is the CALCULATED pace for the cases when the troops collide with an equal in strength enemy and take time to overcome his resistance. You personally, from what parameters would you calculate the average daily pace of advancement - would you take numbers from the ceiling?
      3. Olgovich
        Olgovich 8 August 2019 09: 39
        -2
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Advancing on the roads with one or two divisions having greater mobility than infantry formations can be done at high speed ... But it is impossible to advance up to 2/3 of the troops to the border, including the overwhelming mass of infantry - at the pace you specified.

        Yes Yes: tread on at that pace with fights -possible, but just move the same troops, without fighting- "NO"
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        But on June 19, 20 and 22 in the Soviet headquarters they did not yet know about the pace (70 km / day) of the advance of German troops to Minsk)))

        They didn’t know to Minsk, but to WARSAW, yes, they HAD to know: 55 km / day
  5. Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko
    Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko 7 August 2019 09: 51
    +4
    Very interesting ! Yes, something becomes clear on June 21-22! Thank !!!
    1. AsmyppoL
      7 August 2019 19: 03
      +1
      ПожР° Р »СѓР№СЃС‚Р °, СѓРІР ° жР° емы Р№ Андрей Р – РґР ° РЅРѕРІ-Недилько))
      1. Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko
        Andrey Zhdanov-Nedilko 8 August 2019 09: 23
        +1
        I will answer in more detail: although I am a civil engineer by education, and not a professional historian, I have been interested in history, including military, since childhood - but according to the 12-volume "History of the Second World War" some things were distorted to please GlavPUR, were silent or simply lied. I noticed this back then, but in the 1970s-80s there were few other sources and it was impossible to double-check, let alone dispute. Teachers at school also avoided answering. I proposed to create a circle of history lovers following the example of circles in mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology. In response, I heard: Andrey, you have an A in history. So what else do you want? You are alone and for the sake of you no one will create it. The history teacher has a family and she has to go home after school. Do you understand ? That's all, stomp and you're home !!!
        ... the school years flew by quickly - then the university, the army, work, Chernobyl 86-87, again work, travel, work, but the craving for the unknown remained! ... Therefore, I am very glad that I have this site "VOENNOE REVIEW ", where I hear sensible things from normal people and their arguments! In general, thanks a lot !!!
  6. megavolt823
    megavolt823 7 August 2019 12: 17
    +1
    The main thing is not to confuse the military with the political and not to forget the economy. The USSR could not resist in a short-term war. 10 years ago, the country was starving, was under sanctions, and suffered interventions. Many territories of the USSR were ready and deployed (bayonets). Baltic, third of the Ukrainian SSR. The state was preparing in advance for the evacuation of industry. This affected the supply of troops. There were mistakes, stupidities, because how much do not prepare for war, but it is always sudden. If the USSR fought back to the maximum in the first days of the war, it would have been left without economic, military and political support. It was a war between Europe and Eurasia. And not as it is presented, as the Russians against the Germans, Hitler against Stalin. Little was discussed about the events from 1925 to 1935. Many (historians) prefer to talk immediately about the time of Stalin, in order to violently slander and ascribe other people's mistakes. Germany had theorists and practitioners of tank and submarine warfare. Many of us have suffered in repressions and squabbles for power and influence. The truth is always disgusting. Reality does not have a touch of heroism. And only false historians paint with the right paint. Take care of your comrades. hi
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 8 August 2019 08: 29
      0
      Quote: megavolt823
      And only false historians paint with the right paint. Take care of your comrades.

      I agree with your instruction - too many pseudo-historians appeared after the collapse of the USSR, you need to bring them to clean water.
  7. ccsr
    ccsr 7 August 2019 12: 18
    -2
    Author:
    Eugene
    However, this statement cannot be verified due to the lack of intelligence in the period from June 20 to 21 ...

    And why did they create this document?
    Intelligence report
    headquarters of the Western Special Military District
    about the grouping of German troops
    June 21, 1941
    Owls secretly.
    Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red
    Army Lieutenant Comrade Golikov
    Army reconnaissance chiefs: 3, 10, 13, 4
    The German army grouping on 21.6.41 is determined by:
    ...
    CONCLUSION:
    1) According to available data, which are being checked, the bulk of the German army in the strip against the Western Special Military District took up its original position.
    3) In all directions, there is a pull-up of parts and means of reinforcing the border.

    3) By means of intelligence, the location of troops at the border and depth is checked.
    Chief of Staff of the Western Special Military District
    Major General Klimovsky
    Head of Intelligence Division
    Western Special Military District Colonel Blokhin

    http://bdsa.ru/documents/html/donesiune41/41061822.html
    By the way, the author apparently still does not understand that in addition to the daily intelligence reports received from the districts, a intelligence report was also created daily in the General Staff of the General Staff on the basis of all the received intelligence information, including strategic intelligence intelligence, which was reported by the NSS and NGOs. And at their direction, the data from it was promptly communicated both to the command of the districts, and to the heads of intelligence of the districts in the part concerning.
    Apparently the author is too weak to make assessments of the activities of the intelligence structures of NPOs, if he has no idea about the entire array of information that was available in different structures of the armed forces on the eve of the war. That is why he writes about the "lack" of information, instead of honestly saying that apart from what is on the network, he has never seen a single real intelligence report (especially undisclosed ones), and therefore one can blame the intelligence for being wrong reported.
    Typical scam used by mount researchers.
    1. AsmyppoL
      7 August 2019 19: 02
      0
      РџРѕР »СЊР · РѕРІР ° тел СЏ СЃСЃsr: In RўRёРRРRРOS Ѕ RЅS ‹R№ R¶SѓR, SRЊRЅROS ‡ RµСЃРєРёР№ R Ррием, РёСЃРІРѕР» СЊР · СѓРµРјС ‹РіРѕСЂРµ-РёСЃСЃР »Р РРЏРґРЏРЏРЏРЏРґРЏРЏРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґРґР

      СтрР° РЅРЅРѕ, СЗ С‚Рѕ Р'С ‹РІРµС € Р ° еЂте РјРЅРµ СЏСЂР» С ‹Рє РЅРµ СЂР ° Р · РѕР ± СЂР ° РІС € РёСЃСЊ РІ РјР ° теЀЀ RёR »Rё СЃРѕР · РЅР ° тел СЊРЅРѕ РёСЃРєР ° жР° СЏ СЃРјС ‹СЃР».

      СЃcsr РјРѕР¶РµС ‚СЃРїРѕРєРѕР№РЅРѕ дел Р ° ть Р · Р ° СЏРІР »РµРЅРёСЏ: In "Rљ SЃR" RѕRІSѓ, P ° RІS,RѕSЂ RІRoRґRoRјRѕ RґRѕ SЃRoS ... RїRѕSЂ RЅRμ RїRѕRЅRoRјR ° RμS, C ‡ ‡ S,Rѕ RїRѕRјRoRјRѕ RμR¶RμSЃSѓS,RѕS RЅS <C ... SЂR ° F · RІRμRґSЃRІRѕRґRѕRє, RїRѕR "SѓS ‡ P RμRјS ° <C ... Röhr · RѕRєSЂSѓRіRѕRІ, PI P P RЈ "Ryo S,R ° RєR¶Rμ RμR¶RμSЃSѓS,RѕS ‡ RЅRѕ SЃRѕR · RґR RІR ° ° P" P ° SЃSЊ SЂR ° F · ° RІRμRґSЃRІRѕRґRєR RЅR ° RѕSЃRЅRѕRІRμ RІSЃRμR No. RІРѕР »СѓС З РµРЅРЅРѕР№ СЂР ° Р · веды РІР ° тельной РёРЅС„ РѕСЂРјР ° С † РёРё, РІ том СРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёРёР ° гентурной СЂР ° Р · ведки, которР° СЏ РґРѕРєР » ° RґS <RІR ° P "P ° SЃSЊ RќR" Ryo Ryo RќRљRћV ". Хотя РІСЃРµ это РґР ° РІРЅРѕ РёР · Р »РѕР¶РµРЅРѕ РІ С † РёРєР» Рµ Р ° втором Р'РёРє. РџРѕС ... оже этР° С „СЂР ° Р · Р ° преднР° Р · Р ·РЅР ° С З РµРЅР ° тол СЊРєРѕ РґР »СЏ РІРѕР · РІС‹ С € ения СЏРЖ Рµ С € РєРѕР »СЊРЅРёРєРѕРІ, которы ‹Рµ РЅРµ РјРЅРѕРіРѕ Р · РЅР ° СЋС‚ РѕР ± РѕРїРёСЃС ‹РІР ° емы С ... СЃРѕР ± С ‹…

      СЃcsr СЃРїРѕРєРѕР№РЅРѕ Рё СЃРѕР · РЅР ° тельно может РІС ‹СЂС‹ РІР ° ть С З Р ° сть С „СЂР ° Р ·. "RћRґRЅR ° RєRѕ SЌS,Rѕ SѓS,RІRμSЂR¶RґRμRЅRoRμ RЅRμR "SЊR SЏ RїSЂRѕRІRμSЂRoS,SЊ Röhr · · · P ° -P RѕS,SЃSѓS,SЃS,RІRoSЏ SЂR ° F · RІRμRґRoRЅS" RѕSЂRјR ° C † RoRo PI RїRμSЂRoRѕRґ SЃ 20 21 RїRѕ июня… » Ryo RїRѕRґSЃRѕRІS <RІR ° S,SЊ SЃSЃS <P "RєRo, RєRѕS,RѕSЂS <Rμ RЅRμ RoRјRμSЋS, RЅRoRєR ° RєRѕRіRѕ RѕS,RЅRѕS € RμRЅRoSЏ Rє S,RμRєSЃS,Sѓ RІS,RѕSЂR P ° °. РџРѕСЏРІР »СЏРµС‚СЃСЏ СЃСЃС‹ Р »РєР ° РЅР ° СЃРІРѕРґРєСѓ СЂР ° Р · ведотдел Р ° С € тР° Р ± Р ° Р — Р ° РїРћР'Рћ. РўРѕР »СЊРєРѕ РІС‹ СЂРІР ° РЅРЅР ° СЏ С „СЂР ° Р · Р ° РІР · ятР° РёР · СЂР ° Р · дел Р °, РєРѕС‚РѕСЂС ‹Р№ восвяЉЉщЉЉщЉР°СјР‰Р‰СјР‰Р‰СјР‰Р‰СјР‰С‰Р‰Р‰СјР‰РјСјР‰Р‰СјР‰РјСјР‰Р‰СјР‰РјСјР‰РјСјР‰РјСјР‰РјСјР RёRё RёR · СЃРІРѕРґРѕРє R R ° R · RIRPґRґSѓРїСЂР ° РІР »RµРЅРёСЏ Р“ РµРЅС € тР° Р ± Р ° РљРђ! RS,Ro SЃRІRѕRґRєRo RїSЂRμRґRЅR ° F · RЅR ° C ‡ RμRЅS <RґR "SЏ RЅR ° RїSЂR ° RІR" RμRЅRoSЏ RќR ° ± SЂRєRѕRјSѓ RѕR RѕSЂRѕRЅS <RЅR ° C ° F ‡ P "SЊRЅRoRєSѓ P" RμRЅS € S,R ° F ± Р °, СтР° Р »РёРЅСѓ Рё РІ РЎРќРљ. P ‡ RμS SЊ RoRґRμS, RѕR ± RѕS,SЃSѓS,SЃS,RІRoRo RoRјRμRЅRЅRѕ SЃRІRѕRґRѕRє P P P ° · ° RІRμRґSѓRїSЂR RІR "RμRЅRoSЏ P" Ryo RљRђ P · P ° 20 21 RoSЋRЅSЏ Ryo! P • SЃR "Ryo SЏ RѕS € Röhr ± P ° SЋSЃSЊ, S,Rѕ RїSЂRoRІRμRґRoS,Rμ SЃSЃS <P" RєRo RЅR SЂR ° ° P · P RІRμRґSЃRІRѕRґRєRo RЈ P "Ryo RљRђ PI RїRμSЂRoRѕRґ SЃ RїRѕ 20 21 1941 RoSЋRЅSЏ RіRѕRґR °.

      РќРµ нужно СЃСЃС ‹Р» Р ° ться РЅР ° некие РµС ‰ Рµ Р · Р ° СЃРµРєСЂРµС ‡ РµРЅРЅС ‹Рµ СЂР ° Р · ведЁвРРРРІРРРРРІРРРРРІРРРРРІРРРРРРРР P • SЃR "Ryo RoRјRμSЋS,SЃSЏ RЅRμRєRoRμ SЃRμRєSЂRμS,RЅS <Rμ SЃRІRѕRґRєRo, RіRґRμ RїSЂRoRІRμRґRμRЅR ° SЃRѕRІRμSЂS € RμRЅRЅRѕ RoRЅR ° SЏ RoRЅS" RѕSЂRјR ° C † RoSЏ SЂR ° F · RІRμRґRѕRє, S,Rѕ S,RѕRіRґR ° SЃS,RѕRoS, RїSЂRoR · РЅР ° ть С З С‚Рѕ СЂР ° Р · ведкР° РљРђ готовилР° Р» РёРїРѕРІС ‹Рµ СЃРІРѕРґРєРё РґР» СЏ СтР° Р »РёРЅР ° Р 'ерии Рё руководствР° РљРђ Рё РёРј Р · Р ° эту Р »РёРїСѓ РЅРёС З РµРіРѕ РЅРµ Р ± С‹ Р »Рѕ. РќРѕ это уже РёР · СЂР ° Р · делР° Р · Р ° Р ± Р ° Р» С‚С ‹РИР ° РЅРёСЏ первокл Р ° С € ек)))

      РќР ° РїР ° С‚РµС‚РёС ‡ еский РІРѕРїСЂРѕСЃ sssr. "And why did they create this document?»Answer already decades below ccsr user cited summary: "[document] sent 15-20 22 June." This document simply did not reach any addressee! And in order to understand what they knew at the headquarters of ZAPOVO on the eve of the war, you just need to look at the previous intelligence report, which has a date of June 21. There is no particularly disturbing information in this roundup of the June 20 events, and no other surveillance intelligence information has been received by the district headquarters anymore.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 8 August 2019 07: 50
        -1
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Although all this has long been set out in a cycle by Vick.

        Here you write, that’s responsible for your words, and don’t translate arrows on an unknown author.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        It seems that this phrase is intended only to exalt themselves in the person of schoolchildren who do not know much about the events described ...

        This phrase comes from my knowledge of this issue, in which you are not very versed.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Only the torn phrase is taken from the section that is devoted to information from the intelligence reports of the General Staff of the KA!

        And from whom did they receive information daily?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        We are talking about the absence of exactly the intelligence reports of the General Staff of the Spacecraft for June 20 and 21! If I am mistaken, then provide links to intelligence reports of the General Staff of the General Staff of the Spacecraft from June 20 to 21, 1941.

        Why did you get the idea that they are absent if there is an urgent report card, which indicates not only the date, but sometimes the final time for submission of reports? If you have not found the bulletins, then this does not mean that they do not exist.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        No need to refer to some still classified intelligence reports that no one has seen.

        Who told you that all archives of the GRU GSh are declassified? Your naivety is simply amazing.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        To the pathetic question of cssr: “And what was this document created for?” The answer has already been available for decades at the bottom of the ccsr user summary: "[document] sent June 15-20, June 22nd."

        You don’t even know where to find out the correct time for sending documents, but you’re already getting ready to teach me that I know you better.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        This document simply did not reach any addressee!

        Any first-grader can easily refute your lie - this is the text of the bulletin, and the time of sending and receiving is fixed on the cipher telegram forms for each addressee, and not on the reconnaissance text. Now, when you give the text of the cipher telegram of this summary, then we’ll talk about who and when received what.
        1. AsmyppoL
          24 August 2019 21: 41
          0
          But what knowledge of the issue can you have if I brought you to the question for three weeks that Zhukov was the direct head of the Main Air Defense and Communications Directorate !! And you gave me links where it says what I said. Three weeks did not reach what is written in the document quoted by you ...
          Ku-ku rests in one word !!
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 25 August 2019 14: 32
            -4
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            But what knowledge of the issue can you have if I brought you to the question for three weeks that Zhukov was the direct head of the Main Air Defense and Communications Directorate !!

            This happened in mid-March, and before that he was not their boss. And with the beginning of the war, already in August, these structures came out of his subordination. It’s because of your ignorance that you didn’t understand these subtleties, and decided that it was Zhukov who was to blame for all the communication failures. Either liars or mean people who are trying to distort history, in particular, hang on Zhukov all responsibility for the losses in the first months of the war.
            Quote: AsmyppoL
            Ku-ku rests in one word !!

            Well, you will definitely not rest - lie further, remember that your dirt does not stick to everything.
  8. ccsr
    ccsr 7 August 2019 12: 24
    -1
    Author:
    Eugene
    Above the line of separation of responsibility between ZapOVO and KOVO, we see information about the presence at the border of a group of three infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades, a tank brigade and two tank battalions. The map shows the location zone of this grouping depth from 45 to 67 km from the border. Therefore, it cannot be argued that all of these troops were located directly at the border.

    The author once again perverts the true picture and misleads readers, because the June 21 report clearly states:
    5. Most of the troops are in the thirty-kilometer strip from the border. District Suwalki, Aris continues pulling up troops and rear to the border. Artillery is on firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki) heavy and anti-aircraft artillery were installed. Heavy and medium tanks are concentrated there.


    http://bdsa.ru/documents/html/donesiune41/41061822.html
    1. AsmyppoL
      7 August 2019 18: 58
      -1
      Reply to the user cccsr Your link to the evening summary of the intelligence department of the ZAPOVO headquarters is not correct ... The article discusses the KOVO-SWF map with the situation on June 21 (although the map was prepared on June 23). On this map the zone indicated in the article is marked - this cannot be argued. If you determine the scale and measure the distances on the map, you get the distances indicated in the article.

      You completely not careful. In the recipients the intelligence you specified no KOVO and this information could not get on the map prepared at the KOVO headquarters before the war.

      In addition, the summary you have indicated is: “[document] Shipped 22 June 1941 y. at 15 hours 20 minutes"". Therefore, the given summary could not get to the headquarters of KOVO and 22 in June.

      Based on the foregoing, only the situation in the zone of responsibility of ZAPOVO as previously sent to the KOVO headquarters of intelligence information can be marked on the map. Based on her leadership KOVO and made decisions.
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 8 August 2019 07: 35
        -1
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Reply to sssr. Your link to the evening summary of the intelligence department of the ZAPOVO headquarters is not correct ...

        Your ignorance in military intelligence documents has not surprised me for a long time - you are an absolutely incompetent person in these matters.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        You are completely not attentive. The recipients of the intelligence report indicated by you do not have KOVO and this information could not get on the map prepared at the KOVO headquarters before the war.

        This is KOVO intelligence and it was sent to the army and to the General Staff of the General Staff Golikova, which means that at least in the armies it was received before June 22.
        Don’t you see who signed it?
        Chief of Staff of the Western Special Military District
        Major General Klimovsky
        Head of Intelligence Division
        Western Special Military District Colonel Blokhin

        What "addressees" are you fantasizing about?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        In addition, the summary indicated by you contains a note: “[document] was sent on June 22, 1941 at 15 hours 20 minutes” ”. Therefore, the cited summary could not get to the headquarters of KOVO on June 22.

        Yes, it was compiled at the headquarters of KOVO - what are you talking about? A mark about sending only indicates the time when the last recipient confirmed receipt, and not the first, you are not in the subject here. The exact time of sending and receiving the document can only be found on the cipher telegram form, and not on the document itself.
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Based on the foregoing, only the situation in the zone of responsibility of ZAPOVO as previously sent to the KOVO headquarters of intelligence information can be marked on the map.

        Do not smack nonsense - when applying the situation, not only the latest intelligence report is used, into which not all the material can fall due to various reasons, but also what was known before its arrival.
  9. Seal
    Seal 7 August 2019 17: 46
    +1
    The information from the first SWF report is in good agreement with the situation on the map and the intelligence information that was reflected in other pre-war documents.
    Well, so Kirponos and Purkayev did it in essence themselves. After all, the operational department of the Headquarters of the South-Western Front, headed by its chief Colonel Baghramyan, according to him (Baghramyan), deigned to come to the war only at 07:00 on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    And according to my calculations, not earlier than 10:00 on 22.06.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX.
    But the front headquarters without the operations department of the front headquarters is not a headquarters, but fiction.
    So after all, the operational department still needed time to turn around, sit at the desktops, and then still need to collect information, and in the absence of communication with many armies. And Moscow requires a summary.
    1. AsmyppoL
      7 August 2019 18: 54
      -1
      You wrote it right. Only the situation on the map was plotted on June 23 for some explanation. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the situation in the operations department was inflicted. And the situation did not change from June 19 until the outbreak of war
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 8 August 2019 08: 34
        -1
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        You wrote it right. Only the situation was put on the map on June 23 for some explanation.

        Those. Do you even speculate on a genuine map that was conducted at the district headquarters in at least each department, and still want your conclusions to be taken seriously?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        And the situation did not change from June 19 to the outbreak of war

        But if you have not seen the original maps for June 18-21, then how can you say that the situation on them has not changed? You are just blatantly lying, adjusting your "conclusions" to your theory that intelligence was reporting incorrectly, which is why there were dire consequences.
  10. AsmyppoL
    24 August 2019 21: 36
    +1
    Quote: ccsr
    Yes, it was compiled at the headquarters of KOVO - what are you talking about?

    You can’t even read from your link that the report was written in the headquarters intelligence department SOBOVO
    Damn, well, cuckoo
    Give a link to a document or memoirs that the bulletin was sent with the encryption of 21 on June !!
    No need to cheat !!! In the late evening, such headaches were going on at headquarters that the hands did not reach the reports !!! How can you lie constantly and not present facts ...
    How to get sofa experts. You ask about the facts and again a bunch of verbal garbage
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 25 August 2019 14: 57
      -5
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      You can’t even read from your link that the report was written in the intelligence department of ZAPOVO headquarters

      Several summaries are given in the link because it "Dispatches, intelligence reports and orders for June 18-21, 1941"- open your eyes.
      http://bdsa.ru/documents/html/donesiune41/41061822.html
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      No need to cheat !!! In the late evening, such headaches were going on at headquarters that the hands did not reach the reports !!!

      You are definitely an illiterate person in military affairs - the operational duty officer of the intelligence department is preparing a summary, and he does not have the right to disrupt the timelines for its submission, so as not to happen at headquarters. Maybe enough lies about what you just have wild ideas about?
      By the way, the first document on the link just presented intelligence on June 20.00 at 21:XNUMX, but from another district.
      EXPLORATION № 02 K 20.00 21.6.41 HQ PANEVEZHIS
      22.6.41 0.25
  11. ccsr
    ccsr 25 August 2019 14: 58
    -5
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    How to get sofa experts.

    This is stated by a professional liar on military issues - the chickens will die with a laugh ...