On the eve of the Great Patriotic. Reports intelligence about the German group against the troops PribOVO
In the previous part we compared the data presented in the intelligence reports of the General Staff of the spacecraft as of 1 and 22 in June of 1941, with the actual presence of German connections at the border. It was noted that the leadership of the spacecraft incorrectly assessed minimal amount German troops needed to start a war with the Soviet Union (to 180 divisions). However, due to mass misinformation, our intelligence services were unable to document the exit of German formations to the state border until June 21. In accordance with the RM, German troops as of June 21 were located at points of deployment far enough from the border and would simply not have been able to advance to it through an area that did not have so many roads during the day. Discovered tank units were extremely small for an attack on our country.
According to the situation on the map of PribOVO on 21 June, it can be noted that the district command did not suspect that the Nazi troops pulled up to the border and on the night of June 22 were ready to take their initial positions for the attack. In the Moscow Commissariat of Defense in Moscow, a similar map should have had a similar map with the situation according to which the leadership of the 21 SC June also found it difficult to conclude that the war was beginning at dawn on 22.6.41.
Maybe the presented map, which we considered in the previous part, is a post-war falsification of generals who sympathized with the traitor generals? No, it's much easier. The situation was plotted in accordance with the PribOVO intelligence department of the Republic of Moldova as of 17 June and on 20-00 21 June. Both reports are reviewed in detail in a loop. In the same place, the author Wik led the maps with the detailed placement of the German troops in accordance with the data specified in the Republic of Moldova.
The figure shows the area of responsibility of the PribOVO intelligence department (border: Suwalki - Likk - Allenstein - Koenigsberg) and ZOVOVO.
The ZOVOVO intelligence zone of responsibility passes through Suwalki and then beyond the border of the figure (to the west on 53 km), turns to the city of Mlawa and then goes to Warsaw. From Warsaw to the city of Radom and turns to the border. Intelligence ZOVOVO considered its German troops to be located in the cities of Alenstein and Suwalki. The intelligence agency believed that the troops in these cities belong to the PrbOVO area of responsibility.
Also in the Republic of Moldova ZOVOVO intelligence department there are troops stationed outside their area of responsibility. For example, for 400 km from the state border. Therefore, the data on the German troops in the Zapov intelligence department of the Republic of Moldova are exaggerated relative to similar data from the reports of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. Such a course of events lasted long enough and it is difficult to say why it was allowed in the Intelligence Directorate. After all, the RM in the Intelligence Service from the headquarters of Zapovo received regularly ...
For clarity, I will give a picture of the cycle, which correspond to the RM on 20-00 21 June. Last year, the author rechecked the consistency of the parts shown in the figures in the cycle with the data given in intelligence reports. Almost everything coincided. It was not possible to find only 4-5 settlements from the Republic of Moldova. Perhaps not looking hard enough ...
It can be seen from the figure that on the northern flank of the invasion grouping stationed in East Prussia and in the territory of the former Poland, just near the border on the eve of the war, only three infantry battalions and one artillery regiment are deployed to Zadarun. There is no question of such an invasion by such forces on this border!
From the town of Zadarun to the Suvalki ledge (in the PribOVO area of responsibility) there is a larger grouping: the headquarters of the infantry division, 3 infantry regiment, artillery, tank, motorized and cavalry regiments, 2 artillery battalion, 4 infantry and one sapper battalion. In total, these forces can be estimated in 2 ... 2,5 divisions. Of these parts, only three regiments (tank, motorized, and cavalry) can form a kind of mobile group for the rapid advancement into the depths of the territory of the district. From the presented situation, it is possible to assume only certain provocative actions of the German generals against the PribOVO troops in the area of the Suvalki bulge. It was about this that they spoke from Moscow ...
From the figure it can be seen that 8 hours before the start of the war, at a distance of 10 km from the border, there are only four tank battalions. Another part of the infantry, motorized and tank units is located in 15-20 km from the border. PribOVO intelligence did not reveal where the enemy’s strike groups were concentrated at the border. The grouping, concentrated near the city of Gambinnnen, can be redeployed to the Suwalki bulge, which corresponds to the concept of threatened areas, which were reflected in the “Cover Plans ...”.
Some of the German troops disappeared from the zone of attention of our intelligence. Intelligence was instructed to investigate this matter: “... The concentration of German troops continues to the state border. The overall grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions ... It is required to establish ... whether the units that are not indicated in this report continue to be noted by us (our intelligence report No. XXUMX [intelligence from 18.06.41 g.]... »
Information that reconnaissance by PribOVO did not reveal the movement of the German troops to the border before 21 June is confirmed by the order of the chief of artillery headquarters of the 11 Army: “... Headquarters Nachart 11, Kaunas. 21.6.1941 14-00 1. According to intelligence, the situation remains the same... »
Chief of Staff PribOVO, Lieutenant-General Peter Semenovich Klenov was arrested in early July and he was charged with sabotage. In this, he was accused by the testimony of four witnesses, three of whom belonged to the leadership of the PribOVO headquarters intelligence department (later the North-Western Front intelligence department). The present-day RMs show the complete absence on the eve of the war of reliable information provided to the district leadership by the headquarters intelligence department and the General Staff Intelligence Directorate ...
Consider the situation on the map of the North-Western Front (formerly PribOVO) as of 22-23 in June.
From the map you can see that Liepāja is moving near a tank company. An unknown number of infantry and tanks are moving in the direction of Prietkul. Against the three rifle regiments of the 10 th rifle division, there are two infantry regiments in defense.
Unknown enemy units, tanks are marked on the map fragment. Probably 23 Jun marked 61-I Infantry Division. Below are another infantry and one motorized division.
Again, an infantry division with an unknown number of tanks, two infantry regiments, an infantry division, a tank brigade, a more infantry division with a tank regiment.
Up to three infantry divisions, a tank division, an infantry regiment, a motorized regiment, an unknown number of tanks.
War has been going on for a day, but not so many German units have been discovered. Impact groups on the map are not marked and, therefore, are not identified again. Based on the situation on the northern flank of the front, the Germans attached tank units to infantry divisions. This is exactly what was expected of their use in small groups, since reconnaissance has not yet discovered motorized corps and tank groups.
The figure below shows the divisions for the two sections of the North-Western Front.
According to the data available on 22-00, June 22 prepared the Intelligence Report No. XXUMX Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the SC. The figure below shows in blue color the direction of enemy strikes against troops of the North-Western and Western Fronts.
Based on the above, we can state the following:
1) The PribOVO headquarters intelligence department (SZF) in its area of responsibility on 21 June numbered up to 24-24,5 the German divisions from 41, which are in its area of responsibility. This testifies to the excellent work of the German special services and the German military command in disinformation work and in the hidden redeployment of divisions to the border;
2) as of June 21, most of the German troops are concentrated far enough from the border. It takes about 1-2 day crossings to concentrate infantry units and about one to concentrate motorized and tank units. Given the limited number of roads, it can be assumed that concentration will require at least two days. Two days will allow the leadership of the KA and PribOVO to timely bring the troops of the district in full combat readiness. Withdraw troops from permanent deployment points or camps, and disperse Aviation;
3) according to the information of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the SC against the PribOVO troops, the concentrated 29 German divisions. Since only 21-24 divisions are noted in the PribOVO intelligence department’s data on 24,5 June, another five divisions (according to district intelligence officers) are located west of PribOVO’s intelligence area, i.e. far enough from the border;
4) RM about the deployment of German troops on 20-00 21 June cannot indicate the expectation of the start of war at dawn 22 June against the troops of PribOVO.
It is likely that on the night of June 22, county headquarters received numerous reports on the German advancement of the initial positions before the attack to the border. Only this can explain the appearance in the PribOVO Directive No. XXUMX sent to the troops a separate point about the beginning of mining immediately. Even the fact that on the roads of the pit under the installation of mines were dug and mines were transported to the installation sites - they did not have time to install them ...
I propose to consider the topic of overstating the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border. To start the discussion, I’ll give a picture that was used by the author Vick in the intelligence units. On 1 September 1940, the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border (to Slovakia) ranged from 83 to 90. For PM on 1.10.40, the number of divisions ranged from 80 to 88.
According to the Republic of Moldova, on the eve of the war on the border with the Soviet Union (including the border with Romania, but excluding the border with Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine), there were up to 125 German divisions. If we remove from this number the 17 German divisions, which, according to the Republic of Moldova, were near the border in Romania, we get the number of 108 divisions concentrated to Slovakia. By June 22, the German group from Koenigsberg to Slovakia increased by 9,3% compared with the number of the grouping at the end of August 1940 of the year! Intensive transport to the border over the 8,5 months, there was an increase in the German invasion group by only the amount of no more than 10%!
Those who read the parts of the cycle devoted to intelligence understand that the RMs have been rechecked by various intelligence services and, if necessary, they have been preparing requests to double-check the data by other sources. The 83-90 or 80-88 of the German divisions is reasonably accurate intelligence data. German troops were stationed somewhere, soldiers from these divisions were somewhere ... It’s a pity that the actual number of units available in this zone could not be found for this period.
In the period when there was a grouping up to the 80-90 enemy divisions at our border and to the west of it, an interesting conversation took place, which was described in the memoirs of General Sandalov:
The 80-90 of the German divisions near the border in the autumn of 1940 did not scare the leadership of ZOVOVO and KA. At that time, the border did not have tank units and many new formations were expected in the Wehrmacht. There was also a war between Germany and England ...
In the future, the movement of German troops in Romania and the Balkans. However, the number of German troops, which intelligence classifies as possible participants in a war with the USSR is at a sufficiently large level - 78 ... 80 formations. During the 4,5 months, how did the intelligence of the spacecraft and the NKVD regularly monitor these compounds and also regularly continued to significantly overestimate their numbers?
The German command not only carried out the release of misinformation at different levels and in different countries — at least something would reach Soviet intelligence, but it also probably organized many fictitious formations. The presence of these fictitious formations of our intelligence regularly checked and again convinced of their presence. There is almost no information on this on the Internet. Of course, someone decides to use another version for himself: about general betrayal in Soviet intelligence ...
In the Republic of Moldova in April-May it was said about the increase in transportation of German troops, equipment and military supplies. In June, there was a significant increase in these shipments. However, from RM the number of divisions in June increased by only 7-9! And where did all this breakthrough of the German troops, which was seen on the railway sections and stations, go? They settled in places reliably protected from ordinary citizens and probably filled with dummy personnel and equipment.
Intelligence found intensive military transport, but in fact could not determine where these troops were and how many of them were concentrated ...
Since April, 1941, reconnaissance recorded a significant increase in the number of German troops transferred to the border. I will clarify that it is not on the border itself, but in settlements at some distance from it. Deletion could be tens of kilometers (for parts carrying out unloading, for example, in Konigsberg or Warsaw and more).
According to the maximum data from intelligence reports, 4.4.41 German divisions were recorded at 84 near the border. On 25 April - 100 divisions (an increase of 19%), and on 15 of May - 119 (an increase of 41,7%). Our intelligence discovered such transportation volumes. Consequently, they carefully monitored communications and possible stations for unloading military units and equipment.
From 4 April to 15, the number of divisions actually increased from 47 to 71 (an increase of 51%). It turns out that the Germans actually transported the 24 divisions, while intelligence services counted 35 during the same period. There was an overestimate of the volume of transported troops on 45%. Actually, this is misinformation ... I say this not to the people of intelligence, but to the writers, who raise intelligence data to the rank of absolutely correct information that does not require recheck. Intelligence delivered the information that could be obtained and was repeatedly checked.
It has long been estimated that, prior to Slovakia, the German command can transfer by rail to 8 divisions per day! After all, the volume of military traffic can greatly increase! And how should the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the Soviet Union respond to the increase in the transfer of German troops to the border? If you accept the version of PA Sudoplatov - they had to build up a group of spacecraft troops near the border and keep advanced units in readiness. In the same period, the Republic of Moldova arrives in which the dates for the start of the 15-20 war of May are indicated and even the end of May is called.
M.G. Padzhiev (commander of the 94 frontier outpost): “... She reported that the Nazis were preparing to attack the Soviet Union, and named the date of the attack - from the seventeenth to the twenty-fifth of May. Apparently, the date 17-25 of May was accepted by the high command. Immediately after the May Day holiday, the covering units allocated their units to the most threatened areas.
3 or 4 May three army commanders arrived at our outpost. The commander of the rifle battalion, already an elderly man with graying temples, unfolded the map and showed me where the defense should be. In the morning, he and the tanker and artilleryman who accompanied him went around the future defensive area. A day later, a tank platoon and an artillery battery took up positions in a hollow outside the village of Krivka. Rifle companies are located in height between the villages of Khusnya and Ivashkovtsy. Defensive structures were built at an accelerated pace. The works were completed by the second half of May ... "
It is possible that the advancement of the infantry battalion with reinforcement units was carried out at the beginning of May and in other directions ... There is practically no such information. It is easier to find information about the troops on the eve of the war ... This version indirectly can also be confirmed by the directive of the 6 Army Headquarters on the installation of VNOS points (do not confuse them with the territorial VNOS points) and the organization of round-the-clock watch on them. Their readiness should be ensured by 5 May. In principle, this is quite a serious indication. More accurate information could not be found ...
Regarding the occupation in May by the garrisons of the long-term structures of the SDs, the information is rather contradictory. There is one memory of the occupation of the firing points in early May. However, two other memories completely refute this version.
I.P. Krivonogov: “... Comrades commanders,” continued the commanders, “we must be ready at any moment to repel a possible attack. Listen to the order: "In 23-00 30.5.41 years to take bunkers and bring them to full combat readiness. Conduct continuous surveillance of that party. Report everything suspicious to headquarters ... ”. Personnel were in buildings before the war.
A.K. Shtankov (platoon commander, 68 SD): “... For almost the whole of April 1941, the personnel were in integral parts in pillboxes. Weapon cleared of winter grease, ammunition and food were brought into the facilities. But in the beginning of May a new order was received, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the pillboxes. The fighters were again settled in the barracks about a kilometer from the facilities, the officers returned to their families. Food, ammunition and shells returned to the mouth of the warehouse. At the same time shells were abundantly smeared with cannon fats for long-term storage ... "
In the future, I plan to work on the subject of readiness of the border forces of the spacecraft in April-May, 1941. In the next part, we will consider the deployment of German divisions according to intelligence reports against KOVO troops.
To be continued ...
According to the situation on the map of PribOVO on 21 June, it can be noted that the district command did not suspect that the Nazi troops pulled up to the border and on the night of June 22 were ready to take their initial positions for the attack. In the Moscow Commissariat of Defense in Moscow, a similar map should have had a similar map with the situation according to which the leadership of the 21 SC June also found it difficult to conclude that the war was beginning at dawn on 22.6.41.
Maybe the presented map, which we considered in the previous part, is a post-war falsification of generals who sympathized with the traitor generals? No, it's much easier. The situation was plotted in accordance with the PribOVO intelligence department of the Republic of Moldova as of 17 June and on 20-00 21 June. Both reports are reviewed in detail in a loop. In the same place, the author Wik led the maps with the detailed placement of the German troops in accordance with the data specified in the Republic of Moldova.
PribOVO intelligence department's area of responsibility
The figure shows the area of responsibility of the PribOVO intelligence department (border: Suwalki - Likk - Allenstein - Koenigsberg) and ZOVOVO.
The ZOVOVO intelligence zone of responsibility passes through Suwalki and then beyond the border of the figure (to the west on 53 km), turns to the city of Mlawa and then goes to Warsaw. From Warsaw to the city of Radom and turns to the border. Intelligence ZOVOVO considered its German troops to be located in the cities of Alenstein and Suwalki. The intelligence agency believed that the troops in these cities belong to the PrbOVO area of responsibility.
Also in the Republic of Moldova ZOVOVO intelligence department there are troops stationed outside their area of responsibility. For example, for 400 km from the state border. Therefore, the data on the German troops in the Zapov intelligence department of the Republic of Moldova are exaggerated relative to similar data from the reports of the Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Spacecraft. Such a course of events lasted long enough and it is difficult to say why it was allowed in the Intelligence Directorate. After all, the RM in the Intelligence Service from the headquarters of Zapovo received regularly ...
The deployment of German troops on the eve of the war according to intelligence
For clarity, I will give a picture of the cycle, which correspond to the RM on 20-00 21 June. Last year, the author rechecked the consistency of the parts shown in the figures in the cycle with the data given in intelligence reports. Almost everything coincided. It was not possible to find only 4-5 settlements from the Republic of Moldova. Perhaps not looking hard enough ...
It can be seen from the figure that on the northern flank of the invasion grouping stationed in East Prussia and in the territory of the former Poland, just near the border on the eve of the war, only three infantry battalions and one artillery regiment are deployed to Zadarun. There is no question of such an invasion by such forces on this border!
From the town of Zadarun to the Suvalki ledge (in the PribOVO area of responsibility) there is a larger grouping: the headquarters of the infantry division, 3 infantry regiment, artillery, tank, motorized and cavalry regiments, 2 artillery battalion, 4 infantry and one sapper battalion. In total, these forces can be estimated in 2 ... 2,5 divisions. Of these parts, only three regiments (tank, motorized, and cavalry) can form a kind of mobile group for the rapid advancement into the depths of the territory of the district. From the presented situation, it is possible to assume only certain provocative actions of the German generals against the PribOVO troops in the area of the Suvalki bulge. It was about this that they spoke from Moscow ...
From the figure it can be seen that 8 hours before the start of the war, at a distance of 10 km from the border, there are only four tank battalions. Another part of the infantry, motorized and tank units is located in 15-20 km from the border. PribOVO intelligence did not reveal where the enemy’s strike groups were concentrated at the border. The grouping, concentrated near the city of Gambinnnen, can be redeployed to the Suwalki bulge, which corresponds to the concept of threatened areas, which were reflected in the “Cover Plans ...”.
Some of the German troops disappeared from the zone of attention of our intelligence. Intelligence was instructed to investigate this matter: “... The concentration of German troops continues to the state border. The overall grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions ... It is required to establish ... whether the units that are not indicated in this report continue to be noted by us (our intelligence report No. XXUMX [intelligence from 18.06.41 g.]... »
Information that reconnaissance by PribOVO did not reveal the movement of the German troops to the border before 21 June is confirmed by the order of the chief of artillery headquarters of the 11 Army: “... Headquarters Nachart 11, Kaunas. 21.6.1941 14-00 1. According to intelligence, the situation remains the same... »
Chief of Staff PribOVO, Lieutenant-General Peter Semenovich Klenov was arrested in early July and he was charged with sabotage. In this, he was accused by the testimony of four witnesses, three of whom belonged to the leadership of the PribOVO headquarters intelligence department (later the North-Western Front intelligence department). The present-day RMs show the complete absence on the eve of the war of reliable information provided to the district leadership by the headquarters intelligence department and the General Staff Intelligence Directorate ...
Data on the German grouping after the start of the war
Consider the situation on the map of the North-Western Front (formerly PribOVO) as of 22-23 in June.
From the map you can see that Liepāja is moving near a tank company. An unknown number of infantry and tanks are moving in the direction of Prietkul. Against the three rifle regiments of the 10 th rifle division, there are two infantry regiments in defense.
Unknown enemy units, tanks are marked on the map fragment. Probably 23 Jun marked 61-I Infantry Division. Below are another infantry and one motorized division.
Again, an infantry division with an unknown number of tanks, two infantry regiments, an infantry division, a tank brigade, a more infantry division with a tank regiment.
Up to three infantry divisions, a tank division, an infantry regiment, a motorized regiment, an unknown number of tanks.
War has been going on for a day, but not so many German units have been discovered. Impact groups on the map are not marked and, therefore, are not identified again. Based on the situation on the northern flank of the front, the Germans attached tank units to infantry divisions. This is exactly what was expected of their use in small groups, since reconnaissance has not yet discovered motorized corps and tank groups.
The figure below shows the divisions for the two sections of the North-Western Front.
Intelligence of the situation on the North-Western Front
According to the data available on 22-00, June 22 prepared the Intelligence Report No. XXUMX Intelligence Agency of the General Staff of the SC. The figure below shows in blue color the direction of enemy strikes against troops of the North-Western and Western Fronts.
Conclusions on the submitted RM
Based on the above, we can state the following:
1) The PribOVO headquarters intelligence department (SZF) in its area of responsibility on 21 June numbered up to 24-24,5 the German divisions from 41, which are in its area of responsibility. This testifies to the excellent work of the German special services and the German military command in disinformation work and in the hidden redeployment of divisions to the border;
2) as of June 21, most of the German troops are concentrated far enough from the border. It takes about 1-2 day crossings to concentrate infantry units and about one to concentrate motorized and tank units. Given the limited number of roads, it can be assumed that concentration will require at least two days. Two days will allow the leadership of the KA and PribOVO to timely bring the troops of the district in full combat readiness. Withdraw troops from permanent deployment points or camps, and disperse Aviation;
3) according to the information of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the SC against the PribOVO troops, the concentrated 29 German divisions. Since only 21-24 divisions are noted in the PribOVO intelligence department’s data on 24,5 June, another five divisions (according to district intelligence officers) are located west of PribOVO’s intelligence area, i.e. far enough from the border;
4) RM about the deployment of German troops on 20-00 21 June cannot indicate the expectation of the start of war at dawn 22 June against the troops of PribOVO.
It is likely that on the night of June 22, county headquarters received numerous reports on the German advancement of the initial positions before the attack to the border. Only this can explain the appearance in the PribOVO Directive No. XXUMX sent to the troops a separate point about the beginning of mining immediately. Even the fact that on the roads of the pit under the installation of mines were dug and mines were transported to the installation sites - they did not have time to install them ...
The overestimation of the number of German divisions by Soviet intelligence
I propose to consider the topic of overstating the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border. To start the discussion, I’ll give a picture that was used by the author Vick in the intelligence units. On 1 September 1940, the number of German divisions on the Soviet-German border (to Slovakia) ranged from 83 to 90. For PM on 1.10.40, the number of divisions ranged from 80 to 88.
According to the Republic of Moldova, on the eve of the war on the border with the Soviet Union (including the border with Romania, but excluding the border with Slovakia and the Carpathian Ukraine), there were up to 125 German divisions. If we remove from this number the 17 German divisions, which, according to the Republic of Moldova, were near the border in Romania, we get the number of 108 divisions concentrated to Slovakia. By June 22, the German group from Koenigsberg to Slovakia increased by 9,3% compared with the number of the grouping at the end of August 1940 of the year! Intensive transport to the border over the 8,5 months, there was an increase in the German invasion group by only the amount of no more than 10%!
Those who read the parts of the cycle devoted to intelligence understand that the RMs have been rechecked by various intelligence services and, if necessary, they have been preparing requests to double-check the data by other sources. The 83-90 or 80-88 of the German divisions is reasonably accurate intelligence data. German troops were stationed somewhere, soldiers from these divisions were somewhere ... It’s a pity that the actual number of units available in this zone could not be found for this period.
In the period when there was a grouping up to the 80-90 enemy divisions at our border and to the west of it, an interesting conversation took place, which was described in the memoirs of General Sandalov:
"... At first, it may be necessary to retreat," Pavlov specified ... But when the internal districts come from the rear, "Pavlov looked at Tyulenin," when the authorized density is reached in your army band - 7,5 kilometers per division, then, of course , it will be possible to move forward and not doubt the success ...
Then Chuikov rose:
“You are well aware, comrade commander of the district, that in the first echelon of the 4 Army in the spring of this year there were only two divisions a hundred and fifty kilometers of front. In the summer we threw another one. So now the density is fifty kilometers per division. In the second echelon, too, not much - only one division. This is not an army, but only a corps ... Why not advance two or three divisions from the rear of the country into our lane in advance?
- How do you not understand that such actions can provoke a war? - Pavlov answered irritably. - And we don’t have barracks to house new troops ...
I hurried to help Chuikov:
- A new division into the army can be held in the spring under the guise of training fees. With housing, there will be a way out: at first, we will build dugouts. After all, we thus settled the forty-ninth division.
Zaporozhets interrupted me:
— We have a non-aggression pact with Germany, and there is no reason to doubt that it is not fulfilling its obligations.. And in general, - he turned in the direction of Pavlov, - it starts to seem to me that some of your commanders here begin to show excessive German fear.
And although the Zaporozhets uttered the last words with a smile, Pavlov, who knew something that Chuikov did not know. neither did I feel that this was no longer a member of the Military Council of the capital district. He also painted a smile on his face and tried to bring complete clarity:
“Do you speak in this case as a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District or already as the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda? ..”
Then Chuikov rose:
“You are well aware, comrade commander of the district, that in the first echelon of the 4 Army in the spring of this year there were only two divisions a hundred and fifty kilometers of front. In the summer we threw another one. So now the density is fifty kilometers per division. In the second echelon, too, not much - only one division. This is not an army, but only a corps ... Why not advance two or three divisions from the rear of the country into our lane in advance?
- How do you not understand that such actions can provoke a war? - Pavlov answered irritably. - And we don’t have barracks to house new troops ...
I hurried to help Chuikov:
- A new division into the army can be held in the spring under the guise of training fees. With housing, there will be a way out: at first, we will build dugouts. After all, we thus settled the forty-ninth division.
Zaporozhets interrupted me:
— We have a non-aggression pact with Germany, and there is no reason to doubt that it is not fulfilling its obligations.. And in general, - he turned in the direction of Pavlov, - it starts to seem to me that some of your commanders here begin to show excessive German fear.
And although the Zaporozhets uttered the last words with a smile, Pavlov, who knew something that Chuikov did not know. neither did I feel that this was no longer a member of the Military Council of the capital district. He also painted a smile on his face and tried to bring complete clarity:
“Do you speak in this case as a member of the Military Council of the Moscow Military District or already as the head of the Main Directorate of Political Propaganda? ..”
The 80-90 of the German divisions near the border in the autumn of 1940 did not scare the leadership of ZOVOVO and KA. At that time, the border did not have tank units and many new formations were expected in the Wehrmacht. There was also a war between Germany and England ...
In the future, the movement of German troops in Romania and the Balkans. However, the number of German troops, which intelligence classifies as possible participants in a war with the USSR is at a sufficiently large level - 78 ... 80 formations. During the 4,5 months, how did the intelligence of the spacecraft and the NKVD regularly monitor these compounds and also regularly continued to significantly overestimate their numbers?
The German command not only carried out the release of misinformation at different levels and in different countries — at least something would reach Soviet intelligence, but it also probably organized many fictitious formations. The presence of these fictitious formations of our intelligence regularly checked and again convinced of their presence. There is almost no information on this on the Internet. Of course, someone decides to use another version for himself: about general betrayal in Soviet intelligence ...
In the Republic of Moldova in April-May it was said about the increase in transportation of German troops, equipment and military supplies. In June, there was a significant increase in these shipments. However, from RM the number of divisions in June increased by only 7-9! And where did all this breakthrough of the German troops, which was seen on the railway sections and stations, go? They settled in places reliably protected from ordinary citizens and probably filled with dummy personnel and equipment.
Intelligence found intensive military transport, but in fact could not determine where these troops were and how many of them were concentrated ...
Since April, 1941, reconnaissance recorded a significant increase in the number of German troops transferred to the border. I will clarify that it is not on the border itself, but in settlements at some distance from it. Deletion could be tens of kilometers (for parts carrying out unloading, for example, in Konigsberg or Warsaw and more).
According to the maximum data from intelligence reports, 4.4.41 German divisions were recorded at 84 near the border. On 25 April - 100 divisions (an increase of 19%), and on 15 of May - 119 (an increase of 41,7%). Our intelligence discovered such transportation volumes. Consequently, they carefully monitored communications and possible stations for unloading military units and equipment.
From 4 April to 15, the number of divisions actually increased from 47 to 71 (an increase of 51%). It turns out that the Germans actually transported the 24 divisions, while intelligence services counted 35 during the same period. There was an overestimate of the volume of transported troops on 45%. Actually, this is misinformation ... I say this not to the people of intelligence, but to the writers, who raise intelligence data to the rank of absolutely correct information that does not require recheck. Intelligence delivered the information that could be obtained and was repeatedly checked.
It has long been estimated that, prior to Slovakia, the German command can transfer by rail to 8 divisions per day! After all, the volume of military traffic can greatly increase! And how should the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the Soviet Union respond to the increase in the transfer of German troops to the border? If you accept the version of PA Sudoplatov - they had to build up a group of spacecraft troops near the border and keep advanced units in readiness. In the same period, the Republic of Moldova arrives in which the dates for the start of the 15-20 war of May are indicated and even the end of May is called.
M.G. Padzhiev (commander of the 94 frontier outpost): “... She reported that the Nazis were preparing to attack the Soviet Union, and named the date of the attack - from the seventeenth to the twenty-fifth of May. Apparently, the date 17-25 of May was accepted by the high command. Immediately after the May Day holiday, the covering units allocated their units to the most threatened areas.
3 or 4 May three army commanders arrived at our outpost. The commander of the rifle battalion, already an elderly man with graying temples, unfolded the map and showed me where the defense should be. In the morning, he and the tanker and artilleryman who accompanied him went around the future defensive area. A day later, a tank platoon and an artillery battery took up positions in a hollow outside the village of Krivka. Rifle companies are located in height between the villages of Khusnya and Ivashkovtsy. Defensive structures were built at an accelerated pace. The works were completed by the second half of May ... "
It is possible that the advancement of the infantry battalion with reinforcement units was carried out at the beginning of May and in other directions ... There is practically no such information. It is easier to find information about the troops on the eve of the war ... This version indirectly can also be confirmed by the directive of the 6 Army Headquarters on the installation of VNOS points (do not confuse them with the territorial VNOS points) and the organization of round-the-clock watch on them. Their readiness should be ensured by 5 May. In principle, this is quite a serious indication. More accurate information could not be found ...
Regarding the occupation in May by the garrisons of the long-term structures of the SDs, the information is rather contradictory. There is one memory of the occupation of the firing points in early May. However, two other memories completely refute this version.
I.P. Krivonogov: “... Comrades commanders,” continued the commanders, “we must be ready at any moment to repel a possible attack. Listen to the order: "In 23-00 30.5.41 years to take bunkers and bring them to full combat readiness. Conduct continuous surveillance of that party. Report everything suspicious to headquarters ... ”. Personnel were in buildings before the war.
A.K. Shtankov (platoon commander, 68 SD): “... For almost the whole of April 1941, the personnel were in integral parts in pillboxes. Weapon cleared of winter grease, ammunition and food were brought into the facilities. But in the beginning of May a new order was received, and the garrisons were withdrawn from the pillboxes. The fighters were again settled in the barracks about a kilometer from the facilities, the officers returned to their families. Food, ammunition and shells returned to the mouth of the warehouse. At the same time shells were abundantly smeared with cannon fats for long-term storage ... "
In the future, I plan to work on the subject of readiness of the border forces of the spacecraft in April-May, 1941. In the next part, we will consider the deployment of German divisions according to intelligence reports against KOVO troops.
To be continued ...
Information