Surface ships against the aircraft. Rocket era
The first decades after the Second World War were marked by a real revolution in the naval business. The massive appearance of the radar in all naval forces, automation of anti-aircraft fire control, the emergence of anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ship missiles, the emergence of nuclear submarines with unlimited range, high speed underwater, and the lack of the need to ascend during a combat campaign in the amount changed the sea battle to unrecognizable .
A little later, anti-ship missiles launched from aircraft, all-weather deck and basic shock became a mass phenomenon aviation, air refueling, long-range ground-based radars.
The world has changed, and the fleets have changed with it. But have the capabilities of surface ships changed to counter aircraft attacks? We will repeat just in case the main conclusions from the experience of the Second World War (see the article "Surface ships against aircraft. World War II".).
So, abbreviated quote from the first part:
Are these conclusions true to the present? Fortunately, the emergence of nuclear weapons saved mankind from the nightmare of full-scale planetary wars. This, however, led to some virtualization of the combat capabilities of the fleets - we simply do not know what a serious sea war will look like with the use of modern technology. No teachings and no mathematical modeling will give such an understanding in full.
However, a number of countries have some combat experience of modern naval war. But before analyzing it, it is worth paying attention to military maneuvers - in that part that would differ little from a real war, happen such. First of all, it concerns the detection of ships, which in serious maneuvers are always carried out with the same exertion of forces as in a real war.
Let us ask ourselves the question: was it really possible for surface ships to slip away from aviation in the era of radars with a range of hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometers? After all, if you turn your attention to the experience of the Second World War, then the key to the success of a surface ship is not only its air defense, but also the ability to be where the enemy does not expect it and is not looking. Already not looking, or not yet looking, no difference. The sea is big.
Article “How can a rocket ship sink an aircraft carrier?” A few examples" examples of the confrontation of rocket ships and the aircraft carrier were dismantled. Let us briefly list how the surface ships (who had no cover at all) managed during the training, in an environment as close as possible to the combat, to escape the enemy, who used carrier-based aircraft for their search, including DRLO aircraft.
1. Disguise under merchant ships. URO ships were moving along trade routes, at the speed of merchant ships, not showing themselves to turn on the radar, in full, as Vice-Admiral Hank Mastin said, “electromagnetic silence”. The radar was turned on only at the time preceding the conventional launch of the missiles. Air reconnaissance, focusing on radar signals, was unable to classify the detected ships, taking them for merchant ships.
2. Dispersal. Admiral Woodward, later commanding the British naval unit during the Falklands War, simply dispersed all of his ships so that American pilots from the aircraft carrier Coral Sea simply would not have been able to “melt down” (by convention, of course) all of them before darkness. And at night, the last "surviving" destroyer was the British ... disguised as a cruise liner (see paragraph 1, as they say). And in the end went to the aircraft carrier at a distance of a rocket strike.
3. The use of the unexpected for the enemy, "wrong" tactics, such as for which you can and "scolding" get. During the conditional strike on the "Eisenhower" Mastin commanded the Forrestal AUG. All doctrinal installations of the US Navy, all combat training, the entire experience of the exercises said that it was the Forrestal carrier aircraft that were supposed to be the main striking force in the operation. But Mastin simply went on an aircraft carrier to an area where, from the point of view of the combat mission, his finding was completely meaningless, stopped flights, and sent Eisenhower missile escort ships, which again were disguised in civilian traffic, focusing on passive means of detection and intelligence from external sources.
Aviation lost in all cases, and in the case of the American exercises it lost dry - URO ships unhindered took to the distance of a rocket strike on an aircraft carrier and worked on it with rockets at the moment when its deck was filled with airplanes ready for combat flight. With bombs, with fuel ... They never got their way.
The British did not work dry. Of the entire strike group, one ship survived, and if this attack were to be in reality, it would have been sunk by escort ships. But - they would have sunk after the "Exocates" would have hit the aircraft carrier. Woodward simply did not have room for maneuver in that area, and the only way to get his way was to substitute the ships for the strike of the planes, which he did. These teachings turned out to be prophetic - very soon after that, Woodward had to substitute his own ships for real air strikes, take losses and, in general, lead the war "on the verge of a foul" ...
But the loudest example was given by completely different teachings ...
From the memoirs of Rear Admiral V.A. Karev "Unknown Soviet" Pearl Harbor ":
Example exercises NorPac Fleetex Ops'82 Some people may not seem to be completely “clean” - firstly, the Americans substituted the whole AUG with the aircraft carrier “Enterprise” as bait - without this, they would not have succeeded in hiding the Midway AUG from our air reconnaissance. In a real war, they would have had such a trick only during the first sudden strike, which in itself is very unlikely. Secondly, during the operation, the Americans actively used their aircraft for disinformation, which, by their actions, created a distorted picture of what was happening in the intelligence of the Pacific Fleet.
But the specific episode with the departure of the already combined carrier-assault strike link with two aircraft carriers from the conventional strike of missile carriers from Kamchatka is just what we are interested in. A ship connection detected by enemy reconnaissance must be attacked by its aircraft. But by the time the aircraft arrives, there is no ship connection on the spot, and nowhere in the detection range of the aircraft is the radar either. Exactly this element, which the Americans showed us, was made out of touch with the presence of aviation in the strike compound. It could also be done by connecting missile ships.
How is it going?
Those who were involved in the interpretation of intelligence, know how. At present, a naval connection at a large distance from the coast can be detected by optical-electronic space reconnaissance, over-the-horizon radar, aerial reconnaissance, surface ships, radio electronic and electronic reconnaissance means, and in some cases, submarines. At the same time, the boat is extremely limited in the classification of such a contact, its hydroacoustics may simply not understand what they heard, and the data transmission from the submarine will in any case be carried out with the planned contact, as a result of which the data will become outdated. Chasing a "contact" boat, as a rule, can not, it will mean the loss of stealth. The range at which it detects ships is greater than that of ship-based sonar systems, but much smaller than that of radar facilities.
What can a group of surface ships oppose to such a detection? Firstly, the orbits of satellites and the time of their flight over any part of the world ocean are known in advance. The same Americans widely use maneuvers under the cover of cloudiness. Secondly, masking under trade traffic works against satellites and ZGRLS - ships are scattered among merchant ships, their construction does not bear signs of a combat formation order, as a result, the enemy simply sees a break through the same type of signals on the intensive merchant shipping route, and there is no possibility to classify them.
Again, the Americans understand that sooner or later their opponent, that is, we will be able to obtain more accurate data about the reflected radar signal and analyze them, so they have used and used various tactical schemes for counter tracking for many years. For example, in the course of the “window” between the span of the aircraft carrier satellites and the tanker already leaving the junction, they switch places. Ship signatures are made similar by various methods. In a number of cases, it is possible to deceive with such methods not only reconnaissance on the “coast” but also tracking ships hanging by the Americans “ha tail” - for example, it was in 1986 during the attack of the US Navy on Libya - the Soviet Navy simply lost an aircraft carrier, who participated in the strike, and intelligence could not track the rise of the aircraft.
Thirdly, the care to that very “electromagnetic silence” described by Admiral Mastien and many others is applied against various types of radio intelligence - it is impossible to detect the radiation of a target that emits nothing. Actually, this is what they usually do when they hide.
Aerial reconnaissance is a much more obvious threat on the one hand - if they found an aircraft or a group of ships, they discovered it. But on the other hand, they need to know where to find the target. A modern combat aircraft, such as, for example, the Tu-95, can detect the signature of a working shipborne radar system more than a thousand kilometers from the ship - the tropospheric refraction of centimeter radio waves contributes to a very wide spread of radiation from the radar. But if the radar does not radiate? The ocean is huge, where to look for targets among hundreds, if not thousands of similar to indistinguishable contacts, observed with the help of SGRLS is not clear. A submarine is a risk - but in any kind of search its target detection range in the open ocean is still insufficient, and the data quickly becomes outdated. For effective use of submarines, you need to know about where the attacked target will soon be. This is probably not always.
In the case of detection of the ship's connection at sea, the latter can destroy the aircraft or the enemy's ship, cutting off the transfer of the location of the connection to the enemy, after which it will be necessary to get out from under a potential air strike.
How to do it? An abrupt change of course, in some cases dispersal of forces, leaving the dangerous area at maximum speed. When performing such a maneuver, the commander of the compound knows how much time the enemy needs so that the compound will be attacked by truly large aviation forces large enough to destroy it. No air force and no naval aviation has the ability to constantly hold entire regiments of airplanes in the air - at all times, the air forces that had the task of destroying the naval formations were waiting for an order to strike in the alert position at the airfield, in “readiness number two”. In another way it is impossible, only individual units can be on duty in the air, in exceptional cases and not for long - a squadron.
Next comes his majesty calculator. The rise of the regiment on alert from readiness number two, its construction in order of battle and the exit to the desired course is ideally an hour. Next, the distance from the air bases, which are known to the commander of the naval compound, is taken, the speed with which enemy aircraft go to the target according to past experience, the typical force squad for additional intelligence, the detection range of surface radars of enemy aircraft ... and everything, in fact, areas to be transferred ship group to avoid hitting easily miscalculated. That is how the Americans in the 1982 year, and many times after that, came out of the conventional attack of the USSR Navy MRA. We left successfully.
The task of the commander of the operation of the ship's shock group ultimately boils down to the fact that at the moment when its location supposedly should be opened by the enemy (and it is likely to be opened sooner or later), be at such a distance from its air bases in order to have time left for way out of the blow.
What happens if the blowout succeeds? Now the ship shock group gets a head start in time. If the enemy has other air regiments, then now he will have to throw some of the forces back at the air reconnaissance, find the ship group, raise the strike forces, and all over again. If the enemy does not have other aviation forces in the theater, then it is still worse for him - now all the time that the strike forces of aviation will return to the airfield, re-prepare for a combat flight, wait for the aerial reconnaissance data that is relevant at the very moment when the flight is again it will be possible to fly again on the strike, the ship group will act freely. And the only threat to it will be that the enemy’s reconnaissance will also be able to attack it when detected, but this raises the question of who is who — the ship is far from defenseless, the group of ships is all the more, and there are excellent examples from combat experience, which will be discussed below. This regiment of aircraft can, in theory, "crush" with a mass of air defense missiles of the ship group, but a couple or two pairs of aircraft cannot.
Suppose, the KUG has won eight hours from one massive air strike failed by the enemy to a potential next one. It is at a good speed of approximately 370-400 kilometers traveled in any direction. This is the distance from Sapporo to Aniva Bay (Sakhalin) with regard to maneuvering. Or from Sevastopol to Constanta. Or from Novorossiysk to any port on the eastern part of the Black Sea coast of Turkey. Or from Baltiysk to the coast of Denmark.
This is a lot, especially considering that in fact the modern ship does not need to come close to shore to attack a ground target.
But eight hours is not the limit. Other aircraft so much for one only inter-flight service will require. Without taking flight time.
At the same time, it should be understood that modern ships are armed with cruise missiles and, in principle, such a CBG can attack any airfield, and any important radar from a distance of "a thousand kilometers or more." Unfulfilled airstrike for the air regiment may be the last mistake and after its landing at the home airfield cruise missiles from ships that could not be destroyed will fall on it. And this is what awaits various types of SGRLS immediately, long before the first rise of strike aircraft.
This is true for the ships of our opponents, this is true for our ships. They can do all this, we can too. Such actions, of course, require extensive support - above all intelligence. They require excellent training of personnel - apparently superior to the one that has personnel in the Navy of most countries. But they are possible. No less possible than air strikes.
Of course, all this should not be understood as a guaranteed safety of surface ships from air attacks. Aviation may well "catch" the ships off guard, and then the military story replenished with another tragedy like the sinking of the "Prince of Wales." The probability of this option is not zero, it is, frankly, high.
But the probability of the opposite is not lower. Contrary to popular belief.
But how do modern surface ships behave under attack from the air? After all, to avoid one-time departure of large enemy aviation forces is one thing, but after all, an air reconnaissance can also be armed and can attack a detected target after transmitting information about its location. The duty link, unlike the regiment, may well be on duty with rockets in the air, and then the strike on the detected ships will be delivered almost instantly. What does the closest experience say about the vulnerability of modern warships to air strikes?
The only episode where such events took place in a more or less massive amount is the Falklands War.
Atmospheric video from the scene (to feel)
It was the largest after the Second World War, and in the course of its naval forces suffered the greatest losses in the post-war history of the ship. It is customary to think that on the Falklands, surface ships suffered unjustifiably high losses from the actions of aviation, and, as many think, almost proved that their time was up. Understand this war in more detail.
The history of this conflict and the course of the fighting are set forth in the mass of sources and in sufficient detail, but practically all commentators leave out of their consideration the completely obvious features of this war.
A Ship's Fool to Fight a Fort (Foolishness to fight a fortress for a ship). This phrase is attributed to Nelson, although for the first time it is recorded in one of the letters of Admiral John Fisher. Its meaning is that to throw with the ships on the defense prepared in advance (no matter what is behind this word) is nonsense. And the British really acted that way. Their standard scheme was to first achieve dominance at sea, then completely block the enemy’s ability to threaten the British naval forces, and only then land a large and powerful landing force.
The war for the Falklands went strictly the opposite. The English strike force commander, John Woodward, was expressly forbidden to conduct military operations outside the zone to which the Teacher government wanted to limit the war. Britain found itself in a politically difficult position and the entire burden of this position fell on the Royal Navy.
Woodward had to take the island by storm in conditions when the enemy had a mass of air forces to protect them. Take tight time limits before seasonal storms hit the South Atlantic. Without resorting to either blockade actions or “offensive mining” from submarines, attacking the enemy “in the forehead”. He had to throw his ships into battle against the whole of Argentina, and not only (and not so much) of its fleet. This required such a specific step as the “Battle of the Bomb Alley”, and it was this that in many ways caused the losses that the British suffered as a result.
Let us clarify the question of how surface ships showed themselves vulnerable to air strikes, while on the high seas as a result of this war? We remember that today the main combat missions - from the blockade to strikes with cruise missiles. Ships perform it in the open sea, not somewhere under the shore. How in these conditions was with the vulnerability of the British?
Excluding the ships that covered the landing, Woodward’s surface forces lost two ships to the air attacks. One of them was the Atlantic Conveyor transport, a civilian vessel built without any constructive measures to ensure survivability, without any means of protection from airplanes or rockets and full of combustible cargo.
Transport is just not lucky. He was not equipped in a hurry with the passive jamming systems, and the rocket, set aside by a false cloud of targets, from a real warship, deviated precisely to the transport and struck him. This case does not give us anything to assess the survival of warships, since the Atlantic Conveyor was not, although it must be admitted that the British suffered tremendous damage, and for the Argentines it was a major victory, which, however, did not save them.
And the British lost the warship on the sea ... one - the destroyer Sheffield. Moreover, they lost under still unclear circumstances. Or rather, not fully disclosed. Therefore, we list the facts that we know about this drowning.
1. The radar ship were disabled. According to the official version - in order not to interfere with satellite communications. This version worries us a little, we confine ourselves to the fact that radars were turned off at the ship in the combat zone.
2. KP "Sheffield" received a warning about a rocket attack from the EM "Glasgow" in advance - like all British ships at sea at that moment.
3. Sheffield watch officers did not react to this warning, did not deliver the LOC, they did not even bother the ship commander. At the same time, there was plenty of time for setting a false cloud of goals.
There is the so-called "human factor". It is worth noting that at that time the crews and commanders of the ships were exhausted by false alarms, and many did not believe the Glasgow warning. For example, the shift on duty at KP "Invincible". It was possible that this was also the case at Sheffield. But it was necessary to shoot the false targets ...
Thus, we summarize - the Argentines outside the "bomb lane", where Woodward deliberately framed his fleet "under execution" managed to destroy one combat ship. Because of the erroneous actions of his crew. And one transport on which they really did not aim, the rocket attacked it by chance.
Can this be considered evidence that surface ships are doomed during air raids?
In total, the Argentine "Super-Etandara" made five combat sorties, one of which was in conjunction with the "Skyhawks", fired five Exochet missiles, sank the "Sheffield" and "Atlantic Conveyor", in the last flight the joint group "Super-Etendarov" and The Skyhocks lost two planes (the Skyhawks) were shot down, and the last missile was shot down. For Argentines, these are more than good results. But they talk about the vulnerability of ships quite a bit. None of the ships that managed to expose the LOC was not hit, but as soon as the EX Exter appeared on the arena, the attacking side immediately lost. Sheffield is guaranteed to have survived, if its crew acted as the team of any other British ship acted in that war. “Atlantic Conveyor” would have survived, if the British were to attach the launchers of false targets during the revision.
Note that the Argentines acted in very favorable conditions - the ship’s radar and British air defense system had continuous technical problems, and the political restrictions imposed on the fleet made his maneuvers extremely predictable and the Argentines knew where to look for the British. It is also important that the Britons could not get the Argentine "Neptune", which provided guidance for the aircraft to 15 in May 1982 year. They simply had nothing to do. It is also indicative of how many real-life sorties against ships and ships outside the Falkland Strait were able to make by the Argentines.
All other battles between planes and warships took place in the Falkland Channel - a channel between the islands, from 10 to 23 kilometers wide, surrounded by mountains and rocks.
These were ideal conditions for the attackers - a small space with a large number of targets, the always known position of the enemy ships and the relief, which allows them to secretly reach the target - only a few tens of seconds before the bombs drop.
In contrast to the Argentines, the surface ships of Woodward were actually driven into a trap, they could not leave, there was no place to maneuver, and as luck would have it, there were mass refusals of the air defense system. In the course of the subsequent battles, situations when the sailors, when repelling air raids, ran out onto the deck and fired at small-arms aircraft, were the norm. In this case, the plan of operation itself provided for the following. From the memoirs of John Woodward:
Thus, according to the battle plan, the surface ships were supposed to take the first strike of the Argentine aviation, inflict maximum possible losses on the attacking aircraft, break the attack on the landing force and transport for it at any cost, and only then, when the Argentines who had already freed themselves from the bombs “Harriers” would be involved. Aircraft targeting on the enemy should also be provided by ships. Woodward in his memoirs writes straightforward - we waged a war of attrition against Argentine aviation. The ships in the strait were put under execution, with the task of preventing the disruption of the landing force and if they “ran out” faster than the Argentine aircraft, the war would have been lost. A little later, when the British adapted to the situation, the "Harriers" began to intercept Argentine aircraft before they attacked the British ships. But at first it was not like that. 21 May 1982 in the first half of the day, the British put on a “clean” experiment - they took the battle with the aircraft without air support, and having the Harriers work to cut off the leaving Argentines, for all its importance, it had zero impact on the safety of the ships under attack. . Again the word Woodward.
The first time the “Harriers” worked to break the attack only after 14.00. Prior to that, the ships had to fight alone, and then mostly the Argentine planes made their way to the ships with bombs and the ships mostly had to repel their attacks themselves.
September 21 was one of the hardest days for the British. Of the seven warships that joined the battle - the frigate Ardent was destroyed by the Argentines, the Entrym was seriously damaged and could not shoot, but remained afloat and kept the course, the Argonot was seriously damaged and lost its course, but could weapons, two more ships had serious damage reducing their combat capability.
And this despite the fact that the Argentines made fifty sorties against British forces. In a narrow strait, where everything is in full view and there is no room for maneuver.
At the same time, it should be understood that the only surface ship lost on that day, the Ardent, was lost due to the inoperative air defense system. The first blow, which did not destroy the ship, but cost him its combat capability, was missed precisely because of this, if the ship’s air defense missile system was intact, the Ardent would probably not have been lost.
In further battles, the role of the Harriers continued to grow, and it was they who ensured the majority of the losses of the attacking aircraft. If we single out from the general list of downed Argentine attack aircraft and fighters only those who died at the time of the British repelling attacks on their ships, then it turns out that the "Harriers" shot down a little more than half of all these aircraft, and the ships - a little more than a third. The role of the Harriers in the depletion of the Argentine forces was thus extremely important, but it must be understood that they overtook most of their victims after they dropped bombs on British ships. Yes, and directed them to target from the ships.
Woodward’s book is full of emotions and doubts that the British will manage to hold out, but the fact remains that they didn’t just hold out, they won, and they won in a theoretically hopeless situation — a large lake of water size, numerical superiority of the enemy in aviation and non-working air defense systems . And as a result - from the 23 URO ships in general, who participated in the war from the British side, was lost ... 4. Less than 20%. Somehow it does not fit with the crushing role of aviation. The performance of the "Harriers" in this case should not deceive anyone.
Could the British only defeat URO ships, without the support of the Harriers? With the existing plan of operation, they could not. Although the ships successfully repulsed the attacks, the losses they inflicted were not sufficient for the Argentines to dry up so quickly. They would continue to attack and not the fact that the British would not have ended the ships before. But this provided that the plan of operation would be the same, and that the landing zones would be there, and that the landing pattern, under which it continued not only at night, but also during the day, would not have changed ...
Generally speaking, such a plan, which would allow an amphibious assault operation without using “Harriers” to protect URO ships, was quite possible, simply not needed.
And, of course, fantasizing about how things would have gone if the Argentines had bombs working normally would have been dofantazirovat and for the other side, and assume that the British air defense system and radar. So honest.
What did the Falklands war show? She showed that surface forces can fight against aviation and win. And also that it is very difficult to sink a ship that is on the high seas on the move and ready to repel an attack. The Argentines failed. Never.
Enthusiasts of rocket strikes from the air like to recall the American defeat of the Stark frigate by an Iraqi rocket launched from an Iraqi aircraft allegedly converted into a rocket-carrying carrier of a business jet Falcon 50.
But we must understand one simple thing - the operational connection of the US Navy, which included the frigate, did not conduct military operations against Iraq or Iran. For this reason, the frigate did not open fire on an Iraqi aircraft when the latter was discovered.
Starck spotted an Iraqi aircraft at 20.55. In a real combat situation at that moment the ship would have opened fire on the plane, and most likely the incident would have been settled on this - at the cost of either escaping or shooting down the plane. But Stark was not at war.
But next year, another American ship turned up in the war - the Wainwright missile cruiser, the same one on which Vice-Admiral Mastin worked on the use of Tomahawks anti-ship. The operation "Mantis" conducted by the US Navy against Iran in 1988 was mentioned in the article "The harmful myth of the mosquito fleet". We are specifically interested in the next moment.
In the morning of 18 on April 1988, the Americans, following orders to destroy Iranian platforms in the Persian Gulf, which were used by Iranians in raids on tankers, carried out the successive destruction of two platforms. In the morning, two Iranian Phantoms attempted to approach the American destroyer McCromic. However, this time the Americans had orders to shoot. The destroyer took the fighters to escort the air defense system and they turned away. The Americans did not let the missiles go.
A few hours later, another American ship group consisting of the Wainwright cruiser, the Badley and Simpson frigates encountered the corvette Joshan. The latter launched the cruiser the launch of the RCC "Harpoon", which the Americans successfully removed by interference and in response to this attack was sunk by rocket attacks from the cruiser and the Simpson. And here the ship group was attacked from the air by a pair of Iranian Phantoms. It should be understood that the Iranians had a successful experience of attacks of surface targets, and the Maverick guided missiles. It is not known exactly what the planes were really armed with, but they had the opportunity to inflict serious damage on ships.
But the American ships were not the same as the English ones. The cruiser took airplanes to escort, one of the pilots had the sense to turn away, the second continued to fly to the target and received two anti-aircraft missiles. The pilot was lucky, his heavily damaged aircraft could reach the Iranian territory.
What does such an example show? First of all, what should not be done is far-reaching conclusions from the situation with Starck. In a real combat situation, aircraft attempts to get close to the ships look like this.
Secondly, the outcome of the collision of Iranian fighters with the ships of the US Navy is an excellent illustration of what awaits both an armed aerial reconnaissance and airborne units of attack aircraft during attempts to attack surface ships.
It is also worth noting that the Americans were not at all afraid of the massive air raid from Iranian territory. And not only because of the aircraft carrier, but also because of the shipbuilding systems of the eighties that were very advanced for the late eighties.
Today, the air defense system is much more dangerous.
There is one now slightly forgotten, but an incredibly instructive example of a real attack by Soviet bombers of a warship. This example is specific, because this ship was also a Soviet one. We are talking about the TFR "watchdog" project 1135, on which 8 November 1975, there was a rebellion.
The story of the communist insurrection at the Watchdog, which was raised by the commander of the ship's captain of the 3 rank Valery Sablin, was heard, most likely, by everyone. Less is known about the details of the bomb strike, which stopped the departure of the ship from the Soviet territorial waters and made it possible for the captain of the ship to regain control of it. On the night of November 9, Sablin, who took control of the ship, took him to the exit from the Gulf of Riga. To stop the ship, it was decided to launch a bomb strike on it, for which one of the most combat-ready bomber units in the USSR Air Force - the 668-th Bomber Aviation Regiment, armed with Yak-28 aircraft - was raised in alarm.
Further events perfectly show how difficult it is to attack a surface ship. Even when he does not resist. Even when it happens in its territorial waters.
Of articles by Major General A.G. Tsymbalova:
Once again - the ship did not resist and was in the territorial waters of the USSR. Its coordinates, course and speed were transferred to the strike aircraft without delay. At the same time, the mere fact of an emergency departure of a regiment to strike in a real combat situation and several mistakes in organizing the departure almost ended in disasters both at takeoff and over the sea. Miraculously, "their" ships were not sunk. Miraculously, the frontier guards were not shot down by any aircraft. This, by the way, is the usual military chaos, the inevitable companion of suddenly beginning hostilities. Then everyone gets a “hand crammed” and he disappears, the regiments and divisions start working with the accuracy of a well-established mechanism.
If the enemy will give time.
It is necessary to understand - in a real combat situation if necessary to provide a strike on real enemy ships, it would be the same thing - and a crash during takeoff, and a consistent exit on the target with separate units and squadrons, with the shooting of attacking aircraft with shipborne air defense missile systems, and the loss of a target, and strikes against my own Only the losses from the ship-based air defense missile systems would be real - the enemy would definitely not regret anyone. At the same time, the hypothetical presence of the anti-ship missiles on their own aircraft would not have done anything - the aviation anti-ship anti-ship missiles capture the target on the carrier in order to launch it, the carrier must find the attacked object and correctly identify it. And this in the described military episode failed, and for objective reasons.
So blows on surface ships look inside the "real world".
Russia, in part of its sea power, is entering a very dangerous situation. On the one hand, the Syrian operation, the confrontation with the United States in Venezuela, and the intensification of Russian foreign policy as a whole, shows that Russia has a rather aggressive foreign policy. At the same time, the navy is an extremely important, and often indispensable, tool. So, without intensive military work of the Navy in 2012-2015, there would be no operation in Syria.
But in leading such actions, the Russian leadership has allowed a critical on the scale disorganization of naval construction, from shipbuilding to the collapse of adequate organizational and staff structures. In such circumstances, the rapid development of the Navy is impossible, and demand from the Russian fleet will soon begin as with the present. So, there are no guarantees that the Navy will not have to conduct full-scale military operations outside the zone of operations of coastal fighter aircraft. And since the Navy has one aircraft carrier, and with unclear prospects, it is necessary to prepare to fight with what we have.
And there are "mixed" ships with guided missile weapons.
Examples from the military practice of the Second World War (including domestic experience) and the wars and military operations of the second half of the last century tell us that in some cases, the base aviation is powerless against surface ships. But in order for enemy aircraft to be incapable of harming our ships over and over again, the latter must act flawlessly, maneuvering so that at times faster, but strongly limited in fuel, aircraft missed the ship's team over and over again, giving it a head start over time and opportunity to hit the airfields and other objects with their cruise missiles.
We need intelligence that can warn ships in advance about the rise of enemy aircraft, we need super-power systems of ship-based air defense capable of enabling ships to repel at least one massive air attack, need DRLO helicopters that could be based on frigates and cruisers, real training is needed, without “show off” to this kind of action. Finally, we need a psychological readiness to go for such risky operations, and we need the ability to cut off unnecessarily risky and hopeless options from simply moderately risky ones. We must learn to deceive the enemy, who has perfect systems of intelligence and communication, and who dominates the sea. Not having an aircraft carrier fleet, not being able to create it quickly, not having bases all over the world, from where basic aircraft could cover the ships, we will have to learn to do without all these (important and necessary, in general) things.
And sometimes it will be quite possible, although it is always very difficult.
Sea war of the end of the twentieth century. Launch of the RCC "Exochet" from the "Super Etandarov" of the Argentine Navy
A little later, anti-ship missiles launched from aircraft, all-weather deck and basic shock became a mass phenomenon aviation, air refueling, long-range ground-based radars.
The world has changed, and the fleets have changed with it. But have the capabilities of surface ships changed to counter aircraft attacks? We will repeat just in case the main conclusions from the experience of the Second World War (see the article "Surface ships against aircraft. World War II".).
So, abbreviated quote from the first part:
In cases where a single surface ship or a small group of surface ships encounters large, well-trained aviation forces that purposefully carry out a large-scale operation aimed at the destruction of these particular ships, there is no chance. The ship is slow and the planes that did not destroy it the first time will then return again and again, and with each attack, the ship will be less and less able to resist - unless of course it is sunk at all immediately.
...
But in cases when a single ship or group operating in the zone of enemy domination in the air, they retain the surprise of their actions, they act according to a clear plan that allows using all the flaws of aviation as a combat vehicle (using the time of day and weather, taking into account the reaction time of aviation to the detected combat ship when planning an operation and choosing points for changing course, masking when entering the bases, high speed at the transition and unpredictable maneuvering, choosing an unexpected course for reconnaissance of the enemy after any contact with his forces, not only with aircraft), have a strong anti-aircraft weapon and a trained crew, observe discipline when using radio communications, have everything they need on board to fight for survivability right during the battle and after it - the situation becomes reversed. Small-scale aerial reconnaissance forces are generally powerless to harm such a ship, as are the duty attack squadrons alerted upon its detection.
Even the mistress says that in the overwhelming number of cases, when such “prepared” surface ships entered hostile waters, they won fights against aviation. The same Black Sea fleet is quite an example, because every ship, even a dead one, first TENS 10 times went where the Luftwaffe could act and act freely.
This is exactly what the correct conclusions are about what we should learn from the experience of WWII. This does not detract from the role of naval aviation, it does not reduce its danger for surface ships, and especially for supply vessels, it does not cancel its ability to destroy absolutely any ship if necessary, or a group of ships.
But it shows well that it has a limit of possibilities in the first place, and that in order to succeed it needs to create a huge superiority in forces over the enemy in the second place.
This is the real outcome of the Second World War in terms of the ability of surface warships to conduct combat operations in an area where the enemy has the ability to use aircraft or air superiority in general.
...
But in cases when a single ship or group operating in the zone of enemy domination in the air, they retain the surprise of their actions, they act according to a clear plan that allows using all the flaws of aviation as a combat vehicle (using the time of day and weather, taking into account the reaction time of aviation to the detected combat ship when planning an operation and choosing points for changing course, masking when entering the bases, high speed at the transition and unpredictable maneuvering, choosing an unexpected course for reconnaissance of the enemy after any contact with his forces, not only with aircraft), have a strong anti-aircraft weapon and a trained crew, observe discipline when using radio communications, have everything they need on board to fight for survivability right during the battle and after it - the situation becomes reversed. Small-scale aerial reconnaissance forces are generally powerless to harm such a ship, as are the duty attack squadrons alerted upon its detection.
Even the mistress says that in the overwhelming number of cases, when such “prepared” surface ships entered hostile waters, they won fights against aviation. The same Black Sea fleet is quite an example, because every ship, even a dead one, first TENS 10 times went where the Luftwaffe could act and act freely.
This is exactly what the correct conclusions are about what we should learn from the experience of WWII. This does not detract from the role of naval aviation, it does not reduce its danger for surface ships, and especially for supply vessels, it does not cancel its ability to destroy absolutely any ship if necessary, or a group of ships.
But it shows well that it has a limit of possibilities in the first place, and that in order to succeed it needs to create a huge superiority in forces over the enemy in the second place.
This is the real outcome of the Second World War in terms of the ability of surface warships to conduct combat operations in an area where the enemy has the ability to use aircraft or air superiority in general.
Are these conclusions true to the present? Fortunately, the emergence of nuclear weapons saved mankind from the nightmare of full-scale planetary wars. This, however, led to some virtualization of the combat capabilities of the fleets - we simply do not know what a serious sea war will look like with the use of modern technology. No teachings and no mathematical modeling will give such an understanding in full.
However, a number of countries have some combat experience of modern naval war. But before analyzing it, it is worth paying attention to military maneuvers - in that part that would differ little from a real war, happen such. First of all, it concerns the detection of ships, which in serious maneuvers are always carried out with the same exertion of forces as in a real war.
Let us ask ourselves the question: was it really possible for surface ships to slip away from aviation in the era of radars with a range of hundreds and sometimes thousands of kilometers? After all, if you turn your attention to the experience of the Second World War, then the key to the success of a surface ship is not only its air defense, but also the ability to be where the enemy does not expect it and is not looking. Already not looking, or not yet looking, no difference. The sea is big.
Deception of the enemy, counter tracking and separation
Article “How can a rocket ship sink an aircraft carrier?” A few examples" examples of the confrontation of rocket ships and the aircraft carrier were dismantled. Let us briefly list how the surface ships (who had no cover at all) managed during the training, in an environment as close as possible to the combat, to escape the enemy, who used carrier-based aircraft for their search, including DRLO aircraft.
1. Disguise under merchant ships. URO ships were moving along trade routes, at the speed of merchant ships, not showing themselves to turn on the radar, in full, as Vice-Admiral Hank Mastin said, “electromagnetic silence”. The radar was turned on only at the time preceding the conventional launch of the missiles. Air reconnaissance, focusing on radar signals, was unable to classify the detected ships, taking them for merchant ships.
2. Dispersal. Admiral Woodward, later commanding the British naval unit during the Falklands War, simply dispersed all of his ships so that American pilots from the aircraft carrier Coral Sea simply would not have been able to “melt down” (by convention, of course) all of them before darkness. And at night, the last "surviving" destroyer was the British ... disguised as a cruise liner (see paragraph 1, as they say). And in the end went to the aircraft carrier at a distance of a rocket strike.
3. The use of the unexpected for the enemy, "wrong" tactics, such as for which you can and "scolding" get. During the conditional strike on the "Eisenhower" Mastin commanded the Forrestal AUG. All doctrinal installations of the US Navy, all combat training, the entire experience of the exercises said that it was the Forrestal carrier aircraft that were supposed to be the main striking force in the operation. But Mastin simply went on an aircraft carrier to an area where, from the point of view of the combat mission, his finding was completely meaningless, stopped flights, and sent Eisenhower missile escort ships, which again were disguised in civilian traffic, focusing on passive means of detection and intelligence from external sources.
Aviation lost in all cases, and in the case of the American exercises it lost dry - URO ships unhindered took to the distance of a rocket strike on an aircraft carrier and worked on it with rockets at the moment when its deck was filled with airplanes ready for combat flight. With bombs, with fuel ... They never got their way.
The British did not work dry. Of the entire strike group, one ship survived, and if this attack were to be in reality, it would have been sunk by escort ships. But - they would have sunk after the "Exocates" would have hit the aircraft carrier. Woodward simply did not have room for maneuver in that area, and the only way to get his way was to substitute the ships for the strike of the planes, which he did. These teachings turned out to be prophetic - very soon after that, Woodward had to substitute his own ships for real air strikes, take losses and, in general, lead the war "on the verge of a foul" ...
But the loudest example was given by completely different teachings ...
From the memoirs of Rear Admiral V.A. Karev "Unknown Soviet" Pearl Harbor ":
Thus, we remained in the dark about where the Midway AUG is located. And only on the afternoon of Sunday, a report was received from our coastal radio squadron in Kamchatka that our posts commemorate the work of the ships at frequencies of the AUG Midway intra-firing link.
It was a shock. The radio finding results showed that the newly formed carrier-assault strike compound (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts flights of deck aircraft at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the General Staff of the Navy. Navy Commander Admiral fleet Soviet Union Gorshkov S.G. makes a decision immediately. Urgently send the Watchdog “Storozhevoy”, three Project 671 RTM multipurpose nuclear submarines for tracking ACS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, fully alert all the Pacific Fleet’s naval missile aircraft, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, and bring them into full combat readiness all parts and ships of the Pacific Fleet reconnaissance.
In response to such aggressive actions by the Americans to prepare for the departure a naval division of the naval-carrying aviation in readiness, on Monday to designate an airborne missile attack on an aircraft carrier. At the same time, multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
13 September, Monday. The reconnaissance of the Pacific Fleet will have to locate the AUS and deploy a naval missile-bearing aviation division. But at that time, radio silence was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off. We are carefully studying the data of optical space intelligence. There is no reliable data on the location of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA from Kamchatka took place. In an empty place.
Only a day later, on Tuesday, 14 of September, we learn from the data of the air defense posts in the Kuril Islands that the carrier-based strike force is maneuvering east of the island of Paramushir (the Kuril Islands), conducting flights of carrier-based aircraft.
It was a shock. The radio finding results showed that the newly formed carrier-assault strike compound (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts flights of deck aircraft at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the General Staff of the Navy. Navy Commander Admiral fleet Soviet Union Gorshkov S.G. makes a decision immediately. Urgently send the Watchdog “Storozhevoy”, three Project 671 RTM multipurpose nuclear submarines for tracking ACS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, fully alert all the Pacific Fleet’s naval missile aircraft, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, and bring them into full combat readiness all parts and ships of the Pacific Fleet reconnaissance.
In response to such aggressive actions by the Americans to prepare for the departure a naval division of the naval-carrying aviation in readiness, on Monday to designate an airborne missile attack on an aircraft carrier. At the same time, multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
13 September, Monday. The reconnaissance of the Pacific Fleet will have to locate the AUS and deploy a naval missile-bearing aviation division. But at that time, radio silence was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off. We are carefully studying the data of optical space intelligence. There is no reliable data on the location of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA from Kamchatka took place. In an empty place.
Only a day later, on Tuesday, 14 of September, we learn from the data of the air defense posts in the Kuril Islands that the carrier-based strike force is maneuvering east of the island of Paramushir (the Kuril Islands), conducting flights of carrier-based aircraft.
Example exercises NorPac Fleetex Ops'82 Some people may not seem to be completely “clean” - firstly, the Americans substituted the whole AUG with the aircraft carrier “Enterprise” as bait - without this, they would not have succeeded in hiding the Midway AUG from our air reconnaissance. In a real war, they would have had such a trick only during the first sudden strike, which in itself is very unlikely. Secondly, during the operation, the Americans actively used their aircraft for disinformation, which, by their actions, created a distorted picture of what was happening in the intelligence of the Pacific Fleet.
But the specific episode with the departure of the already combined carrier-assault strike link with two aircraft carriers from the conventional strike of missile carriers from Kamchatka is just what we are interested in. A ship connection detected by enemy reconnaissance must be attacked by its aircraft. But by the time the aircraft arrives, there is no ship connection on the spot, and nowhere in the detection range of the aircraft is the radar either. Exactly this element, which the Americans showed us, was made out of touch with the presence of aviation in the strike compound. It could also be done by connecting missile ships.
How is it going?
Those who were involved in the interpretation of intelligence, know how. At present, a naval connection at a large distance from the coast can be detected by optical-electronic space reconnaissance, over-the-horizon radar, aerial reconnaissance, surface ships, radio electronic and electronic reconnaissance means, and in some cases, submarines. At the same time, the boat is extremely limited in the classification of such a contact, its hydroacoustics may simply not understand what they heard, and the data transmission from the submarine will in any case be carried out with the planned contact, as a result of which the data will become outdated. Chasing a "contact" boat, as a rule, can not, it will mean the loss of stealth. The range at which it detects ships is greater than that of ship-based sonar systems, but much smaller than that of radar facilities.
What can a group of surface ships oppose to such a detection? Firstly, the orbits of satellites and the time of their flight over any part of the world ocean are known in advance. The same Americans widely use maneuvers under the cover of cloudiness. Secondly, masking under trade traffic works against satellites and ZGRLS - ships are scattered among merchant ships, their construction does not bear signs of a combat formation order, as a result, the enemy simply sees a break through the same type of signals on the intensive merchant shipping route, and there is no possibility to classify them.
Again, the Americans understand that sooner or later their opponent, that is, we will be able to obtain more accurate data about the reflected radar signal and analyze them, so they have used and used various tactical schemes for counter tracking for many years. For example, in the course of the “window” between the span of the aircraft carrier satellites and the tanker already leaving the junction, they switch places. Ship signatures are made similar by various methods. In a number of cases, it is possible to deceive with such methods not only reconnaissance on the “coast” but also tracking ships hanging by the Americans “ha tail” - for example, it was in 1986 during the attack of the US Navy on Libya - the Soviet Navy simply lost an aircraft carrier, who participated in the strike, and intelligence could not track the rise of the aircraft.
Thirdly, the care to that very “electromagnetic silence” described by Admiral Mastien and many others is applied against various types of radio intelligence - it is impossible to detect the radiation of a target that emits nothing. Actually, this is what they usually do when they hide.
Aerial reconnaissance is a much more obvious threat on the one hand - if they found an aircraft or a group of ships, they discovered it. But on the other hand, they need to know where to find the target. A modern combat aircraft, such as, for example, the Tu-95, can detect the signature of a working shipborne radar system more than a thousand kilometers from the ship - the tropospheric refraction of centimeter radio waves contributes to a very wide spread of radiation from the radar. But if the radar does not radiate? The ocean is huge, where to look for targets among hundreds, if not thousands of similar to indistinguishable contacts, observed with the help of SGRLS is not clear. A submarine is a risk - but in any kind of search its target detection range in the open ocean is still insufficient, and the data quickly becomes outdated. For effective use of submarines, you need to know about where the attacked target will soon be. This is probably not always.
In the case of detection of the ship's connection at sea, the latter can destroy the aircraft or the enemy's ship, cutting off the transfer of the location of the connection to the enemy, after which it will be necessary to get out from under a potential air strike.
How to do it? An abrupt change of course, in some cases dispersal of forces, leaving the dangerous area at maximum speed. When performing such a maneuver, the commander of the compound knows how much time the enemy needs so that the compound will be attacked by truly large aviation forces large enough to destroy it. No air force and no naval aviation has the ability to constantly hold entire regiments of airplanes in the air - at all times, the air forces that had the task of destroying the naval formations were waiting for an order to strike in the alert position at the airfield, in “readiness number two”. In another way it is impossible, only individual units can be on duty in the air, in exceptional cases and not for long - a squadron.
Next comes his majesty calculator. The rise of the regiment on alert from readiness number two, its construction in order of battle and the exit to the desired course is ideally an hour. Next, the distance from the air bases, which are known to the commander of the naval compound, is taken, the speed with which enemy aircraft go to the target according to past experience, the typical force squad for additional intelligence, the detection range of surface radars of enemy aircraft ... and everything, in fact, areas to be transferred ship group to avoid hitting easily miscalculated. That is how the Americans in the 1982 year, and many times after that, came out of the conventional attack of the USSR Navy MRA. We left successfully.
The task of the commander of the operation of the ship's shock group ultimately boils down to the fact that at the moment when its location supposedly should be opened by the enemy (and it is likely to be opened sooner or later), be at such a distance from its air bases in order to have time left for way out of the blow.
What happens if the blowout succeeds? Now the ship shock group gets a head start in time. If the enemy has other air regiments, then now he will have to throw some of the forces back at the air reconnaissance, find the ship group, raise the strike forces, and all over again. If the enemy does not have other aviation forces in the theater, then it is still worse for him - now all the time that the strike forces of aviation will return to the airfield, re-prepare for a combat flight, wait for the aerial reconnaissance data that is relevant at the very moment when the flight is again it will be possible to fly again on the strike, the ship group will act freely. And the only threat to it will be that the enemy’s reconnaissance will also be able to attack it when detected, but this raises the question of who is who — the ship is far from defenseless, the group of ships is all the more, and there are excellent examples from combat experience, which will be discussed below. This regiment of aircraft can, in theory, "crush" with a mass of air defense missiles of the ship group, but a couple or two pairs of aircraft cannot.
Suppose, the KUG has won eight hours from one massive air strike failed by the enemy to a potential next one. It is at a good speed of approximately 370-400 kilometers traveled in any direction. This is the distance from Sapporo to Aniva Bay (Sakhalin) with regard to maneuvering. Or from Sevastopol to Constanta. Or from Novorossiysk to any port on the eastern part of the Black Sea coast of Turkey. Or from Baltiysk to the coast of Denmark.
This is a lot, especially considering that in fact the modern ship does not need to come close to shore to attack a ground target.
But eight hours is not the limit. Other aircraft so much for one only inter-flight service will require. Without taking flight time.
At the same time, it should be understood that modern ships are armed with cruise missiles and, in principle, such a CBG can attack any airfield, and any important radar from a distance of "a thousand kilometers or more." Unfulfilled airstrike for the air regiment may be the last mistake and after its landing at the home airfield cruise missiles from ships that could not be destroyed will fall on it. And this is what awaits various types of SGRLS immediately, long before the first rise of strike aircraft.
This is true for the ships of our opponents, this is true for our ships. They can do all this, we can too. Such actions, of course, require extensive support - above all intelligence. They require excellent training of personnel - apparently superior to the one that has personnel in the Navy of most countries. But they are possible. No less possible than air strikes.
Of course, all this should not be understood as a guaranteed safety of surface ships from air attacks. Aviation may well "catch" the ships off guard, and then the military story replenished with another tragedy like the sinking of the "Prince of Wales." The probability of this option is not zero, it is, frankly, high.
But the probability of the opposite is not lower. Contrary to popular belief.
Combat experience. Falklands
But how do modern surface ships behave under attack from the air? After all, to avoid one-time departure of large enemy aviation forces is one thing, but after all, an air reconnaissance can also be armed and can attack a detected target after transmitting information about its location. The duty link, unlike the regiment, may well be on duty with rockets in the air, and then the strike on the detected ships will be delivered almost instantly. What does the closest experience say about the vulnerability of modern warships to air strikes?
The only episode where such events took place in a more or less massive amount is the Falklands War.
Atmospheric video from the scene (to feel)
It was the largest after the Second World War, and in the course of its naval forces suffered the greatest losses in the post-war history of the ship. It is customary to think that on the Falklands, surface ships suffered unjustifiably high losses from the actions of aviation, and, as many think, almost proved that their time was up. Understand this war in more detail.
The history of this conflict and the course of the fighting are set forth in the mass of sources and in sufficient detail, but practically all commentators leave out of their consideration the completely obvious features of this war.
A Ship's Fool to Fight a Fort (Foolishness to fight a fortress for a ship). This phrase is attributed to Nelson, although for the first time it is recorded in one of the letters of Admiral John Fisher. Its meaning is that to throw with the ships on the defense prepared in advance (no matter what is behind this word) is nonsense. And the British really acted that way. Their standard scheme was to first achieve dominance at sea, then completely block the enemy’s ability to threaten the British naval forces, and only then land a large and powerful landing force.
The war for the Falklands went strictly the opposite. The English strike force commander, John Woodward, was expressly forbidden to conduct military operations outside the zone to which the Teacher government wanted to limit the war. Britain found itself in a politically difficult position and the entire burden of this position fell on the Royal Navy.
Woodward had to take the island by storm in conditions when the enemy had a mass of air forces to protect them. Take tight time limits before seasonal storms hit the South Atlantic. Without resorting to either blockade actions or “offensive mining” from submarines, attacking the enemy “in the forehead”. He had to throw his ships into battle against the whole of Argentina, and not only (and not so much) of its fleet. This required such a specific step as the “Battle of the Bomb Alley”, and it was this that in many ways caused the losses that the British suffered as a result.
Let us clarify the question of how surface ships showed themselves vulnerable to air strikes, while on the high seas as a result of this war? We remember that today the main combat missions - from the blockade to strikes with cruise missiles. Ships perform it in the open sea, not somewhere under the shore. How in these conditions was with the vulnerability of the British?
Excluding the ships that covered the landing, Woodward’s surface forces lost two ships to the air attacks. One of them was the Atlantic Conveyor transport, a civilian vessel built without any constructive measures to ensure survivability, without any means of protection from airplanes or rockets and full of combustible cargo.
Reserve "Harriers" on the deck "Atlantic conveyor"
Transport is just not lucky. He was not equipped in a hurry with the passive jamming systems, and the rocket, set aside by a false cloud of targets, from a real warship, deviated precisely to the transport and struck him. This case does not give us anything to assess the survival of warships, since the Atlantic Conveyor was not, although it must be admitted that the British suffered tremendous damage, and for the Argentines it was a major victory, which, however, did not save them.
Burning after hitting the Sheffield rocket. The result of the mistakes of the crew and no more.
And the British lost the warship on the sea ... one - the destroyer Sheffield. Moreover, they lost under still unclear circumstances. Or rather, not fully disclosed. Therefore, we list the facts that we know about this drowning.
1. The radar ship were disabled. According to the official version - in order not to interfere with satellite communications. This version worries us a little, we confine ourselves to the fact that radars were turned off at the ship in the combat zone.
2. KP "Sheffield" received a warning about a rocket attack from the EM "Glasgow" in advance - like all British ships at sea at that moment.
3. Sheffield watch officers did not react to this warning, did not deliver the LOC, they did not even bother the ship commander. At the same time, there was plenty of time for setting a false cloud of goals.
There is the so-called "human factor". It is worth noting that at that time the crews and commanders of the ships were exhausted by false alarms, and many did not believe the Glasgow warning. For example, the shift on duty at KP "Invincible". It was possible that this was also the case at Sheffield. But it was necessary to shoot the false targets ...
Thus, we summarize - the Argentines outside the "bomb lane", where Woodward deliberately framed his fleet "under execution" managed to destroy one combat ship. Because of the erroneous actions of his crew. And one transport on which they really did not aim, the rocket attacked it by chance.
Can this be considered evidence that surface ships are doomed during air raids?
In total, the Argentine "Super-Etandara" made five combat sorties, one of which was in conjunction with the "Skyhawks", fired five Exochet missiles, sank the "Sheffield" and "Atlantic Conveyor", in the last flight the joint group "Super-Etendarov" and The Skyhocks lost two planes (the Skyhawks) were shot down, and the last missile was shot down. For Argentines, these are more than good results. But they talk about the vulnerability of ships quite a bit. None of the ships that managed to expose the LOC was not hit, but as soon as the EX Exter appeared on the arena, the attacking side immediately lost. Sheffield is guaranteed to have survived, if its crew acted as the team of any other British ship acted in that war. “Atlantic Conveyor” would have survived, if the British were to attach the launchers of false targets during the revision.
Note that the Argentines acted in very favorable conditions - the ship’s radar and British air defense system had continuous technical problems, and the political restrictions imposed on the fleet made his maneuvers extremely predictable and the Argentines knew where to look for the British. It is also important that the Britons could not get the Argentine "Neptune", which provided guidance for the aircraft to 15 in May 1982 year. They simply had nothing to do. It is also indicative of how many real-life sorties against ships and ships outside the Falkland Strait were able to make by the Argentines.
All other battles between planes and warships took place in the Falkland Channel - a channel between the islands, from 10 to 23 kilometers wide, surrounded by mountains and rocks.
These were ideal conditions for the attackers - a small space with a large number of targets, the always known position of the enemy ships and the relief, which allows them to secretly reach the target - only a few tens of seconds before the bombs drop.
In contrast to the Argentines, the surface ships of Woodward were actually driven into a trap, they could not leave, there was no place to maneuver, and as luck would have it, there were mass refusals of the air defense system. In the course of the subsequent battles, situations when the sailors, when repelling air raids, ran out onto the deck and fired at small-arms aircraft, were the norm. In this case, the plan of operation itself provided for the following. From the memoirs of John Woodward:
... I invented the simplest possible plan, which, if I didn’t rule out shooting at mine, I would at least guarantee that it would be infrequent. We initially identified a zone that covered the eastern part of the Falklands Strait from the northwest of the island to Cape Fanning and the area around the Carlos Bay. I knew that inside this zone there would be basically all British troops, landing ships, ships, transports and warships. Above it, a "ceiling" was installed at a height of ten thousand feet, which formed a kind of massive air "box" about ten miles wide and two miles high. I ordered our “Harriers” not to go into this “box”. Inside it, our helicopters could deliver anything from the coast to the ships and vice versa, but they must quickly hide whenever an enemy aircraft enters this area.
In the "box" will only fly enemy fighters and bombers, if they want to threaten landing.
I decided that it would be more expedient to give our troops and ships complete freedom to shoot at any aircraft they found inside the "box", since it should only be Argentine. Meanwhile, the Harriers must wait at a higher altitude, knowing that any aircraft departing from the box should only be Argentine, since our planes are not allowed to enter there, and our helicopters are not allowed to fly out of it. The most dangerous in this case was the situation when the Mirage, pursued by the Harrier, enters the “box”.
In this case, the latter could be shot down by one of our frigates. Accident or even poor interaction is possible, but poor planning is unforgivable. Keep in mind that it will take only ninety seconds for the Mirage to cross the box at a speed of four hundred knots until it flies out of it on the other side, having the Harrier swooping down like a falcon on top of it ... I just hoped for it.
In the "box" will only fly enemy fighters and bombers, if they want to threaten landing.
I decided that it would be more expedient to give our troops and ships complete freedom to shoot at any aircraft they found inside the "box", since it should only be Argentine. Meanwhile, the Harriers must wait at a higher altitude, knowing that any aircraft departing from the box should only be Argentine, since our planes are not allowed to enter there, and our helicopters are not allowed to fly out of it. The most dangerous in this case was the situation when the Mirage, pursued by the Harrier, enters the “box”.
In this case, the latter could be shot down by one of our frigates. Accident or even poor interaction is possible, but poor planning is unforgivable. Keep in mind that it will take only ninety seconds for the Mirage to cross the box at a speed of four hundred knots until it flies out of it on the other side, having the Harrier swooping down like a falcon on top of it ... I just hoped for it.
Thus, according to the battle plan, the surface ships were supposed to take the first strike of the Argentine aviation, inflict maximum possible losses on the attacking aircraft, break the attack on the landing force and transport for it at any cost, and only then, when the Argentines who had already freed themselves from the bombs “Harriers” would be involved. Aircraft targeting on the enemy should also be provided by ships. Woodward in his memoirs writes straightforward - we waged a war of attrition against Argentine aviation. The ships in the strait were put under execution, with the task of preventing the disruption of the landing force and if they “ran out” faster than the Argentine aircraft, the war would have been lost. A little later, when the British adapted to the situation, the "Harriers" began to intercept Argentine aircraft before they attacked the British ships. But at first it was not like that. 21 May 1982 in the first half of the day, the British put on a “clean” experiment - they took the battle with the aircraft without air support, and having the Harriers work to cut off the leaving Argentines, for all its importance, it had zero impact on the safety of the ships under attack. . Again the word Woodward.
On this day, the first morning flights of the air cover were flown from the Entrim, located in the eastern part of the Falkland Channel, in the center of the amphibious
groups. Most of the cover aircraft returned to the aircraft carrier before the Argentines did something in terms of attacks. For more than two hours after sunrise, the situation remained inexplicably calm. Then it all started.
The Argentinean lightweight double jet attack aircraft of the naval aviation, the McNee 339 (Italian), flew at the highest possible speed above the waves along the northern coast and turned sharply into the narrow entrance of the Falkland Channel. The first ship he saw was the frigate “Argonot” by Keith Leyman, and the pilot fired all his eight five-inch rockets at him, and as he flew closer, he fired at him with an 30-mm gun.
One rocket hit the Sea Cat launcher and injured three people - one of them lost an eye, the other, a weapon master, wounded a fragment in the chest an inch above the heart.
The attack was so sudden and rapid that the raider safely disappeared in the south-east direction before any Argonot firearm was aimed at him. As a result, the aircraft launched the Bloupipe rocket from the Canberra deck, the Intrepid launched the C Cat rocket, and David Pentrite's Plymouth opened fire with an 4,5-inch artillery unit. But the “McCups” managed to leave in order to, no doubt, hit their high command with a story about what they saw in the Carlos Bay area.
...
Captain 2 rank captain's CCU worked quickly. His two young gun control officers, lieutenants Mike Nols and Tom Williams, had to get used to the constant switch from attack to defense, being in a very vulnerable position, far to the south of other ships. The commander of the ship, formerly a senior officer of the frigate's command and control department, was personally involved in their preparation. Now they opened fire on the enemy from an 4,5-inch artillery mount and fired the Sea Cat missile, which made the Argentine pilots leave without causing us any harm.
The first significant attack of this day began about half an hour after that - on 12.35. Three supersonic "Dagger" Israeli production from behind Mount Rosalia went to West Falkland. They descended above the water to a height of only fifty feet and swept across the Falkland Straits between Cape Fanning and Chencho, no doubt intending to attack the landing craft behind them.
This time we were ready. Argonot and Intrepid fired their Sea Cat missiles when the attacking Argentines were two miles from Carlos Bay. Plymouth opened the scoring first, knocking the right-hand distant aircraft from this group with a Si Cat missile. The pilot had no chance of escape. The second Dagger turned away from the missiles to the right and was now flying through the gap in the defense. The next ship he saw was Bill Canning's Broadsworth. The bomber rushed at him, firing a frigate of 30-mm guns. Twenty-nine shells hit the ship. Fourteen people were injured in the hangar area, and two Linke helicopters were damaged, but, fortunately, both bombs dropped by them did not hit the ship.
The third Dagger turned to the south and headed straight for the Entrym by Brian Yang. The ship was less than a mile from the rocky coast of Kota Island and three and a half miles south of Cape Chencho. The Argentine bomb, as it turned out later, a thousand-pound, hit the Entrim flight deck, flew through a hatch into the aft part of the rocket cellar "Si S lag", hit the tangent two large missiles, and finished its rather long way in the walk-in closet, known for its military -sea jargon as "latrine". It was a miracle that neither the bomb nor the missiles exploded. An explosion in a rocket cellar would almost certainly lead to the death of a ship. Yet several fires broke out, and the Entrim team found itself in a difficult position, trying to cope with them. Commander Yang gave a full course to the north in order to get closer to the Broadsworth to cover up and get help. But he did not have time to go there - after six minutes the next Argentine strike struck him.
This was another wave of the three Daggers, flying almost the same as the first wave, heading over West Falkland.
They went straight to the damaged Entrym, which they tried to throw over the Sea Slug missile in case the fire approached them. In desperation, Entrim fired the Sea Slug rocket, completely uncontrollable, in the direction of the attacking Daggers, hoping to somehow influence them. Their "Sea Cat" system was disabled, but 4,5-inch gun mounts and all machine guns fired at the attacking aircraft.
One plane broke through and fired a burning destroyer from its guns, wounding seven people and causing an even greater fire. The situation on the Entrime has become threatening. The second Dagger chose Fort Austin, a large supply vessel, which was very bad for us. newssince Fort Austin was completely defenseless against such an attack. Commander Dunlop ordered to open fire from two of his guns, twenty-four more people from the upper deck of the vessel spewed heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. But this was not enough, and Sam must have already prepared himself for the bombing, when, to his amazement, Dagger exploded a thousand yards from him, hit by "Sea Wolfe" from Broadsworth. The last plane again shot at Broadsworth, but the thousand-pound bomb dropped by him did not hit the ship.
groups. Most of the cover aircraft returned to the aircraft carrier before the Argentines did something in terms of attacks. For more than two hours after sunrise, the situation remained inexplicably calm. Then it all started.
The Argentinean lightweight double jet attack aircraft of the naval aviation, the McNee 339 (Italian), flew at the highest possible speed above the waves along the northern coast and turned sharply into the narrow entrance of the Falkland Channel. The first ship he saw was the frigate “Argonot” by Keith Leyman, and the pilot fired all his eight five-inch rockets at him, and as he flew closer, he fired at him with an 30-mm gun.
One rocket hit the Sea Cat launcher and injured three people - one of them lost an eye, the other, a weapon master, wounded a fragment in the chest an inch above the heart.
The attack was so sudden and rapid that the raider safely disappeared in the south-east direction before any Argonot firearm was aimed at him. As a result, the aircraft launched the Bloupipe rocket from the Canberra deck, the Intrepid launched the C Cat rocket, and David Pentrite's Plymouth opened fire with an 4,5-inch artillery unit. But the “McCups” managed to leave in order to, no doubt, hit their high command with a story about what they saw in the Carlos Bay area.
...
Captain 2 rank captain's CCU worked quickly. His two young gun control officers, lieutenants Mike Nols and Tom Williams, had to get used to the constant switch from attack to defense, being in a very vulnerable position, far to the south of other ships. The commander of the ship, formerly a senior officer of the frigate's command and control department, was personally involved in their preparation. Now they opened fire on the enemy from an 4,5-inch artillery mount and fired the Sea Cat missile, which made the Argentine pilots leave without causing us any harm.
The first significant attack of this day began about half an hour after that - on 12.35. Three supersonic "Dagger" Israeli production from behind Mount Rosalia went to West Falkland. They descended above the water to a height of only fifty feet and swept across the Falkland Straits between Cape Fanning and Chencho, no doubt intending to attack the landing craft behind them.
This time we were ready. Argonot and Intrepid fired their Sea Cat missiles when the attacking Argentines were two miles from Carlos Bay. Plymouth opened the scoring first, knocking the right-hand distant aircraft from this group with a Si Cat missile. The pilot had no chance of escape. The second Dagger turned away from the missiles to the right and was now flying through the gap in the defense. The next ship he saw was Bill Canning's Broadsworth. The bomber rushed at him, firing a frigate of 30-mm guns. Twenty-nine shells hit the ship. Fourteen people were injured in the hangar area, and two Linke helicopters were damaged, but, fortunately, both bombs dropped by them did not hit the ship.
The third Dagger turned to the south and headed straight for the Entrym by Brian Yang. The ship was less than a mile from the rocky coast of Kota Island and three and a half miles south of Cape Chencho. The Argentine bomb, as it turned out later, a thousand-pound, hit the Entrim flight deck, flew through a hatch into the aft part of the rocket cellar "Si S lag", hit the tangent two large missiles, and finished its rather long way in the walk-in closet, known for its military -sea jargon as "latrine". It was a miracle that neither the bomb nor the missiles exploded. An explosion in a rocket cellar would almost certainly lead to the death of a ship. Yet several fires broke out, and the Entrim team found itself in a difficult position, trying to cope with them. Commander Yang gave a full course to the north in order to get closer to the Broadsworth to cover up and get help. But he did not have time to go there - after six minutes the next Argentine strike struck him.
This was another wave of the three Daggers, flying almost the same as the first wave, heading over West Falkland.
They went straight to the damaged Entrym, which they tried to throw over the Sea Slug missile in case the fire approached them. In desperation, Entrim fired the Sea Slug rocket, completely uncontrollable, in the direction of the attacking Daggers, hoping to somehow influence them. Their "Sea Cat" system was disabled, but 4,5-inch gun mounts and all machine guns fired at the attacking aircraft.
One plane broke through and fired a burning destroyer from its guns, wounding seven people and causing an even greater fire. The situation on the Entrime has become threatening. The second Dagger chose Fort Austin, a large supply vessel, which was very bad for us. newssince Fort Austin was completely defenseless against such an attack. Commander Dunlop ordered to open fire from two of his guns, twenty-four more people from the upper deck of the vessel spewed heavy fire from rifles and machine guns. But this was not enough, and Sam must have already prepared himself for the bombing, when, to his amazement, Dagger exploded a thousand yards from him, hit by "Sea Wolfe" from Broadsworth. The last plane again shot at Broadsworth, but the thousand-pound bomb dropped by him did not hit the ship.
The first time the “Harriers” worked to break the attack only after 14.00. Prior to that, the ships had to fight alone, and then mostly the Argentine planes made their way to the ships with bombs and the ships mostly had to repel their attacks themselves.
September 21 was one of the hardest days for the British. Of the seven warships that joined the battle - the frigate Ardent was destroyed by the Argentines, the Entrym was seriously damaged and could not shoot, but remained afloat and kept the course, the Argonot was seriously damaged and lost its course, but could weapons, two more ships had serious damage reducing their combat capability.
And this despite the fact that the Argentines made fifty sorties against British forces. In a narrow strait, where everything is in full view and there is no room for maneuver.
At the same time, it should be understood that the only surface ship lost on that day, the Ardent, was lost due to the inoperative air defense system. The first blow, which did not destroy the ship, but cost him its combat capability, was missed precisely because of this, if the ship’s air defense missile system was intact, the Ardent would probably not have been lost.
In further battles, the role of the Harriers continued to grow, and it was they who ensured the majority of the losses of the attacking aircraft. If we single out from the general list of downed Argentine attack aircraft and fighters only those who died at the time of the British repelling attacks on their ships, then it turns out that the "Harriers" shot down a little more than half of all these aircraft, and the ships - a little more than a third. The role of the Harriers in the depletion of the Argentine forces was thus extremely important, but it must be understood that they overtook most of their victims after they dropped bombs on British ships. Yes, and directed them to target from the ships.
Woodward’s book is full of emotions and doubts that the British will manage to hold out, but the fact remains that they didn’t just hold out, they won, and they won in a theoretically hopeless situation — a large lake of water size, numerical superiority of the enemy in aviation and non-working air defense systems . And as a result - from the 23 URO ships in general, who participated in the war from the British side, was lost ... 4. Less than 20%. Somehow it does not fit with the crushing role of aviation. The performance of the "Harriers" in this case should not deceive anyone.
The frigate "Antiloup" is sinking. Pay attention to how close the mountains are. But the British had no choice, they had to fight here.
Could the British only defeat URO ships, without the support of the Harriers? With the existing plan of operation, they could not. Although the ships successfully repulsed the attacks, the losses they inflicted were not sufficient for the Argentines to dry up so quickly. They would continue to attack and not the fact that the British would not have ended the ships before. But this provided that the plan of operation would be the same, and that the landing zones would be there, and that the landing pattern, under which it continued not only at night, but also during the day, would not have changed ...
Generally speaking, such a plan, which would allow an amphibious assault operation without using “Harriers” to protect URO ships, was quite possible, simply not needed.
And, of course, fantasizing about how things would have gone if the Argentines had bombs working normally would have been dofantazirovat and for the other side, and assume that the British air defense system and radar. So honest.
What did the Falklands war show? She showed that surface forces can fight against aviation and win. And also that it is very difficult to sink a ship that is on the high seas on the move and ready to repel an attack. The Argentines failed. Never.
Persian Gulf
Enthusiasts of rocket strikes from the air like to recall the American defeat of the Stark frigate by an Iraqi rocket launched from an Iraqi aircraft allegedly converted into a rocket-carrying carrier of a business jet Falcon 50.
But we must understand one simple thing - the operational connection of the US Navy, which included the frigate, did not conduct military operations against Iraq or Iran. For this reason, the frigate did not open fire on an Iraqi aircraft when the latter was discovered.
Starck spotted an Iraqi aircraft at 20.55. In a real combat situation at that moment the ship would have opened fire on the plane, and most likely the incident would have been settled on this - at the cost of either escaping or shooting down the plane. But Stark was not at war.
But next year, another American ship turned up in the war - the Wainwright missile cruiser, the same one on which Vice-Admiral Mastin worked on the use of Tomahawks anti-ship. The operation "Mantis" conducted by the US Navy against Iran in 1988 was mentioned in the article "The harmful myth of the mosquito fleet". We are specifically interested in the next moment.
In the morning of 18 on April 1988, the Americans, following orders to destroy Iranian platforms in the Persian Gulf, which were used by Iranians in raids on tankers, carried out the successive destruction of two platforms. In the morning, two Iranian Phantoms attempted to approach the American destroyer McCromic. However, this time the Americans had orders to shoot. The destroyer took the fighters to escort the air defense system and they turned away. The Americans did not let the missiles go.
A few hours later, another American ship group consisting of the Wainwright cruiser, the Badley and Simpson frigates encountered the corvette Joshan. The latter launched the cruiser the launch of the RCC "Harpoon", which the Americans successfully removed by interference and in response to this attack was sunk by rocket attacks from the cruiser and the Simpson. And here the ship group was attacked from the air by a pair of Iranian Phantoms. It should be understood that the Iranians had a successful experience of attacks of surface targets, and the Maverick guided missiles. It is not known exactly what the planes were really armed with, but they had the opportunity to inflict serious damage on ships.
But the American ships were not the same as the English ones. The cruiser took airplanes to escort, one of the pilots had the sense to turn away, the second continued to fly to the target and received two anti-aircraft missiles. The pilot was lucky, his heavily damaged aircraft could reach the Iranian territory.
US Navy missile cruiser "Wainwright".
What does such an example show? First of all, what should not be done is far-reaching conclusions from the situation with Starck. In a real combat situation, aircraft attempts to get close to the ships look like this.
Secondly, the outcome of the collision of Iranian fighters with the ships of the US Navy is an excellent illustration of what awaits both an armed aerial reconnaissance and airborne units of attack aircraft during attempts to attack surface ships.
It is also worth noting that the Americans were not at all afraid of the massive air raid from Iranian territory. And not only because of the aircraft carrier, but also because of the shipbuilding systems of the eighties that were very advanced for the late eighties.
Today, the air defense system is much more dangerous.
TFR "Watchdog". Forgotten Soviet example
There is one now slightly forgotten, but an incredibly instructive example of a real attack by Soviet bombers of a warship. This example is specific, because this ship was also a Soviet one. We are talking about the TFR "watchdog" project 1135, on which 8 November 1975, there was a rebellion.
TFR "Watchdog"
The story of the communist insurrection at the Watchdog, which was raised by the commander of the ship's captain of the 3 rank Valery Sablin, was heard, most likely, by everyone. Less is known about the details of the bomb strike, which stopped the departure of the ship from the Soviet territorial waters and made it possible for the captain of the ship to regain control of it. On the night of November 9, Sablin, who took control of the ship, took him to the exit from the Gulf of Riga. To stop the ship, it was decided to launch a bomb strike on it, for which one of the most combat-ready bomber units in the USSR Air Force - the 668-th Bomber Aviation Regiment, armed with Yak-28 aircraft - was raised in alarm.
Yak-28
Further events perfectly show how difficult it is to attack a surface ship. Even when he does not resist. Even when it happens in its territorial waters.
Of articles by Major General A.G. Tsymbalova:
The commander of the second (non-standard reconnaissance) squadron flew for weather reconnaissance and supplementary exploration ...
According to the decision of the commander, the reconnaissance of the target took off on a Yak-28L aircraft, the sighting and navigation system of which made it possible to determine its coordinates when a target was detected with an accuracy of several hundred meters. But it is - when detected. The crew of the reconnaissance aircraft, having arrived at the estimated point of the ship’s location, did not find it there and proceeded with a visual search for the ship in the direction of its probable movement.
The meteorological conditions of the autumn Baltic, of course, were not suitable for conducting aerial visual reconnaissance: morning twilight, broken 5-6 cloud scores with the lower edge at 600-700 m and thick haze with horizontal visibility no more than 3-4 km. Finding a ship visually in such conditions, identifying it by its silhouette and tail number was unlikely. He who flew over the autumn sea knows that the horizon line is absent, the gray sky in the mist merges with the water of lead color, the flight at 500 m altitude with poor visibility is possible only by means of instruments. And the crew of the reconnaissance aircraft did not fulfill the main task - the ship did not find bombers with the task of warning bombing along the ship’s course following at 5- and 6-minute intervals, didn’t bring it.
ERROR
So, the crews of the first two bombers went into the area of the ship’s intended location and, without receiving information from the reconnaissance aircraft, were forced to search for the target independently using the RBP in a survey mode. By the decision of the regiment commander, the crew of the deputy flight training commander began searching for the ship, starting with the area of its intended location, and the crew of the chief of the fire and tactical training of the regiment (navigator - secretary of the party committee of the regiment) from the Baltic Sea Gotland. At the same time, the distance to the island was determined using the RBP, so that the state border of Sweden was not violated.
The crew performing the search in the estimated area of the ship’s location almost immediately discovered a large surface target within the search area, reached it at a given height in 500 m, identified it visually in the haze as a destroyer of a destroyer and bombed ahead of the ship’s course, seeking to put a series of bombs closer to the ship. If the bombing were carried out at the test site, it would have been rated excellently - the points of the fall of the bombs would not exceed the mark of a circle with a radius of 80 m. But the series of bombs did not lie down the line through the ship’s hull. In contact with rods, assault bombs exploded on the water almost over its surface, and a sheaf of fragments ricocheted (water is incompressible) directly into the side of the ship, which turned out to be Soviet dry cargothat left just a few hours ago from the port of Ventspils.
...
ORDER: PUT A STRIKE
The crew of the chief of the fire and tactical training of the regiment, searching for a ship from the island of Gotland, consistently found several groups of surface targets. But, remembering the failure of his comrade, he went down to the height of 200 m and examined them visually. Fortunately, the weather has improved somewhat: the haze has slightly cleared and visibility has become 5-6 km. In the overwhelming majority, these were the vessels of fishermen who went fishing after the holidays at sea. Time passed, but the ship could not be found, and the regimental commander, with the consent of the acting. the commander of the air army decided to increase the efforts of the crews of the regiment control in the air by the two crews of the first squadron, which started the engines and began taxiing to the launch site.
And at this time in the situation, something radically changed. I think that the ship controlled by Sablina approached the border of the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, which the prosecution ships reported to the command. Why these ships and the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet did not carry out target designation for Air Force planes during the first sorties, so far I can only build guesses. Apparently, until this time, 668-th bap was not considered as the main force capable of stopping the rebellious ship. And when the ship approached neutral waters and the final decision was made to destroy it by any combat-ready forces, the regiment was in the center of the events.
Whatever it was, the. the commander of the air army suddenly ordered to raise the entire regiment in the shortest possible time to strike the ship (we still did not know the exact location of the ship).
Here it is necessary to make one explanation. At that time, the Air Force adopted three regiment departure missions for combat alert: to perform combat missions within the tactical range of the aircraft (in accordance with the planned flight table, which was what happened that day); with relocation to operational airfields (GSVG) and exit from the enemy's sudden strike at the airfield (take-off without ammunition suspension, by frame, from different directions to duty zones in the air, followed by landing on your airfield). On leaving the first strike, the squadron, whose parking was closest to any one of the runway ends, took off, in the 668-th bap it was the third squadron. Behind her, the first squadron should fly up from the opposite direction (just from the direction from which flights were flown on that ill-fated morning) and, secondly, the second squadron of jammers (the non-standard reconnaissance squadron) was to fly up.
The commander of the third squadron, having received an order to carry out a takeoff by a squadron according to the option of getting out of attack, quickly drove out to the runway, lined up another 9 aircraft in front of the runway, and immediately began taking off at the occupied strip by two aircraft of the first squadron. The collision and aircraft crash directly on the runway did not happen only because the commander of the first squadron and his slave managed to stop the run-up in the initial stage and free the lane.
The head of the flights at the command and control center (KDP), having first understood all the absurdity and danger of the situation, forbade anyone to take off without his permission than to incur a storm of negative emotions on the part of the regiment commander. To the credit of the old and experienced lieutenant colonel (who was not afraid of anyone or anything in life), who showed firmness, the regiment took off to perform a combat mission acquired a manageable character. But it was already impossible to build a pre-designed battle order of the regiment in the air, and the planes went to the strike area mixed up in two echelons with a minute interval at each. In fact, it was already a flock, not controlled by squadron commanders in the air, and an ideal target for two shipboard missile systems with an 40-second shooting cycle. With a high degree of probability, it can be argued that if the ship actually reflected this air strike, then all the 18 planes of this “battle order” would have been shot down.
ATTACK
And the plane searching for a ship from the island of Gotland finally found a group of ships, two of which looked bigger on the screen of the RBP, while the others lined up like a front. Violating all prohibitions not to fall below 500 m, the crew passed between two warships at a height of 50 m, which he defined as large anti-submarine ships (BOD). Between the ships was 5-6 km, on board one of them was clearly visible on-board number. A report on the azimuth and distance of the ship from the Tukums airfield, as well as a confirmation of its attack, immediately went to the regiment's command post. Having received permission to attack, the crew executed the maneuver and attacked the ship from a height of 200 m from the front from the side at an angle of 20-25 degrees from its axis. Sablin, driving the ship, competently tore off the attack, vigorously maneuvering in the direction of the attacking aircraft to a course angle equal to 0 degrees.
The bomber was forced to stop the attack (it was unlikely to hit the narrow target when bombing from the horizon) and with a descent to 50 m (the crew remembered all the two OCA air defense missile systems) slipped right above the ship. With a small set to a height of 200, he carried out a maneuver called the "standard 270 degrees turn" in tactics of the Air Force, and attacked the ship again from the side behind. Quite reasonably assuming that the ship would emerge from under attack by maneuvering in the opposite direction from the attacking plane, the crew attacked at such an angle that the ship did not have time to turn around to the course angle of the plane equal to 180 degrees before the bombs dropped.
It happened exactly as the crew intended. Sablin, of course, sought not to substitute the board of the ship, fearing top-mast bombing (but he did not know that the bomber did not have those bombs that are needed for this method of bombing). The first bomb of the series hit right in the middle of the deck on the hulk of the ship, destroyed the deck covering during the explosion and jammed the ship’s steering wheel in the position it was in. Other bombs of the series lay with a flight at a slight angle from the axis of the ship and did not cause any damage to the ship. The ship began to describe a wide circulation and stalled course.
The crew, having executed the attack, began to sharply gain altitude, keeping the ship in sight and trying to determine the result of the strike, as he saw a series of signal rockets fired from the side of the attacked ship. The report on the regiment's command post sounded extremely briefly: it lets the missiles go. In the air and on the crew of the regiment, there was instant silence, because everyone was waiting for the Zur launches and did not forget about it for a minute. Who got them? After all, the column of our single aircraft was already approaching the point where the ship was located. These moments of absolute silence personally seemed to me a long hour. After some time, a clarification followed: the signal flares, and the air literally exploded with the diverse voices of crews trying to clarify their combat mission. And at this moment again the emotional cry of the commander of the crew above the ship: but not because it worked!
What can you do in war as in war. This is the first crew of the regiment's column jumped out onto one of the pursuit ships and immediately attacked, taking it as a rebellious ship. The attacked ship from falling bombs dodged, but responded with fire from all of its anti-aircraft automatic weapons. He shot a ship a lot, but by, and this is understandable. The border guards are unlikely to ever have shot at a “living”, skillfully maneuvering aircraft.
It attacked only the first bomber from 18 in the column of the regiment, and who will attack the rest? Nobody doubted the determination of the pilots by this point in time: the rebels and the pursuers. Apparently, the naval command in time asked itself this question, and found the right answer to it, realizing that it was time to stop this orgy of strikes, in fact, by them, and "organized."
According to the decision of the commander, the reconnaissance of the target took off on a Yak-28L aircraft, the sighting and navigation system of which made it possible to determine its coordinates when a target was detected with an accuracy of several hundred meters. But it is - when detected. The crew of the reconnaissance aircraft, having arrived at the estimated point of the ship’s location, did not find it there and proceeded with a visual search for the ship in the direction of its probable movement.
The meteorological conditions of the autumn Baltic, of course, were not suitable for conducting aerial visual reconnaissance: morning twilight, broken 5-6 cloud scores with the lower edge at 600-700 m and thick haze with horizontal visibility no more than 3-4 km. Finding a ship visually in such conditions, identifying it by its silhouette and tail number was unlikely. He who flew over the autumn sea knows that the horizon line is absent, the gray sky in the mist merges with the water of lead color, the flight at 500 m altitude with poor visibility is possible only by means of instruments. And the crew of the reconnaissance aircraft did not fulfill the main task - the ship did not find bombers with the task of warning bombing along the ship’s course following at 5- and 6-minute intervals, didn’t bring it.
ERROR
So, the crews of the first two bombers went into the area of the ship’s intended location and, without receiving information from the reconnaissance aircraft, were forced to search for the target independently using the RBP in a survey mode. By the decision of the regiment commander, the crew of the deputy flight training commander began searching for the ship, starting with the area of its intended location, and the crew of the chief of the fire and tactical training of the regiment (navigator - secretary of the party committee of the regiment) from the Baltic Sea Gotland. At the same time, the distance to the island was determined using the RBP, so that the state border of Sweden was not violated.
The crew performing the search in the estimated area of the ship’s location almost immediately discovered a large surface target within the search area, reached it at a given height in 500 m, identified it visually in the haze as a destroyer of a destroyer and bombed ahead of the ship’s course, seeking to put a series of bombs closer to the ship. If the bombing were carried out at the test site, it would have been rated excellently - the points of the fall of the bombs would not exceed the mark of a circle with a radius of 80 m. But the series of bombs did not lie down the line through the ship’s hull. In contact with rods, assault bombs exploded on the water almost over its surface, and a sheaf of fragments ricocheted (water is incompressible) directly into the side of the ship, which turned out to be Soviet dry cargothat left just a few hours ago from the port of Ventspils.
...
ORDER: PUT A STRIKE
The crew of the chief of the fire and tactical training of the regiment, searching for a ship from the island of Gotland, consistently found several groups of surface targets. But, remembering the failure of his comrade, he went down to the height of 200 m and examined them visually. Fortunately, the weather has improved somewhat: the haze has slightly cleared and visibility has become 5-6 km. In the overwhelming majority, these were the vessels of fishermen who went fishing after the holidays at sea. Time passed, but the ship could not be found, and the regimental commander, with the consent of the acting. the commander of the air army decided to increase the efforts of the crews of the regiment control in the air by the two crews of the first squadron, which started the engines and began taxiing to the launch site.
And at this time in the situation, something radically changed. I think that the ship controlled by Sablina approached the border of the territorial waters of the Soviet Union, which the prosecution ships reported to the command. Why these ships and the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet did not carry out target designation for Air Force planes during the first sorties, so far I can only build guesses. Apparently, until this time, 668-th bap was not considered as the main force capable of stopping the rebellious ship. And when the ship approached neutral waters and the final decision was made to destroy it by any combat-ready forces, the regiment was in the center of the events.
Whatever it was, the. the commander of the air army suddenly ordered to raise the entire regiment in the shortest possible time to strike the ship (we still did not know the exact location of the ship).
Here it is necessary to make one explanation. At that time, the Air Force adopted three regiment departure missions for combat alert: to perform combat missions within the tactical range of the aircraft (in accordance with the planned flight table, which was what happened that day); with relocation to operational airfields (GSVG) and exit from the enemy's sudden strike at the airfield (take-off without ammunition suspension, by frame, from different directions to duty zones in the air, followed by landing on your airfield). On leaving the first strike, the squadron, whose parking was closest to any one of the runway ends, took off, in the 668-th bap it was the third squadron. Behind her, the first squadron should fly up from the opposite direction (just from the direction from which flights were flown on that ill-fated morning) and, secondly, the second squadron of jammers (the non-standard reconnaissance squadron) was to fly up.
The commander of the third squadron, having received an order to carry out a takeoff by a squadron according to the option of getting out of attack, quickly drove out to the runway, lined up another 9 aircraft in front of the runway, and immediately began taking off at the occupied strip by two aircraft of the first squadron. The collision and aircraft crash directly on the runway did not happen only because the commander of the first squadron and his slave managed to stop the run-up in the initial stage and free the lane.
The head of the flights at the command and control center (KDP), having first understood all the absurdity and danger of the situation, forbade anyone to take off without his permission than to incur a storm of negative emotions on the part of the regiment commander. To the credit of the old and experienced lieutenant colonel (who was not afraid of anyone or anything in life), who showed firmness, the regiment took off to perform a combat mission acquired a manageable character. But it was already impossible to build a pre-designed battle order of the regiment in the air, and the planes went to the strike area mixed up in two echelons with a minute interval at each. In fact, it was already a flock, not controlled by squadron commanders in the air, and an ideal target for two shipboard missile systems with an 40-second shooting cycle. With a high degree of probability, it can be argued that if the ship actually reflected this air strike, then all the 18 planes of this “battle order” would have been shot down.
ATTACK
And the plane searching for a ship from the island of Gotland finally found a group of ships, two of which looked bigger on the screen of the RBP, while the others lined up like a front. Violating all prohibitions not to fall below 500 m, the crew passed between two warships at a height of 50 m, which he defined as large anti-submarine ships (BOD). Between the ships was 5-6 km, on board one of them was clearly visible on-board number. A report on the azimuth and distance of the ship from the Tukums airfield, as well as a confirmation of its attack, immediately went to the regiment's command post. Having received permission to attack, the crew executed the maneuver and attacked the ship from a height of 200 m from the front from the side at an angle of 20-25 degrees from its axis. Sablin, driving the ship, competently tore off the attack, vigorously maneuvering in the direction of the attacking aircraft to a course angle equal to 0 degrees.
The bomber was forced to stop the attack (it was unlikely to hit the narrow target when bombing from the horizon) and with a descent to 50 m (the crew remembered all the two OCA air defense missile systems) slipped right above the ship. With a small set to a height of 200, he carried out a maneuver called the "standard 270 degrees turn" in tactics of the Air Force, and attacked the ship again from the side behind. Quite reasonably assuming that the ship would emerge from under attack by maneuvering in the opposite direction from the attacking plane, the crew attacked at such an angle that the ship did not have time to turn around to the course angle of the plane equal to 180 degrees before the bombs dropped.
It happened exactly as the crew intended. Sablin, of course, sought not to substitute the board of the ship, fearing top-mast bombing (but he did not know that the bomber did not have those bombs that are needed for this method of bombing). The first bomb of the series hit right in the middle of the deck on the hulk of the ship, destroyed the deck covering during the explosion and jammed the ship’s steering wheel in the position it was in. Other bombs of the series lay with a flight at a slight angle from the axis of the ship and did not cause any damage to the ship. The ship began to describe a wide circulation and stalled course.
The crew, having executed the attack, began to sharply gain altitude, keeping the ship in sight and trying to determine the result of the strike, as he saw a series of signal rockets fired from the side of the attacked ship. The report on the regiment's command post sounded extremely briefly: it lets the missiles go. In the air and on the crew of the regiment, there was instant silence, because everyone was waiting for the Zur launches and did not forget about it for a minute. Who got them? After all, the column of our single aircraft was already approaching the point where the ship was located. These moments of absolute silence personally seemed to me a long hour. After some time, a clarification followed: the signal flares, and the air literally exploded with the diverse voices of crews trying to clarify their combat mission. And at this moment again the emotional cry of the commander of the crew above the ship: but not because it worked!
What can you do in war as in war. This is the first crew of the regiment's column jumped out onto one of the pursuit ships and immediately attacked, taking it as a rebellious ship. The attacked ship from falling bombs dodged, but responded with fire from all of its anti-aircraft automatic weapons. He shot a ship a lot, but by, and this is understandable. The border guards are unlikely to ever have shot at a “living”, skillfully maneuvering aircraft.
It attacked only the first bomber from 18 in the column of the regiment, and who will attack the rest? Nobody doubted the determination of the pilots by this point in time: the rebels and the pursuers. Apparently, the naval command in time asked itself this question, and found the right answer to it, realizing that it was time to stop this orgy of strikes, in fact, by them, and "organized."
Once again - the ship did not resist and was in the territorial waters of the USSR. Its coordinates, course and speed were transferred to the strike aircraft without delay. At the same time, the mere fact of an emergency departure of a regiment to strike in a real combat situation and several mistakes in organizing the departure almost ended in disasters both at takeoff and over the sea. Miraculously, "their" ships were not sunk. Miraculously, the frontier guards were not shot down by any aircraft. This, by the way, is the usual military chaos, the inevitable companion of suddenly beginning hostilities. Then everyone gets a “hand crammed” and he disappears, the regiments and divisions start working with the accuracy of a well-established mechanism.
If the enemy will give time.
It is necessary to understand - in a real combat situation if necessary to provide a strike on real enemy ships, it would be the same thing - and a crash during takeoff, and a consistent exit on the target with separate units and squadrons, with the shooting of attacking aircraft with shipborne air defense missile systems, and the loss of a target, and strikes against my own Only the losses from the ship-based air defense missile systems would be real - the enemy would definitely not regret anyone. At the same time, the hypothetical presence of the anti-ship missiles on their own aircraft would not have done anything - the aviation anti-ship anti-ship missiles capture the target on the carrier in order to launch it, the carrier must find the attacked object and correctly identify it. And this in the described military episode failed, and for objective reasons.
So blows on surface ships look inside the "real world".
Conclusion
Russia, in part of its sea power, is entering a very dangerous situation. On the one hand, the Syrian operation, the confrontation with the United States in Venezuela, and the intensification of Russian foreign policy as a whole, shows that Russia has a rather aggressive foreign policy. At the same time, the navy is an extremely important, and often indispensable, tool. So, without intensive military work of the Navy in 2012-2015, there would be no operation in Syria.
But in leading such actions, the Russian leadership has allowed a critical on the scale disorganization of naval construction, from shipbuilding to the collapse of adequate organizational and staff structures. In such circumstances, the rapid development of the Navy is impossible, and demand from the Russian fleet will soon begin as with the present. So, there are no guarantees that the Navy will not have to conduct full-scale military operations outside the zone of operations of coastal fighter aircraft. And since the Navy has one aircraft carrier, and with unclear prospects, it is necessary to prepare to fight with what we have.
And there are "mixed" ships with guided missile weapons.
Examples from the military practice of the Second World War (including domestic experience) and the wars and military operations of the second half of the last century tell us that in some cases, the base aviation is powerless against surface ships. But in order for enemy aircraft to be incapable of harming our ships over and over again, the latter must act flawlessly, maneuvering so that at times faster, but strongly limited in fuel, aircraft missed the ship's team over and over again, giving it a head start over time and opportunity to hit the airfields and other objects with their cruise missiles.
We need intelligence that can warn ships in advance about the rise of enemy aircraft, we need super-power systems of ship-based air defense capable of enabling ships to repel at least one massive air attack, need DRLO helicopters that could be based on frigates and cruisers, real training is needed, without “show off” to this kind of action. Finally, we need a psychological readiness to go for such risky operations, and we need the ability to cut off unnecessarily risky and hopeless options from simply moderately risky ones. We must learn to deceive the enemy, who has perfect systems of intelligence and communication, and who dominates the sea. Not having an aircraft carrier fleet, not being able to create it quickly, not having bases all over the world, from where basic aircraft could cover the ships, we will have to learn to do without all these (important and necessary, in general) things.
And sometimes it will be quite possible, although it is always very difficult.
- Alexander Timokhin
- going-postal.com, UK Imperial War Museum (Crown copyright), Wikipedia
- Surface ships against the aircraft. World War II
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