Delayed reorganization of the US Navy under the ROAD plan and the Caribbean Crisis

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Stages of the reorganization of US CB according to the ROAD plan. Justification of the reorganization


During the early options for developing a ROAD plan (Objective reorganization of army divisions 1961 – 1965) General Powell (Commander of the Continental Army Command) proposed to Eddleman that, if approved, the army had a comprehensive information plan to justify such a major reorganization. Both the military and the general public should have been reminded that organizations evolved in response to past experience and new weapons. In addition, political implications must be considered. General Taylor, the main defender of the "pentami" units, who then served in the headquarters of the White House, could cast doubt on a radical reorganization. In addition, the military community may object to new changes and reorganization so soon after the completion of the reorganization under the plan “Pentomic Division”.

Delayed reorganization of the US Navy under the ROAD plan and the Caribbean Crisis

M60 and BTRM113 in storage




Powell's desire to implement the plan received an impetus when the new Kennedy administration, waging a global struggle against communism, decided to improve the readiness of the country's armed forces. 25 May 1961 President John F. Kennedy announced at a joint Session of Congress that army divisional forces will be upgraded to increase conventional firepower, improve tactical mobility in all conditions and provide flexibility. In addition, separate brigades will be organized to help counter direct or indirect threats around the world.

Delay reorganization


Kennedy's statement implied immediate reorganization, but international events delayed the change. In the summer of 1961, relations between the Soviet Union and the United States deteriorated, especially in connection with the status of Berlin, and on July 25, the president asked Congress for funds to replenish the existing Pentomic Division and upgrade their weapons. He also sought to obtain the authority to call in reservists for a year of active service. Congress agreed, and the army postponed the reorganization of the ROAD.

In order to "respond" to the Soviet "initiatives" in Berlin, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara instructed that five divisions in Europe be transferred to a full organizational structure and that 3, 8, and 24-I infantry divisions should receive additional by 1000 military personnel. The increase in the number of troops allowed the divisions to be fully staffed with additional armored personnel carriers. The readiness of the army in the United States increased due to the expansion of the training base, which excluded primary training in combat divisions.

In the summer of 1961, Congress also authorized the Department of Defense to call 250 000 reservists into active service for twelve months. The subsequent closure of the Berlin border 13 August 1961, caused another series of mobilization measures. In October, the 1 Division of the Army Reserve was ordered to switch to active military service in order to open a training center at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. In the same month, the Kennedy Administration approved the deployment of two additional combat divisions for the European command. In October, two divisions of the National Guard were transferred to the core staff to replace the divisions intended for the deployment of strategic forces in Europe, bringing the total number of divisions in active service to sixteen. The 32 Infantry Division (Wisconsin) was sent to Fort Polk, Louisiana, and the 49 Armored Division (Texas) was sent to Fort Hood, Texas. A total of 113 254 officer and military personnel of the National Guard and army reserve were called up for active military service.

During the Caribbean crisis, no division was deployed in Germany, but over the next few months the army took other steps to strengthen its forces in Europe. Measures included equipping troops with new M 14 rifles and M 60 machine guns and accelerating the production of main combat tanks M 60 and M 113 armored personnel carriers, which allowed the army to deploy these systems earlier than planned. To reduce the time required to move units to Europe, the army deployed enough equipment in Germany to equip one armored division, one infantry division, and several separate battalions. To service equipment and armament, the personnel of the 2nd Armored and 4th Infantry Divisions were transferred to Germany, but in the end these people were replaced by permanent maintenance personnel. Shortly after the equipment was stationed in Germany, the army launched Operation “Big Lift” when units from the United States traveled to Europe and conducted exercises using stockpiled equipment and weapons that preceded similar exercises, which were soon due were to become regular in the army.

The army also increased combat readiness in other formations. In the 82 and 101 airborne divisions, as well as in the 4 and 25 infantry divisions, the Onest John missile systems were replaced by the Little John. The 25 Infantry Division was fully engaged in Hawaii, and the reinforced airborne combat group, which was sent to Okinawa in June 1960, was relieved of its assignment to the division, but remained in Okinawa. In Korea, the number of two divisions also increased.

Trial steps for reorganization


After the accumulation of reserves for resolving the Berlin crisis, Congress authorized a moderate permanent increase in the size of the regular army, and in January 1962, Secretary of State McNamara demanded the activation of the first two divisions of the ROAD plan, which ultimately had to replace the two National Guard units as part of the strategic forces. February 3 The US 4 Army reorganized the 1 Armored Division, using its Combat Command "A" as its core, into Fort Hood. The division became a division of mechanized infantry with four tank and six battalions of mechanized infantry. Sixteen days later, the US 5 Army reorganized the 5 Infantry Division (with the exception of its 2 Brigade and a separate battalion) at Fort Carson, Colorado, and swallowed up personnel at the training center. The 2 Brigade, the 5 Infantry Division, was activated in Fort Devens, Massachusetts using the resources of the 2 Infantry Brigade, which was inactivated. The brigade continued to support the reserve exercises in the area of ​​the First US Army, while one of the tank battalions of the 5 Division, stationed in Fort Irvine, California, supported the testing and evaluation programs of the Combat Development Command. In the 5 Infantry Division, located from coast to coast, there were three infantry battalions in Fort Devens, one tank and six infantry battalions in Fort Carson and one tank battalion in Fort Irwin.

When McNamara approved the activation of two divisions of the regular army at the start of 1962, he decided to postpone the reorganization of the rest of the army until the financial year's 1964 due to the Berlin crisis. But events soon changed that decision. For example, in the spring of 1962, Mr. Powell ordered that all classes at the infantry school after July 1 reflect the ROAD doctrine. Therefore, the infantry school requested permission to reorganize the 1 Infantry Brigade under the ROAD structure. Instead, the army headquarters decided to inactivate the "pentamy" structured brigade and replace it with a new ROAD unit, the 197th Infantry Brigade, which raised the issue with the unit designation.

The reorganization of the plan "ROAD" again raised the question of the designation of units. Divisional brigades have not appeared in the structure of the army since the abolition of the old "square" divisions. Army leaders decided that two of the three new brigade headquarters in each infantry division would inherit the disbanded or inactivated infantry brigade headquarters associated with the former "square" divisions. The newly returned 1 Infantry Brigade is scheduled to return to the 1 Infantry Division when transformed according to the ROAD plan, the existing unit in Fort Benning needed a new name. For this and other individual brigades, the staff selected infantry brigade numbers that were associated with units of the Organizational Reserve, which were no longer in the main force.

For example, for the new ROAD brigade in Fort Benning, Georgia, Adjutant General 1 August 1962 used 99 Infantry Division units, such as headquarters and staff companies, to create 197 and 198 Infantry Brigades . The following month, the 197 Infantry Brigade was activated at Fort Benning. For the third brigade in each infantry division, officers used division headquarters, which were disbanded during the reorganization and transferred to brigade headquarters. For example: The 3 Brigade, a new 5 Infantry Division, immortalized a company headquarters, the old 5 Infantry Division, which was inactivated in the 1957 year. In the armored division, combat teams A, B, and C were renamed 1, 2, and 3 brigade.

When the US 3 Army activated the 197 Infantry Brigade at Fort Benning to support and train at the infantry center, it consisted of a composite artillery battalion (105-mm and 155-mm howitzers and NUR Oneest John), a armored battalion, a mechanized battalion, and a mechanized battalion. infantry, two infantry battalions, an engineering company and a chemical platoon, but without a support battalion. The size of the brigade was approximately 3500 people.

After the failure of the invasion of the Bay of Pigs and rumors of Soviet aid to Cuba, McNamara decided to support the existing army forces in the Caribbean. The Army replaced the battle group in the channel zone with an 193 Infantry Brigade, which was activated on 8 August 1962. Initially, it consisted of only one infantry battalion and one airborne infantry battalion, but soon after the activation, an artillery battery and an engineering company were added.

By mid-August, the 1962, the 1-I Tank and 5-I Infantry Divisions, reached an approved level of readiness for the strategic forces, and the army revised its divisions, freeing reserve units three months earlier. Subsequently, the 32 Infantry Division and the 49 Tank Division of the National Guard left the federal service and returned to the Organizational Reserve, and the 100 Division (training) also returned to reserve status, closing the training center in Fort Chaffee.

In October, 1962, less than three months after the 1-Armored Division became part of the strategic forces, the army used it as part of the emergency attack forces, which are assembled to counter the accumulation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. For faster access to port facilities, the division moved from Fort Hood to Fort Stewart, Georgia, where it conducted a series of amphibious exercises. As the tension eased during the late fall, the “Old Iron Parts” returned to Fort Hood without conducting active operations against Cuba.

Evaluation of the first steps


When the army postponed the reorganization of the remaining units of the regular army under the ROAD plan until January 1963, the delay allowed the 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions to evaluate the concept. General Decker (Chief of Staff / Commander-in-Chief of the US Army) told Army Secretary Cyrus R. Vance that “ROAD provides significant improvements in command structure, organization flexibility, ability to sustained combat, tactical mobility (ground and air), balanced firepower (nuclear and non-nuclear), logistical support and compatibility with the Allied forces (in particular, with NATO) ”.


George Henry Decker, Chief of Staff of the United States Army in 1960-1962


The chief of staff added that the commanders of the 1 armored and 5 infantry divisions did not reveal any serious problems that would require changes in the general concept).

Decker saw the advantages and disadvantages of the upcoming reorganization of ROAD. A comparison of ROAD infantry and mechanized infantry divisions with a reinforced penta infantry division showed some significant benefits for the new organization. With an increase in personnel numbers of just 2 percent, the ROAD organization demonstrated a significant increase in combat power, which in some weapon systems exceeded 200 percent. But the new units will be expensive, and the full implementation of the ROAD plan will have to wait for the supply of new weapons and equipment. Up to this point, instead of helicopters, airplanes were to be used, and infantry battalions would replace mechanized infantry battalions until armored personnel carriers became available to all divisions. In addition, due to staff shortages, the units will be maintained at a level below full.

To be continued ...
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  1. +7
    20 July 2019 15: 20
    Thanks to the author. These are the articles that make the face of "VO".
  2. +1
    20 July 2019 20: 40
    But is there anything similar regarding the metamorphoses of the Soviet army organization in the post-war period?
  3. +1
    21 July 2019 09: 54
    The Americans stubbornly kept the structure that was copied from the German battle groups.
    And yet the system when formations are created for tasks is worse than when tasks for formations are selected. They will ultimately come to a formation with a permanent OSH.

    In some areas, we always had corps and brigades (instead of armies and divisions); at worst, it’s possible to strengthen the formation of a permanent firefighting system for the task (normal practice).

    And yet, the pure translation of the type-artillery battalion cuts the ear. A semantic division is easier to read.
  4. +1
    22 July 2019 16: 55
    Perhaps the most interesting:
    To reduce the time required to move units to Europe, the army deployed enough equipment in Germany to equip one armored division, one infantry division and several separate battalions

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