The submarine "Suffren" challenges the naval aviation of the Russian Navy. The treacherous hunter with air defense capabilities
As it is known, the solemn ceremony of launching the 12 X-type generation Suffren of the Barracuda SNA 2019 4, held on July 12, XNUMX, was presented by the central French media and highly specialized Western European military analytical publications as the most significant event in stories military-industrial complex and the Navy of France.
Without going into the already known technical characteristics, design features, as well as the range of tasks assigned to Barracuda, it was possible to conclude that the Suffren nuclear powered icebreaker that descended from the stocks of the Naval Group (DCNS) is an “ordinary” conceptual analogue of the Russian MAPL Pr 885 / M "Ash / -M" and the American "Virginia", and the surge of media pathos was triggered by exceptionally beautiful statements sounded by the head of state Emmanuel Macron and the Chief of Staff of the French Navy Admiral Christophe Puzuka, post-collision in the event.
We decided to abandon the erroneous practice of superficially assessing the combat capabilities of one or another sample of promising military equipment and plunged into a rigorous study of the technical parameters, the hull layout, the architecture of the power plant, and the ammunition submarines of this series.
As a result, a thorough analysis of foreign and domestic reference publications publishing information about the “Barracuda” project from the second half of 2000's led us to a very unexpected result, which could perplex not only the regulars of military analytical blogs, but also real experts in the military naval equipment and anti-submarine weapons. As time has shown, a significant "slip" of the project "Barracuda" (from the moment of laying the main submarine "Suffren" until its launch into the water took about 11,5 years) only played into the hands of DCNS specialists, who managed to carefully consider all the technical problems encountered in during the operation of the American and British MAPL "Virginia" and "Estujt", and then eliminate the probable causes of their occurrence during the construction of the Suffren nuclear nuclear-powered ship.
One of such problems can be considered the “childhood disease” of the American multi-purpose atomic submarine cruisers of the Virginia class in the Block I / II versions, which consists in the detachment of the sound-absorbing coating segments from the hull (due to a decrease in the adhesive strength under the influence of sea water), which ultimately led to a significant increase in the acoustic signature of the submarines, and hence the range of their direction finding through radio acoustic buoys and the enemy SAC. In combat conditions (in the oceanic theater of operations), this technological “breach” can lead to the “collapse” of the layered anti-submarine and anti-ship zones “A2 / AD” formed around the US Navy AUG. It is obvious that during the installation of the elements of the sound-absorbing (“anechoic”) coating on the head MAPL “Suffren” a more advanced version of waterproof glue was used, which could be used on the Le Triomphant strategic submarine cruisers. As is known, the latter did not encounter the above-described "childhood illness."
However, the implementation of the highest level of acoustic secrecy of the submarine “Suffren” and its “sisterships” under construction (at the level or higher than that of MAPL pr. 885, “Virginia” and “Estuit”) is caused not only by the use of high-performance “anechoic” coating segments on high-quality glue-based, but also weight and size indicators, as well as the configuration of controls and propulsion design. Thus, the submarines of the class “Barracuda” can boast with an underwater displacement of just 5300 t (in comparison with the 13800 t in Yasenei) and hull width in 8,8 m.
These indicators in combination with the water-jet propulsion unit (absent on the “early” MAPL of 885 av.), Which reduce the disturbance of the water column from the cavitation effect, compact cutting, “smoothly integrated” into the architecture of the hull, X-shaped tail unit, and a single energy center (steam generators Combined into a single module with a K-15 water-cooled reactor placed on a multi-tiered depreciation platform), it will be possible to achieve a reduction in the level of acoustic noise "Barracuda" to 45 — 50 dB in the “sneak” mode, which will only be achitelno indicators exceed modern SSKs / DSEPL (including anaerobic "Soryu" type 212A etc.). Moreover, the X-shaped configuration of accommodation of feed stabilizers and rudders that do not rise above the hull's upper generator will reduce the effective dispersion surface of Barracuda-class submarines in surface mode, which will noticeably decrease the range of their detection by onboard anti-aircraft search and target radar lines the adversary.
Meanwhile, this is not the whole list of "trumps" of nuclear submarine cruisers of this family. In addition to the software and hardware adaptation of combat information and control systems of submarines announced by the Naval Group and the Arms Procurement Agency of the Defense Ministry of France for the use of advanced heavy torpedoes F21 Artemis and long-range tactical missiles SCALP Naval / MdCN, Barracud equipment The A3SM undersea-based self-defense self-defense SAM system, developed by the joint division of concerns MBDA and DCNS, will be replenished. The key element of the A3SM complex (Arme Anti-Aérienne pour Sous Marins) is the “anti-aircraft” modification of the medium-range air combat missile MICA-IR (with a dual-band infrared homing head: 3-5 micron and 8-12 micron, respectively), placed in a protective starter launched from 533-mm submarine torpedo tubes.
Already in the foreseeable future, the underwater version of launching VL MICA-IR missiles in the A3SM version can be considered an extremely “wake-up call” not only for crews of anti-submarine helicopters and IL-38N aircraft, carrying out sonar reconnaissance and monitoring of the surface situation in the most dangerous areas of the theater of military operations, but also for tactical flight personnel aviationinvolved in gaining dominance in the air or air patrolling on the far approaches to the zones A2 / AD of the Russian Air Force. And there is no exaggeration here, because the underwater launch of these missiles can be carried out completely unexpectedly for the crews of potential targets, while it is impossible to record the operation of an infrared seeker using standard radiation warning devices or RTR stations, and optoelectronic attack detection stations missiles (due to infrared radiation from engine flares) are far from being installed on all types of aircraft of naval aviation or Russian aerospace forces.
And even in the case of timely detection of the fact that the MICA-IR rocket emerges from the depths of the sea, it will be extremely difficult to avoid interception. Why? Firstly, because the modern two-spectral matrix photodetector of the MICA-IR rocket has excellent noise immunity with the ability to select a real target against the background of a “swarm” of heat traps and even optical-electronic countermeasures. Secondly, in connection with the possibility of receiving re-targeting / correction (in the event of a “capture” failure) from remote DRLO planes and airborne radars of Western fighters via the Link-16 radio channel (participation of the submarine carrier in this case is not required). Thirdly, due to the highest maneuverability of the MICA family of rockets, which is achieved through the use of the gas jetting system of the OBE during the period of burning out the solid propellant charge of the engine (at this stage the available MICA-IR / EM overloads can reach 55 units).
Salvation from such an insidious tactic of using the A3SM underwater-based defensive complex can only be flights at altitudes greater than 10 km, outside the high-altitude ceiling of the MICA family of missiles in the “anti-aircraft” version. Unfortunately, in the conditions of high-intensity combat operations on the sea / ocean theater, it is unlikely to envisage the above points, as well as effectively suppress the underwater communication channels through which target designation can be transmitted to the operators of the A3SM complex.
Without going into the already known technical characteristics, design features, as well as the range of tasks assigned to Barracuda, it was possible to conclude that the Suffren nuclear powered icebreaker that descended from the stocks of the Naval Group (DCNS) is an “ordinary” conceptual analogue of the Russian MAPL Pr 885 / M "Ash / -M" and the American "Virginia", and the surge of media pathos was triggered by exceptionally beautiful statements sounded by the head of state Emmanuel Macron and the Chief of Staff of the French Navy Admiral Christophe Puzuka, post-collision in the event.
MAPL "Suffren" - a reference sample of Western submarine construction
We decided to abandon the erroneous practice of superficially assessing the combat capabilities of one or another sample of promising military equipment and plunged into a rigorous study of the technical parameters, the hull layout, the architecture of the power plant, and the ammunition submarines of this series.
As a result, a thorough analysis of foreign and domestic reference publications publishing information about the “Barracuda” project from the second half of 2000's led us to a very unexpected result, which could perplex not only the regulars of military analytical blogs, but also real experts in the military naval equipment and anti-submarine weapons. As time has shown, a significant "slip" of the project "Barracuda" (from the moment of laying the main submarine "Suffren" until its launch into the water took about 11,5 years) only played into the hands of DCNS specialists, who managed to carefully consider all the technical problems encountered in during the operation of the American and British MAPL "Virginia" and "Estujt", and then eliminate the probable causes of their occurrence during the construction of the Suffren nuclear nuclear-powered ship.
One of such problems can be considered the “childhood disease” of the American multi-purpose atomic submarine cruisers of the Virginia class in the Block I / II versions, which consists in the detachment of the sound-absorbing coating segments from the hull (due to a decrease in the adhesive strength under the influence of sea water), which ultimately led to a significant increase in the acoustic signature of the submarines, and hence the range of their direction finding through radio acoustic buoys and the enemy SAC. In combat conditions (in the oceanic theater of operations), this technological “breach” can lead to the “collapse” of the layered anti-submarine and anti-ship zones “A2 / AD” formed around the US Navy AUG. It is obvious that during the installation of the elements of the sound-absorbing (“anechoic”) coating on the head MAPL “Suffren” a more advanced version of waterproof glue was used, which could be used on the Le Triomphant strategic submarine cruisers. As is known, the latter did not encounter the above-described "childhood illness."
However, the implementation of the highest level of acoustic secrecy of the submarine “Suffren” and its “sisterships” under construction (at the level or higher than that of MAPL pr. 885, “Virginia” and “Estuit”) is caused not only by the use of high-performance “anechoic” coating segments on high-quality glue-based, but also weight and size indicators, as well as the configuration of controls and propulsion design. Thus, the submarines of the class “Barracuda” can boast with an underwater displacement of just 5300 t (in comparison with the 13800 t in Yasenei) and hull width in 8,8 m.
These indicators in combination with the water-jet propulsion unit (absent on the “early” MAPL of 885 av.), Which reduce the disturbance of the water column from the cavitation effect, compact cutting, “smoothly integrated” into the architecture of the hull, X-shaped tail unit, and a single energy center (steam generators Combined into a single module with a K-15 water-cooled reactor placed on a multi-tiered depreciation platform), it will be possible to achieve a reduction in the level of acoustic noise "Barracuda" to 45 — 50 dB in the “sneak” mode, which will only be achitelno indicators exceed modern SSKs / DSEPL (including anaerobic "Soryu" type 212A etc.). Moreover, the X-shaped configuration of accommodation of feed stabilizers and rudders that do not rise above the hull's upper generator will reduce the effective dispersion surface of Barracuda-class submarines in surface mode, which will noticeably decrease the range of their detection by onboard anti-aircraft search and target radar lines the adversary.
"Underwater predator" with anti-aircraft potential
Meanwhile, this is not the whole list of "trumps" of nuclear submarine cruisers of this family. In addition to the software and hardware adaptation of combat information and control systems of submarines announced by the Naval Group and the Arms Procurement Agency of the Defense Ministry of France for the use of advanced heavy torpedoes F21 Artemis and long-range tactical missiles SCALP Naval / MdCN, Barracud equipment The A3SM undersea-based self-defense self-defense SAM system, developed by the joint division of concerns MBDA and DCNS, will be replenished. The key element of the A3SM complex (Arme Anti-Aérienne pour Sous Marins) is the “anti-aircraft” modification of the medium-range air combat missile MICA-IR (with a dual-band infrared homing head: 3-5 micron and 8-12 micron, respectively), placed in a protective starter launched from 533-mm submarine torpedo tubes.
The configuration of the placement of anti-aircraft guided missile VL MICA-IR in the launch capsule, adapted to the use of 533-mm TA
Already in the foreseeable future, the underwater version of launching VL MICA-IR missiles in the A3SM version can be considered an extremely “wake-up call” not only for crews of anti-submarine helicopters and IL-38N aircraft, carrying out sonar reconnaissance and monitoring of the surface situation in the most dangerous areas of the theater of military operations, but also for tactical flight personnel aviationinvolved in gaining dominance in the air or air patrolling on the far approaches to the zones A2 / AD of the Russian Air Force. And there is no exaggeration here, because the underwater launch of these missiles can be carried out completely unexpectedly for the crews of potential targets, while it is impossible to record the operation of an infrared seeker using standard radiation warning devices or RTR stations, and optoelectronic attack detection stations missiles (due to infrared radiation from engine flares) are far from being installed on all types of aircraft of naval aviation or Russian aerospace forces.
And even in the case of timely detection of the fact that the MICA-IR rocket emerges from the depths of the sea, it will be extremely difficult to avoid interception. Why? Firstly, because the modern two-spectral matrix photodetector of the MICA-IR rocket has excellent noise immunity with the ability to select a real target against the background of a “swarm” of heat traps and even optical-electronic countermeasures. Secondly, in connection with the possibility of receiving re-targeting / correction (in the event of a “capture” failure) from remote DRLO planes and airborne radars of Western fighters via the Link-16 radio channel (participation of the submarine carrier in this case is not required). Thirdly, due to the highest maneuverability of the MICA family of rockets, which is achieved through the use of the gas jetting system of the OBE during the period of burning out the solid propellant charge of the engine (at this stage the available MICA-IR / EM overloads can reach 55 units).
Salvation from such an insidious tactic of using the A3SM underwater-based defensive complex can only be flights at altitudes greater than 10 km, outside the high-altitude ceiling of the MICA family of missiles in the “anti-aircraft” version. Unfortunately, in the conditions of high-intensity combat operations on the sea / ocean theater, it is unlikely to envisage the above points, as well as effectively suppress the underwater communication channels through which target designation can be transmitted to the operators of the A3SM complex.
Information