Tsushima Actions armored cruisers "Pearls" and "Emerald" on the night of May 15

The first day of the Tsushima battle, 14 May, ended pitifully for the Russian squadron. By the night it could not be considered destroyed, but she suffered heavy losses and was defeated, because of her main force, the 1 of the armored squad, there was almost nothing left. Shortly before sunset, the entire Emperor Alexander III crew died, and then Borodino and Prince Suvorov were destroyed in 19.10-19.20. Taking into account the death at the very beginning of the Oslyab battle, the Russian squadron lost four modern battleships out of five, but the only remaining Eagle was heavily damaged, and, very importantly, the centralized fire control was destroyed on it. In other words, he was quite capable of holding out for some time in battle, but he could not hope to inflict any tangible harm on the Japanese. Still, by the night of 14 on 15 in May, 12 still remained from 8 battleships (and the armored cruiser Admiral Nakhimov), although their combat value was low, and in addition, many of them were damaged during the day battle.

The moment of the death of the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov". Photo from the board of the Japanese ship

So, after sunset, the paths of the Emerald and Pearls diverged - as is known, the first one remained in the armored squadron, while the second joined the cruiser detachment. Why did this happen?

Why did Emerald stay?

As for "Emerald", then everything is clear - its commander, Baron V.N. Ferzen, received an order from the squadron commander to hold at the 2 armored detachment, from which the 3 ship from the 4 still remained in the evening. In addition, shortly before sunset, the ships received a message from the destroyer that Z.P. Rozhestvensky transfers command to Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatovu. Probably, we are talking about “Violent”, because, although “Impeccable” also announced the transfer of command to “Emperor Nicholas I”, he did it with a voice, coming close to the battleship, while V.N. Fersen in his report still talks about the signal. Therefore, the Baron quite rightly decided that the services of his cruiser squadron would still be needed. After an unsuccessful attempt to save at least part of the crew of the Emperor Alexander III, he returned to the squadron, took up a position on the left side of the flagship battleship N.I. Nebogatov "Emperor Nicholas I", but there he stayed until the morning.

The night for Izumrud was calm, the destroyers were not seen on the cruiser and they did not open fire on them. At the same time, in his report VN. Ferzen noted that before midnight, the Japanese destroyers attacked the terminal ships of the Russian convoy intensively, but believed that these attacks were unsuccessful, since they had not heard the explosions of mines. Russian battleships, according to V.N. Ferzen, strongly stretched the line, and the head lights were not fired and did not turn on the combat lighting, but the end ones did both. As for the main forces of the Japanese, the commander of the Emerald believed that they were nearby, and noted that the Russian ships, unmasking themselves with the light of searchlights, immediately came under fire from Japanese heavy guns. Of course, in fact, this was not, because after dusk, H. Togo gave an order for all detachments (detached to send this order of the “Tatsuta” advice) to go north to Fr. Dazhelet. With these actions, the Japanese admiral pursued two goals: firstly, the next morning, his main forces would be again between the Russian squadron and Vladivostok, and secondly, he would leave the battlefield to his numerous destroyers, thereby avoiding friendly fire. But V.N. Fersen saw the situation exactly as he saw it.

Why did Pearls go?

In fact, the commander of the cruiser didn’t even have the idea to leave somewhere. But the armored detachment to which his cruiser was "assigned" ceased to exist, and simply be near the PP Armadillos. Levitsky considered unnecessary and even harmful. Almost until dusk, the main forces of the Russian squadron continued to fight with the 1 combat detachment of H. Togo. Being in the battleships, "Pearls" could not damage the enemy, since, keeping from the side opposite to the Japanese, he did not have any acceptable conditions for his own shooting, while overflights of enemy shells created a great danger for him. P.P. Levitsky also pointed out that the Japanese main forces, having much more combat experience, did not keep light ships near their battleships, like small cruisers or an advice note.

Z.P. Rozhestvensky, “tying” the 2 rank cruiser to the main forces, expected to use them as repetitive ships, and that was right, but by the evening of May 14 it became absolutely obvious that this function would remain unclaimed. The main forces of the Russian squadron were driven by a badly beaten Borodino, followed by the Eagle, which was roughly in three cables, was also badly damaged. “Emperor Nicholas I”, instead of trying to lead the column, pulled the cables off to 5-6, and it was clear that N.I. Nebogatov not going to take command of the squadron. In such a situation, obviously, no complex evolutions were possible, and there was no one to venture to them, so the need for a “repetitive ship” was clearly not visible.

At the same time, the cruiser detachment O.A. Until recently, Enquist waged a hot battle with numerous Japanese armored cruisers: a similar goal was fully within the power of Pearl's 120-mm guns, and in the opinion of P.P. Levitsky, he would be much more useful than with the battleships of the squadron. But the most important thing was that PP Levitsky could not have thought that OA Enquist will leave the main forces of the squadron to the mercy of fate and will act independently.

"Pearls" on the roads of Kronstadt

For pp Levitsky events unfolded as follows. With 18.00, as before, he led his “Pearl” behind the cruisers O.A. Enkvist, with the cruiser kept close to the battleships, the squadron was assembled. Approximately at 19.00, at Zhemugue, we saw several detachments of Japanese destroyers, “along 4-5 ships in each” - they were in front, at the rate of Russian battleships, and the distance to them was very long. Soon Borodino was killed, and the Eagle, being in the head of the squadron, turned sharply to the left, according to PP Levitsky - on 8 points, that is, 90 degrees. and the rest of the battleships followed him. The new course of the main forces led them to come closer to the Russian cruisers, and the “Oleg” also turned left, increasing the course. The rest of the cruisers, including the Zhemchug, went to the Oleg, but here PP Levitsky discovered that OA Enquist led his ships with far greater speed than before, and the Pearl was lagging behind, with transports behind it, and the destroyers on the left.

P.P. Levitsky ordered an increase in speed, and soon caught up with Oleg, Aurora, Svetlana, and Almaz who had gone ahead. At this point, the last two cruisers were rebuilt, so that the "Pearl" went third in the ranks, after the "Aurora". Much to the surprise of P.P. Levitsky "Oleg" did not reduce the course, despite the fact that the transports and destroyers lagged behind, and the battleships were not visible. Only here did the commander of the “Pearl” suspect that O.A. Enquist is not at all going to remain with his battleships, but goes on a breakthrough, or somewhere else, on his own.

And now what was PP to do? Levitsky? It was already dark by that time, and “Oleg” was already poorly seen at Zhemugug, although it was no further than 3 cable from the cruiser. You could, of course, try to leave the cruisers and return to the battleships, but the rumble of guns suggested that this was a bad idea. Firstly, in the night darkness it was easy to lose the cruisers O.A. Enkvist, but not find the battleships, and secondly - the discovery of the main forces of the Russian squadron could end for the "Pearl" tragedy. On the battleships engaged in repulsing mine attacks, the small cruiser unexpectedly emerged from the darkness for the enemy could easily have been taken from the dark and shot at point-blank range.

In general, in this situation, P.P. Levitsky considered it best to stay with the OA cruisers. Enquist Do not forget that before the fight Z.P. Rozhestvensky ordered the commanders to keep as united as possible, and generally, from the standpoint of the tactics of those years, the most correct act for the ship that “lost” its detachment was not to search for it, but to join the detachment of the first flagship he encountered.

Interestingly, PP In the very near future Levitsky had the opportunity to verify the legitimacy of his own suspicions regarding the danger of "friendly fire." The fact is that “Oleg” was constantly changing course, and it was not so easy to stay in the ranks. At some point, PP Levitsky, wanting to figure out where his cruiser is now, entered the wheelhouse on the bridge, and stayed there, working with maps, on the strength of 5 minutes, when he was told from the bridge that contact with the cruisers was lost.

The commander of "Pearl" immediately ordered to change the course to 2-3 rumba to the right (exactly PP Levitsky did not remember) and add the turn. It was a true maneuver - the wind was heading, and soon on the "Pearl" we could smell the smoke from the pipes of the ships ahead of us, and then, in a matter of minutes, the cruisers themselves appeared through 10. P.P. Levitsky immediately ordered that Ratier be identified with a flashlight, which was done - nevertheless, the Aurora and Oleg were ready to fire and deployed the guns. In order to avoid such misunderstandings in the future, PP. Levitsky ordered to change the place of “Pearls” in the ranks, and to go on the left beam of the Aurora, in order to see well not only her, but also “Oleg,” and to notice their maneuvers in time.

For a while nothing happened, and then the “Pearl” was sold out left-handed with a vessel that its commander described as “a private steamer without lights,” and the distance between them did not exceed the semi-cable and ships on the right side were parallel with cruisers course. That all this was in reality - it is already absolutely impossible to say.

Around the 23.00, the cruisers left the Tsushima Strait to the East China Sea, and PP Levitsky for some time believed that OA Enquist will lead its ships to the western Korean strait, but this did not happen. At this time, the cruisers went on 17-18 nodes, but then, after midnight, they slowed down to 12, and shortly before dawn - and even to 10 nodes. At dawn, however, they found out that only the 3 of the ship: “Oleg”, “Aurora” and “Pearl” remained from the entire detachment, and there was no enemy within sight, and it was necessary to decide what to do next.

In this series of articles, we will not analyze the motives that pushed O.A. Enquist to care in Manila, but we note some inconsistencies in the reports of the Rear Admiral and the commander of the "Pearl". O.A. Enquist writes about the numerous mine attacks that the Japanese had fired at Oleg, while nothing was seen on the Pearl. O.A. Enquist claimed that he repeatedly tried to turn back on a breakthrough through the Korean Strait, but all the time it turned out that in this case he was moving closer to certain lights in which he assumed the Japanese combat detachment. The “Pearls” also saw the lights, but it seems that they were not the ones and not when O.A. Enquist, but the constant turns of "Oleg" is fully confirmed.

In one of his publications, A. Sickly brought such a proverb that was common among military historians: "He lies, as an eyewitness." Its essence is that the memory of a person who has been in a battle plays evil jokes with him, and after some time it is very difficult for him to remember what exactly he saw and in what sequence. Apparently, this is exactly what happened to PP. Levitsky, in describing the events of 15 May.

According to him, the cruiser detachment stopped at about 12.00 in order for the rear admiral to switch from Oleg to Aurora, from Pearl they asked for Oleg: “Does the admiral intend to try to go to Vladivostok?” And received a reply the commander of the cruiser LF Dobrotvorsky: "Try it yourself if you find yourself strong enough to pass through the entire Japanese fleet." At this time, according to PP Levitsky appeared tug Svir, but nothing new about the fate of the squadron with him not reported. As soon as oa Enquist climbed to the Aurora, he sent a request to the Pearls, whether he can go to Manila, and PP Levitsky, checking with the morning report of the mechanic, reported that he could not, because there was not enough coal. However, he immediately sent his senior mechanic to personally examine the existing coal reserves.

The point here was this — for some unclear reason, the daily consumption of coal at Zhemchug was considered somewhat larger than it was in reality. The commander knew about this, but he seemed to be “turning a blind eye”, believing that it would always be more beneficial to have an unrecorded supply of coal than not to have it.

Rear Admiral O.A. Enquist, having learned about the shortage of coal at Zhemugue, ordered him to approach Aurora, and when this was done, PP Levitsky on the megaphone received the order. “Pearls” should go to refuel to Shanghai, having entered it at night, as the presence of Japanese warships is possible. In the afternoon, it was necessary to reload coal from the Russian transports that were there, and the next night - to go to sea and go to Manila on their own. As for "Oleg" and "Aurora", then they had enough coal reserves to go straight to Manila without bunkering.

Everything was already decided, and "Oleg" received an order to go to the Aurora's wake, and "Pearls" - to follow its purpose, that is, to Shanghai. But then a senior ship mechanic of Zhemchug announced with a report that actual coal reserves turned out to be 80 tons more than estimated. This all changed, since with the existing supply, Pearls could follow to Manila without entering Shanghai, which was immediately reported to the rear admiral. As a result, the cruisers did not split up, but went to Manila with the whole detachment.

What is wrong in the report of P.P. Levitsky? In fact, everything happened a little differently. Happy 15 May Rear Admiral OA Enquist did move from “Oleg” to “Aurora”, but not “around noon”, but on 15.00, and on the same day, probably, in the morning, requested data on coal residues. But May 15 admiral did not think about going directly to Manila: he thought it necessary to go to Shanghai to bunker the whole detachment, it was there that all three cruisers kept their course all day on 15 and morning on May 16.

But the meeting with Sviryu occurred the next day, 16 in the morning. The cruisers again stalled the course around 09.30, but this was done now in order to enable the relatively slow-moving tug to get closer to the squad. And only then O.A. Enquist changed his mind about going to Shanghai and, apparently, again requested data on coal residues for “Oleg” and “Pearls”: it is obvious that it was then that the episode occurred, as described by PP Levitsky.

Photo "Pearls", made in Manila through the hole of the cruiser "Oleg", he received in the Battle of Tsushima

Anyway, “Oleg”, “Aurora” and “Pearls” went to Manila, and “Svir” headed for Shanghai. By order of O.A. Ankvist, on arrival in Shanghai, the tug had to send an urgent telegram to Saigon, so that a transport with coal would be sent from there to Manila. O.A. Enquist hoped that the Americans would give the Russian detachment enough time to repair the most dangerous injuries, accept the coal and would not object to the departure of the ships at sea.

So, the cruisers went to Manila. But the chimneys on all three ships were damaged, causing the consumption of coal increased, and OA Enquist began to seriously fear that he could not reach Manila. Then he decided to go to the port of Sual, located on the road, where they expected to find a hospital for seriously wounded, supplies and coal, as well as a telegraph, with which the rear admiral hoped to redirect the transport with coal, which was supposed to leave Saigon, from Manila to Sual.

But these hopes were not destined to come true, since Sual was completely abandoned, and nothing could be obtained there. As a result, the cruisers O.A. Enquist has nothing left to follow in Manila. In fact, only very quiet weather, extremely favorable for the transition, allowed to go there: the risk that the ships would be completely without coal in the ocean was very great. In his report, the commander of "Oleg" L.F. Dobrotvorsky gave the following description: “They barely reached Manila, risking in the case of fresh weather or the appearance of ships on the horizon, to remain completely without coal in the ocean and die from lack of desalinated water. It is impossible to compare the torments of the imagination with any battle that painted a picture of the death of people from thirst.

But Russian cruisers still managed to reach. Approximately 100 miles from Manila, they saw 5 battleships flying in the wake of the wake, and, fearing that it might be the Japanese, prepared for the last battle. But it turned out to be an American squadron of two battleships and three cruisers, which accompanied the detachment of O.A. Enquist in Manila, where three Russian cruisers and anchored in 19.45 21 May.

The description of the vicissitudes of being in Manila is beyond the scope of this series of articles - sometime, in a different cycle dedicated to the cruisers of the 2 Pacific Squadron, the author will definitely return to them. Now we confine ourselves to stating the fact that the Russian-Japanese war for Pearls has ended on arrival in Manila. Here we will leave it, and we will return to the “Emerald”, which, unlike its “fellow”, stayed with the main forces of the squadron and witnessed the tragic events of May 15.

To be continued ...

Comments

[WILL]

Well, it started .... with all due respect to the author Andrei from Chelyabinsk, comments on his articles and his answers to them - reading is much more interesting than the articles themselves! how has not one hand-to-hand combat happened yet?

[27091965]

Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, “tying” the cruiser of the 2nd rank to the main forces, hoped to use them as repetitive ships, and that was right,

Dear Andrew.
Unfortunately, this was not correct, the tasks of cruisers of the 2nd rank, in those days, were determined differently, this concerns the squadron battle. Determining the location of the enemy and transmitting data to the main forces for the best position of their fleet. Rotate me as a person from the commander of the 5 years RWG. I understand that on earth this is completely different, but in the sea it is much simpler than on earth.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Greetings, dear Igor!

Quote: 27091965i

Unfortunately it wasn’t right, the tasks of 2 rank cruisers were determined differently at that time.

Well, why? Russian cruisers of the 2 rank were charged with service in the squadron in all its diversity, including the repetitive service.

Quote: 27091965i

Determining the location of the enemy and the transfer of data to the main forces for the best position of his fleet.

From my point of view, which I described in many articles earlier, the Russian fleet in Tsushima did not benefit from such reconnaissance (effective firing range is half the detection distance, that is, more rapid Japanese could always evade), and besides, it was still physically impossible - where Rozhestvo expected to see the main forces of Togo was the 2 fighting squad of light Japanese forces. So why not give the cruisers realistic tasks that they could handle?

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

From my point of view, which I stated in many articles earlier, the Russian fleet in Tsushima did not get an advantage with such reconnaissance

Andrei, understand the reconnaissance and reconnaissance service is a complex process that includes a whole range of activities that requires not only the commander, but also subordinates of a certain level of training. If it is not, then the unit that this group leads is in most cases doomed to defeat.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

I understand this perfectly, but I don’t see any ways at all:
1) How could successful exploration of Russian cruisers be conducted
2) How could this help the Russian squadron.
Of course, I perfectly understand that if I do not see something, this does not mean that there is nothing there. But no analyst in my memory has proposed a realistic scenario of exploration and the use of its results.

Quote: 27091965i

If not, then the unit that leads this group in most cases is doomed to defeat.

I understand, but please take into account an important peculiarity - in those years, the main forces at sea saw each other much further than they could effectively fire. That is, with rare exceptions, after the enemy was discovered, there was still more than enough time for maneuvers.

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

How could Russian cruisers conduct successful reconnaissance?

Determination of the quantitative composition of the enemy forces.
Identify possible routes of movement of the enemy.
Determining the possibility of concentrating fire on specific targets of the enemy.
Identification of possible maneuvers in cases of deployment in unfavorable conditions and under enemy fire.
This is a small part of what intelligence units should do. A complete stupor came in 1994, by this year most of our zero parts had been disbanded.

[27091965]

Quote: 27091965i

A complete stupor came in 1994 year, by this year most of our zero parts were disbanded.

I apologize for touching my personal.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

Determination of the quantitative composition of the enemy forces.

This was known before the fight. Rozhdestvensky, in any case, should have expected a battle with 12 with armored ships of Togo and Kamimura, and even if the intelligence service had reported that they were fewer, I should not believe this, writing off the scout as a mistake.

Quote: 27091965i

Identify possible routes of movement of the enemy.

From this information it was impossible to extract anything useful - in any case, the Japanese were going to intercept, which the Russians could not evade.

Quote: 27091965i

Determining the possibility of concentrating fire on specific targets of the enemy.

In Tsushima, this would have been determined only after the main forces saw each other and approached a sufficient distance, here "over-the-horizon" reconnaissance gives nothing.

Quote: 27091965i

Identification of possible maneuvers in cases of deployment in unfavorable conditions and under enemy fire.

So they were identified Rozhestvensky before the fight. The bottom line is that the conditions were a priori unprofitable, but the enemy did not have the opportunity to move closer invisibly to the distance of real fire.

Quote: 27091965i

This is a small part of what intelligence units must do.

Everything is correct, and all this is of paramount importance. Yes, actually, all of the above was crucial in 99% of all possible cases. Even for the same Togo, for example, intelligence was archival and arch-important.
But for us in Tsushima the circumstances were so unique that it really did not matter.

Quote: 27091965i

A complete stupor came in 1994 year, by this year most of our zero parts were disbanded.

One can only hope that now it has become better.

[mmaxx]

I beg to differ. Our squadron did not need a battle. It was necessary to in every possible way delay his beginning and avoid contact as long as possible. There was still some luck: poor visibility. And just for this purpose, intelligence was critically necessary. How to organize this is the commander’s problem. He was the admiral. Now, from the position of our time, it is difficult for us to imagine the sum of the problems and capabilities of the then technology. But he did not even try to do something.

That's what I agree with, that in the battle model that Rozhestvensky planned, nothing was needed at all. He did everything to defeat from the very beginning. If you know that the Japanese have superiority in power, in speed, in the end they are at home, then the stupidest thing you can do is to go to these forces with the whole crowd at low speed in broad daylight. It would be simpler for the Japanese only one thing: to drown themselves in front of the Japanese.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: mmaxx

Our squadron did not need a fight. It was necessary in every way to delay its beginning and avoid contact as long as possible.

The squadron was actually sent with the task of destroying the Japanese fleet and seizing dominance at sea. How to do this without a fight? Further, given the superiority of the Japanese fleet in speed, any attempt to delay contact would have resulted in the Russian squadron engaging in a general battle, exhausted by the night mine attacks (for example, they still managed to avoid the 14 battle of May) - is that good?

Quote: mmaxx

He did everything to defeat from the very beginning. If you know that the Japanese have superiority in strength, in speed, in the end they are at home, then the most stupid thing you can do is to go to these forces with the whole crowd at low speed on a white day.

OK, but you did not say that it was possible to make smart? :)))))

[mmaxx]

Nah ... How is it? The sovereign commanded Vladivostok. So the task was not to immediately defeat the Japanese.
Without reliance on the base to conquer the sea? Somehow I did not hear. Then, after the breakthrough, yes. I smile sadly)))).
If it was impossible to walk this distance without transports, then you had to go around Japan. Then the Japanese’s problems, exactly like ours, are coming to our side: we have to hang out at sea, load with coal, release destroyers, etc. The range of the Japanese armadillos and armored cruisers was also not so hot. But it’s still better to let go of transport before the battle and send it to Vladivostok in another way, maybe even with slow-moving cruisers.
Or break into the Korean Strait without transports. At the risk of being left without coal. Adventure.
But in any of these cases there was a chance for a breakthrough of forces. All hardly any way.
I know you considered these chances. But weighing the pluses and minuses purely tactically, there were no pluses at all by passing the Korean Strait with transports. In addition to the hope of chance and a good dream of Togo.
The decision made for 2 TOE did not give any advantages.
And I was a good tactician on a sail. From the point of view of tactical fundamentals - if the matter is disastrous from the very beginning, then we must do the opposite. You can’t solve your problems, drop it. Maybe your problems will be the problems of the enemy. The war of honesty does not imply.
The most interesting thing is that if Togo missed the whole 2 TOEs in Vladivostok, the outcome of the war would be exactly the same. Vlad is far away. There, as in the database, there was nothing at all. Worse than Port Arthur. This squadron, based on Vladivostok, could not prevent the Japanese from supplying the army. Port Arthur squadron did not interfere, being nearby. And from Vladivostok to Liaodong a one-way ticket for coal. Also, loading the Transsiberian with the supply of the fleet as well would impair the supply of the army. But the army had a lot of chances to defeat the Japanese. There, the factors were only subjective, unlike the fleet.
Therefore, it seems that Togo’s decision to attack the left column of the 2nd TOE with the old battleships showed that he allowed the breakthrough of the strongest ships. He could not afford to fight from the leeward due to the shutdown of part of the artillery and was ready to be content with half the success, he could postpone everything tomorrow. And then Rozhdestvensky made a rebuild and Togo made another decision. Most importantly, his flagships were ready for any development of the situation. In contrast to the rigid scheme of Christmas. She didn’t provide for anything at all. No changes and options. He also tore the distance many times and left, losing contact. I was not afraid to let go of ours. So intelligence was organized, and, in principle, there was no fear of missing our squadron. All competently. Naval commander, you will not say anything. What is it that the Mikado ordered him ...
Moreover, I state all this by reading your materials. With a small amount of gag. Before that, I did not delve into all the details. The defeat was of such force that it simply accepted all the reasons as is. Even taking into account the dubious point of view of Chistyakov. But there was at least an analysis. There were three reasons for everything before.
Briefly, as it were. There are no forces to write articles))).

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: mmaxx

Nah ... How is it? The sovereign commanded Vladivostok. So the task was not to immediately defeat the Japanese.

You are confused with 1TOE - so they, the task was to go to Vladivostok.

Quote: mmaxx

If it was impossible to pass this distance without transports, then it was necessary to go around Japan.

This idea was dismantled if so ... very much :)))) It is much worse than a breakthrough by the Tsushima Channel. In short, one would have to break through Sangarsky (Tsugaru), where the Japanese minefields would be added to all the charms - the narrow and small shedding, there is not much maneuver.

Quote: mmaxx

Then the problems of the Japanese are exactly on our side, just like ours: you have to dangle in the sea, load with coal, release the destroyers, etc.

Exactly the opposite. You see, after all, Togo was not a stupid naval commander, he knew the date of the last parking of Rozhestvensky. Therefore, if within a certain time the Russians do not appear in the Tsushima Strait, then they went around Japan, therefore, they should be expected there. Therefore, Togo simply took the maximum supply of coal to the ships and waited for news - this is a historical fact. The fact that the Russians showed up at Tsushimsky forced him to go to sea and take the battle on overloaded ships (Togo had excess coal reserves), well, and if the Russians go around Japan, they will be met by Togo with a normal coal reserve. But the Russians will be tormented by another coal loading, without which Japan could not be avoided. In general, such a campaign did not give us anything - we would have been met by exactly the same forces as in Tsushima, and there would be as many destroyers (we could also bunk them at the other end of Japan)

Quote: mmaxx

But weighing the pros cons purely tactically no prospect passage of the Korean Strait with the transport was not at all.

There was one plus - with all the drawbacks of the passage through the Tsushima Strait, the other cons had even more options :))))

Quote: mmaxx

Most importantly, his flagships were ready for any development of the situation. In contrast to the rigid scheme Rozhestvensky. She did not provide for anything at all. No changes and options.

What kind of flagships? :)))) The deceased Felkerzam, or Nebogatov, who just arrived, whose squad didn’t seriously consider Rozhdestvensky as a fighting force? :))))
Rozhestvensky expected a fight modeled after the Battle of Shantung, and was well prepared for such a battle. Commanders after his failure acted rationally and tactically competently.

Quote: mmaxx

Togo also many times maneuvered the distance and left, losing contact. Not afraid to let go of ours. So intelligence was organized, and, in principle, there was no fear of missing our squadron.

It is strange that you write down the frank mistakes of the Japanese admiral in the pros. And yes, with its cruising forces, reconnaissance was easy

[Rurikovich]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Rozhdestvensky expected a battle on the model of the Battle of Shantung, and was well prepared for such a battle.

I agree with that. It’s just that many commentators do not want to see the whole picture preceding Tsushima, in general. They don’t want to see that the assumptions regarding the possible outcomes of the ZPR battle were based on certain tolerances, which were based on the form of fights between Shantung and Ulsan. And they were based on the fact that Russian ships are able to withstand the Japanese. Therefore, the speed with which the Russians marched was also allowed.
It's just that the difference in speed turned out to be higher than in the battle at Shantung, the previously not very noticeable power of the shells got out sideways in Tsushima, which, in general, was the reason for the defeat. Due to the speed, the Japanese concentrated the fire of a larger number of ships against a smaller one among the Russians, which is why it turned out that the ships could no longer bear such fire. -I TOE would have gone to Vladik with some losses, but without defeat. Alas, but this is "if by then."
So, dear A&Ch, I completely agree with you on the reasons for the defeat

Strong loss in squad speed

и

A tiny amount of explosives in our shells

[mmaxx]

1. In terms of options, I would not be so categorical. Another thing is that we know the result.
2. About flagships you missed something. I wrote about Togo's flagships. On the Russian squadron, the flagships were lowered for the duration of the battle: during the battle, the lead squadron (does not even command). This is independent of the life and death of Fitofoff. And the fact that he did nothing so that other admirals could somehow replace him, this only speaks of his level of command.
But the commanders, yes, acted in every way more literate than their admiral. At least they did not allow to destroy one battleship and disable another in 15-20 minutes. One gets the feeling that Rozhdestvensky brewed porridge with the aim of killing himself, and let others dissolve it.
3. And about Vladivostok ... Is there at least an intelligible mention of the text of Rozhdestvensky's order, where it says "destroy"? Breakthrough and defeat must somehow differ in tactics. It is clear that the order itself could not be preserved. And about NO 23 gr. they write wherever they are not lazy. So the enemy is not crushed, so they break through. About the expectations of a fight similar to Shantung .... You never know what he expected ... It's called - maybe.
4. And why did Togo make a mistake? All his mistakes did not lead to any serious consequences. And just the opposite. They led to a crushing victory. And already on May 14th. The outcome of the night and the 15th did not even have to be foreseen. Everyone is mistaken. The price is different. Just always lucky winners.

[mmaxx]

He did it a bit. Not Fitofof, of course, but Felkersam. Oh, these Germans).

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

From my point of view, which I stated in many articles earlier, the Russian fleet in Tsushima did not get an advantage with such reconnaissance (the effective firing range is half the detection distance, that is, more fast Japanese could always evade), and besides, it was still physically impossible - there, from where Rozhestvensky expected to see the main forces of Togo there were 2 combat detachments of light forces of the Japanese.

I do not agree with you.
I believe, that:
1. It was necessary to break through without slow-moving ships and ships with dubious combat value (transports, tugs, "yachts", ...).
2. It was necessary to allocate a fast wing from 5 battleships.
3. It was necessary to conduct active reconnaissance by cruisers.
In fact, until 13-20 (and this is most of the daylight) Togo main forces went to our squadron. If the squadron actively changed course and even speed, Togo would have solved this task longer. And if Rozhestvensky received information from cruisers about the location of Togo, then maneuvering could be more efficient. So it was possible to hold out until sunset. And in the end, reduce the meeting of the main forces to the position of “Togo - catching up, Rozhdestvensky - running away” a la battle in the Yellow Sea, 2nd phase. In such a position, the already fast wing can deliver a pay over T to the Japanese. For the sake of this, it was possible to change the course by 180 degrees at the last moment.

[Thrifty]

Andrei I want to know your private opinion at the end of this review — what do you see the reasons for the death of our squadrons in the Tsushima battle!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

And I already reported them in Tsushima Myths, if it is short, it:
1) Strong loss in squadron speed. The idea of ​​separating the Oslyabi and the 4th EDR Borodino into a separate detachment, alas, does not give anything, because even if they had the same speed as the Japanese (and they did not have it), 5 ships cannot break 12
2) A tiny amount of explosives in our shells. This was a consequence of the concept of a lightweight shell, combined with the inability of factories to make thin-walled projectiles (steel of poor quality). In addition, the equipment of our high-explosive 305-mm projectiles in Tsushima did not have pyroxylin, they were equipped with gunpowder ... If our head EDBs fired 1907 g projectiles (light, 331,7 kg, but equipped with TNT), then for those hits that received Mikasa on the fact of the first 15 minutes, he could well have received so severe damage that he would temporarily lose his combat capability, and X. Togo would have been killed. As you understand, this is not necessary, but ... the probability is very high.
The rest - by and large trivia. Our people in Tsushima shot worse than the Japanese, but not so much worse than to suffer a rout.

[Thrifty]

That is, even the newest battleships of the Glory type, in fact, were held hostage to common problems? Perhaps the deceased Admiral Makarov was right, proposing to build more maneuverable cruisers instead of armadillos? ??

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Thrifty

Perhaps, the deceased admiral Makarov was right, who offered to build more maneuverable cruisers instead of armadillos? ??

So the shells from this will not be better :))))) Well, and still the cruisers could not resist the armadillos

Quote: Thrifty

That is, even the newest battleships like Slava were essentially hostages of common problems?

They - first of all. On ships with old artillery there were still more or less normal heavy shells.

[Thrifty]

Andrei thanks for the clarifications waiting for the next part of the article!
Although, in my amateurish opinion, it was cruisers who needed to take a closer look, develop and build heavy and linear cruisers, not armadillos!

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Thrifty

Although, in my amateurish opinion, it was cruisers who needed to take a closer look, develop and build heavy and linear cruisers, not armadillos!

I am also the same dilettante as you are, therefore I am happy to feed on the knowledge that people share both in articles and in the comments, and there are a lot of literate people here. And for myself, I came to the conclusion that at the time of the RYAV it was not the cruisers, but the battleships that were "taxed". Not to mention that the concept of a "battle cruiser" was not yet born at that time, but even after its birth, the very first battles showed that these cruisers can successfully fight either with the same cruisers, or even more successfully drive the cruisers "of the past. generation "of the Spee squadron in 1914. We in the RYaV just lacked modern battleships of the Retvizan type with good shells for them. And cruisers - light armored deck thousands of 4-5 displacement, armed with 6-10 medium-caliber cannons, capable of controlling the waters of Port Arthur and chasing Japanese scouts.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Good evening, Andrew!

about the hits that Mikas received in fact for the first 15 minutes, he could have been so seriously injured that for a while he would have lost his combat effectiveness, and H. Togo would have been killed

Eh, if you wrote down an article on the topic: "What would happen to the Mikasa if all the shells were Model 1907" - that would be the heat.

Our in Tsushima shot worse than the Japanese

and one of the reasons for this, IMHO, is the stupid order of the ZPR to concentrate fire on Mikasa

Lieutenant Shamshev, senior artillery officer:
"With the raising of the battle flag on the Suvorov, we could open fire on the enemy, but the distance was so great that we had to wait and, in a gradual manner with the other battleships, the Eagle entered the battle, after the Borodin." 57 cables (at B. and S.) by sighting. Concentrating fire on the Mikaza. A short alarm was sounded at a distance of 55 cables. It was impossible to distinguish the bursts of our sighting shots. There were too many bursts around the Mikaza. The stopwatch did not help. "

Lieutenant Slavinsky:
"According to the combat schedule, I was in the so-called" sighting ", left bow 6" battleship tower, commanding the left bow group, which included: 12 "bow, 6" left middle, 6 "left bow towers, bow casemate and all 75 mm. Left side battery. ... "Oslyabya" answered the enemy, "Suvorov" also, we were silent for the distance ... At 1 hour 40 minutes half., According to the order received from the combat indicator from the conning tower, I opened zeroing with cast-iron shells at the head flagship battleship Mikaza from a distance of 57 cables. After three shots had been fired, I had to abandon zeroing, due to the complete impossibility of observing the fall of my shells in a mass of bursts, at times completely covering the Mikaza from our eyes. "

I apologize for the off topic. This is me just to the comment thread. I won’t wait anymore - we’ll wait for a more relevant topic.

Thank you for the interesting article on a little-studied topic!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Eh, if you wrote down an article on the topic: "What would happen to the Mikasa if all the shells were Model 1907" - that would be the heat.

Maybe somehow I will get together :)))

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

and one of the reasons for this, IMHO, is the stupid order of the ZPR to concentrate fire on Mikasa

And what does not like the order? :)))) I recall, contrary to leisure opinion, it extended only to the first armored detachment. The Japanese, by the way, also enjoyed concentrating fire on the same ship.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Maybe somehow I will get together :)))

it would be great - if not for you)

And what does not like the order? :))))

the impossibility of its normal execution,
hell, this is a topic for at least one more ... well, can you take it?

Shl. Thanks for the "pebbles" I'm looking forward to the breakthrough "Emerald.
Creative success!

[anzar]

Maybe somehow I will get together :)))

Great ... and not only with Mikasa ... Alas, this will not be published on the topvar)) You can try something like "Comparative modeling of the action of shells ...")))
Could buy TNT in Germany and re-equip old shells. Even R. could buy from Madagascar))) Well, I had money, in cr. case, let him sell Diamond))) The yacht!
Only a "prominent artilleryman" would have explained about the problems with shells (did not believe Jessen?)
But I remember your beautiful Tsushima 2.0; 2.1; 3.0 (Sandro, although Arthur is there))) The "shell" alternative would also look good, sorry - "modeling"

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: anzar

Well, he had money, in cr. case, let him sell a diamond)))

[AK64]

so what, this ... this ugly courtier did not even think of the towers from Sisoy and Navariin instead of the central 6 "towers!

[Comrade]

Quote: anzar

and not only with Mikasa ... Alas, this will not be published on topvar

As far as I can judge from personal experience, "riveted" articles are generally not in honor here.

[mmaxx]

Nevertheless, the Japanese had superiority in speed and in the Yellow Sea. But that tyagomotin lasted a long time. And Togo did not see those killed by artillery fire. And overwhelming superiority to the Japanese in speed was provided by Rozhdestvensky thanks to transport. Rozhdestvensky, yielding to the Japanese, did everything to give them superiority at all. No need to say that all the same it was all bad. 12-13 knots are not 9. 9 - this is the course of transports at the transition, and not ships in battle.

[Nehist]

The superiority was not significant, or rather not critical! And Togo made a huge bruise while catching up with our squadron than (the unreinforced Witgeft took advantage of it) The famous loop of Togo under Tsushima just says that the Japanese were not going to repeat the mistakes of the battle in the yellow sea where Mikasa suddenly found out he received more damage than during Tsushima (this to the question of who better shot 1TOE or, as the respected Andrey 2TOE claims)

[rytik32]

1) There was no significant loss in squadron speed. Our squadron could go 12-13 knots, while Togo had 14-15 knots. 2 knots - this is not a catastrophic difference, look at the battle in the Yellow Sea, one mistake of Togo and ours we had to catch up with for almost 3 hours and then attack from an unfavorable position. What prevented Rozhdestvensky from going faster and actively maneuvering? Only his own decisions!
2) It makes sense to talk about shells if we reached a decent amount of hits. That would have given Mikas 40 shells of 12-10 inches and had not drowned - then the question is for shells. And in fact, in the Yellow Sea, Mikasa threw more than 12-10 dumas than under Tsushima. And the reason is that in Tsushima Togo very quickly led Mikasu out of our concentrated fire, but kept Suvorov and Oslyabyu under fire. The lack of understanding by Rozhdestvensky of the importance of concentration of fire is the reason that within half an hour after the start of the battle, its outcome was already predetermined.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: rytik32

Our squadron could go 12-13 nodes

But for some reason, while trying to go 11 nodes, 3 TOE could not keep order and strongly delayed.

Quote: rytik32

2 node is not a catastrophic difference.

Which led to the fact that in the 3 maneuvers of the British fleet in a row more than the high-speed squadron put less speed crossing T without problems

Quote: rytik32

watch the fight in the Yellow Sea

This is YOU, please watch the fight in the Yellow Sea. In which Togo made no attempt at all to cross

Quote: rytik32

It would make sense to talk about projectiles if we achieved a decent amount of hits.

We have reached

Quote: rytik32

That would have Mikas 40 12-10 shells in. And did not drown - then the question to the shells

Why not 400? :))))) Neither we nor the Japanese have reached such a number of hits on one ship. For example, no more than 11 shells of 254-305 mm caliber and 3 more caliber 203-305 mm hit the Orel. Campbell generally believes that 5 * 305-mm and 2 * 254-mm shells hit the Orel

Quote: rytik32

And in fact, in the Yellow Sea, Mikasa was given more 12-10 Dyumovok than at Tsushima.

Yes, right on the 2 projectile - 12 vs. 10. While at Tsushima Mikasa, 22-mm was hit by 152, and in XM, 6 was hit. and that the total number of hits in Tsushima exceeded 40, and in the XM - 23

Quote: rytik32

And the reason is that in Tsushima Togo very quickly brought Mikasa out from under our concentrated fire, but kept Suvorov and Oslaby under fire

Not. The reason is that in the battle in the ZhM Togo first managed to fall behind, and then caught up with our squadron in full, replacing the fire of the battleships - it meledleenooooo crawled along the whole line of our EBRD for an hour. That is, if the 1TOE gunners had the 2TOE training - he would not crawl to the middle, drown just under the weight of the shells falling into him

Quote: rytik32

Rozhestvensky's misunderstanding of the importance of concentrating fire is the reason why within half an hour after the start of the battle its outcome was already predetermined.

Well, great :)))) What Rozhestvensky was not blamed for, but that he did not focus fire on Mikas ...

[AK64]

A little about maneuvering christmas:

Quote (the main thing at the end, highlighted by me):

Since Admiral Eberhard knew about the presence of "Goeben" at sea and had no reason to be convinced that a meeting with him would not happen, then, it would seem, his first concern should have been the appropriate formation of the marching order in order to be able to:

in the shortest possible time to be reconstructed into a battle formation in order to immediately attack the enemy;

choose a system that would enable all ships to take part in the attack;

provide for the need to ensure an attack by detaining the enemy in combat contact with the fleet, seeking to extend the attack time, and then exploit it.

The most probable direction in which the chances are most likely to find the enemy ahead along the course could serve as a guiding consideration for constructing the marching order.

In reality, battleships (see Diagram 1) are in the wake formation, which is very convenient for joint navigation, since "following the movement of the lead" ships automatically reproduce the admiral's maneuvers, they are, as it were, "tethered" with him. But if the enemy appears in front, they are doomed to a long turn in order to build a battle line, making it possible to enter all the guns into battle.

The favorable heading angle, which in this case the fleet had to go to, was about 80-90 "(large corrections for the heading angle are a consequence of centralized shooting, when all ships in a column are concentrating fire on one target). Thus, the turn pattern would be drawn in the form shown in Scheme 2.

Meanwhile, if the fleet commander had been imbued with the idea of ​​the need for "the shortest deployment", which was dictated by the situation itself, then he would probably have chosen a different marching order, which would make it possible to reduce the rebuilding time by at least half. This was achieved, for example, by the formation of two wake columns with sufficient intervals between them (see diagram 3). But the division of the fleet, even in marching order, contradicted the organization of the artillery service. The principle of "centralized" fire control is required, as a rigid rule, for fleet maneuvering in one wake column with precise retention of place in the formation. The moment of unfinished rebuilding when opening fire disrupted the organization of centralized shooting. The fleet could not separate, the ships were tied to each other, and together - to the wake column.

And you know where it comes from ?? And this is MA Petrov, TWO FIGHTS. Soviet historian. writing about the battles at Cape Sarych and Gotland.
But if the same Petrov wrote about Tsushima - what would THEN he write about these "two columns"?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

And you know where it comes from ?? And this is MA Petrov, TWO FIGHTS. Soviet historian. writing about the battles at Cape Sarych and Gotland.

Gorgeous, thanks! It seems that Petrov almost memorized by heart, and in fact did not see this moment while you were me in it .... They did not show

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Great, thanks! It seems that Petrova almost memorized by heart, but you didn’t see this moment while you got me into it ....

Interestingly, why are you so happy? After all, your favorite Rozhdestvensky just failed and failed miserably. Having acted directly opposite to Petrov’s explanations. :(

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Saxahorse

After all, your favorite Rozhdestvensky was precisely the deployment and failed miserably.

He won it :)))

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

He won it :)))

Yes Yes Yes! And he defeated the Japanese! And he personally captured Mikadu! It’s just that some kind of villains then classified it all! You are our dreamer.

[Saxahorse]

There are unusually few comments today, although there is a lot to add and say about the episodes described. :)

but the only remaining Eagle was badly damaged, and, very importantly, central fire control was destroyed on it. In other words, he was quite capable of holding out in battle for some time, but he could no longer hope to cause significant harm to the Japanese.

One can agree that the firepower of the Eagle had greatly decreased by that time, but what does the "centralized fire control" have to do with it? He was not on the ships of that time. Only dials for transmitting distance and target number. In rare cases, sight and rear sight. The Japanese did just fine without them, sending a messenger with a note ..

The main forces of the Russian squadron were driven by the heavily battered Borodino, followed by the Eagle, also badly damaged, in about three cables. "Emperor Nicholas I", instead of trying to head the column, pulled cables 5-6, and it was clear that N.I. Nebogatov is not going to take command of the squadron. .. so the need for a "rehearsal ship" was clearly not visible.

Meanwhile, the testimony mentions that Emerald rehearsed signals from Borodino and Nikolai. Unfortunately, the author ignored these points completely. And it would be interesting to clarify exactly what signals Borodino and Nikolai gave to the squadron. It seems that this was the main role of the "pebbles" assigned to him by the wing admiral.

But then a senior ship mechanic Zhemchuga showed up with a report that the actual coal reserves were 80 tons more than estimated.

The moment is extremely interesting. One involuntarily recalls our friend Andrey and "Comrade" repeatedly waving a sign with the remains of coal at the ships of the squadron. The plate that was drawn up by the commander of Almaz Chagin on the basis of morning signals "out of interest", as we suddenly see, does not correspond to reality very much. The reason is simple, the figures of the remains of coal, called by the commanders every day, were not actual, but roughly calculated. Obtained by subtracting "by eye" from yesterday's report of the average consumption. And of course every time with a large stock. These 80 tons of coal represent almost 25% of the normal stock. At the very least, this means that the overloading of the ships of the squadron, including coal, was still there. And Chagin's plate is just fiction. In fact, it turns out that there was no serious assessment of the stocks on the ships. Overloading both with fuel and with all kinds of repair parts and materials was significant.

I’m afraid to write too long comments, I will endure the second part separately.

[Saxahorse]

And in the sequel - an interesting topic with Enquist’s campaign not to Comrade Manila in Shanghai :)

The Pearl should have been refueling in Shanghai, entering it at night, since the presence of Japanese warships is possible. During the day, it was necessary to reload coal from Russian transports there, and the next night - go to sea and go to Manila on your own

Here, the author partially explained why Shanghai. It was there that Rozhdestvensky sent his coal miners approaching the Tsushima Strait. But in Enquis’s squad, Shanghai appeared as an explanation of why the admiral continues to scrub south against the orders. Initially, this was explained by the impossibility of breaking the cruisers into Vladivostok through Tsushima without armadillos and the need to load coal from their transports to hike around Japan. But the further the more interesting the situation became.

But the meeting with "Svir" occurred the next day, May 16 in the morning. The cruisers again stalled at approximately 09.30, .. And only then O.A. The enquist changed his mind about going to Shanghai and, apparently, again requested data on the remaining coal to Oleg and Zhemchug: it is obvious that the episode described by P.P. Levitsky.

Here our friend Andrey, "tactfully" skips the well-known episode with the insolent answer of the commander of Svir, ensign Rosenfeld, to the admiral.

"You should know better, Mr. Admiral, where our squadron is now!" (from)

It should be noted that the squadron officers, of course, were not naive boobies and understood very well that they had witnessed the shameful flight from their battle, a cruising detachment. And the subsequent turn from Shanghai to Manila already clearly showed subordinates the commanders' refusal to fulfill the order received - to follow to Vladivostok. And many officers took it painfully. From the commander Oleg, Dobrotvorsky, cruiser officers, for example, directly demanded an explanation for such unsightly behavior. Reminding him by the way of Diana, whose disarmament already in Saigon has been repeatedly discussed on a ship in a derogatory manner.

Dobrotvorsky's answer directly reveals the motives of all these officers, despite all the subsequent cunning excuses. "You may consider me a coward, but I've had enough! I fought pretty well yesterday. I won't turn back!" And this is Dobrotvorsky, who generally showed himself well in battle!

The cruisers went to Manila to disarm. Commanders fled from a possible battle. They fled from the war.

[Andrey Shmelev]

The cruisers went to Manila to disarm. Commanders fled from a possible battle. They fled from the war.

Nebogatov should have done that too

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Nebogatov should have done that too

Apparently it is. Just not to Manila, disarm. And to Shanghai for fuel, and then either to Saigon or to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky. It was important to save the remains of the squadron as a virtual threat.

Well, in any case, Nebogatov should have been preoccupied with the adoption of the command. Assemble a squadron, find out the condition of ships and stocks, organize joint movement and security. This is where the desperately needed and quickly messenger and rehearsal ships were needed.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Saxahorse

One can agree that the firepower of the Eagle had greatly decreased by that time, but what does the "centralized fire control" have to do with it? He was not on the ships of that time.

It was just that, you just do not understand what centralized fire control is.

Quote: Saxahorse

Meanwhile, the testimony mentions that the Emerald rehearsed the signals of Borodino and Nikolai. Unfortunately, the author ignored these moments completely. And it would be interesting to clarify exactly which signals Borodino and Nikolai issued to the squadron

So write, it will be a great addition :)))))

Quote: Saxahorse

The moment is extremely interesting. One cannot help recalling our friend Andrey and "Comrade" repeatedly waving a sign with the remains of coal at the ships of the squadron. The tablet, drawn up by the commander of Almaz Chagin on the basis of morning signals "out of interest," as we suddenly see, does not correspond to reality very much.

Wow? :))))) That is, you take the actual situation of Pearls and automatically pull it on all the other ships of the squadron

Quote: Saxahorse

At a minimum, this means that the overload of the squadron ships, including coal, was still there.

At a minimum, this means that you will cling to anything, just to argue. Open recommend book

We see that the remains of coal on May 13 at "Pearl" - 492 tons, while the daily consumption for May 12 was 48 tons. Now we assume that the overweight on May 13 was 80 tons, which is categorically wrong - to anyone who is at odds with arithmetic, it is obvious that the preponderance relative to the calculated values ​​will grow every day, and if on May 16 it was 80 tons, then on May 13 it was clearly less. But let's say that there was 80 tons.
Then the "true" weight of coal on the "Pearl" was not 492, but 572 tons. But this - in the morning of May 13, and in the morning of May 14, that is, on the day of the battle, the cruiser entered, having approximately 572 - 48 tons of daily consumption on May 12 = 524 The total supply of coal in terms of the capacity of the coal pits at Pearl was 535 tons, that is, he went into battle with a margin less than the full one - and this provided that the advantage on May 13 was 80 tons, but in reality it was less.
That is, Saxahorns, your owl again did not stretch the globe - well, Pearls were not overloaded :)))) As for the rest of the squadron ships, you were again struck by selective myopia, because the same Dobrotvorsky to which you turn there where it is profitable for you, wrote:

In my opinion, there was no particular overload at the time of the battle, as the cruiser had approximately 900 tons of coal (100 tons less than normal supply) and 400 tons of water (200 tons more) instead of 1530 tons of coal and 530 tons of water, which we usually took in the squadron Rozhestvensky

Quote: Saxahorse

Here our friend Andrey, "tactfully" skips the well-known episode with the insolent answer of the commander of Svir, ensign Rosenfeld, to the admiral.
"You should know better, Mr. Admiral, where our squadron is now!" (from)

As I already said, the description of the epic of the cruisers of Enquist is not included in this cycle, so I give only what is related to Pearls

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

It was just that, you just do not understand what centralized fire control is.

It looks like you just have cereal in your head because of writing two marine cycles at the same time. Write about Oryol and think about Sevastopol.

Neither Eagle nor Mikasa had any SUAO. The simplest devices without which they could safely do. Moreover, they often fell apart after the first shots and hits from tremors. I reminded you that the newsletter with a note perfectly replaced all this supposedly system.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

So write, it will be a great addition :)))))

How lovely! You've thrown a whole series about "pebbles" here, you couldn't find anything intelligible about the Emerald, but on the main issues, let someone else finish writing? You came up with this great!

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Then the "true" weight of coal on the "Pearl" was not 492, but 572 tons. But this - in the morning of May 13, and in the morning of May 14, that is, on the day of the battle, the cruiser entered, having approximately 572 - 48 tons of daily consumption on May 12 = 524 t. The full supply of coal in terms of the capacity of the coal pits at Pearl was 535 tons, that is, he went into battle with a supply less than the full

And why didn’t you remember that the NORMAL Pearl coal reserve is 360 tons? Why did you decide that 524 tons instead of 360 tons is not a bit overload? And this is not counting a large overload of stocks!

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

As I already said, the description of the epic of the cruisers of Enquist is not included in this cycle, so I give only what is related to Pearls

And Pearl's departure to Manila instead of Shanghai, and the subsequent disarmament, apparently to Pearl, has nothing to do with it .. This is again your trademark: "read here, don't read here!" (from)

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

The figures of coal residues, called commanders every day, were not actual but roughly estimated.

And on the Pearl, it means that all the coal was taken out of the coal pits on the upper deck, then weighed on the scales and then poured back?

Quote: Saxahorse

Obtained by subtracting "by eye" from yesterday's report of the average consumption.

Lying.
There were special marks in the coal pits on the walls, which, knowing the density of coal, made it possible to determine the weight of coal residues.

Quote: Saxahorse

On ships of that time, only dials for transmitting distance and target number. In rare cases, the sight and rear sight. The Japanese did well without them, sending a messenger with a note

Old buddy, actually Japanese not dispensed with them, all ships of the 1 class had a fire control system, but judging by your remark, you can hardly even name a manufacturing company.
The following information was transferred to each casemate, to each barbette installation:
- target,
- type of projectile,
- distance.
The system was reported to work well on all ships except the Nisshin. At the end of the war, experiments were being carried out with another company's system.
Either by insurance, or not too trusting, the system was duplicated by the Japanese.
The direction of fire and the target were to be transmitted in the form of orders written on the boards. If firing conditions allowed, two specially appointed officers in the hearing zone transmitted commander orders with the help of horns.
It was believed that the fire control system is very reliably covered under armor, and, as the advertisement assured, the probability of failure is one in a million.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

There were special marks in the coal pits on the walls, which, knowing the density of coal, made it possible to determine the weight of coal residues.

There were. That’s how the Pearl mechanic determined that they still have 80 tons of unaccounted coal. That's just on a campaign, every morning, it’s unlikely that every coal pit for a report was just as carefully climbed. 80 tons of coal (and this is 25% of the normal supply) proved it.

Quote: Comrade

It was believed that the fire control system is very reliably covered under armor, and, as the advertisement assured, the probability of failure is one in a million.

Oh yeah! Since advertising guarantees it means that it is!

I have already cited the opinion of the artillery officer Peresvet., He identified the reliability of these systems as useless.

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

on a hike, every morning, it was unlikely that every coal pit for a report was just as carefully climbed.

This is your personal opinion.
But in essence, Andrei has already answered you quite comprehensively.

Quote: Saxahorse

I have already cited the opinion of an artillery officer Peresvet., He identified the reliability of these systems as useless

It’s not the opinion of Peresvet, but the fact that you lied by writing that

Quote: Saxahorse

Mikasa did not have any SUAO.

I suggest you bring a document confirming your words.
You can even ask for money for information, I still do not risk anything, because you are lying again.
I have at hand not only an authoritative English book with a description of this system, but also a photograph of the system.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

This is your personal opinion.
But in essence, Andrei has already answered you quite comprehensively.

You, like our mutual friend Andrei, are not aware that normal displacement is calculated with normal reserves? Then go and learn at least basic definitions of ship parameters before throwing your childish accusations.

Quote: Comrade

I suggest you bring a document confirming your words.
You can even ask for money for information, I still do not risk anything, because you are lying again.

You have repeatedly accused me of lying. Do you understand what you're talking about? You just demonstrated your ignorance a little higher with your own passages about overload .. Now you insistently demand that I explain to you what SUAO is? Pliz themselves ..

No. Several devices transmitting the distance to warhead commanders are not a full-fledged SUAO. And even telephones, fashionable but also unreliable, cannot be called SUAO. SUAO as a system at the time of the NRW was not. No need to fantasize here.

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

You have repeatedly accused me of lying.

So do not lie, then there will be no accusations. You are a liar. You see, I blame you, you know why, but you have nothing to object to.

Quote: Saxahorse

Several devices transmitting the distance to warhead commanders are not a full-fledged SUAO.

The point is not what they are, but how Peckingham called this system in his report on fire control in the Tsushima battle. And he called this system fire-control system.
Do not believe it, but the term battleship in the USA and England, ships of the era of the Spanish-American War, as well as the era of the First World War, as well as the Second World War, were called.
Following your logic, you need to state that "Maine" is not battleship, because he had - further down the list, which was not there, but the battleship "Iowa" had, for example.

Andrey Shmelev,
if you read these lines, I strongly recommend that you find and read this report of Packinham, and, cognitively, at the same time lose some illusions.
I also strongly advise you to find a jubilee edition dedicated to the centenary of Barr & Stroud. There are a lot of interesting things, and you will discover a lot of new things.

The coal issue is closed, against two trolls I pass.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

So do not lie, then there will be no accusations. You are a liar. You see, I blame you, you know why, but you have nothing to object to.

This is a normal style of communication. Is it so customary in your country?

Quote: Comrade

The point is not what they are, but how Peckinham called this system in his report on fire control in the Tsushima battle. And he called this system fire-control system.

No not like this. The point is exactly what exactly this system is. And this is the simplest alarm system, a little better than the broadcast but much worse than a regular phone. And in the opinion of Pekingham, I deeply do not care .. Mentioning the fantasies of this gentleman has long been a bad manners. And since you are completely stuck, let me remind you what we are discussing:

the Eagle was also badly damaged, and, which is very important, the centralized fire control was destroyed on it. In other words, he was quite capable of holding out for some time in the battle, but he could no longer hope to inflict tangible harm on the Japanese. "

It is not hard to guess that damage to the "phone" can in no way cause the complete loss of the ship's firepower at that time.

And let's fantasize less, frankly tired of ..

[Andrey Shmelev]

I highly recommend you find and read this Pekingham report

dear Valentin, share, psta, exactly this, I already asked you

now essentially:

1. The Mikasa system, as I understand it, provided the following:
The following information was transferred to each casemate, to each barbette installation:
- target,
- type of projectile,
- distance.

2. The Borodino system, as I understand it, provided the following:
data was transmitted about the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance ... After obtaining the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AU installed guns at given angles

That is, we conclude:
"Mikasa" had a primitive target designation system
"Borodino" had a system of centralized transmission of firing angles, that is, a completely different level of coolness of the system

Dear Colleagues! both two.
Let’s not arrange sracha, but define the terminology relative to the SUAO, such as:
target designation system
-fire angle transmission system
- centralized guidance system
-Automation of calculation of angles of fire
and so on

"Happiness is when you are understood ..." (c)

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Dear Colleagues! both two.
Let’s not arrange sracha, but define the terminology relative to the SUAO, such as:

Actually, there is no reason for srach. "Comrade" understands perfectly well that the battleship's command and control system and the devices of battleships of the RYAV times are fundamentally different things. Just stubborn as usual ..

A battleship SUAO begins with directors tracking the angle of the target, rangefinders, continuously taking a distance, a central calculator that calculates the sight and rear sight based on the averaged data stream, signaling devices transmitting data to the warhead, and an automatic salvo system (taking into account the warhead and the readiness of the warhead to fire).

The armadillos of all this only have a signal system.

Simply put, there was simply no SUAO at the time of the REV.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Simply put, there was simply no SUAO at the time of the REV.

In Russia:
Fire Control System (SLA, SUV) - automated systemuniting a complex of sensors and technical means. Provides search, detection and recognition of targets; preparing weapons for firing, their guidance and solving the task of hitting the target.

Abroad:
Around 1905, mechanical fire control aids began to become available, such as the Dreyer Table, Dumaresq (which was also part of the Dreyer Table), and Argo Clock, but these devices took a number of years to become widely deployed. early forms of rangekeepers.
Arthur Pollen and Frederic Charles Dreyer independently developed the first such systems.

Threat 1.
-fire angle transmission system
it's incomparably cooler than
target designation system
very likely, if not for her, the accuracy of "Borodintsev" would have been at the beginning of the battle several times lower than in reality

Threat 2. ZProfilov, hello!
but they thought that the accuracy of "Borodintsev" was the result of ingenious tactics)

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

but they thought that the accuracy of "Borodintsev" was the result of ingenious tactics)

Accuracy Borodintsev, this is a direct consequence of the distance reduced from 4700 meters about 14 hours to 2300 meters about 15 hours.

For understanding, 10-15 kbl is actually a direct fire distance for 6 "and above; 20-25 kbl - they also allow you to shoot simply at a rangefinder; a distance of 30-40 kbl - already require a mandatory zeroing. Distance of 2300 meters is 12 kbl.

From two kilometers and on purpose the size of a five-story building .. There is not accuracy to admire but ask how they smeared contrived ..

[Andrey Shmelev]

consequence of the distance reduced

And Nitsche, that I explained to Valentin three days in a row that he explained five posts back :)))
And he is all: "accuracy does not change with a reduction in distance"

For understanding

Mosinki's sight was marked at 3200 steps

[Andrey Shmelev]

Lying.
There were special marks in the coal pits on the walls, which, knowing the density of coal, made it possible to determine the weight of coal residues.

Dear colleague, the marks give a significant error in the mass considered due to the error in determining the bulk density.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Dear colleague, the marks give a significant error in the mass considered due to the error in determining the bulk density.

The question is not even error. No one soared early in the morning crawling on his belly through the numerous coal pits of the ship solely for the ordinary morning report on the squadron. They trivially subtracted from their yesterday’s report the approximate average daily consumption figure and sent a signal to the flagship. And of course, every time, according to Kurkulsky, they underestimated their reserves - what if they don’t give how much they need next time?

[Andrey Shmelev]

No one steamed early in the morning crawling on his belly

Xs. Anyway, some kind of slag, not tsifiri

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Xs. Anyway, some kind of slag, not tsifiri

Of course. Nobody Chagin commissioned this tablet. He could, and probably confused something somewhere, there was no reconciliation.

Well, and most importantly, Andrei, point-blank, does not understand that overload is considered from a normal displacement. So even the numbers of Chagin, he’s still an achtung. Even considering that they are very understated. (The pearls underestimated for two days of the move ..)

[Andrey Shmelev]

I'm sitting waiting for the numbers from Valentin - "Comrade" 10050% will give something, which he himself is refuted
for which I appreciate him)

[Comrade]

And you get up and go down the discussion to where you wrote that supposedly
“For any force less than 20 nodes”
will develop the "Garibaldians" bought by Japan.
I was "given" information that in fact, "Nisshin" overcame this mark, reaching 20,15 nodes.
So do not consider it hard to answer for your words, show me how these figures refute me.
While they disprove you.
Your humble servant has already told you, ignorance of the "materiel" fails you, but self-confidence prevents you from realizing it.
Along the way, the plates you posted with the errors of the rangefinders, from which you deduced the whole theory, are ridiculous.
As I already advised you above, read a book about Barr and Strood products, do not replace knowledge with speculation. This is a sad sight, believe me.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Do not replace knowledge with speculation. This is a sad sight, believe me.

yeah, how to count coal without taking into account errors in bulk density, this is knowledge - but this, of course, is not the same knowledge as the exact number of cartridges fired by "Eagle" during firing)

read a book on Barr and Strood products

throw, read - enlighten

Along the way, the plates you posted with the errors of the rangefinders, from which you deduced the whole theory, are ridiculous.

sir, how to say, do not be sophisticated, as I advised, - take pneumatics and a coin - get a practice that fully corresponds to the "theory"

and now back to this topic from this side:
In April 1905, you hit the Fuji island you mentioned 2 times out of 8, on the basis of which you began to carry a blizzard about the refutation of this fact of the "theory" of increasing accuracy with decreasing range (there 25% and here 25%)

I did not heat up then, but now I’ll remind

You completely deliberately ignored the information that, for example, "Sikishima" hit the same island 6 times out of 8, and "Mikasa" 5 times out of 8, which fully confirms my "theory"

You are our objective)

I was "given" information that in fact, "Nisshin" overcame this mark, reaching 20,15 nodes.

Thank you, the information is useful and interesting, only it was on trials,
for comparison on trials Tokiwa has developed 23,1 knots

Every one of the first "Garibaldians" had problems with reaching the contract speed even during the tests, after the tests to reach the contract speed, there was no talk, and the "Rivadavia" and "Moreno", of course, they flew like swallows, despite the growth displacement by 1 (!) tons compared to its predecessors
Since you are such an expert, tell us:
- where, by whom and when were the official trials of these cruisers
- what speed did the English attaches determine for them

Threat. don’t be offended by my harshness - you’re the most well-read man on the REE at sea, I don’t argue with that, but the conclusions from your data can often be completely different

[Andrey Shmelev]

Semenov described it this way:

"At the table, the admiral, contrary to custom, did not speak to anyone. Immediately after breakfast he went to his office. At about 1 pm he unexpectedly appeared on the upper bridge and ordered that all ships immediately, according to the exact measurement of coal pits, report the presence The order is quite unusual, it would seem, even superfluous (Every day in the morning, all ships showed a "morning report" with signals, containing information about the availability of coal, fresh water by 8 am, the number of patients and arrested, about the temperature in the cellars, etc. p. Secondary request for the same, on the same day, was only a control).
"Well," I thought, "apparently I made up my mind. Good hour!"
As you might expect, everyone showed 100-150 tons more than in the morning report. Only "Alexander" hesitated for something. Made him a reminder. Finally he answered ... We look - we don't understand anything ... A semaphore started working: "Is there an error in the signal? You show 300 tons less than in the morning!" - Alas! - it turned out that this signal is completely correct, that there is no error in it ... On the contrary, it corrects a number of errors that were made when showing the morning report ... The presence there was usually determined not by measuring the coal pits, but by writing off the daily consumption from the reserve , listed in the magazine and consisting of coal taken in Nosi-be and before taken on the way during loading at sea, of which, not counting today, there were five. As a result - a miscalculation, that is, a shortage of 400 tons.
Of course, errors were possible, both when recording the flow rate and in the acceptance marks, but not equally. Consumption is carried out systematically from hour to hour. On the second squadron, on which coal was a condition sine qua non of its existence, it was especially strictly prescribed to release it to the stoker not directly from the coal pits, but in measured tubs, under strict control, for which to help the mechanics a midshipman or a reserve warrant officer was appointed from the watch. The purpose of this measure was to keep every pood of coal on record. With this method, the chief mechanic was also given the opportunity to strictly control the work of the officials under his jurisdiction. If the consumption of coal during one shift sharply differed from the same consumption during another, he would have to make sure by his personal presence whether such a circumstance is caused by the ineptitude or negligence of the stokers, who compensate for the disadvantages of poor combustion, depending on the maintenance of the furnace, by the increased tossing of fuel ... In a word, consumption records, of course, were not alien to errors, but they could hardly give such results. Another thing is the recording of the parish, which was conducted during "emergency work", with a terrible haste, with a general desire to be ahead of others, to distinguish oneself ...
In order to avoid misunderstanding, I consider it my duty to make a reservation that there can be no question of any monetary interests of those who released and received coal in this case. The coal was ours, state-owned, paid for long ago in Petersburg. Whether it is on a transport or on a warship - it doesn't matter - no one in the squadron can get any percentage of its value. If Alexander's counters, displaying the average weight of a bag of coal, were inclined to estimate rather than throw away dubious pounds, then this was caused only by the (true, short-sighted) desire to glorify their ship, but by no means selfish motives "

It seems to be cool, but ... there is a problem
And if coal was stored not only in regular pits - where to take measured risks for this coal)

[Andrey Shmelev]

Good morning, dear colleague!

The following information was transferred to each casemate, to each barbette installation:
- target,
- type of projectile,
- distance.

it’s never an SLA, so the germ of a target designation system

See "Borodino":
data were transmitted on the angles of vertical and horizontal guidance ... After receiving the necessary data, the gunners-operators of the selected AU set the guns at the given angles

that's the secret of accuracy of the EDR "Borodino")

[Trapperxnumx]

someday, in a different cycle dedicated to the cruisers of the 2 Pacific Squadron

I will wait with impatience!

[voyaka uh]

Amazing!
It seems that the only cruisers with whom they can fight are destroyers.
But at night the surviving Russian battleships were actually thrown at the mercy of Japanese destroyers. Under the pretext that "if Russian cruisers appear, the battleships will mistake them for the enemy and fire them."
Maybe ... But what, it is better to be drowned by a torpedo of a Japanese destroyer, to which no one bothered to approach the distance of launching a torpedo?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

The observation is correct, if not for one "but". In the era of the RYAV, cruisers could not protect the EBR from night attacks in any way, so the defense against them was built on completely different principles (see ITOE). Therefore, it is wrong to say that Pearl neglected to protect the EBR

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The observation is correct, if not for one "but". In the era of the RYAV, cruisers could not protect the EBR from night attacks in any way, so the defense against them was built on completely different principles (see ITOE). Therefore, it is wrong to say that Pearl neglected to protect the EBR

Nevertheless, many people, including contemporaries, blamed Enquist for exactly what he threw the battleships and they were eventually destroyed by the destroyers.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Trapper7

Nevertheless, many people, including contemporaries, blamed Enquist for exactly what he threw the battleships and they were eventually destroyed by the destroyers.

This is an unofficial point of view, and it is also incorrect. But the fact that Enquist did not comply with the order to break through to Vladivostok and took the cruiser "to winter quarters" - yes, this is a weighty claim

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

But the fact that Enquist did not comply with the order to break through to Vladivostok and took the cruiser "to winter quarters" - yes, this is a weighty claim

That is, if Enquist didn’t leave for Manila, but burst into Vladik at full speed at night, would he be a hero?

[AK64]

That is, if Enquist didn’t leave for Manila, but burst into Vladik at full speed at night, would he be a hero?

Yes, I would.
Moreover, he would not need a full speed.
As they say, Enquist was under the full influence of Dobrotvorsky (Oleg's commander): who was in command there? Dobrotvorsky would say (I just want to write "dobrooyubov") "we must go along Vladik!" - and went to Vladik cruiser.

[Catfish]

Well, what can you say ... Andrei's detailed story about the actions of the Enquist cruisers leads to a disappointing and gloomy conclusion about the competence and loyalty to the duty of the Russian admirals of Tsushima. If we abandon the "lyrics", then the bottom line everything looks like this:

1). The "genius strategist" Rozhdestvensky brought the squadron entrusted to him under the Japanese hammers, allowing the enemy, almost equal in strength, to drown half of his battleships with impunity at the very beginning of the battle.

2). The fact that the Japanese, for unknown reasons, did not have time to drown, the next day they just gave them the second flagship of the squadron - Admiral Nebogatov.

3). The third, Admiral Enquist, banally fled the battlefield, leaving his main forces to be torn to pieces by the Japanese destroyers. They (torpedo boats) are not to blame for the fact that they did not melt the remains of our squadron at that time.

Most of all, Admiral von Felkersam was "lucky", he died suddenly before the start of the battle ("The davit broke on the battleship." (C) Looks like the old man was tormented by a premonition of imminent defeat.

As for the justification of those who surrendered and fled, Ushakov and Nakhimov also cherished both their ships and crews, but another memory remained about them.

PS A bit out of topic, just about the twists and turns of life. The grandson of the Russian Admiral Felkersam, SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Adrian von Felkersam, was Otto Skorzeny's chief of staff at the end of the war. Our soldiers killed him a couple of days before the end of the war while trying to cross the front line. Excellent knowledge of the Russian language did not help either.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Sea Cat

The "genius strategist" Rozhdestvensky brought the squadron entrusted to him under the Japanese hammers, allowing the enemy, almost equal in strength, to drown half of his battleships with impunity at the very beginning of the battle.

Well, firstly, the Japanese were not equal, but many times superior - here and the speed and power of artillery. In fact, at first, both the Japanese and Russian ships received a comparable number of hits, but if the Japanese reduced the combat capability of the Russians, then the Russian hits did not. As a result, the Russians lost their combat capability, but the Japanese did not, and this decided the outcome of the battle.
Secondly, at the very beginning of the battle only one EDB was drowned - Oslabya, the other three died before, or immediately after sunset

Quote: Sea Cat

The fact that the Japanese, for unknown reasons, did not have time to drown, the next day they just gave the second flagship of the squadron - Admiral Nebogatov.

Agree

Quote: Sea Cat

The third, Admiral Enquist, trivially escaped from the battlefield, leaving his main forces to be torn apart by Japanese destroyers.

Strictly speaking, he could not defend the squadron at night from the destroyers, in those years such protection was based on different principles.

[Catfish]

Strictly speaking, he could not defend the squadron at night from the destroyers, in those years such protection was based on different principles.

Good day, Andrey.

Could, or could not - this is another question, but he just did not begin to do this.
And the commanders of our cruisers were not very good. Something I can hardly imagine their efficiency in a single raiding, as, for example, in "Emden". Although the German cruiser is not far from the "Pearl" left in terms of weapons and progress.
Is it all about training commanders and motivation?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Sea Cat

Could, or could not - this is another question, but he just did not begin to do this.

So no one did, see the practice of night battles 1TOE. You blame Levitsky for not fulfilling his duty, but the point is that he didn’t have such a duty.

[Catfish]

Yes, not Levitsky (although he is also "good"), I'm talking about admirals. In relation to cruisers - about Enquist.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

So no one did, see the practice of night battles 1TOE. You blame Levitsky for not fulfilling his duty, but the point is that he didn’t have such a duty.

"And nobody did" this is apparently a reminder that the 1TOE cruisers also escaped from their battleships immediately after the battle. I don't think this can be considered a model of naval tactics ..

And by the way, we can recall that the commander of the Chinese cruiser, who abandoned his battleships at Yalu, was shot. Apparently so that I don't do that anymore. :)

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

1TOE cruisers also fled from their battleships immediately after the battle.

Not "fled", but tried to fulfill the order of the emperor:" Go to Vladivostok. "

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

They did not "run away", but tried to fulfill the order of the emperor: "Go to Vladivostok."

Yeah, that was it: part 1 — they carried out the order, went to Vladivostok, and ended up in Shanghai. Where disarmed. part 2 — they carried out the order, went to Vladivostok, then turned to Shanghai, then for some reason then to Manila, where they suddenly again disarmed.

It seems to me there is something in common ..

[Comrade]

The moment of the death of the squadron battleship "Prince Suvorov". Photo from the board of the Japanese ship

Another image in the subject.
The picture shows the squadron battleship “Prince Suvorov” four hours before the death. The photo was taken from the cruiser “Idzumo” by the officer of the headquarters of the 2th squadron of the United Fleet as senior lieutenant Yamamoto (山 本 英 輔 大尉) in 15: 34 (in Japanese time). In the foreground, a splash from the fall of the Russian shell is noteworthy.

«In 3 hours 34 min. suddenly, in the midst of the fog, "Prince Suvorov" was seen, shrouded in smoke and flame; The 2-th detachment opened fire on it at close range, about 2 000 meters, and a mine was fired at it from Yakumo. This ship already had great damage - the masts, pipes, bridges and in general all the settings were destroyed and he almost lost his combat ability, shooting only with small caliber fodder cannons. Therefore, the 2-th fighting detachment stopped shooting at him". (Description of military operations at sea in the 37-38 of Meiji).

[Comrade]

Dear Andrew,
In the development of the theme of the battle of cruisers, a comparison of the released shells of the caliber 152 mm and 120 mm. For convenience of perception, the Japanese have given the Reds the transcripts of the names of the ships and the caliber of the shells.

I collected information for the tables from various sources. It is a pity that in the "Reports and Descriptions of the Participants of the Battle" precisely on "Pearl" there are not enough pages. It is likely that there is information on the consumption of projectiles.

[rytik32]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

But for some reason, while trying to go 11 nodes, 3 TOE could not keep order and strongly delayed.

In fact, our squadron after a day’s battle went at a speed of 12 or even 13 knots (according to Kostenko). And why 3 TOEs delayed it is not clear, not the fact that they could not squeeze more.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Which led to the fact that in the 3 maneuvers of the British fleet in a row more than the high-speed squadron put less speed crossing T without problems

So the tasks were different in Tsushima and in those exercises. In Tsushima, no one forbade Rozhestvensky at the sight of the Japanese to turn 180 degrees and leave in full steam in the hope of reaching the sunset and getting lost in the night.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

This is YOU, please watch the fight in the Yellow Sea. In which Togo made no attempt at all to cross

But what about the first phase of the battle ???

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Yes, right on the 2 projectile - 12 vs. 10. While at Tsushima Mikasa, 22-mm was hit by 152, and in XM, 6 was hit. and that the total number of hits in Tsushima exceeded 40, and in the XM - 23

Only large shells are capable of causing major damage.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

That is, if the 1TOE gunners had the preparation of the 2TOE, he would not have crawled to the middle, he drowned simply under the weight of the shells that hit him

Oh, I doubt it. Tsushima has a higher percentage of hits with our 6-inches due to the shorter range of combat than in the Yellow Sea. That's the whole secret. Poltava got to Yakumo with 80 cables and repulsed all the desire to take our tail in "pincers". Who could boast such precision in Tsushima?