Heavy BTR: an extremely dubious idea
About the uselessness of heavy armored personnel carriers
When discussing heavy armored personnel carriers, such as the Israeli Azkharit or the Timer, the argument is usually developed in the plane of their usefulness. Moreover, it develops in a style that is quite aggressive towards opponents. I will come from the other side and I will develop the argument in the opposite direction, in the plane of their uselessness.
Israeli "Timer". What an awkward car: huge and tall, with weak arms and poor visibility. A large "dead zone" around it, not viewed from the instruments and not fired from weapons. The corridor for the landing in the stern asks that a cumulative grenade be thrown into it. Notice that, although Israeli soldiers feel safe, they still put their superbronet into something like a trench.
So, a few theses.
The first. As far as I can see from the publications and comments, supporters of TBTR captivate the security of the machine, which justifies all other accessories, in particular, great weight. Like, TBTR can drive under the dense fire of the enemy. But it is impossible not to ask a simple question: if the enemy’s fire is so strong and powerful, then what is there for the infantry to do?
The experience of the war in fact quite clearly shows that for successful infantry operations, the enemy must be destroyed, or at least suppressed. If not all and everyone, then, at a minimum, its main firing points and its heavy armament. As part of the Soviet tactics, this task was carried out by artillery preparation. When it was carried out qualitatively, then the infantry was left with a smaller part of the combat mission, executable for it.
In my opinion, the popularity of the TBTR arises in the context of declining artillery, when they are trying to replace with a heavy machine the obviously insufficient or completely missing artillery preparation. For Israel, with its specific theater of operations, this circumstance is explained by the fact that battles are fought in densely populated areas in which artillery cannot be used - there are non-combatants. Therefore, the Israelis, as a rule, carry out pinpoint operations to storm the single house in which the militants have settled. You must drive up to the house under fire, including an RPG and an ATGM, in order to carry out a successful attack. These unique conditions create the need for TBTR, determining, in particular, their design.
"Timer" is driving from Gaza. It is not easy to find a photo in which this TBTR was captured not in the range, but in combat conditions
Thus, if we do not fight according to the Israeli method, in the absence of cities with a very high population density and development, as well as in the absence of non-combatants in the war zone, then instead of TBTR we need good artillery, and with the direct support of infantry in the same city battle will cope and Tanks.
The second. Substituting under the fire of the enemy and counting that the forehead and sides of the TBTR will withstand it, from a tactical point of view means giving initiative to the enemy. Motorized infantry with TBTR will prefer the same style of warfare: moving forward, on enemy defenses, shooting from onboard weapons so that the infantry, upon reaching the fortifications, can go out and clear them. This concept implicitly relies on the fact that the enemy will be weak and has little initiative, will be afraid of steel boxes, and will prefer to step back when meeting with them. In case he decides to shoot, the infantry will be protected by tank armor.
This is all wonderful, until the enemy has got angry, decisive and inventive. Without much difficulty, you can develop tactics against TBTR. For example, anti-tankers with an RPG or ATGM, hiding in disguised trenches and shelters, and do not open fire until the armored vehicles are near, on the 70-80 meters, better board or stern to them. Then they hit from close range, when a miss is unlikely and there is an opportunity to aim at the vulnerable spots that any armored vehicles have. There may be an addition to this tactic - the rapid convergence and the use of overhead charges for the final destruction of the damaged armored vehicles. Guided land mines can be used to kill the caterpillar and immobilize the machine.
German magnetic anti-mine mine Hafthohlladung (HHL 3). In addition to this design can be, for example, mine-velcro.
Any kind of radar, night vision devices, infrared cameras or thermal imagers somewhat increase the capabilities of the TBTR, but they are unlikely to help you see the hidden trench (which may have a thermal shield), cracks, or even a hole in an underground tunnel. Especially in heavy rain, fog or snow. Because the enemy can wait and hit for sure.
Or the reception of a tactical drape, when the enemy, when the TBTR is approaching its positions, represents a hasty retreat, and when the motorized infantry got out and their boxes for trophies and prisoners, the fired and disguised firing points strike them. Against military tricks, thick armor is not a particularly good helper.
In other words, the motorized infantry planted in TBTR is very limited in the variety of tactics used, which makes their actions very well predictable. An opponent without armor can diversify his tactics and catch TBTR on an unexpected course. Giving back the initiative to the enemy, even at the level of a tactical concept, is a very bad decision. For this reason, I am generally against any "well-protected" armored cars for infantry. They accustom the infantry to passivity and hope that it will survive the armor.
Third. Since the TBTR, in contrast to the BMP-1 and its later branches, does not provide for the possibility of firing a landing force from under the armor, it turns out that a considerable part of the battle the motorized infantry will passively, as passengers. When they say that TBTR can support tanks on the battlefield, this fact is usually forgotten. Support can be provided by the TBTR itself, with its guns and machine guns, but not with infantry, which is deprived of this opportunity. The role of the infantry on the battlefield comes down, essentially, to a trophy team; when the enemy fled without accepting a battle with armored vehicles, the motorized infantry would pick up what the enemy had abandoned while fleeing. If so, if the infantry is only involved in the head-up analysis, when all the work has already been done by the tanks and crews of the TBTR, then why is it needed there at all? Trophy team can be sent later.
Does the battle lead one armored?
Theoretically, you can consider the tactical concept, when the battle is one armored vehicles: tanks and tank-shaped armored vehicles with automatic guns and speed guns. But then for this purpose T-15 with the module "Boomerang-BM" or AU-220М is best suited from all the creativity of domestic designers. Landing from this machine to remove, and the vacated space to use for additional ammunition.
The T-15 can be quite good without an assault force inside, but with increased ammunition.
Here are these three circumstances: replacing the enemy’s suppression with artillery preparation with armor protection against him, giving the initiative back to the enemy at the level of the tactical concept, as well as the passive nature of the motorized infantry actions, actually at the level of the trophy team, is enough to consider the idea of TBTR extremely doubtful.
And now you can debate.
Information