Finished developing a ROAD plan in the USA. Objective reorganization of army divisions

Introduction of battalions instead of battle groups

The development of the organizational structure of the divisions of the US Army in 1960-1980 years. Answering to Addleman's wishes, the developers of the ROAD plan determined that the infantry battalion was more suitable than the combat group as the main building block of the infantry division. The advantages of the battalion included better management, simpler training procedures, a greater variety of tactics on the battlefield, and more career opportunities for infantry officers. In the battle group, the effective command level of the commander was too great. He had so many diverse units for supervision (infantry, artillery, engineering units, medical, communications, reconnaissance, logistics and maintenance) that it was difficult for him to manage the detachment.

Deputy Chief of Staff of the US Army, General Clyde Addleman, the ideological inspirer of the ROAD plan (Objective Reorganization of Army Divisions, 1961 — 1965), who determined the organizational structure of the US divisions for several decades ahead

Returning to the infantry battalion will simplify command and control, logistics and maintenance, and training. Given the need to disperse on the battlefield, the study noted that 20 per cent of the combat strength of the pentomic infantry division accounted for each combat group. The loss of one battle group in battle would be significant. With nine infantry battalions, the new division will lose only 11 percent of its combat power if one of its battalions is hit by a nuclear strike. In addition, many situations in combat required a greater variety of answers than the combat group could easily have given. Some tasks were too big for a company, but too small for a battle group; other tasks require strength more than one battle group, but less than two. Smaller infantry battalions seemed to meet these needs. Finally, the battle group provided little opportunity for infantry officers to gain command experience. If the battle group is maintained, only 5 percent of the army lieutenant colonels will receive command assignments, and only the 4 percent of the majors will serve as deputy commander. After weighing all these aspects, the planners recommended that the infantry battalions replace the battle groups.

In an effort to ensure maximum uniformity, simplicity and flexibility, shunting battalions were as similar as possible in accordance with their individual functions. Each infantry, mechanized infantry and tank The battalions consisted of a headquarters, three line companies, as well as a headquarters and a serving company. The similarities between the shunting battalions extended to reconnaissance platoons, which were the same in all battalions, and to platoons in reconnaissance squadrons. Given these battalions, companies and platoons can be used to create battle groups for specific operations with minimal differences. Using the latest weapons, all infantry battalions and reconnaissance squadrons had two low-power Davy Crockett nuclear above-caliber ammunition, which were considered a “salvage strike” for ROAD divisions. Infantry and mechanized infantry battalions also had a new ENgin-Teleguide Anti-Char (ENTAC) rocket, a French-developed anti-tank weapon.

The plan's developers assumed that if there is a unified division base and different numbers and types of battalions for shunting, the divisions can be adapted in three ways. The first, “strategic level”, will give the army headquarters the opportunity to create combat groups to accomplish the task in the interests of the operation; the second, “internal tactical level,” allowed the division commander to create battle groups for his own tasks; and the third, “external tactical level,” allowed the commanders of an army or corps to change divisions, depending on the circumstances. In the past, units were adapted in all three ways, but the ROAD plan facilitated this adaptation at all levels.

Completion of development

4 April 1961 officers of the Continental Command Army and Army Headquarters introduced Decker with the concept, and he approved it nine days later. However, he told Powell that the divisions should have been mainly fixed, because the army did not have the resources to maintain the reserve divisional battalions for the division within or between theaters. According to Decker, the interchangeable characteristics of the battalions were sufficient to ensure the organizational structure within and between divisions without retaining additional units. He asked Powell only to consider replacing the towed artillery with self-propelled artillery, including 155-mm howitzers and reorganizing the missile battalion, to include both Onest John and two 8-inch howitzers batteries. The number of vehicles in the infantry battalion also seemed excessive, and Decker wanted to reduce it whenever possible. The study provided only two Davy Crockett charges for each infantry battalion and reconnaissance squadron; Decker proposed adding a third one, making one available for each linear company or squad in these units. As a priority, Decker wanted the doctrine and educational literature to be quickly developed, especially for a company of support. The doctrine of the use of nuclear weapons remained unclear.

Over the course of several months, the Continental Army Command published draft tables for divisions under the ROAD plan - infantry, mechanized infantry. and armored divisions (3 chart). They switched to 105-mm towed howitzers in the infantry division and the 30-percent reduction in infantry battalion transport. The 155-mm / 8-inch howitzer battalion remained as planned, but a new missile battalion was developed, consisting of a headquarters and service unit and two Onest John batteries. In each infantry battalion and reconnaissance squadron there were three, rather than two, Davy Crockett charges.

Diagram 3.
HHC - headquarters and company staff services; MP CO - police company; MECH BDE - Mechanized Brigade; INF BDE - Infantry Brigade; ARMORED BDE - tank brigade; SV CMD - support command; Recon sqdn - reconnaissance squadron; Sig Bn - battalion of communications; Aviation Bn - Army Battalion aviation; ENGR BN - Engineering Battalion; DIV ARTILLERI - Division artillery (not division); 155mm HOW SP FA BN - 155mm self-propelled field artillery battalion (closer to the division in the SA); MISSLE Bn - missile battalion; TRAINS Bn (TRAINS) - battalion of transport support; MED BN - medical battalion; MAINT BN - maintenance battalion; ADMIN CO - curfew company

Considering this diagram, we can note that as a result of the development of the ROAD plan, the divisions of the United States received a United States Army Command, which remained with slight changes until the end of the Cold War. The changes concerned the number and types of the main battalions, the composition of the division’s artillery while maintaining the number of field artillery battalions, the expansion of the army aviation battalion to the brigade, but the idea of ​​having 3-x brigade headquarters that did not have a permanent battalion and received them for a specific combat task remained until of our days.

To be continued ...

Comments

[evgen1221]

So there’s the military on the site, the topic is that it’s not important to eat, but there are no commentators. Where is anyone ???

[Earthshaker]

Here the opinion of a graduate of the Academy of the General Staff is necessary. My opinion, the level of a platoon company, is not appropriate. To the diagram a couple of questions arose.
1) Does the Army Aviation Battalion include only helicopters? How many squadrons are there and which ones?
2) Does the military police not carry out curfews? What is the difference between a commandant company and an MR company?
The division is very independent in structure. May act in isolation for some time.

[Lopatov]

Quote: Earthshaker

2) Does the military police not carry out curfews?

Military police can act as curfews
But at the same time, the curfew company is not usually attracted to this.

Quote: Earthshaker

What is the difference between a commandant company and an MR company?

VP company is occupied by law and order; commandant company is organizing the work of the headquarters

Just do not confuse, the curfew company is one thing, the curfew service is another.

[Sergej1972]

It would be more correct to translate it as "headquarters company".

[Glory1974]

This is history, from the 60-ies 50-60 years have passed. More interesting new data on the composition of modern units and divisions. There is room for discussion.

[saygon66]

- Like during "Desert Storm" they returned to the battalion tactical groups?

[Operator]

The goal-setting at the expense of the battalion is not clear - if the authors of the concept had a mess in their head, then the author of the article had to reveal these goals himself.

[pmkemcity]

The war is won by "big battalions", and modern war by very large battalions. Large armies require simple solutions; therefore, small armies can, and simply must, have a complex structure. At the end of the Second World War, not that the regiments, divisions were built in one echelon. And the tasks were set for one or two days. Not only the shortage of junior officers, but also the elementary absence of "active bayonets" - this is the portrait of the 3th division, to which should be added an immense amount of artillery, which broke through the enemy's defenses. Moreover, it can be noted that this situation is more the rule than the exception - the Patriotic War of 1812 is a vivid example of this. Borodino, and all subsequent battles, with a catastrophic shortage of infantry, in the end turned into an artillery firefight. The infantry has transformed into a "guard" of collective weapons, and has long been unable to independently solve combat missions.
The company-battalion is small, there is a lot of non-divisions ... For everyday combat training, a regiment (homogeneous!) Is our everything. And even in a war lasting three or four years, when all the forces of the state are straining, the regiment becomes nothing more than a "reinforced battalion." Each commander (officer) must have at his (!) Disposal a weapon capable of turning the tide of battle in his sector to the depth of the nearest mission and to the width of the front of the neighboring subunit. Platoon commander - sniper, machine gun, grenade launcher. Company commander - ATGM, 23-30 mm artillery, MANPADS. The battalion commander - 120 mm mortar, 122 mm howitzer, something like an URC. Regiment commander - MLRS from Grad to Buratino, depending on the "severity" of the regiment, 152 mm artillery, SAM (URK). And so on, according to the type of troops.
The commander of a formation (division, corps, army) must not maneuver with fire, he must maneuver his forces and means. It is possible to prepare four full-fledged headquarters for the connection only for a mobilization perspective in peacetime. But, the "small" headquarters, undoubtedly, must be prepared at any headquarters - shock and holding groups, work in a secondary direction, organization of the commander's work directly in the order of the troops, but you never know ...
I consider it unworthy of domestic "military thought" to look into the mouths of the imperialists and try to figure it out, because our enemies have never taught us anything good.

[sleeve]

The prototype of the combat groups is the mechanized and tank brigades of the Soviet Army in the Second World War. A further stimulus to their development is the localization of hostilities in the theater of operations. This experience was gained by the Americans in Vietnam and we in Afghanistan. This implies the presence of a not very strong enemy in technical and fire equipment and a wide range of tasks, diminished due to the fragmentation of the opposing forces. The Vietnamese experience completely rubbed the Korean War, which was fought in the rules of the battlefield of the WWII. It was rubbed emotionally, due to the apparent tension of the confrontation, the mass (relative for that moment) losses, the impossibility of obtaining the usual absolute trump card. In fact, battalion battle group theory is not American know-how. Again, the assault groups of the Soviet army of a mixed type, especially during the Berlin operation. In principle, the offensive actions of the Soviet troops of the post-war period were planned in this link, with an increase in firepower by regimental means and the work of divisional artillery and air defense as rear support. In this case, the "division" link was assigned an operational assignment (the task of the main direction, the defense front, the offensive, the supply link in the area of ​​operations of the combat groups, work with front-line aviation, and the distribution of tactical link reserves). Somehow such "progress". All repeats...

[pmkemcity]

Any lesson on the tactics of the marine corps in the late 80s began with the phrase - the forces of the senior commander delivered a nuclear strike of 5 kt with a force of the enemy’s battalion stronghold, and more ...
The war in Russia will be "correct", so to speak, "academic". The war in Europe is a continuous "Stalingrad" (the level of development of the territory is simply colossal). The only thing that can save Europe from total destruction is surrender, which they are counting on. For the most part, an ordinary European does not care whether Negroes or Russians wash their boots in the English Channel. The main thing is that your hut is intact.
American tactics, like strategy, have never been decisive in their goals. Reliance on overwhelming superiority in resources, the time factor and the inaccessibility of the territory in which industrial centers are located are the factors that have always put pressure on American military thought. BTG, brigades (division of the division) were precisely sharpened for the war in the European theater of operations (I remember "division of the 90s", "air-ground operation (battle)"). Only the armored cavalry regiment as part of the corps was considered a mobile unit. With the collapse of the Soviet army, the need for "heavy" divisions disappeared, surrogates appeared in the form of LPD, Hamers and other rubbish, which, by the way, with each day of the war became more and more difficult. With the return to the European theater of operations, the Americans and we began to think about the divisional structure.

[Sasha_rulevoy]

Changes related to the number and types of main battalions

I don’t remember the number of battalions changing.

Changes inside the battalions:
- the number of infantry / tank companies in the battalion up to four and vice versa
- anti-tank company E, at first it was, then there was a company and anti-tank sections in infantry companies, then only anti-tank sections
- the mortar section in the company was added and decreased.

[Sasha_rulevoy]

Incidentally, the structure of the American division of the 80s is easy to remember. Apart from nine line battalions and three brigade headquarters, the rear of the division, the rest three each: three brigades, three battalions and three companies.

Three brigades: army aviation, engineering, artillery (DivArty)
Three battalions: communications, intelligence (intelligence battalion, not to be confused with the armored cavalry squadron, which is part of the AA brigade), air defense.
Three companies: headquarters, smoke curtains and military police.

[pmkemcity]

This makes it easier to interrogate a military translator - what is the strength, brother? Three tape recorders, three movie cameras abroad, a suede jacket (gortex), three pieces ...