The future of the US Navy: nuclear "supery" or light aircraft carriers?
Well, the position is clear. But it is interesting for a change to see what America thinks about the prospects for the development of its own carrier-based forces. Moreover, there has been a certain revival in recent years in terms of the concept of aircraft construction.
A bit of history
For a long time in the American fleet everything was more or less simple and clear. The experience of the Second World War led the Americans to the idea of a super-large aircraft carrier of the largest possible size, since it was such a ship that created the best conditions for the actions of its own wing. This is how Midway appeared, laid out on October 27 1943 and having a standard displacement - 47219 t.
The new aircraft carrier was only slightly smaller than the most modern at the time of American battleships of the Iowa type and was one of the largest warships in the world. Of course, in the US, small aircraft carriers were also built, the purpose of which is well understood from their very name: “escort.” These ships were not intended for sea battles, but for escorting caravans of transport or amphibious ships, anti-submarine defense and solving other, of course, important, but secondary in terms of gaining dominance at sea.
Then, after the end of the war and the start of mass production of atomic weapons, the idea arose that aircraft carriers as a means of war were completely outdated. The American admirals strongly disagreed with this, and therefore the US aircraft carriers increased in size: firstly, in order to ensure the basing of jet aircraft, for its era had come, and secondly, to carry aircraft capable of using atomic weapons . As a result, the first serial aircraft carriers of the post-war type “Forrestol” already had over 61 thousand tons of standard displacement, and it only grew in the future. And there already arrived, and nuclear power. Of course, the use of the latter on ships and ships has caused up to now even known controversies, but, by and large, for the three classes of ships: aircraft carriers, submarines and icebreakers, their usefulness has never been seriously disputed. In addition, combat aircraft increased in size by leaps and bounds, and it is not surprising that the displacement of American aircraft carriers eventually exceeded 100 000 tons.
However, it did not bother the Americans at all. In their post-war concepts, the Air Force always played first fiddle, a special role, air superiority was revered by them as an absolutely necessary prerequisite for winning the war. It is not surprising that with such an approach, and even having the richest experience of aircraft carrier war in the Pacific, the American admirals are absolutely sure that it is aviation that is the priority in armed struggle at sea. It is precisely aviation, in their opinion, that should win air supremacy, destroy enemy enemy ship groups, play an essential role in antisubmarine defense of formations, strike the coast, etc. and so on
Thus, the growth of the size and cost of aircraft carriers could not embarrass the command of the Navy - it is obvious that they thought it would be criminal to save on the key naval armaments system. And besides, may this banality be forgiven to the author, America is a rich country, and could afford a lot.
But then the inevitable happened. There is one very interesting economic law, commonly known as the "Pareto Rule", which says: "20% effort gives 80% result, and the remaining 80% effort - only 20% result." In other words, upon reaching a certain level, it becomes more and more expensive to increase the combat qualities of an aircraft carrier, and at some stage, simply speaking, the game is no longer worth the candle. According to the personal opinion of the author of this article, the Americans either reached the ideal, or were extremely close to him in a project of aircraft carriers of the Nimitz type - very expensive, but at the same time extremely efficient aircraft carriers. But as time went on, this project gradually became obsolete morally, new technologies appeared, and the US Navy wanted to get an aircraft carrier of a new project. This was the start of the development of a ship of the type “Gerald. R. Ford.
In essence, this ship was viewed as the “improved Nimitz”, and there were three main areas for improvement:
1. The transition from steam to electromagnetic catapults, the latter is much more comfortable, and better preserve both the health of the pilots and the life of the aircraft.
2. The increase in the average number of sorties per day from 140 to 160 while maintaining the same size of the air group.
3. Reduction in crew size due to automation: it was assumed that this would reduce the operating costs of the ship.
Besides, naturally, “Gerald. R. Ford had to get the most advanced technologies: such, for example, as new reactors that do not require recharging of the core for the entire service life of the aircraft carrier, the use of stealth technology, etc. etc.
And how are you doing?
What did the Americans do as a result? It is still premature to judge, because “Gerald R. Ford” turned out to be very “raw” and cannot cope with numerous “childhood diseases”, including in such important systems as electromagnetic catapults. Whether he will cope with them, or the disadvantages will become chronic, the future will show. But this is absolutely impossible to deny - the aircraft carrier turned out to be expensive. Very expensive.
Of course, the US military budget is titanic; in 2018, Uncle Sam’s military expenditures accounted for 36% of world military spending. But you need to understand that the costs of the Americans are also huge - their military-industrial complex has long been no different moderate appetites. And because the price tag of atomic aircraft carriers of the newest project is capable of driving even the senators of the United States of America into depression.
Initially, it was planned to meet the 10,5 billion dollars, and only for the lead ship, which the US has traditionally spent on its development costs, while the serial cost was supposed to be at the level of 8 billion dollars. However, in fact the costs for the creation of "Gerald R. Ford" passed for 13 billion, dollars, and a number of systems still do not want to work as it should. Of course, in these conditions, someone had to offer to build aircraft carriers "in sizes smaller, cheaper prices," and this happened. For some time now, both in the US Congress and in the US Department of Defense, the LAC concept has been discussed in one way or another, that is, Light Aircraft Carrier, which means “Light Aircraft Carrier” in Russian. As far as the author knows, the word "light" Americans understand aircraft carriers less than 70 000 tons of standard displacement.
In 2017, the notorious, terribly odious and now deceased US Senator John McCain succumbed to the heat: he suggested that in the period before 2022 r, the programs of building amphibious assault ships should be curtailed in favor of light aircraft carriers that should complement the existing heavy ones. Besides him, the Research Institute for Budget and Strategic Analysis Center (Center for Budgetary and Strategic Analysis) spoke in favor of light aircraft carriers in his report Restoring American Seapower, made in January of 2017. The latter proposed to build aircraft carriers with a displacement of 40-60 thousand tons with a conventional, non-nuclear power plant, whose air group will be approximately 40 airplanes and helicopters, that is, roughly, half of the wing of the supercarrier.
Why do the US Navy light aircraft carriers?
The logic of the supporters of light aircraft carriers is as follows: there are a number of tasks for carriers of carrier-based aircraft for which the capabilities of atomic superavian carriers are excessive. Among these tasks are mentioned:
1. Participation in low-intensity combat operations.
2. Direct protection of amphibious and shock ship groups.
3. Escort convoys.
4. The projection of force and the demonstration of the flag.
Accordingly, it is possible to solve them with light aircraft carriers, using heavy ones only where it is really needed.
I must say that what is happening in 2017 and now is not new in stories US Navy. At the turn of 70, the notorious Admiral E. Zamvolt, after whom the newest American destroyer was later named, also drew attention to the high cost of atomic aircraft carriers and, accordingly, a relatively small number of them in the fleet, which did not allow control of the ocean spaces. His proposals gave life to the concept of Sea Control Ship (SCS), I mean the ship control of the sea. In the original version, it was a small aircraft carrying ship with a displacement of only 13 000 t, speed 26 kt., Crew 700 person and air group of 17 aircraft including 11 anti helicopters, 3 helicopters AEW and 3 fighters vertical and short takeoff and landing. It was assumed that by abandoning one atomic "super" it would be possible to build eight SCS with the money saved.
The concept of SCS seemed interesting, so the Americans even converted one of their landing helicopter carriers (“Guam”) into the carrier of “Harriers” and anti-submarine helicopters. Subsequently, the idea evolved into a ship about 30 thousand tons. at a speed of 30 units and an air group of 26 aircraft including the 4 of the VTOL aircraft, but it seemed to be non-optimal by the criterion of “cost-effectiveness”. As a result, the concept gradually came to naught, although for a long time articles appeared on the American press that SCS with a displacement of up to 40 KT, a non-nuclear power plant and with VTOL aircraft are the future of aircraft carriers. However, there is a persistent feeling that this was being done with one sole purpose - to convince the USSR, which was then just engaged in the construction of the Kiev-type TAVKR, which, they say, “go the right way, comrades!”
And in the US Navy it all boiled down only to the fact that the universal landing ships were able to carry VTOL and antisubmarine helicopters. Usually in online publications this fact is presented as recognition of the SCS concept, but the author of this article has big doubts about this. The fact is that such innovations increase the SAR of amphibious ship groups and enable the American marines to better use the VTOL aircraft at their disposal. That is, such steps only increase the capabilities of amphibious compounds and do not claim any “control over the sea”.
In other words, some real step towards the concept of light aircraft carriers in the United States was made a very long time ago, and that was all. However, in June, the Congressional Budget Office 2017 amended to allocate 2018 million to 30 for the development of the initial light aircraft carrier concept. In other words, from idle talk the Americans are moving to business.
New concepts
What awaits the US carrier fleet in the future? Experts of the notorious RAND corporation tried to answer this question. They compiled and published the Future Aircraft Carrier Options report, in which they considered possible directions for the development of carrier-based carrier aircraft in the event of the abandonment of serial construction of aircraft carriers of the Gerald R. Ford type.
The authors of the report, B. Martin and M. McMahon, presented the following variants to 4:
In the first case, we are talking about almost the same "Gerald R. Ford", but with a number of activities that allow to reduce the cost of the ship with a minimum drop in the combat capability of the latter. In the report, this version of the aircraft carrier is designated CVN 8X, while the aircraft carrier of the Gerald R.Ford type is the CVN 80.
The second project is the most funny and unusual concept of a modern aircraft carrier that the author of this article has ever come across (the horrors of the Krylovsky KGNTS, that is, the 23000 Storm project and other catamarans do not offer - they are trembling). It is all about the combined power plant of the latter. No, the combined power plants have been known for a very long time and are used everywhere, but here, at least, to recall our frigates of the 22350 project - there is used diesel for the economic course, and for the full version - a gas turbine. But gentlemen from RAND proposed to combine gas turbines with a nuclear engine ...
The essence of the proposal is as follows: “Gerald R. Ford” has two A1В reactors, which provide all the needs of an aircraft carrier, but, of course, are very expensive. So, the proposed concept with a displacement in 70 000 t. Should do with only one such reactor, and since its power is not enough for the needs of such a giant, it is proposed to “finish” it with gas turbines. The option of a full transition to "fossil" fuel by American experts was considered, but was rejected, as obviously wrong, to go the way of the British with their "Queen Elizabeth" in the United States do not want. It is very significant that, it would seem, the most logical option is to create a new reactor for the needs of an aircraft carrier with a displacement of 70 KT. “Randowers” are not considered either. And this is probably logical, because in today's realities of the US military-industrial complex such development will not even be gold, but diamond, but the RAND task, in general, to reduce the cost of US aircraft carrier programs, rather than increase it. This concept B. Martin and M. McMahon was designated as CVN LX.
With the third concept, everything is very simple. In essence, this is a light aircraft carrier with a displacement of 40 000 t., Carrying only VTOL aircraft, that is, today, F-35B. Naturally, no nuclear reactor is not provided. The concept is named CV LX.
And finally, the fourth ship, which received the CV EX designation, is downright a renaissance of the ideas of E. Zamvolta, since we are talking about an “aircraft carrier” displacement within 20 000 tons or a bit more. Of course, his air group is also limited to VTOL and helicopters.
B. Martin and M. McMahon rated the possible performance characteristics of all four concepts, they are tabulated in the report, and for people who do not speak English, the author will try to give the necessary explanations below.
The flight deck area (Flight-deck maximum size) of the CVN 8X concept remains the same as that of Gerald R. Ford, while for the 70-thousandth CVN LX it is slightly (by 3,8%) smaller. And the same applies to the size of the air group (Embarked aircraft): on the CVN 8X it counts, as on the Ford 80 aircraft, and on the CVN LX it can be a little less than their number - 70-80. But the reduction in size led to a significant drop in the “fire performance” of the aircraft carrier. If Gerald R. Ford is expected to provide 160 sorties per day (SGR sustained per day), and from its simplified analogue CVN 8X - 140-160, then from 70 thousandth CVN LX - no more than 80 aircraft sorties per day. Strictly speaking, B. Martin and M. McMahon stipulated that this is a conservative estimate, that is, the number of sorties may turn out to be higher, but in any case, the backlog from the supercarrier will be more than significant. In addition, according to American analysts, the aircraft carrier in 70 000 t. Will be heavily lost to the aircraft carrier in 100 000 t. In terms of aviation fuel stocks, ammunition and the level of structural protection. The reduction in speed from 30 + to 28 knots also attracts attention.
Naturally, the forty-eight-ton CV LX is much more modest - the area of the flight deck will be slightly more than 35% from Gerald R. Ford, the air group - 25-35 aircraft and 50-55 sorties a day maximum. CVN LX also has the lowest speed - 22 node.
But on a small CV EX, the authors of the report did not find an opportunity to place on it more 10 aircraft with the ability to provide flights per day up to 15-20. The speed of the ship will be 28 knots.
And how much will that cost?
As for the relative value of concepts, here, alas, the author brings poor knowledge of English. Apparently, the term “Total recurring ship cost” B. Martin and M. McMahon understand something intermediate between the cost of building a serial ship and the cost of its life cycle. In any case, this “Total recurring ship cost” for ships of the “Gerald R. Ford” type in 2018 g prices is defined in the report as 18 460 million dollars.
As you can see, CVN 8X is almost as good as Gerald R. Ford in terms of its combat potential, but alas, it is also almost as good as the cost - it is defined by the authors of the report in 17 540 million and just 920 million. dollars (less than 5%) below "Ford". Another thing is the seventieth CVN LX - here the savings will be 4 895 million or a little more than 26,5%. However, it should not be forgotten that it will be achieved due to a significant drop in the aircraft carrier’s combat capability, approximately twice as many sorties, as well as a significant reduction in combat reserves and weakening of the structural protection.
But CV LX is a very attractive option from a financial point of view, because its “Total recurring ship cost” is only 4 200 million dollars or less 23% of the cost of an atomic supercarrier. But here B. Martin and M. McMahon remind that in order to compensate for the absence of one Gerald R. Ford, at least two ships of the CV LX type will be required, and most importantly, it is impossible to base DRLO and EW aircraft on them, without which modern air combat is completely unthinkable. Thus, ships of the CV LX type can only be used where they can be adequately supported either by supercarriers or land-based aircraft, that is, their combat potential is significantly limited.
As for CV EX, the verdict of RAND specialists is unequivocal - maybe in some specific cases such ships will be useful, but they cannot replace, or at least act as, a useful addition to supercarriers. But the CVN LX and CV LX with certain reservations can be considered as a direction for further work on a light aircraft carrier.
And what does the US Navy command think about this?
It is, to put it mildly, not happy. The idea of giving up combat potential for the price, for obvious reasons, does not attract admirals at all, but fears that in order to implement the light aircraft carrier construction program will have to reduce the number of heavy ones, they exist and express themselves.
Strictly speaking, given the current state of the US military budget, it is possible to build light aircraft carriers only at the expense of atomic "supers", or at the expense of universal landing ships. Obviously, the first option is not to the sailors' liking, and the second to the marine corps, which has repeatedly raised the issue of the lack of airborne assault vehicles for the scale of amphibious operations expected from them.
And finally
We can only wish the Americans every success in promoting the LAC program and building light aircraft carriers. According to the experience of a number of US military programs, it can be expected that as a result of an attempt to reduce the cost of the US Navy aircraft carrier fleet, ships will receive one and a half times less, two times worse and three times more expensive than existing ones. The author, of course, exaggerates, but in every joke there is some joke, and everything else is true.
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