For the fleet there was not only money. Industrial opportunities - too
Comparing what our fleet could be if the money spent on it were spent wisely (see“There was money for the fleet. They even spent ") willy-nilly have to deal with such an issue as the possibility of industry. Adjacent, manufacturing subsystems for ships - weapon, Radar, sonar systems, engines and so on. It is no secret that the shipyard itself or the shipyard produces mainly the hull. Other enterprises and subcontractors are responsible for its filling.
And here lovers of defending what the Navy has turned into are starting their favorite song: “The industry could not cope. We simply cannot build normal ships, we have to build all sorts of patrol and small rocket ships, otherwise nothing will be built at all! It is necessary to saturate the fleet with at least this! ”This myth has recently wandered around the network, slowly acquiring new supporters who are starting a song about what to build gunboats for 800 tons, or nothing. Industry can not.
In fact, this is not true. Similarly to the fact that supposedly there was no money (and in fact they were, they were spent on various kinds of experiments like “patrol” ships, underfrigate project 20386 and the like - the link was disassembled), the industry was also quite “could”. And more than that - did. Made weapons, radar stations, missile launchers ... engines too, yes. Once again - all this could not simply be produced, it was actually produced. But on the way out it turned out.
Let's deal with the fact that our industry allegedly could not produce.
Let us make a reservation right away - the need to have frigates of projects 11356 and 22350 is not in doubt, we are considering the situation with the ships of the near sea zone. It is also probably worthwhile to acknowledge the meaningful construction of small artillery ships of project 21630 for the Caspian flotilla, and “Tatarstan” with “Dagestan” for her. And also not to doubt that these ships were to be born, and about the same as they appeared. Therefore, we will not “touch” them.
Now we revise everything else.
Let's start with the weapon.
First - the artillery. So, from the beginning of the 2000-ies to date, built or is in completion:
- 20380 corvettes - 8 units (6 is built, 2 is still in the final stage before launching, and 2 still remaining in the building we do not take into account, a lot of them are simply not produced);
- Corsets 20385 - 2 units;
- ROC of the 21631 project - 10 units (7 is built, 3 will be commissioned before the end of 2020 of the year, the rest of the series is not taken into account);
- 22800 project MRK - 5 units (tentatively, 1 is built and delivered, 1 is under test, 1 is in the process afloat, 1 is launched, possibly another 1 ship can be lowered, the rest are not taken into account);
- PC project 22160 - 4 units (2 in the line, 1 launched, 1 will be launched this year, the rest do not take into account).
What can be said about their artillery? And the fact that the ships mentioned are installed or will soon be installed:
- 100-mm guns - 20 units;
- 76 mm guns - 9 units.
Total 29 full ship cannon. Is it a lot or a little? This is one more gun than the main warships (destroyers, frigates, corvettes and patrol ships) of the Italian Navy. It's a lot.
And this is exactly what the industry has given, and not really straining in terms of quantity (although with huge problems in terms of the quality of 100 graph paper. However, they have been solved for today).
Thus, we find that we had enough cannons just to reproduce far from the weakest fleet, and with a margin. If we add to this the possibility of using 76-mm guns, which previously stood on the ships being written off, and remained in good condition (there are many examples), then Italy could and, as they say, “surpass” absolutely unconditionally.
But perhaps the industry could not produce rocket launchers? Well, again we look at the numbers.
The two 20385 project corvettes and the whole brood of the above-mentioned MRCs are the 15 3C-14П vertical launchers. On 8 cruise missiles each. That is, it is the equivalent of 15 20385 corvettes of the missile volley. It is worth noting that no one has ever claimed that there are any problems with the production of this PU. On the same series of 21631 installations come at a good pace, another thing is that there is a simplified version of the UCSC, which is not able to use either PLUR or Onyx, but this would be solved, installations for some other project would be made.
In reality, of course, there are no problems with the production of these PUs. As much as it is necessary, so much will the industry do, however, in terms of installations already manufactured and installed on ships, we have a proven fact that it is very important not to let the defenders of the existing order of things prove that it could not be otherwise.
It couldn’t have happened, but here they are, the 15 launchers, paid for and manufactured, let someone now prove that they too could not be done.
And of course - the launchers of the Uranus complex. In fact, they are certainly not any deficit, especially if you remember how many of them are put on upgraded RTOs, or are being exported ...
For shipboard-based air defense system "Redut" is also quite relevant.
And attempts to accurately assess the production of anti-aircraft 30-mm automatic guns will eventually lead to the same - they could not just be produced in large quantities, they were produced in these quantities and put on a huge number of all sorts of different ships - and not only Russian ones.
In general, we state - there were no problems with artillery guns and rocket launchers - they could be produced in sufficient quantities, moreover, they were produced in these quantities.
But maybe the problem was in anti-submarine weapons? And again, no, the CM-588 PU for the complex. The package is consistently reproduced for the corvettes of the 20380, 20385 project and the frigates of the 22350 project. And, again, there is no evidence that the industry is experiencing difficulties with the production of both the PU itself and the control system.
Here it is necessary to make a reservation - SM-588 is not optimal, as is the placement of 324-mm torpedoes and anti-torpedoes in the WPC with a gas generator, and you need to develop a normal torpedo unit with a torpedo air suspension (clarification - here). Nevertheless, we can fully state the possibility of obtaining at least CM-588 in the right quantities.
What is next? Maybe GAKI and radar?
Nowhere and never have any of the specialists involved in the production have ever stated that there are delays in the hydroacoustic complexes. On the constructed corvettes of the 20380 and 20385 projects there are both bulbic and towed GUS. In total, the 10 units are mentioned in the list, but it is worth remembering that our industry did not really reach the limit of production capabilities in hydroacoustics in post-Soviet times. There is no evidence of this.
The situation is similar with radar. Thus, the IRC of the 22800 project has the Mineral-M complex, designed to detect surface targets, and the first two ships are equipped with a Positiv-MK radar capable of detecting aerial targets. This is not to say that it was the most advanced radar complex, but it is also definitely impossible to call it bad. Let's just say - for the mass ship BMZ it is quite sufficient. In parallel with the installation of the “Positive-MK” radar on the “Karakurt”, another 4 kit has already been mounted or mounted on the 4-s mentioned patrol ships of the 22160 project. Moreover, the production program of these ships speaks eloquently that there are no problems with components for them - they are being built very quickly for Russia. Specifically, the mentioned six "Positives-MK" were produced or are finished produced from the beginning of the year 2014 to the present - more than a set per year. And, given the fact that 22160 continue to be built, the radar will also be produced. So there is power.
But they alone are not limited. Russia has been building a lot of warships since the beginning of the 2000-ies - here and the completion of the 11661 "Tatarstan", and "Dagestan" with its USSC, and export ships for Vietnam, and so on. Naturally, for all these ships, the radar was also produced - “Furke” for corvettes 20380 and radar “Puma” for them, various navigation and artillery radars for ships of other classes, old “Positives” for 21631 and 11661, etc.
Thus, it is worthwhile to state that there were no problems with the radar station - there really wasn’t, they were made, and that would have been done for several other ships too.
What, then, is our industry lacking and lacking for building full-fledged multifunctional ships? Maybe steel? No, this is absolutely the edge, we still have steel in our country. In extreme cases, the Chinese can sell. So what can it not produce?
Maybe it is a pipe? Cable? Paint? Radio stations? Plumbing? Light bulbs? Information display devices any? Furniture? Spotlights?
No.
In fact, we had real problems only with the production of the main power plants - ship engines and gearboxes. But here too, apologists of the opinion “we cannot build anything good, we must build something bad” will have to move forward.
It is necessary to immediately stipulate that. We have problems with the GEM, but they started only in 2014, after the events in Ukraine. Before that, Ukrainian turbines with gearboxes were available, and German MTU diesel engines were easily imported into the country and stood up at the 21631 project's MRCs. And from this follows the conclusion number one - in the presence of a conscious shipbuilding policy, without throwing and rushing from side to side, the ability to get turbines with gearboxes and diesel units were limited only by the industrial capabilities of Ukraine and Germany for their production, and the MO capabilities for their purchase. The Ministry of Defense, by the way, managed to buy twenty MTU 16V4000M90 diesels and install them on five Buyan-M rocket gunboats.
Could and for more serious ships to buy more serious engines, if they had advance warning in advance and they would be where to put them that year in 2011. But they did not join in and did not.
The question of what to buy them was disassembled in the article, the link to which is given above, and, given that the infusion of money into shipbuilding began in 2009, our shipbuilders had almost five years to stock up with the necessary number of ANY foreign engines. It is worth noting that the Ministry of Defense knew about the future financing in advance - there is no such thing that at the end of 2008, you would not plan a budget for 2009. And the money went to 2009.
Of course, then problems would begin with the projects that were made for these engines, but they, firstly, started this way, and secondly, let's also recognize that the active import substitution of Ukrainian equipment for the Russian Armed Forces began long before Maidan. Someone would definitely be worth, for example, not only import-replacing turbines, but also gearboxes. And the Ministry of Industry and Trade’s money is not for dubious projects such as the Pulsar super-motor, which in the end didn’t take off, to start up, but for something more mundane.
Nevertheless, even with all the problems with imports, Russia had another option, and it was even used. We are talking about the Kolomna diesel engines 49-th family. Those who are moving almost everything that we build - and the 22350 frigates on an economic move, and the corvettes 20380 and 20385, and the BDK "Ivan Gren", and the patrolmen 22160 - a lot of things.
We are mainly interested in the 16D49 engine with the 6000 horsepower. and units assembled with it - DDA12000 and DRRA6000.
The first are used in pairs - two units per ship, or four diesel engines and a pair of gearboxes. Such GEM on 24000 HP stand on the corvettes of both projects - 20380 and 20385.
The latter are also used in pairs for the construction of a two-shaft HEV with two units and a total horsepower 12000, taken from two engines. Such installations are serially produced (and very quickly, by the way) for ships of the 22160 project.
What about the type of ships could be built on such energy?
Well, for example, look at the Chinese. Frigates project 054 and its modifications are equipped with diesel GEM based on four SEMT Pielstik diesel engines, with a total power of 25300 hp.
At the same time, the frigates have a displacement of 3900 tons, an air defense missile system, a helicopter, anti-submarine weapons, and are an example of a completely successful, massive ship from a distant maritime zone - sufficiently seaworthy to send it anywhere.
Our units DDA12000, installed by a pair, together give 24000 HP. - comparable figure. If we add to this the magic of the Krylov State Scientific Center, which is quite capable of “playing back” the lack of power, then it turns out that we can build similar ships on “Kolomna” - with our weapons, of course, which is basically (not everything, but alas, generally better than Chinese, like REV and RTV.
If you look at the parameters of "Pilstic" installed on the Chinese, then they are close to ours.
PIELSTICK 16 PA6 V - 280:
Power - 5184 kW
Weight - 30,5 tons
16D49:
Power - 4412 kW
Weight - 26 tons
Our size is a little smaller.
How many such power plants have the industry given to the fleet and is preparing to give right now? That's right - those same 10 kits, and before the 2022 of the year - two more, we did not consider these two ships either in the case of guns or in the case of missiles, but generally speaking they will soon be there.
What about corvettes then? Well, again, look at the Chinese - the project 056.
It cannot be said that this is a very fortunate ship, and, frankly speaking, for our fleet it will be as the English say “downgrade” - a step backwards. But on the other hand, if even then, at the end of 90's, we would have made decisions similar to the Chinese, now we could well have a certain number of quite good diesel frigates, perhaps the same ten, and all of them would carry "Calibers" on board, and diesel corvettes with the same 2DRR6000, apparently with the UCS, apparently compact enough to be built anywhere — on Amur, and in Zelenodolsk — even where. And they, too, would have “Calibers” on board. But, unlike the real-built RTOs, they could also fight with submarines, and performing tasks in the DMZ on a frigate is much more convenient, although in truth, 20380 corvettes also perform them.
At the same time, the speed with which ships of the 22160 project are delivered clearly indicates that there are no special problems with obtaining DRRA6000 units, and if necessary, they can be supplied in significant quantities. The main thing is not to try to move huge barges along 1900 tons with ugly contours, but to use them on appropriate hulls.
Once again - all this is not a call to quit and copy the Chinese bundle 056 + 054 (although it would not be so bad), this is an example of how much we underestimate ourselves.
It is worth noting that the main problem in the production of diesel-diesel units is not how the Kolomna Plant rents engines, but at what speed from two engines and one gearbox (produced in St. Petersburg at Zvezda-reduktur LLC ) complete the ready two-engine DDA12000. Approximately now without a break is a single unit per year. Accordingly, the kit for the corvette 20380 / 20385 or a hypothetical frigate for two.
This roughly corresponds to how many corvettes of 20380 and 20385 projects have received and will receive their GEM from approximately 2012 to 2020 years. Approximately, because the 1-2 kit could still be “accelerated”, but oh well.
What is the reason for such poor performance? First, the Star-Reducer slowly makes gears. Secondly, the diesel-diesel unit is a complex machine and its final assembly and testing are carried out on a special stand. This stand is one.
Let us ask the question - if, when it became clear that funding had appeared, instead of the Pulsar project, would the money be sent, for example, to the second stand? Or instead of one of the ISCs of the 21631 project? In this case, the “bottleneck” of the gear unit would expand to the number of gearboxes that the star-reducer could produce.
Suppose, using different methods, we could have achieved (if there is a second stand) another reducer in two years. This is not to prepare for the Olympics in Sochi, if the state had set such a goal before itself, then it would have achieved it, even though the manufacturer is a private company.
Then, from 2009 to the present, we could still get 5 gearboxes by now, and by the end of 2021 of the year - 6, which would have resulted in three additional GEMs from the DDA2020 pair each by the end of 12000.
These are three additional 20380 or 20385 corvettes.
And if it were possible to “squeeze” from “Star reducer” not one additional reducer in two years, but two additional ones in three?
Then by the year 2022 plus 8 gearboxes. That is, four additional corvette. Now the entire 20380 series will end on 10 units, and the 20385 series will be limited to two more. Total 12 ships to 2022 year.
And it would be 16.
The example of “Russian 054” given above is not entirely honest - we could not order a ship that we never wanted, although it would be better than corvettes.
But something between 20380 and 20385 from the end of 2000-s was quite real. A certain ship with a UKSK and a Redoubt on the stern, like the 20385, but with a simplified REV, similar to the usual 20380 or closer to the radar, for example, to Karakurt, was quite real. And these additional 4 corvettes could well be like that.
Moreover, after the 20380 series has been completed in real life, in some ideal reality these corvettes could have been pawned further.
And if it turned out (and it would have turned out) that the number of carriers of "Caliber" needs to be increased faster, then they could be increased due to simplified corvettes with 2DRRA6000, "Russian 056", unified with 2038X in arms, with the same Kolomna diesel engines , but with two, not four, in a smaller case, without a hangar, without a huge cellar for aviation means of destruction ...
If we are so caught up with the gearboxes, then this was quite a way out, and much better than the narrowly specialized "Buyan-M" with unsuitable for a warship (even such!) Chinese diesel engines, and than "Karakurt", for which there are no engines, and which, because of this, will now be built for five to six years.
This is what reality looks like. We have engines for bigger ships, but not for small things. And take them in the foreseeable future, nowhere. The idea that "we need to set up what we can, otherwise we will remain without ships" is correct. But we can only build ships of a class from a corvette and more, and for every little thing we don’T HAVE ANY ENGINE IN THE NECESSARY QUANTITY, AND WILL NOT BE MANY YEARS, AND THIS IS ALMOST NOT CORRECT.
It looks like the real world. Not the other way around. From this point of view, the continuation of the bookmarks of the same IRAs is pure insanity. No discounts. Why lay the ships doomed for many years to wait for the engines? Money nowhere to put?
Take, for example, the Chinese. They firmly know why the fleet is for them to enforce the interests of China in Africa and other similar places first, and to prevent the blockade of China from the sea second. At the same time, they see the US sea power as their main enemy. Hence, the program for the construction of aircraft carriers, URO ships, the creation of expeditionary amphibious forces, but from here and mass corvettes. The Chinese do not only know what the fleet is for, they also understand that it should be as large as possible, so the “work horses” - the same 056 are specifically made primitive, much simpler than China could build - but there are really a lot of them.
Since the Chinese know what they want, and represent how they can quickly achieve this with their economies, their military shipbuilding has long-term programs for building single-type warships and long typed series. Our fleet does not recognize the last phrase, although it came to that, even the Ministry of Industry and Trade began to hint at the need to reduce the type of warships. Funny, but like this.
In the absence of society, the Ministry of Defense and the Navy understanding of "where to live", the decision-making mechanism regarding the construction of military ships begins to be based on the voluntarism of individual commanders, on their connections in industry and material interest. About this your boring combat capability no one remembers.
At the Zelenodolsk plant, the contracted misunderstandings of 21631 and 22160 projects will soon end. What to load the plant? And now the leadership begins to look for what else to build. And finds support in the Navy, in the person of Rear Admiral V.M. Tryapichnikov, head of the naval shipbuilding department.
Probably, they will decide something with diesel engines - maybe they will increase the ship under 2DRR6000, from 22160, they won't go on Chinese diesel engines, they will not “take out” this combat ship, and Kolomna should be fed up in the conditions of the 20380 series termination, and once "Kolomna", there will be an increase in the ship in size, here and additional PU on the 8 "Caliber" can be added - the same increased ammunition. There is where. And everyone is happy. Zelenodolsk will receive money and work, the population will have the opportunity to throw up their caps in a patriotic frenzy, looking at the new wonder-ship, which already has the 16 Kalibrov, everyone is happy, everyone is happy, done here. Rear Admiral Tryapchnikov also rejoice with everyone.
Experienced "military experts" will explain in the press how great this project is, the non-existing combat capabilities of the supercanonerki will be replaced by tales about all-conquering missiles that can sink an American aircraft carrier thousands of miles away ...
... and so on until the first old foreign submarine, whose crew will receive an order with the word "destroy" and a farewell to their command with the word "sink."
So it works for us.
No goal setting - no fleet. With no industry and no financing. Let small, but we had money for a normal balanced fleet. And let us be modest, but we also had technological opportunities for its construction. The statements reverse to this are not true.
Corvette 20380 could become the main ship of the near sea zone. Now will not become
And here lovers of defending what the Navy has turned into are starting their favorite song: “The industry could not cope. We simply cannot build normal ships, we have to build all sorts of patrol and small rocket ships, otherwise nothing will be built at all! It is necessary to saturate the fleet with at least this! ”This myth has recently wandered around the network, slowly acquiring new supporters who are starting a song about what to build gunboats for 800 tons, or nothing. Industry can not.
In fact, this is not true. Similarly to the fact that supposedly there was no money (and in fact they were, they were spent on various kinds of experiments like “patrol” ships, underfrigate project 20386 and the like - the link was disassembled), the industry was also quite “could”. And more than that - did. Made weapons, radar stations, missile launchers ... engines too, yes. Once again - all this could not simply be produced, it was actually produced. But on the way out it turned out.
Let's deal with the fact that our industry allegedly could not produce.
Let us make a reservation right away - the need to have frigates of projects 11356 and 22350 is not in doubt, we are considering the situation with the ships of the near sea zone. It is also probably worthwhile to acknowledge the meaningful construction of small artillery ships of project 21630 for the Caspian flotilla, and “Tatarstan” with “Dagestan” for her. And also not to doubt that these ships were to be born, and about the same as they appeared. Therefore, we will not “touch” them.
Now we revise everything else.
Weapons and armament
Let's start with the weapon.
First - the artillery. So, from the beginning of the 2000-ies to date, built or is in completion:
- 20380 corvettes - 8 units (6 is built, 2 is still in the final stage before launching, and 2 still remaining in the building we do not take into account, a lot of them are simply not produced);
- Corsets 20385 - 2 units;
- ROC of the 21631 project - 10 units (7 is built, 3 will be commissioned before the end of 2020 of the year, the rest of the series is not taken into account);
- 22800 project MRK - 5 units (tentatively, 1 is built and delivered, 1 is under test, 1 is in the process afloat, 1 is launched, possibly another 1 ship can be lowered, the rest are not taken into account);
- PC project 22160 - 4 units (2 in the line, 1 launched, 1 will be launched this year, the rest do not take into account).
What can be said about their artillery? And the fact that the ships mentioned are installed or will soon be installed:
- 100-mm guns - 20 units;
- 76 mm guns - 9 units.
Total 29 full ship cannon. Is it a lot or a little? This is one more gun than the main warships (destroyers, frigates, corvettes and patrol ships) of the Italian Navy. It's a lot.
And this is exactly what the industry has given, and not really straining in terms of quantity (although with huge problems in terms of the quality of 100 graph paper. However, they have been solved for today).
Thus, we find that we had enough cannons just to reproduce far from the weakest fleet, and with a margin. If we add to this the possibility of using 76-mm guns, which previously stood on the ships being written off, and remained in good condition (there are many examples), then Italy could and, as they say, “surpass” absolutely unconditionally.
But perhaps the industry could not produce rocket launchers? Well, again we look at the numbers.
The two 20385 project corvettes and the whole brood of the above-mentioned MRCs are the 15 3C-14П vertical launchers. On 8 cruise missiles each. That is, it is the equivalent of 15 20385 corvettes of the missile volley. It is worth noting that no one has ever claimed that there are any problems with the production of this PU. On the same series of 21631 installations come at a good pace, another thing is that there is a simplified version of the UCSC, which is not able to use either PLUR or Onyx, but this would be solved, installations for some other project would be made.
In reality, of course, there are no problems with the production of these PUs. As much as it is necessary, so much will the industry do, however, in terms of installations already manufactured and installed on ships, we have a proven fact that it is very important not to let the defenders of the existing order of things prove that it could not be otherwise.
It couldn’t have happened, but here they are, the 15 launchers, paid for and manufactured, let someone now prove that they too could not be done.
And of course - the launchers of the Uranus complex. In fact, they are certainly not any deficit, especially if you remember how many of them are put on upgraded RTOs, or are being exported ...
For shipboard-based air defense system "Redut" is also quite relevant.
And attempts to accurately assess the production of anti-aircraft 30-mm automatic guns will eventually lead to the same - they could not just be produced in large quantities, they were produced in these quantities and put on a huge number of all sorts of different ships - and not only Russian ones.
In general, we state - there were no problems with artillery guns and rocket launchers - they could be produced in sufficient quantities, moreover, they were produced in these quantities.
But maybe the problem was in anti-submarine weapons? And again, no, the CM-588 PU for the complex. The package is consistently reproduced for the corvettes of the 20380, 20385 project and the frigates of the 22350 project. And, again, there is no evidence that the industry is experiencing difficulties with the production of both the PU itself and the control system.
Here it is necessary to make a reservation - SM-588 is not optimal, as is the placement of 324-mm torpedoes and anti-torpedoes in the WPC with a gas generator, and you need to develop a normal torpedo unit with a torpedo air suspension (clarification - here). Nevertheless, we can fully state the possibility of obtaining at least CM-588 in the right quantities.
What is next? Maybe GAKI and radar?
Nowhere and never have any of the specialists involved in the production have ever stated that there are delays in the hydroacoustic complexes. On the constructed corvettes of the 20380 and 20385 projects there are both bulbic and towed GUS. In total, the 10 units are mentioned in the list, but it is worth remembering that our industry did not really reach the limit of production capabilities in hydroacoustics in post-Soviet times. There is no evidence of this.
The situation is similar with radar. Thus, the IRC of the 22800 project has the Mineral-M complex, designed to detect surface targets, and the first two ships are equipped with a Positiv-MK radar capable of detecting aerial targets. This is not to say that it was the most advanced radar complex, but it is also definitely impossible to call it bad. Let's just say - for the mass ship BMZ it is quite sufficient. In parallel with the installation of the “Positive-MK” radar on the “Karakurt”, another 4 kit has already been mounted or mounted on the 4-s mentioned patrol ships of the 22160 project. Moreover, the production program of these ships speaks eloquently that there are no problems with components for them - they are being built very quickly for Russia. Specifically, the mentioned six "Positives-MK" were produced or are finished produced from the beginning of the year 2014 to the present - more than a set per year. And, given the fact that 22160 continue to be built, the radar will also be produced. So there is power.
But they alone are not limited. Russia has been building a lot of warships since the beginning of the 2000-ies - here and the completion of the 11661 "Tatarstan", and "Dagestan" with its USSC, and export ships for Vietnam, and so on. Naturally, for all these ships, the radar was also produced - “Furke” for corvettes 20380 and radar “Puma” for them, various navigation and artillery radars for ships of other classes, old “Positives” for 21631 and 11661, etc.
Thus, it is worthwhile to state that there were no problems with the radar station - there really wasn’t, they were made, and that would have been done for several other ships too.
What, then, is our industry lacking and lacking for building full-fledged multifunctional ships? Maybe steel? No, this is absolutely the edge, we still have steel in our country. In extreme cases, the Chinese can sell. So what can it not produce?
Maybe it is a pipe? Cable? Paint? Radio stations? Plumbing? Light bulbs? Information display devices any? Furniture? Spotlights?
No.
In fact, we had real problems only with the production of the main power plants - ship engines and gearboxes. But here too, apologists of the opinion “we cannot build anything good, we must build something bad” will have to move forward.
Engine issue
It is necessary to immediately stipulate that. We have problems with the GEM, but they started only in 2014, after the events in Ukraine. Before that, Ukrainian turbines with gearboxes were available, and German MTU diesel engines were easily imported into the country and stood up at the 21631 project's MRCs. And from this follows the conclusion number one - in the presence of a conscious shipbuilding policy, without throwing and rushing from side to side, the ability to get turbines with gearboxes and diesel units were limited only by the industrial capabilities of Ukraine and Germany for their production, and the MO capabilities for their purchase. The Ministry of Defense, by the way, managed to buy twenty MTU 16V4000M90 diesels and install them on five Buyan-M rocket gunboats.
Could and for more serious ships to buy more serious engines, if they had advance warning in advance and they would be where to put them that year in 2011. But they did not join in and did not.
The question of what to buy them was disassembled in the article, the link to which is given above, and, given that the infusion of money into shipbuilding began in 2009, our shipbuilders had almost five years to stock up with the necessary number of ANY foreign engines. It is worth noting that the Ministry of Defense knew about the future financing in advance - there is no such thing that at the end of 2008, you would not plan a budget for 2009. And the money went to 2009.
Of course, then problems would begin with the projects that were made for these engines, but they, firstly, started this way, and secondly, let's also recognize that the active import substitution of Ukrainian equipment for the Russian Armed Forces began long before Maidan. Someone would definitely be worth, for example, not only import-replacing turbines, but also gearboxes. And the Ministry of Industry and Trade’s money is not for dubious projects such as the Pulsar super-motor, which in the end didn’t take off, to start up, but for something more mundane.
A good motor could be, but not destiny. State-funded diesel M150 "Pulsar" from the "Stars". The project "did not go," and the money mastered
Nevertheless, even with all the problems with imports, Russia had another option, and it was even used. We are talking about the Kolomna diesel engines 49-th family. Those who are moving almost everything that we build - and the 22350 frigates on an economic move, and the corvettes 20380 and 20385, and the BDK "Ivan Gren", and the patrolmen 22160 - a lot of things.
We are mainly interested in the 16D49 engine with the 6000 horsepower. and units assembled with it - DDA12000 and DRRA6000.
The first are used in pairs - two units per ship, or four diesel engines and a pair of gearboxes. Such GEM on 24000 HP stand on the corvettes of both projects - 20380 and 20385.
Diesel-diesel unit DDA12000 (figures mean power in hp)
And this is their "Spark" - the heart of the corvettes 20380 and 20385. A frigate of such a GEM can also be “moved”
The latter are also used in pairs for the construction of a two-shaft HEV with two units and a total horsepower 12000, taken from two engines. Such installations are serially produced (and very quickly, by the way) for ships of the 22160 project.
What about the type of ships could be built on such energy?
Simple DRRA6000. A couple of these are already normal GEM.
Well, for example, look at the Chinese. Frigates project 054 and its modifications are equipped with diesel GEM based on four SEMT Pielstik diesel engines, with a total power of 25300 hp.
At the same time, the frigates have a displacement of 3900 tons, an air defense missile system, a helicopter, anti-submarine weapons, and are an example of a completely successful, massive ship from a distant maritime zone - sufficiently seaworthy to send it anywhere.
Frigate pr.054
Our units DDA12000, installed by a pair, together give 24000 HP. - comparable figure. If we add to this the magic of the Krylov State Scientific Center, which is quite capable of “playing back” the lack of power, then it turns out that we can build similar ships on “Kolomna” - with our weapons, of course, which is basically (not everything, but alas, generally better than Chinese, like REV and RTV.
If you look at the parameters of "Pilstic" installed on the Chinese, then they are close to ours.
PIELSTICK 16 PA6 V - 280:
Power - 5184 kW
Weight - 30,5 tons
16D49:
Power - 4412 kW
Weight - 26 tons
Our size is a little smaller.
How many such power plants have the industry given to the fleet and is preparing to give right now? That's right - those same 10 kits, and before the 2022 of the year - two more, we did not consider these two ships either in the case of guns or in the case of missiles, but generally speaking they will soon be there.
What about corvettes then? Well, again, look at the Chinese - the project 056.
Corvette Project 056.
It cannot be said that this is a very fortunate ship, and, frankly speaking, for our fleet it will be as the English say “downgrade” - a step backwards. But on the other hand, if even then, at the end of 90's, we would have made decisions similar to the Chinese, now we could well have a certain number of quite good diesel frigates, perhaps the same ten, and all of them would carry "Calibers" on board, and diesel corvettes with the same 2DRR6000, apparently with the UCS, apparently compact enough to be built anywhere — on Amur, and in Zelenodolsk — even where. And they, too, would have “Calibers” on board. But, unlike the real-built RTOs, they could also fight with submarines, and performing tasks in the DMZ on a frigate is much more convenient, although in truth, 20380 corvettes also perform them.
At the same time, the speed with which ships of the 22160 project are delivered clearly indicates that there are no special problems with obtaining DRRA6000 units, and if necessary, they can be supplied in significant quantities. The main thing is not to try to move huge barges along 1900 tons with ugly contours, but to use them on appropriate hulls.
Once again - all this is not a call to quit and copy the Chinese bundle 056 + 054 (although it would not be so bad), this is an example of how much we underestimate ourselves.
It is worth noting that the main problem in the production of diesel-diesel units is not how the Kolomna Plant rents engines, but at what speed from two engines and one gearbox (produced in St. Petersburg at Zvezda-reduktur LLC ) complete the ready two-engine DDA12000. Approximately now without a break is a single unit per year. Accordingly, the kit for the corvette 20380 / 20385 or a hypothetical frigate for two.
This roughly corresponds to how many corvettes of 20380 and 20385 projects have received and will receive their GEM from approximately 2012 to 2020 years. Approximately, because the 1-2 kit could still be “accelerated”, but oh well.
What is the reason for such poor performance? First, the Star-Reducer slowly makes gears. Secondly, the diesel-diesel unit is a complex machine and its final assembly and testing are carried out on a special stand. This stand is one.
Let us ask the question - if, when it became clear that funding had appeared, instead of the Pulsar project, would the money be sent, for example, to the second stand? Or instead of one of the ISCs of the 21631 project? In this case, the “bottleneck” of the gear unit would expand to the number of gearboxes that the star-reducer could produce.
Suppose, using different methods, we could have achieved (if there is a second stand) another reducer in two years. This is not to prepare for the Olympics in Sochi, if the state had set such a goal before itself, then it would have achieved it, even though the manufacturer is a private company.
Then, from 2009 to the present, we could still get 5 gearboxes by now, and by the end of 2021 of the year - 6, which would have resulted in three additional GEMs from the DDA2020 pair each by the end of 12000.
These are three additional 20380 or 20385 corvettes.
And if it were possible to “squeeze” from “Star reducer” not one additional reducer in two years, but two additional ones in three?
Then by the year 2022 plus 8 gearboxes. That is, four additional corvette. Now the entire 20380 series will end on 10 units, and the 20385 series will be limited to two more. Total 12 ships to 2022 year.
And it would be 16.
The example of “Russian 054” given above is not entirely honest - we could not order a ship that we never wanted, although it would be better than corvettes.
But something between 20380 and 20385 from the end of 2000-s was quite real. A certain ship with a UKSK and a Redoubt on the stern, like the 20385, but with a simplified REV, similar to the usual 20380 or closer to the radar, for example, to Karakurt, was quite real. And these additional 4 corvettes could well be like that.
Moreover, after the 20380 series has been completed in real life, in some ideal reality these corvettes could have been pawned further.
And if it turned out (and it would have turned out) that the number of carriers of "Caliber" needs to be increased faster, then they could be increased due to simplified corvettes with 2DRRA6000, "Russian 056", unified with 2038X in arms, with the same Kolomna diesel engines , but with two, not four, in a smaller case, without a hangar, without a huge cellar for aviation means of destruction ...
If we are so caught up with the gearboxes, then this was quite a way out, and much better than the narrowly specialized "Buyan-M" with unsuitable for a warship (even such!) Chinese diesel engines, and than "Karakurt", for which there are no engines, and which, because of this, will now be built for five to six years.
This is what reality looks like. We have engines for bigger ships, but not for small things. And take them in the foreseeable future, nowhere. The idea that "we need to set up what we can, otherwise we will remain without ships" is correct. But we can only build ships of a class from a corvette and more, and for every little thing we don’T HAVE ANY ENGINE IN THE NECESSARY QUANTITY, AND WILL NOT BE MANY YEARS, AND THIS IS ALMOST NOT CORRECT.
It looks like the real world. Not the other way around. From this point of view, the continuation of the bookmarks of the same IRAs is pure insanity. No discounts. Why lay the ships doomed for many years to wait for the engines? Money nowhere to put?
Why is this so?
Take, for example, the Chinese. They firmly know why the fleet is for them to enforce the interests of China in Africa and other similar places first, and to prevent the blockade of China from the sea second. At the same time, they see the US sea power as their main enemy. Hence, the program for the construction of aircraft carriers, URO ships, the creation of expeditionary amphibious forces, but from here and mass corvettes. The Chinese do not only know what the fleet is for, they also understand that it should be as large as possible, so the “work horses” - the same 056 are specifically made primitive, much simpler than China could build - but there are really a lot of them.
Since the Chinese know what they want, and represent how they can quickly achieve this with their economies, their military shipbuilding has long-term programs for building single-type warships and long typed series. Our fleet does not recognize the last phrase, although it came to that, even the Ministry of Industry and Trade began to hint at the need to reduce the type of warships. Funny, but like this.
In the absence of society, the Ministry of Defense and the Navy understanding of "where to live", the decision-making mechanism regarding the construction of military ships begins to be based on the voluntarism of individual commanders, on their connections in industry and material interest. About this your boring combat capability no one remembers.
Example
At the Zelenodolsk plant, the contracted misunderstandings of 21631 and 22160 projects will soon end. What to load the plant? And now the leadership begins to look for what else to build. And finds support in the Navy, in the person of Rear Admiral V.M. Tryapichnikov, head of the naval shipbuilding department.
Vladimir Tryapichnikov, head of the shipbuilding department of the Russian Navy, expressed hope that in 2024 the construction of the upgraded ships of the 21631 project will begin.
According to Tryapichnikov, the upgraded ships of the 21631 project will receive increased ammunition.
www.tvzvezda.ru
According to Tryapichnikov, the upgraded ships of the 21631 project will receive increased ammunition.
www.tvzvezda.ru
Probably, they will decide something with diesel engines - maybe they will increase the ship under 2DRR6000, from 22160, they won't go on Chinese diesel engines, they will not “take out” this combat ship, and Kolomna should be fed up in the conditions of the 20380 series termination, and once "Kolomna", there will be an increase in the ship in size, here and additional PU on the 8 "Caliber" can be added - the same increased ammunition. There is where. And everyone is happy. Zelenodolsk will receive money and work, the population will have the opportunity to throw up their caps in a patriotic frenzy, looking at the new wonder-ship, which already has the 16 Kalibrov, everyone is happy, everyone is happy, done here. Rear Admiral Tryapchnikov also rejoice with everyone.
Experienced "military experts" will explain in the press how great this project is, the non-existing combat capabilities of the supercanonerki will be replaced by tales about all-conquering missiles that can sink an American aircraft carrier thousands of miles away ...
... and so on until the first old foreign submarine, whose crew will receive an order with the word "destroy" and a farewell to their command with the word "sink."
So it works for us.
No goal setting - no fleet. With no industry and no financing. Let small, but we had money for a normal balanced fleet. And let us be modest, but we also had technological opportunities for its construction. The statements reverse to this are not true.
- Alexander Timokhin
- tvzvezda.ru, press service of PJSC "Zvezda", JSC "Kolomna Plant". janes.com, zonwar.ru
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