BMP-1. Tank landing
I will say once again that armored vehicles and, in general, any weapon created under a certain tactic. The BMP-1 is one of the brightest examples of the armored vehicle’s specialization for a very specific tactic. Only, that's bad luck, this tactic is little known. Famous article on "BO" 2012, Oleg Kaptsov "Landing on armor. Why no one trusts domestic BMP?" opens with a statement by the Chief of General Staff, Army General N.Ye. Makarova: "BMD-4 is a version of the BMP-3, no protection, again everything is at the top, and it costs more than a tank." Very, I must say, speaking statement. “Again, everything is above” - Army General N.E. Makarov sees this as a flaw. Meanwhile, this is a tactic, and a completely certain kind of tactic.
What are the advantages of a tank amphibious landing party?
Not long ago, I read the memoirs of E.I. Bessonova "To Berlin!". These are memoirs of a platoon / company commander from the 49-th mechanized brigade, 4-th tank army. Why platoon / company? Because Bessonov was a platoon commander, but he almost always commanded the entire company, since the company commander appeared and disappeared in a completely unpredictable way, but for some reason he was not appointed as company himself.
Memoirs are good. The author had a tenacious memory, a good syllable and the ability to tell interestingly. The most interesting thing in the other: Bessonov commanded a tank descent, infantry units, planted on tanks that were part of the breakthrough defense and rushed forward, tearing off the enemy’s rear. In this capacity, he passed from Lvov to Berlin, in almost continuous battles, and was a lucky and lucky commander; only once was seriously injured. In his memoirs he, using the example of a number of episodes, he described in detail the tactics of a tank amphibious assault ship and its features.
In general, the task of the tank landing force was to move forward, in a certain direction, as soon as possible, to advance along settlements, important roads, bridges, as well as destroying enemy barriers, columns and troops. Bessonov most often acted on the edge of this movement, 5-7 km ahead of his mechbrigade, and had to clear the way for the main forces of the mehbrigade and prevent its opponent from intercepting. By virtue of this circumstance, defensive tasks were sometimes set for him.
In my opinion, these memoirs are very important for understanding tank amphibious tactics and understanding why motorized infantry have since preferred to ride armor rather than in the troop compartment.
Thinking over this article, I encountered the difficulty of explaining the difference between motorized infantry riding on tanks and armored personnel carriers. She was clearly and well felt in Bessonov’s memoirs, but he does not give her a definition due to the self-evidentness of this moment for himself. At first glance, it seems that the BTR is better than a tank, but the fighters of the tank assault commander of the 49 mehbrigade did not think so, and preferred the T-34. When they were given the EC-2, they liked it more: a wider feed - it is more convenient to sit and a gun. 122-mm gun - it was an argument. Bessonov described how in one of the not-too-successful attacks, tankmen came to their aid and their IP-2 with one projectile struck two German assault guns at once. “I have never seen such a miracle,” wrote Bessonov.
Reviewing the descriptions of fights in Bessonov’s memoirs, I came to the conclusion that the tank had three important advantages for the motorized infantry over any armored personnel carrier, even over Sd Kfz 251.
First, the ability to instantly jump off the tank. Many fights began like this. They drove along the road, then they were fired at with a rifle and machine-gun fire, the infantry jumped from the tanks and turned into a chain. The fighters specially trained and knew how to jump on the move, jumped in different directions, so that the chain was obtained by itself. From the BTR so not jump out. The exit of ten people from the same German Sd Kfz 251 takes much longer, and the soldiers inevitably pile up for a while behind the machine, where they can be mowed by a successful machine-gun line, where they can be hit with a mortar bomb or even a hand grenade. An APC for landing soldiers must stop, that is, become a target. Then, even when the shell hit the tank, the infantry had the opportunity to jump and run. If a shell hit an armored troop carrier with infantry, it almost always led to the death of most soldiers or even all.
Secondly, the fighters rode in a tank, sitting along the sides behind the turret or, sometimes, in front of it, carrying a weapon (there was no other way, there were no fastenings for a tank descendant on the tank). The tank usually drove a 7-8 man, and this meant that the crew of the tank received observers who saw everything that was happening around. This is an important point. The survey from the tank (and any other armored vehicles) was bad, and the tankers saw farther and better than the tankers, why they noticed an ambush or faunters before. Next butt on armor to warn tank crews, jump to the ground and fire. In the APC, the soldiers sat inside, their backs to the sides, and, of course, could not see anything. On the armored personnel carrier only the gunner could observe, sometimes the soldiers could get up on the seat and look over the sides. But in this case, the review was worse than that of a tank landing ship.
Thirdly, tank paratroopers could shoot directly from armor if they saw an enemy nearby. Bessonov writes that they very often fought such battles, without leaving the tanks, with all the firepower of the unit planted on the tank. They were jumping at the speed of the street, on the move shelling the enemy, caught off guard. This was done more often at night — a favorite time for a tank descent. If they saw that the enemy was strong, had fortified positions, armored vehicles, or opened heavy fire, then the paratroopers dismounted and fought a normal infantry battle with the support of tanks. In the BTR, the use of weapons by the troops was significantly limited. Of course, you could get up on the seat and shoot over the side, but much less convenient, especially in motion. When they left the APC, the soldiers stopped firing, self-suppression of the fire occurred, which gave an advantage to the enemy.
It was precisely because of the opportunity to see, shoot and jump, the tank amphibious soldiers drove a tank and did not try to change it to an armored personnel carrier. If we formulate the main difference between the tank landing and the armored personnel carrier, then it consists of the following. In the tank desmants, the fighter at any time could actively participate in the battle. In the APC, the soldiers were targets for some time, unable to participate in the battle. As long as the BTR stops, until the doors are opened, until everyone leaves, runs and turns into a chain - how long will it take? A minute or so. During this time they will have time to riddle.
The BTR in its classic German version (there were similar samples in the USSR) is suitable against a weak and little-initiative opponent with rifles alone. Then the armor protects from bullets, the machine gun suppresses the enemy, the infantry gets out, turns into a chain and completes the attack. Under such tactics of battle and such an opponent, he was created.
If the enemy has large-caliber machine guns, cannons and tanks, and he is engaged in an evil and energetic battle, then the BTR is the target. At a distance of infantry dismounting, the armored personnel carrier will be in the reach of these guns and tanks, and thin armor will not protect it. If the infantry landed earlier, then he and armor is not needed. Armor against an armed and decisive opponent is a very conditional defense. The Germans in the middle of the war understood this, and therefore used the Sd Kfz 251 as a passable truck and mobile firing point armed with a machine gun, sometimes flamethrower or even missiles.
Tanko and BMP-1
In my opinion, the BMP-1 inherited precisely the tactics of the tank amphibian, and adapted to it. Therefore, the motorized infantry had to regularly ride from above, while the troop compartment was only a temporary shelter, when the enemy defense broke through with a nuclear strike, and the armor was under the nuclear fungus.
In order to sit out the shock wave of a nuclear explosion, it was enough to shelter from penetrating radiation, and then to travel in a cloud of radioactive dust, a close and low troop compartment of the BMP-1. Fighting in the zone of a nuclear explosion could be (for which the troop compartment was equipped with surveillance devices and embrasures for firing), but with a low probability. Then, as already mentioned, the tanks were supposed to finish off everything that had survived the nuclear strike.
But the war did not end there, but on the contrary, entered its most rollicking phase. After breaking through the defenses or destroying the enemy grouping blocking the road, the Soviet troops entered the operational space of the enemy rear. Here, they faced the tasks exactly the same as those of the tank amphibious war: go ahead, shoot down barriers, destroy enemy troops, seize bridges, towns, cities. After the passage of the nuclear explosion zone, the BMP-1 was driven into the nearest river or lake, poured with water to wash away the radioactive dust, then the motorized infantry sat on the armor and rushed forward.
The BMP-1 was much more comfortable for tank descent than the T-34. First, the almost flat roof of the hull and the small height of the car; more comfortable to sit and easier to jump. Secondly, the buoyancy saved the riflemen from having to search for transport means and allowed them to cross rivers and canals in any convenient place. The tank commander did not have this, and therefore was sometimes forced to bathe, and one of the EC-2 Bessonov fighters drowned at the crossing and could not get it. Third, the troop compartment.
This is what the tankers of the war did not have, it was the airborne unit of the BMP-1. That was a real blessing. In it it was possible to sleep parts of fighters in shifts and to the commander. Bessonov writes that when he fought 200 km across Poland and Germany, his sleep fell from his feet all the time. At night, he climbed to the stern of the tank, lay down between the fighters and slept. Several times he slept through fleeting night fights in motion. The ability to sleep dramatically improves combat capability, especially to sleep in a warm, relatively comfortable and safe place.
Further, in Germany it is not uncommon cold and wet weather, with rain or sleet. In the troop compartment, you can also shift and dry in shifts. In a long, multi-day offensive almost non-stop, with frequent dismounting for battle, crawling through mud and snow, such an opportunity would be very valuable.
In the troop compartment can also accommodate the wounded, especially heavy. There were many wounded in the tank desmants. Bessonov writes that the losses due to the almost continuous battles were high. After the raid in the company of 100, 23 was left. On average, every three kilometers of movement were treated wounded or killed. The fact that the BMP-1 could carry the wounded in the troop compartment was very valuable for its quality. An extra chance to survive.
So, speaking of the BMP-1, you should always remember that this model was created under a certain tactic, under a certain enemy and certain typical combat conditions. These conditions should have been realized in a war, which, fortunately, did not happen.
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