Military Review

Moscow campaign army Denikin

Smoot. 1919 year. 100 years ago, in May — July of 1919, the Moscow march of Denikin’s army began. By the beginning of June, the White Guards captured the Donbas, June 24 - took Kharkov, June 27 - Ekaterinoslav, June June 30 - Tsaritsyn. 3 July 1919, Denikin signed the Moscow directive, in which he set the task to take Moscow.

Moscow campaign army Denikin

Denikin and Wrangel at the parade in Tsaritsyn after it was captured by the troops of Vyvur

May battle on Manych and Sala

In 17 on May 1919, the strategic offensive of the Armed Forces of South Russia under the command of Denikin began with the aim of defeating the Southern Front of the Red Army under Gittis. In the middle of May 1919, the troops of the Southern Red Front (2-I Ukrainian Army, 13-I, 8-I, 9-I and 10-I armies) launched an offensive in the Donbass, on the rivers Seversky Donets and Manych. As a result, a fierce oncoming battle took place.

The Red Command delivered the main blow to Rostov-on-Don, in the direction of which two converging blows were struck. The 10-I army of Egorov was advancing from the east, which stood on the Manych and deeply broke through, was in 80 km from Rostov. From the west came the forces of the 8, 13 and 2 of the Ukrainian armies. The Reds had a significant advantage in strength and resources. So, in the Luhansk direction, where the main attack was struck, the reds exceeded the number of whites in 6 times.

The battle began on the eastern sector of the Southern Front, on the Manych. The main forces of the 10 Army of Egorov forced the Manych, the 4 Cavalry Division of Budyonny on the right flank captured the village of Olginskaya and Grabyevskaya. Red cavalry was preparing to break through to the enemy's rear. However, at the same time, the white command prepared its counter-strike. Denikin personally supervised the operation. A strike force led Wrangel. For flank attacks were concentrated Kuban corps Ulagay and Pokrovsky. In the center of the Reds, the infantry corps of Kutepov met.

As a result, the main forces of the army of Egorov were connected by frontal battles with white infantry, and on the flanks of the Kuban cavalry made a roundabout maneuver. The division of Budyonny was defeated in a fierce battle with Pokrovsky's cavalry. However, the Budennovists were able to cover the retreat for the Manych 37 and 39 of the red divisions. On the left flank of the 10 Army, the situation was even worse. The Corps of Ulagaya in the stubborn battles of Priyutny, Repair, and Grabievsky defeated the Steppe Group of the 10 Army (32-Infantry and 6-I Cavalry Divisions). Reds were cut off from the main forces and suffered heavy losses. Egorov threw from the Grand Duke against Ulagaya selective red cavalry under the command of Dumenko. May 17 near Grabbevskoy there was a head-on battle, after a fierce battle Ulagay defeated Dumenko's cavalry, which retreated to the west. After the success on the flanks, Wrangel attacked in the center and defeated red in a three-day battle near the Grand Duke's.

By May 20, the heavily drained Egorov divisions were able to unite at Repair. Having gathered all the troops together, Yegorov decided to give White one more battle. The cavalry divisions (4-i and 6-i) were united in the Cavalry Corps under the command of Dumenko (the core of the future famous 1-th Cavalry Army). 25 May began a new oncoming battle on the Sal River. The fight was extremely stubborn and fierce. Suffice it to say that on the same day the best commanders of the Reds were knocked out — Egorov himself, Dumenko, and two divisional divisions were seriously injured. As a result, the Red troops again suffered a heavy defeat and were pursued by the army of Wrangel, began to roll back to Tsaritsyn. At this time, striking at the junction of the 9 th Red Army, broke the front of the white-horse cavalry of Mamontov.

Thus, the 10 army was defeated in the Manych battle and on the Sal river, suffered heavy losses and retreated towards Tsaritsyn. The Manych White Front was named the Caucasian Army under Wrangel and launched an offensive against Tsaritsyn. The troops of the former Caucasian Volunteer Army were called the Volunteer Army. It was led by General May-Mayevsky.

Map source:

White victory in the Donbas

At the same time, the White Guards won in the Donetsk direction. On May 17, 1919, the Reds, having concentrated the forces of three armies and reinforced by units from the Crimea, went on a general offensive. The greatest success was achieved by the Makhnovists who were advancing on the southern, coastal sector of the front. They occupied Mariupol, Volnovakha, broke far ahead to the station Kuteinikovo, north of Taganrog. The May-Mayevsky volunteer army was inferior to the enemy in numbers, but this inequality was somewhat smoothed out by the fact that the most selected parts of the White Guards fought here - Markov, Drozdov, Kornilov. Kutepov’s army corps reinforced with other units. The corps was given the first and only British detachment in the White Army tanks. True, their value should not be exaggerated. Tanks then had many restrictions, so they could only go on flat terrain and for a short distance. For their further use, special railway platforms and loading and unloading facilities were required. Therefore, in the Russian civil war, they were rather psychological weaponsthan martial. Armored trains were much safer, more efficient, faster and more maneuverable.

The Reds had complete superiority in forces and assets, any attempt to conduct positional defense on the huge 400-kilometer front for White was doomed to defeat. The only hope for success was a sudden attack. 19 May 1919, the corps of Kutepov struck at the junction of the troops of Makhno and the 13 of the Red Army. The effect exceeded all expectations. The Reds were not ready for such a development of the situation and began to retreat. Taking advantage of the first success, the White Guards threw a tank detachment into the attack. Their appearance caused a great psychological effect, panic.

Later, in order to justify the defeat, Makhnovists were accused of everything. Like, they betrayed, opened the front. Trotskyf accused Makhno of the collapse of the front. The Makhnovists, on the other hand, blamed the Reds, allegedly opening the front for Denikin to destroy the rebels. In fact, there was no betrayal. White’s counterstrike was unexpected for the Reds, who were confident of their superiority. In addition, the red command at this time carried out a regrouping of forces here, taking the units infected with the anarchy to the rear, replacing them with others. But the Makhnovists had the greatest success here, bursting forward. This success was not yet consolidated and White was able to strike at the joint, under the base of the ledge. As a result, the new parts of the Reds, among which were many undecided recruits, mixed up. Ran parts decomposed Makhnovshchina. More robust, combat-ready units (2 International Regiment, Voronezh and Jewish Communist Regiments, Special Regiment, etc.) fell under a general wave of confusion and panic, and also mixed.

By 23 May 1919, a gap was made in 100 kilometers. May-Mayevsky threw the 3 th Kuban Horse Body Corps into it. The Makhnovists, who were threatened by the encirclement, also ran. Their retreating units were met with cavalry Shkuro and were defeated in three-day battles. White cavalry rapidly developed the offensive in Tavria, moved to the Dnieper, cutting off the Crimean grouping of the Reds. Kutepov's corps, defeating the Reds under the Grishino station, attacked the Red Army 13 from the flank. It was already a disaster. The red front was falling apart, I had to leave Lugansk. 13-I army fled, the soldiers rallied and deserted in whole units. The White Guards came to Bakhmut, began to develop an offensive along the Seversky Donets, on Slavyansk, Raisin and Kharkov.

Thus, Denikin’s army also launched a counter-offensive on the western flank, defeated the enemy for several days, and again captured the Yuzovski and Mariupol regions. White began to develop an offensive on the Kharkov direction. The Red Army suffered a heavy defeat, lost thousands of fighters, a large number of weapons. The rebel army of Makhno also suffered heavy losses, again came into conflict with the Bolsheviks, but at the same time the Makhnovists remained white enemies.

The commander of the 1 Army Corps, General A.P. Kutepov, with flowers in the newly taken Kharkov. June 1919 of the year

Strategic turn in favor of the White Army

As a result, in May, the 1919 of the year on the southern front from the Caspian Sea to the Donets and from the Donets to the Azov and the Black Sea came a strategic turnaround in favor of the Denikin army. The strike forces of the Reds on the flanks of the Southern Front suffered a heavy defeat, retreating. The White Guards launched a decisive offensive. White troops from the North Caucasus attacked Astrakhan, the Caucasian army - on the Tsaritsa direction, the Don army - on the Voronezh, the Povorino-Liski line, the Volunteer army - on the Kharkov direction and to the lower reaches of the Dnieper, the 3-I army corps, attacking from Ak-Monai positions, was supposed to free from the red Crimea.

The position of the Red armies of the Southern Front was complicated by the disintegration of the troops in Little Russia, which in many ways were formed from the Little Russian insurgent detachments. Former rebels had low discipline, politically often leaning toward the Social Revolutionaries, Petliurists, anarchists, or were outspoken bandits. Their commanders, chieftains and bats, were unreliable, accustomed to anarchy, unlimited personal power, “flexible” politics ”- were transferred from camp to camp.

At the same time, the peasant war continued, its new stage began, connected with the tight food policy of the Bolsheviks — the food dictatorship, the surplus, the food detachments. Throughout Little Russia, insurgent detachments led by atamans, who did not recognize any authority, continued to walk. For example, in Tripoli, until June 1919, the ataman Zeleny (Daniel Terpilo) hosted.

The rear of the Red Army was destabilized by a major uprising of the Don Cossacks - the Veshensky uprising and the rebellion of ataman Grigoriev in Little Russia. In May 1919, Novorossia was shocked by the Grigoriev revolt (How did the uprising of ataman Grigoriev; Nikifor Grigoriev, "ataman of the rebel forces of Kherson region, Zaporizhia and Tavria"; Odessa operation ataman Grigoriev; Uprising in the Ukraine. How failed the “Blitzkrieg” of Grigorievka). At the first stage of the uprising, the Grigorievtsy captured Elisavetgrad, Krivoi Rog, Yekaterinoslav, Kremenchug, Cherkasy, Uman, Kherson and Nikolaev. Grigorievtsy threatened Kiev. The local red garrisons en masse went over to the insurgents. The reserves of the Southern Front, reinforcements from the central part of Russia, were thrown into battle against the Grigorievs. The insurgency was quickly suppressed, which was due to the weakness of the rebel command and their low combat capability. Grigoriev's gangs, spoiled by easy victories (including the troops of the Entente in Odessa) and permissiveness, degenerated into hordes of robbers and murderers, who massacred Jews and "outsiders from the North" by thousands. Therefore, Voroshilov, who led the Kharkov district, and began the offensive from Kiev, Poltava and Odessa, easily dispersed Grigoriev's gangs. Grigorievtsy, who are accustomed to being afraid of everyone and running in front of them, did not withstand a proper fight with motivated, staunch Soviet units. With Grigorievshchina finished in two weeks.

Large gangs broke up into small squads and groups and were predatory even before July of the 1919 year. Thus, the Grigoriev uprising was quickly suppressed, but it distracted the large forces of the Red Army at the time of the decisive battle on the Southern Front, which contributed to the victory of the White Army in southern Russia.

Also, the Bolshevik conflict with the Makhnovists contributed to the failure of the Red Army on the western flank of the Southern Front. Makhno and his commanders controlled a huge area (72 volunteers of Ekaterinoslav and Tauride provinces) with 2 million population, not allowing the Bolsheviks there. "Capital" Makhno was in Gulyay-Polya. Makhno's "brigade" was as large as an entire army. In words, Makhno submitted to the red command, in fact, he maintained independence and independence. In fact, Makhno created the core of the anarchist "state in the state." In April, the local 3 Congress proclaimed an anarchist platform, refused to recognize the dictatorship of one Bolshevik party, and opposed the policy of war communism.

For some time the conflict was restrained by the presence of a common enemy - the whites. Therefore, the first attempts of the red command to restore order among the Makhnovists, to disband part of the troops, did not lead to success. The commander of the Ukrainian front, Antonov-Ovseenko, held a meeting with Makhno in Gulyai-Polya at the end of April. The most pressing issues were resolved. However, the Makhnovist freemen was a strong corrupting factor with which the red military-political leadership could not come to terms. Discipline in the parts adjacent to the Makhnovists fell, the Red Army soldiers deserted en masse to Makhno. In response, the red command stopped supplying Makhnovists with weapons and ammunition. At the junction of the 13 th Red Army with the 2-Ukrainian army, which included the Makhno detachments, began to transfer the most reliable communist, internationalist troops, the Cheka detachments. There were clashes between them and the Makhnovists.

Makhno did not support the uprising of Grigoriev, his commanders were unhappy with the actions of Grigorievka (pogroms, massacre of Jews). However, Makhno put the responsibility for the uprising not only on Grigoriev, but also on the Soviet power. As a result, on May 25, the Council of Ukraine’s Defense, at the direction of Lenin and Trotsky, decided to “eliminate Makhnovshchina in a short time”. After the uprising Grigoriev in Little Russia, they stopped betting on the "Ukrainization" of the army. Purged military command. By order of 4 June 1919, the Ukrainian front and the Ukrainian Soviet armies were disbanded. Thus, the 2-I Ukrainian army was transformed into the 14-th army of the Red Army and retained as part of the Southern Front. 14 th army led Voroshilov. On June 6, Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council Trotsky issued an order in which he outlawed the head of the 7-th Ukrainian Soviet Division, “for the collapse of the front and disobeying the command”. Several commanders of the Makhnovist detachments were shot. Part of the Makhnovists continued to fight as part of the Red Army.

Makhno with the other part of the troops broke off relations with the Bolsheviks, retreated to Kherson province, entered into a temporary alliance with Grigoriev (as a result, he was shot for trying to go over to the whites), and continued the war with the whites. Makhno led the Revolutionary Military Council of the united Revolutionary Rebel Army of Ukraine (RPAU), and when Denikin’s army launched an offensive against Moscow, again formed an alliance with the Reds, began a large-scale partisan war in the rear of Denikin’s army.

Rebel leaders in 1919 year (left to right): S. Karetnik, N. Makhno, F. Schus. Source:

To be continued ...
Articles from this series:
Smoot. 1919 year

How the British created the Armed Forces of the South of Russia
How to restore Soviet power in Ukraine
How Petliurists led Little Russia to a complete catastrophe
How defeated Petliurism
Give the boundaries of 1772 of the year!
Battle for the North Caucasus. How to suppress the Terek Uprising
Battle for the North Caucasus. CH 2. December battle
Battle for the North Caucasus. CH 3. The January accident of the 11 Army
Battle for the North Caucasus. CH 4. How the 11 army died
Battle for the North Caucasus. CH 5. Capture of Kizlyar and the Terrible
Battle for the North Caucasus. CH 6. Furious assault of Vladikavkaz
How Georgia tried to seize Sochi
How the Whites crushed the Georgian invaders
The war of February and October as a confrontation between two civilization projects
How did the "Flight to the Volga"
How Kolchak's army broke through to the Volga
Catastrophe of the Don Cossacks
Verkhniyon uprising
How "Great Finland" planned to seize Petrograd
"All to fight with Kolchak!"
Frunze. Red Napoleon
The missed opportunities of the army of Kolchak
May offensive of the Northern Corps
How white broke through to Petrograd
Battle for the South of Russia
Strategic change on the southern front. Manych operation
Crimea on fire Russian distemper
Crimea in 1918-1919. Intervents, local authorities and whites
How did the uprising of ataman Grigoriev
Nikifor Grigoriev, "ataman of the rebel forces of Kherson region, Zaporizhia and Tavria"
Odessa operation ataman Grigoriev
Uprising in the Ukraine. How failed the “Blitzkrieg” of Grigorievka
Ufa operation. How were defeated the best parts of the army of Kolchak

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  1. Comrade
    Comrade 2 July 2019 05: 13
    Thank you, Alexander, it was very interesting to read.
    It would be good if such articles, if possible, provide at least estimates on the quantitative composition of the warring parties.
    If memory serves, in the book by Yu. Pilsudski "1920. Soviet-Polish War" it is said that the "army" of Petliura, which joined the Poles during the latter's campaign against Kiev, numbered about five to six thousand people.
  2. 210ox
    210ox 2 July 2019 06: 02
    Despite the success of the White Guards, they simply did not have enough reserves. Literally six months later, the situation changed dramatically.
    1. Sugar Honeyovich
      Sugar Honeyovich 2 July 2019 15: 00
      Why did it happen?
      Maybe that's why:
      “We moved across Russia, it was our Motherland, however, leaving the Donetsk basin, we could not get rid of the strange feeling that we were entering some foreign country. The irreconcilable difference of worldviews affected. During many months of the winter struggle, we were like - they got used to the idea that there, behind the red front, there is not real Russia "(BA Shteifon).

      "The liberation of vast areas by us was to cause a popular upsurge, an uprising of all elements hostile to Soviet power, not only strengthening the ranks, but also the moral strengthening of the white armies. The only question was whether the popular masses had sufficiently outlived Bolshevism and whether the will to Will the people go with us or will they still remain inert and passive between two oncoming waves, between two deadly hostile camps.
      Due to a number of complex reasons, spontaneous and dependent on us, life gave an answer at first indecisive, then negative "(AI Denikin)

      "-Well, it's good that we did not take Moscow, they would sweep us out of there with a broom, - this is how Ignatius, the wounded pioneer seven times, finished his story ..." (A.R. Trushnovich
  3. Same lech
    Same lech 2 July 2019 06: 43
    What can I say Civil war is in full swing ... a war to deplete Russia's resources.
  4. Moskovit
    Moskovit 2 July 2019 08: 05
    Bitterly read these lines ... The Russians killed the Russians ... But the truth then was on the side of the Red Army. So as not to write Olgovich now)).
    1. Ingvar 72
      Ingvar 72 2 July 2019 16: 54
      Quote: Moskovit
      But the truth then was on the side of the Red Army.
      Controversial. Trotsky's raids on the armored train do not fit into this "truth."
      1. Moskovit
        Moskovit 2 July 2019 17: 32
        And that thanks to the armored train of Trotsky won the Civil? It is time to calmly admit that the majority of Russia supported the Bolsheviks then. Despite foreign intervention.
        1. Ingvar 72
          Ingvar 72 2 July 2019 17: 34
          Quote: Moskovit
          that the majority of Russia supported the Bolsheviks then.

          Many later regretted it. Later we know about them from the "kulak" uprisings.
          1. Moskovit
            Moskovit 2 July 2019 17: 43
            It was after ...
            1. Ingvar 72
              Ingvar 72 2 July 2019 17: 50
              Quote: Moskovit
              It was after ...

              There is such a term - a causal relationship. wink
          2. naidas
            naidas 8 July 2019 15: 29
            By 1927, the stratification of the kulaks (5% of the peasantry) and the poor (7% of the landless, 35% of the "uninventory") led to the refusal of stronger kulaks to sell bread.
            I wonder what you offer?
            Leave as it is, by 1927, already about half of the households lost their land or hired on their own, leaving only a part for themselves.
            For example, the Bolsheviks proposed collective and state farms.
        2. RUSS
          RUSS 3 July 2019 08: 32
          Quote: Moskovit
          It's time to calmly admit that the majority of Russia supported the Bolsheviks then

          Absolutely not true
          1. Moskovit
            Moskovit 3 July 2019 09: 03
            You so confidently declare about it as if you lived at that time. We see that the Bolsheviks, relying on the support of the masses, defeated the white movement, expelled them, well, of course, there was political maneuvering and pan-European tiredness from the war and the interventionists. They built a state. How can this be done without the support of the people?
            What happened next is another question.
          2. Sugar Honeyovich
            Sugar Honeyovich 3 July 2019 15: 07
            Quote: RUSS
            Absolutely not true

            But this is claimed by both red and white.
  5. bober1982
    bober1982 2 July 2019 09: 24
    The Moscow campaign of Denikin’s army was a gross mistake and a miscalculation of the general himself; there was no chance of taking Moscow, which is what Wrangel pointed out rightly afterwards.
    There were not enough forces, there were no reserves, there was chaos in the rear - all these unreliable rebels, with the Poles failed and did not want to agree. The result is logical.
    1. Sneaky Urus
      Sneaky Urus 2 July 2019 11: 38
      That's right. It was necessary for Denikin to advance in the direction of Kolchak. In fact, the Reds just went on the counterattack.
      1. bober1982
        bober1982 2 July 2019 11: 44
        Yes, I agree, it was necessary to strengthen the rear and the front line (?? !!) to stabilize, gather strength and continue to interact with Kolchak, instead, he thoughtlessly climbed to Moscow.
        One word is civil war.
        1. Sneaky Urus
          Sneaky Urus 3 July 2019 10: 23
          Although we are strong afterlife, Denikin liked to spray. Ukraine, Moscow, the Caucasus ... And so it would have hit the rear of the Eastern Red Front - it is still unknown how the course of history would have turned. Moreover, in the Volunteer and Don armies the qualitative composition of officers was better than that of Kolchak.
          1. bober1982
            bober1982 3 July 2019 10: 32
            Quote: Sneaky Urus
            the quality of the officers was better than that of Kolchak.

            Denikin had many volunteers, officers gathered from the whole of Russia for the Don, Siberia had anarchy for a relatively long time, Socialist Revolutionaries, Cossack chieftains, some members of the U. Assembly, and so on. Hence the difference in the quality of officers.
  6. place
    place 2 July 2019 10: 50
    The fact that Anton Denikin was talented is awesome, but I don’t care after 100 years.
    But what made him act?

    Here are excerpts from Denikin's letter to President Truman from 1946, it is stored in the US National Archives in the Admiral Leahy Foundation. SO, "The following measures must be taken without delay: ......... Close cooperation, especially between the English-speaking powers. ..... A priority task is to protect France and Spain from communization. ..... Refusal from providing the USSR with any loans (American or British), until absolute guarantees are received of the cessation of any military, political and propaganda aggression ..... the Bolshevik "restoration plan" of the USSR is known: all Russia's resources will be directed to guns, airplanes and atomic bombs in accordance with the new five-year plan recently proclaimed by Stalin ............ IN THE EVENT OF THE OCCUPATION of Russian territory, immediately establish Russian self-government and, as soon as possible, encourage the creation on the Russian lands of a temporary central government authority formed from citizens of Russia with possible participation of specially selected emigrants. "

    WHAT DO WE SEE? YES IT IS DANGEROUS CRETIN !!!! who sincerely believed that the West could bring order to Russia and ensure the prosperity of Russians simply because the West is "culture and civilization."
    1. bober1982
      bober1982 2 July 2019 11: 00
      Quote: ort

      So, after all, Anton Ivanovich really wanted to take Moscow, which was not the motive for doing things here, and why it was unusual that Truman wrote letters, it wasn’t for Stalin to write letters to the former white general.
      1. place
        place 2 July 2019 13: 23
        The motive must be proven. "I wanted to take" is not a motive, but a consequence of a motive, that is, some reason for Denikin's appearance of this desire to "take Moscow."

        But the fact that he has a completely sucky for a normal person and is not at all an ordinary motive - belief in a "great white civilization" that will save Russia if it is occupied - Denikin in 1946 wrote in his letter to Truman and signed. Back in 1918, Denikin began to create his own army in the territories temporarily occupied by the Germans. Just like General Krasnov did this in 1918 and in 1942.

        So you find out that although the smart people were Russian nobles, many were clearly dislocated. They do not write about this. Although modern gentlemen Denikin copy one-to-one. Where does such nonsense come from? Here is the riddle.
        1. bober1982
          bober1982 2 July 2019 13: 36
          Quote: ort
          that although smart people were Russian nobles, but many were clearly dislocated

          During the civil war, a dislocation in the minds of all segments of the population happened, why rebuke Denikin, by the way he was never a nobleman, he was from the poor.
          Quote: ort
          As early as 1918, Denikin began to create his own army in the territories temporarily occupied by the Germans.

          Generals Alekseev and Kornilov began to create an army, they did not have any relations with the Germans, Denikin joined them, did not sit back, like many.
    2. Moskovit
      Moskovit 2 July 2019 14: 43
      The British and Americans showed how they can restore order in Russia. Mudyug concentration camp for example.
      1. RUSS
        RUSS 3 July 2019 08: 34
        Quote: Moskovit
        The British and Americans showed how they can restore order in Russia. Mudyug concentration camp for example.

        Stalin apparently learned from them by creating the Gulag
  7. RUSS
    RUSS 3 July 2019 08: 31
    Quite a bit of red-bellied did not squeeze, sorry ....
    1. Sugar Honeyovich
      Sugar Honeyovich 3 July 2019 15: 09
      Quote: RUSS
      Quite a bit of Red-bellied

      As a result of this, "they did not put the squeeze on a little", the number of red-bellies increased by an order of magnitude ... if not more. lol
      1. Carl_Magne
        Carl_Magne 3 July 2019 21: 10
        And then it began to decline sharply when, instead of advice, Tsar Joseph Vissarionovich came to crown
    2. ecolog
      ecolog 4 July 2019 22: 22
      Well, in the 90s they squeezed.
      Has it gotten better?
  8. Aviator_
    Aviator_ 4 July 2019 21: 44
    Stronger, combat-ready units (2-th International Regiment, Voronezh and Jewish Communist Regiments, Special Cavalry Regiment, etc.

    Very interesting evidence. I didn’t even know that there was a Jewish communist regiment in the GV. Respect for the article to the author.
  9. place
    place 24 September 2019 11: 17
    Of course, having formed an army in the territories temporarily occupied by the Germans, even having its own ambassadorial representative in Germany, material assistance from England and France, it is possible to achieve temporary success! BUT reserves were not enough. The Germans are gone. The French and the British are not that completely thrown but DIDN'T HELP HELP AS PROMISED. WHERE AFTER THIS IS THE RUSSIAN PATRIOT SUBMIT?

    To write such articles, one must not have a conscience at all.
  10. place
    place 24 September 2019 11: 21
    Everything ended naturally: in 1921-to-to-to beloved France! The Entente saved from death, helped, but not in the way the Russian patriots would like ..... long decades began in Paris and Berlin and the expectation of a new campaign ....
  11. place
    place 24 September 2019 11: 23
    Sorry, inaccuracy! They pushed them in and pendal under the ass was punched not in 1921, but earlier - in the fall of 1920