Is the General Staff guilty or not of communication problems with 22 June 1941?

Opinion of individual readers and the opinion of the author

Recently published last часть on the deployment of field management of the Southern Front.

Pointing to problems with the communications troops, the author named the General Staff as one of the perpetrators of this:

Prior to the mobilization of the communications units of the RGK, in the initial period of the war, communications in the front-army control link were supposed to be organized at the expense of the network of the People’s Commissariat of Communications (NCC). Such an approach, adopted by the General Staff, was one of the reasons for the defeat of troops Zapovo and Pribovo in border battles due to the loss of command and control ... When planning combat operations in the initial period of the war, the General Staff did not attach importance to possible communication problems in the border districts during this period.

A similar opinion was expressed by the communications marshal I.T. Peresypkin and other senior officials of the communications troops. However, these words caused a number of disapproving messages in the comments to the 4 part of the article and in personal mail. Let's look at one of these messages:

Another distortion of the author of the article, which deliberately misleads readers, because "such an approachWas adopted not by the General Staff, but by the governmentWhich did not allocate funds for the organization of its own communication system of NPOs due to the fact that the country simply did not have enough money to create such a system. Already at the end of the war, at a later time, the Ministry of Defense managed to create a completely autonomous communication system, so that the General Staff is accused of lack of finances [not] ...
An illiterate statement, because the Communications Directorate of the SC was in charge of communication issues at NCO ... It’s impossible to throw all the mistakes of pre-war construction at the General Staff, if only because there were 20 directorates in the NCO, and everyone has to do their work.

The author suspects that many other readers who did not express their point of view adhere to the same opinion. Therefore, he decided to consider this issue in more detail, because this reason has made a considerable contribution to the rout of the border group of our troops. According to the author, the General Staff (the chiefs of the General Staff and the staff of the Operational Directorate) devoted too much time to repelling the attack and the subsequent offensive on the territory of the enemy. Carefully carried out calculations of the required number of divisions, artillery, aviation, tanks, resources to replace losses and did not understand at all how communication should be organized. For them, this was a minor issue ...

Having a lot of mechanized corps with a huge amount of equipment and estimating how much they would grind up enemy troops was interesting and necessary for them. Estimating how much fuel corps will take with them, supplies, how tanks will advance in 3-echelons - that was also interesting. But how exactly competently to use these bodies, the leadership of the AC and the districts were not well represented.

A similar situation was with anti-aircraft artillery units and fighter units, which were attached to the command of air defense. Everyone understood how to do this, but before the start of the war they did not bother to deploy a system of aerial observation posts of VNOS. On the territory of all border armies there were only four company observation posts and one battalion point. Such a number of them did not allow timely notification of air defense units and fighters at the airfields about the routes of flight of German aircraft. It is not uncommon that German planes intersected only when approaching to attack airfields. Already by midday, there were problems with wired communication, and the effectiveness of VNOS posts even after deployment (18 posts for each VNOS company) sharply decreased. On the eve of the war, only the posts of separate battalions of SPLM 29 (KOVO) and 44 (PribOVO) were deployed (more in parts of 18 and parts of 19).

The leaders of the Red Army about problems with communication

Head of communications PribOVO General PM Kurochkin, describing the pre-war method of combat training of staffs and command personnel of the communications troops of the army and district levels of command, pointed out one of the reasons that led to the loss of command and control in the first days of the war:

Communication in the area of ​​exercises and maneuvers always prepared in advancefor 2 – 3 weeks. In order to provide communication at maneuvers held in any one military district, many parts of communication from other districts gathered. Widely used national communications. All prepared communications were used only for operational command and control of troops.

As for the communication necessary to control the air defense, air force, rear, it or not counted at all, or her organization was studied in special classes, in which communication issues for operational management did not understandi.e. again created favorable conditions.

Under such conditions the commanders and staffs got used to the fact that the organization of communication poses no difficulties, there will always be communication at their disposal, and not any, but wired. Is it not the appearance of well-being in providing communication, created in peacetime, that the combined-arms commanders and staffs neglected the difficulties in organizing communications that occurred at every step from the very beginning of the war? Was not This is one of the reasons that led to great difficulties in guiding the troops, and often to a complete loss of control....

Not only the commanders and staffs of the front-army-corps command lines did not understand the difficulties of organizing communications in the initial period of the war, but they did not understand it at least in the General Staff. Perhaps they could not come to terms with the idea that war could create problems with communications and everything would go completely wrong as they had planned ... I remind you that since March 1941, among other directorates, the Communications Directorate was subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. he was the direct supervisor for the head of communications of the SC! G.K. Zhukov:

Major General N.I. Galich reported to us about the lack of modern communications and the lack of sufficient mobilization and emergency supplies of communications ... The Western Border Military District had radio stations only on 27%, KOVO on 30%, PribOVO - on 52%. Approximately the same was the case with other means of radio and wired communication.

Before the war, it was believed that in the event of war, it was believed that the leadership of the fronts, internal districts and troops of the reserve of the High Command would be mainly used by means of the NCC and the HF NKVD. The communications centers of the High Command, the General Staff and the fronts will receive everything they need from the local NCC agencies. But they, as it turned out, were not prepared for work in the conditions of war ...

The memoirs are the specific culprits of this problem:

Stalin did not sufficiently assess the role of radio in modern maneuvering war, and leading military workers failed to promptly prove to him the need for organizing mass production of army radio engineering...

Conversations on these issues with the NCC did not lead to anything ... After listening to our messages, S.K. Tymoshenko said: “I agree with your assessment of the situation. But I think that it is hardly possible to do anything serious in order to immediately eliminate all these shortcomings. Yesterday I was with Comrade Stalin. He received a Pavlov telegram and ordered to convey to him that, for all the justice of his demands, we do not have today the opportunity to satisfy his “fantastic” proposals ...

General Galich about communication

An interesting article was published on the site. "Production of domestic military communications". Head of the Spacecraft Communications Directorate, General N.I. At the end of 1940, Gapich prepared a Report, which he presented to the People's Commissar of Defense. The report said:

Despite the annual increase in the number of communications equipment entering the troops, the percentage of communications equipment not only does not increase, but, on the contrary, decreases due to the fact that the increase in production income is not proportional to the growth of the army.

A large shortage of communications equipment for the deployment of new military units does not allow creating the necessary mobilization reserves for the first period of the war ... All property coming from industry immediately, “from the wheels” is sent to the troops. If the supply of communications equipment by the industry remains unchanged and there is no loss of communication property, then to meet the full needs of NPOs without creating mobilization reserves, it will be necessary for a number of nomenclatures over 5 years.

The People's Commissar of Defense and the General Staff are engaged in the deployment of all new formations and formations, and they are not at all interested in the fact that these troops cannot be adequately equipped with communications! Was it possible to correct this situation? Yes, such measures were also mentioned in the Report:

- to speed up the construction and commissioning of factories: telephone equipment in the city of Molotov - Ural; tank radio stations in Ryazan; ... typical radio components of Ryazan;

- oblige: NKEP in 1941 to produce telephone equipment at the Krasnodar plant “ZIP”; NKChermet USSR to increase in 1941 year at least twice the production of steel tinned wire for the release of field cables and master the production of thin steel wire with a diameter of 0,15-0,2 mm; NKEP USSR to organize workshops of manual dynamo drives at plant No. 266 in order to bring the production of these machines in 1941 to 10000-15000 pieces;

— allow immediately to use the factory in Tartu (Estonia), which has been producing telephone equipment for the Baltic armies, for the production of field telephone equipment; and the VEF plant (Riga), which has very valuable equipment and qualified personnel;

- for the needs of operative communication, obligate the NKEP of the USSR to master and supply 1941 km 500-core cable for the NKO as an experimental batch in 4, XNUMX km, with devices for unwinding and winding the cable purchased in Germany and used in the German army;

- to transfer the following enterprises to the NKEP USSR for the production of field radio stations: Minsk Radio Plant NKMP4 BSSR, plant “ХХ years of October” NKMP RSFSR; Odessa Radio Plant NKMP USSR; Red Guard Gramophone Factory - VSPK; Rosinstrument plant buildings (Pavlovsky Posad) of the NKMP RSFSR with the equipment of their NKEP to the 2 quarter of 1941; the building of the former Vilna radio plant in Vilnius using it for the production of radio equipment from 3 quarter 1941 year;

- release plants NKEP USSR "Electrosignal" Voronezh and number 3 Alexandrov from the production of consumer goods by loading factories with military orders...

The head of communications of the spacecraft proposed specific measures to significantly increase the release of communications. Below, we will see that if the USSR Government competently justifies the need to transfer enterprises to produce products necessary for NPOs, the government supported such decisions. Financial and material resources were allocated, it was allowed to look for enterprises for the production of these products, funds were allocated for overtime work. It was only necessary to understand the problem to the leadership of the spacecraft and justify it before the Government of the USSR The management of the spacecraft either could not convince Stalin of the need to increase the output of communications, or did not understand the seriousness of this problem. The author is inclined to the second ...

Heads of communication in districts about problems with communication

In 1941, this problem was once again reported to GK. Zhukov. PM Kurochkin:

Analyzing the vitality of communication in the Baltic States, we noted that all the main lines pass near the railways and highways, and, therefore, can be destroyed by aerial bombardment. The main components were very vulnerable from the air.located in large settlements or in areas of railway crossings, while backup did not exist... About all this, the Chief of Staff of the District, General PS Maples reported to the General Staff...

It turns out that the chief of staff, Pribovo, dealt with communication issues better than the chief of the General Staff. Immediately after the start of the war (in 4-00 22 of June) P.S. Maples sends a cipher telegram to the Chief of the General Staff:

The weak points of communication of the district, capable of causing a crisis, are:
1. Weakness of front-line and army communications units in terms of size and power relative to their tasks.
2. Non-equipped communication centers of the army and the front.
3. Insufficient development of wires from the Panevezys and Dvinsky communication centers.
4. Lack of communications to ensure rear communication.
5. Weak security of communications property of the district, army communications units and the air force.
Please: 1. Allow partial mobilization front and army communications units, having mobilized communications regiments, linear battalions, operational companies and communications squadrons ...

30 Jun PS Maples will be removed from leadership and soon arrested. Among other things, he will be accused of being removed from command and control ... In the previous section, the same situation was examined with the head of the law department, General Shishenin, who was also removed from office on June 30. The headquarters of the Law Firm at that time was also practically without communication: the front communications regiment began to arrive at the location of the front control only from July 1 ...

In PribOVO (from the 22 of June - the North-Western Front), by the evening of 22 of June, the front command lost contact with the troops. T.P. Kargapolov (from 3.8.41, Head of Communications of the North-West Direction):

On the eve of the war, the communications commanders of the LVO and PribOVO had very a small number of units and communications troops. These units could not provide command and control of troops in the border battles that began on 22.6.41. These units could not meet the need for personnel of military communications specialists for the army and front units formed with the announcement of mobilization ...

The 8, 11, 14 and 23 armies that started the 22-26 battles on June 1941 were in possession of only one army communications battalion to control their subordinate units in combat situations. Provide uninterrupted control when maneuvering communication battalions of these armies due to their small number and lack of necessary wire assets could not. They had a decent composition of radio equipment, but headquarters and commanders could not use radio communications to control troops in battle. District and army headquarters demanded to control the troops leading the battle, wire connection (telephone, telegraph) ...

The enemy of aviation and saboteurs destroyed the permanent lines of communication, and to restore them, organized power was required in the form of linear communications — and it was not yet at the disposal of the commanders of districts and armies ... Headquarters lost its wired communication with its connections by the end of 22.6.41. … and after that first restored wired connection with their subordinate connections only July 7-8 ...

The same situation was ZOVOVO. The executed chiefs of staff and communications did not leave their memoirs. It is possible that there were quite a few reproaches towards the General Staff ... In article it was said:

In the middle of the day on June 22, the commander of the Western Front, General Pavlov, reported to the General Staff that, of the three radio stations he had, two were completely defeated, and the third was damaged and was not working. With constant breaks of wired communication lines, the absence of data on the location of their units and enemy units - this was a complete loss of communication with subordinate troops. The General Staff was obliged to urgently correct this situation. General Pavlov was promised to send three new radio stations, but they did not send ...

D.M. Dobykin (head of communications KOVO):

In view of the fact that the war began suddenly, therefore, the coalescence and combat training of the communications units during the period of their mobilization was not actually carried out ... In peacetime, the district headquarters did not pay enough attention to the preparation of the KP in engineering in the area of ​​Tarnopol. The headquarters was located in the city and on the first day of the war was forced to reach an unprepared KP ... The basis of the whole wired communication of the SWF was a network of wires and communication centers of NGOs and NCCs prepared in peacetime .. In view of enemy aircraft, especially in the early days of the war, sought to destroy the main highways and communications centers, in such cases, communication was provided in bypass directions or switched to radio communication, and also used mobile communications ...

The events in KOVO were not as critical as in PribOVO or Zapovo because of the large territory, a larger number of spacecraft troops and a smaller number of enemy troops ...

Proposals of the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff to the Government of the USSR

So who is to blame for the loss of command and control of troops due to communications problems in border districts: Head of the Communications Directorate, General Staff or Stalin? General Galich was removed from his post as head of the June 22 Communications Department, and on August 6 he was arrested. General Galich is not exactly to blame for this, since his report, long before the war, described the problems of the communication crisis in the initial period of the war and measures to remedy the situation. Blame Stalin or Zhukov? Could it have been possible to improve the situation by increasing the output of communications and increase the number of trained personnel?

A note People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and SNK USSR - V.M. Molotov on organizing events in the military districts 4.07.1940:

The total number of divisions currently available is insufficient. Clean infantry divisions, excluding tank and motorized, designed mainly for offensive action, maneuver and repel counterattacks, we will have 148 ... that is not enough ...
I consider it urgently necessary now beyond the existing ... divisions ... to create another 23 division for 3000 people each, as divisions of the 2 echelon with a monthly mobilization readiness and thus bring the total number of divisions to 200 ...
It is advisable to reduce the number of communications troops and road units - 20800 people, because the need for field communications and road maintenance has decreased ...
When carrying out these activities, the savings are ..., which ensures the organization of measures for the formation of 23 sd and the transfer of 3-x divisions from 9000 people to 12000 people ...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
Chief of the General Staff of the Space Marshal Marshal of the Soviet Union B. Shaposhnikov.

In July, 1940, the decision is made to reduce communications troops and bring them to peacetime states. The document was signed by the Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov and the People's Commissar of Defense Tymoshenko. For them, the connection was not so important. We, being aware of the consequences of such a decision, would not cut down the liaison forces. The General Staff decided that an increase in the number of rifle divisions is more important than having several deployed communications units in the border districts. After all, the leadership of NPOs could justify not a reduction in communications troops, but an increase in the total number of spacecraft. The main thing was to justify the need for the presence of full-fledged communications units at the border in front of the Government ...

In another situation, NGOs and the Air Force were able to substantiate the increase in numbers and the corresponding Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR issued by 25.07.1940:

SNK USSR decides: ... 10. To carry out the above activities, allow NPOs to increase the staffing capacity of the KA Air Force by 60248 man ... Chairman of the USSR SNK V. Molotov

By October 1940, the General Staff did not have enough tanks to support the infantry and in the corresponding A note People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of General Staff of the Spacecraft [not earlier than 05.10.1940] talk about the formation of new units:

Due to the existing number of spacecraft - 18 tank brigades, 20 machinegun artillery brigades ... and one mechanized corps ...

Signed a note to the new Chief of General Staff - Army General Meretskov. He, too, was all arranged with a connection. After analyzing the situation, NPOs appear before the Government of the country with a request for another increase in the number of spacecraft, and again this does not apply to communications.

A note People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and SNK USSR - V.M. Molotov on increasing the number of tank units and formations [no later than 11.10.1940]:

Please: 1. Allow 25 to begin forming individual tank brigades with a deadline for 1.6.41.
2. Approve the increase in the number of spacecraft for the above event for 49850 people...
ANNEX: Draft Resolution of the CR at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

The note of the draft resolution of the CP under the SNK of the USSR is even attached to the note, and the reader told us that this cannot be ... It turns out maybe if you understand the problem and explain it to the government. The leadership of a spacecraft may apply to the government for an increase in the number of spacecraft. It is required to justify it only! And not just to propose, but even to propose a draft resolution on this issue.

On November 5, NPOs and the Air Force again appeal to the government with a request to increase the number and even to issue additional auto-tractor equipment over and above the plan. This technique is much more expensive than telephone or telegraph devices and cables for them.

Decision of the USSR SNK:

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR SSR: ... 1. Increase the number of Air Force KA on 173484 man ...
9. To ensure the training of flight technical staff in new and expanding military schools and schools, let go of NGOs over planned vacation in 1941 year:
... d) motor vehicles - 1493 units;
e) special machines - 1484 pieces;
e) tractors - 362 pieces ...

14.1.41, the post of Chief of the General Staff, was held by G.K. Zhukov, and by mid-February the government receives a new document with the next increase in the number of spacecraft forces. it A note NKO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and SNK USSR - V.M. Molotov outlining the plan for the mobilization deployment of the spacecraft [no later than 12.02.1941]. Considered a significant increase in mechanized corps (up to 30), tank (up to 60) and motorized (up to 30) divisions. Why so many troops? Again, this is Stalin insisted? Not, G.K. Zhukov Don't blame him:

In February 1941, the General Staff developed an even broader plan for the creation of armored formations than was envisaged by government decisions in 1940 ... I.V. Stalin, apparently, at that time had not yet had a definite opinion on this issue and hesitated. Time passed, and it was only in March 1941 of the year that the decision was made to form the 20 mechanized corps we were requesting [new mechkorpus to the existing ones].
But we didn't calculate objective capabilities of our tank industry. To fully equip the new mechanic corps, 16,6 needed thousands of tanks of only new types, and only about 32 of thousands of tanks. This number of cars for one year was practically nowhere to take, lacked technical and command personnel...

Of course, tanks and lots of other equipment are better than dealing with a secondary communication problem, which may not exist ... Only, as subsequent events showed without communication, these enormous mechanized corps are just a pile of scrap metal that was left in the border districts ... Rapid deployment of new parts (I would say thoughtless) led to the selection of the entire mobil reserve and for anti-tank 45-mm guns, which were not planned for the 1941 year. Until February, the mob-reserve for anti-tank guns was enough.

On February 22, the deputy chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff prepared a document that spoke about the prospects of the mechanized corps. Nineteen hulls were considered combat 1-th queues: from 1 to 12, from 14 to 16, 22, and from 28 to 30. Seven bodies were considered combat abbreviated 1-th queue: 13 (on 22 June 282 tank and 17809 people personnel), 17 (63 tank and 16578 people), 18 (282 tank and 26879 people), 19 (453 tank and 21651 people) , 20 (94 tank and 20391 people), 21 (128 tanks (excluding two battalions received after 22 June). There were so many personnel in 21 mk without technology that 17000 people were left at the locations in the camps) and 24 (222 tank and 21556 man).

The mechanized corps of the second stage were: 23 (413 tanks), 25 (300 tanks), 26 (184 tanks) and 27 (356 tanks). They should have been reckoned by corps to 1.1.42. Maybe it was more efficient to transfer tanks and equipment to other corps and to include part of the personnel in other formations and units? For example, were there many technical specialists in these connections and could they be retrained to signalers? Or send valuable technical specialists to the reserve, and call infantrymen, machine-gunners, mortar gunners, gunners and others to rifle divisions? And also deploy the communication parts of the border districts? Unfortunately, the General Staff thought about a different start of hostilities ... G.K. Zhukov:

[The executives of the NPO and the General Staff] were preparing to wage the war according to the old scheme, mistakenly believing that war will begin, as before, from the border battles, and then the main forces of the enemy will only enter. But the war, contrary to expectations, began immediately with the offensive actions of all the land and air forces of Nazi Germany....

The sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas, was not provided...

В A note according to the mobilization deployment scheme of the spacecraft, it was also stated:

To increase the mobilization readiness and security of the army for the most insufficient types of weapons, it is necessary to resolve the issue of their additional deployment in industry ... The mobilization plan for the 1941 of the year provides for mobilization in two options:
a) the first option provides for the mobilization of individual military districts, individual parts and compounds established by a special decision of the SNK of the USSR - a hidden order, in the order of the so-called "Large training fees (BEAD)." In this case, the call of the military reserve, as well as the delivery of motor vehicles and horse units assigned to the parts, is made by personal summonses, without announcing the orders of NGOs.
b) the second option provides for a general mobilization of all the Armed Forces of the USSR or individual military districts in open order, i.e. when mobilization is announced by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ...

In other words, according to the first option, if this is justified before the Government of the USSR, then it is possible to mobilize individual parts. For example, communication units of border districts before the outbreak of war. Only the need for their deployment should be understood by the leadership of the AC and it is required to justify this before Stalin. But no one has done this ... Huge mechanized corps looking more solid? ... In February it comes out Resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "About the plan of military orders for 1941 g. On ammunition" 14.02.1941:

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) DECIDE:
1. To approve the plan of military orders of NKO, NKVMF and NKVD on 1941 for a complete shot at shells, land mines, grenades, bombs and mine-torpedo arms...
4. To increase the production capacity of shot elements transfer to The following enterprises entered the system of the Commissariat for Chemicals as of 1.2.41: Pervomaysky Plant ..., Stroymekhanizmov Plant and Pavshinsky Concrete Products Plant (for organizing the production of reinforced concrete bombs). To oblige Narkomsredmash, Narkomstroy and Narkomstroymaterialov USSR locate at their enterprises civilian products being removed from the factories transferred to the Narkomboe ...
5. To approve the construction of a new projectile and equipment plant in the city of Kirov for the production of shells of large calibers and their equipment ...
To entrust the NKV munitions together with the State Planning Committee within a month find a factory for transfer to the system of the Commissariat for the production of 37 mm anti-aircraft shells.
Chairman of the USSR SNK V. Molotov.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin.

It turns out that for the production of shells it was possible to repurpose several enterprises and load them with the release of shells. You could even find a factory to produce 37-mm shots. No one argues that the production of shells is an important thing, but communications, as we have seen, were also necessary. And according to the proposals of General Galich - nothing has been done. Even for an enterprise producing consumer goods! Can anyone say that the problem of communication was clear and its solution was very worried about the General Staff? In March 1941, there were problems with explosives and this issue is quickly resolved.
From the minutes of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 27.03.1941:

To approve the draft resolution of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On the production of toluene" ... Instruct the People's Commissariat of External Trade to take measures to acquire one installation for the production of trinitrobenzene in Germany's 1941.
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. Stalin.

In April, new troops are formed again, and in order to preserve the indicated number of spacecraft, the number of other units is reduced or they are disbanded. Of course, anti-brigades are needed, as well as airborne troops! The question arises: are they needed in such a quantity, as stated by the NPO, and are these parts of the equipment enough for all? The government does not ask such a question: after all, the military should know what they are asking. Again, the military does not think about communication ... But four months have passed since the Report of Galich and Zhukov, a document from the Chief of Staff PribOVO had already arrived, but for the General Staff of this problem, probably not ...

Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and SNK USSR 23.04.1941:

The Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR agree:
1. Approve the proposed NPO formation:
a) 10-TI anti-tank artillery brigades RGC, each consisting of ...
b) 5-ti airborne corps, each consisting of ...
2. The formations specified in paragraph 1 should be carried out due to the existing number of spacecraft, for which:
a) disband 11 six-thousand infantry divisions ... a total of 64251 people.
b) to disband the 29 control microns and 46 ck with body parts, the total number of 2639 people;
c) to reorganize 10 sd into mountain rifle divisions ... reducing in this regard each rifle division by 1473 man;
d) transfer corps and artillery regiments and regiments of the Trans-Baikal Military District and the Far Eastern Front to new (common for the entire KA), reducing them in connection with this by 30 people ...
3. Specified in pp 1 and 2 events to hold for 1.6.41 g…
5. Gosplan USSR to provide for the allocation of NPOs over 1941 of the year, over the plan, to provide the measures specified by this Decree - 8225 trucks (of which 5000 ZIS-5 vehicles), 960 STZ-5 and 420 tractors "Stalinetz" ...

After 15 May 1941, the NGO has prepared Project Notes People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and Chief of the General Staff of the SC to the Chairman of the USSR SNK I.V. Stalin with considerations on the strategic deployment plan of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies:

... Please: 1. To approve the submitted plan for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the plan for planned combat operations in case of war with Germany;
2. In due time to allow the consistent conduct of covert mobilization and covert concentration in the first place of all the armies of the RGC and aviation ...

First of all, it is necessary to mobilize all the RGK armies and aircraft, but again there is not a word about the communications troops of the border districts and units of the GDH ... In June, the NPO issues a new proposal to increase the number of spacecraft in the RMAs, and in fact many long-term facilities will not be ready soon and they also need communications! And underground communication lines! The military justify the need to increase the number of spacecraft and Stalin again agrees! We see again that he can be convinced.
Resolution SNK USSR 4.06.1941:

The Council of People's Commissars of the USSR resolves:
1. To approve the proposed NPO USSR formation of parts for the newly built fortified areas ...
2. The formation of the parts finish to 1.10.41 g., Spending it in two turns:
1-I turn - on 45000 people to 1.7.41 g.
2-i queue - on 75000 man to 1.10.41 g…

In 10 days, a new ordinance order. It turns out that if justified, then you can get new funds and allow overtime work. Resolution SNK USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) 16.06.1941:

In order to speed up the combat readiness of the fortified areas, the SNK of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) DECIDE:
a) allow the People's Commissariat of Weapons to use two-hour overtime work at the 369, 69, 66 and 2 factories;
b) To the People's Commissariat of Weapons, to allocate at its own expense the necessary equipment for the factories No. 69 and No. 4 and materials for the production of an additional program for sights and periscopes at factories No. XXUMX and No. XXUMX ...

On the same day, the Chief of the General Staff writes Note about the need to build gliders. It turns out that this is an important problem, but the connection is not ... Note of the Chief of the General Staff of the SSC to the People's Commissar of the Aviation Industry 16.06.1941:

... In order to provide airborne units, an NPO needs the following number of gliders in 41 – 42 ... Total for 1941 g. - 2000 pcs ...

So how can you blame the government of the USSR for communication problems (in particular, with wire lines)? After all, the government of the USSR and our whole country donated to NGOs for orders of magnitude greater financial and material resources, and the leadership of the army, poorly understanding the problems, spent these resources ineptly! These resources could be used more optimally, but it turned out as always ... But, it turns out that Stalin is to blame for everything! He badly considered footcloths, guns and telephones, did not think how to use the mechanized corps ... So who is to blame: Stalin or the General Staff?

Comments

[AsmyppoL]

When an article about the Southern Front (LF) came out, comments were made to it, or clarifications were made that might be of interest to other readers. The author has grouped the most interesting materials and decided to place them in the comments to this article.
Text in the 3 part of the article:

... At that time, the OO [operations department] also included a division of specialists of the cryptographic-headquarters service (UCS) ... ”.
Question: “Ostap was carried away ... There was no" cipher-headquarters service (SHS) ", but there was just a" cipher service (SHS) ", without any" headquarters ". This is how people who are illiterate in military affairs come up with fables, spread them through the networks, and then they are surprised that they are called liars. Where did you get the term "cipher-headquarters service (SHS)" - tell or give a link, just not to Victoria, who herself is illiterate in such matters ...

Reply. You are not too attentive. In the List, this is the name of the position of the cryptographer: Assistant to the Head of the Department for ShShS (cryptographic-staff service).

The encryption service itself is officially called cryptographic headquarters service (ShShS), and its departments (department, office) in the troops at the same time are called the cryptographic department, or 8 department, or special communication department (this department is also a cryptographic department, because the ShShS is mentioned in the documents).

In the postwar period there was a change in the name of the position. The minimum staffing unit in the 8 department or branch began to be called: ATP Senior Specialist (Special Communication Unit) (ISC 903864) is the open name of the military specialty. Closed name - cryptographic service specialist. There were also ATP specialists - equipment for the repair of encryption equipment. It was the same before the war: ShSH is a closed name for the service, and for a certain period of time there was an open name - special staff service. It is believed that the name cryptographic and headquarters service existed from 1933 to 1950. However, this name is already found in 1930 year and until this year.

With 15.11.1929, by order of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council, special courses for the training of officers of middle and senior commanders are organized. Courses were seconded to the Military Academy. Mv Frunze. This date is the birthday of the Krasnodar Higher Military School. Army General Shtemenko. Initially, the study period was 4 month.

In November, 1930, the courses were reorganized into the Special Branch of the Special Staff Service for shooting and tactical courses for improving the command personnel of the Red Army “The Shot”. At the beginning of 1934, the courses were relocated to Tambov, and in 1935, they received the name “Tambov advanced training courses for the commanding staff of the special staff service of the KA” with a training period of 12 months. Before the start of World War II, about two thousand service specialists prepared the courses.
In 1926 and in 1928, Instructions were the basic materials for the service, and the Revolutionary Military Council's USS Directive appeared in 1930. Next is the space. In the year 1943 the troops went to the "Instruction on the ES of the Spacecraft."

The figure clearly reads the name of the cryptographic staff service.

The following figure shows the position of a military man: Head of the 8 department, and he manages the cryptographic staff service.

[AsmyppoL]

Below is the same. Position - Senior Assistant Chief of 8 department, and began the war as a commander of the cryptographic staff service.

At the headquarters of the military districts there were schools of the School of Emergency Situations of the Spacecraft, the graduates of which received the rank of junior lieutenant. In the ground forces, only the spacecraft commanders could be the cipher clerk (SShS specialists).

We managed to find the following cryptographic staff service specialists:
- Isakov S.K. - in May, 1936 of the year was sent to the ShShS RKKA courses in the city of Tambov;
- ml. Lieutenant Gorbachev A.M. graduated from courses KSOVS KS at the headquarters of KOVO in 1941;
- ml. Lieutenant Dementiev Yu.V. completed refresher courses for officers of the School of Emergency Situations in the city of Ulyanovsk in 1943 (the duration of training is 7 months);
- Lt. Col. Likhachev D.A. - Head of the ShShS Air Force CBF in 1938;
- Tripolsky A.V. - until January 1930 petty officer ShShS 1 th submarine division.

In the journal “Protection of Information. Inside »2006 g., №5 also refers to the ShShS:

As the volume of production of encryption and coding equipment increased (each year it was planned to double its output) it was increasingly being introduced into operation. However, by the beginning of the war, it was still not enough to cover the necessary needs of the cryptographic-staff services ...

The name of the service even mentions the Commissar of Defense. Order No.213 from 1.12.39 of the People's Commissar of Defense on the "Establishment of December 5 by the annual holiday of the Advanced Training Courses cipher and staff service of the Red Army". I think that there is enough information about the mention of the term "cryptographic headquarters service" in the Red Army and in the Red Navy.

[AsmyppoL]

Part 3 stated that when reviewing the List it was noted:

The list includes 20 people, including the deputy chief of staff - the chief of the PA, General Vorobyov, and the deputy chief of the PA, Major Lyamin. If Captain Kolokoltsev had arrived, then the 21 man was on the list. You do not think that this number of commanders is too small for the OO headquarters of the army or the front?

Below is a list in question.

In the 4 part, a drawing was placed and the text was placed: "At 22.6.41 statewide, the number of people at the frontline field headquarters was 333.".

Question: “The operational department includes the entire 35 man, including the crypto department. And more recently, you convinced everyone: “21 was listed on the list. You do not think that this number of commanders is too small for the OO headquarters of the army or the front? ”It turns out that you just didn’t understand the numbers, but did you make stupid conclusions with a smart look?”

Reply. The table was taken from the collection of statistical materials and deliberately cited without correction to verify the attentiveness and interest of readers. A question appeared and the author is ready to give a clarifying answer.
The states of the departments presented in the table were approved by the People's Commissar of Defense:
- for the front 12.6.41 g .;
- for the army - 13.9.40

For front-line control, the above 02 / 45 staff was introduced from July 1 on 1941.
The article said: "Information about the number of people in the NGO on the eve of the war could not be found". It was meant that the previous state could not be found before the introduction of the state 02 / 45.

When the number of personnel of the front-line command staff is added, the 304 person is obtained, which differs from the reduced number (333) by 29 people. Where are they missing? A similar table without distortion looks like this.

We see that the cryptographic department was missing in 29 people. The figure with the table of positions in the cryptographic department was also given in the 3 part and it was possible to understand what was going on ... Thus, the number of OO 35 people is the number without the ShHS and 21 people planning to go on a field trip, less than the number of 35 regular units in OO.)))

[AsmyppoL]

The 4 part of the article said: “The deployment of LF management was too messy and not planned, which can only be connected with the unexpected start of the war in June 1941 for the spacecraft leadership and not understanding how the German command would conduct the fighting during the initial period of the war. When troops entered Bessarabia in 1940, everything was more organized. ”.

Statement: “Comparing the entry of troops into Bessarabia on a limited territory, and the beginning of a war with the most powerful army in the world for thousands of kilometers along the front, can only be the“ great strategist ”Yevgeny, who once again showed that he does not understand not only military affairs, but also common sense he has problems ".

Reply. If you walk along the link indicated in the section, you can see how the military mechanism worked smoothly before sending troops into Bessarabia: troop marches, transfer of troops from the LVO, KOVO, HVO, brought to the alert the Black Sea Fleet. Everything happens in advance, well coordinated for 18 days.

Indeed, we are talking about one small district, corresponding to a sufficiently large army on the front. Of such army sectors, the entire spacecraft front was composed on the western Soviet-German border. And if the events on military planning and movement of troops and material resources within one army were coordinated, it could be assumed that if they really expected 22 on June, then in this case the troops also coordinated along the entire border ...

However, nothing of the kind happened on the eve of the war, not only in the SC as a whole, but also in the border districts. Airplanes are not dispersed, air defense units are more at landfills and at permanent locations, parts of VNOS are not deployed; days. Despite requests for the transport of troops by railway transport, the General Staff banned it. URov garrisons are in places of permanent deployment, ammunition and food are in the company’s ammunition depots. Disorder and vacillation and no uniformity and leadership from Moscow.

[AsmyppoL]

Statement: "The special corps in the Crimea did nothing to reflect the landing of the enemy, rather, on the contrary, he himself was going to participate in the landing ...".

Reply. The danger of the passage of the Italian fleet is reflected in some documents. For example, in Note and in Plans. They also indicate the task of not allowing enemy landings in the Crimea and the Caucasus. In the Note of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on the basics of deploying the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East on 1940 and 1941 years 18.09.1940:

...Italian fleet will have its main actions in the Black Sea...
Black Sea Fleet:
a) the setting of minefields, the actions of submarines and aircraft - to prevent the passage of the enemy fleet in the Black Sea;
b) to destroy the enemy’s fleet breaking through into the Black Sea by active operations of the Black Sea Fleet;
c) to actively defend our shores from the surface fleet of probable adversaries breaking through into the Black Sea;
d) not to allow landings to land on the shores of the Black Sea in the Crimea and the Caucasus;
e) active actions, first of all, to aviation, by laying mines from the air, to conduct a constant struggle with the enemy’s navy, and especially in the Sea of ​​Marmara;
e) to secure from the sea the flank of the SWF;
g) in the case of the performance of Romania, destroy the Romanian fleet and interrupt its naval posts;
h) in the event of Turkey’s demonstration, defeat its fleet, interrupt its naval posts here, destroy Trebizond harbor ...

After six months, the concept has not changed:

From the plan of the General Staff of the spacecraft for the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the west and east of 11.03.1941 ... The Italian fleet will seek to transfer its main actions to the Black Sea ...

P.I. Batov (the commander of the land forces of the Crimea - the commander of 9 otd.sk):

Since the beginning of the war, the Supreme Headquarters set the task for the land forces of Crimea to defend the coast and prevent the landing of both naval and airborne troops, and the Black Sea Fleet to ensure the supremacy of our naval forces on the Black Sea ... The resulting task obliged us to determine the place and role of 9 Special SK in the defense of the Crimea ...

At the end of June 1941, during negotiations with Moscow, Marshal B.Shaposhnikov told me: “You understand, my dear fellow, that the success of the German landing force in the Crimea would have exacerbated the situation not only in the law firm. From the Crimea one step to Taman and to the Caucasian oil. Take all measures of antiamphibious defense both on the coast and inside the Crimea ...

From the first days of the war, submarines were sent into active search in positions near the Bosphorus, Varna and Constanta - waiting for entry into the Black Sea from outside ...

I have extracts from intelligence and other staff documents of the time. What is there just not!
June 22: a landing is being prepared in Constanta ... 10 enemy transports have been discovered by air reconnaissance ... direction to the Crimea.
June 24: a submarine was found aboard Shocho ... concentration of vessels in the Constanta area indicates preparation of a landing ... on the airfields of Bucharest a cluster of six-engine transport aircraft for paratroop transfer.
27 June: the Italian fleet proceeded through the Dardanelles into the Black Sea for the landing of troops in Odessa and Sevastopol.
June 28: confirmed the presence of landing craft in Constance 150. In the first half of July, the same thing - from the region of Constanta, Tulcea, from the airfields of Romania it is possible to wait for landings, both sea and air, from day to day.
On July 7, the headquarters of the Danube Flotilla reported that 37 transports with troops had left the ports of Bulgaria and Romania ...

[AsmyppoL]

Of Scraps according to the action plan of the OdVO troops in covering the state border according to the directive of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 503874 of 6.5.41.

"...I. Objectives of the OdVO troops to cover the state border
... 7. In cooperation with the Black Sea Fleet prevent the landing of enemy naval landings on the Black Sea coast OdVO ...

D. Possible enemy action plan
Of particular importance to the enemy may be the territory of the Crimea as the basis for the actions of its aviation on industrial facilities of the USSR. In this case, we should expect a combined action of naval and airborne assault forces to seize the territory of the Crimean peninsula.

The most possible and probable areas for amphibious assault landing on the Crimean peninsula are:
1. District Yarylgach and Ak-Mosque, which opens up the possibility of an auxiliary strike in cooperation with the Evpatorian airborne group in the general direction of Dzhankoy.
2. Evpatoria landing area with a total length of beaches to 25 -30 km from the lake. Donuzlav to the lake. Kizil-Yar provides an opportunity to develop blows both on Dzhankoy (120 km) and on Simferopol (60 km), as well as to threaten the flank and rear of the Sevastopol SD.
3. On the southern coast of the Crimea, the Feodosia landing area up to 7 km long is of the most serious importance, which allows the landing force to develop actions in the north to capture the Kerch SD from the rear and to develop success along the railway to Dzhankoy and especially for further action on Rostov and Mariupol. On the rest of the southern coast, the landing areas of Yalta, Alushta and Sudak acquire only tactical significance, since enough small units to close the way into the mainland through the mountain passes. Therefore, the grouping of troops on the territory of Crimea should provide cover only for the most dangerous and important areas and the creation of mobile reserves for the destruction of airborne troops pr-ka. In addition, the possibility of amphibious assault on the Black Sea coast in the area of ​​the Dniester Liman, Ochakov, which has landing sites of various sizes to 10, is not excluded ...

The Directive specifies the areas of cover and deployment of troops along the coast of Crimea. The task of landing our landings is not worth it. According to our intelligence estimates, in the central part of Romania, there were up to 18-19 German divisions and almost as many Romanian divisions. With our three divisions in the Crimea, it was impossible to talk about the landing of large landing forces in Romania. Maybe some landings to secure the flanks of the Southern Front

[AsmyppoL]

Statement: “The OdVO had its own OPS, which at the initial stage was supposed to provide communications for the deployment of front-line control”.

Reply. This version has no documentary evidence. This is not mentioned in the memoirs. Maybe you can provide documentary evidence of this version? Just do not make assumptions)))

Opinion of the author. Since the OdVO leadership learned about the establishment of the LF department only on the night from 23 to 24 June, there could not be a task to provide front-line communications with the tasks for 9 of the front-line command line. Moreover, this front-line administration was stationed on the territory of the South-Western Front.

[AsmyppoL]

The 3 part said:

From the information provided it is clear that the headquarters and field management of the Law Faculty began its deployment only after the start of the war. How so? Indeed, in accordance with the Note of the NPO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Spacecraft, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (February 1941 of the year) state the mobilization deployment scheme of the spacecraft that 9 of the field directorates is being deployed? The Far Eastern Front already existed. Deployment of front-line directorates was to be carried out in ZabVO, ZakVO, LVO, PribOVO, ZOVOVO, KOVO, ArVO and MVO. If the telegram about the deployment of front-line control went off in ArVO 19 June, then why wasn’t the deployment of the same control begun in the Moscow Military District? The answer lies on the surface.
The scheme took into account the deployment of troops in case of war, which did not necessarily have to start on June 22. The document should have included the possibility of starting a war in 1941 or in 1942 ...

Statement.

Another nonsense, because the author does not know how to read official documents, and makes silly conclusions. If you carefully study the draft Resolution, the first paragraph of the second section contains the key words: “Document No. 273 Draft Decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR“ On the mobilization plan for 1941 year ”12.02.1941 ... II. The volume of the mobilization deployment of the Red Army on mobplan number 23. 1. By land forces deploy:
The volume of the mobilization deployment of the Red Army on 1941 year, in the case of the announcement of the general mobilization, set in the following key indicators (in the 1 line) ... "
Any military professional understands that a GENERAL MOBILIZATION has not yet been announced, the plan cannot enter into force. But some points of the plan, which affect only NPOs, can be executed in advance at the expense of NPOs own resources, even if no general mobilization is announced. So this mobilization algorithm acted not only in the 1941 year, but also in other periods before or after the war ...

Response. Something you are such a wordy and vague comment without analysis more like a student from the couch, and not a tough military professional))) Vacations? There is another text in the cited document:

The mobilization plan 1941 of the year provides for mobilization in two ways:
a) the first option provides for mobilization individual military districts individual parts and connections, established by a special decision of the USSR SNK - in a hidden order, in the order of the so-called "Large training fees (BEAD)."
In this case, the call-up of the military-obliged stock, as well as the delivery of motor vehicles and horse personnel assigned to the parts, is made by personal summonses, without announcing the orders of NKO ...

Item in draft Resolutions the creation of the law firm already says that the deployment of front-line control is carried out by listing a) for individual connections (although this is a union). The 22 war of June does not start, then the deployment of the LF administration, its communications regiment, the guard battalion, etc. held in a hidden order after the preparation of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense (indicating the timing of deployment and advancement). The order of an NPO would legalize the corresponding Ordinance of the CPC. Similar situations for the deployment of new parts are found in the cited article on whether the General Staff is guilty or not. Increased the number of personnel for the URA and in PribOVO began to form battalions for them, and there were practically no ready pillboxes in PribOVO

In addition, for these rapidly formed battalions from the XO NUMX June, they began to train teams of conscripts to send:

Cipher Telegram No. 620 / m from 22.6.41, the Commander of the PribOVO Troops. The headquarters of the Moscow Military District gave instructions to call up the assigned list of reserve teams and send 23 and 24.6 to staff URs: Kaunas - U-186, U-189, U-192, U-193, U-194, C-67, C-72, all commands 3098 man of rank and file, destination station Kaunas; Telšiai - C-70, C-68, C-128, C-130, C-39, U-195 teams, a total of 2130 manpower, the destination station is Telšiai; Šiauliai - teams C-134, C-129, C-132, U-191, U-197, U-188, U-187, total 2670 people. rank and file, destination station - Siauliai; Alytusky - commands C-133, C-135, C-71, C-131, C-127, U-196, total 2133 people. rank and file, destination station - Alytus. Organize the reception of people and send them in part of the URS. Replenishment will arrive uniformed and armed with personal weapons. V. Sokolovsky

[AsmyppoL]

Statement: “The article says that the pre-war communications armies of the Russian state command and control consisted of 19-ops (14 district and 5 army), 25 separate communication battalions, 16 separate radio battalions for special interception (for conducting radio interception).
The article is another lie - there were no “16 separate radio special purpose battalions (for conducting radio interception)” in the communications troops, but there were separate OSNAZ DIVISIONS that were subordinate to the district intelligence officer, and they had no relation to the control of the units, because they worked only in the interests radio intelligence ... ".

Reply. The text you provided is taken from the relevant article (there is a link). Of course, this is inaccuracy: the text is “special radio battalions (for conducting radio interception)"Instead of"divisions OSNAZ».

The inaccuracy is not specifically corrected so that readers who do not know the subtleties would not have the question: “What are these divisions for?” A table with the correct designation was given below the indicated text.

Words about lies are clearly trolling. The article does not say that OSNAZ divisions were related to the management of parts - this is the substitution of the author's words in his own words. The said divisions, in accordance with the official documents, belong to the communications parts of the RGC.

The author has no text indicating to whom these divisions. This is again a deliberate distortion of the author's opinion: setting his words as supposedly the words of the author ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

These divisions, in accordance with official documents, relate to parts of the RGC communications.

This is another lie - the OSNAZ divisions were subordinate to the district’s intelligence chief, were on alert around the clock in peacetime, and they were never any reserve. They did not participate in organizing communications for command and control - they have other tasks.
In 1931, radio intelligence units were expelled from communications battalions. An independent organizational development of radio intelligence began, first as a heavy direction-finding company, and then, since 1935, as separate special-purpose radio divisions. Our radio intelligence officers, as advisers and specialists, actively helped republican Spain. History keeps their names: V.V. Mukhin, V.V. Ploshay, V.F. Efremov, E.M. Kossovsky, V.M. Markovich, V.K. Modebadze, L.S. Sazykin, I. I Wukhanov. During the Great Patriotic War, it was they who commanded the parts of the radio intelligence, led it on various fronts, served in the central apparatus.

Source: https://statehistory.ru/4566/Radiodiviziony-osobogo-naznacheniya--OSNAZ--v-gody-Velikoy-Otechestvennoy-voyny/

[AsmyppoL]

The above document has the number, signature of the People's Commissar and the Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.
Do not talk in vain, but provide a link to a document that says that the above document does NOT exist!
No need to throw quotes that can not refute the signed and existing document of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense!
In this document, these parts of the Commissar of Defense and the Chief of General Staff were ranked among the troops of communication! The rest is just a chat - OBS in one word))))
Just the facts and do not be idle chatter - here are adults!

[AsmyppoL]

The above document has the number, signature of the People's Commissar and the Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The above document has the number, signature of the People's Commissar and the Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army.

So what if you don’t even understand the essence of the document?
This document is a mobilization document, and has nothing to do with the operational work of the General Intelligence Directorate, if only because the divisions are deployed and carry out constant combat duty in the interests of intelligence, and do not work in the communications system of the armed forces.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Do not talk in vain, but provide a link to a document that says that the above document does NOT exist!

You just have no idea how documents of such a level are created where large bosses absolutely do not need details, but only quantity is of interest. But amateurs do not know this, that's why they fantasize to the extent of their ignorance.
By the way, in the mobplan it is just indicated that there were as many OSNAZ divisions on the eve of the war as it was envisaged by the mobplan, and they were on alert - what else could be the "reserve of the main command", even if they would think about it.

Quote: AsmyppoL

adults are here!

Judging by your illiterate writings, your knowledge of the Red Army is at the level of a modern student, which of course affects the assessment of your speculation.

[cavl]

Liked the cryptographic service
Is it possible to prepare a separate article about cryptographers? I can help with something

[AsmyppoL]

This topic is new to me. I do not know, but I will think about your proposal .....

[LeonidL]

“So who is to blame: Stalin or the General Staff?” - It is more difficult to answer this question6 than what comes first - a chicken or an egg. The reasons for the lag in communication issues have deep roots in the pre-war period. Radio engineering, electronics, radar, radio measuring devices, production of electronic tubes, capacitors, resistances ... ferrites. Practical construction of complex equipment is impossible without a theoretical, scientific basis. Without the availability of high-quality electronic-vacuum components, radio components, ferrites, it is simply impossible to build high-quality reliable radio communication equipment, radar. without high-quality radio measuring equipment, oscilloscopes, all this is impossible to configure. But with all this there were huge problems. Almost all measuring equipment was imported and was valued at its weight in gold, literally. The production of high-quality components for radio equipment was stalled. In 36 - 38 years, any breakdown, any failure to fulfill the planned task was considered a sabotage and was severely punished. But this only led to the washing out of engineering and scientific personnel. A typical example is with the inventor Oshchepkov, who created the first samples of a radar, with people who created the first semiconductor devices, the first oscilloscopes, magnetrons and klystrons (by the way, Soviet inventions), you cannot list them all. And until the time of Beria's saving sharashka, those arrested and not shot still had to live. It was this that caused the crisis of lagging behind and the disastrous situation with RT security, which was corrected only by the middle of the war, partly due to Lend-Lease, partly due to its own resources. In addition, the lower level simply did not have a sufficient number of professional radio technicians, radio masters, radio operators capable of servicing and repairing the most complex equipment at that time. Once again, before the war, they were simply afraid to use it for training, due to the lack of spare parts, especially lamps, and the failure of equipment was fraught ... Who is more to blame? I think that Comrade Stalin was not very seriously versed in the issues of the radio engineering industry and the radio engineering and communications itself, especially radar. I think that the General Staff did not fully understand the full depth of the problem. And the headquarters of different levels in the first weeks of the war were sick with "radio fear", preferring the usual telephone and dispatch of messengers, delegates and liaison officers. What is there to look for the first among the guilty? By the way, approximately the same situation developed in the first months of the First World War.

[PSih2097]

You can also recall the epic with the creation of the T-34 and KV tanks (the initial performance characteristics of these tanks), the defeat of Polikarpov's design bureau by various "figures" and many other things on the eve of the war ...

[antivirus]

life results, summed up anonymously

[Amateur]

An old joke about the attitude of the military towards communications and signalmen.

Teachings are coming. Tanks shoot, planes fly, infantry comes ...
The general summarizes the teachings: Well done tankmen, pilots coped with their tasks, the infantry defeated everyone. Any questions?
And the signalmen?
Signalers ??? The exercises were successful, so this time we will not punish the signalmen!

[PSih2097]

Quote: Amateur

Signalers ??? The exercises were successful, so this time we will not punish the signalmen!

Jo ... and in soap, face in the mud,
Where are you from? We, out of touch ...

[avia12005]

The same anecdote, only on behalf of signalers. Last phrase: they did not remember the signalers, which means they did a great job!

[antivirus]

20 years before working in Polikarpov Design Bureau - you need to prepare teachers and then they teach peasant children 10 years + 5 years college and + entry into special.
IF TAKING FROM N TO KRUPSKY - 1917 +25 years = ???
there is also a "general level of culture"

[Astra wild]

Actually, then there were not 10 classes, but 7-8 classes and they studied at the institute for not 5 years

[avia12005]

Communication is the nerves of the army. 22 June 1941, the Red Army met virtually without nerves.

[Amateur]

Loss of communication is a loss of control, and a loss of control of troops in battle inevitably leads to defeat.

Order of the Supreme High Command Headquarters No. 170526 of July 24, 1942
about underestimating radio communications

[yehat]

Quote: LeonidL

“So who is to blame: Stalin or the General Staff?” - It is more difficult to answer this question6 than what comes first - a chicken or an egg. The reasons for the lag in communication issues have deep roots in the pre-war period. Radio engineering, electronics, radar, radio measuring devices, production of electronic tubes, capacitors, resistances ... ferrites. Practical construction of complex equipment is impossible without a theoretical, scientific basis. Without the availability of high-quality electronic-vacuum components, radio components, ferrites, it is simply impossible to build high-quality reliable radio communication equipment, radar. without high-quality radio measuring equipment, oscilloscopes, all this is impossible to configure. But with all this there were huge problems.

communication problems could be solved sequentially - they really did not receive enough attention. You have indicated one narrow niche. And I will give another example - commonplace telephone cables. Why did the Germans have water resistance in isolation on them was about 8 times better than ours? There is no need for any super technologies - just besides the shaft and the plan, quality was also needed. The same thing was sad with the quality of the mass of the simplest electrical components, such as copper contacts.
But batteries and accumulators - what, could not do better? Could ...
Next, the radio stations. They were issued by thousands. But what quality? They were simply removed from planes due to their mass and uselessness (continuous interference on the air, very low radius).
Personally, I see this industry neglected. Stalin correctly and objectively assessed the difficulties of industry in the production of high-tech components, but besides them there were many other shortcomings

And the last thing about the guilt of the General Staff. After the delegation’s trip to Germany on the eve of the war, many officers who were there realized a big lag in communications, but the army is a huge mechanism. It took time to react ...

[LeonidL]

Speaking of telephone cable, after the start of Lend-Lease, almost the entire telephone cable was allied. so neither domestic nor western were particularly distinguished by quality. Yes, German was better, more water-resistant, soft, it was easier to spliced ​​than the rocky of the Red Army coils. Therefore, as soon as possible they searched for the trophy. I wrote about the problems of domestic radio stations - the whole thing is in design, technology, as components, as an assembly and tuning. Even a good scheme, welded together and badly tuned naturally will spark, drown out all the interference. so the problem is complex. Well, and besides - the radio-fear in the first months of the war, the staff simply believed that the Germans tracked the radio and bombed. There is a shortage of qualified encryptors that can quickly and correctly encrypt - decode PCs. Well, and in the pre-war period, the fear of spoiling valuable equipment during training, for which there were no spare parts. Because a lot of radio equipment went to the Germans as trophies unpacked, in the original packaging.

[Undecim]

The conversation about whether the General Staff is guilty of communication problems or not guilty should begin with an analysis of the resource base of the USSR of those years in terms of organizing this very connection. After all, the site had a series of articles on this subject.
You can write a lot of papers with formidable orders and decrees, develop detailed organizational and mobilization plans for organizing communications. But if these very means of communication do not exist and the industry for their production is in the stage of creation, then all measures will remain as such.

This is a Soviet portable radio station RBS (4-P). The radio station was the result of the modernization of the "RRU" station, it was put into service in 1940 and was produced by factories No. 512 and 564. It was intended to organize communications within the battalion and operated at 58 fixed frequencies. The station was assembled on 4 lamps and could work as a phonic telephone. It was carried in two packages, combined for carrying on a shoulder strap in one. TTX radio stations: frequency range - 33,25 - 40,5 MHz; types of modulation - TLF and TLG; power - 0,25 W; antenna - whip 1,37 m long with a counterweight; communication range - 5 km; dimensions - 242x124x338 mm; weight - 12 kg.

[Undecim]

And this is the American radio station of similar purpose SCR-536, in this case - the 1940 version of the BC-611-A.
The portable station was intended for voice communication at one frequency out of 50 fixed. It was built on 5 miniature radio tubes and could be controlled with one hand (Walkie-Talkie). It had a telescopic telescopic antenna with a length of 945 mm and dry batteries, which were placed inside the case and allowed it to work normally throughout the day. The station turned on by extending the antenna, turned off - the opposite way. By the end of the war, 130 thousand stations were produced. TTX radio stations: receiver sensitivity - from 3 to 5 μV; frequency range - 3.5 - 6 MHz; types of modulation - TLF; output power - 0,35 W; communication range - 1,6 km; food - dry batteries VA-37 (1,5 V) and VA-38 (103,5 V); dimensions - 92x400x136 mm; weight with batteries - 2,5 kg.
As they say - feel the difference. The communication range in this case is quite sufficient within the battalion.

[Undecim]

The serious problems that existed in providing the Red Army with radio communications are evidenced by the accelerated development in 1941 and the start of production of the 1942-P radio station in 13.

13-P - HF radio station combined arms. It was used in grassroots networks of rifle and artillery regiments (communication between a company and a battalion, between battalions and a regiment, between a battery and a division, between an observation post and a division).
It was made according to a simplified scheme based on pre-war parts and components for serial broadcast radio receivers. Often, receivers seized from the population after the outbreak of war were disassembled for details. The receiving part is a 6-tube superheterodyne with one frequency conversion. The transmitter is assembled on one lamp (oscillator).
TTX radio stations: frequency range - 1,75 -4,25 MHz; output power - 0,5 W; range - by telephone (telegraph) on a whip antenna 2,65 m high - 12 (17) km, on a beam antenna 11 m long with a suspension height of 3-4 m and with a counterweight 11 m long - 18 (25) km; food - four dry BAS-60 batteries and 2-NKN-10 batteries; operating time from one set of power - 25 - 27 hours; dimensions - 490 × 370 × 270 mm; set weight - 20 kg.

[BAI]

Moreover, all radio stations had a range of 15 km and more - hundreds, or even thousands of kilometers. Obviously, the "concept" was like that.

[sgapich]

In the article, only in one place is the surname of the Head of the Communications Administration of the Red Army - Gapich Nikolai Ivanovich correctly indicated. In the rest of the article, his last name is mistakenly written - Galich.

General Galich was removed from his post as head of the Communications Directorate on June 22 ...

Major General N.I. Gapich was relieved of his post and seconded to the Office of the command and command staff of the NPO July 22 1941 city In 2011, in "Krasnaya Zvezda" there was an article about him: http://old.redstar.ru/2011/05/05_05/4_05.html

[Mikhail3]

What a strange article. The USSR was not ready for such a huge war SYSTEM. That is, he was not ready for anything. There were holes everywhere because NOBODY in the USSR understood the problems of such a war.
And there were those to blame. This is the top leadership of the country, including, of course, Stalin, and the top leadership of the army in full force.
Their main fault was that they did not conduct real mass exercises in an environment close to military. Therefore, there was no experience at all! Instead of exercises, extremely rare theatrical performances were held, intended only for fraud and complacency. Given the capabilities of the NKVD, one cannot think that the top leadership did not know about this.
Extremely reminiscent of someone. Those who are completely satisfied with their standard of living and their place in it, furiously telling the people how everything is good and correct around them, "rattling armor, sparkling with the brilliance of steel." We got together, rode the tanks, looked at the beautiful regular columns and drove back to the Kremlin, completely reassured. There were no real analyzes. Problems were not revealed. Everyone lied to each other.
By the way, the main problem of the then Soviet radio communication was a detail, colloquially called "quartz". I wonder how many reports were written about this, and how many were taken into account?

[Alexander Greene]

One of the main reasons for the defeats of the Red Army at the beginning of the war was the lack of proper radio communications in the Red Army. On June 22, German saboteurs disabled almost all of the wireline telephony, without which there were no armies, corps, divisions, or regiments in the western district. Instead, several thousand independent units were formed, which operated without unified plans and orders.

Formally, there were radio stations, but there were so few and of such poor quality that we can assume that we started the war without radio communications. And the blame for this lies with Tukhachevsky, who was the deputy people's commissar for armaments, and Yegorov, the chief of the General Staff, it was they who did not develop it, and after eliminating them there was no longer enough time.

It is known that the production of new equipment takes ten years, for this it is necessary not only to have experienced specialists in product design, but also to develop the production of components in other industries, and this takes years.

Tukhachevsky and Egorov had to assess the state of radio communications in the Red Army and make timely orders for the industry. They ordered a huge number of tanks, planes, but they had to understand that without radio communications both tanks and planes are useless in a war of engines.

I do not think that I.V. Stalin would refuse to allocate funds for the development of radio communications. Most likely this is either negligence or wrecking by Tukhachevsky and Egorov.

[Astra wild]

Green, although they taught at school that Tukhachevsky was betrayed by the Soviet regime (remember his telegrams to Lenin regarding the capture of Samara and Simbirsk), I changed my mind about him, but Yegorov was a decent person. Therefore, do not slander him.
That Yegorov was not to blame Stalin was already sure by 1940.

[hist]

I am embarrassed to ask, on what basis did you decide that Tukhachevsky was "dishonest"? Whom did you read?

[Colonel]

Communication, it is like air, which is remembered when it is not. The author makes the same mistake that the leadership of the country and the Red Army made before the war. It contrasts the formation of shock formations (for example, tank corps) and communication units (ChSVT).

tanks and many other equipment is better than dealing with a secondary communication problem, which may not exist ...

And it was supposed to be one. A tank corps cannot exist without serious communications units, just as it cannot exist without an arms service, without fuel and lubricants, etc.
Communications did not become a form of combat support, and military leaders of various ranks a priori believed that communications would always be, out of nothing, and were not ready to organize it, believing that someone would do it for them and for them. They paid for it. And this concerns everyone and the High Command and local commanders. And the technical capabilities of communication parts are a derivative of the underestimation of the issue by management.
I will not open America. if I say that the Wehrmacht achieved dizzying successes in 1941 and 1942. including mainly thanks to the excellent MANAGEMENT. We did not immediately realize this.

I was still in school when our hams were the first to catch SOS from the Nobile airship. And in my battalion there is still no mobile radio. And how many messengers died before my eyes due to the fact that we lacked the most ordinary telephone connection, due to the fact that we have huge telephone reels and we need to drag them together, and the wire is thick and heavy, and the connection should work like follows, you need to pull it into two wires. And this wire is always not enough ... And the fascist, the bastard, runs and twists a small coil, and on it the wires are thin-thin. And we just didn’t have to make a connection because there was not enough wire, even on a barbed wire they put ...

This is from Simonov, if that.
Summary - until the commander (who is the one-man manager) feels that he is responsible for communication with subordinate units and subunits, and not his uncle from the outside, the 1941 rake.

[Astra wild]

Somewhere on the site I read: "Generals are preparing for the coming war", and in WWI the telephone was the main means of communication. The same Zhukov or Stalin got used to it in peacetime: by phone and from here: "they will receive everything they need from the local bodies of the NCC." Why walkie-talkies when you have a phone?

[hohol95]

The radio also needed batteries. And take off was a differential ...

[yehat]

Quote: LeonidL

There is a lack of qualified encryptors able to quickly and correctly encrypt

as far as I know, encryption methods were quite primitive then, maximum table encryption. And any student who knew mathematics well could handle this.

[cavl]

Your vision of the cryptographic staff service is not quite right. To transmit information in the link of the General Staff district, mostly cryptographic machines were used. The so-called communication using a hand-held cipher was a backup communication scheme.
I can’t say anything about the district-headquarters army link — I did not conduct an analysis.

In the fourth part about the "Unexpected War" at the general educational level, it is described about encryption tools, as it happened about the standards.
https://topwar.ru/121933-neozhidannaya-voyna-gitlerovskoy-germanii-s-sssr-chast-4.html

I had to serve in the specified service after the war and I can not dispute anything that was written in the above article. The only inaccuracy that I can note is the speed of the cryptographers with a manual cipher. The standard was somewhere around 200-250 groups per hour (I can’t say more precisely - it was a long time and very little used this scheme). Frequently working specialists could work at a speed of 300 groups / hour. The article also indicates the speed of up to 600 groups / hour. Maybe there were such unique ones, but in my opinion - hardly.

[cavl]

Quote: yehat

encryption methods were then quite primitive, maximum table encryption

Since the comment contains the word "tabular", I would also clarify the following.
Negotiation tables relate to SUV - covert command and control of troops. Tables are prepared by cryptographers for the command of units and some officers of the operational department. Cryptographers themselves do not use these tables. They have a connection of another more advanced level.
What are SUV tables? The officers of the department provide phrases and single words that can be used by them in messages. Order the number of possible repetitions of the same phrase in one table of suv.
Based on the number of phrases and their repetitions, the number of combinations is determined. If it is 999, then a pile of cards with numbers from 1 to 999 fell out onto the table, mixed up.
If ten meanings were required for the first phrase in the table, then numbers from ten consecutively delivered cards were written opposite this phrase. Then we proceeded to the next phrase.
This is one table. When using it in negotiations or when transmitting text by telegraph, the numbers after use are crossed out to avoid their reuse.
The work was to prepare such talits long, tiring. Tables should not be wasted.
We prepared four-digit tables for the threatened period (up to the number 9999). Three-digit used only for exercises.
Whether somewhere prepared 5-digit tables - I do not know.
I sometimes wrote about the bus and it is possible, if interested, to see some of my answers.

[yehat]

I meant the table coding, which was shown in 17 instants of spring,
when 2 lines overlap each other according to some algorithm, 1 line is the key, the second is the text

[cavl]

The army has not seen such a system for many years.
I wrote a little incorrectly about the negotiation tables: all the services gave the most common phrases and phrases in their reports and other documents, and the principle of bringing numbers to these words is the same.

[ccsr]

Quote: yehat

I meant the table coding, which was shown in 17 instants of spring,
when 2 lines overlap each other according to some algorithm, 1 line is the key, the second is the text

This is a typical example of encryption, not encryption. Coding is used in order to convert alphanumeric text to digital in order to eliminate linguistic and alphabetic features, knowing which it is much easier for decryptors to open encrypted messages. Undercover networks just use mandatory encryption and encryption, which was shown in the film. For less significant situations in the field, especially fleeting ones, it is possible to do only with coding - this was usually done during the war.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

I remind you that since March 1941, the Chief of Staff of the General Staff, among other departments, was also subordinate to the Communications Administration of the spacecraft, i.e. he was the direct boss for the chief of communications of the spacecraft! G.K. Zhukov:

Can you give the number and date of the Government Decree on this decision?

. However, in general, on June 22, 1941, the Red Army had only 19 regiments of communications, 14 of which were subordinate to military districts, and 5 to specific armies. In addition, there were 25 separate battalions of wired communications, 16 separate radio battalions, including special battalions that were directly subordinate to the General Staff and NPO, and four separate communications companies. [670]

If you figure it out, then we are talking only about OSNAZ battalions, which were subordinated to the RU GSH, and not the entire communications control department of the spacecraft.
And to whom did GUSKA submit after its formation in 1941?

July 28, 1941 NPO created General Directorate of Communications of the Red Army (GUSKA) [676] and assigned him responsibility for establishing and maintaining communications between the Headquarters, its active fronts and armies with military services and departments. [677] This new department used the personnel of the communications units from the disbanded infantry and mechanized corps to form new units and units of communications in the existing divisions, armies and fronts.

Where are the words about his entry into the General Staff?

[AsmyppoL]

Comment ccsr: «Eugene: “I remind you that since March 1941, among other directorates, he was the direct supervisor for the head of communications of the SC!»

Number and date of the Government Decree on this decision can lead? "

Answer Eugene. If you yourself can not find anything on the Internet, then I will help you for the last time.

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR "On the distribution of responsibilities between the Deputy Commissar of Defense of the USSR" No.0113 15.3.41

In accordance with the decision of the Government of March 8 1941 g. I establish the following distribution of duties between my deputies:

... 2. On Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the General Staff of the Spacecraft, General of the Army t. Zhukov GK In addition to directing the activities of the Directorate of the General Staff of the spacecraft, I entrust the management of fuel supply, communications, and air defense of the country and the Academy of the General Staff.

Under the direct supervision of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the KA:
a) the General Staff of the spacecraft;
b) Management of fuel supply to the spacecraft;
at) Spacecraft Communications Directorate;
d) Main Directorate of Air Defense;
e) General Staff Academy ... ".

“The officers, to whom the servicemen are subordinated in the service, even if temporarily, are direct officers. The immediate superior to the subordinate is called the immediate superior. ” The Chief of the General Staff was the immediate superior for the Chief of the Spacecraft Communications Directorate.

Previously, you have already given messages that distort reality (Ccsr, 24.6.19): “All the independent departments, including the Main ones, are commanded only by the people's commissar, and the NGSh can bring his orders, and no more, because he does not have the rights to command the commanders or heads of departments that are not part of the general staff ...

At that time, Budyonny was the deputy to the NKO, and Zhukov, as the NGSh, was the first deputy to the NKO Tymoshenko ... ”.

The text of the order of the People's Commissar of Defense is unambiguous: “The Main Automobile Armored Directorate of the Red Army, 3-e Directorate, the Department of Personnel of the Red Army, the Financial Directorate at the Non-Profit Organization, the Administration of the Affairs of the Non-Profit Organization in my immediate submission ...”. Only five directorates are directly subordinate to the People's Commissar of Defense..

You write your messages and do not look at the text of the order itself ... Interesting position: I know, but I’m going to look at the original sources ... The sofa experts at least try to search for something on the Internet ...

[AsmyppoL]

Comment Ccsr: "However, in general, on 22 June 1941, the KA had only 19 regiments of communications, 14 of which were subordinated to military districts, and 5 - to specific armies. In addition, there were 25 separate wire battalions, 16 individual radio battalions, including special-purpose radio battalions, which were directly subordinate to the General Staff and the NPO, and four separate communications companies.
If you figure it out, then we are talking only about OSNAZ battalions, which were subordinated to the RU GSH, and not the entire communications control department of the spacecraft.
And to whom did GUSKA submit after its formation in 1941?
28 July 1941 was created by the NKO created the Red Army Communications Directorate (GUSKA) and placed on it the responsibility for establishing and maintaining the link between the Stavka, its active fronts and armies with military services and departments. This new administration used the personnel of the communications units from the disbanded infantry and mechanized corps to form new communications units and subunits as part of the existing divisions, armies and fronts.
Where are the words about his entry into the General Staff? ”

[AsmyppoL]

Answer Eugene. I am surprised that you are throwing everything in a heap: there was only more text. Even if this text is off topic.

What does the 28.7.41 event of the year have to do with my article? The period before the start of the war and the first days after its start are considered! Until 1 July!

Do you have something against the order of Tymoshenko from 15 March 1941? Then give a more precise wording of this order (in your opinion), which says that in the direct submission of the Chief of the General Staff No Office of Communications KA! Why write any nonsense, if the text of the Order of the People's Commissar of Defense cannot be refuted !!

You do not agree with the fact that divisions OSNAZ listed in the document, which was signed by the leaders of NGOs? Give another interpretation of this document, which states that these parts are not considered to be part of the RGK communications, but for the RS GSA! Why write any nonsense, if the text of the NPO document cannot be refuted !!

Note by the NKO of the USSR and the General Staff of the Spacecraft in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) - I.V. Stalin and SNK V.M. Molotov outlining the mobilization deployment of the spacecraft

Appendix 2 Statement of the main parts and connections of spacecraft deployed on the mobilization plan 1941 of the year, compared with the mobilization plan 1938-1939.

Chief of the General Staff of the SC, Army General Zhukov
Major General Chetverikov, Chief of the General Staff Administration

Why write some text if you can not refute the documents that I brought for information!

I am surprised that you do not even know that the number of these divisions of OSNAZ was among the number of CONNECTION troops!
“Communication troops on the eve of the war, unlike other types of troops, were kept in reduced peacetime states. They consisted of: personnel - 42384 man, communications regiments - 19 (14 district and 5 army), separate communication battalions - 25, individual radio divisions, including OSNAZ, 16, individual companies - 4 and a number of other units ... ”.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

I am surprised that you do not even know that the number of these divisions of OSNAZ was among the number of CONNECTION troops!

Do not lie - the divisions of the Special Forces Aviation Administration subordinate to the chief of intelligence of the district, and not to the chief of communications of the district, and were not part of the district communications units, but were part of the district intelligence kit.

Appendix 2 Statement of the main parts and formations of the spacecraft deployed according to the mobilization plan of 1941, compared with the mobilization plan of 1938-1939.

The statement does not indicate the purpose of the OSNAZ divisions - they were simply not singled out in the RGK units as radio intelligence units, so as not to produce a separate table - teach materiel, "theorist".

Order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the Union of the SSR "On the distribution of duties between deputies of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR" No. 0113 15.3.41

As regards this order of the NPO, it could not decide anything in matters of improving communications, but on the contrary played a negative role, lowering the threshold of the importance of communications troops in the structure of the Armed Forces, and its adoption, in addition to harm, did nothing. So, in essence, he did not give anything to the communications troops, but only aggravated the already unenviable state of the communications troops on the eve of the war. Moreover, this order was canceled altogether, because the future marshal of the communications troops Peresypkin himself became the deputy people's commissar of defense:

On July 25, 1941, Peresypkin sent a memorandum to Stalin’s defense narcotic in order to improve the management and logistics of communications units, reorganize the USCA into GUSKA, which was done by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense on July 28.
In 1941-1943, as deputy commissar of defense for communications and head of GUSKA (1941-1945) Ivan Peresypkin, in accordance with the constantly changing situation, was deciding the issues of ensuring communication in the operational-strategic link of management, coordinating its organization.

https://topwar.ru/51746-svyazuyuschee-zveno-velikoy-pobedy.html
Those. all your speculation about the March order concerned only four and a few months of 1941, and essentially the chief of the general staff had no time to play any role in the activities of the communications troops. But you can assume that you have solved the great mystery of the pre-war construction of the communications troops - it was the March order that showed that it was a mistake to entrust the chief of the general staff with such a thing. But you will never understand this anyway, because you don’t know the essence of the processes then.

[AsmyppoL]

According to the documents, the number of OSNAZ divisions was considered in the total number of communications troops!
Give a document refuting my words! Give the facts and do not need to talk!
It seems you are confused, I'm not going to sit with you on the bench and gossip like OBS. This is your own chat!
Facts, documents!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

According to the documents, the number of OSNAZ divisions was considered in the total number of communications troops!

Lies - after the separation of direction finding companies from communication battalions, they no longer belonged to communication units. Even in the military intelligence system, the district intelligence chief had his own separate radio node, which was used outside the district’s communications system - you are just an amateur in these matters.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Facts, documents!

Open the states of military intelligence, and then you will find out where the parts of the Special Forces Forces entered - I won’t do this for you, do the educational program yourself.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

What does the event of July 28.7.41, 1 have to do with my article? The period before the start of the war and the first days after its start is considered! Until July XNUMXst!

This "period" lasted four months - isn't it too short to be considered something decisive for the signal troops?

Quote: AsmyppoL

Do you have something against the order of Tymoshenko from 15 March 1941?

No, I have nothing against him, except that it was canceled very quickly, which means that the order was not reasonable and did not meet the tasks of the communications troops.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Why write some text if you can not refute the documents that I brought for information!

Your speculation on the excellent order is unlikely to add credibility to you, especially since you don’t understand how much damage he has done to the communications troops, given that there were signalmen in all types and branches of the armed forces, and who did not report directly to the NSS - you still don’t understand.

[AsmyppoL]

Chatter again - OBS. The order exists, do not refute it! During the war years and in less time, the head brought order, if he wanted to!
Just the facts! For the authority to fight in your eyes - God forbid from such authority! A user who can not submit a single document or fact, and only everywhere quotes his opinion of the sofa expert!

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The order exists, it cannot be refuted! During the war years and in less time, the chief put things in order if he wanted to!

This is all demagogy, which once again proved that you do not see the forests beyond the trees, and in general you don’t understand how everything in the army works. Burn further, considering that Zhukov could solve all the problems of the communications troops if he was appointed responsible in March 1941, three months before the war.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You write your messages and do not look at the text of the order itself ... Interesting position: I know, but I’m going to look at the original sources ... The sofa experts at least try to search for something on the Internet ...

This is you a typical couch expert who grabbed some sort of order in 1941, and does not understand at all that until that time the communications department was not subordinate to the chief of the General Staff, but subordinated to NGOs. Those. the general headquarters had nothing to do with all the many years of pre-war work of the communications department, but you absolutely did not understand this and blamed the NSS for the communications failures, which once again showed what kind of amateur you are in military matters, since you don’t understand that the Red Army’s communications troops cannot be modernized in four months if this has not happened in previous years. Those. You initially launched a false version of the responsibility of the General Staff for failures in the pre-war planning of communication systems, and this once again proved that you are an ordinary couch expert.

[AsmyppoL]

[quote = AsmyppoL]ccsr: “Ostap was carried away ... There was no" cipher-headquarters service (SHS) ", but there was just a" cipher service (SHS) ", without any" headquarters ". This is how people who are illiterate in military affairs come up with fables, spread them through the networks, and then they are surprised that they are called liars. Where did you get the term "cipher-staff service (SHS)" - tell us or give a link, just not to Victoria, which itself is illiterate in such matters ... [/ quote]
Reply. The encryption service itself is officially called cryptographic headquarters service (ШШС), and its departments (department, administration) in the troops at the same time are called the crypto department, or the 8 department ...
It is strange that you do not know this, but confidently prove your wrong opinion. And Victoria knew it and wrote earlier. It turns out that your status is significantly lower than its illiterate ... [/ quote]

There are even more 10000 related documents mentioning shsh while mentioning the 8 department (8 Office) or the encryption department ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Answer. The encryption service itself is officially called the encryption-staff service (SHS), and its departments (department, Directorate) in the troops at the same time are called the encryption department, or 8 department ...

This is a lie, because there is an Order of the NKO of the USSR announcing provisions on the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR. November 22, 1934 where no "cipher-staff service" is registered in the General Staff:

Regulations of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR
About the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR
Section 1 People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR
....Chapter 1
Headquarters of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army
18. The headquarters of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army consists of the following departments: 1) operational, 2) combat training, 3) military communications, 4) organizational, 5) material and planning, 6) fuel, 7) military topographic service, 8) cryptographic.

You can continue to speculate with some texts from encrypted messages. but the fundamental one is the Government Decree, where the name "encryption department" is clearly given, without any "headquarters".
This is what distinguishes me from you - you can fantasize anything, and I use only the existing orders and regulations. So where is the decree or order on the formation of a "cipher-staff department (management)" in the spacecraft or in the general staff?

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

There are even more 10000 related documents mentioning shsh while mentioning the 8 department (8 Office) or the encryption department ...

You are simply talking nonsense, because in the text of this encryption "ShShS" stands for "cipher of the cipher service", because besides the cipher officers, the cipher service has clerks, clerks, typists, etc.
That is why, in the list that you posted here at the beginning of the article, shSS is written next to the names of the officers, and you could not even explain why it was printed like that in the service document, because the position is called "encryption assistant of the encryption service", and the factory does not have it.
https://

topwar.ru/uploads/posts/2019-07/thumbs/1561946726_6.jpg

[AsmyppoL]

When God wants to punish someone, he takes away brains! Again many words and not a single fact!
Lying on the couch, it's easy to come up with everything. You can let the fog go: "You can write whatever you want, but you don't even understand why the document says "ШШС" and not "ШШС" and why the first letter is uppercase and not capitalized - this is a Chinese letter for you". This is exactly what the typical sofa experts do - they know, and everyone else does not ...

Then we'll come up with a position for importance. "cryptographic encryption assistant". And again, not a single fact! So" geniuses "from the couch do not need this! At the same time, you do not even need to read previous messages, so the couch expert knows everything, panting with zeal!

Here is a drawing of Junior Lieutenant Lyubimy, whose would-be expert spotted a tiny letter "w" in front of "ShS". Below is the full official name of the position of this commander of the "cipher-staff service" without any secret meaning.

Again, the official document:

In the opinion of the would-be expert, he should be called the "Encryption Commander of the Encryption Service"!
Only for some reason such "smart" thoughts did not occur to our really smart military ancestors. They call these specialists - specialists of the cipher-staff service:

.

For an expert from the couch, even the major general - the chief of staff who is obliged to know all the full job titles in his headquarters is mistaken!))) When there is nothing to say, we’re threatening to inflate our cheeks and thoughtfully say something that only a divider knows)))

[AsmyppoL]

For an expert from the couch, it’s like a department or service! He is not in the house that these are different concepts!
And the People's Commissar of Defense made a mistake by signing order No. 213 from 1 December 1939 of the year! And the fact that such documents in the archive more than 10 thousands of copies! In short, this is a user who is not responsible for his words and cannot submit any documents. OBS

[AsmyppoL]

Not in the hands of couch experts that the structure of military bodies is not so simple ...
The intelligence department or the Directorate, and it also has an information intelligence service ... They don’t teach such tricks in school ... They have a narrow mind, and they don’t allow mothers to search on websites and archives .....

[AsmyppoL]

Thinking deeply, the sofa expert issued another brilliant saying: "cipher of the encryption service". Without even thinking that this pearl shows his lack of competence in the previous answer. In which he also zealously proved some nonsense WITHOUT PRESENTING ANY DOCUMENT AS USUALLY.
The only argument is that the clerk does not apply to shsc. Only the conclusion as usual is wrong! And how to make the right conclusion, if you are lying on the couch, there is no experience in this matter, but to look for something is frankly lazy!
Not to the expert from the sofa, that until 1 in July, 1941 had no clerks in the cryptographic department, which was part of the operations department! All clerks were listed in the operations department and one of them worked with documents received from the cryptographic department (or from the cryptographic-staff service) in the operations department.
A typical example of how a couch expert tries to show his importance and I don’t know for sure he constantly writes all sorts of nonsense
It looks like the situation changes dramatically with age. "Genius" is critically increasing .....

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

Not to the expert’s house from the couch, that until July 1, 1941 there were no clerks in the encryption department, which was part of the operations department!

Here you are lying, and because of your ignorance, you have ridiculed yourself, because there were two secret parts in the operational management, and the cryptographic department's work was independent. The order of NCO 0105 of 1939 did not abolish the conduct of secret office work in the encryption department, and moreover, it was canceled as soon as the war broke out, which once again confirmed the stupidity of some commanders.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

For an expert from the couch, it’s the same as a department or a service!

You nifiga do not know that, in addition to 8 divisions (offices) of headquarters, the encryptors were on the ships of the Navy (before they left the NCO subordination), in embassies, in residencies and in reconnaissance and sabotage groups, and all this was united by one common concept in the Red Army "encryption service". And how will you drag your "cipher-headquarters" service to the radio operator-cipher officer of the General Staff, if they had their own encryption system, which had nothing to do with the 8th department (management) of the General Staff? However, this question is understood by experts, and not by such amateurs as you.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

And the People's Commissar of Defense made a mistake by signing order No. 213 from 1 December 1939 of the year! And the fact that such documents in the archive more than 10 thousands of copies! In short, this is a user who is not responsible for his words and cannot submit any documents. OBS

Your ignorance is no longer surprising, but you seem to have no idea where the name "headquarters encryption service" came from and in what context. have never seen the order of the NCO No. 0105 of 1939. Educate yourself, verbiage:

ORDER OF THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF DEFENSE OF THE USSR
On the reorganization of the operational management of the General Staff and operational departments of the headquarters of military districts, military units
No. 0105 July 19, 1939
.... On the basis of this, the Main Military Council recognized the need to change the existing situation and raise the importance of operational directorates and staff divisions, having assigned to them all the responsibility for organizing operational communications, headquarters cryptographic service manual and for processing all intelligence data.

If you understood at least something in the documents, then you would have understood that the order does not refer to all the RKKA encryptors, but only those who were in the headquarters. And this does not mean that a "headquarters encryption service" was created in the General Staff, as you have been lying for a long time, but we are talking about the MANAGEMENT of the headquarters 8th department (encryption), and no more. By the way, the order does not contain a hyphen in the words "headquarters encryption service", which you, due to illiteracy, insert into the text of your posts:

coming from the encryption department (or from the cryptographic staff service) to the affairs of the oper department.

Well, you are literate, you are nonsense with a smart look, without even having studied the governing documents.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

For an expert from the couch, even the major general - the chief of staff who is obliged to know all the full job titles in his headquarters is mistaken!))) When there is nothing to say, we’re threatening to inflate our cheeks and thoughtfully say something that only a divider knows)))

Once again, I remind the layman that in the 1934 government decree, a "cipher department" is provided for in the structure of the General Staff. the word "headquarters" is missing. If the department has a name of two phrases, then the department is called: "5) material planning, ... 7) military topographic service," All your dances around the words of the "cipher-staff" service are connected with documents of the lower level, where some illiterate performers arbitrarily distorted the name of the department, and senior bosses signed them without reading them. You are now running around with this, and you absolutely do not want to present me at least one document of the government or an order of the People's Commissar of Defense, where the structure of the General Staff would have a "cipher-headquarters department" you just made up its existence, and you cannot admit that you have blasted stupidity.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Then, for the sake of importance, we'll come up with the position "Encryption Assistant Encryption Service"

Yes, I didn’t come up with this - it was you who posted the document where there is the text "Assistant Chief of the Department for ShShS" and could not explain why the first "sh" is written with a small letter. So I had to open your eyes to this so that you would not replicate your lies further. By the way, the first document where this is indicated was created at the level of the district headquarters (front), and this speaks of the level of knowledge of its constituents, and all your other examples are at best not higher than the army level, or even lower, which does not surprise me ...

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

So who is to blame for the loss of command and control of troops due to communications problems in border districts: Head of the Communications Directorate, General Staff or Stalin? General Galich was removed from his post as head of the June 22 Communications Department, and on August 6 he was arrested. General Galich is not exactly to blame for this, since his report, long before the war, described the problems of the communication crisis in the initial period of the war and measures to remedy the situation. Blame Stalin or Zhukov? Could it have been possible to improve the situation by increasing the output of communications and increase the number of trained personnel?

A typical illiterate statement by the author, which is characterized not only by the fact that the author does not even know the name of the head of the Communications Directorate, but essentially it is false.
First, GAPICH did not submit to the General Staff until March 1941, but submitted to the addict Tymoshenko, i.e. the author deliberately juggles, contrasting Zhukov and Stalin. In fact, since 1934, after the release of the famous Decree, the head of communications of the spacecraft for seven years obeyed the drug addict, i.e. the same Tymoshenko in 1940, and only in March 1941 began to obey Zhukov. So blame the General Staff for all the mistakes of the many years of pre-war construction of communications troops can either an illiterate person, or an outright liar, misinterpreting our military history.
And this is clearly seen from the following text:

Note by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the Chief of the General Staff of the KA in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B.) - I.V. Stalin and SNK of the USSR - V.M. Molotov on organizing events in the military districts of 4.07.1940/XNUMX/XNUMX:

Firstly, Zhukov at that time was not an NGS, and secondly, the note itself just says that the organization of communications in the spacecraft should be decided first of all by the Government of the country, and not by the People’s Commissariat of Defense, and especially not the chief of the General Staff. Yes, and the note itself was signed by an NPO, and that says it all.
It is from such distortions that the author stubbornly pushes the theory that it is the General Staff that is to blame for the failure of command and control of the troops, because he allegedly could not solve the problem with the means of communication in the three pre-war months. It remains to pity the readers who believe this false historian, who even misinterpreted the name of the head of the Communications Department of the KA, which further testifies to his illiteracy in military matters of the pre-war period and the improper use of other people's materials.

[Griol]

When the question is asked whether the General Staff is guilty of the confusion, defeat of units, border armies in the first weeks and months of the war, in the absence of proper communications among the troops, it seems that the author of the question is mocking those who read his opuses. Who's to blame? Since the post-war times, a whole division of "military" historians licks the issues of the Second World War, but the trouble is that they cannot find the culprits of those tragic events. In order not to stir up this issue further, as a career officer who has served 27 years, I can say: communications in the Armed Forces, especially in the ground forces, in artillery has always been the most disastrous, neglected issue. And how many political workers did not sing to us that "..... the party has drawn the right conclusions from the hard lessons of the Second World War and is doing everything ...." She did not do anything, the connection was always at the level of the Kus-Kus Indians.