Tsushima battle. "Pearls" in battle
In this article we return to the description of the actions of the Pearl type cruisers in the Tsushima battle. It might seem that, arguing about the intentions and decisions of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, the author has excessively gone from the topic, but all this was absolutely necessary for understanding why our high-speed reconnaissance cruisers were not used for their intended purpose, that is, to detect the main forces of the enemy.
In the classic sea battle, when both squadrons are looking for a decisive battle, reconnaissance is necessary, as it allows the admiral, who produces it, to detect enemy main forces in advance, which allows him to arrange and build up his squadron at the time of visual contact with them. fight in the most rational and profitable way.
In previous articles of this series, the author showed that the Russian commander, fully aware of the advantages that H. gives. Togo's high squadron speed of his ships, did not have the slightest hope. The problem was that the main forces, even in conditions of poor visibility, could see each other for seven miles, and the distance of decisive artillery battle, at which it would really be possible to cause significant damage to enemy ships, was less than 4 miles, i.e. 40 cable. In other words, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky could not have “trapped” the Japanese fleet, lined up in one way or another: having discovered that the situation was not in his favor, H. Togo would always have been able to evade, retreat and begin rapprochement in a new way. Moreover, the superiority of the Japanese fleet in speed, it provided him with an unconditional tactical advantage, which, with proper maneuvering, allowed the Russians to set the “crossing T” and defeat the Russian squadron.
According to the author, which he substantiated in detail in previous materials, Z.P. Rozhestvensky, understanding the advantages of the Japanese, found a very original way out of a seemingly intractable situation. He planned to follow the march consisting of two columns, and to unfold in battle formation only when the main forces of the enemy were within his sight, and their intentions would become clear. In other words, since the Japanese could have crushed any Russian squadron in any military formation, which the Russian squadron could only accept, Zinovy Petrovich decided not to take any order, and to make a reorganization into battle order only at the very last moment.
Oddly enough, this tactic in Tsushima worked - H. Togo went to the left shell of the Russian squadron to attack the relatively weak left column, led by the battleship Oslyabya, consisting of the old ships 2-oh and 3-his armored troops. According to the author, the fact that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky nevertheless managed to bring his newest battleships of the Borodino type into the left column head, it became a most unpleasant surprise for H. Togo, so instead of crushing the weakest part of the Russian ships or setting up the "crossing T" he was forced to portray a maneuver, later called the "Loop Togo". Its essence was to turn consistently under enemy fire, and it is difficult to assume that this maneuver was pre-planned by the Japanese admiral: not only did he put the Japanese in a vulnerable position at the stage of its execution, he also did not give great tactical advantages. If H. Togo needed to simply bring the columns of his battleships and armored cruisers into the head of the Russian squadron, he could have done this in a much less extreme way.
However, to understand the role that Z.P. took to “Pearl” and “Emerald”. Rozhdestvensky, the consequences of maneuvering the Japanese and Russian squadrons are not so important. The key is the plan of the Russian commander, which consisted in not doing any rebuilding until the main Japanese forces appeared on the horizon and showed their intentions. In other words, Z.P. Rozhestvensky was not going to rebuild before the main forces of the Japanese appeared.
But if so, why would he conduct reconnaissance?
Of course, from the point of view of the classic tactics of the sea battle, intelligence was extremely important, but the whole point was that the Russian commander was going to act completely unclassical. His non-standard plan for the outbreak of battle made reconnaissance by cruisers unnecessary, so there was no point in sending Pearls and Emeralds to it.
Of course, for cruisers intended for service during the squadron, there was another task: to prevent the enemy from conducting reconnaissance. But, first, this was never charged to the domestic "second-class" ships of this class - after all, they were too weak for that. Secondly, it was required to drive away the enemy's cruisers in order not to let the enemy know about their intentions, in order to hide their location, range, course and speed, but Z.P. Rozhestvensky, who made the decision to unfold in order of battle in view of the enemy, all this was not necessary.
And, finally, the third obvious reason for refusing to interfere in enemy reconnaissance was the sheer weakness of the cruisers 2 and 3 in the Pacific Squadrons. The Japanese had an overwhelming numerical superiority in armored cruisers over Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. In addition, as was known from the experience of fighting at Port Arthur, they often supported the latter with armored cruisers H. Kamimura: at the same time, the Russian commander did not have ships capable of providing such support to our armored cruisers.
As is known, the Russian commander expected the appearance of the main Japanese forces from the north. It was from there that the 5 combat squadron appeared, consisting of the old battleship Chin-Yen and the armored cruisers “Itsukushima”, “Hasidate”, and “Matsushima”, and on the Russian squadron they were also believed to be accompanied by “Akitsushima” and “Suma” . In fact, in addition to these two cruisers, the 5 squadron also accompanied the Chiyoda. There was no point in directing Russian cruisers against such forces: it is possible that they could drive away the Japanese ships, but at what cost? And if one more cruiser detachment approached the Japanese, then the battle would become unequal.
In other words, the cruisers of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was a little, and they were not too strong (excluding "Oleg"). The Russian admiral decided to use them to protect the transports, as well as to cover the main forces from the attacks of the destroyers and the role of repetitive ships. Accordingly, any other use of them was possible only for the achievement of some important, significant goals: an attack by Japanese intelligence officers, obviously, was not such a target. Z.P. Rozhestvensky won absolutely nothing because Japanese scouts would not have seen his squadron - on the contrary! Recall that the decision to attack the left column of the Russian squadron X. Togo made long before coming on direct visibility, guided by information received from its cruisers engaged in reconnaissance.
Strictly speaking, to implement the plan Z.P. Rozhestvensky should not just hide the Russian squadron, but proudly demonstrate its marching system to the Japanese scouts. Only in this way it would be possible to “convince” H. Togo to abandon the “crossing T” and to attack one of the columns of the Russian ships. Perhaps this is the reason for the strange reluctance of the Russian commander to discourage Japanese intelligence officers: the prohibition to interrupt Japanese radiograms, the rejection of the Izumi attack, etc.
Thus, the Russian commander did not have a single reason to send the Emerald and the Pearls to reconnaissance, but there were many reasons not to do so. In any case, intelligence itself is not an end in itself, but a means to put the enemy at a disadvantage: and, since it was the Japanese who got into it, there is no reason to consider this decision of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky erroneous.
The consequence of this decision of the Russian commander was a completely non-heroic stay of "Pearls" and "Emerald" under the main forces of the squadron. And although “Zhemchug” before the battle began, the main forces managed to “clarify” the Japanese ship trying to pass under the nose of the squadron, and “Emerald” even fought a little with the Japanese cruisers when an occasional shot from the Eagle in 11.15 put an end to the short ten-minute Russian exchange of fire Armadillos with the ships of admirals Kataoki and Deva, but, by and large, nothing interesting happened to these cruisers.
After a small skirmish with the Japanese cruisers, during which the Emerald, while firing, switched to the right flank of the Russian squadron, he was instructed to be in the battle from a non-shooting side. At that time, both Russian cruisers along with the 1 detachment of the destroyers were aboard the "Prince Suvorov", while the "Emerald" was going to the wilderness of the "Pearl". But, approximately in 12.00 Z.P. Rozhestvensky ordered them to retreat a little, having shifted to the traverse of the Eagle, which was executed by the cruisers.
The main forces of the Japanese were found at Zhemchug at about the same time as they were seen on Prince Suvorov, that is, somewhere in 13.20, when they were still on the right shell of the Russian squadron. From a cruiser, just in case, they made a shot from the nose 120-mm guns, so that the Japanese battleships would not overlook the flagship. Then, after the ships of Kh. Togo and H. Kamimura crossed to the left side, they were lost on the Pearls, and were seen again only after the Japanese, carrying out the “loop of Togo”, opened fire on the Oslyab. But on the “Pearl” battleships H. Togo, nevertheless, saw badly. However, the Japanese shells that gave the flight went near the “Pearl”, and even fell into it. The commander of the cruiser PP Levitsky ordered to open a return fire - not so much in order to damage the enemy, who was almost invisible, but rather to raise the morale of the team.
For some time nothing happened for “Pearls”, and then the real adventures began. As you know, the 14.26 on the "Prince Suvorov" was disabled wheel, and he turned to 180 hail. (16 points), rolled right. Initially, "Alexander III" turned behind him, and only after it was realized that it was not a maneuver, but an uncontrolled movement of a damaged ship, "Alexander III" led the squadron further.
However, at the "Pearl" these events saw that the main forces of the squadron unfold. And at the same time, they found the Japanese flagship Mikasa, which seemed to be cutting across the Russian course. This was not true, since at that moment squadron courses were closer to parallel ones, but the commander of Pearls suggested that the Japanese were moving to the right side of the Russian system. Accordingly, staying at the same place “Zhemugug” risked being between the main forces of the Russians and the Japanese, which was unacceptable: the order of Z.P. Rozhestvensky determined the place of 2 rank cruisers behind the formation of Russian battleships, and nothing else.
Accordingly, P.P. Levitsky led his ship to the left side of the Russian squadron, sending "Pearls" in the gap formed between the "Eagle" and "Great Sisoy" after the failure of "Oslyabi". However, this, seemingly the right decision, led to the fact that the Pearl was no more than an 25 cable from the end armored cruisers of the 1 of the Japanese military unit, Nissin and Kasuga, which immediately fired at the small Russian cruiser. However, it is possible, of course, that some other ships fired at Pearl, it is only certain that shells were falling around it.
P.P. Levitsky quickly realized that he was mistaken in his assumption, and made an attempt to return to the right side of the squadron. For some reason, he could not return just as he had come — that is, through the gap between the “Eagle” and “Sisoy the Great”, and therefore he went along the Russian squadron.
“On the Internet,” the author repeatedly encountered the opinion that the 3 Pacific Pacific Squadron was well trained in maneuvering. However, at the "Pearl" saw a completely different, PP In his testimony of the Investigation Commission, Levitsky stated: “Seeing that the vessels of Admiral Nebogatov were stretched to such an extent that the intervals between them reach the 5 cable and more ...”. In other words, with commander intervals set at 2 cabel, the length of the entire squadron system was about 3 miles, but only 4 of the Nebogatov ship managed to stretch at least 1,7-1,8 miles!
Taking advantage of large intervals, the Zhemchug passed under the stern at coastal defense battleship Admiral-General Apraksin, who was following the Emperor Nicholas I, in the gap between him and the Senyavin, and returned to the right side of the squadron.
P.P. Levitsky saw that the Russian cruisers, to the right of transports going a little way off, were fighting with their Japanese "classmates", and that the Apraksin was trying to help them - apparently, the ships of the main Japanese forces were too far for him, or on the battleship coastal defense did not see them. The commander of the "Pearl" then reported that both towers of the Apraksin were aimed at Japanese cruisers trying to break through to the transports. Not wanting to shoot them down, PP Levitsky reduced the speed of his ship to small — and it was here that the auxiliary cruiser “Ural”, which tried to keep closer to the battleships, and made a pile on the “Pearl”.
P.P. Levitsky ordered an increase in the course immediately after the main caliber of the Apraksin, but this was not enough, since the Ural was in contact with the bow of the Pearls astern. Damage was not fatal, but unpleasant:
1. The edges of the blades of the right propeller were bent;
2. The square, fastening shirstrekovy belt side plating with deck stringer in the stern, was dented;
3. The scoop of the stern mine apparatus broke, the mine itself, charged into it, broke, and its charging compartment fell into the water and sank.
I must say that the stern mine apparatus was on the cruiser the only one made for battle: the airborne, with that excitement and draft of the cruiser, could not be used. Thus, the bulk of the "Ural" has deprived the cruiser of its torpedo armament: however, given the meager firing range, it was still completely useless. There was one more thing - the right machine of the latter stopped from the impact of the “Ural” on the “Pearls” body, and steam was immediately blocked off: but then it was gradually added, and the car acted quite freely, obviously without receiving any damage.
But why in the "Ural" did not do anything to avoid a collision with a cruiser reduced course? The fact is that by this time the "Ural" received quite serious damage.
About half an hour after the start of the battle, according to the commander of the cruiser, a “at least ten-inch” projectile hit him, as a result of which the “Ural” got an underwater hole on the port side, in the nose. The water immediately flooded the front "bomb cellar", as well as the coal pit, which turned out to be empty, which caused the Ural to have a strong trim on the bow and roll on the port side. As a result, the auxiliary cruiser, built as a passenger airliner, and not a warship, became ill to obey the helm. But, as if this was not enough, the enemy shells damaged the telemotor and killed the steering pipe's steam pipe. As a result, the ship completely lost the helm and could only be controlled by machines.
All this, of course, in itself, extremely difficult to control the cruiser, but, as if all of the above were not enough, almost immediately interrupted the machine telegraph. This has not completely broken the connection with the engine room, because, in addition to the telegraph, there was also a telephone, on which the commander of the Ural Istomin began to give commands. But then the watch mechanic Ivanitsky appeared to him and reported on behalf of the senior mechanic that because of the roar of shells and the fire of his own artillery in the engine, they could not hear the phone at all ...
In the light of the foregoing, by the time when Zhemchug dropped the turn in order not to interfere with the Apraksin shot, the Urals was almost out of control, which led to bulk. It is interesting, by the way, that the commander of the Ural believed that he was confronted not with the Pearl, but with the Emerald.
Having completed his “run” between the squadron battling the main forces and returning to the right side of the Russian column, PP Levitsky, as it seemed to him then, finally considered the plight of the flagship battleship "Prince Suvorov" and went to him. Later on the "Pearl" we learned that in fact it was not the "Suvorov", and the battleship "Alexander III". On the way, “Pearls” had to dodge “Sisoi the Great”, which, according to the words of the “Pearls” commander, he went to intercept. It was not possible for the author of this article to find out what it was, because there is no evidence that Sisoy the Great would leave the column at this time (closer to four o'clock in the afternoon). Around 16.00, the Pearl came under the stern of Alexander III and partially stopped the course: two destroyers were seen leaving the battered flagship, one of which began to unfold, as if having a desire to approach the starboard of the Pearls. On the cruiser, they noticed that flag-captain Clape de Colong was on board the destroyer, and they decided that the rest of the headquarters and the admiral were also there, and that they probably all wanted to go to the cruiser. Accordingly, “Pearls” prepared to receive people on board: the entrance to the right ladder was open, ends were prepared, stretchers for the wounded and began to launch the whaleboat.
However, when the whaleboat had already begun to lower, PP Levitsky discovered that the destroyer was not going to approach the Pearl at all, but went somewhere further to the right of the cruiser, with the second destroyer moving behind him. And on the left, the Japanese battleships appeared, and the range finder showed that there was no more than 20 cables to them. The enemy immediately opened fire, so that around the "Alexander III" and "Pearls" immediately began to tear shells. Having lost his only mine apparatus capable of using torpedoes, PP Levitsky lost even theoretical chances to harm such a strong opponent, and was forced to retreat, especially since his battleships could not be seen. From the “Pearls” they saw only Borodino and the Eagle, which passed under the stern of the cruiser and disappeared from view. The cruiser made a full turn and, turning to the right, went after the destroyers leaving the Alexander III.
Perhaps someone will be able to see this as a lack of PP Morale. Levitsky, who left the "Alexander" alone in the face of a detachment of Japanese battleships. Perhaps someone will remember the actions N.O. von Essen, fearlessly leading his Novik to Japanese armored ships. But let's not forget that Nikolai Ottovich still “attacked” the Japanese flagship because of the whole port-arthur squadron, to which the Japanese fire was diverted, and here at Pearl, dare he do that, there was no such cover. Decision P.P. Levitsky, of course, was not heroic, but it can’t be considered cowardly in any way.
Why on the "Pearls" could not distinguish the "Alexander III" from the "Suvorov"? Flagship battleship ZP Rozhestvensky was on, already without pipes and masts, and was not seen from the cruiser. At the same time, "Alexander III" by that time had already been badly burned and was so smoked that the inscription on the stern of the armadillo became completely indistinguishable. Although P.P. Levitsky later admitted that someone from his team could still read it when Pearls, turning to the right, briefly approached the battleship.
At the departure, “Pearls” received damage: it was at this time that an impact occurred, the consequences of which PP Levitsky described in his testimony in detail. The enemy shell hit the middle pipe and severely damaged it, fragments flew into the stoker, and the gases from the gap blew the flame out of the fireboxes. But the majority of the fragments hit the place where the right-side 120-mm cannon was located, the commanders serving him were killed or wounded, and the deck was pierced in many places. In addition, the fragments hit the nasal bridge, wounding three sailors and killing warrant officer Tavassherna. There were also ignitions - the fire engulfed four 120-mm "cartridges" lying at the gun, the command compartment filled with coal and a boot on the whaleboot caught fire. Gunpowder in the cartridges began to explode, and one of the cartridges was wounded by midshipman Ratkov.
Here I would like to note a small discrepancy: V.V. Khromov, in his monograph on Pearl-class cruisers, indicates that it was not four 120-mm cartridges that caught fire, but only three, but the commander of Pearls, P.P. Levitsky indicates that there were four of them. Be that as it may, the "Pearl" left after the destroyers. P.P. Levitsky assumed that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky and the admiral himself did not switch to his cruiser only because of the proximity of the enemy battleships, but when he went beyond their fire and, around 16.00, he approached the destroyers to KNI 1, they still did not express such a desire.
But what was the Emerald doing at this time? To be continued…
And yet: why?
In the classic sea battle, when both squadrons are looking for a decisive battle, reconnaissance is necessary, as it allows the admiral, who produces it, to detect enemy main forces in advance, which allows him to arrange and build up his squadron at the time of visual contact with them. fight in the most rational and profitable way.
In previous articles of this series, the author showed that the Russian commander, fully aware of the advantages that H. gives. Togo's high squadron speed of his ships, did not have the slightest hope. The problem was that the main forces, even in conditions of poor visibility, could see each other for seven miles, and the distance of decisive artillery battle, at which it would really be possible to cause significant damage to enemy ships, was less than 4 miles, i.e. 40 cable. In other words, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky could not have “trapped” the Japanese fleet, lined up in one way or another: having discovered that the situation was not in his favor, H. Togo would always have been able to evade, retreat and begin rapprochement in a new way. Moreover, the superiority of the Japanese fleet in speed, it provided him with an unconditional tactical advantage, which, with proper maneuvering, allowed the Russians to set the “crossing T” and defeat the Russian squadron.
According to the author, which he substantiated in detail in previous materials, Z.P. Rozhestvensky, understanding the advantages of the Japanese, found a very original way out of a seemingly intractable situation. He planned to follow the march consisting of two columns, and to unfold in battle formation only when the main forces of the enemy were within his sight, and their intentions would become clear. In other words, since the Japanese could have crushed any Russian squadron in any military formation, which the Russian squadron could only accept, Zinovy Petrovich decided not to take any order, and to make a reorganization into battle order only at the very last moment.
Oddly enough, this tactic in Tsushima worked - H. Togo went to the left shell of the Russian squadron to attack the relatively weak left column, led by the battleship Oslyabya, consisting of the old ships 2-oh and 3-his armored troops. According to the author, the fact that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky nevertheless managed to bring his newest battleships of the Borodino type into the left column head, it became a most unpleasant surprise for H. Togo, so instead of crushing the weakest part of the Russian ships or setting up the "crossing T" he was forced to portray a maneuver, later called the "Loop Togo". Its essence was to turn consistently under enemy fire, and it is difficult to assume that this maneuver was pre-planned by the Japanese admiral: not only did he put the Japanese in a vulnerable position at the stage of its execution, he also did not give great tactical advantages. If H. Togo needed to simply bring the columns of his battleships and armored cruisers into the head of the Russian squadron, he could have done this in a much less extreme way.
However, to understand the role that Z.P. took to “Pearl” and “Emerald”. Rozhdestvensky, the consequences of maneuvering the Japanese and Russian squadrons are not so important. The key is the plan of the Russian commander, which consisted in not doing any rebuilding until the main Japanese forces appeared on the horizon and showed their intentions. In other words, Z.P. Rozhestvensky was not going to rebuild before the main forces of the Japanese appeared.
But if so, why would he conduct reconnaissance?
Of course, from the point of view of the classic tactics of the sea battle, intelligence was extremely important, but the whole point was that the Russian commander was going to act completely unclassical. His non-standard plan for the outbreak of battle made reconnaissance by cruisers unnecessary, so there was no point in sending Pearls and Emeralds to it.
Of course, for cruisers intended for service during the squadron, there was another task: to prevent the enemy from conducting reconnaissance. But, first, this was never charged to the domestic "second-class" ships of this class - after all, they were too weak for that. Secondly, it was required to drive away the enemy's cruisers in order not to let the enemy know about their intentions, in order to hide their location, range, course and speed, but Z.P. Rozhestvensky, who made the decision to unfold in order of battle in view of the enemy, all this was not necessary.
And, finally, the third obvious reason for refusing to interfere in enemy reconnaissance was the sheer weakness of the cruisers 2 and 3 in the Pacific Squadrons. The Japanese had an overwhelming numerical superiority in armored cruisers over Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. In addition, as was known from the experience of fighting at Port Arthur, they often supported the latter with armored cruisers H. Kamimura: at the same time, the Russian commander did not have ships capable of providing such support to our armored cruisers.
As is known, the Russian commander expected the appearance of the main Japanese forces from the north. It was from there that the 5 combat squadron appeared, consisting of the old battleship Chin-Yen and the armored cruisers “Itsukushima”, “Hasidate”, and “Matsushima”, and on the Russian squadron they were also believed to be accompanied by “Akitsushima” and “Suma” . In fact, in addition to these two cruisers, the 5 squadron also accompanied the Chiyoda. There was no point in directing Russian cruisers against such forces: it is possible that they could drive away the Japanese ships, but at what cost? And if one more cruiser detachment approached the Japanese, then the battle would become unequal.
In other words, the cruisers of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was a little, and they were not too strong (excluding "Oleg"). The Russian admiral decided to use them to protect the transports, as well as to cover the main forces from the attacks of the destroyers and the role of repetitive ships. Accordingly, any other use of them was possible only for the achievement of some important, significant goals: an attack by Japanese intelligence officers, obviously, was not such a target. Z.P. Rozhestvensky won absolutely nothing because Japanese scouts would not have seen his squadron - on the contrary! Recall that the decision to attack the left column of the Russian squadron X. Togo made long before coming on direct visibility, guided by information received from its cruisers engaged in reconnaissance.
Strictly speaking, to implement the plan Z.P. Rozhestvensky should not just hide the Russian squadron, but proudly demonstrate its marching system to the Japanese scouts. Only in this way it would be possible to “convince” H. Togo to abandon the “crossing T” and to attack one of the columns of the Russian ships. Perhaps this is the reason for the strange reluctance of the Russian commander to discourage Japanese intelligence officers: the prohibition to interrupt Japanese radiograms, the rejection of the Izumi attack, etc.
Thus, the Russian commander did not have a single reason to send the Emerald and the Pearls to reconnaissance, but there were many reasons not to do so. In any case, intelligence itself is not an end in itself, but a means to put the enemy at a disadvantage: and, since it was the Japanese who got into it, there is no reason to consider this decision of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky erroneous.
The consequence of this decision of the Russian commander was a completely non-heroic stay of "Pearls" and "Emerald" under the main forces of the squadron. And although “Zhemchug” before the battle began, the main forces managed to “clarify” the Japanese ship trying to pass under the nose of the squadron, and “Emerald” even fought a little with the Japanese cruisers when an occasional shot from the Eagle in 11.15 put an end to the short ten-minute Russian exchange of fire Armadillos with the ships of admirals Kataoki and Deva, but, by and large, nothing interesting happened to these cruisers.
The beginning of the battle
After a small skirmish with the Japanese cruisers, during which the Emerald, while firing, switched to the right flank of the Russian squadron, he was instructed to be in the battle from a non-shooting side. At that time, both Russian cruisers along with the 1 detachment of the destroyers were aboard the "Prince Suvorov", while the "Emerald" was going to the wilderness of the "Pearl". But, approximately in 12.00 Z.P. Rozhestvensky ordered them to retreat a little, having shifted to the traverse of the Eagle, which was executed by the cruisers.
The main forces of the Japanese were found at Zhemchug at about the same time as they were seen on Prince Suvorov, that is, somewhere in 13.20, when they were still on the right shell of the Russian squadron. From a cruiser, just in case, they made a shot from the nose 120-mm guns, so that the Japanese battleships would not overlook the flagship. Then, after the ships of Kh. Togo and H. Kamimura crossed to the left side, they were lost on the Pearls, and were seen again only after the Japanese, carrying out the “loop of Togo”, opened fire on the Oslyab. But on the “Pearl” battleships H. Togo, nevertheless, saw badly. However, the Japanese shells that gave the flight went near the “Pearl”, and even fell into it. The commander of the cruiser PP Levitsky ordered to open a return fire - not so much in order to damage the enemy, who was almost invisible, but rather to raise the morale of the team.
For some time nothing happened for “Pearls”, and then the real adventures began. As you know, the 14.26 on the "Prince Suvorov" was disabled wheel, and he turned to 180 hail. (16 points), rolled right. Initially, "Alexander III" turned behind him, and only after it was realized that it was not a maneuver, but an uncontrolled movement of a damaged ship, "Alexander III" led the squadron further.
However, at the "Pearl" these events saw that the main forces of the squadron unfold. And at the same time, they found the Japanese flagship Mikasa, which seemed to be cutting across the Russian course. This was not true, since at that moment squadron courses were closer to parallel ones, but the commander of Pearls suggested that the Japanese were moving to the right side of the Russian system. Accordingly, staying at the same place “Zhemugug” risked being between the main forces of the Russians and the Japanese, which was unacceptable: the order of Z.P. Rozhestvensky determined the place of 2 rank cruisers behind the formation of Russian battleships, and nothing else.
Accordingly, P.P. Levitsky led his ship to the left side of the Russian squadron, sending "Pearls" in the gap formed between the "Eagle" and "Great Sisoy" after the failure of "Oslyabi". However, this, seemingly the right decision, led to the fact that the Pearl was no more than an 25 cable from the end armored cruisers of the 1 of the Japanese military unit, Nissin and Kasuga, which immediately fired at the small Russian cruiser. However, it is possible, of course, that some other ships fired at Pearl, it is only certain that shells were falling around it.
P.P. Levitsky quickly realized that he was mistaken in his assumption, and made an attempt to return to the right side of the squadron. For some reason, he could not return just as he had come — that is, through the gap between the “Eagle” and “Sisoy the Great”, and therefore he went along the Russian squadron.
“On the Internet,” the author repeatedly encountered the opinion that the 3 Pacific Pacific Squadron was well trained in maneuvering. However, at the "Pearl" saw a completely different, PP In his testimony of the Investigation Commission, Levitsky stated: “Seeing that the vessels of Admiral Nebogatov were stretched to such an extent that the intervals between them reach the 5 cable and more ...”. In other words, with commander intervals set at 2 cabel, the length of the entire squadron system was about 3 miles, but only 4 of the Nebogatov ship managed to stretch at least 1,7-1,8 miles!
Taking advantage of large intervals, the Zhemchug passed under the stern at coastal defense battleship Admiral-General Apraksin, who was following the Emperor Nicholas I, in the gap between him and the Senyavin, and returned to the right side of the squadron.
Clash with "Ural"
P.P. Levitsky saw that the Russian cruisers, to the right of transports going a little way off, were fighting with their Japanese "classmates", and that the Apraksin was trying to help them - apparently, the ships of the main Japanese forces were too far for him, or on the battleship coastal defense did not see them. The commander of the "Pearl" then reported that both towers of the Apraksin were aimed at Japanese cruisers trying to break through to the transports. Not wanting to shoot them down, PP Levitsky reduced the speed of his ship to small — and it was here that the auxiliary cruiser “Ural”, which tried to keep closer to the battleships, and made a pile on the “Pearl”.
P.P. Levitsky ordered an increase in the course immediately after the main caliber of the Apraksin, but this was not enough, since the Ural was in contact with the bow of the Pearls astern. Damage was not fatal, but unpleasant:
1. The edges of the blades of the right propeller were bent;
2. The square, fastening shirstrekovy belt side plating with deck stringer in the stern, was dented;
3. The scoop of the stern mine apparatus broke, the mine itself, charged into it, broke, and its charging compartment fell into the water and sank.
I must say that the stern mine apparatus was on the cruiser the only one made for battle: the airborne, with that excitement and draft of the cruiser, could not be used. Thus, the bulk of the "Ural" has deprived the cruiser of its torpedo armament: however, given the meager firing range, it was still completely useless. There was one more thing - the right machine of the latter stopped from the impact of the “Ural” on the “Pearls” body, and steam was immediately blocked off: but then it was gradually added, and the car acted quite freely, obviously without receiving any damage.
But why in the "Ural" did not do anything to avoid a collision with a cruiser reduced course? The fact is that by this time the "Ural" received quite serious damage.
About half an hour after the start of the battle, according to the commander of the cruiser, a “at least ten-inch” projectile hit him, as a result of which the “Ural” got an underwater hole on the port side, in the nose. The water immediately flooded the front "bomb cellar", as well as the coal pit, which turned out to be empty, which caused the Ural to have a strong trim on the bow and roll on the port side. As a result, the auxiliary cruiser, built as a passenger airliner, and not a warship, became ill to obey the helm. But, as if this was not enough, the enemy shells damaged the telemotor and killed the steering pipe's steam pipe. As a result, the ship completely lost the helm and could only be controlled by machines.
All this, of course, in itself, extremely difficult to control the cruiser, but, as if all of the above were not enough, almost immediately interrupted the machine telegraph. This has not completely broken the connection with the engine room, because, in addition to the telegraph, there was also a telephone, on which the commander of the Ural Istomin began to give commands. But then the watch mechanic Ivanitsky appeared to him and reported on behalf of the senior mechanic that because of the roar of shells and the fire of his own artillery in the engine, they could not hear the phone at all ...
In the light of the foregoing, by the time when Zhemchug dropped the turn in order not to interfere with the Apraksin shot, the Urals was almost out of control, which led to bulk. It is interesting, by the way, that the commander of the Ural believed that he was confronted not with the Pearl, but with the Emerald.
Having completed his “run” between the squadron battling the main forces and returning to the right side of the Russian column, PP Levitsky, as it seemed to him then, finally considered the plight of the flagship battleship "Prince Suvorov" and went to him. Later on the "Pearl" we learned that in fact it was not the "Suvorov", and the battleship "Alexander III". On the way, “Pearls” had to dodge “Sisoi the Great”, which, according to the words of the “Pearls” commander, he went to intercept. It was not possible for the author of this article to find out what it was, because there is no evidence that Sisoy the Great would leave the column at this time (closer to four o'clock in the afternoon). Around 16.00, the Pearl came under the stern of Alexander III and partially stopped the course: two destroyers were seen leaving the battered flagship, one of which began to unfold, as if having a desire to approach the starboard of the Pearls. On the cruiser, they noticed that flag-captain Clape de Colong was on board the destroyer, and they decided that the rest of the headquarters and the admiral were also there, and that they probably all wanted to go to the cruiser. Accordingly, “Pearls” prepared to receive people on board: the entrance to the right ladder was open, ends were prepared, stretchers for the wounded and began to launch the whaleboat.
However, when the whaleboat had already begun to lower, PP Levitsky discovered that the destroyer was not going to approach the Pearl at all, but went somewhere further to the right of the cruiser, with the second destroyer moving behind him. And on the left, the Japanese battleships appeared, and the range finder showed that there was no more than 20 cables to them. The enemy immediately opened fire, so that around the "Alexander III" and "Pearls" immediately began to tear shells. Having lost his only mine apparatus capable of using torpedoes, PP Levitsky lost even theoretical chances to harm such a strong opponent, and was forced to retreat, especially since his battleships could not be seen. From the “Pearls” they saw only Borodino and the Eagle, which passed under the stern of the cruiser and disappeared from view. The cruiser made a full turn and, turning to the right, went after the destroyers leaving the Alexander III.
Perhaps someone will be able to see this as a lack of PP Morale. Levitsky, who left the "Alexander" alone in the face of a detachment of Japanese battleships. Perhaps someone will remember the actions N.O. von Essen, fearlessly leading his Novik to Japanese armored ships. But let's not forget that Nikolai Ottovich still “attacked” the Japanese flagship because of the whole port-arthur squadron, to which the Japanese fire was diverted, and here at Pearl, dare he do that, there was no such cover. Decision P.P. Levitsky, of course, was not heroic, but it can’t be considered cowardly in any way.
Why on the "Pearls" could not distinguish the "Alexander III" from the "Suvorov"? Flagship battleship ZP Rozhestvensky was on, already without pipes and masts, and was not seen from the cruiser. At the same time, "Alexander III" by that time had already been badly burned and was so smoked that the inscription on the stern of the armadillo became completely indistinguishable. Although P.P. Levitsky later admitted that someone from his team could still read it when Pearls, turning to the right, briefly approached the battleship.
At the departure, “Pearls” received damage: it was at this time that an impact occurred, the consequences of which PP Levitsky described in his testimony in detail. The enemy shell hit the middle pipe and severely damaged it, fragments flew into the stoker, and the gases from the gap blew the flame out of the fireboxes. But the majority of the fragments hit the place where the right-side 120-mm cannon was located, the commanders serving him were killed or wounded, and the deck was pierced in many places. In addition, the fragments hit the nasal bridge, wounding three sailors and killing warrant officer Tavassherna. There were also ignitions - the fire engulfed four 120-mm "cartridges" lying at the gun, the command compartment filled with coal and a boot on the whaleboot caught fire. Gunpowder in the cartridges began to explode, and one of the cartridges was wounded by midshipman Ratkov.
Here I would like to note a small discrepancy: V.V. Khromov, in his monograph on Pearl-class cruisers, indicates that it was not four 120-mm cartridges that caught fire, but only three, but the commander of Pearls, P.P. Levitsky indicates that there were four of them. Be that as it may, the "Pearl" left after the destroyers. P.P. Levitsky assumed that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky and the admiral himself did not switch to his cruiser only because of the proximity of the enemy battleships, but when he went beyond their fire and, around 16.00, he approached the destroyers to KNI 1, they still did not express such a desire.
But what was the Emerald doing at this time? To be continued…
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Information