Anti-tank weapons of the Japanese infantry in World War II

42
Japanese army first encountered tanks and Soviet-made armored vehicles in the late 1930s during the fighting in China and during military conflicts in the area of ​​Lake Hassan and near the Khalkhin Gol River. Soviet, Chinese and Mongolian troops used light tanks T-26, BT-5, BT-7 and armored vehicles BA-10 with bulletproof armor, which were vulnerable to 37 mm anti-tank guns and 20 mm anti-tank guns.

Anti-tank weapons of the Japanese infantry in World War II

Soviet armored car BA-10, lined during the fighting at the river Khalkhin-Gol




Type 97 anti-tank rifle


During the fighting at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese infantry used the Type 20 97 anti-tank rifle for the first time. It entered service in 1937 year and was used by Japanese troops until the end of World War II. PTR Type 97 was heavy and not very easy to handle, but it significantly increased the capabilities of the Japanese infantry in the fight against enemy armored vehicles.


Type 97 anti-tank rifle, which became a trophy of the Red Army during the Khalkhin Gol fighting


The 97xNNXX mm ammunition, originally developed for use in 20-mm anti-aircraft guns, was used to fire a Type 124 PTR. Ammunition could include: armor-piercing tracer, high-explosive tracer, high explosive incendiary and incendiary tracer shells. For firing at armored vehicles, an armor-piercing tracer with a mass of 20 g was used, which left the barrel with a length of 109 mm with a speed of 1064 m / s. At a distance of 865 m, normal he could pierce 250 mm armor, which in the second half of 30's was a very good indicator.

Automation 20-mm anti-tank gun worked by the removal of a part of the powder gases. In order to increase the reliability of operation weapons in various conditions and for the use of different types of ammunition, the gas outlet tube of an anti-tank gun was equipped with a regulator that allowed the gas pressure on the piston to be changed. Power was supplied from a detachable magazine on 7 cartridges. Combat rate reached 12 rds / min. Aim devices allowed to fire at a distance of up to 1000 m.


The calculation of the PTR Type 97 in firing position


Although armor penetration and rate of fire PTR Type 97 at the time of creation were at altitude, the anti-tank gun had a lot of flaws. Automation when shooting gave up to 5% of delays. The most common cause was not the burst shot. But if the calculations were reconciled with this, then the transport of PTR on the battlefield caused many problems. Before carrying the gun, the calculation was to install special metal handles. The designers believed that the anti-tank rifle would be carried by two calculation numbers, but in practice the transportation of weapons required the involvement of more people. Typically, the PTR Type 97 was tolerated by three or four fighters. The mass of weapons without arms and shield was 52,2 kg. An unloaded rifle with a flap and handles weighed 68 kg. Due to the heavy weight of the PTR Type 97 was used mainly in defense. To reduce a very strong impact on the gun there was a muzzle brake, but when fired, the powder gases scattered in the horizontal plane raised dust, which made it difficult to observe and aim, and also unmasked the firing position.


Type 97 anti-tank rifle with carrying handles


But perhaps the main disadvantage of the Type 97 anti-tank gun was its very high cost. In 1941, the price of a single 20-mm PTR made in the Kokura arsenal was 6400 yen. For comparison, the Type 6,5 38 mm rifle cost just 77 yen. Due to the high cost, after the release of approximately 1100 copies, the production of the Type 97 PTR in the second half of 1941 was curtailed. However, in 1943, Nihon Seikosho received an order for the manufacture of new rifles. The load of the enterprise did not allow him to release a large number of anti-tank guns, and the military was given a little more than 100 anti-tank guns.

Despite the relatively small circulation, Type 97 MFRs were used in combat until Japan surrendered in August 1945. 20-mm projectiles penetrated the relatively thin side armor of light M3 / M5 Stuart tanks, and also successfully hit floating LVT conveyors from any direction. Reflecting the landing of assault forces on the Pacific Islands, the Type 97 PTR created quite a few problems for the American marines. At the same time, the excessive mass of 20-mm guns forced them to fire from stationary positions, which were quickly identified and suppressed. In addition, even in the case of armor penetration, the striking effect of 20-mm projectiles was relatively small.

Although the Red Army used armored vehicles in sufficiently large volumes at Khalkhin-Gol, the command of the Imperial Armed Forces of Japan did not draw appropriate conclusions and did not bother to equip infantry units with a sufficient number of effective anti-tank weapons. This was partly due to the fact that the land army in Japan was financed on the leftover principle, it did not participate in the battles of the First World War and until the second half of the 1930-s did not face a strong adversary. 20-mm anti-tank guns after the appearance of tanks with counter-launch armor no longer met modern requirements, and the problem of anti-tank infantry defense had to be urgently addressed through the use of various improvised and surrogate means.

Anti-tank grenades, bundles and incendiary bottles


The simplest means of combating enemy armored vehicles that could be quickly manufactured in the field is a bunch of hand grenades. For this, the Type 98 grenade, which was an adapted copy of the German M-24 beater, was best suited. From the German prototype, it outwardly differed shortened handle.


Hand Grenade Type 98


The body of the grenade is made of cast iron and has a thread at the bottom for attaching a wooden handle. The charge of picric acid was placed inside the case and packed in a paper cap. With a mass of 560 g grenades, it was loaded with 50 g of explosive. Slow down time 6-7 sec. In order to destroy the caterpillar or damage the tank chassis, it was necessary to fix it to the grenade with the 5-6 fuse of the grenade hulls, and the weight of the bundle was 2,5-3 kg. It is clear that it is relatively safe to apply such a construction only from the trench. To increase the high-explosive effect, the body of a grenade Type 98 was often tied with swords with melinit.


Hand Grenade Ture 97


Also, the Japanese armed forces used several types of grenades without handles with cast housings that had vertical and horizontal notches. Such grenades could be fastened with wire or rope to a wooden stick. Grenade Toure 97 weighed 450 g and contained 65 G trotyl. Slow down time - 4-5 with.

A common feature of all Japanese fragmentation grenades was the inconvenience of their use and low effectiveness in anti-tank combat. Due to the imperfection of the fuses, their response time varied greatly, which could be dangerous for those who used them. In 1943, the Type 3 hand-held anti-tank grenade was adopted by the imperial army, which the American Marines called the “Fox Tail” for their unique appearance.


Type 3 anti-tank grenade


The construction of the Type 3 grenade was very simple, and its production used affordable and cheap materials. The explosive charge was placed in a cloth case. In the upper part of the charge, a metal ring with a thread was fastened with a clamp, into which a fuse was screwed. The same clamp fixes the cloth cover. A hemp or silk twine stabilizer was attached to the grenade with a yoke. Bottom charge rests on a wooden base. At the head of the grenade there was a cumulative funnel lined with steel or aluminum 3 mm thick. Before throwing a grenade, a cloth tape was removed and a safety check was removed. Thanks to the grenade stabilizer, the Type 3 flew forward. Inertial fuse triggered by hitting the barrier.



There are several modifications of Type 3 grenades: Ko (Type A), Otsu (Type B) and Hei (Type C). They differed in size, weight and filling. A modification of Type A (the color of the bag is white or brown-yellow) weighed 1270 g and was filled with 853 g with a mixture of hexogen and trinitroaniline. Type B variant (the color of the bag is white or brown-yellow) had a mass of 855 g and contained a mixture of TNT and Teng. The latter is the most compact and lightweight modification (bag color is yellow) with a mass of 830 g and 690 g of picric acid.

In the English reference books it says that all modifications when hit at right angles had the same armor penetration - 70 mm. However, taking into account the use of various metals for facing a cumulative funnel and explosive components that differed in detonation speed and power, it is extremely unlikely. Now it is impossible to reliably establish what thickness of armor a particular modification of the Type 3 anti-tank grenade could penetrate. But this armor penetration theoretically allowed to hit the frontal armor of the tank M4 Sherman. A well-trained and physically developed soldier could throw a Type 3 Hei anti-tank grenade on 25 m, but usually the target throw didn’t exceed the 15 m. This anti-tank grenade contained a minimum of metal parts and gave a better chance for the grenade launcher to survive than a bunch of frag grenades.

Quite predictably, the Japanese military tried to fight tanks with glass bottles filled with fuel. At the first stage, these were bottles filled in troops with a mixture of low-octane gasoline with used engine oil. Before you throw such an incendiary projectile into an enemy tank, it was necessary to ignite the wick-stopper of tow.

Since 1943, the industrial production of glass incendiary grenades, filled with a flammable liquid with rubber dissolved in it, has been organized. The rubber acting as a thickener, which did not allow the incendiary mixture to drain, quickly contributed to the fact that the ignited liquid stuck to the tank's armor and when it hit the viewing devices an opaque film was formed. The burning of ognesmesi, thickened with rubber, was accompanied by thick black smoke, which severely limited the visibility for tank crews. The industrially manufactured incendiary bottle was sealed with an airtight stopper. When breaking the armor, fuel ignition was provided by a special chemical composition in fabric bags, which was fastened to the bottle with ribbons. Incendiary bottles were delivered to the troops in cardboard or tin cases protecting them from mechanical impact.


Japanese glass smoke and incendiary grenades


Along with incendiary, the Japanese army actively used smoke glass grenades filled with titanium tetrachloride. The field as the glass wall of the grenade collapsed, a chemical reaction occurred in which titanium tetrachloride, evaporating, reacted with water vapor contained in the air. In this case, the chemical compound decomposed into titanium dioxide and hydrogen chloride, with the formation of thick smoke. A smoke cloud blinded the tankers and allowed the Japanese infantry to approach the tanks. Especially actively smoke glass grenades were used in Okinawa. Often seeing clubs of thick white smoke ahead, American tankers preferred to retreat and fired artillery or aviation support.


American infantrymen are hiding from the fire of the Japanese behind the Sherman tank


Anti-tank mines


In addition to grenades and bottles, Japanese infantry could use several types of mines to fight tanks. For direct installation on the armor was intended magnetic mine Type 99, adopted by 1939 year. Like most Japanese anti-tank mines, its design was extremely simple and cheap.


Anti-tank magnetic mine Type 99


The body of the mine was a canvas bag in which there were eight checkers to sweep melinit with TNT. Above there was a time-delay fuse designed for 7-10 seconds. The mine is attached to the side of the tank with four magnets located on the side of the canvas bag. Before attaching the mine to the tank, it was necessary to pull out the safety pin for the string, and hit the fuse head on a hard object. With the weight of a magnetic mine 1,23 kg, it contained 680 g of explosives. The diameter of the mines - 121 mm, height - 40 mm. Magnetic mine had only a high-explosive effect, and could penetrate armor with a thickness of 20 mm. To increase armor penetration, you could hold together a few minutes. Two magnetic mines could penetrate 38 mm of homogeneous armor, three - 46 mm. Mines were delivered in canvas bags, where the fuse was also stored.


Mina Type 99 with carrying bag


The implication was that the Japanese soldiers had to mount magnetic mines to the bottom of tanks passing over their trenches, or, running up to a moving tank, set mines on board or stern. In this case, the fuse should be initiated in advance. It is clear that with this method of application the probability of surviving the one who installed it was small. However, Type 99 mines were used until the end of hostilities.

A pole mine with rubber suckers was designed to be mounted on board or astern of the tank. The tin casing contained mines up to 2 kg of the alloy of trotyl with hexogen. This amount of explosives was enough to break through the armor with a thickness of 30 mm. Even if a through-break did not occur, pieces of metal that hit the crew broke from the inner surface of the armor.


Figure of a Japanese pole mine with rubber suckers


The fighter, fixing a mine on suckers, activated the tamper igniter, which set fire to the igniter cord that burned 12-15 with. During this time, the soldiers of the imperial army had to leave the affected area or take refuge in a trench.

Approximately at the same time with the anti-aircraft high-explosive mine, attached to the tank's armor using rubber suction cups, the Ni04 high-explosive mine mine was put into service, which could be placed under the tank track.


Figure anti-sixth high explosive mines Ni04


This anti-tank ammunition had a metal body in the form of a hemisphere, filled with 3 kg of TNT or melinita. In the upper part of the hemisphere was a push fuse, which was activated when a tank hit a mine. Considering the fact that the length of the bamboo pole was no more than 2 m, the close 3 kg explosion of a powerful explosive charge in an open area guaranteed to kill someone who used a mine against a tank. If a Japanese soldier managed to hide before an explosion in a trench, then at best he would get a heavy concussion.

Also, the Japanese infantry had Type 93 universal mines, which, depending on the fuse, could be used as anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. The push action fuse was supplied in two versions - under the actuation force of either 31-32 kg or 110-120 kg. The body of the mine, made of tin, contained 907 g of melinite, the mine itself in curb weight weighed 1,36 kg. Case diameter - 171 mm, height - 45 mm.


Mina Type 93


Unlike other engineering munitions that were used for anti-tank minefields, Type 93 was intended for use by infantry from the very beginning. In view of the relatively small mass and dimensions with it, it was quite easy to move on the battlefield and quickly installed in the path of moving tanks. Also on the case there were rings for ropes, with the help of which the mine could be dragged under the tank track. However, with excessive power for use as an anti-personnel mine, the explosive charge insufficient for an anti-tank mine did not allow serious damage to the tank. In most cases, with the detonation of a Type 93 mine on Sherman medium tanks, the case ended with a broken track.

In addition to the mines in the Type 93 metal hull, Japanese infantry had anti-vehicle mines in the Ni 01 and Type 3 wooden hulls. Among the most commonly used is an anti-vehicle elongated mine, referred to in the United States as Yardstick.


Japanese anti-vehicle extended mine


The anti-vehicle mine had a metal body of oval cross section with a length of 94 cm. Total weight - 4,76 kg, of which 1840 g accounted for an explosive (melinit). There were four push action fuses in the mine with a triggering force of about 120 kg. Due to the greater length, the probability that the tank would roll over an extended mine was higher.

After it became clear that the scales in the Pacific theater were leaning toward the Allies, the Japanese armed forces widely used kamikaze tactics not only in air and sea battles, but also on land. Initially, Japanese suicide bombers undermined British and American armored vehicles, hung up with grenades and swords with explosives, or rushed under a tank with an anti-tank mine. Later, special knapsacks with surrogate explosives based on ammonium nitrate and cumulative pole mines of Ni05 instant action were used.


Ni05 Cumulative Cumulative Mine


In American sources, this anti-tank ammunition is referred to as Lunge Mine (Shock Mine). In terms of its design and method of use, Ni05 refers to airborne cumulative mines. Structurally mine is very simple. A charge of TNT weighing about 3,5 kg was placed in a cone-shaped body made of tin. In the lower part of the body there is a cumulative groove lined with iron. Three metal legs are welded to the lower plane of the hull so that at the time of the explosion the charge is at a strictly defined distance from the armor, which ensures optimal formation of a cumulative jet. The upper part of the body is a short cylindrical tube with an external thread. A long tube is screwed onto this tube, the end of which is wide and has an internal thread. A bamboo pole up to 2 m is inserted into a long tube. The total mass of the mine is about 6,5 kg. The case diameter at the bottom of the 20,3 cm, the length of the case - 48 cm. Armor penetration - more than 150 mm.



Before using the mine, the soldier had to remove the safety check. Then he ran to the tank, holding a mine horizontally in front of him like peaks, aiming at the side of the tank. At the moment of the impact of the mines with their feet into the side of the pole, moving forward by inertia, broke the shear pin. The drummer worked on the detonator cap, which caused it to explode and transfer detonation to a shaped charge. The explosion of a cumulative charge led to penetration of armor and destruction of the tank. Kamikaze also died in a mine explosion.

Anti-tank grenade launchers


Although from the second half of 1943, the Japanese command in the fight against tanks relied on the primitive anti-tank ammunition used by land-based kamikazes, it should not be assumed that Japan did not create “remote” VET weapons in which fragments and impact weapons were minimized wave and there was no need to leave the shelter. As part of military-technical cooperation with Germany, in the 1941, documentation was received for the Panzergranate 30 (G.Pzgr.30) anti-tank 30-mm cumulative grenades. Japanese designers adapted the Panzergranate 30 for their production capabilities and created the Type 2 rifle grenade launcher.



The Type 2 grenade launcher was mounted on Japanese 6,5 rifles mm Type 38 and 7,7 mm Type 99. If the German rifles Mauser 98k for shooting grenades used blank ammunition with a sleeve starved "asterisk", the Japanese used 7,7-mm cartridges with a wooden bullet. This somewhat increased the range of the shot, but it was necessary to strengthen the bottom of the grenade. The maximum range of a Type 99 rifle at an elevation angle of 45 ° is about 300 m. The sighting is no more than 45 m. The firing range of grenades with 6,5-mm rifles was less by about 30%.

To stabilize the grenade in flight, in its tail part there was a belt with ready-made cuts, which coincided with the rifled part of the mortar. The head of the grenade was made of tin, and the tail was made of aluminum alloy. In the head part there was a cumulative funnel and a charge from an alloy of trotyl with hexogen with a mass of 50 g, and in the back - a bottom fuse. A cumulative 30-mm grenade weighing about 230 g along the normal could penetrate 30 mm armor, which allowed it to fight only with light tanks and armored cars. Due to the lack of armor penetration, an 40-mm cumulative grenade with over-caliber warhead soon entered service. The mass of the grenade increased to 370 g, while in its case 105 g of explosives were contained. The thickness of the pierced armor when hit at an angle of 90 ° was 50 mm, and the maximum range of a shot from a rifle grenade launcher - 130 m.


Type 2 rifle grenade launcher with 30-mm and 40-mm cumulative grenades


In theory, infantrymen armed with Type 2 grenade launchers with 40-mm grenades could hit American light tanks M3 / M5 Stuart from any direction, and the average M4 Sherman into the board. However, the accuracy and firing range of cumulative rifle grenades was low, and the reliability of the timely operation of the bottom inertial fuse left much to be desired.

After the captured American "bazookas" fell into the hands of Japanese designers, in Japan, work began on creating their own anti-tank rocket grenade launchers. In July, the 1944-mm grenade launcher, designated the Type 74, was put into service.


74-mm Type 4 anti-tank rocket launcher


Apparently, the design of the RPG Type 4 was influenced not only by the American Bazooka, but also by the German Panzerschreck. By analogy with the American M9 Bazooka grenade launcher, the Japanese RPG Type 4, created by the designers of the army arsenal in Osaka, was collapsible and consisted of two parts, which were assembled together just before the battle, and on the march the grenade launcher was transferred in a disassembled state. In the front of the Type 4 grenade launcher, the bipod from the Type 99 light machine gun was attached, and the rear - a pistol grip and firing mechanism. The sights consisted of a rear viewfinder and a front frame with front sights.

Although the Type 4 grenade launcher viewed features of the American and German samples, it had a number of significant differences. Thus, the stabilization of the Japanese jet grenade in flight was not carried out by tail, but due to rotation caused by the expiration of powder gases from inclined nozzles. Another difference between the Type 4 and the American and German grenade launchers was the replacement of the device for the electric launch of a rocket jet engine with a mechanical one. The trigger was connected by a cord with a spring-loaded drummer fixed to the rear end of the barrel with a striker. Before loading, the drummer cocked and locked, and when the trigger was pressed, the cable released the drummer, and he, turning on the axis, smashed the primer-igniter in the center of the nozzle bottom of the jet grenade


74-mm rocket grenade in combat and disassembled


Structurally and externally, the rocket grenade resembled a Japanese missile 203-mm. At the head of the rocket grenade there was a fuse from 81-mm mines. It was followed by a steel recess and a shaped charge. At the rear was a jet engine with oblique nozzles. Jet fuel served as pyroxylin powder. With a length of 359 mm, the rocket grenade weighed 4,1 kg. Of which 0,7 kg accounted for explosives. The powder charge of a jet engine with a mass of 0,26 kg accelerated a grenade in a pipe to 160 m / s. The maximum range of shooting 750 m, effective - 110 m. The mass of the unloaded grenade launcher in a combat position - 8 kg, length - 1500 mm.



The calculation of the grenade launcher consisted of two people: the gunner and loader. Shooting, as a rule, was conducted from a prone position. Experienced calculation could produce up to 6 rds / min. When firing behind the grenade launcher, due to the release of a jet stream, a dangerous zone with a length of about 20 m was formed.

Compared to other models of Japanese anti-tank weapons, the Type 4 grenade launcher was a big step forward. However, the Japanese industry at the final stage of the hostilities could not equip the army with the necessary number of 74-mm rocket launchers. According to US data, before the end of World War II, about 3000 anti-tank rocket launchers were launched in Japan. In addition, the rotation of the reactive grenade reduced armor penetration due to the “splashing” of the cumulative jet due to centrifugal force. During the fighting, it turned out that with the declared armor penetration along the normal 80-mm, a cumulative grenade cannot guarantee reliable penetration of the frontal armor of the American Shermans and the British Matilda.

Due to the lack of armor penetration Type 4 at the beginning of 1945, the 90-RPG RPG was created, which constructively repeated the Type 4, but had an increased caliber. Due to the significant increase in weight, the 90-mm grenade launcher received additional support located at the rear of the barrel.


90 mm anti-tank rocket launcher


The mass of the new grenade launcher was about 12 kg, the reactive grenade - 8,6 kg (of which 1,6 kg accounted for the explosive and 0,62 kg for the powder charge of the jet engine). The initial speed of the grenade was 106 m / s, armor penetration - 120 mm, effective firing range - 100 m. Despite successful trials in the army, mass production of 90-mm grenade launchers was not adjusted.

Tactics of Japanese tank destroyers


To fight the tanks, the Japanese formed special detachments of 10-12 people. The group was ordered to act cohesively and from an ambush. Two or three people were engaged in setting up a smoke screen, at that time 5-6 people tried to immobilize a tank by blowing up a caterpillar, put a magnetic mine on board, or hit a pole-shaped cumulative mine, and blew up the tank with a knapsack bomb. The rest threw incendiary bottles and grenades, and also covered the squad’s actions, firing at enemy infantry, and distracted the tank crew’s attention to themselves. Very often, Japanese detachments hid in fox-holes, which were stockpiled on top with bamboo shields and vegetation. After waiting for the right moment, all members of the detachment attacked the approaching tanks.

Measures to protect against Japanese infantry fighter tanks


The creation of reactive anti-tank grenade launchers in Japan began too late, and the RPG received by the troops did not have a noticeable effect on the course of hostilities. To fight American and British armored vehicles, the Japanese used the tactic of “one soldier - one tank,” which meant that, sacrificing themselves, one Japanese soldier must destroy one tank. This approach brought the desired effect only in the first stage. Faced with land-based kamikazes, the Americans, Australians and the British avoided using tanks in places where they had the opportunity to secretly approach them to install a magnetic mine, strike a cumulative mine pole, or use a land mine bomb. In addition to the use of specially designed anti-tank weapons against enemy tanks, Japanese infantrymen were instructed to use other methods: wedge the chassis with metal rods, smash optical devices, jumping onto the tank through open hatches, throwing fragmentation grenades inside. It is clear that such methods of dealing with armored vehicles led to enormous losses among those who dared to do so.

In part, the actions of the Japanese infantry were facilitated by poor visibility in combat operations in the jungle. Having suffered losses, the Americans began to actively burn vegetation with napalm aircraft tanks, to use flamethrower tanks and backpack infantry flamethrowers.


The flamethrower tank M4A3R3 during the fighting on the island of Iwo Jima, March 1945 of the year


Also, to protect their tanks, the US Army and Marine Corps began to attract infantrymen armed with automatic weapons, and preemptively comb through suspicious places with machine-guns and artillery and mortar fire. Due to the increased consumption of ammunition, it was often possible to disperse and destroy Japanese groups of tank destroyers hiding among tropical vegetation.


American infantry escorted tanks "Sherman"


American tankers also used passive means of protection: boards were sheathed with boards, armor was increased by hanging trucks, and the hatches were welded with nails pointing up or covered with a net, which prevented the magnetic mine from being installed directly on the hatch. Top armor was enhanced by sandbags.



The Japanese land kamikazes, armed with pole mines and loaded with satchels of explosives, tried to delay the advance of Soviet tanks in Manchuria and in Korea. However, the extensive experience of the fighting at the time of the outbreak of war with Japan allowed the Red Army to avoid any noticeable losses in armored vehicles. Long before the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, tank escort by infantry became the standard. As a rule, a submachine gun unit was planted on each tank. In this way, even during the battles in Germany, tanks were protected from "faustnikov."
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

42 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +14
    25 2019 June
    10 man vs tank or fixed assets of the Japanese near PTO:

    Judging by the "bayonet carrier" who dropped the grenade, in a couple of seconds only two survivors will remain in the picture (on MTO, covered by the hull and turret). And a tank.
    1. +9
      25 2019 June
      after a couple of seconds, only two live in the picture
      and then if lucky and the extreme left samurai will not have time to launch a cumulative grenade in their own comrades entrenched on the tank ...
      And laughter and sin of course, but how can you not remember the already forgotten "iron kaput"
      1. +8
        25 2019 June
        At the "Kaput" legs Chassis grows from one of the experimental ACS Christie, by the way.
        1. GDP
          0
          23 September 2019
          The Japanese, accustomed to crushing the backward armies of the Papuans and Chinese, had a false sense of invincibility and a complex of supermen. As a result, they were unprepared for war with the truly technologically advanced armies of the USSR and the USA.
          What are their famous pedal tanks "Khan" on a bicycle traction, which surprised Soviet tankers so much))) I'm not talking about those tanks of which the World of Tanks fans are piously convinced that they existed only on paper or in prototypes, or could not really ride or shoot.
  2. +5
    25 2019 June
    Thank you for an interesting review.
    1. +4
      25 2019 June
      Yes, anti-tank tactics at the level. With such advanced technology and careful attitude to their soldiers lost, strange!
      1. +10
        25 2019 June
        Well, do not. Soviet and Japanese fighting styles were very similar. The approach to technology is also (cheap, reliable and angry). Just Japan didn’t take a bite off of the order - this is not a giant of the USSR, but a small island state, which also has practically no deposits of strategic resources and materials on its territory. It is clear that against the States, when they restructured their economy and the production of the war, will not work out anymore. The calculation was what it was - to have enough time to win enough for the States to want to make peace (well, how it happened with Russia to Russian-Japanese). But here - not fartanulo, with Midway all the plans and fell down .. And then - stretched agony. Just the heroism of simple Japanese soldiers and stretched right up to 45 (and the USSR did not intervene, which destroyed the Kwantung Army - and this was the real reason for the surrender - it would continue to fight on its land with the Yankees).
        1. +1
          26 2019 June
          Yes, such a cannibalistic approach to people, like the Japanese (which is to their own, that to strangers), is probably worth looking for. Fighting style with complete disregard for the lives of subordinates and the average 1-XXNX alignment for the dead - this is a bit like the Soviet 5, but there is nothing to be proud of. But by the end of the war, the Red Army did not stand here and there - it was an offensive under a barrage, assault groups, introduction of mechanized corps and deep loops into the breach, and not a kamikaze with pole mines and frontal attacks.

          Well, the Kwantun Army (with a wild shortage in terms of weapons and military equipment, without normal combat experience, aircraft and armored vehicles), even with neutrality of the USSR, would hardly have strongly detained surrender - it would definitely not be possible to ship it to the metropolis, and it is doubtful that would have come to a full-scale land operation on the islands. Although perhaps another month or two, Japan would have battered, but only the Japanese would have been worse off of it (well, and perhaps the USSR - all the same, the Kurils and Sakhalin were not for their beautiful eyes after the war changed their identity).
          1. +2
            26 2019 June
            Quote: CTABEP
            But by the end of the war, the Red Army did not stand here and there - it was an offensive under a barrage, assault groups, introduction of mechanized corps and deep loops into the breach, and not a kamikaze with pole mines and frontal attacks.

            We lose Stalingrad - and we would have that. Too the agony would begin. Do you seriously not understand this? And if Japan won Midway, then she too wouldn’t need kamikazes and pole mines.
            Quote: CTABEP
            Well, the Kwantun Army (with a wild shortage in terms of weapons and military equipment, without normal combat experience, aircraft and armored vehicles), even with neutrality of the USSR, would hardly have strongly delayed the surrender

            It's not even the army itself. Just one on one with the Yankees, the Japanese still had hope, even if they put a sea of ​​people during the invasion of the Yankees on the islands, but still achieve honorable surrender (and the Americans themselves regarded their future losses as monstrous, therefore they asked Stalin to help them with Japan). But with the entry into the game of the USSR, this hope has died. The only option remained unconditional surrender.
            1. +3
              26 2019 June
              Yes, I do not argue, the more you study the history of the Second World War, the more you understand that more than once or twice everything was kept "on thin". In the Battle of Stalingrad, in fact, there were moments when, not just a battalion, a fresh full-blooded company could turn the tide with an unknown outcome further. However, firstly, even if we had lost Stalingrad, it would hardly have sunk to this point, and secondly, even if the Japanese had won Midway - the economy was not on their side, but there was a chance for peace, yes.

              PS USSR defeated the Kwantun Army losing 12 people. Do you seriously think that the United States would not have been able to isolate it by crushing it with a desire, even if it was at the cost of twice the great loss in manpower? Army, the combat capability of most divisions of which the Japanese estimated at 15% of the ideal, cut off from the supply, under the strikes of aviation, naval artillery and tanks? The United States would not have any catastrophic losses - they would have been with the Yapovs - well, they would have been bombed for a couple more months, would have captured after the artillery preparation with the exchange of 1 to 6-7 in favor of the Americans small islands (the same Kuriles / Sakhalin) - the result would be that the same, a little later and with a little more loss to the USA. But with much greater losses for the Japanese and without territorial acquisitions in the Far East for the USSR, this is why, not from the desire to save the allies or to liberate China, Stalin began the war with Japan.
              1. +4
                26 2019 June
                Quote: CTABEP
                Yes, I do not argue, the more you study the history of the Second World War, the more you understand that more than once or twice everything was kept "on thin".

                Here's to you just on the topic of "Bagration" from varheda.su:
                https://warhead.su/2019/06/23/pyat-povorotnyh-momentov-operatsii-bagration-kak-nemtsy-poterpeli-samoe-krupnoe-porazhenie
                Yes, even in this greatest operation of World War II in places everything was also on snot, as they say, held out.
                Quote: CTABEP
                However, in the first place, even if we lost to Stalingrad, we would hardly have

                I'm not sure. It really was a turning point: who wins. In general, it would be worth a separate article analysis zababahat on this topic, but I personally am too couch for such a scale.
                Quote: CTABEP
                PS USSR defeated the Kwantun Army losing 12 people. Do you seriously think that the United States would not have been able to isolate it by crushing it with a desire, even if it was at the cost of twice the great loss in manpower?

                The United States did not even think about the Kwantung Army at all. They were preparing purely for landing on Japan itself (and they could not have acted in China, having Japan not yet conquered on the backside - and the Japanese fleet even after Leyte was still very serious). And they themselves estimated their losses in the event of a storming of Japan MINIMUM in a million amer groups.
                Predictions of possible losses during the operation differ, however, they are believed to be extremely high: depending on the degree of participation of Japanese civilians in the hostilities, they could be counted in millions for the Allies and tens of millions for the Japanese

                And I will also note that after the destruction of the Kwantung grouping of the USSR, he began to land on the islands himself - and even managed to capture a couple before the surrender (and much more skillfully than the Americans). Those. the Japanese really had nowhere to go when they were hit by a sledgehammer of the USSR. Only give up.
                1. +2
                  26 2019 June
                  Quote: Kuroneko
                  Quote: CTABEP
                  Yes, I do not argue, the more you study the history of the Second World War, the more you understand that more than once or twice everything was kept "on thin".

                  Here's to you just on the topic of "Bagration" from varheda.su:
                  https://warhead.su/2019/06/23/pyat-povorotnyh-momentov-operatsii-bagration-kak-nemtsy-poterpeli-samoe-krupnoe-porazhenie


                  Thank you very much, I read, it is always interesting to read a good article, even on a familiar topic.

                  Quote: Kuroneko

                  The United States did not even think about the Kwantung Army at all. They were preparing purely for landing on Japan itself (and they could not have acted in China, having Japan not yet conquered on the backside - and the Japanese fleet even after Leyte was still very serious). And they themselves estimated their losses in the event of a storming of Japan MINIMUM in a million amer groups.
                  Predictions of possible losses during the operation differ, however, they are believed to be extremely high: depending on the degree of participation of Japanese civilians in the hostilities, they could be counted in millions for the Allies and tens of millions for the Japanese



                  Estimates of losses in the "Dawnfall" operation ranged from 107 thousand (MacArthur's estimate, very optimistic) to 4 million (doubtful estimate, I did not find any proofs except for the wiki) total losses - incl. wounded. Even if we count the losses according to the Okinawa coefficient - 268 thousand killed and wounded - this is a much more realistic estimate. However, "Dawnfall" would have passed in reality, and if it did, then when this operation began, the timing could well have shifted "to the left" (and to be honest - more than 2 months of bombing, processing the coast with artillery, hunger and lack of resources clearly would not contribute to the strengthening of the Japanese). Because logic inexorably prompted to play for time, finally strangling the metropolis with the blockade, and only then take the Yaps with our bare hands (remember their fighting spirit during, for example, the Kuril operation - the best cadres were already practically knocked out), 2-3-4 months have no role didn't play much, especially since the political decision was "victory over Japan within a year after victory over Germany", there was still plenty of time :). But I have no doubts about tens of millions of Japanese people.

                  Quote: Kuroneko

                  And I will also note that after the destruction of the Kwantung grouping of the USSR, he began to land on the islands himself - and even managed to capture a couple before the surrender (and much more skillfully than the Americans). Those. the Japanese really had nowhere to go when they were hit by a sledgehammer of the USSR. Only give up.


                  Yes, I know. Although I would not argue about "more skillfully than the Americans" - landings in icy water were not made from great art, nevertheless in something, and in landing operations by 1945 the Americans were the best in the world with the strongest fleet in the world, and The Red Army specialized in large-scale ground operations, and there was really no navy in the Pacific Ocean (artillery support with 102-mm cannons of Tsarist times is indisputably better than nothing, but it is also very far from normal). And the fact that the garrisons on the islands surrendered en masse suggests that their quality was not high - let me remind you that in Okinawa, for 93000-110000 dead soldiers, 7400 surrendered, and during the Kuril operation, 1000 surrendered for 50000 killed.
                  1. +3
                    26 2019 June
                    Quote: CTABEP
                    MacArthur assessment, very optimistic

                    Goat. Just a goat, plus a clear inconsistency with the position held (well, Korea has also confirmed this more than once). Together with the humble and the scumbag Patton (even his friend Eisenhower had to "otmazat" more than once after the next quirks). And this is the color of the nation and kakbe icons of the American generals. Both Rommel's boots are not worth it. = _ =
                    Sorry, could not help it.
                    Well, I say the same, on average - milen amerotrupov is averaged (because the estimates you cite do not take into account the general guerrilla warfare of the population - and it was ideologically pumped up enough, 268k - this is perhaps in direct clashes and during landing). That is why the United States called "Uncle Joe".
                    1. +2
                      26 2019 June
                      Nevertheless, in Korea, the Incheon operation was superbly planned and carried out by him, and only the massive intervention of the Chinese "volunteers" saved the UK from complete defeat. And the politicians probably should have foreseen this moment (although, probably, no one expected this, the Chinese did everything well too). And in the Pacific Ocean, I don't know any obvious failures behind it.
                      And I will not argue about Patton, he apparently wasn’t very human (although I think many commanders suffered battling), but as a military leader I’m not going to remember any failures either. Although of course I studied the war in the West superficially, what can I say. If you advise what to read (that's just the format of the article above - I did not find anything new about Bagration there, but it’s written really well, albeit with some inaccuracies) - I will be grateful.
                      1. +3
                        26 2019 June
                        Quote: CTABEP
                        If you advise what to read (that's just the format of the article above - I did not find anything new about Bagration there, but it’s written really well, albeit with some inaccuracies) - I will be grateful.

                        Not right now, sorry. It's time to go to the boats (WoWS). New patch, new mode - try to try. But the other day, somehow skins in a personal.
                        And about MacArthur - the degree of his responsibility can already be assessed at least on the proposal to throw North Korea (and China) with nuclear bombs. = _ =
                        PS My thesis about the incompatibility of the position held remains in force: MacArthur, if you remember, was so stunned that he publicly declared about nuclear bombardment, spitting on the direct prohibition of the president. What kind of a general is he who doesn’t put his commander in chief?
            2. 0
              28 2019 June
              Quote: Kuroneko
              And if Japan won Midway, then she too wouldn’t need kamikazes and pole mines.

              That is unlikely. ©
              Winning Midway would only extend the agony of the Japanese Empire for about a year. For the US victory was forged in the rear - in factories and shipyards. And beat the trump card "new AV every two months"The Japanese had nothing. And the loss of overseas territories did not really bother Washington. So Orange's pre-war plan would have continued to be carried out, as in real life: to concentrate more forces and move to the Japanese Metropolis by jumping over the atolls. The deadlines would have simply shifted."
              Quote: Kuroneko
              Just one on one with the Yankees, the Japanese still had hope, even if they put a sea of ​​people during the invasion of the Yankees on the islands, but still achieve honorable surrender (and the Americans themselves regarded their future losses as monstrous, therefore they asked Stalin to help them with Japan).

              The Japanese had no chance. Hattori describes what constituted the bulk of the defense forces - the divisions of the 44-45 formation. with "one rifle for three".
              And about the monstrous losses - the estimated level of losses grew as we approached Washington, because this figure was used for internal political squabbles and knocking out the budget. The assessments made at the headquarters "on the ground" by analogy with the previous landings, gave a quite reasonable level of losses.
      2. Alf
        +7
        25 2019 June
        Quote: CTABEP
        Yes, anti-tank tactics at the level. With such advanced technology and careful attitude to their soldiers lost, strange!

        Kamikaze ran out before the tanks. laughing
      3. +5
        25 2019 June
        Quote: CTABEP
        Yes, anti-tank tactics at the level. With such advanced technology and careful attitude to their soldiers lost, strange!

        For the sake of justice, it is necessary to recognize that the Americans won a victory in the Pacific theater of affairs very difficultly and in some places the fighting was very fierce. During the 82 day of the fighting in Okinawa, the Allies lost more than 50 thousand people killed and wounded. The Americans lost 225 tanks and several dozen armored tracked amphibians LVT (A) 5. Only the overwhelming superiority in firepower and the massive use of napalm allowed the United States to reverse the course of the battle.
        1. +3
          26 2019 June
          Quote: Bongo

          For the sake of justice, it is necessary to recognize that the Americans won a victory in the Pacific theater of affairs very difficultly and in some places the fighting was very fierce. During the 82 day of the fighting in Okinawa, the Allies lost more than 50 thousand people killed and wounded. The Americans lost 225 tanks and several dozen armored tracked amphibians LVT (A) 5. Only the overwhelming superiority in firepower and the massive use of napalm allowed the United States to reverse the course of the battle.


          By the way, in my time, when I became interested in history a little more than the school course, I was very surprised that the US WWII lost half a million dead and missing, and "having washed in blood in Vietnam" - less than 60 thousand.
          1. +2
            26 2019 June
            Quote: CTABEP
            By the way, in my time, when I became interested in history a little more than the school course, I was very surprised that the US WWII lost half a million dead and missing, and "having washed in blood in Vietnam" - less than 60 thousand.

            We are like in Afghanistan, too, lost two orders of magnitude less than in the Second World War.
            1. +2
              26 2019 June
              Quote: Narak-zempo
              Quote: CTABEP
              By the way, in my time, when I became interested in history a little more than the school course, I was very surprised that the US WWII lost half a million dead and missing, and "having washed in blood in Vietnam" - less than 60 thousand.

              We are like in Afghanistan, too, lost two orders of magnitude less than in the Second World War.


              Well, we bore the brunt of the land war with Germany, and that was clear. Plus, to still compare Afgan and Vietnam is so-so, in Vietnam there were full-fledged military operations with tanks, aircraft and artillery from both sides, and in Afghanistan the SA, despite all its problems, drove with the mujahideen’s rags until a political decision was made to leave there . In general, 20 years ago for me it was quite shocking information, it somehow confirmed in my head that the United States for WWII had losses from Gulkin (for some reason, the figure in 70 was, and this turned out to be missing :), and in Vietnam more, the war went on longer :).
              1. +3
                26 2019 June
                Quote: CTABEP
                Well, we bore the brunt of the land war with Germany, and that was clear. Plus, to still compare Afgan and Vietnam is so-so, in Vietnam there were full-fledged military operations with tanks, aircraft and artillery from both sides, and in Afghanistan the SA, despite all its problems, drove with the mujahideen’s rags until a political decision was made to leave there .

                Still, in WWII, the American army was waging a real "big war" with an enemy comparable (and in the case of the Germans at first, superior) in technology and tactics. And such losses were expected and, from the point of view of public understanding of the goals of the war, acceptable.
                And in Vietnam, with absolute technical superiority - the rejection of the goals of war by American society, in which any losses are considered unreasonably high.
  3. 0
    25 2019 June
    It would be nice to create parts of tank destroyers with impact cumulative pole mines here as well - especially for clever people who want to hang out by sight laughing
    1. +3
      26 2019 June
      For students of the military department)))
  4. +5
    25 2019 June

    Experienced Japanese 105 mm recoilless anti-tank gun. The troops did not have time to enter.
    1. +4
      26 2019 June
      Oh ... Type 3! But the Japanese before that "worked" and on the 81-mm "recoilless"! Ballistic qualities were not high, but differed in low weight (37 kg versus 54 kg of the 75-mm "American" M20 ...) Unlike the Tour 3, it is possible that several guns were used by the Japanese in the battles in Okinawa (according to some Japanese veterans ...)
  5. +4
    26 2019 June
    Long before the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, tank escort by infantry became the standard. As a rule, a submachine gun unit was planted on each tank. In this way, even during the battles in Germany, tanks were protected from "faustnik"
    Sergey, an unexpected topic and thanks. And the article was just in time, not tied to any date, but for what reason: "The Amur region joined the All-Russian patriotic action" A Handful of Memory. "From the burial places of soldiers who died during the Great Patriotic War, tobacco pouches with earth are transferred to Moscow 15 memorial bags will be sent from the Amur Region to the historical-memorial complex of the main temple of the Armed Forces. " According to the memoirs of veterans of the war with Japan, the main danger is land "kamikaze", and just the infantry, trying not to let the Soviet Army go deep into Manchuria. The Japanese inflicted the most significant damage to our troops in the spurs of the Great Khingan. Now it became more obvious than the Japanese fought against tanks. Thanks again.
    1. +5
      26 2019 June
      My grandfather told me about the kamikaze of the air (first on the boats when approaching Sakhalin, swooped, then on the columns of vehicles) and on the Earth suysiders. He also talked about the chain chaining these critters of his soldiers in pillboxes. Japanese called fanatics.
      1. +4
        26 2019 June
        Quote: Krasnodar
        He also talked about the chain chaining these critters of his soldiers in pillboxes. Japanese called fanatics.

        On against my city was the Sakhalyansky UR of the Japanese, so far this is a secret behind seven seals. There is a good book by Valentina Runova. All fortified areas and defensive lines of the Second World War. And even there is little described about this part of the border. And how this area of ​​the border was stormed was also little described. Umoyego friend and classmate father participated in the first strike in the area of ​​Konstantinovka and he also told similar incidents.
        1. +6
          26 2019 June
          My conclusions from the stories are as follows:
          Ours attacked Sakhalin in many places from the sea. Grandfather was a self-propelled commander. They came up on barges. The Japanese planted soldiers and tanks at the landing site. Our self-propelled guns (grandfather was on the Su-100) shot straight from the barges. Hit tanks. Under the cover of fire infantry landed. I do not remember how the self-propelled guns landed on the beach or he did not tell me. Fortifications were in the depths of the island.
          As far as he did not like Germans (he began to fight with 43, with the Kursk Bulge), he spoke of them in the case. And when I asked him about the Japanese, I frowned and said - fanatics.
  6. +6
    26 2019 June
    Very good article. Especially about the mines learned a lot. Thanks to the author!

    Well, yes, too many Japanese put up for exchange, a soldier on a tank, with such simplified approaches, no one could have reached the enemy tank in the end.
  7. -1
    26 2019 June
    "Long before the USSR entered the war against Japan, the standard was the accompaniment of tanks by infantry. As a rule, a squad of machine gunners was planted on each tank.", Of course, the suicide bombers had a psychological effect from their use, as my grandfather recalled during the battles in Manchuria, they had to constantly control the space around the tank. they literally appeared out of the ground. The suicide bomber did not even have to jump on the tank, there were so many explosives on it that a detonation a dozen meters away simply blew the troops off the armor, crippling soldiers and sometimes the tank stopped due to the stalled engine.
    1. +2
      26 2019 June
      Quote: Strashila
      as my grandfather recalled during the battles in Manchuria, we had to constantly control the space around the tank, they appeared literally from the ground. The bomber did not even need to jump onto the tank, there were so many explosives on it that the blast of ten meters simply blew up the troops with armor of the crippling soldiers and sometimes the tank stopped because of a dead engine.

      Such cases certainly were. But how many Soviet tanks were lost in Manchuria, and give them the casualties of the Red Army and the Japanese army?
      1. 0
        26 2019 June
        The losses were especially in the first days, when we faced with camouflaged fortified areas along roads or tanky passable directions, which were built for a dozen years, masked them like that. that intelligence went over their top and could not find them, it was necessary to check the area several times in order to identify it. And then ... then the infantry ... the infantry ... the infantry with their feet checked the routes of movement, searched ... found ambushes, practiced artillery and aircraft, and only then again the infantry and its supporting tanks.
        1. +3
          26 2019 June
          Quote: Strashila
          The losses were especially in the first days, when we faced with camouflaged fortified areas along roads or tanky passable directions, which were built for a dozen years, masked them like that. that intelligence went over their top and could not find them, it was necessary to check the area several times in order to identify it. And then ... then the infantry ... the infantry ... the infantry with their feet checked the routes of movement, searched ... found ambushes, practiced artillery and aircraft, and only then again the infantry and its supporting tanks.

          I apologize for the annoying typos, I write from the phone. But you do agree that the Japanese could not inflict significant losses on our tank crews?
          1. 0
            26 2019 June
            The term substantial loss, it is relative.
            1. +2
              26 2019 June
              Quote: Strashila
              The term substantial loss, it is relative.

              Let's not play with words, but compare the numerical values ​​of the losses in tanks in Germany and Manchuria?
              1. +2
                26 2019 June
                Quote: zyablik.olga
                Let's not play with words, but compare the numerical values ​​of the losses in tanks in Germany and Manchuria?

                Olya! These things are not comparable. I will not give figures here, or other arguments, the main thing is that the Soviet Army 1945 of the year is not the RKKA 1941. This is an army with rich combat experience, and the trained personnel began to be transferred to the Far Eastern Front from 1944. good love love love
      2. +1
        26 2019 June
        Here it is, kmk, not so much in the losses as in the psychological effect. Starting from not understanding the motivation of the enemy, ending with the expectation of such runners from each bush. At the same time, for the landing, it was important not only to kill them, but to kill them so that the kamikaze would not activate the explosive device during the death, when falling, otherwise the landing party would not seem.
  8. +2
    30 2019 June
    However, melinite (shimoza) for the Japanese is like the first love that does not rust, from the time of the Russian-Japanese war. It does not matter that it is short-lived and dangerous in circulation, especially in contact with metals, and in production it is dangerous. Well, the Japanese did not feel sorry for their own, not like their enemies. But more powerful than TNT and does not require a high consumption of concentrated acids during the synthesis.
    Perhaps the Japanese were the only ones who massively used melinite in the BP in WWII.
  9. +2
    30 2019 June
    [quoteModification Type A (bag color - white or brown-yellow) weighed 1270 g and was filled with 853 g with a mixture of hexogen and trinitroaniline] [/ quote]
    Trinitroaniline? Maybe, nevertheless, tetryl (2,4,6-trinitro-N-methyl-N-nitroaniline)? Tetril, as BVV, during WWII was run. But in order to synthesize trinitroaniline, it is necessary to try very, very much, because it is the amino group that will be replaced by the first nitrite. Consequently, an additional stage is needed - the reduction of the amino group. What for? During the war, no one will bother with technologically complex multi-step syntheses, when there are more accessible and equally effective explosives.
  10. 0
    July 5 2019
    How many cumulative ammunition they had!

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"