Tsushima The main forces join the battle

Studying the actions of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky in the morning of the Tsushima battle, the author came to the conclusion that the Russian commander had extremely good reasons for not rushing to deploy the squadron into battle formation. The fact is that losing heavily to the Japanese in speed, Z.P. Rozhestvensky had no chance of replaying H. Togo in the classic maneuvering of wake columns. Build a Russian squadron into a column, a ledge, or into the front — with some correct actions by the Japanese admiral “crossing T” was almost inevitable.

Actions Russian admiral

Apparently, Z.P. Rozhestvensky saw a way out in not taking combat order until the appearance of the main enemy forces, and only then do the rebuilding. In this case, the Russian commander had a good chance to avoid “crossing T”, because X. Togo, until the very last moment, will not know the order in which the Russian squadron will be deployed. However, this decision had a downside. Given that May morning 14 visibility did not exceed 7 miles, Z.P. Rozhestvensky risked not having time to complete the rebuilding by the time the fire was opened.

Therefore, the Russian commander tried to hedge. When the Xumi Watching Izumi was seen on the squadron around 06.30, he did nothing, rightly believing that the main forces were still far away. The squadron continued marching, with its main forces moving in two parallel columns. But when the 3 battle squad appeared, ZP Rozhdestvensky, awaiting the imminent appearance of the battleships H. Togo and the armored cruisers H. Kamimura, orders the right column to increase its speed from 9 to 11 nodes. Thus, the right column gradually overtook the left, reducing the time required for rebuilding into a battle line - however, for the time being, from the side this maneuver was poorly seen and gave no idea what exactly the Russians started.

But time passed, but the main forces of the Japanese were not. The right column advanced strongly, and Z.P. Rozhdestvensky could only reorganize into the wake. At this moment, a short exchange of fire with the Japanese cruisers arises, and contact for some time was lost. Taking advantage of the lack of observation, Z.P. Rozhestvensky is trying to reorganize from the wake column to the front line. This made sense, since the intelligence officers probably had to report to Kh. Togo with the formation of a Russian squadron, but then the Japanese commander was expecting a small surprise.

But this surprise was not asked - at the time of the start of the execution of the maneuver, the Japanese cruisers appeared. Then Z.P. Rozhdestvensky orders the 2 squad to cancel the maneuver, and his 1 squad, made up of 4 squadron battleships of the Borodino type, returns the front to wake down. As a result, the Russian squadron once again moves in two parallel columns, and the only difference is that if Oslyabya and the 2 combat unit were in the right column in the morning, into the wake of the 1 armored squadron, now he headed the left column.

In other words, Z.P. Rozhestvensky again rebuilt his ships into a non-combat order, from which, however, he could quickly turn both into a front line and into a wake column. What happened next?

And what did H. Togo do?

Japanese admiral received a message about Russian navy at approximately 04.30. A little more than an hour and a half later he weighed anchor, and on 06.07 led his main forces to intercept. H. Togo was about to begin a general battle near Fr. Okinoshima, but how? A comprehensive answer to this question is given by the Japanese admiral himself, in his official report on the battle:

“... the reports received allowed me, being a few dozen miles away, to have a clear idea of ​​the position of the enemy. Thus, before seeing him, I already knew that the enemy fleet consists of all the ships of the 2 and 3 squadrons; that they are accompanied by 7 transports; that the ships of the enemy are in the ranks of two wake columns, that its main forces are in the head of the right column, and transports in the tail; that it goes at a speed of about 12 nodes; that he continues to go to the Eastern Strait, etc. Based on this information, I could make a decision - to meet the enemy with my main forces around 2 hours of the day near Okinosyma and attack the leading ships of the left column. ”

Why precisely left? Obviously, made up of the Oslyab battleship-cruiser, the old battleships of the 2 armored detachment, and the 3 th self-suicides, it was a very vulnerable target, unable to withstand the strike of the main Japanese forces. Both of these detachments made sense only as support forces for the main force of the Russian squadron — four squadron battleships of the Borodino type, but without them they could not successfully fight the Japanese battleships. On the other hand, if the 2 and 3 armored units were defeated, the fate of Borodino-type ships would be quickly resolved. Having attacked the left column, the Japanese commander could quickly, and with minimal damage to himself, achieve decisive success, and it would be strange if X. Togo neglected this chance.

And now the Japanese commander led the fleet towards the Russians. In 13.17 (according to Japanese data) - 13.20 (according to Russian data), the parties saw each other. Mikasa was found a little to the right of the course of the right Russian column, while the Japanese battleships crossed the course of the Russian squadron around 90 degrees. from right to left.

Obviously, Kh. Togo was preparing to put his plan into practice — in order to attack the left Russian column, he had to go to the left side of the Russian squadron, which he did.

Russian squadron begins rebuilding

In response to this, Z.P. Rozhestvensky immediately ordered to increase the speed of his flagship to 11,5 knots, and ordered to raise the signal to the “1 squadron - keep 11 knots.”, And immediately turned to the left: now the 1 th battle squad, turning successively, headed by “Suvorov” ", Went against the course" Oslyabi. " According to the testimony of Z.P. Rozhestvenskogo Investigation Commission, the turn was started in 13.20, and completed in 13.49 - at this moment "Prince Suvorov" entered the course "Oslyabi" and, tying to the right, headed the wake column of the main forces of the Russian squadron.

It must be said that in various, and sometimes very serious sources, the above events are described quite differently. The Japanese detection time is indicated by 13.20, but sometimes by 13.25., And the completion time of the maneuver of the 1 armor unit is from 13.40 to 13.49 minutes. Thus, according to the testimony of eyewitnesses, the maneuver execution time “jumps” from 15 to 29 minutes. There is a statement that the 1 combat unit did not turn consistently, but “all at once” on the 8 points (90 degrees) left. At the same time, an eyewitness to the events, flag-captain K.K. Clapier de Colong, in his testimony to the Investigation Commission, stated that the battleships did not turn "all at once", but consistently, and not at 8, but at 4 rumba (45 degrees). The official Russian historiography, apparently, decided to somehow reconcile these contradictory points of view, agreeing with the flag officer that the turn was at 4 rumba, but stating that it was not carried out consistently, but “all at once”. But that's not all: KK Clapier de Colong reported that the 1 armored detachment turned immediately after developing 11 knots, but the flagship mine officer Leontyev 1 th, reported that the right column, developing 11 knots, was first ahead left, and only then began to turn.

A separate issue is the distance between the left and right Russian columns, and their mutual arrangement. Z.P. Rozhestvensky argued that the distance between the columns was 8 cabling, the flagship navigator Filippovsky indicated the same distance. Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogaty practically agreed with them, reporting 7 cable. There were other similar testimonies: for example, Lieutenant Maximov from the coastal defense battleship Ushakov reported on 6-8 cable. But here, the officers of the squadron battleship "Eagle" had a different opinion and reported on 14-15 and even 20 cables, on "Sisoy Velikiy" they believed that the distance between the columns was 17 cables, etc. The same problem with the position of the columns: a series of testimonies and the official Russian story they say that by the time the Japanese appeared on the horizon, Oslyabya was on the traverse of Suvorov, but “there are opinions” that the right column had turned out to be somewhat advanced.

Thus, it is very difficult to make a consistent description of this maneuver, based on the recollections of eyewitnesses and on historical works, since the latter too contradict each other. But for the reasons that will be described below, the author sticks to the version of ZP. Rozhdestvensky.

So, in 13.20, the Russian squadron was going in two columns, the distance between which was 8 cable or so, while the Oslyabya was on the beam of the Suvorov, or slightly behind. Seeing the Japanese, "Suvorov" immediately increased the speed to 11,5 knots. and leaned to the left, but not on 4, and certainly not on 8 points, but very slightly - the change in course was less than point, about 9 degrees.

In order to build a single wake column with an 1 armored detachment led by such a turn, it took almost half an hour, but this is Z.P. Rozhestvensky quite satisfied. He needed to finish the rebuilding by the time the Japanese opened fire on the ships of the left column, and for that just about that was required. But the most important thing is that such a rebuilding, performed relatively slowly, and with a slight left turn, would be very difficult to see from the Japanese flagship.

From the perspective of the Japanese flagship, it was practically impossible to “catch” a slight increase in speed and a slight turn of the “Prince Suvorov” and the battleships following him. Thus, the Russian squadron was gradually reorganized into battle formation, but for X. Togo, the situation looked as if the Russians continued to follow the march in two columns, and did nothing. In other words, it turned out that ZP Rozhestvensky, as it were, “invited” H. Togo to rush to a relatively vulnerable left column, showing him that in this case the Borodino-type battleships would not have time to lead the Russian squadron. In fact, due to the increase in speed and rotation of the 1 armored detachment, this was not the case, because the Russians had time to complete the rebuilding.

And it turned out that if H. Togo continued his movement towards the Russian squadron, in order to crush the old ships led by the Oslyabyi on the 7 countercourse, he would soon find the wake column leading to him, leading by the best battleships of the 2 Pacific Squadron. Such a start of the battle became extremely advantageous for the Russian commander, especially since in the Russian Imperial Navy, shooting on countercourses was considered one of the most important artillery exercises.

Of course, all this was not a sentence for Kh. Togo at all. The Japanese commander, having superiority in speed and seeing that everything was not going well for him, could easily retreat, breaking the distance. But in this case, a tactical victory at this stage would be left to Z.P. Rozhdestvensky: he did not allow "crossing T" and even forced the Japanese to withdraw, what else can you demand from him? In addition, during the retreat, the Japanese fell for some time under the fire of Russian guns, being in a position that was not very favorable for them: there were chances not to drown, but at least to damage their ships. And if H. Togo was slow, or ventured to disperse on countercourses for a short distance ... Even with the disgusting quality of Russian shells, and even under the condition that H. Kamimura would not have substituted his ships for dagger fire, the passage of four battleships and Nissin with "Kasuga" along the line of 12 Russian ships, 11 of which (except for "Admiral Nakhimov") carried heavy guns, could cause very heavy damage to the Japanese.

On the squadron battleship Navarin

Apparently, for the first time, the version of the “trap for X. Togo” was put forward by the respected V. Chistyakov (“A quarter of an hour for Russian guns”), and, in the author’s opinion, he was largely right. It is possible, of course, that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was guided by somewhat different considerations than V. Chistyakov described. But the fact is that the Russian commander perfectly imagined the benefits of delaying the rebuilding of the marching order in the battle, which follows from the words of ZP himself. Rozhestvensky: the author quoted them in a previous article.

Coming to the left side of the Russian squadron, the Japanese turned around and went to the countercourse: it was because they were going to attack the relatively weak left Russian column. Here, of course, a number of readers may have a fair remark - by diverging from X. Togo’s countercurse, they would hardly have managed to completely crush the old Russian battleships with 305-mm guns, and those could well have been able to “recoup” on the relatively weakly armored cruisers of H. Kamimura. But the fact is that the Japanese squadron did not form a single wake column, the 2 th combat detachment went separately and a little to the right of the 1 th. In addition, H. Kamimura had quite broad powers, he had to act on the situation and was not obliged to follow the flagship. Thus, armored cruisers X. Kamimury could break the distance in case of divergence by the countercourse, which would minimize their risks, or even completely retreat if it becomes very hot. However, it was unlikely that all of this could have been known in the Russian squadron.

For some time, the squadrons converged on countercourses, and then the Japanese turned almost on 180 degrees - more precisely, on 15, and perhaps all the same, and all 16 points, and lay down on a course almost parallel to the Russian squadron. This maneuver was later called the “Loop of Togo”.

Such a turnaround, taken in view of the enemy, in any respect cannot be considered a success of Japanese tactics, because during the execution of the maneuver only deployed ships could fire, interfering with those that only went to the turning point.

After 2 minutes after “Mikasa” entered the circulation, that is, into 13.49, several events occurred simultaneously:

1. "Prince Suvorov" came to the head of the Russian squadron and turned it to the right, laying down the course NO23, which the left column followed;

2. "Mikasa" completed the turn and lay down on a new course;

3. "Prince Suvorov" reduced the speed to 9 knots. and opened fire.

This ended the pre-combat maneuvering - the main forces of the Russian and Japanese squadrons entered the battle, and the author with a clear conscience could return to the description of the history of the cruisers “Pearl” and “Emerald”. However, in order to avoid understatement, we briefly and briefly consider the consequences of the maneuvers of the opposing sides.

How strongly did the Japanese "substitute" by performing the "Noose of Togo"?

Unfortunately, the position of the turning point of the Japanese ships relative to the Russian squadron is not precisely known: eyewitnesses have a “spread” in opinions, considering that the bearing on it ranged from 8 to 45 degrees to the left. But, be that as it may, there is a completely reliable fact confirmed by the Japanese themselves - in the first 15 minutes of the battle, while Mikasa received 19 hits, including 5 * 305-mm and 14 * 152-mm projectiles, and in others Japanese fleet ships still hit at least 6 shells. Why at least? The fact is that the Japanese, of course, at the end of the battle had the opportunity to record almost all the hits to their ships, but, of course, they were far from always able to fix the time of hits. Thus, we are talking only about hits, the time of which is known for sure, but it is quite possible that there were others.

All of the above indicates a very accurate shooting of Russian ships, which it would hardly have been possible to carry out if the Japanese had made their turn at very sharp course angles. Thus, by indirect evidence it can be argued that the bearing from the “Suvorov” to the Japanese squadron was nevertheless closer to 45 degrees than to 8.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is that the mutual position of the Russian and Japanese ships at the time of the start of the battle allowed the Russian artillerymen to achieve a large number of hits in the Japanese, that is, the “Togo Loop” was an extremely risky maneuver for them.

Why does Z.P. Rozhestvensky concentrated the entire squadron fire on the Japanese flagship?

The question is very important: didn’t the Russian admiral realize that the 12 ships would make it difficult to target each other? Of course he understood. That is why Zinovy ​​Petrovich did not give the order to shoot at the "Mikas" throughout the squadron.

According to the testimony of numerous eyewitnesses, the signal "1" was raised on "Prince Suvorov" - he indicated the sequence number of the enemy ship on which it was necessary to concentrate the fire. Undoubtedly, it was about Mikas. But the thing is that, according to the order No. 29 of 10 in January, this signal did not concern the squadron as a whole, but only the 1 of the armored detachment. Literally, this place sounds like this:

“The signal will indicate the number of the enemy ship, according to the account from the lead ship in the wake or from the right flank in the front. This number should be focused on the fire of the entire squad if possible. ”

Moreover, it is obvious from the context that a detachment means precisely one of the armored detachments, and not the entire squadron as a whole. For example, the order contains the following indication:

"... when approaching with heading courses and after concentrating fire on the head, the number to which the entire artillery of the first (head) squadron squadron should be directed, while the second squadron will continue to act on the originally chosen target."

Thus, Z.P. Rozhestvensky ordered only four squadron battleships of the Borodino type to fire at Mikas, while the rest of the 2 armored detachments were free to choose their targets on their own.

What advantages did the Japanese admiral receive at the end of the “Loop of Togo”?

They, oddly enough, were relatively small: the fact is that from the situation in which the Japanese ships found themselves at the end of the maneuver, it was almost impossible to set the Russian “crossing T”. In other words, after the "Loop of Togo" 2-th and 3-I Pacific squadrons, although they lost the advantage of the position (and the Japanese acquired it), but at the same time occupied a position that excluded the possibility of placing them "crossing T".

The thing was that the Russian and Japanese squadrons were on courses very close to parallel ones, and the Japanese were ahead. But any attempt to turn them to the right, in order to set up a “crossing T”, could be parried in the same turn to the right of the Russian squadron. In this case, the Japanese were moving as if on the outer circumference, and the Russians - on the inside, respectively, to keep the current position, the Russians needed to travel a smaller distance than the Japanese, and this eliminated the Japanese advantage in speed.

Why ZP Rozhestvensky did not take advantage of the advantages that the "maneuver around the inner circle" gave him?

And who said that he did not use them? In 13.49, "Prince Suvorov" turned to NO23 and opened fire, and for the 15 minutes kept the same course in order to give the Russian commanders to realize the advantage of the position. Then, in 14.05 Z.P. Rozhestvensky turns the rumba to the left on 2, in order to be closer to the Japanese, but quickly realizes that this is not a good idea, and then go to the 4 rumba to the right. Thus, the combat columns of the Russians and the Japanese turned out to be on parallel courses, and the chances of the Japanese to set the “crossing T” fall to zero. They did not even try to do this, confining themselves to the fact that their 1-th combat unit was ahead of the Russian flagship, which gave the Japanese a certain advantage.

Why ZP Rozhdestvensky did not rush with his 5 relatively high-speed armadillos to the turning point of the Japanese ships in order to turn the battle into a landfill?

Such an action did not have the slightest sense for a number of reasons.

Firstly, it could not be executed on time, because taking into account the time needed for picking up and raising signals, and increasing the speed to 13-14 nodes, the Russian ships did not have time to get close to the enemy ships in a heap. Let's not forget that up to the turning point, according to Russian data, there remained about 37-38 cable, that is, about 4 miles, and it would be possible to overcome them in 15 minutes only if the Russian battleships had a speed of around 16 from the very beginning knots. Of course, they could not develop such a speed, and even if they could, they could not have done it quickly. In addition, we must not forget that, unlike successive turns, the turn “all of a sudden” required a flag signal, and it had to be dialed, lifted, waited until the ships that received the order would rehearse (that is, raise the same signals), and only then order to perform ...

Secondly, it was much more profitable to move with the previous course than to rush headlong. The fact is that moving forward at a speed of at least 9 nodes brought the Russian squadron closer to the turning point of the Japanese, and opened the best course angle to this point. In other words, by the time when the terminal Japanese ships, the weakly protected cruisers H. Kamimura, would have entered the turn, almost the entire squadron from the distance that Z.P. Rozhestvensky estimated as not exceeding 35 cables for the end of the Russian ship. At the same time, throwing forward led to the fact that the most powerful Russian battleships could operate only half of their large-caliber artillery (bow towers) and prevented the 2 and 3 armored detachments from firing.

Thirdly, after the completion of the maneuver, the “landfill” could not have turned out all the same - the relatively low-speed 1 of the Japanese detachment of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky didn’t have time to do it anyway, and the cruiser X. Kamimura had a larger course and could very quickly break the distance. But after that, the Russian squadron would have been dispersed in the 2 squad, and would have been easily defeated.

Why did the Japanese admiral start his “noose” at all?

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese commander in his report reported that, based on intelligence data, he decided to attack the left column of the Russian squadron. Obviously, for this purpose he moved from the right shell of the Russian squadron to the left. H. Togo explained his subsequent actions as follows:

"The 1 combat unit temporarily turned to SW to make the enemy think that we would go with him in a nasty course, but in 13.47 immediately turned to Ost, pressing the enemy's head in a curved line."

It must be said that the explanation of this maneuver, which was given by Kh. Togo, is completely unsatisfactory. There was no point in “forcing the enemy to think about a countercurse.” What could be achieved by this? Only that the Russians would try to reorganize into one wake column. But if X. Togo initially conceived such a maneuver, then he should have built his maneuvering in such a way as to put a "crossing T", or to achieve another significant advantage. However, all that the Japanese commander achieved as a result of the “Loop of Togo” - turned out to be in almost parallel columns somewhat ahead of the Russian squadron - was quite achievable even without extreme turns at gunpoint of the heavy battleships of the battleships Z.P. Rozhdestvensky.

In other words, it was possible to believe the Japanese admiral that his maneuvers were part of a predetermined plan, if, as a result of their implementation, the Japanese would have a clear, tangible advantage that could not be achieved in a different way. But there was nothing of this. Therefore, it is most likely that H. Togo, going to the left shell of the Russian squadron and turning it on a countercourse, was really going to fall on its left column, believing that the battleships of the Borodino type did not have time to lead the Russian system. And when he saw that the Russians had nevertheless managed, he was forced in a hurry to urgently invent something. He probably did not dare to turn "all of a sudden", since in this case the battle control passed to his youngest flagship. There remained only a turn consistently that H. Togo executed, that is, this decision was forced for him.

Thus, it can be stated that the idea of ​​Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was a great success - for a long time keeping the “two-column” system and rebuilding so that it was invisible from the Japanese ships, he tactically outplayed the Japanese commander, saved his squadron from the “crossing T”, provided its 15-minute advantage in the battlefield and made X. Togo to join the battle is not in the best position possible.

All of the above would have allowed the Russian commander to be considered a brilliant naval commander ... if not for the series of mistakes that Zinovy ​​Petrovich made when implementing his own, in any respect, outstanding plan. But we will discuss this in the next article.

Comments

[Thrifty]

Andrei you would have to write a script for a historical film about the Battle of Tsushima - there is such a literary and analytical ability in you!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Thrifty

Andrei hi you would write a script for a historical film about the Tsushima Battle

And who will be shooting? :))) If someone like Druzhinin and Shalopa, who removed the 28 Panfilovs, I agree, but if Mikhalkov, then I’m sorry, I can't help but take the cutting from the shovel and ... And which is typical, even after all I will not hold back

[Saxahorse]

I don’t even know how such a "work" can be commented on .. What a golimous trash literally in every paragraph! It feels like you need to write an article three times as large to make out every blunder (to put it mildly) made by the author in literally every sentence ..

I’ll try to point out at least some of the gross errors and distortions made by our friend Andrei.

Studying the actions of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky in the morning of the Tsushima battle, the author came to the conclusion that the Russian commander had extremely good reason not to rush to deploy the squadron into combat formation.

There is not the slightest reason to believe that the author’s favorite, Admiral Rozhestvensky, was in his right mind at the time of the battle .. I recall that at the tribunal following the results of Tsushima, neither the admiral, nor his headquarters, could give clear explanations for the strange maneuvering of the squadron before the battle. Either ZPR is being built in one column, or it is tearing up a column, and either the front or the poker moves towards the enemy .. It seems that the admiral did not understand what to do here, and as a child copying adults, he simply depicted activity in the face of the enemy. Like you need to lead the battle, so I give commands .. Why and why he gave all these commands, this gentleman could not explain even under pain of the death penalty. :(

In response to this Z.P. Rozhdestvensky immediately ordered to increase the speed of his flagship to 11,5 knots, and ordered to raise the signal “1st unit - keep 11 knots.”, And immediately turned a little to the left: now the first combat detachment, turning sequentially, led by "Suvorov," went across the course "Oslyaby."

Then there are several paragraphs of incomprehensible fantasies taken from the ceiling by the author (at best ..). There is no disagreement in the sources about the rebuilding of the 1st detachment. Suvorov took to the left and rebuilt diagonally at the head of the left column with his detachment. Nonsense about some kind of twist "all of a sudden" the author himself invented and excluded. Such maneuvers are not performed in passing, but no one in the Russian squadron recorded any flagship commands for such a maneuver. But it is worth recalling that Roestvensky, as a typical bad carrier, gave the order to reduce Suvorov's speed to 9 knots without even looking in the mirror! And Borodino at that moment was still on the Oslyabi traverse (not to mention the Orel). With this maneuver, Rozhestvensky completely destroyed the squadron's formation and forced the 2nd and 3rd detachments to reduce the speed to zero. In fact, these two detachments were knocked out of the battle for a long time by these ZPR maneuvers alone.

The editor began to fail .. long comment :(
Continuation of the second piece head.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Saxahorse

I will try to indicate at least some of the gross errors.

Better not:))))

Quote: Saxahorse

Let me remind you that at the tribunal on the results of Tsushima, neither the admiral nor his headquarters could give any clear explanations for the squadron’s strange maneuvering before the battle.

The admiral and his headquarters gave exhaustive explanations of all the questions of the investigative commission, it is obvious from the copies of their testimony, which anyone can be sure of after reading these testimonies.

Quote: Saxahorse

There is not the slightest reason to believe that the author's favorite, Admiral Rozhestvensky, was in his right mind at the time of the battle ..

Let's try to understand the value of this conclusion. our friend Saksaors, obujanny thirst for exposure writes

Quote: Saxahorse

There is no disagreement in the sources about the rebuilding of the 1st detachment. Suvorov took to the left and rebuilt diagonally at the head of the left column with his detachment. Nonsense about some kind of twist "all of a sudden" the author himself invented and excluded.

We open the official national history "Russian-Japanese war 1904-1905", read

That is, the person reproaching me for fantasies and forgery did not bother to get acquainted even with the basic, fundamental work on the NEA of the sea.
If someone from our dear readers is still unclear about the level of our "debunker" - ask, I will answer :)))

[Saxahorse]

Apparently the protocols of the history of the RYAV were edited by an "expert" of the same level as you, our dear Andrey. :) The word "bowed" means a maneuver behind the flagship and "all of a sudden" is a separate maneuver on the orders of the flagship. After the ridiculous maneuver of the ZPR by the 1st armored detachment, all Suvorov's signals were discussed, and one might say sucked, many times. There was definitely no command to turn "all of a sudden". In general, there were no commands before the order to reduce the speed to 9 knots.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Saxahorse

Apparently the protocols of the history of the RYAV were edited by an "expert" of the same level as you, our dear Andrey. :)

Of course, where are the staff of the historical commission at the Naval General Staff :)))
But the point is that you did not know this, that is, you are unfamiliar even with the main sources on the topic ..

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

It seems that you need to write an article three times as large to make out each blunder (to put it mildly), the author allowed literally in every sentence ..

Why parasitize on someone else's work?
You, dear colleague, better give out on the mountain its own vision of events described by deeply respected Andrey.
We, grateful readers, will only have to decide for ourselves whose interpretation of the plot of the Tsushima battle is more convincing and believable.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Comrade

Quote: Saxahorse

It seems that you need to write an article three times as large to make out each blunder (to put it mildly), the author allowed literally in every sentence ..

Why parasitize on someone else's work?
You, dear colleague, better give out on the mountain its own vision of events described by deeply respected Andrey.
We, grateful readers, will only have to decide for ourselves whose interpretation of the plot of the Tsushima battle is more convincing and believable.

Why? Personally, I already understand the "interpretation" of Saksakhors - the mad admiral began to issue ridiculous orders running with bulging eyes on the deck of the battleship squadron, which led to confusion and defeat. Now, if Saksakhors himself were on the deck of Suvorov, then the Japanese would be immediately defeated.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Now, if on the deck of Suvorov was Saksahorse himself, then the Japanese would be immediately defeated.

Now, if Andrei Shmelev himself were on the deck of the "Suvorov", he would shoot a little and give a tear) it would still have turned out better than the ZPR, since, in principle, no one else can do worse than the ZPR.

"this result can be repeated, but cannot be surpassed" (c)

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

The problem is that the author of the article retroactively tries to figure out for Rozhestvensky what kind of tactics he wanted to apply. But if Rozhdestvensky had thought out a tactic, he himself would have explained his actions to the Commission of Inquiry. And he, as we know, did not say anything intelligible. Accordingly, his actions look neither like a cunning trap for Togo, but like ordinary throwing, i.e. an attempt to improvise on the go, ending in failure.
Speaking about the fact that Rozhdestvensky had no options - the author is wrong, the very same Witheft, despite the slower speed, managed to break up with Togo in counter-courses, so that he found himself in a catch-up position. And the attempts to 2TOE to slip behind the tail of the Japanese column to the Japanese were not at all easy to parry, despite the fact that the 2TOE had already lost and lost 2 strong ships at this point.
So there were options, just Rozhestvensky did not care about their advance study.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

We, grateful readers, will only have to decide for ourselves whose interpretation of the plot of the Tsushima battle is more convincing and believable.

"Plausible"? Are you looking at the article as a science fiction competition? It's time for you to finally look at the name of the site. This is not at all your favorite "Alternative History", it is customary to describe real events here and the "tactical victory" of Admiral Rozhestvensky at Tsushima, described by the author of the article, is definitely not real.

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

Naturally does not apply. The advantage in the outset of the battle, Rozhestvensky received a maximum of 5 minutes, while the Japanese had 1 combat detachment deployed. Within 10 minutes after the start of the battle Mikasa emerged from the sectors of the aft tower of the Eagle, and opposite him was the "Iwate-class cruiser", the 7th or 8th ship of the Japanese line. At the same time, Mikasa herself was at a distance of about 40 cables from Orel. And practically any Japanese ship could fire at Suvorov or Oslyabya with no more than 30 cables, on which the accuracy, according to the Japanese estimate, was 1.5 times higher than 40. Our terminal ships, from Sisoi and further, even along the middle-tail of the Japanese line could shoot from about 40 cables. Naturally, the Japanese got a fire advantage at times, against our head and smashed them.
There is no need to talk about any 15 minutes of Russian advantage. The maximum can be said that in these 15 minutes they had a position that allowed more or less effective shooting at Mikasa, but nothing more.

[sevtrash]

Another "ingenious" manners of the author to rewrite history within topwar. In the previous article, once again the pearl ripened that Rozhestvensky's "genius" consisted of "genius" doing nothing, the author again leaves aside the catastrophic consequences of Rozhdestvensky's reconstruction, which were noted in the commission to investigate the circumstances of the battle. Now it turns out that Rozhestvensky's "brilliant" decisions were disguised in the context of orders ?? Sumptuously! The author, you missed the moment to point out another proof of Rozhestvensky's "genius" - it turns out that his instructions had to be looked for in the context of orders! Bravo! What is the use of meetings with discussion or presentation of battle plans, you just need to type them in context, guess and understand somehow. A new word in the manual, apparently introduced by the author from his own blogging experience. Nelson, Ushakov did not reach this point.
In general, of course, such attempts to rewrite history look strange, albeit on an amateur couch level. But we must remember the goal - there should be an article that will attract the attention of readers to it and to the site, including comments. Well, maybe even complexes of their own exclusiveness or vice versa.

[ser56]

Quote: sevtrash

Why meetings with discussion or presentation of battle plans,

He didn’t even tell Nebogatov his plans that there were EDB commanders ...

Quote: sevtrash

Well, maybe even complexes of their own exclusiveness or vice versa

I think both options

[ser56]

Quote: Saxahorse

With this maneuver, Rozhestvensky completely destroyed the squadron system and forced the 2nd and 3rd detachments to reduce their progress to zero. In fact, these two detachments were knocked out of the battle for a long time with this ZPR maneuver alone.

Bravo! to the point!
and in addition, after the turn to NO23, the ZPR took off - what finished off the 2nd TOE completely ... if I had given 13uz - there would have been a chance to disagree with a result like Shatung ... but there was not a charismatic, but smart admiral at the head of the squadron ...

[Saxahorse]

I’ll continue, since it doesn’t go in one piece.

Unfortunately, the position of the pivot point of Japanese ships relative to the Russian squadron is not exactly known: eyewitnesses have a “scatter” in opinions, believing that the bearing on it ranged from 8 to 45 degrees to the left.

I don’t understand why the author needed this turbidity, then on the diagram he draws the Japanese move at 90 degrees to the right, then on the scan we suddenly see that the Japanese are directly ahead of the squadron .. In fact, the Japanese squadron crossed the Russian course at an angle of about 45 degrees and started the battle abruptly turning back. The author correctly indicated that the course angle at the beginning of the battle was from 30 to 50 degrees. The enemy was right in front of the Russian squadron and turned left, crossing the course of the Russians and placing them under the concentrated fire of both detachments.

Further discussions about how Rozhestvensky successfully avoided crossing T could not be called delirium. ZPR directly and directly substituted Suvorov and Oslyaba for the shooting of the Japanese in the very first minutes of the battle. It was the first maneuvers of our nearby admiral in the first minutes of the battle that launched the Tsushima disaster.

At 13.49, “Prince Suvorov” turned to NO23 and opened fire, and for 15 minutes kept his previous course in order to give the Russian commandos to take advantage of the position. Then, at 14.05 Z.P. Rozhdestvensky turns 2 rumba to the left in order to be closer to the Japanese, but quickly realizes that this is not a good idea, and then go to 4 rumba to the right. Thus, the battle columns of the Russians and the Japanese found themselves on parallel courses, and the chances of the Japanese to set up “crossing T” drop to zero.

Yes, yes, yes .. The author just forgot to add that the fight began at 13:49, 15 minutes later, by 14:05, Suvorov was already very bad, and after 25 minutes from the start, (when the time came "to lie down on 4 rumba to the right . ") Suvorov rolled out of action completely destroyed. But the author is trying to tell us here that it turns out to be almost a victory!

You are our dreamer!

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

add that the battle began at 13:49, 15 minutes later, by 14:05, Suvorov was already very bad, and after 25 minutes from the start, (when the time came "to lie down on 4 rumba to the right.") Suvorov rolled out of order

Let's look at the facts, dear colleague.
"Prince Suvorov", to 13:53 caught in the fire of four armadillos at once, thirty three minutes later in 14:26, ceasing to obey the steering wheel, failed. According to your version, this is a consequence

Quote: Saxahorse

the first maneuvers of our nearby admiral in the first minutes of the battle

.
So good.
And now let's compare what happened with the flagship of the 2nd Pacific Squadron with what happened to the Tsesarevich.
В 17:40 "Tsesarevich" received three hits with 12 "shells, with two hitting exactly on the nasal bridge, where Rear Admiral VK Vitgeft was with the headquarters.
В 17:45 the battleship "Tsesarevich" receives two hits with 12 "shells. 17:50, at the beginning of circulation, another armadillo one 12 "projectile. The latter disabled the steering wheel of the hydraulic steering drive in the conning tower, and the uncontrollable" Tsesarevich "with a large dynamic roll went out of order.
Total six hits with 12 "shells received for ten minutes, and the chain of successive events caused by them leads to the fact that the flagship of the 1-th Pacific squadron fails.
There is reason to believe that "Prince Suvorov" by the time of failure had received up to nine 12 "shells.
You write that Vice Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky is personally guilty of the failure of "Prince Suvorov", and who then, in your opinion, is personally guilty of the failure of the "Tsesarevich"?
In fact, this is an incredible simplification, to look for the culprits, everything is decided by the number and distribution of hits. One ship is lucky ("Peresvet", 11-12 hits by 12 "shells), and the other does not (" Oslyabya ", three hits with 12 "shells)

Quote: Saxahorse

You are our dreamer!

And how long have you been talking about yourself in the plural?

[Andrey Shmelev]

incredible simplification, look for the guilty, everything is decided by the number and distribution of hits

I will answer again with abbreviations true:

Firstly, you, unfortunately, operate on fixed hits, so there are really more of them for anyone - the question is how many.

Of the recorded hits, you ignore, for some reason, "extra":
For example, you forget about "Oslyabya": "three large shells hit the bow turret; the first damaged the installation, and the third, having flown into the embrasure, took out all the servants, seriously wounded the commander of the tower, warrant officer Maikov"
hitting only 3 heavy shells in the nose turret gives grounds to statistically assume TENS of hits of heavy shells in Oslyabya in total

IMHO, statistically, lakishot is formed by the accumulation of attempts. That is, according to the experience of the disassembled battles (except for Tsushima), a very successful hit is a statistical regularity for a couple of dozen hits of heavy shells.

The statistics are such a thing that Lakichot in a battle of 2 ships is unpredictable, and in a battle of 24 ships is a consequence of the overall quality of shooting and obeys statistical laws due to "large numbers"
10 shots give a random result.
1000 shots give a natural result.
This is the law of large and small numbers in a statistical sample.

We see:
"Suvorov" with a completely broken side in a part uncovered by a belt,
completely broken nose of "Alexander III", coupled with many other holes in the hull, "Borodino", which was a priority target of the Japanese for a long time, but nothing is said about damage to which until half past six in the evening, but which are presumed
+ "Oslyabya", in respect of which it is modestly written as a result of these and other hits

And we also have the "Eagle", which was not really damaged in fact. Which makes it extremely logical to suggest at least doubling its damage rate for each sunken battleship on average.
Of course, this assumption, however, does not just contradict the picture of the battle and any of its descriptions, but it fits very logically into them.
In contrast to the assumption that any of the battleships had enough damage rate "Eagle", which is technically possible, however, completely unreliable statistically

Now about the lacquers.

Regarding the fight on 28.07 - the maximum in "Tsarevich", but it followed from the logic of the fight.
A skirmish at Port Arthur - not a single one.
Fight at Ulsan - theoretically only damage to the Rurik's rudder can be attributed to them, but something very bad should have happened to him, given the weakness of its booking.
In total, for two long and persistent squadron battles, only a couple of very successful hits that stemmed from the logic of the process, therefore not entirely laconic.

So:
The Russians at Tsushima hit 47 times with heavy shells - they got very successful hits on Fuji and Asama. The Japanese on 28.07 and 01.08 also fully deserved those in terms of the total number of attempts. The Germans honestly deserved their lacichots with 122 hits at Jutland. The British also deserved it, but the Germans turned out to be painfully tenacious.
Attention is the question: why exactly under Tsushima the statistics stop working and the Lakishots pour in from the Japanese like miracles sent from the sky, and not as a logical result of dozens of heavy shells entering Russian battleships?

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Comrade

Let's look at the facts, dear colleague.
"Prince Suvorov", by 13:53 found himself under fire from four battleships at once, thirty-three minutes later, at 14:26, having ceased to obey the steering wheel, went out of order. According to your version, this is a consequence ..

Dear Canadian "Comrade", you seem to be unable to understand. The admiral's fault is not that his flagship was out of order, but that he suddenly ONE was under fire from "four battleships at once" and two more BRKRs about which you again forgot. And the reason for this was the mediocre management of the squadron by Rozhdestvensky.

ZPR made the very same crossing-T for itself by personally sending the squadron exactly in the middle of Togo's detachment, under concentrated fire. It is not so easy to lose two of the newest battleships in such a short time, but ZPR managed to ..

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Saxahorse

The author just forgot to add that the battle began in 13: 49, in 15 minutes, to 14: 05, Suvorov was already very bad

It was very bad for 14.26, and the first hits on it were around 14.00, so by 14.05 it couldn’t be bad at all :)

[Andrey Shmelev]

14.05 bad

could since

Very bad he was at 14.26

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

In this case, what do you mean by the word "bad"? :))))

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

It was very bad for 14.26, and the first hits on it were around 14.00, so by 14.05 it couldn’t be bad at all :)

At the same time, by 14:10, when Suvorov made the first turn by two points, he no longer had masts, one pipe, aft 12 "tower and one 6" tower. It’s hard to call such a good state. :) Well, by 14:26 he was already completely baked. Admiral Rozhestvensky did not fight for long.

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

You are confusing something. According to Semenov, the explosion of the aft tower and the fall of the pipe occurred almost simultaneously with the loss of control.

[hostel]

Bravo, Andrey.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Good afternoon, dear colleague!

It becomes much more interesting. However, before leaving for AI, there are a couple of considerations.

In case of discrepancy on the countercourse.
The first one. Togo had every opportunity in a quarter of an hour to send the entire detachment of Nebogatov to the bottom and ZPR maneuvers could not prevent him from doing so.
The second one. ZPR maneuvers would have made sense when attacking the Kamimur detachment, which was marching with a snake after Togo, but the Japanese maneuvered by detachments rather than a single long snake, because Kamimura would not have been substituted, too close to the head battleships of 2 TOE, which deprived the ZPR maneuver of chances of success.

In real history - "Togo's loop".
First. 15 minutes after the start of the battle, "Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" were already doomed. The debut won Togo with a clear advantage. The maneuvers of the ZPR, which crowded the battleships and forced the Oslyabya vehicles to stop, sharply exacerbated the consequences of Togo's loop.
The second one. ZPR maneuvers would make sense when attacking at a speed of at least 15 knots. What was not, which deprived the ZPR maneuver of a chance of success.

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

ZPR maneuvers would make sense when attacking a Kamimur detachment marching with a snake after Togo, but the Japanese maneuvered with detachments, rather than a single long snake

Here is a fragment of the Japanese outline of the episode of the Tsushima battle under discussion, time is visible there.

As you can see, the flagship of Kamimura didn’t really breathe in the back of the neck of the Togo terminal ship, but the distance between the trajectories of the two connections did not exceed a hundred yards. And the distance between Kamimura and Togo is comparable with the distance between Nebogatov and Rozhdestvensky.
During the battle, there were cases when the trajectories of Togo and Kamimura merged, which means that all twelve ships went in one column.

[Andrey Shmelev]

dear colleague, I don’t argue that Kamimura also followed Togo, but also maneuvered separately

You, as a connoisseur of cartographic material, can help to shed light, for example, here on this maneuver:
"Meanwhile, our squadron, after its sharp turn from Suvorov, was gradually leaning to the right, so as not to let the Japanese, who invariably strived for this, to cross their course. As a result, both opponents moved in concentric arcs: ours - along the inner circle, the Japanese - on the outside. At about 4 pm, fate seemed to try to smile at us for the last time. Among the thick smoke that poured from damaged chimneys, smoke from shots and fires, mixed with the fog still floating over the sea, the Japanese main forces somehow dispersed with ours and lost sight of them. Japanese sources, which I use, speak of this episode very briefly and dully. It is only clear that Togo considered our squadron to somehow break through to the north and went there in search of it, but Kamimura did not agreed with this opinion and headed to S and SW with his cruisers, so at least one can understand the heated eulogies in a special section of the book entitled "The Valor of Admiral Kamimura." if this "valor" had been, it is possible that on May 14 the battle would have been over and our squadron would have had time to gather and recover. Going to S and then SW, Kamimura heard heavy cannon fire coming from the west and went straight there. It was Admiral Kataoka who attacked (so far rather unsuccessfully) our cruisers and transports. Kamimura took an active part in the battle and immediately soon discovered our main forces, which, having circled almost a circle with a diameter of about 5 miles, returned to the same place from where "Alexander" made his sudden and sharp turn and around which "Suvorov" wandered helplessly " ...
So it was, judging by the Japanese map?

This is me about the degree of independence of the Japanese younger flagships.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

In case of discrepancy on the countercourse.
The first. Togo had the full opportunity in a quarter of an hour to send to the bottom of the entire squad Nebogatov

After passing under fire 305-mm guns of our ADB? Yes, I could, if I had retained enough strength by that time. And he could save them only because of the disgusting quality of our shells, and that’s not a fact

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

ZPR maneuvers would make sense when attacking Kamimur's detachment, following Togo as a snake, but the Japanese maneuvered with detachments, rather than a single long snake, so Kamimura simply wouldn’t substitute, getting too close to the main 2 battleships of TEE, which deprived ZPR maneuvers of chances for success.

Let's remember that Kamimura's "self-maneuvering" led him to repeat the "Togo Loop" - a maneuver extremely unfortunate for the Japanese.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

First. 15 minutes after the start of the battle, "Suvorov" and "Oslyabya" were already doomed.

Oslyabya is possible, but only because of the extremely successful distribution of hits, Suvorov is definitely not.

[Andrey Shmelev]

After passing under fire 305 mm guns of our EDB?

what, "Navarina"?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

what, Navarin?

Including. They, by the way, would be especially dangerous for the Japanese - they fired old shells

[ser56]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

By the way, they would be especially dangerous for the Japanese - they fired with old shells

like EDB IN1!

[Senior seaman]

As far as I remember, the 30-caliber guns of the "Nikolai" could not fire heavy shells (although its shells are still heavier than the Model 1891). But "Navarin" has quite

[Victor Leningradets]

Good afternoon, colleagues!
I warmly support your thesis, Andrei Shmelev, about the doom of the Russian squadron!
Just a little remark: not after 15 minutes, but from the moment of discovery. All this slow-moving community was a beaten convoy, unable to maneuver to attack. Combining everything that could stunt into a single column Z.P. Rozhestvensky completely gave the initiative to the enemy. That (also not a great mind!) Began to destroy the flagships (obviously believing that the Russian admirals are of some value to their own fleet), and could have reduced the whole battle to the destruction of the first armored detachment by constantly placing it in two lights. If the target of Kamimura was "Oryol" and not "Oslyabya", then by 16 o'clock ALL the battleships of the first detachment would have lost their combat capability and would inevitably have been finished off by destroyers. What Nebogatov and Enquist would have done with the remaining ships, we know from the fact.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Kind!

Combining all that could blow into a single column Z.P. Rozhdestvensky completely gave the initiative to the enemy

Yes sir!

Togo (also not a great mind!) Set about destroying the flagships

I think Togo wanted to slow them down so that the squadron would not be able to accelerate at the initiative of the flagship, how did he know that they would not accelerate

[27091965]

And when he saw that the Russians still managed, he was forced to rush something urgently in a hurry. He probably did not dare to turn “all of a sudden”, since in this case the control of the battle passed to his younger flagship. There remained only a turn in sequence, which H. Togo executed, that is, this decision was forced for him.

In principle, the decision was not forced, Admiral H. Togo repeated, of course, not "one to one" the actions of Vice-Admiral AK Wilson in the 1903 exercises. Unfortunately, Admiral ZP Rozhestvensky did not repeat the actions of Admiral CE Domvile in this battle. The chances of winning were "ghostly", but at least the score would not have been dry and the defeat would not have been so devastating.

[Saxahorse]

Quote: 27091965i

Admiral H. Togo repeated, of course, not "one to one" the actions of Vice-Admiral AK Wilson in the 1903 exercises.

I do not think Togo consciously repeated Wilson’s maneuvers in the 1903 exercises. Togo had his own, unsuccessful experience of combat at kontrokursy in combat in the Yellow Sea. With the subsequent hours-long pursuit, miraculously ending with a successful hit and victory. It is unlikely that the same pursuit of the 2nd squadron smiled at him.

[27091965]

Quote: Saxahorse

I do not think Togo consciously repeated Wilson’s maneuvers in the 1903 exercises. Togo had his own, unsuccessful experience of combat at kontrokursy in combat in the Yellow Sea.

Therefore, I wrote "of course not" one to one ", the general concept of fighting in such conditions was taken.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

In principle, the decision was not forced, Admiral H. Togo repeated, of course, not "one to one" the actions of Vice-Admiral AK Wilson in the 1903 exercises.

That is, he repeated the decision of the commander of a less high-speed squadron, which was defeated as a result of the battle.

Quote: 27091965i

Unfortunately, Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not repeat the actions of Admiral CE Domvile in this battle.

Discussion, but interesting :)

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

That is, he repeated the decision of the commander of a less high-speed squadron, which was defeated as a result of the battle.

Thanks for pointing out the error. I honestly don’t understand why I mixed up the names of the admirals.
The comment should have been written like this;

" In principle, the decision was not forced, Admiral H. Togo repeated, of course, not "one to one" the actions of Admiral CE Domvile on the exercises in 1903. Unfortunately, Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky did not repeat the actions of Vice-Admiral AK Wilson in this battle. The chances of winning were "ghostly", but at least the score would not have been dry and the defeat would not have been so devastating."

But this does not change the very meaning of what happened in the battle of Tsushima and does not justify the inaction of Admiral Z. P. Rozhestvensky.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

In principle, the decision was not forced, Admiral H. Togo repeated, of course, not "one to one" the actions of Admiral CE Domvile on the exercises in 1903. Unfortunately, Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not repeat the actions of Vice-Admiral AK Wilson in this battle

Okay, but in this case it's still not clear - Wilson kind of lost the fight with a bang, and Domville didn't have any "Domville loop" :)))

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Okay, but in this case it's still not clear - Wilson kind of lost the fight with a bang, and Domville didn't have any Domville loop.

Dear Andrew.
If we take a report on these exercises, we can see that Vice-Admiral AK Wilson did not lose this training battle, he disabled 1 battleship detachment, just like in the Tsushima battle, while he disabled the end battalion detachment Admiral CE Domvile. But here the fact is that Vice-Admiral AK Wilson himself was on the battleship "Revenge", which was part of the 2nd battleship detachment and is the third in a row. Therefore, he exercised command without putting himself at great risk if this was a real battle. The lead detachment was commanded by the junior flagship.
Vice-Admiral AK Wilson, realizing what position he was in, brought the third armored detachment out of the wake column, ordered him to rebuild the "front" and increase the speed to 13 knots to also attack the enemy's end ships, while the lead detachment was "firing" at 1 enemy squad ... At the same time, he forced Admiral CE Domvile to make a decision, to protect the end ships of the squadron, or by increasing the speed to 15 knots again to withdraw from the battle.
One of the schemes of this training battle;

On the meeting of the fleets not much later.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: 27091965i

On the meeting of the fleets not much later.

Fine! I'll wait there and continue!

[27091965]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Fine! I'll wait there and continue!

Picked up exactly what Admiral CE Domvile writes;

"...... Having met the combined fleet, I made a U-turn back along the line of my movement with the intention to go around them ............ but, changing course, they gave me such an advantage in going around that I took advantage of it, shooting only at their leading ships; the Vice-Admiral AK Wilson fleet initially moved in a wake column, then reorganized into a "front" formation towards the enemy, later reorganized into a wake column; the ships at the end of the column could not fire at my ships ..... "
But, it should be noted that the distance between the English squadrons at the meeting was more than at Tsushima.

Admiral H. Togo, if you look at both battles with the Russian fleets, has some strange craving for error in choosing a position and calculating the movement of the squadron. Well, and so, in principle, he did not come up with anything new. Just used the conclusions drawn from the teachings in a particular battle, it is clear that with the appropriate adjustment.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Please forgive for the delay with the answer, dear Igor!

Quote: 27091965i

But, it should be noted that the distance between the English squadrons at the meeting was more than at Tsushima.

Honestly, I could not understand where this moment is on the diagram. As for the reversal, it can be considered the right decision if it:
1) Committed beyond the range of effective artillery fire
2) Done within this range, but in a position that excludes the concentration of fire on unfolding ships.
That is, if, for example, Togo made its turn in the 50-60 cable, or so that the bearing to the turning point from Suvorov did not exceed one or one and a half rhombs from the course of the Russian squadron, then it should be considered undoubtedly a good step, but what in fact did that ...

[bars1]

For me, all articles about the Tsushima battle are articles for masochists ...

[Catfish]

Andrey, thanks for the article.

But, there is one big and fat BUT, how can we say that:

he tactically outplayed the Japanese commander,

knowing the results of the Tsushima battle. Nonsense. "Do not count your chickens before they are hatched." (FROM.)

Sincerely, M.Kot.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Sea Cat

So you can say that:
he tactically outplayed the Japanese commander,
knowing the results of the Tsushima battlefield.

Elementary. Rozhestvensky outplayed the Japanese in the battle stitch, and the battle, alas, the battle is not exhausted. After 15 mines, the advantage of the Russian squadron faded away, the poor quality of the shells did not allow it to be realized, and then the Japanese had the advantage of the position

[Catfish]

Oh, Andrei ... When reading about the poor quality of the shells, one involuntarily recalls a parable about a famous dancer who always gets in the way. There would be no reason for the shells, there would be something else.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Sea Cat

Reading about the poor quality of the shells, you involuntarily recall a parable about a famous dancer who is always in the way of something.

You can perceive it this way, but I studied the damage that Russian shells inflicted. A simple example - 4 Russian projectile got into Mikasy's casemates
1) 12-in. the shell pierced the roof of casemate No. 3, wounded almost all the gun servants and caused an explosion of 10 3 "cartridges in the vicinity. 6" the gun in the casemate retained its ability to fire.
2) 6-inch. the projectile exploded when it hit the lower coaming of the casemate No. XXUMX, displacing the armored joint and disabling the servant, although the gun itself did not receive damage.
3) 6-inch. the shell pierced the roof of the casemate №11 without damaging the gun.
4) 6-inch. the shell hit the embrasure of the casemate No.10 and exploded on the 6 "gun bed, disabling this weapon.
So, 4 Russian shells went into the embrasures / pierced the armor of the Japanese casemates and ... only in one case the Japanese six-inch was disabled. And to achieve this result, the projectile had to get not just into the dungeon, but into the gun itself! In another, the calculation suffered.

[Undecim]

2) 6-inch. the projectile exploded when it hit the lower coaming of the casemate No. XXUMX, displacing the armored joint and disabling the servant, although the gun itself did not receive damage.
The value of such information is near-zero, since it is generally not clear where the projectile hit. The source of this information is interesting, since the writer or rewriter clearly does not understand the structure of the ship. There are no lower coamings.

This is casemate # 4 of the Mikasa six-inch gun. Casemate # 5 is identical.

[Undecim]

What is coaming. This or the protection of a similar hatch from the upper deck.

In the figure, position 1 is the longitudinal coaming of the hatch, position 2 is the transverse coaming.

[Undecim]

Or is this what is called a door threshold on land.

Position 4 - coaming.
Question - where did the shell go?
If he hit the coamings of a similar hatch, which was closed by alarm, his fragments had to pierce the armor deck, which is not realistic.
If he broke through the armor belt and hit the door coaming, then he could hit the maid, but for this he had to break through the armor of the casemate (min. 152 mm), which is also unlikely.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

If he hit the coamings of a similar hatch, which was closed by alarm, his fragments had to pierce the armor deck, which is not realistic.

If by a similar hatch you mean a hatch leading to the dungeon from the deck above it, then yes, of course. But then this hit is not in the dungeon, but in the deck above it.

Quote: Undecim

If he broke through the armor belt, and hit the coaming door, he could hit the servant, but for this he had to break through the casemate armor

What for? The shell penetrates the casemate (most likely, through the shield, if it was installed), and gets into the coaming either of the door or of the hatch leading down from the casemate and explodes. In this case, the Japanese projectile usually had enough explosives to destroy everything around it.

[Undecim]

Judging by the photo of Mikasa in Sasebo, the shields were installed. Casemate No. 5 - position 5.
The version is quite believable. Better even than Campbell referencing. in turn at Pekingham.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Honestly, my English is so bad that I take up the translation only if there is no other translation :))) I'm afraid I will make more mistakes than even an unsophisticated man in the history of the Navy.
There was a case for which it is still a shame - when translating to 100, I distorted the meaning of what was written. Well, that in the comments pointed to my mistake

[Undecim]

This problem is present for everyone, but it is really impossible to write articles at a level to which you yourself are being driven without foreign sources. And ideally, it would be nice to get into the archives. That is, here either swing must correspond to available materials, or it is necessary to improve. By the way, now there are techniques that allow you to quickly learn the framework, and the specifics will come in the process.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

Everybody has this problem, but it’s really impossible to write articles at the level where you drive yourself without foreign sources.

I use them, but only those that have already been translated :))))

Quote: Undecim

And ideally, it would be nice to get into the archives.

Of course! But who will pay for all this? :)))) We, with a respected Comrade, wondered how long it would take to work with our and German archives and put an end to the question of the Gotland battle. It turned out, we need about a year of work. And a lot of money. And at the exit - there will be an article on several sheets of A4 format. But even if you stretch to a monograph - the circulation in 500 copies (and those are now the majority) will not be repulsed, even if at all someone will undertake to print

Quote: Undecim

That is, here or swing must match the available materials.

This is not entirely clear to me :))) When I say: "the available materials are contradictory, but it could be so and so", I think, I am not doing anything bad

Quote: Undecim

By the way, now there are techniques that allow you to quickly master the framework, and the specifics will come in the process.

Hmm ... Could you recommend something? I tried to learn from the disks, buying tutorials, but something did not work.

[Undecim]

Self-instruction will not work. We must look for a good teacher.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

Self-help will not work.

It's a pity. And I was ready to try again :))))) English is really needed

[Undecim]

Surely you are proud of no English teachers?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

Surely you are proud of no English teachers?

Well, to begin with the fact that I live in different cities (now in one, then in the other), and the teacher is hard to find - a lot of people who have been learning languages ​​for years, and cannot speak it
The most important thing is that when I work, I have no time to learn English from teachers, and when I am unemployed I don’t have the money for it

[Undecim]

The most important thing - when I work, I have no time to learn English
The main thing is to set a goal. Who wants - is looking for ways. who does not want - reasons.
a lot of people who have been learning languages ​​for years, but cannot speak it
Without communication in the target language, learning it is very difficult. Need an environment.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

The main thing is to set a goal. Who wants - is looking for ways. who does not want - reasons.

Alas, the methods available to me (samobuch) did not work. A waste of time on courses in theory is possible, but would lead to excessive infringement of the interests of the family and children, this is unacceptable. When you work at least 10 hours a day + time to work and take home time 3 for children is not easy.
Therefore, I, of course, appreciate your penchant for elementary truths, but simple statements are not always true. Yes, I could go to English courses by setting myself such a goal. But for this I would have to sacrifice what I was not ready to donate. Setting goals and setting priorities in a pure form, if you know what I mean.

[Undecim]

Yes, the financial gap and the search for ways to overcome it is a serious problem, I know by myself.

[ser56]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

oh, I live in different cities (either in one or the other), and it’s hard to find a teacher - there’s a lot of people who have been teaching languages ​​for years and cannot speak it

I give the second idea - do it on Skype ... now there are whole companies that teach this way ...

[Andrey Shmelev]

dear colleagues, I apologize if there are super-interesting materials in English, send me - I’m ready to read in my spare time and share my opinion, translate, I won’t have time, but to see and tell what my eye has hooked is easy
for example, about 15 years old I want to read Pekingham's reports - I won’t get it

[Undecim]

But they are not. They were not published to the general public. Only in 1917 for the Admiralty. Campbell refers to them in a 1978 Warship article. So turn to the First Sea Lord. I won’t say who it is today; Jones seems to have resigned on June 7th.

[Andrey Shmelev]

number of archived reports is being sought, hopefully someday we will read

[AK64]

and what, the Google translator does not work?
Who needs translators in the era of online translations?

[Undecim]

And who needs a Google translation, which is designed to translate primitive texts?
Here on the site sometimes local publishers issue translated articles from under Google. You can’t read without tears.

[AK64]

And who needs a Google translation, which is designed to translate primitive texts?

But in fact: who needs translators in the era of online translations?

Here on the site sometimes local publishers issue translated articles from under Google. You can’t read without tears.

You need to edit --- if for others the translation. A muddy place and with a dictionary.
But I somehow have doubts that Google translates worse than you.
Will we check? We will argue, check .... ??

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

Will we check? We will argue, check .... ??

My translation, which on 100% distorted the meaning of what was written in the source, I did just that - drove the text through the prompt, the rest - with a dictionary.

[AK64]

My translation, which on 100% distorted the meaning of what was written in the source, I did just that - drove the text through the prompt, the rest - with a dictionary.

I do not even know how this can happen ....

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

I do not even know how this can happen ....

Do you want a check? Well, look, we take the prompt, which, generally speaking, is a very good autotranslator, and certainly not the worst of them. Here are some examples of the translation of the English text into Russian (LKR artillery Fon der Tann)

With increasing ranks of battles, a longer barrel was required with a corresponding higher muzzle velocity, which led to an increase in forty-five gauge lengths. The turret model, then developed through the C / 01 version and then the 3 C / 1906 model, the main differences between the models, were the equipment lift measures from the equipment chambers (magazines) and the number and position of the elevators.

Strongly helped? :)))
Or, for example, here it is, from there

Being transferred to passable trays, shells and cartridges were presented to the bottom, where they rammed home manually.

[AK64]

we take industrial, which, generally speaking, is a very good auto-translator

No need promp, need google. And Promp is not necessary, yes

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

and what, the Google translator does not work?

From the word "no way"

[AK64]

From the word "no way"

Maybe you're just somehow wrong with him?

Andrei, I lived for 7 years in one country, not knowing the language in fact, and 3 years in another. (if in doubt --- I can also name the country. And even give the phone number. ..... But by the way. The phone number is only for girls, yes)
And I have never had a problem with Google translation.
Maybe you put a little tea? Well, or sugar?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

Andrew, I have lived 7 for years in one country, not knowing the language as a matter of fact, and 3 of the year in another.

Because there is a big difference between generic phrases and technical text, I cited the examples above :)))

[ser56]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

our and German archives and put an end to the issue of the Gotland battle.

I give the idea - contact the relevant universities, for students this is normal WRC ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

The source of this information is interesting, since the writer or rewriter obviously does not understand the ship's device.

Nuuu, just some kind of N.J.M. Campbell, author of the overwhelming "The battle of Tsu-Shima" :))))))
Where is he to your heights of knowledge materiel. But in general, we can assume a banal error in the translation, just from this?

[Undecim]

Well, to begin with, tell me honestly, have you seen Campbell's article live, or have you used links to it? Where did you get the Warship magazine?
And the second one. Even an error in the translation does not explain anything, and the question - where the shell hit, remains open.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Undecim

Well, to begin with, tell me honestly, did you see the Campbell article live, or did you use links to it?

I use the translation of this article, which can be read, for example, here http://battleships.spb.ru/Tsusima/Tsusima.html
If you find the original - it will be possible to check what is wrong with this lower coamings.

Quote: Undecim

And the second. Even the error in the translation does not explain anything and the question - where the projectile hit remains open.

It exploded in the casemate, and most likely hit the coaming of one of the hatches. What is there to be wise? With a probability of 99% the error in the phrase "lower casemate" is in the word "lower"

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I use the translation of this article, which can be read, for example, here http://battleships.spb.ru/Tsusima/Tsusima.html
If you find the original - it will be possible to check what is wrong with this lower coamings.

Campbell is a good source only in the absence of others. We discussed this with you in your article on "medium caliber". This author did not consider it necessary to check at least with the Japanese, even in the simplest question of who opened fire on whom in the first minutes of the battle. Although in the same "Meiji" it is detailed. I don’t understand how one can draw serious conclusions from his figures. It is possible that they are simply made up.

Reviews of damage to Japanese ships, for example from the recently mentioned "https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/56888.html", look much more convincing. But by the way, he has an overview of hits in Mikasa "https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/58524.html"

[mmaxx]

Lower coaming - this is the part that is located directly under the gun port. Upper - respectively above the port. Coaming, strictly speaking, is not the threshold. It's just that there is no analogue in Russian. This is a cutout fence to limit or prevent water from entering under certain conditions.

[ser56]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

A simple example is

Was the tower of the Civil Code of the Russian EDB broken? But the Japanese was ... and underwater hits a la Asam was not ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: ser56

Has the tower of the Russian ADB Civil Code been pierced?

They broke down without breaking through

Quote: ser56

But the Japanese was ...

And as a result - one disabled weapon (the second was later commissioned). And a lot of confusion from such breaks? By the way, not a tower was pierced, but a barbet installation, more precisely - its dome 152 mm thick

[ser56]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

They broke down without breaking through

however, breaking through the armor is the shortest way ... Or do you propose to cancel armor-piercing shells?

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

By the way, it was not the tower that was broken through, but the barbette installation, more precisely, its dome 152 mm thick

and a 12/30 gun with tabular armor penetration on 10kab 186mm iron armor ...

[Bormanxnumx]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

12-inch TV the shell pierced the roof of casemate No. 3, wounded almost all the gun servants and caused an explosion of 10 3 "cartridges in the vicinity. 6" the gun in the casemate retained its ability to fire.

During the well-known experiments with Baden, there was a very similar hit, a 15 "semi-armor-piercing" shell exploded while passing through the roof armor of the casemate of 150mm guns. shells, while no one questioned

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

So you can compare with hits in the towers of the Eagle, there the effect is, as it were, not even lower.
And when it hit the casemate - there the shells hit the far part of the casemate, already behind the gun and the bulk of the fragments flew to the center of the ship, from the gun, and not to it.
You kind of know that.

[Demagogue]

Christmas was doomed initially, due to errors of the General Staff. None of the European powers held large fleet forces in China, all of them held with one fist in the metropolis. And in China, a couple of cruisers by force. Sharing power was a huge mistake. Perhaps the biggest mistake was to try to build a large fleet in principle. The cost of all this scrap metal in Manchuria could hold about a dozen divisions and, in principle, prevent the Japanese from landing near Arthur and not let them out of Korea. And the fleet was no use at all.

[Catfish]

But our "metropolis" was close by, and not on the other side of the world. And in general, it was necessary to follow the Northern Sea Route! ))) Joke.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Rozhdestvensky was doomed initially, thanks to errors of the General Staff

and who was the head of the Moscow State School at the beginning of the century?

[Senior seaman]

MGSH is not a general staff.
As a matter of fact, the general staff in Russia was not as such either land or sea.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Yes, colleague, I'm sorry, GMSH) of course
I imagine the structure and powers of it a little, but no one interfered with taking the initiative
within the framework of VMUO it was possible to develop a war plan and tactfully ask the shells to test

[Senior seaman]

Alas, the Naval General Staff was overwhelmed with fluidity. And even Tyrtov, being the manager of the naval ministry, could not achieve the test of shells. What can we say about "correcting the position of the chief" of the General Music School

[Andrey Shmelev]

even Tyrtov could not achieve the test of shells

it would be very necessary - I could, the wok was tested in 1905

[Senior seaman]

Head of a separate detachment, far from Spitz, during the war ...
Cunningham once said: "If there was a teletypewriter in Nelson's time, England would not have won."

[ser56]

Quote: Senior Sailor

there was no ground headquarters in Russia as such

Well, the main headquarters of the RIA after 1903 does not differ from the general ...

[Senior seaman]

The General Directorate of the General Staff was created in June 1905.

[ser56]

Quote: Demagogue

General Staff.

he was not then

[Mooh]

Generally confused. It seems that the Tsushima battles were at least 2. And even a dozen. And all are different. In some, Rozhdestvensky stupidly maneuvered, but had an excellent materiel that he could not realize, in others he turned out to be a genius, but the shells failed, and the ships weren’t very good. All the same, polar points of view are almost always further from the truth than compromise. In no case do I dare to enter into a dispute with a respected author for the weight category is not the same, but I still say I DO NOT BELIEVE! Rozhdestvensky’s possible motivation is very convincing, and everything else smacks of trying to pull an owl on a globe.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: MooH

Generally confused. It seems that the Tsushima battles were at least 2. And even a dozen. And all are different.

This is normal.
A couple of years ago, Ulanov had a parsing of documents on the liberation of one of the cities. From our side tankers and infantry participated. So, the same dates, landmarks, streets are mentioned in the documents - but only the tankers liberated the city from them, without infantry. and the infantry - the same, but without the tank. It seems that after the start of the battle, reality was divided - both tankers and infantry fought in parallel realities.
The comments suggested that somewhere else was another reality - the reality of German documents, according to which the attack was repelled and the city remained with the Germans.

[voyaka uh]

To summarize:
1) Togo was going to defeat at first the left weak column of armadillos.
2) Rozhdestvensky with his maneuver of the right column set up under fire
Togo and the flagship of the right column are the battleship Suvorov.

[mmaxx]

ZPR brought the column of the 1st detachment into a common wake with the 2nd detachment and equalized the speed, i.e. reduced it to 9 knots. Here is a brilliant solution! Where it was necessary to add, so as not to get into the coverage, he climbed there himself.
And the very course of the beginning of the day suggests that the Russians had a lot of opportunities to hold out until the evening. They drove off the Izumi and the contact was lost. And who constantly interfered with driving the scouts? But real naval commanders must have a nice fight.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: mmaxx

They drove off the Izumi and the contact was lost.

Izumi nobody drove away :)))

Quote: mmaxx

And who constantly hampered scouts?

What? :))) Oleg and Aurora? :)))) Rozhestvensky had no strength for this

[mmaxx]

They shot at him a little and he preferred to get away. They would have fired earlier, washed off earlier.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: mmaxx

They shot him a little and he preferred to slip away.

They did not shoot at him, but at 2 groups of Japanese cruisers who came from the other side. Those retreated, but almost immediately returned, Rozhestvensky did not even have time to finish the rebuilding.

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

In fact, he had 5 new high-speed cruisers that were not really used.

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

IMHO, statistically, lakishot is formed by the accumulation of attempts. That is, according to the experience of the disassembled battles (except for Tsushima), a very successful hit is a statistical regularity for a couple of dozen hits of heavy shells.

No. Look at the fight between Novik and Tsushima. One single hit after constant misses, but the enemy cruiser is knocked down (albeit late), the same with the hit of "Rurik" at Ulsan.
That is, there are events whose probability is extremely low, but which, nevertheless, happen. And there are events the probability of which is great and which do not occur. Lakishots from the first.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Colleague, I wrote:

Statistics are such a thing that Lacquote in the battle of 2 ships is unpredictable, and in a battle of 24 ships is a consequence of the overall quality of shooting and obeys statistical laws due to the "large numbers"
10 shots give a random result.
1000 shots give a natural result.
This is the law of large and small numbers in a statistical sample.

[Demagogue]

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

Rozhdestvensky was doomed initially, thanks to errors of the General Staff

and who was the head of the Moscow State School at the beginning of the century?

Absolutely indifferent. MGSH himself could understand the essence of the problem, but in RI if something is "highly approved", then it is impossible to influence the decision. I generalized with the general staff. In general, the level was certainly much higher than in modern Russia, if we are talking about experts and senior command personnel, but many decisions were made behind the scenes and did not depend on them. There were even really smart people in the navy and in power, but the system brought their efforts to nothing. It was profitable for someone to throw a lot of money into the absolutely unnecessary Arthur and the Pacific squadron and then argue suicidal. As an example: in the 1830s, a general close to the court pushed through a system for the "treasury" stolen in the west, and in an unsuccessful execution and 5 times more expensive than normal analogues. It was carried to the kitchens in chips. Everyone spat, gave denials in the press, and as a result, lands from the emperor. And the experts were not afraid to argue, but they were afraid not to praise him until the 1880s. When he died 20 years.

[ser56]

Quote: Demagogue

It was beneficial for someone to push a breakthrough of money into Arthur, which was absolutely unnecessary, and

Witte

[Andrey Shmelev]

not true) he swelled a lot of money in the Far Japanese very needed)

[mmaxx]

Everything would have been normal if some had not climbed into Korea. The prospects of the Far opened huge. But....

[Andrey Shmelev]

The prospects of the Far opened huge. But....

either not to get into Korea, or with this money to buy another five EDB and a couple of buildings to relocate from Western Russia

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Demagogue

It was beneficial for someone to push a breakthrough of money into Arthur and the Pacific Squadron, which was absolutely unnecessary, and then object suicidally.

Heh heh heh ... it would be worth remembering that the admirals did not want to be based on Port Arthur. And the Foreign Ministry posed the fact that the agreement was signed and go to bed tomorrow the base of the fleet will be completely unsuitable in the opinion of the same admirals.
For the fleet wanted Mozampo, Fusan, the island of Kargodo and even Kiao Chao.

[mmaxx]

It's just that Arthur, as a base, is, to put it mildly, complete nonsense. It sounded here that it would be nice to leave the old battleships in Arthur and add "Oslyabya" and "Aurora". Then the fleet would generally go out to the outer roadstead for three days. The harbor is very tight. Maybe that's why they dispatched the cruiser to Vladivostok. At least one of the reasons could be.
It is especially difficult to understand the basing in Arthur when Dalniy was. Apparently, it was necessary to take a place and all. Politics and nothing more.

[Demagogue]

Quote: Senior Sailor

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

IMHO, statistically, lakishot is formed by the accumulation of attempts. That is, according to the experience of the disassembled battles (except for Tsushima), a very successful hit is a statistical regularity for a couple of dozen hits of heavy shells.

No. Look at the fight between Novik and Tsushima. One single hit after constant misses, but the enemy cruiser is knocked down (albeit late), the same with the hit of "Rurik" at Ulsan.
That is, there are events whose probability is extremely low, but which, nevertheless, happen. And there are events the probability of which is great and which do not occur. Lakishots from the first.

Successful hits are usually the result of design flaws - as in the exchange of Hood with Bismarck.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Demagogue

Successful hits are usually the result of design flaws - as in the exchange of Hood with Bismarck.

It is completely wrong, since the Hood explosion, with the probability of 99,9, is in no way connected with a constructive flaw - most likely the projectile went under the armor belt, from which almost no battleship was insured

[Andrey Shmelev]

most likely the shell passed under the armored belt, from which almost no battleship was insured

and torn he could go through bronepoyas
as well he could pass through the deck

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

and torn he could go through bronepoyas

Could not

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

as well he could pass through the deck

Almost no chance

[AK64]

Well, the super-dangerous one is on the other hand. I would have ballisticitis like everyone else - you look and would survive this hit

[Andrey Shmelev]

Successful hits are usually the result of design flaws

yes very often so
weak armor of battlecruisers
transfer corridors of armored cruisers
and even the glacis "Scharnhorst"

but the weak armor of the battlecruisers simply provoked successful hits,
but the glacis of "Scharnhorst" is pure lacishot

[Ural resident]

Thanks Andrew for the next article. It is interesting to speculate about Rozhdestvensky’s ideas. Still, I can’t believe that before the battle he did not think at all about anything and did nothing. This plan is quite logical for a breakthrough in Vladivostok.
As for the option of "throwing" new battleships head-on at the enemy, then such a maneuver was hardly considered at all. This idea came later from the "experts" who figured out how it was still possible to win the battle, or at least cause irreparable damage to Togo. Whether any admiral decided on such a suicidal attack in order to sell his life at a higher price. Nobody expected such a defeat, and the idea of ​​"fighting off" the Japanese with a breakthrough was quite real.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

I totally agree

[ser56]

It is a pity that the author again pulls an owl on the globe and looks for something that is not ...

[Demagogue]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Demagogue

Successful hits are usually the result of design flaws - as in the exchange of Hood with Bismarck.

It is completely wrong, since the Hood explosion, with the probability of 99,9, is in no way connected with a constructive flaw - most likely the projectile went under the armor belt, from which almost no battleship was insured

What is this on the basis of such an unambiguous statement? It is clearly clear that the bk detonated, and then there are many versions. Both the penetration of the deck and the armor belt also appear. In any case, Bismarck was much better thought out and this could hardly happen to him. Hood was a primitive design with relatively weak armor. "It happens to everyone, but more often to fools"

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Demagogue

This is on the basis of what is an unequivocal statement? There it is clearly clear that the BC was detonated, and then many versions. And breaking through the deck and armored belts also appear.

They do appear, but some serious research shows that neither one nor the other could have been practically - the thickness of the armor is too large for passage into the cellar. And even if this happened, the reason for that was the constructive flaw of the German projectile, which "stuck" the fuse :))))

[Andrey Shmelev]

the thickness of the armor is too large for passage in the cellar

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

You didn't know that either? :)))))

[Andrey Shmelev]

no, I know that the upper belt, for example, is not enough to normalize a 380-mm projectile - do not believe me, see the shooting in Baden
materiel, sir

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

materiel, sir

What is the point of remembering it in vain, if you don’t study it like this? It was impossible to come up with a more nightmarish comparison (Baden and Hood), it is better than comparing the battleship and the tank, perhaps

[Andrey Shmelev]

Once again, they explained to you that you do not understand the normalization of a projectile by the example of a specific experimental shooting. You have already chewed twice on the example of Baden the incorrectness of your ideas about the normalization of the projectile and gave the corresponding descriptions and diagrams from the ADM.

And you - learn to lead the discussion as a decent person, psta

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Once again they have explained to you that you do not understand how to normalize the projectile on the example of a specific test shooting.

Osspada, yes and where is the normalization? :)))) Marsh to learn materiel, sir.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

And you - learn to lead the discussion as a decent person, psta

With you, I haven’t led any discussions for a long time, and I respond only to those remarks that may be of interest to other readers.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Saving, and what's more, normalization? :))))

well, if not at all, then it’s clear why you idol ZPR

[Victor Leningradets]

Given an angle of 49 to 53 degrees reduced to the normal armor of the belt, it is very normal! And while this almost goes parallel to the deck. Here, with a roll to the left side of degrees 8, you can get into the bevel. Only the roll at the turn was supposed to be on the starboard side.

[Andrey Shmelev]

dear colleague, we have previously dismantled two shots at Baden

180 mm inclined belt did not have a normalizing effect (expected)
The 250-mm vertical belt also had almost no normalizing effect (unexpected)

counterquestion:
whence for the upper belt "Mighty uda"

angle 49 - 53 degrees

[Victor Leningradets]

Geometrically add the course angle of the target, the angle of incidence of the projectile, the angle of inclination of the armor belt, well, it will grow together. I did not calculate this angle, I remember from some work that I read in the 90s.

[Andrey Shmelev]

heading angle

here I am about this: where are the woods from?

and the versions are full: such as the detonation of 102-mm shells, and only then everything else

not a single version negates the fact that the "Hood" was extremely vulnerable by the standards of WWII and could fly to it along a huge variety of trajectories

[Victor Leningradets]

Andrei, I apologize, but course layouts and the battle plan are available. Hood before the turn could not use the feed towers, therefore the angle of the target was more than 60 degrees from the beam. But it is believed that Hood entered the turn, well, depending on the steering wheel shift, the grassy angle was 46 - 50 degrees.

[Andrey Shmelev]

therefore, the target angle was more than 60 degrees from the beam

logically, I agree, a 305 mm belt can then be thrown out of suspects
the upper belt would probably not help

[Victor Leningradets]

Here, perhaps, more or less:
http://m.globalwarnews.ru/upload/editor/news/2018.08/5b669bc72c560_1533451207.jpg

[Andrey Shmelev]

course 260 and course 218, if so, then you are right about the 305 mm belt,
But through the armor of 127-178 mm, the Bismarck projectile still passes and normalization will not be enough with all that it implies, isn't it?

[Andrey Shmelev]

you know, to be honest, in the scheme that I have bearings at 6-00 are incomprehensible and in general it’s kind of nonsense that Hood already at 5-55 could well use all the towers, maybe send your own, take a look together

[Victor Leningradets]

Not with me, I’m writing from work, in parallel with TK. I'll look at the cottage.

[Victor Leningradets]

Actually, in my opinion in 1995 we tried to make a computer game about the battle in the Danish Strait. That's where they shot. I did ballistics, projectiles - the action of the projectile on the target (the explosive action was helped by the tankers), mathematicians - the position of objects in space, taking into account the roll, pitching, movement. So: we only got hit by a diving projectile with a faulty fuse through the boule, the fuel tank of the aft engine room, into the anti-aircraft ammunition cellar. And there is a chain detonation of unitary cartridges with a breakdown of the bulkhead into the aft cellars. The deck at an angle of incidence of the projectile of about 14 degrees was never bitten. Through the 7 "belt, the projectile exited almost parallel to the main deck in a very dead form. To get into the cellar through it was necessary to add a roll to the port side, which contradicts the actual roll to the starboard when circulating to the left. It was also unlikely that it would hit through the upper 5" belt, the boiler room and three engine rooms.

[Andrey Shmelev]

we only got defeated by a diving shell with a faulty fuse through a bullet, the fuel tank of the aft engine room, into the anti-aircraft ammunition cellar.

this is very logical, but why is the fuse defective?

Through the 7 "belt, the projectile came out almost parallel to the main deck in a very dead form.

here is where my dog ​​rummaged - why almost in parallel, on "Baden" we almost did not observe normalization from almost 250-mm vertical armor

+ why is the deck "not biting"?

[Victor Leningradets]

Yes, not very primitive. D'Eincourt did a very good job of defending at combat ranges. The opinions of experts regarding the fatal hit differ: either the penetration of the 178-mm belt and bevel in rolling conditions (otherwise the projectile will be normalized), or a projectile diving with a faulty fuse that passed through the PTZ into the anti-aircraft ammunition cellar. Personally, I stick to the latest version after practicing on a mathematical model. And so, in a side-versus-side fight, Hood has not a bad chance of incapacitating an opponent.

[AK64]

detonated bk

most likely still gunpowder (extremely dangerous cord), and not BC

[gorenina91]

-From everything personally read, I understood one thing ...:
-Practically the forces of both squadrons were equal ... -And the Russian squadron was not much weaker than the Japanese ...
.. -And the pyroxylin shells of the Russian squadron were even more effective against armor than the Japanese, which were stuffed with shimoza ... -During the naval battle of Jutland in 1916, it was the pyroxylin armor-piercing shells that caused the greatest damage ...

-And the Japanese command acted rather clumsily and made a large number of serious mistakes ....- It was just that the Russian naval commanders under Tsushima acted even more unprofessionally and stupidly than the Japanese ... -It was then necessary to bring the entire Russian command to justice (but did soft enough) ...
-And then, at Tsushima, the Russian squadron could, if not win, then achieve a "draw" ... -So it was in the Battle of Jutland (Germans-British) ...

-But, 30 years later, the "Battle of the Coral Sea" took place ... when the Japanese were already very unlucky in the battle with the American fleet ... -then the naval battle was fought with the help of aviation ... -And then, they could also have won the Japanese .., or reduce everything to a "draw" ...; but luck left the Japanese and they lost their main aircraft carriers ...
- That's it ... luck and luck suddenly become decisive factors ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: gorenina91

And the pyroxylin shells of the Russian squadron were even more effective against armor than the Japanese, which were stuffed with shimozy ..

Let's just say, unlike Japanese armor, they punched. But their action was insignificant, so there was no sense in the breakdown. Japanese shells also led to critical damage even without armor breakdown. For example, the 12-dm projectile hit the 152-mm turret of the ADB Eagle did not lead to the penetration of armor, but the tower was completely out of order

Quote: gorenina91

It was necessary then to bring to justice all the Russian command

So they gave :))))

[gorenina91]

-Today in Russia only Caucasians are judged so "loyally" ...
-What's wrong with pyroxylin armor-piercing shells.? ... -With Utland, only they caused damage, and shimoza did not take place there at all ...
-The example about the tower on the "Eagle" is not indicative ... -The armor was supposed to protect from shimosa ...- it protected ...- there were no sails on the cruisers ...
- You can also give a bunch of examples "in the appendage" ... - to justify the stupidity of the command ...
-The forces were approximately equal ... -IMHO ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: gorenina91

What's wrong with pyroxylin armor-piercing rounds? ... -With Utland, only they caused damage, and shimoza did not take place there at all ...

Under Jutland, pyroxylin was not used in shells at all. The Germans shot TNT, the British - black powder or Liddite
And what's wrong ... Not so was the low content of explosives in the projectile.

Quote: gorenina91

-The example about the tower on the "Eagle" is not indicative ... -The armor was supposed to protect from shimosa ...- it protected ...- there were no sails on the cruisers ...

We look at the impact of not piercing armor shells
1) In the nasal 75 m / m casemate, through the semiportiles, two large-caliber projectiles hit one after the other, probably 8-mi inches, which made both 75 m / m left-side guns inoperable, and some fragments flying through the door in longitudinal armor bulkhead, disabled 75 m / m gun number 18 starboard.
2) 12-inch. projectile trapped in the barrel of the left nasal 12-inch. guns, beat off a piece of the barrel foot on the 8 from the muzzle and threw it on the upper nasal bridge, where they killed three people lower. ranks and stuck there him stand.
3) A large-caliber projectile that has fallen into the stern of armor above the embrasure of the left 12-inches. the stern gun distorted the embrasure frame and, pushing the armor over the gun, limited the angle of elevation of the gun, so that the gun could act only on the 30 cable.
4) 12-inch. projectile caught in the vertical table armor near the embrasure (six-inch bow tower. - Approx. aut.), shifted the armor plate, lifted the roof, tore off the caps, smashed the frame of the left gun, twisted the tower on the rinks, and stuck it. The tower is rendered unusable.
5) Snoop 8-inch. or a large caliber, caught in the vertical armor of the table, ricocheted into a light board, at break it turned it, thus limiting the angle of attack of the tower (medium six-inch. - Note by author) to the stern from the beam.
6) 8-inch projectile, ricocheting from the water, hit the left side of the shell in the slot of the battle house. The ruptured rangefinder Barr and Strouda broke the projectile and its fragments, ruined the battle signposts and crushed many negotiation pipes, damaged the compass and steering wheel.
That is, the Japanese projectiles perfectly knocked out our artillery, but most importantly, they quickly knocked out the fire control systems of the Russian DAD, after which the number of hits on the Japanese was sharply reduced
In total in Tsushima, Japanese got about 230 projectiles. Of these, the hit time of 85 shells is fixed
1) From the beginning of the battle (from 13.50) to 15.10, i.e. in the first one hour and twenty minutes of the battle, 63 recorded all calibres falling into Japanese ships.
2) From 15.40 to 17.00 over the next hour twenty battles - only 13 hits.
3) And finally, from 17.42 until the end of the fight, i.e. before 19.12, in an hour and a half - another 9 hits.

[gorenina91]

-Well, that means the Japanese knew how to shoot, but ours didn’t ... -From the Japanese that he arrives, it’s all to the detriment of the Russians ... -Probably, if the Japanese fired with cast-iron yars, then there would be great damage to the Russian cruisers. ..
-You listen, so the Russian squadron did not have a chance at all ... -you would then shoot a boiled turnip ...- exactly the same effect ...
-I think the Japanese praised their weapons too much ...

- And a little off topic ... - During WWII, tanks were shot at with armor-piercing shells, and all high-explosive, fragmentation tanks did not cause much harm ...
“And why did the Japanese suddenly during the Tsushima turn out to be such effective high-explosive shells that the armor of Russian cruisers and everything that was next to the armor was turned into scrap metal ...?”
-And then, during WWII, the Germans did shoot at our tanks with "blanks" and inflicted huge damage on our tanks ...
-If we assume that during Tsushima our cruisers also fired at the Japanese with "blanks", then why did the Japanese ships not burn and sink ..?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: gorenina91

Well, then the Japanese knew how to shoot, but ours did not.

19 hits in Mikasa in 15 minutes and 6 in other ships of the Japanese squadron strongly disagree with you :)))) especially considering that these are only hits whose time is known, and on 1 a projectile whose time is known There were still 2 that are unknown when they hit the enemy. And given the fact that at the beginning of the battle the Russians shot significantly more precisely, most likely there were more hits on the Japanese ships at this stage.
English observers noted the high accuracy of the Russian gunners.

Quote: gorenina91

You listen, so the Russian squadron and did not have a chance

With such projectiles - was not

Quote: gorenina91

And a little off topic ... -While WWII tanks were hit by armor-piercing shells, and all high-explosive, fragmentation tanks did not cause much harm ...

You are deeply mistaken. for example, the Red Army often used shrapnel as anti-tank ammunition, 122-152-mm "St. John's Hunters" worked with land mines, etc.

Quote: gorenina91

And why did the Japanese suddenly, during Tsushima, turn out to be such effective high-explosive shells that the armor of Russian cruisers and everything that was next to the armor was turned into scrap metal ...?

They made them so. There were no other similar shells in the world.

Quote: gorenina91

If we assume that during Tsushima, our cruisers also fired at the Japanese with "blanks", then why did the Japanese ships not burn and sink ..?

Because the ships are not tanks - the tank is a very tightly assembled machine, but even in this case, 1 from 5 sabot projectiles (on average) caused serious damage. But ships are almost useless to make blanks - in the silhouette of any ship, huge areas can be struck without much damage to combat capability.

[gorenina91]

The Red Army often used shrapnel as anti-tank ammunition, 122-152-mm "St. John's Hunters" worked with land mines, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-And when did these "St. John's Wort" appear .. ??? - Yes, and their German tigers would simply shoot everyone from afar and ... what kind of shrapnel ... - Fast T-34 tanks - and they did not have time to approach, and even these crawling self-propelled guns and even more so ...

-As for Tsushima, our people had to pretend to give up, get as close to the Japanese as possible, and then try to ram them and go boarding ... -Hahah ...
Absurdity, of course, but at least there was a chance ...
-But our admiral didn’t have any abilities and adventurous either ...
-With such a command and first-class technology you always lose ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: gorenina91

When did these "St. John's Wort" appear .. ???

In 1943 was

Quote: gorenina91

Yes, and their German tigers just all would be shot from afar and

Do you think tank fighting is a knight tournament? :))))

[gorenina91]

-What are you ... portray ... or wallow ...
-On the Kursk Bulge, tigers shot the whole tank army of Rotmistrov ...- mostly it was the T-34 and T-70 tanks ... -sufficiently fast and maneuverable tanks ...
-And clumsy and slow self-propelled guns could kill a tiger from a fairly close distance ... -Yes, there were such cases, and on the Kursk Bulge the SU-152 was used against German tanks, and the SU-152 could hit 700-750 meters from a fairly close distance. ..- could even disrupt the tiger's tower with an armor-piercing shell; but relying on their shrapnel ... is already out of necessity and not because of the "good life" ... -The German tiger could "get" them from a distance of more than a kilometer ...

[AK64]

-On the Kursk Bulge, tigers shot the whole tank army of Rotmistrov ...- mostly it was the T-34 and T-70 tanks ... -sufficiently fast and maneuverable tanks ...
-And clumsy and slow self-propelled guns could kill a tiger from a fairly close distance ... -Yes, there were such cases, and on the Kursk Bulge the SU-152 was used against German tanks, and the SU-152 could hit 700-750 meters from a fairly close distance. ..- could even disrupt the tiger's tower with an armor-piercing shell; but relying on their shrapnel ... is already out of necessity and not because of the "good life" ... -The German tiger could "get" them from a distance of more than a kilometer ...

How many Tigers were against Rotmistrov?
Not at all.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: gorenina91

what shrapnel is there ...

The usual - "shrapnel is not a blow".

3. Shrapnel is still one of the main armor-piercing shells, since it can penetrate up to 300 mm of armor at a range of up to 35 meters, which allows it to be used successfully against light tanks, and at close range (up to 200 m) and against medium side airborne armor tanks ...

© From the report “Defeat of the armor of German tanks”. July 1942 NII-48.
The overwhelming majority of "armor-piercing" 76-mm shells in our mechanized corps at the beginning of the war were, in fact, just shrapnel put on strike. Katukov had it near Mtsensk.
For all plans for the release of the BR-350A NKBP failed - and the main and additional.

[gorenina91]

-Yes, I don’t actually argue ... -But the German tanks (and not only the German ones) had a hard time when they began to use cumulative and sub-caliber shells against them; and buckshot remained in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century; and also in the works of Pushkin and Lermontov ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: gorenina91

and buckshot remained in the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century; and also in the works of Pushkin and Lermontov ...

And in the documents of 1945.

In the battle of April 29, anti-tankers killed up to 420 Germans, burned two armored personnel carriers and captured 250 enemy soldiers and officers. Own losses of the 320th regiment in the battle on April 29 can be estimated as insignificant. The batteries lost 9 people killed and 22 wounded. Five vehicles were damaged, including one Studebaker, four 76 mm guns and one 57 mm gun. During the battle, 76 mm cannons were used up: 642 high-explosive fragmentation shells and 10 shrapnel. Accordingly, the 57-mm gun ZIS-2 shot 99 fragmentation, 59 armor-piercing, 40 sub-caliber, 18 card shots.

© Isaev

[Andrey Shmelev]

and for 1 shell, the time of which is known, there were 2 more that are unknown when they hit the enemy.

sir, this your statement is not true, for example, for a short period of 1 TOE, the number of hits by an average caliber of more than a third of their total number recorded during the battle was recorded

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Sir, this is your statement is not true

Medical description reports approximately 230 hits on Japanese ships
The exact time is known for 85 shells. What have you got

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

for example, in a short period of 1 TOE, the number of hits with an average caliber of more than a third of their total number recorded in a battle

it is absolutely impossible to understand

[Andrey Shmelev]

I will explain:

19 hits in Mikasu in 15 minutes and 6 more - to other ships of the Japanese squadron categorically disagree with you :)))) especially considering that these are only those hits whose time is known, and for 1 projectile whose time is known there were 2 more who do not know when they hit the enemy

As I understand Campbell, hits on Mikasa (the main goal) were recorded all and carefully, so you should not transparently hint at the possibly even greater accuracy of 2 TOE at that moment, well, I agree with a couple of shells

criticism of Campbell's opinion is also present: its basis is the overestimation of the number of hits with heavy projectiles, such as the commander of "Azuma" attributed everything except small-caliber, etc. to such, this criticism should also be supported by the statistically anomalous ratio of hits of heavy and medium shells for a short range

about 230 hits in Japanese ships

it's all hits, not the first two squads

[Alexey RA]

Quote: gorenina91

- And a little off topic ... - During WWII, tanks were shot at with armor-piercing shells, and all high-explosive, fragmentation tanks did not cause much harm ...

Now let's turn to the documents:

In view of the lack of the required number of kamor armor-piercing shells in artillery units, the shooting of German tanks from 76,2-mm divisional guns with projectiles of other types is common ...
2. High-explosive fragmentation steel grenade. It can be used when firing at light (in some cases medium) tanks during their oblique movement on the sides, or in the turret ring, which leads to the destruction of side sheets, or to their detachment from the mounts, as well as jamming of the tower and damage to tower mechanisms, including optical sights and observation devices ... In a number of cases, there was a cessation of the turret’s rotation ability, and in the case of howitzers firing, and a light tank’s tower being disengaged from the mounts ...
5. A high-explosive steel grenade is most effective in case of firing on the sides of the tank during its oblique movement ...

© From the report “Defeat of the armor of German tanks”. July 1942 NII-48.
It was not that the OFS and FS did not cause much harm to the tanks. The fact was that OFS and FS with a steel case were extremely small - for the main material of the shells of non-armor-piercing shells during the war was cast iron:

6. Fragmentation grenade of steel cast iron can only be used when firing at the tank’s tower "to blind" ...

Quote: gorenina91

-And then, during WWII, the Germans did shoot at our tanks with "blanks" and inflicted huge damage on our tanks ...

1. Armor-piercing continuous shells. They break through the armor of German tanks from any direction. They have insufficient armor action. They cause fire and tank damage only if they get into the engine, gas tanks or ammunition ...

And this is with the tight layout of the tank. When navigating a ship, firing blanks is like trying stab a giant netch with a fork, glory Sheogoratu kill the elephant by throwing knitting needles at it.

[gorenina91]

-Well, knitting needles and forks are a kind of buckshot, if they are tamped with shells, or where else ... -but it will all be, again ...- dangerous only for men who are not covered by armor ..
-Well, shoot at the tanks with buckshot ... and on the sides ... -This is all due to hopelessness ... -Like throwing grenades with your hands ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: gorenina91

Well, shoot at the tanks with buckshot ... and even at the sides ... -all this because of hopelessness

Not buckshot - shrapnel. Shrapnel "to strike" is an almost solid armor-piercing projectile that penetrates 300 mm of armor from 30 m. Few? Yes, not enough. But there are no other mass BBS.

[Andrey Shmelev]

stab a giant netch with a fork, glory Sheogoratu

colleague, respect! apply only the last blows with a fork

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

colleague, respect! apply only the last blows with a fork

Hihix ... I went through the Third Scrolls in the early 2000s and read the guide only after first pass. So netcha for the first time I honestly plugged the fork given to me.

[Andrey Shmelev]

passed the Third Scrolls

three times, the first without add-ons. I don’t remember much, but it was cool)

[16329]

The quality (more precisely, the type and power) of explosives in shells is the defining characteristic of the munition, the detonation velocity of trinitrophenol is about 7500 m / s, closely approaching modern compositions based on RDX, in addition to this there is a very high explosiveness
Pyroxylin, even well pressed in, has a detonation velocity of about 5000 maximum, and in Russian shells it had increased humidity and a detonation velocity in such conditions of a maximum of 3500-4000 m / s
The number of explosives in Russian armor-piercing shells was insignificant, therefore, when firing at long ranges, the result of the Russian shells was minimal, the bottom fuses often did not fire, unlike high-explosive Japanese shells, whose sensitive fuses worked perfectly from any obstacles and the explosion of a heavy high-explosive shell caused terrible damage, fires and nitrophenol vapor poisoning
Comparison with tanks is not correct, this is a small compact target and they are shot at with short armor-piercing shells
The most effective are sub-caliber ammunition (blanks) and shaped-charge shells equipped with a quantity of powerful explosives.
In addition, a 152 mm HE shell, if hit, is guaranteed to disable any tank of the Second World War
There is only one conclusion: it is difficult and ineffective to fight unfit ammunition

[Demagogue]

Or maybe the Japanese were helped by the Kyudo technique, according to which part of the gunners allegedly trained to work? ))) that is, the Japanese were shooting, but the Buddha himself hit.) Or maybe each charge of "Mikado Banzai, Kaigun Banzai" added 20% accuracy ...

[Andrey Shmelev]

I will write extremely simplified, but simple)

shooting quality increases exponentially while reducing the distance in arithmetic, that is, roughly speaking, 5% of hits from a distance of 35 cable will easily outgrow 25% from a distance of 20 cable and almost 100% from a distance of 5 cable and at a distance 60 cable dry to the size of the nose gulkin

[Saxahorse]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

I will write extremely simplified, but simple)

Until I forgot once again I will give a link to the topic.

"https://naval-manual.livejournal.com/58524.html"

There, a friend has a good analysis of the number of large-caliber hits on the Japanese at Tsushima. Including the comparison between Campbell and Meiji. In general, the blog is very interesting with a good selection of materials about RYAV.

[gorenina91]

-I will write more on this "marine theme" ...
- The sailors just had to stop showing off ... - with all these "cable", "nautical miles", "feet", "inches", "tacks", "knots" and so on ... - all this had to be left back in the 19th century ... -And to switch to kilometers, meters, "km per hour" and so on ... -And Russia had to switch to such a calculation in the first place ... Then, perhaps, they would shoot more accurately. ..
-And then the force is higher than the roof, but it’s of little use ...
-Supporting "Seven feet under the keel" ... -this, of course, sounds romantic .., but then the "severe everyday practical" already begins ...- kilometers and millimeters ...

[AK64]

Not so was the low explosive content in the projectile.

2 kg of pyroxylin .... 2 kg of pyroxylin should have exploded in a "wrong way", as described in the results of the shelling of Japanese ships.
At least believe, at least check - not so.
this charge of pyroxylin in Russian 12 "shells should have been much more powerful in terms of the result of a 76mm grenade with TNT from WWII times (650 g TNT). Well, how are Japanese descriptions very similar to something similar to the explosion of a 76mm grenade with TNT? IMHO - - and not close.

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

You simply chose the effective hits of the Japanese and omitted the ineffective ones, which completely distorted the picture. There were 2 hits on the roofs of the 6 "and 12" Eagle towers, which ended only in the injury (not even death) of the commanders of the towers sitting in the cap. There were several hits in the vertical armor of the towers, with a near-zero effect. Russian shells caused the strongest destruction on Asama and Azuma. The shells that hit Mikasa caused quite serious damage, just the places of hits were not optimal.

[Trapperxnumx]

Again, looking at what to compare. A single hit in Goeben (the same casemate, by the way), led to very serious consequences and a large number of wounded and dead. There was nothing like this with Mikasa. Although the shells are the same mass. Only explosives are different.

[Dmitry Sotsilenkov]

And from another hit in Goeben, by the same projectile, in the battle near the Bosphorus, not a single person was injured, although the deck was broken through and the interior was damaged. Is it not clear that the result of the hit is a random variable? A shell hit a casemate with a large number of people - hence the dead and wounded. And on Mikas, the shell actually passed OVER the casemate and hit the roof near its back wall. The bulk of the fragments naturally left in the direction of the flight of the shells, in the opposite direction from the gun and the calculation of the casemate. Hence the surviving gun and a relatively small number of wounded.
And I repeat - and for Japanese shells, you can easily find a lot of examples with a near-zero effect. And the Russian shells have an example of hitting the barrel of an 8 "Azuma gun, which led not only to the failure of the gun, but also to a large hole in the deck. Or the most striking example is Asama hit in the stern, there are generally very strong damages. side, a large hole in the middle deck, shrapnel holes in the lower deck, near bulkheads destroyed, shrapnel pierced more distant bulkheads, large floods.

[Victor Leningradets]

Andrey from Chelyabinsk, huge respect!
Although I fundamentally disagree with Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, as a naval commander and commander, but I have to thank the author for allowing him to rethink many of the decisions of this military commander.
As I wrote, I don’t really like AI. It was just that the card laid down like this, and not otherwise, because there were circumstances that influenced the decision making by both parties, not reflected in the memoirs.
By personality Z.P. Of Christmas I’ve read for half a century, I can make the following assumptions:
1. The position of the head of the MSh corresponded, was technically competent, strong-willed and demanding chief. Sneak before the senior bosses suffered in the average Russian degree.
2. The squadron prepared for the campaign, maintained discipline, trained artillerymen and mechanics for battle.
3. The strategy was a complete ignoramus, the tasks of the fleet in the modern war did not understand, drove the squadron to slaughter, believing in a miracle. He could not tactically conduct a squadron battle.
4. He could not and could not teach the flagships and commanders how to conduct a modern battle, he did not trust his subordinates, seeing the key to success in blindly obeying orders from above, effectively ensuring the enemy had complete control of the initiative. In this case, the flagships were reduced to the role of signalmen rehearsing the signals of the commander, and in the absence of them stupidly performing the last received, regardless of the change in situation.
With such qualities of the commander, the entire squadron became a low-speed convoy for small transports and was destroyed in parts in an artillery battle, and then in torpedo attacks. Three ships managed to reach Vladivostok, six ships and ships were interned in neutral ports, and five ships surrendered to the enemy.
All attempts to give at least some meaning to Rozhestvensky’s actions in battle are doomed due to a strategic mistake that led to disaster. It was impossible under the noses of the Japanese to try to conduct the Second Pacific Squadron as a whole.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Although I fundamentally disagree with Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, as a naval commander and commander, but I have to thank the author for allowing him to rethink many of the decisions of this military commander.

And thank you for a weighted comment! My job is to present the facts and my point of view, and you, of course, are free to draw any conclusions you would like.
But still - let a couple of comments

Quote: Victor Leningradets

The strategy was a complete layman, the fleet tasks in the modern war did not understand, drove the squadron for slaughter believing in a miracle.

Just Rozhestvensky diligently persuaded Petersburg to interrupt the campaign of the squadron after it became aware of the loss of arthur. He explained to the king that with the available forces he could not defeat the Japanese, that the non-rich would not strengthen him, and that the most that he could count on was to go to Vladivostok by a detachment of the most high-speed vessels and from there to pirate communications
To this he was told that his task was not a breakthrough to Vladivostok, but the defeat of the main forces of the Japanese fleet in the general battle and the conquest of dominance at sea.
And what was he to do?

Quote: Victor Leningradets

He could not and did not manage to teach the flagships and commanders to conduct modern combat, did not trust his subordinates, seeing the key to success in blindly obeying orders from above

Ummm ... Did you read the instructions of Rozhdestvensky to your subordinates?

Quote: Victor Leningradets

The flagships were reduced to the role of signalmen, rehearsing the signals of the commander

What other role could the late Felkers take on?

[Victor Leningradets]

Thank you for your reply!
I write that half a century after reading "Tsushima", which became the beginning of the passion for the Fleet, very Mongo is seen differently.
BUT!
The commander in the ocean is a vice God and until the appearance of the Almighty himself on the spot performs his duties on the squadron entrusted to him. And if you see so and think that you are right - do it your way. Well, don't give this ill-fated "general battle", organize a breakthrough of the most valuable part of your squadron. The flagships are a complete insignificance - replace them as those who have dropped out due to illness on their proteges (Bukhvostov, Ignatius, Baer). You never know what they will come up with in St. Petersburg - they know better on the spot, and the winners are not judged. No, Dostoyevschina has seized up - "to accept suffering" (well, at the same time to ditch the peasants).
But if you are already going to Calvary, there’s nothing to think of what will happen next, you’ve already been killed - act according to conscience and wisdom.
But a tactician who did not understand how the Japanese are fighting is not worth a penny. The fact that a high-speed opponent will outplay you is clear, as God's day, that they can shoot - it is also clear. So all his maneuvers are at a glance that the Japanese, as in the battle of July 28 (August 10), 1904, will slip into the tail of our squadron and then they will catch up, or they will be confused if the flagship dies when the fire is massaged.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

And if you see it and think that you are right, do it your way.

Sorry, but a military man must carry out the order. Moreover, Rozhestvensky had no reason to expect a defeat similar to Tsushima - he believed that he could break through to Vladivostok with the loss of several ships. The base - the fight at Shantung - more than weighty

Quote: Victor Leningradets

A tactician who did not understand how the Japanese are fighting is not worth a penny. The fact that the high-speed opponent will replay you is as clear as day.

The Japanese surpassed 1TOE in speed, had an advantageous position at the beginning of the battle and tactically lost

[Victor Leningradets]

As for the order, there is an unwritten rule for the wartime: "do what you need, and report it right."
Moreover, there was no direct order to flock the herd to the Korea Strait.
The trouble with the strong-willed bosses is to frighten subordinates so that they stop thinking and prefer not to hang out.

[Andrey Shmelev]

The trouble with the strong-willed bosses is that they frighten subordinates so much that they stop thinking and prefer not to lean out

Yes sir!

[AK64]

Well, don't give this ill-fated "general battle"

Christmas and did not break the general battle to give. On the contrary --- he did everything to slip without a fight.

organize a breakthrough of the most valuable part of your squadron.

Throwing away the rest? Like: "you guys are of little value --- well, you nafig, only interfere!"
Rozhestvensky, with all his might, refused such a "strengthening" as the 3rd TOE --- but to no avail, they imposed it. He RUNNED from the 3rd TOE. But since she did catch up with him and connected --- then what do you order? To leave to the mercy of fate?

Flagships are completely insignificance - replace them as those who retired due to illness on their proteges (Bukhvostov, Ignatius, Rem).

Whom and with whom to "replace"? and who will command the ships? Does Rozhestvensky have a personal talent pool somewhere?

and the winners are not judged.

WHAT exactly should Rozhdestvensky do?
So far, you have "made" only one "proposal": to abandon all the slugs ("sorry, guys, but you are of little value"), and break through only with a fast squad. That's why he would have gone to court, GUARANTEED. (Even if he would break into Vladik)

No, Dostoyevschina has seized up - "to accept suffering" (well, at the same time to ditch the peasants).

What did CHRISTMAS EXACTLY KNOW? Rozhdestvensky knew exactly about the battle in the Yellow Sea.
Based on this knowledge, he relied on guns, hoping to break into Vladik.
This is not a stupid plan at all - and he would have succeeded. If the shells would explode NORMALLY - the plan would be a success.

But a tactician who did not understand how the Japanese are fighting is not worth a penny.

And what was so unusual about the Japanese war? Everything was normal. Christmas did, EVERYTHING

[Senior seaman]

I do not agree with the "sycophant", rather I was inclined to cut the truth.

[Scaffold]

The cycle seems to have been initially supposed about "Pearls" and "Emerald" ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Scaffold

The cycle seems to have been initially supposed about "Pearls" and "Emerald" ...

Ishsho one article, and we will return to them. I admit, I did not intend to go so far into Rozhestvensky’s maneuvers, but comments to the articles to this pushed

[Demagogue]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Demagogue

This is on the basis of what is an unequivocal statement? There it is clearly clear that the BC was detonated, and then many versions. And breaking through the deck and armored belts also appear.

They do appear, but some serious research shows that neither one nor the other could have been practically - the thickness of the armor is too large for passage into the cellar. And even if this happened, the reason for that was the constructive flaw of the German projectile, which "stuck" the fuse :))))

The deck above the exploded bk was tiny, it was not built up during the modernization, like other sections. There was no problem punching her. No one completely rejects this version. But even if the shell went down, the defense there at Bismarck was much more substantial. Yes, and it is unlikely that the Germans would have forgotten how the British pour water on the BK after the hit.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Demagogue

The deck over the exploded BC was thin, it was not built up during the modernization, like other sections. Punch her problem was not.

If you ignore the rest of the obstacles - then yes. But the German shell could not ignore them :)))

Quote: Demagogue

But even if the projectile passed through the bottom, then the defense there in Bismarck was much more substantial.

Was not.

[Demagogue]

A German 380 mm SK C / 34 gun could penetrate up to 15 mm of British cemented armor from a distance of about 000-17 m, on which Hood pulled. That is, flash the main Hood belt with a large margin. It was not necessary to dive a shell under it. It was harder to get through the canopy, for this it was necessary to shoot from a German gun from almost 500 m. Which seems to be not there, but does not mean that it could not be in principle. And if the Germans got in that way, then 24 mm of armor, to put it mildly, would not be a barrier to their suitcase. By the way, regarding Hood’s imperfection, it should be taken into account that he was overweight at least 000 tons and the belt was deep in water.

[Andrey Shmelev]

dear colleague!

pierce up to 500 mm British cemented armor

yes, but the shell, IMHO, after that would not be capable of detonation

flash Hood’s main belt with a large margin

here I completely agree and, I will add, a projectile capable of detonation

[Demagogue]

Colleague!
The fact that Hood, to put it mildly, is not the crown of creation, is extremely vulnerable against Bismarck. Why Andrei is trying hard to prove the opposite is not clear to me.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Demagogue

The fact that Hood, to put it mildly, is not the crown of creation, is extremely vulnerable against Bismarck. Why Andrei is trying hard to prove the opposite is not clear to me.

Because we are talking about the theoretical confrontation of 2 ships (in which Bismarck is, of course, preferable), but about a specific hit, but it was made at a very large angle, which, in general, almost excluded the possibility of hud's cellars hitting across the deck or armored belts.

[Victor Leningradets]

Once again, the given angle of impact must be taken into account. The effective thickness of the 12 "armor belt (and even 2" lining) will be 22,75 "ie 578 mm armor at an angle of 49 degrees and 25,75" ie 654 mm at an angle of 53 degrees according to Jacob de -Marru.

[Andrey Shmelev]

why all the same

at an angle of 49 degrees

or

at an angle of 53 degrees

[Doctor]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Undecim

The main thing is to set a goal. Who wants - is looking for ways. who does not want - reasons.

Alas, the methods available to me (self-training) did not work.

And they won't. The system of teaching foreign languages ​​in our country (and not only) is flawed in essence. For 30 years I "studied" the language, school, university, academy, everywhere there are teachers, self-instruction books (including children with children) to no avail.
Until I read the right book on how to learn a language. After 1,5 years of studying 2 hours a day, I learned it at a normal level. Of course, there is no limit to perfection, the study continues.

[LeonidL]

Learning is very difficult without a language environment. Living language differs significantly from the book language. and books are of different levels. For example, in the USA there are simple newspapers for the plebs, where everything is presented in a primitive colloquial language. There are newspapers that are more advanced, with analytics - the language there is more complicated, ordinary people do not read it. There are publications for professionals, with a specific language, for example, "Wall Street Journal", "Forrin Affers" and so on, they can already be read by highly educated people, after Haward, Cambridge, etc. But graduates of, say, community colleges or state universities it will be too tough.

[Doctor]

It's like that. But. Knowledge of the language involves four skills:
1. Translation of the TEXT from a foreign language into the native language.
2. Translation of a foreign SPEECH into a native one (understand speech).
3. Translation of the TEXT from the native language into a foreign language.
4. Translation of the SPEECH from the native language into a foreign language.
Of these skills, Andrei, in principle, needs only one - the first. He needs to translate texts from English into Russian. This means that you can forget about phonetics, pronunciation, the ability to build phrases and sentences verbally and in writing. This means all audio courses, listening to programs, films, work with teachers, etc. - into the firebox.
All attention to vocabulary (gain vocabulary) and the basics of grammar.

[Arthur 85]

Um. Are you serious? I have a foreign press that causes a sense of intellectual inferiority of the authors (though I read in translation), or that they are, however, very ineptly, trying to mislead the reader. Here in VO, even in the most fiercely conspiracy articles, a living thought squeals.

[LeonidL]

You are partly right. The press aimed at the average man in the street, as a rule, very stupidly adheres to the guidelines of the owners, that is, the group or party that supports the owner or which the owner supports. This is about "freedom and independence" of the press. But there are also elite publications that the average man in the street simply will not read, and after reading will not understand anything, there is actually another language, a high level, a more extensive dictionary, different from the dictionary "Elochka cannibals" of the average man in the street. In such publications there is more freedom, analytics is more objective, information is more in line with reality. This is understandable, why should the elite mislead themselves? The elite need truthful and verified information to make decisions; they need reliable analytics. So you are only partly right.

[rayruav]

sometimes respected Andrew writes tuff, speed could develop the main combat core of the squadron consisting of new armadillos and seriously tie the main enemy forces

[LeonidL]

Could, quite agree, but ... this option was not even considered. so they dragged on themselves and behind them all the tie right up to the bottom of Tsushima. Here the option of splitting the squadron would be more suitable. To launch low-speed boats with a tie around Japan along with coal carriers and let them drip along America, the main combat core then had a chance for a "full speed" to break through so-so quietly and quickly and quickly meet Vladivostok cruisers.

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

Of the recorded hits, you ignore, for some reason, "extra":

There could be no "extra" hits.
Of the four Japanese battleships, the Oslyab was fired upon. only "Fuji". The report of the ship's captain (captain Matsumoto Yawara) indicates the time when exactly three 12 '' shell (from twelve released) hit the battleship Oslyabya one by one.

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

you forget about "Oslyabya": "three large shells hit the nose turret; hitting only the nose tower of 3 heavy shells gives grounds to statistically assume TENS of heavy shells hitting the Oslyabya in total

We figured out the 12 '' shells, now 8 '' each.
Five armored cruisers, Kassuga, Nisshin, Idzumo, Tokiwa and Yakumo, fired at Oslyaba. In the battle at Cape Shantung, the firing accuracy of 8 '' guns was less than one percent (0,98 %). In the battle of Port Arthur - 2,4 %. I'm going to meet you, let's take the aggregate averaged accuracy of fire for all 8 '' who fired at Oslyaba, at the level of three percent.
What we have ? In order to accuracy 3% at least twenty 8 '' shells hit the Oslyabyu (after all, we are talking about dozens hits), 667 shells were to be fired into the Russian battleship.
Hence the question immediately, if in two days of fighting these five armored cruisers fired a total of 836 shells of the main caliber, how could they fire 667 of them in half an hour?

So horrible lot downward.
And how could the fate of Oslyabi be affected by the impact of several 8 '' shells? The story of the cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboi" will tell us about this, which received much more than 8 '' shells, but, despite the impressive damage, did not even fail.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

IMHO, statistically, lakishot is formed by the accumulation of attempts. That is, according to the experience of the disassembled battles (except for Tsushima), a very successful hit is a statistical regularity for a couple of dozen hits of heavy shells.

Contrast your IMHO statistics from the battle in the Danish Strait of 24 on May 1941, for example.
We read the "War Diary" of the battleship "Bismarck".
05: 53 The first salvo of the cruiser Hood.
06: 01 and 20 seconds Extraordinary strong detonation on the Hood.
You hardly think that "Hood" got A few dozens 381-mm shells, one of which caused the death of the ship.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

You, as a connoisseur of cartographic material, might help to shed light, for example, here on this maneuver: ...... So it was, judging by the Japanese map?

Sorry, I’m very busy right now, there are many dozens of maps and diagrams there, and I won’t remember at once exactly where the necessary information is being found, so I’ll try to answer another time.

[Andrey Shmelev]

[quote] We figured out the 12 "caliber shells, now 8".
Five armored cruisers, Kassuga, Nisshin, Idzumo, Tokiwa and Yakumo, fired at Oslyaba. In the battle at Cape Shantung, the firing accuracy of 8 '' guns was less than one percent (0,98%). In the battle of Port Arthur - 2,4%. I'm going to meet you, let's take the aggregate average accuracy of fire for all 8 '' who fired at Oslyaba, at the level of three percent.
What we have ? In order for at least twenty 3 '' shells to hit the Oslyaby at an accuracy of 8% (we are talking about dozens of hits), 667 shells had to be fired into the Russian battleship. [/ quote]

dear colleague, sorry, but this is not at all

I repeat again shooting quality grows exponentially while reducing distance in arithmetic,

[/ quote] that is, roughly speaking, 5% of hits from a distance of 35 cable will easily outgrow 25% from a distance of 20 cable and almost 100% from a distance of 5 cable, and at a distance of 60 cable they will dry up to the size of a gulkin’s nose [/ quote]

also shooting quality increases exponentially with a reduction in arithmetic factors affecting the change in distance (speed and course)

as it would be easier for you on an example:
conditional "Worspite", which sometimes could hit at Jutland (with that visibility and distance), if he was a hit, at Tsushima he would give not 2-3% accuracy, as there, but, modestly speaking, much more than 50%, if not at all 80%
conditional "Bismarck, if he turned out to be a hit, under Tsushima would target the ammunition cellars with all that it implies, a dozen shells would have been guaranteed to destroy the Oslyaby, although, most likely, two or four would have been enough

in those conditions where the RIF accuracy jumped to 10%, the RIF accuracy could jump up to 50%, relatively speaking

therefore, in order for the stationary "Oslyabyu" to reach the distance to which twenty 8 '' shells hit it, it was enough to fire them, say, fifty, or maybe significantly less

[Andrey Shmelev]

You hardly think that several dozen 381-mm shells hit the "Hood", one of which caused the ship's death.

for the fourth time)

Colleague, I wrote:

Statistics are such a thing that Lacquote in the battle of 2 ships is unpredictable, and in a battle of 24 ships is a consequence of the overall quality of shooting and obeys statistical laws due to the "large numbers"
10 shots give a random result.
1000 shots give a natural result.
This is the law of large and small numbers in a statistical sample.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Dear, Comrade, to be honest, I’m very glad to any of your comments.
You give out unique primary information that you process and process.

Of the four Japanese battleships, only Fuji fired at Oslyab. The report of the ship's commander (captain Matsumoto Yawara) indicates the time when exactly three 12 '' shells (out of twelve fired) hit the battleship Oslyabya in turn.

We have a Japanese accuracy of 25%. What I was talking about.

[LeonidL]

Fight at a speed of 9-10 knots with a much faster and more superior enemy in terms of combat power, dragging transports and useless old self-propelled coastal defense? What wise decisions can jump out at all?

[AK64]

Fight at a speed of 9-10 knots with a much faster and more superior enemy in terms of combat power, dragging transports and useless old self-propelled coastal defense? What wise decisions can jump out at all?

You are as smart as my wife then

And did Rozhdestvensky do WHAT, even if at this speed Nebogatov lagged behind? What to do? Throw Nebogatov and run?

Oh, well, yes, well, yes: "break through with a high-speed core, and let the rest go through America ...."
And how many nodes were able to give out this fast core --- Did you take an interest in this?

Rozhdestvensky acted TOTALLY CORRECTLY ---- taking into account the experience of the battle at Shantung and relying on the guns. Well, he couldn’t know that his shells are SO .... powerless!
But if the shells at Rozhestvensky would explode as it should, as it should for this type of shells according to the passport ---- then the 2nd TOE would go to Vladik.
Yes Yes.

[LeonidL]

Oh, what a smart wife you have, dear! You should read your lines "But if the shells at Rozhestvensky would explode properly, as follows for this type of shells according to the passport ---- then the 2nd TOE would have passed to Vladik" - and the poor admiral did not know about his shells ! By the way, when the author dreams, you swallow it easily, when someone else tries to suggest a different course of events, and quite real, you get into the pose of an offended wife. Don't be so nervous, by God! Yes, having such bad shells, such diverse and different-speed ships, such a poorly trained and staffed from the pine forest, and such a little fought and little sailing admiral, it was not at all worth it for Nikolai Alexandrovich Romanov to brew such an adventure and thus bring his own death and death of the handed empire to him.

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

years 15 I want to read the reports of Pekingham - I can not get it

I have a translation of one of them in my profile, "Asama" in battle on July 28th. I thought about translating and spreading a little, but after another report (detonating "Asahi" on a floating mine) went into the trash, I abandoned this case.

Quote: Undecim

But they are not. They were not published to the general public.

Some of the reports of three English attaches (Trubridge, Pakenham, Jackson) were published by the Western media during the Russo-Japanese war, for example, in the journal Proceedings.
In 2003, all published reports of four hundred were published in a single compilation.

Quote: Undecim

So turn to the First Sea Lord.

There is no need for this, the Seal of Secrecy was removed from the Pakenham archive last summer, and now photocopies of documents are available. Alas, only for money, and considerable.

[Andrey Shmelev]

I beg you, give links, then you will like it later

[Comrade]

Quote: Saxahorse

The admiral's fault is not that his flagship was out of order, but that he suddenly ONE was under fire from "four battleships at once" and two more BRKRs about which you again forgot. And the reason for this was the mediocre management of the squadron by Rozhdestvensky.

Well, and Wittgeft, whom you never tire of praising as the most effective Russian admiral, did the same.
When his "Tsarevich" became the main target of four battleships at once, they piled on and in ten minutes with six 12 '' shells knocked the battleship out of action. Along the way, Vitgeft looks even more mediocre, since Rozhdestvensky walked at eleven nodes, and Vitgeft - not fourteen. Here, in discussions, they do not get tired of reproaching Rozhdestvensky for having such and such opportunities, but he did not realize them, because he was not smart enough to develop a speed of up to 14 knots.
But here is Vitgeft for you, he walked at 14 knots, but he lost the "Tsarevich", doesn't this mean that Wilhelm Karlovich was stupider than Zinovy ​​Petrovich?
After all, one could turn around, as Rozhdestvensky was advised, rush at Togo and further along the list of unused opportunities ...

Concerning

more two BrKR

then work, dear colleague, to list both, here is a cheat sheet for you.

So what two armored cruisers fired on "Prince Suvorov", or you single Is a shot equal to firing?

[AK64]

But here is Vitgeft for you, he walked at 14 knots, but he lost the "Tsarevich", doesn't this mean that Wilhelm Karlovich was stupider than Zinovy ​​Petrovich?

I just can’t understand why Witgeft did not turn the 8 points to the right when Togo was on the 4 points behind Poltava.
After all, I would win the fight

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: AK64

But here is Vitgeft for you, he walked at 14 knots, but he lost the "Tsarevich", doesn't this mean that Wilhelm Karlovich was stupider than Zinovy ​​Petrovich?

I just can’t understand why Witgeft did not turn the 8 points to the right when Togo was on the 4 points behind Poltava.
After all, I would win the fight

Andrei from Chelyabinsk also had a series of articles about this. There were many alternative possibilities - both to turn "8 points to the right", and to abandon the slugs and break through only with high-speed ships. And AiCh went through all the options.

[AK64]

Andrei from Chelyabinsk also had a series of articles about this. There were many alternative possibilities - both to turn "8 points to the right", and to abandon the slugs and break through only with high-speed ships. And AiCh went through all the options.

With all due respect to Andrei, who has already done more than institutes to promote the history of Russia, and to clear the names of Russian sailors and soldiers, I must admit that I rarely agree with at least one of his words.
So, in the battle with the Yellow Sea: there was, in fact, only one option in the second phase of the battle - and it was OBVIOUS: a turn to the right by 8 points (well, 6 points are possible, but 8 is better). In this way, Wittgeft would build a "stick over T" in front of Togo. In that situation, it would have been both a technical victory and a breakthrough for the squadron.
Witgeft (whom some draw here as a brilliant naval commander) did NOT do this obvious action.

To justify Wittgeft, we can say that he was ill and could not even stand on the bridge (he was sitting in an armchair - that’s why he didn’t go to the wheelhouse). But after all, the headquarters members should have prompted him this obvious maneuver; and there is even evidence that prompted!
Apparently, the stock of his will at that time was completely exhausted. (Condition affected too)

[Senior seaman]

Togo simply turned away and, taking advantage of speed superiority, bypassed the Russian squadron.

[AK64]

Togo simply turned away and, taking advantage of speed superiority, bypassed the Russian squadron.

It is clear that he would have turned away, wherever he would have gone.
But:
1. Before dusk, two hours remained - in these 2 hours, Togo simply did not have time to get around and go into the head.
2. It is not immediately possible to complete the lapel to the Japanese: it would take 15 minutes (10 minimum). But Immediately after turning even one head armadillo, fire fell on Mikas, which intensified with each additional turned armadillo: in addition to the fact that the bow towers of the head armadillos (which couldn’t shoot otherwise) were launched, such longitudinal shooting itself was effective: the angular velocity of the target is low or insignificantly small, and the target itself (ship) fits in the best way with the dispersion ellipse.

In general, it would be a breakthrough and a technical victory.

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: AK64

But Immediately after turning even one head armadillo, fire fell on Mikas, which intensified with each additional turned armadillo:

In my opinion, you are still a little wrong and here's why. At that time, Mikasa was "catching up" and he had to go through the entire formation of the Russian squadron. In fact, Togo experienced in his own skin what Rozhdestvensky was to experience the next year. And this is where the questions begin ...
1. Why, if Mikasa walked along the 1 line, few shells hit him there
2. Why didn’t these shells (so their gear) did with Mikasa what they were supposed to do - didn’t send him to the bottom of the sea.
Honestly, reading descriptions of these battles is a terrible torment for me ... When you understand that you could, well, the truth could! But it did not work out (((

[AK64]

In my opinion, you are still a little wrong and here's why. At that time, Mikasa was "catching up" and he had to go through the entire formation of the Russian squadron.

since Mikasa was catching up, only the stern towers of the Russians shot at him. but when turning 8 points, nasal ones were also introduced into the case.

1. Why, if Mikasa walked along the 1 line, few shells hit him there
2. Why didn’t these shells (so their gear) did with Mikasa what they were supposed to do - didn’t send him to the bottom of the sea.

Christmas is to blame. And the king. It’s clear

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

there was, in fact, only one option in the second phase of the battle - and it was OBVIOUS: a turn to the right by 8 points (well, it is possible by 6, but 8 is better). In this way, Wittgeft would build a "stick over T" in front of Togo.

Togo slightly turns away, and as a result, the Russian squadron is fighting less than half of the barrels on the approach. The question is why? You calculate the consequences of the maneuver that you propose.
In fact, Togo, with its meleelyennyy movement along the entire Russian system, was completely substituted for its onboard volleys. The best position for the Russian squadron would be difficult to imagine. Why turn, more than halving the power of your fire?

[AK64]

Togo slightly turns away, and as a result, the Russian squadron is fighting less than half of the barrels on the approach. The question is why? You calculate the consequences of the maneuver that you propose.

No.
If "Togo slightly turns away", then the situation for Togo does not change - the same "stick over T"
In such a situation, Togo should not be turned "slightly" but by 4 rumba. And even more, to bring in the aft towers. And also because "the leg is shorter than the hypotenuse" (believe me, this is so).

In general, in 2 hours Togo does not have time --- and then it's dark. Peresvet intact, Poltava intact, Tsesarevich intact. The squadron follows the strait.

In fact, Togo, with its meleelyennyy movement along the entire Russian system, was completely substituted for its onboard volleys. The best position for the Russian squadron would be difficult to imagine. Why turn, more than halving the power of your fire?

Exactly the opposite: a turn of 8 points to the right brought into play the bow towers of the head Russian battleships. "Stick over T"

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

If "Togo slightly turns away", then the situation for Togo does not change - the same "stick over T"

Where?:)))

Quote: AK64

In such a situation, Togo should be turned not "slightly" but by 4 rumba.

No problem.

Quote: AK64

And even more to bring the aft towers into action. And also because "the leg is shorter than the hypotenuse" (believe me, this is so).

I don't see a right-angled triangle at point-blank :))) I was catching up in a parallel column, and turning by 8 points did not set crossing at all - in fact, Vitgeft seemed to "shift" the columns, reducing the distance between them without crossing. Togo's little lapel led to what I'm talking about.

[AK64]

You draw something utterly ....

Situation: Togo on a parallel (slightly convergent) course, on 4, the rumba behind Poltava (which is lagging behind). Witgeft successively turns at the intersection of his course, on 8 points, to the right.

An obvious maneuver. I do not understand at all how it is so wrong to understand .... How can you build a "stick over T" (which I said 20 times) if you turn everything suddenly?

That’s why Google and you don’t translate like that

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

Situation: Togo on a parallel (slightly convergent) course, on 4, the rumba behind Poltava (which is lagging behind). Witgeft successively turns at the intersection of his course, on 8 points, to the right.

After that, Togo duplicates his maneuver (turns, lying on a parallel or slightly converging course) and, walking along the inner circle and having superiority in speed, enters the head of the Russian squadron much faster than in reality

Quote: AK64

Absolutely obvious maneuver.

Leading to an obvious losing position. How can you not see this? I confess that I did not even consider this option due to its obvious unsuitability.

Quote: AK64

That’s why Google and you don’t translate like that

That's why Google translates you correctly :)))))

[AK64]

After that, Togo duplicates his maneuver (turns, lying on a parallel or slightly converging course) and, walking along the inner circle and having superiority in speed, enters the head of the Russian squadron much faster than in reality

Does not exceed:
(1) Before dusk 2 hours
(2) If Togo turns to a parallel course, after completing the maneuver, Wittgeft suddenly turns everything back to the previous course. and follows the formation of the front.
(3) and until dusk is already at 2 hours, but only an hour.

It can be said more simply: "in a vacuum" Togo undoubtedly covers the head of the Russians and destroys them at 0. But this, given the speed advantage of only 2 knots, will take him about 10 hours. And Vitgeft needs only 2 hours to scroll before dark.

Let me remind you: at the beginning of the proposed turn, Togo is about 6 miles behind (we will not catch fleas and count to a meter). Well, Togo got up, let him immediately got up on a parallel course. He's still 6 miles - so what? shooting at such a distance, as practice has shown, is not particularly effective.
And if you didn’t get up right away, then the situation for him is only worse.
Let me remind you that there are no instant maneuvers. He cannot make a decision and give an order and begin the maneuver instantly. And after 15 minutes, the entire Russian squadron is already hollowing with airborne volleys lengthwise along the Japanese, with 20 cab.
If Togo reacts after 10 minutes --- then the Russian fire distance will be somewhere around 30 cabs --- also bad for Togo: he can only shoot with bow towers, and his ships are off target.

So Witgeft’s inaction, an attempt to race on parallel courses, is the worst method --- Togo inevitably catches up. If the Russians at least would shoot better .... Or the shells would burst as it should --- then a parallel race could burn out ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

Does not exceed:

Even as it goes

Quote: AK64

Up to twilight hours 2

Eeeee :)))) What are the 2 hours? :))) Mikasa was on the beam of Poltava around 16.30, twilight came around 20.00 Do you want to turn even earlier

Quote: AK64

In the case of Togo turning to a parallel course, after the completion of the maneuver, Vitgeft turns everything suddenly to the previous course. and should go there front line.

Let's say. After that, Togo turns consistently and puts the crossing T

Quote: AK64

(3) and until dusk is already at 2 hours, but only an hour.

Yes, the Lord is with you, it's a matter of seconds. Turning 6 EDB to Witgeft on 8 rhumbs are minutes 8-10, Togo will turn even faster. If then all at once everything suddenly - well, 15 20 minutes from the strength it will take

Quote: AK64

Let me remind you: at the time of the start of the proposed turn, Togo is behind somewhere in 6 miles (we will not catch fleas and count to a meter).

Let's say

Quote: AK64

Well, Togo got up, even if he got up right away, on a parallel course. He's still 6 miles away - so what?

Suppose I got up on the convergent - I still can not remember that you want to unfold not on the traverse of Poltava but before. Togo turns to 45 hail and is going to intercept the new course. Considering the odds in 4 miles

The Russians are clearly late and Togo, while continuing to move, enters the head of the column. AND?

Quote: AK64

Togo cannot make a decision and give the order and start the maneuver instantly.

If we are talking about a turn consistently - it can very quickly, he can start the maneuver at any time after the new course of the Russian flagship is determined.

Quote: AK64

And in 15 minutes, the entire Russian squadron is already hammering long-sided volleys longitudinally along the Japanese, with the 20 cab.

Nobody there does not hammer anyone from any 20 cab - Togo will begin its maneuver long before the Russians fully deploy. And it will take them minutes of 8-10 from strength, a column from the 6 ships

[AK64]

Eeeee :)))) What are the 2 hours? :))) Mikasa was on the beam of Poltava around 16.30, twilight came around 20.00 Do you want to turn even earlier

The night came on 20. And darkness. Twilight came 18.30.
But during a fight on the 30 cab (5.5 km), just having poor visibility is enough to interrupt the fight (for shooting becomes unsuccessful)

Let's say. After that, Togo turns consistently and puts the crossing T

In a vacuum puts. With spherical horses. And in real life, in order to catch up with him, he needs 2 hours, in the absence of counter-action. To get around like this - hours 10.

In your picture: while Togo moves to the right --- the Russians go up, increasing the distance. While Togo was walking and spinning - 6 miles turned into 10.
That, of course, will catch up ---- in 5 hours. Let him catch up.

Yes, the Lord is with you, a second matter. Turning 6 Witgeft’s EBR by 8 points is 8-10 minutes, Togo will turn even faster.

I do not agree: you are not a squadron of cars on the freeway. but let's say.
(1) Witgeft turned.
(2) Togo turned. Do you think that at once - but if he could at once - what did you miss Witgeft south of him? That is, not right away - it's impossible right away, seeing the enemy 10 km away. But let it be right away.
(3) Witgeft turns 2 rumba to the left, still having both towers in action along an approaching column.
(4) squadrons run in parallel, at 6 miles.
The Japanese slowly overtake --- and from time to time Vitgeft turns to the left, holding Mikas on the beam. He can do this 4 times until he returns to his previous course.

After 2 hours - twilight. (Yes, yes - twilight after 2 hours.)

Well, and besides, there is somewhere a coast on this course: the Japanese would not have entered the coast

Togo turns 45 degrees and goes across the new course. Given the handicap of 4 miles.

Russians turn everything suddenly to the same course. Having all of their stern towers against the co-molded Japanese bow. The Japanese are compiled, not cleverly shoot.

If we are talking about a turn consistently - it can very quickly, he can start the maneuver at any time after the new course of the Russian flagship is determined.

What he, on the 10 km, will surely do instantly.

Togo will begin its maneuver long before the Russians are fully deployed. And it will take them 8-10 minutes of strength, a column of 6 ships

Russians suddenly turn everything back on course. Having all its aft towers against the Japanese made.

But I see that it is useless to speak with you - you are a stubborn person. So I’ll end there. I only recall that Vitgeft was advised by his own officers about the same. But you certainly know better.
Witgeft did not maneuver because he had run out of will --- he was already hoping to run away. Although it was maneuvering, and not passive following the course, at the first stage of the battle and brought him success.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

The night came on 20. And darkness. Twilight came 18.30.
But during a fight on the 30 cab (5.5 km), just having poor visibility is enough to interrupt the fight (for shooting becomes unsuccessful)

M-dya. And I am with you as with an adult.
There was no "bad visibility" at 18.30 and could not be. Darkness began much later, and the Japanese cruisers fired at Novik and Askold from 25 cables at 19.20 without any problems. Askold, by the way, stopped shooting at 20.30

Quote: AK64

In a vacuum puts. With spherical horses. And in real life, in order to catch up with him, he needs 2 hours, in the absence of counter-action. To get around like this - hours 10.

It looks like you had a solid deuce in geometry at school.
Vitgeft led away his ships in a parallel column - in this case, the speed of convergence of the Russian and Japanese squadrons was minimal. Any Russian turns increase the speed of convergence, so with the maneuvering recommended to you, the Japanese would overtake Russians much earlier than in Ingushetia.

Quote: AK64

(2) Togo turned. Do you think that right away - but if he could right away - what did you miss Vitgefta south from yourself?

Away to assess combat damage. However, there may have been other reasons - Togo made a lot of strange things in that battle.
The rest of the scheme you draw does not make the slightest sense - at all stages the Japanese are moving closer to the Russians
a) Faster, or at the same speed
b) In the same or more favorable tactical configuration

Quote: AK64

Russians turn everything suddenly to the same course. Having all of their stern towers against the co-molded Japanese bow. The Japanese are compiled, not cleverly shoot.

The most perfect fanaziya - there nothing is hidden. The Japanese, moving forward, slowly move into a T-crossing position about 4 miles from the Cesarevich, who is hit first.

Quote: AK64

What he, on the 10 km, will surely do instantly.

All these ten-kilometer segments exist only in your, alas, geometrically completely illiterate fantasy.
As soon as the Russians turned to the right, the distance between the Japanese and the Russians begins to decline sharply - before that the convergence rate was the 2 node, after that - all 15. If we assume that at the beginning of the maneuver between Mikasa and Tsesarevich there were about 6 miles, as you say, then at the end of the Russian U-turn (take 8 minutes) it is only something 4 miles. If Togo does not undertake maneuvers, then the picture is

In general, turning right to intercept Russian (dotted line) exposes crossover to t. Russians can turn everything all of a sudden, of course, but what’s the point with that? Togo falls on the same course - and hello crossing.
In general, as I said, your maneuver only leads to the fact that the Russians are forced into battle earlier and in the worst configuration.

Quote: AK64

But I see that talking to you is useless - you are a stubborn person.

Just a little understanding in geometry

Quote: AK64

Let me remind you only that this is what the officers advised Vitgeft about.

I do not need to remind anything, because with the memory you have even worse than with the geometry. Read the sources and find out that Witgeft was not offering anything like that. And they offered him completely different maneuvers - either to leave the front line, or to attack the Japanese like this

[AK64]

Go, Andrei. go: I am absolutely not interested in talking to you.

Just for example, I consider Rudnev to be an official and a coward, and much more. So if I tell you everything, then you will definitely not be able to sleep soundly at night. - you will become indignant. So take it easy already --- Your opinion is of little interest to me.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

Go, Andrei. go: I am absolutely not interested in talking to you.

Andrei, I am not at all interested in your interests, but you publish some completely erroneous and very meaningful statements. If I think that your opinion can be misleading, then I refute him - that's all.
That is, generally speaking, from the moment I saw your inability to conduct a discussion, my answers to you were written not for you, but for those who read our correspondence. Your opinion does not bother me at all

Quote: AK64

I, just for example, consider Rudnev to be an official and a coward, and a lot of other things. So if I tell you everything, then you will definitely not be able to sleep at night. - become indignant.

I will not :)))) There are a huge number of people living in the Russian Federation who, at least a count on their heads, will not be able to refuse once and for all the memorized "truths". Inertia and lack of independence of thinking, alas. I can't change that, so why try?
To similar people I answer only the above-described cases, and being annoyed with them is just as silly as it is silly to be angry with a person who has lost a leg if he cannot walk with the same speed as me.

[AK64]

You publish some completely erroneous and very meaningless statements.

Dear, do not be rude: you won’t even be able to read any of my publication --- both because of your lack of knowledge of languages ​​and absolute illiteracy in the issues raised there. (And by the way, I’m lying --- there are a couple in Russian, too)
But if you went down to such ugly statements, let’s do it honestly: you give me your email, and I will send you a couple of my publications from those in Russian.

After that, you either publicly apologize for your rudeness, or just as publicly tell us what is written there and what kind of mistakes are there (you say that there are mistakes in my publications, right? And you have to answer for the market, Andrey. )

Waiting for an Email

[Andrey Shmelev]

But here is Vitgeft for you, he walked at 14 knots, but he lost the "Tsarevich", doesn't this mean that Wilhelm Karlovich was stupider than Zinovy ​​Petrovich?

28.07/XNUMX not a single battleship was irretrievably lost
under Tsushima all were irretrievably lost

[Senior seaman]

The night has come.

[Andrey Shmelev]

that is, for one of them after the evening immediately came a radiant morning)

and, to be honest, in half an hour, the ZPR has already passed two EBRs into the category of hopeless ones, the night has nothing to do with it, just, as AiCh writes: "ZPR won the outset of the battle"

[Senior seaman]

It’s just that with Vitgeft Togo, at first two hours he did something incomprehensible, then he fell behind and only then got down to business. And in the remaining two hours, Vitgeft's battleships hacked to an almost unfit state. The battle lasted a little longer, or go through the narrow places where you can’t hide from the destroyers, there would be no one to meet in the morning.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

ZPR won the eyeballs of the battle

Once again: thirty-two hits on all Japanese ships in four hours of combat. And nineteen in fifteen minutes only at Mikasu.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Once again: thirty-two hits on all Japanese ships in four hours of combat. And nineteen in fifteen minutes only at Mikasu.

1. Sharpness. So dear Comrade just wrote that "Fuji" from 12 shots hit "Oslyabya" 3 times, which gives the Japanese accuracy 25%. The accuracy of both squadrons is ensured by the aggressive start of the battle from Togo, where does the ZPR?

2. Maneuvers ZPR. What is the causal relationship between the stalled Oslyabya vehicles and the armadilloes, on the one hand, that got stuck in a heap, and 19 hits on the Mikasa, on the other?

3. At Witgeft, after 2 hours of battle, 2 armadillos received serious injuries, at ZPR in half an hour the fate of 2 armadillos was already decided.

4. The duration of the battle. Poor visibility under Tsushima extremely interfered with the shooting. The Japanese fired less shells than July 28.07, since the duration of the effective shooting period (actually the battle segments, rather than maneuvers between these segments) on July 28.07 was much longer than under Tsushima.

5. The Tsushima Strait is by no means narrow.

Once again, a little theory about accuracy:

shooting quality increases exponentially while reducing the distance in arithmetic,
shooting quality increases exponentially with a reduction in arithmetic factors affecting the change in distance (speed and course)
and so on

relatively speaking, in those conditions where the accuracy of the RIF jumped to 5%, the accuracy of the nuclear weapon could jump up to 25% (this is speculative, but completely fits into the facts we know about the battle)
I'm building a proportion with the Japanese in firing efficiency, that's why:
A&H writes about the fact that 2 TOE hit more often than 1 TOE, so 2 TOE was better prepared
I write that the increase in 2 TOE hits may be due to different battle conditions, as evidenced by the increase in Japanese hits

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

which gives the accuracy of the Japanese in 25%

No, this is Fuji's accuracy, and in this particular situation

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

ZPR maneuvers.

I think it will come to this.

In Witgeft, after 2 hours of battle, the 2 armadillo received serious damage, in ZPR, the fate of the 2 armadillos was already decided in half an hour.

There is reason to believe that the destructive power of Japanese shells has increased.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

The Tsushima Strait is by no means narrow.

Compared to the Yellow Sea?

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

I build the proportion

I understood your position, but I disagree with it.

[Andrey Shmelev]

this is the accuracy of "Fuji", and in this particular situation

gladly ready to analyze any information about accuracy
Kofman, for example, as I recall, estimated it for the Nuclear Research Institute under Tsushima to be at least 10% for 8 and 6 inches, and also for 12 inches - not less than 1,5-2,0 times higher, which Like, not much different from the considered example

There is reason to believe that the destructive power of Japanese shells has increased.

I have no doubt that against 2 TOE, the Japanese used shells with a certain delay in the explosion, which reduced the size of the damage to the outer skin, but increased the internal damage

Compared to the Yellow Sea?

for night evasion from destroyer attacks after the general day artillery battle I see no fundamental difference

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

at least up to 10%

Colleague, this is an absolutely meaningless statement. To determine the% of hits you need to know the number of hits and the number of shells fired. For good reason, it is impossible to count them in Tsushima. Contemplative assessments in my eyes do not have the slightest value.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

for night evasion from destroyer attacks after the general day artillery battle I see no fundamental difference

And completely in vain.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Contemplative assessments in my eyes do not have the slightest value.

do not consider it harsh, but even that you yourself are not a computer program - you can talk to yourself, only with an unknown amount of certainty

let’s assign the following to speculative estimates:
for example, the commander of "Azuma" attributed all shells larger than three-inch to large shells, and considered close explosions in hits that affected the cruiser by fragments
therefore, 7 hits in 12 inches in "Azuma" were not even close, even speculatively
in fact, the very statement about accuracy of 2 TOE is very speculative and at the same time is not friendly with many things related to common sense: from statistics to the basics of shooting
(I don’t want to water anyone, but I don’t need to grab 2 TOE either)

a completely different matter - the scheme adopted here for counting barrel firing on the "Orel": let us speculatively assume that in the course of each two zinc was consumed with cartridges for the "Berdanka", we get 8346 pieces and give it as a reliably known exact value

where is the objectivity?

[Senior seaman]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

statement about accuracy 2 TOE is very speculative

No, because there is Japanese data that is difficult to ignore. However, it turns out :)

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

to common sense: from statistics to the basics of shooting

Sorry, but you have a bad time with the first, and the second, and the third.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

speculatively accept

Not quite so :) Sorry, I’ve just been talking with Valentin longer than yours and I remember this story very well. He previously wrote that there were five firing (this is known from the documents) and that during one of them (EMNIP in Kamrani) a box of Berdanov cartridges was shot. I.e,there is reason to believe that the same number of rounds was used up in other cases. It really is logical and does not contradict my experience (of course, I did not participate in stem firing, but I had to do it in ordinary ones). Hence the number, which, however, had not previously been stated so categorically.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Japanese data is difficult to ignore

show Japanese data with traces of damage to "Azuma" family shells in 305 mm?

you have a bad time with the first, and second, and third

Can you tell me which mistakes I made?

[Andrey Shmelev]

you have a bad time with the first, and second, and third.

proof number 1:

as we can see, when the distance is reduced in arithmetic progression, the reference accuracy of measuring the rangefinder grows exponentially

proof number 2:

as we can see, when reducing the distance in arithmetic progression, the reference accuracy of the guns grows exponentially

[Senior seaman]

You see, this is all true, but you cannot directly extrapolate this data to the battle. Since in battle there are other factors that cannot be taken into account.

[Andrey Shmelev]

You see, this is all true, but you cannot directly extrapolate this data to the battle. Since in battle there are other factors that cannot be taken into account.

Yes sir! I totally agree.

The problem is that the mathematical expectation of accuracy under Tsushima gives me much more accuracy under Shantung and Ulsan for both sides. Of course, this is just an expectation.

Analysis of the damage to the "Eagle", "Tsarevich", etc. also corresponds to the existing expectations of the accuracy of the Japanese shooting in relation to the assumption of the number of hits on the destroyed ships. Of course, this is only a guess.

Available descriptions, such as: "lost the entire unarmored side", "the whole nose seems to be open," etc., up to 3 eight-inch hits in only one bow tower, again, corresponds to the above expectations and assumptions. Of course, these are only fragmentary descriptions.

Valentine's brief remarks regarding accuracy examples again fit exactly the above. It is understood that this is only fragmentary examples.

On the other hand, 2 TOE showed a statistically anomalous bias in favor of hits with heavy projectiles against smaller calibers, which cannot but make one suspect an overestimation of the caliber of the projectiles that hit - a vivid example of this Azuma.

Again, eight thousand rounds is an indicator of an extremely moderate intensity of combat training in comparison with the same "Varyag". Many sources, from the orders of the ZPR to the letters of the officers, complain about the poor fire training of the 2 TOE, and the only counterarguments to this are the number of hits by heavy shells per battle and medium shells at Mikaks.

In general, I will say, in my opinion, the issue of accuracy under Tsushima at the moment, to put it mildly, is far from closed. Firstly, it is possible that the Japanese at certain moments of the battle could give out 25% and even more accuracy of fire from heavy guns. Secondly, there is a high probability that the canonical 47 hits with heavy shells with 2 TOE can be significantly adjusted downward.

So far my opinion is this: the Japanese fired at least very well, and 2 TOE fired well in the first 15-30 minutes (no more), then the centralized fire control broke up, the rangefinders broke, the sights were inconsistent, etc. - a systematic beating began. The decent results of firing of 2 TOE in the eyeballs of the battle are the result of the aggressive start of the battle on the part of Togo, a good average Borodino artillery, and an average level of training. The maneuvers of the ZPR, alas, did not contribute at all to this.

[anzar]

the mathematical expectation of accuracy under Tsushima I get a lot more accuracy with Shantung and Ulsan for both sides

And why do you do this? What influencing factors are better for C.? Not to mention that for the "mathematical expectation" it is necessary to digitize these factors somehow (reliably!). Eto about possibly based on a large (statistically) array like cases. Do you have one? (with Nubiru?))

[Andrey Shmelev]

but weakly answer for each paragraph of my comment in essence?

[anzar]

but weakly answer by each paragraph of my comment

Life is not enough)) Besides, I understand the "meaning of life" a little differently.

[anzar]

as we can see, when reducing the distance in arithmetic progression, the reference accuracy of the guns grows exponentially

And how will it decrease with an increase in excitement by 1 point ??
In general, it is true that you are bad with 1. 2. 3. What is the attitude of your "proofs" to the issue under discussion? Distances in WM and in the outset of Tsushima are similar. The rest is different.
Your thesis that 2ToE shot more precisely "for reasons beyond her control" and the Japanese fired more accurately (that is, other factors favored) is unprovable, since the number of their hits on the dead Russian ships is unknown. Any "analogies" and "proportions" are incorrect, since there are many factors. Is it so hard to understand? There is a separate question why, when discussing the difference in the training of the Russians, you accept the training of the Japanese as constant.
But the remaining numbers are known. On the basis of them it is concluded that at the beginning of the battle 2 ToE hit more than 1ToE. Why? - absolutely impossible to say exactly, but based on a comparison of other factors, weather and visibility are worse, excitement is stronger, combat stress is stronger (unshooting) THE MOST PROBABLE (remaining)) reason is better preparation of the commandors and better security (rangefinders)

[Andrey Shmelev]

And how will it decrease with an increase in excitement by 1 point ??

I am waiting for a formula from you)

especially for those who read one comment on a branch I answer: I already wrote about other factors, for example, speed and course (also, roughly speaking, in geometric, but it’s more difficult there)

The distances in the LM and in the plot of Tsushima are similar.

I’m sorry, the average distance in GM was much greater

Any "analogies" and "proportions" are incorrect, since there are many factors.

the stump is clear, for example, because I measure the acceleration of gravity at 9,81 m / s, it does not mean that it will not be in another place on Earth 9,83 m / s - there are many factors, but, how can I tell you, dear colleague, simpler: the apple still falls down at a speed of approximately 10 m / s, and you assure me that it will fly up into the heavens, are the "analogy" with the "proportion" clear?

accept japanese constant training

reasonable assumption

2 ToE hit more than 1 TOE. Why?

and why did the Japanese get much more often than in the GM?

[anzar]

I am waiting for a formula from you)

Why? You are a builder of proportions, you and the influence of changing factors "digitize" And they also do not act in isolation (from each other), but have a habit of interacting)) For example, more excitement reduces the accuracy of less trained gunners more ...

just because I measure the acceleration of gravity at 9,81 m / s does not mean that it will not be 9,83 m / s elsewhere on Earth ...

You do not "measure" anything, only "sweep"))

and you assure me that it will fly into the heavens, are the "analogy" with the "proportion" clear?

Not I assure you, but a good analogy about the accuracy of your "proportions"))). The stretch is valid))
and why did the Japanese get much more often than in the GM?
If it is so, then the case of the Japanese, on the location of many factors that do not work the same for the two fleets. And your "mathematical" (?) Attempts remind

[Andrey Shmelev]

If this is so, then the Japanese have a lot to do with the arrangement of factors that are NOT the same for the two fleets.

everything is clear, then the previously asked question is removed:

but weakly answer for each paragraph of my comment in essence?

[PPD]

Hence the conclusion, maybe the lights on the Eagle were worth it? AND?
You look and the night would come earlier?

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Once again, the given angle of impact must be taken into account. The effective thickness of the 12 "armor belt (and even 2" lining) will be 22,75 "ie 578 mm armor at an angle of 49 degrees and 25,75" ie 654 mm at an angle of 53 degrees according to Jacob de -Marru.

Hood didn't have that much armor. In 1920, the Ministry of the Sea conducted a study that showed that a projectile could get into the cellar after breaking through an average belt 178mm thick. The deck armor was also deemed insufficient.

[Victor Leningradets]

Once again for everyone:
If you shoot at the traverse - undoubtedly belt 7 "+ bevel 2" make their way from a distance of 90 cab. at a time. As soon as you enter the heading angle, everything changes. It's like with tanks: "Panther" is on board (0 degrees) - I don't want to hit. Goes at 50 degrees - you can't break it.
And on decks - a British projectile weighing 871 kg with an initial speed of 747 m / s and a German projectile weighing 800 kg with an initial speed of 820 m / s - completely different ballistics.

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Once again for everyone:
If you shoot at the traverse - undoubtedly belt 7 "+ bevel 2" make their way from a distance of 90 cab. at a time. As soon as you enter the heading angle, everything changes. It's like with tanks: "Panther" is on board (0 degrees) - I don't want to hit. Goes at 50 degrees - you can't break it.
And on decks - a British projectile weighing 871 kg with an initial speed of 747 m / s and a German projectile weighing 800 kg with an initial speed of 820 m / s - completely different ballistics.

There is a calculation taking into account the probable courses of both Hood and Bismarck. 178 mm of the middle belt break through it into the light and after the penetration the projectile flies at a speed of about 400 m / s. The main belt cannot be penetrated from this angle, yes. Only 2/3. Actually, what the field tests of the Ministry of the Sea proved in 1920.

[Victor Leningradets]

I didn’t say that they didn’t make their way, but the projectile normalized and went almost parallel to the main deck, but couldn’t get into the bevel. To punch on the matmodels, we introduced a roll to the port side of degrees 6.
In fact, there is another possibility - the exposure of the bull due to the flow of the breakers, but this only works with direct movement.

[Victor Leningradets]

It would be interesting to simulate the hits on the Mikasa with arr. 1911 g.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

It would be interesting to simulate the hits on the Mikasa with arr. 1911 g.

1907 r, because 1911 r did not fit into the armadillos. But that would be enough.

[AK64]

It would be interesting to simulate the hits on the Mikasa with arr. 1911 g.

And what's the difference, which shells will NOT explode?
If those shells arr 1892 and yes exploded NORMALLY, as expected ....

There is much talk about the low explosive content. So the problem is not this: the problem is not that the explosive was small --- but that even this small did not explode normally (in the case of an explosion, as a rule there was only a partial explosion ---- presumably an intermediate detonator explosion. did not explode)

So what's the difference what charge will not explode20 kg or 1.3 kg?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

So this is not the problem: the problem is not that there was little explosives --- but that even this small didn’t explode properly

Well, why? Exploded. Not exploded only if the projectile did not have time to get

[AK64]

Well, why? Exploded. Not exploded only if the projectile did not have time to get

Didn't explode. The picture that you yourself described as "explosions" does not correspond at all to the explosion of 1.3 kg of pyroxylin.
This is similar to an explosion of an intermediate detonator, rather than 1.3 kg of pyroxylin.

Exactly so --- "explosion of an intermediate detonator" --- these explosions were characterized later.

I have already said: 1.3 kg of myroxylin is somewhere around 0.9 - 1.0 kg of TNT. Let's say in a Soviet 76mm grenade - 660 grams of TNT. Well and how - explosions of Russian shells are very similar at least to the explosion of such a grenade? IMHO, it does not seem completely

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: AK64

Didn't explode. The picture that you yourself described as "explosions" does not correspond at all to the explosion of 1.3 kg of pyroxylin.

I'm afraid you don't understand what you are writing about

Quote: AK64

I have already said: 1.3 kg miroksilina --- this is somewhere 0.9 - 1.0 kg TNT. Let's say in the Soviet 76mm grenade - 660 c TNT. Well, and how much do the explosions of Russian shells resemble such a grenade as an explosion?

In order to inflict damage to the explosive, you must first waste energy on the destruction of the shell. Do you put an equal sign between the hulls of a 305-mm AP shell and a 76-mm high-explosive grenade? Seriously?

[Andrey Shmelev]

excuse me, can not help but intervene

it’s very simplified and I don’t really agree, but clearly

[AK64]

This is very optimistic. 1 kg of TNT - and 1 m? Oh well....

Well and besides there is a difference between
(1) undermining the charge in the case and without it. (And it's not just about fragments: Without a case, a significant part of a checker is simply scattered during an explosion. With a sufficiently strong case, the entire explosive charge manages to be initiated)
(2) the effects of explosives and shock waves in internal rooms (albeit with thin walls) and in the open air. In the open air, the amplitude decreases like a cube of distance, but in the room .... in the room it is very different.

It will depend and lie a person or stand. Sheltered, partially covered, or open.

[Andrey Shmelev]

indoors is not so much.

here I completely agree, that's why I wrote "very simplified and I don't really agree"
banal example: if the meeting on July 20.07.1944, XNUMX were in a bunker, and not in a panel house, all those present would be killed with a high degree of probability

1 kg of TNT - and 1 m

there the border of the red zone is exactly 3,5 meters
in principle, based on excess pressure, this is quite true
(the pressure picture doesn’t make out in the normal way - take a word)

so for sure, but TNT is still not black powder, but pyroxylin all the more
on the other hand, the 305 mm outfit still needs to be split, which is not easy at all

[AK64]

It does not matter.
The description of the explosions of Russian 305mm shells does not correspond to the description of the explosions of 1.3 kg pyroxylin.
But the Russian 10-inch shells for some reason exploded much more spectacularly (and more efficiently) - they just matched their content. (And it is they who are cited as an example that "but what do you tell everything - quite well Russian shells were torn!") The shells (old) from Nicholas-1 also match.
But the new ones, from Borodintsev, for some reason not.

One of the possible reasons (well, according to rumors): wax or paraffin (this is not important), or wooden but coated with wax or paraffin, a cork that was inserted into the hole under the fuse during storage: it was removed before the shot and a tube with a detonator was inserted.
So, supposedly, this wax or paraffin phlegmatized pyroxylin at the boundary and the main explosive charge was not initiated.

And there’s no need to argue: here I’ve bought what I’m selling for.
But what about the shells - contrary to Andrei’s opinion --- there were serious problems - it can be seen, at least, from the fact that after the REV, even shells for black gunpowder began to be redone from despair.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Good afternoon! I heard this version more than once.

I bow a little to another:

For safety reasons, the shells were stored without fuses, and moisture penetrated to the pyroxylin through the fuse holders, because the fuse was not always triggered by a regular fuse

[AK64]

For safety reasons, the shells were stored without fuses, and moisture penetrated to the pyroxylin through the fuse holders, because the fuse was not always triggered by a regular fuse

Again drawn to talk about what you do not know?

For security reasons, the shells were really stored without a fuse and an intermediate detonator. But instead of a detonator and a fuse, a wax (or paraffin) plug was inserted into the shell, in the form of a detonator and a fuse. (It is possible that the cork was wooden but waxed) This cork very high-quality insulated explosives from the atmosphere.
Before the shot, they removed the cork and replaced it with a tube and a detonator.

But here: wax (paraffin, stearin) is a rather noticeable phlegmatizer. And from the cork during its introduction and extraction, the adjacent layer of pyroxylin was "smeared". As a result, the detonation wave "did not pass" into the explosive mass.

The explanation is correct, but the version itself is rumored

PS: the projectiles in the drawings are not correct: these are much older projectiles - there is even a primitive detonator, "single action"

[Andrey Shmelev]

there is even a primitive fuse, "single action"

so what then did the Japanese find in Russian shells) I'll look for more

the adjacent pyroxylin layer was "smeared"

1 mm thick or what?

the detonation wave "did not pass" into the explosive mass

detonation wave, excuse me, from what?
if from 2 grams of detonating mercury, then it is not a fact that they will force the wet pyroskilin to detonate, in principle, the coating has nothing to do with it
if from the initiating charge - wax in small amounts of detonation does not hurt, IMHO

[AK64]

so what then did the Japanese find in Russian shells) I'll look for more

This is most likely the field guns mod 1877.

The fuse in the picture is "single action", without a fuse. Such by the time of the RYA was practically not used.
Maybe it’s from ancient Chinese guns?

What it is about: the Brink fuse (and generally modern at that time fuses) had a simple fuse: when fired, a huge accelerating acceleration acts on the projectile. This acceleration cut off the safety ears. Then, upon impact, a strong inhibitory acceleration acts - and a spring-loaded striker hits the capsule.
There is no fuse in the drawing (first stage). This is a feature of previous generation fuses.

1 mm thick or what?

Hardly anyone knows. This is VERSION. But wax (paraffin, stearin) is really a phlegmatizer.
But what is characteristic: according to the results, wax plugs really replaced wooden ones, with waxing only in the thread area (for waterproofing).

detonation wave, excuse me, from what?
if from 2 grams of detonating mercury, then it is not a fact that they will force the wet pyroskilin to detonate, in principle, the coating has nothing to do with it

From a secondary detonator from a charge of DRY pyroxylin.
The capsule initiated an "intermediate detonator" from a dry pyroxylin charge.
I don’t know the weight - I was not interested

if from the initiating charge - wax in small amounts of detonation does not hurt, IMHO

I also somehow doubt it. That's why he wrote - "according to rumors." But wooden plugs were introduced - a fact. And there is such an opinion.

My personal opinion: everything is much simpler, it was a diversion. But there were no ends even then.

This is the same as with the version that Brink's fuses did not work because aluminum of better quality, more honest, they say, began to be used --- they say that "better aluminum" has a higher hardness.
The only thing is that the cleaner the softer the aluminum.
But such a version was expressed, yes.

[Andrey Shmelev]

There is no fuse in the drawing (first stage). This is a feature of previous generation fuses.

I’m arguing, I’ll look for where this drawing came from, just like a drawing of arr. 1891

From a secondary detonator from a charge of DRY pyroxylin

here I consider it getting wet, firstly, quite likely, and secondly, an elementary and independently more than sufficient reason for the absence of a regular explosion precisely because:

wax in small amounts of detonation will not hurt, IMHO
I also somehow doubt it.

everything is much simpler, it was a diversion

it seems like it could be for everyone

Alas. do not forget that even regular breaks of all shells were not at all a sufficient condition for victory

[AK64]

I argue that

I just explained why this particular drawing is not mod 1892

and I think that it’s getting wet, firstly, quite likely, and secondly, an elementary and independently more than sufficient reason for the absence of a regular explosion

It was not stored in a shell, but separately, in a special and hygroscopic pencil case.
It is unlikely that the detonators of the NEW shells will get wet all over the place, but the normal state of the old ones (incl. 10 "on the BBO)

Alas. do not forget that even regular breaks of all shells were not at all a sufficient condition for victory

But the regular gaps guaranteed rout. (Not defeat namely rout)

PS: I already said that Togo, apparently, knew that the shells guaranteed will not explode: from here and him suicidal actions. So NAGO can be acted only if you are absolutely sure that the enemy will not be able or will not be able to damage you: this is the highest degree of disrespect for the enemy.
So why would he not respect Russian so? The 1st TOE did not give a reason for such a degree of disrespect: in the Yellow Sea, Togo only won --- and the 2nd TOE was a trite number. So why such disrespect?
IMHO: Togo was surehe was guaranteed

[Andrey Shmelev]

But the regular gaps guaranteed rout. (Not defeat, namely defeat)

I agree here.

he was guaranteed

Not very much here.

We quote Togo's combat order:
"It should be noted that the target of our first attack will not necessarily be the main forces of the enemy - we will choose the part of their system that is easier and more effective to attack... If we act in this way, the enemy will surely react. "

Let us put ourselves in the place of Togo and think that he was obliged to know from the results of the analyzes of the battles of Shantung and Ulsan:
-Russians shoot mediocre, not good, not bad, but on the C grade,
-Russian armor-piercing shells can cause troubles with a very successful hit, but these are isolated cases,
-efficiency of Japanese long-range shooting is insufficient for a decisive victory,
-the victory under Shantung was brought by a sharp, aggressive rapprochement at the very end of the battle with the concentration of fire on the flagship, even if it was risky,
-Russian ships are very tenacious,
Russians have less move,
-Russian reluctantly abandon their laggards,
-Russian squadron under Shantung collapsed after the failure of the flagship.

let's try this logic:
Togo was preparing to disperse on counter-courses with the left column and smash the squad of Nebogatov - immediately a numerical superiority and tied the squadron to it
(Kamimura at that time independently shots with a relatively safe distance from the Russian head battleships - well, what will come of it) - such a scheme is in Togo's combat order for the second detachment.

Suddenly ZPR exposes Togo both flagships and Togo decides to improvise - the risk is crazy, but what a jackpot is at stake (!) - everything turns out fine: Togo took a chance and won

[AK64]

I'm afraid you don't understand what you are writing about

Really?
I forgot about it more than you ever knew and will know.
this was part of my university course, including labs with the receipt and subsequent testing and determination of properties.
I have such a specialty, according to the first diploma. (And not chemistry, no ....)

[AK64]

if the shell did not have time to cock

And this man is trying to blame others for saying that they don’t know what they are talking about ????
/ shakes his head dejectedly /

Who are you in formal education, Andrey?
However, it doesn’t matter - I believe that a journalist (there is something in you .... sort of, you know ... Inherent in sharks of a pen and an inkwell ....)

But here I am in the first diploma.

So: the fuse is "cocked" when fired, and not when hit. The Brink's fuse was double-acting: when fired, it cocked, and when struck, it worked (well, it should have been).
The fuse can not be cocked only if it is specially done so.

[Andrey Shmelev]

There is much talk about the low explosive content.

I will quote a textbook:
"Meanwhile, an 8-inch projectile, exploding near the side in the battery deck, did not harm even thin cabin bulkheads, piercing them only with large fragments, but not destroying the cabin environment ... Fragments of 6- and even 8-inch shells had a very low penetrating ability They were held even by thin cabin bulkheads, and when hitting people, they did not inflict deep wounds and more often got stuck in the skin. "

Why should we expect that the Russian BB shell will have a regular high-explosive action more than the Japanese 6-8 inch high-explosive shells?

On the contrary, for example, firing and simulating bombing on the internals of the High Seas Fleet showed that even the latest 15-inch shells (and this is already an incomparable level!) Have quite limited high-explosive action, and for significant damage from the shock wave the TNT equivalent should be tens of kilograms

[AK64]

I will quote a textbook:
"Meanwhile, an 8-inch projectile, exploding near the side in the battery deck, did not harm even thin cabin bulkheads, piercing them only with large fragments, but not destroying the cabin environment ... Fragments of 6- and even 8-inch shells had a very low penetrating ability They were held even by thin cabin bulkheads, and when hitting people, they did not inflict deep wounds and more often got stuck in the skin. "

I promised you not to read and not react at all. But still I will explain this (you are here in your usual repertoire ...)

(1) It's about the Japanese "suitcase". They had "suitcases" as soon as they were in Tsushima - before that they hadn't. The property of these shells is: an extremely thin shell to cram as much explosive as possible. But if the shell is thin, then where do the large fragments come from?
(2) In addition, TNF has a strong brisant (crushing) effect --- and as a result, the fragments are usually quite small.
(3) therefore, it would be necessary to look not at the fragmentation, but at the high-explosive effect of such shells --- because it was under the high-explosive effect that they were created (increased explosive content due to the thin shirt).

So in this case, it would be worth looking at what happened with the calculations of the guns, how they got from the explosion --- and not at all what happened to the situation in the cabin. (But the gold miners, of course, it is much more worried about the second)

[Andrey Shmelev]

But if the shell is thin - then where do the large fragments come from?

well, she’s much thicker than the shell of a three-inch grenade)

TNF has a strong brisant (crushing) effect --- and as a result, the fragments are usually quite small

here basically agree

It would be worth seeing what happened to the calculations of the guns, how they got from the explosion

I note that the 203-mm projectile that flew into the Oslyabya tower through the embrasure, exploding inside the tower, did not kill everyone in it, although at least all the survivors were seriously injured

[AK64]

well, she’s much thicker than the shell of a three-inch grenade)

How do you know this and how can you confirm it?
(Just in case: 76 mm grenade - fragmentation. High-explosive 76 mm did not even do, due to the small explosive charge.)

here basically agree

Not! Can not be!
Change your mind immediately !!

I note that the 203-mm projectile that flew into the Oslyabya tower through the embrasure, exploding inside the tower, did not kill everyone in it, although at least all the survivors were seriously injured

(taking into account the fate of Oslyabya) How do you want to know this and how can you confirm it?

[Andrey Shmelev]

How do you want to know this and how can you confirm it?

"At this time, the topmills were shot down, and three large shells hit the bow tower; the first damaged the installation, and the third, having flown into the embrasure, brought out all the servants, seriously wounded the commander of the tower, warrant officer Maikov."

How do you know this and how can you confirm it?

I have already attached you a drawing of a 12-inch shell)

[AK64]

I have already attached you a drawing of a 12-inch shell)

It seemed to me that it was about the Japanese "suitcase" and not about the Russians.
The fact that the Russians gave very large fragments - as it is known

[Andrey Shmelev]

I don’t know how correct this picture is

but if you estimate the volume of the projectile and density, then very thin walls do not work

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

It would be interesting to simulate the hits on the Mikasa with arr. 1911 g.

You don't need to model anything. Everything has already been modeled and in full reality - the battle at Cape Sarych in 1915. Russian ships fire with the same guns and shells, only the shells have already been "corrected" - 1907. One single hit in Goeben destroyed the casemate of a 150mm gun, crippling a lot of people. And compare with hitting Mikasa (((tears and only.

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

I didn’t say that they didn’t make their way, but the projectile normalized and went almost parallel to the main deck, but couldn’t get into the bevel. To punch on the matmodels, we introduced a roll to the port side of degrees 6.
In fact, there is another possibility - the exposure of the bull due to the flow of the breakers, but this only works with direct movement.

In 1920, a full-scale model of the Hood board was built and a real 15-inch shell at 20 degrees was driven into it in the middle belt. Entered as if in oil. And the Bismarck projectile had to normalize somewhere, since it’s a little easier?

[Victor Leningradets]

20 degrees from normal?
Look at the estimated penetration of the 5 "King George V" deck there, the angle of incidence of the projectile is about 30 degrees (60 to the normal), the distance is 29 yards and the projectile is 500crh, not 6crh.

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

20 degrees from normal?
Look at the estimated penetration of the 5 "King George V" deck there, the angle of incidence of the projectile is about 30 degrees (60 to the normal), the distance is 29 yards and the projectile is 500crh, not 6crh.

Under 20 from the normal. Deck under 30 - with the same deplorable result.

And if you believe the Jurens table, then the middle belt could be punched with a finger, if previously lubricated with Vaseline.

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

I repeat once again the quality of shooting increases exponentially while reducing the distance in arithmetic.
That is, roughly speaking, 5% of hits from a distance in 35 cable will easily grow into 25% from a distance in 20 cable and almost in 100% from a distance in 5 cable, and at a distance in 60 cable it will dry to the size of a nose

This is a theoretically witty statement. not passes the test of practice.

On May 14, 1905 "Fuji", firing about 12 shells of the main caliber, achieved three hits.
And on April 25, 1905, during the last shooting practice before the Tsushima battle, "Fuji", firing eight shells of the main caliber, achieved two hits.
As we can see, in both cases accuracy was 25 %.
Now compare the distance and the target.
a) During firing practice, fire was fired on an island 73-91 meters long and 18-27 meters wide. The dimensions of the Oslyabi are, of course, known to you.
b) At shooting practice, the shooting began at 2 meters, gradually decreasing to 743 meters (calculated from yards). In the Tsushima battle, the Oslyab was fired at a distance of about 2 meters.

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

We have the accuracy of the Japanese in 25%.

No need to generalize, it's accuracy not Japanese, and onetaken separately armadillo... The shooting of the other three was markedly different in the practice shooting, and this suggests that in real combat conditions they also showed a different shooting accuracy than that demonstrated by "Fuji".

[Andrey Shmelev]

Good morning, dear colleague!

This is a theoretically witty statement.

this is a simple pattern, empirically easy to prove: take an air rifle and a 5-ruble coin
you get from 4 meters, for example, from 10 times 4 times
it means you will get from 2 meters, certainly not less than 8 times
but from 6 meters you get 2 times - it’s already good

During firing practice, fire was fired on an island 73-91 meters long and 18-27 meters wide. The dimensions of the Oslyabi are, of course, known to you.

height what islands? if a couple of meters, then this directly confirms my statement

it’s accuracy not of the Japanese, but of one, an individual battleship

it accuracy examplewhich you yourself brought

I think the other battleships fired even better:
As I understand it, from T. Jackson's report, for example, the Mikasa firing practice in April 1905 at the same range:
target 24-30 meters long, 10,5-2 meters wide
accuracy 12 inches - 5 hits on 8 shots, 6 inches - 14 hits on 84 shots

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

this is a simple law, easily proven empirically

"I told him about Thomas, and he told me about Erema" (proverb).

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

what is the height of the island? if a couple of meters, then this directly confirms my statement

Judge for yourself what is the price of your "approval"

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

I know about this example, no one has yet been able to tell me what was the distance to this shield

Do not consider it commonplace or moral, but my life experience tells me that the person makes the most valuable gifts in life for himself.

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

and I have this tablet.

Wonderful. This is my job - both the table and the text to it.

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

barrel firing with cartridges, if desired, can be carried out at least every day, than the Japanese did

You are mistaken, according to the war diary, between the exit of the battleship "Mikasa" from repair and the Battle of Tsushima, barrel firing was carried out only when it is indicated in the table. Everything is not as simple as you imagine, the event had to be organized.

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

there is such a chapter in "Tsushima" - "6. Checking combat training"

The price of this "infe" is not high, read the War Diary of the battleship "Eagle" or at least a wonderful book about "Sisoy the Great", written on the basis of historical documents, and not rumors or outright lies.

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

barrel firing was carried out almost every day, while 200 to 300 Berdan bullets were shot "

This is data on "Varyag", is there any statistics on battleships?
This is, firstly, and secondly, stem firing, stem firing, and there are differences in the organization.
Apparently, this is exactly what can explain the following historical fact - despite such intensive training, "Varyag" in battle did not achieve a single hit. As well as "Askold", however.

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

FIVE! For all the time at 2 TOE! Against almost every day at 1 TOE!

Do you have a source or document that says that after the opening of hostilities port arthur armadillos and cruisers each spent a day doing barrel firing while consuming 200-300 rounds?

[Andrey Shmelev]

"I told him about Thomas, and he told me about Erema" (proverb).

how does this invalidate the possibility of empirically proving the correctness of my statement?

This is my job - both the table and the text to it

I know, I’m using it with pleasure.

Judge for yourself what is the price of your "approval"

You write:

on an island 73-91 meters long and 18-27 meters wide.

I ask: what is the height?
You answer 35-40 feet. Without other sizes. Can you lay out a scan of the whole ichka so that you can figure it out easier?

Do not consider it commonplace or moral

I will not consider, so far no one has yet announced the range

The price of this "infe" is small

Is there information that the NP in its book has distorted the content of ZPR orders?

This is data on "Varyag", is there any statistics on battleships?

Will seek. There is evidence that only Varyag for 1 TOE was engaged in combat training?
Do not forget about the standards of sub-caliber firing. Which was recommended to be carried out as often as possible.

Do you have a source or document where it says

Do you have a proof of the opposite?

Threat. Have you even held a pneumatic rifle in your hands? If yes, then you cannot help but understand the following: 8000 rounds of ammunition is less than 200 rounds of ammunition per gunner - this is not a professional training at all. This is more than the training of the Soviet army, but less than the training of the Wehrmacht. For an ordinary.

This is an indicator of the very low intensity of training of the commandors in this, at least, direction.

[Andrey Shmelev]

I really apologize for duplicating the comment, but the discussion fell into parallel parts, therefore, I will answer the same objections to both you and the Senior Sailor

proof number 1:

as we can see, when the distance is reduced in arithmetic progression, the reference accuracy of measuring the rangefinder grows exponentially

proof number 2:

as we can see, when reducing the distance in arithmetic progression, the reference accuracy of the guns grows exponentially

[Comrade]

Quote: Andrey Shmelev

A&H writes about the fact that 2 TOE hit more often than 1 TOE, so 2 TOE was better prepared
I write that the increase in 2 TOE hits may be due to different battle conditions, as evidenced by the increase in Japanese hits

You are arguing in vain with a respected Andrei.
Let's compare the artillery preparation of the two flagship battleships, "Tsarevich" and "Prince Suvorov".
a) R. M. Melnikov in the book "Tsarevich". Part I, battleship battleship 1899-1906 "writes:

b) Junior mine officer of the "Prince Suvorov" Lieutenant P. A. Vyrubov 1st wrote in a letter to his father that during the third practice shooting in Madagascar, which took place on January 19, 1905, of six training shells fired by the bow turret of the main caliber, five (83%) hit the shield.
And in total, an armadillo during training firing was released at least magpie training 12 '' shells.

A few words on stem firing at the 2 Pacific Squadron.
The total number of cartridges fired by the "Eagle" in the course of five subcaliber firing reaches 8 pieces.
A cautious conclusion can be drawn, with reservations, of course, that the sub-caliber firing on the Eagle was comparable in intensity to that on the Mikasa.
According to the military diary “Mikasa”, after completion of repairs and partial modernization on February 17 on February 1905, 9 066 bullets were fired from the target in the Tsushima Strait during three-stage training barreled firing at towed targets, of which 2 845 (XNUM%) hit the target. See table opens on click.

This is how Rozhestvensky’s battleships prepared for battle, hence the excellent fire accuracy compared to Vitgeft’s battleships, which were practically not involved in methodological training after the outbreak of war.

[Andrey Shmelev]

of the six training shells fired by the main caliber bow tower, five (83%) hit the shield

I know about this example, no one has yet been able to tell me what was the distance to this shield

One can make a cautious conclusion, with reservations, of course,

and I have this tablet. There is one caveat: stem firing of cartridges, if desired, can be carried out at least every day, which the Japanese did. Unfortunately, we do not have magazines indicating the number of such shootings per 1 TOE and in the NIF for the period 1902-1905, so there is simply nothing to compare with.

That's how the armadillos of Rozhestvensky prepared for battle

there is such a chapter in "Tsushima" - "6. Checking combat training"

[Andrey Shmelev]

We look at the standard:
Annually, the ship performed the following types of practice firing: auxiliary (stem), preparatory (first and second), combat ("roughly-combat"), counter-course (counter-course), from boats and boats. Auxiliary (barrel) firing served to develop and maintain the skills of aiming and aiming from guns. Large-caliber guns were fired with small-caliber projectiles (5 rounds for shooting) from training barrels, from other guns - bullets, from the barrels of Berdan rifles (10 rounds for shooting). The distance when firing (at a shield in the form of an armadillo measuring 4,5x1,8 m) with bullets is 1-4 kb., With shells — 4-10 kb. With these firing (three daytime and one night), the annual course of combat training began, they were obligatory for all artillerymen, from plutong commanders to small-caliber artillery servants, they were recommended to be repeated as often as possible throughout the year.

Compare with preparation for 1 TOE:

"barrel shooting carried out almost every day, while shooting from 200 to 300 Berdan bullets "

Now we look at your argument about 2 TOE

The total number of cartridges fired by the "Eagle" during five sub-caliber firing

FIVE! For all the time at 2 TOE! Against almost every day at 1 TOE!

[Trapperxnumx]

Quote: Comrade

Let's compare the artillery preparation of the two flagship battleships, "Tsarevich" and "Prince Suvorov".

I love your comments. Concise, informative, accurate. Write more often!

[Demagogue]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Demagogue

The fact that Hood, to put it mildly, is not the crown of creation, is extremely vulnerable against Bismarck. Why Andrei is trying hard to prove the opposite is not clear to me.

Because we are talking about the theoretical confrontation of 2 ships (in which Bismarck is, of course, preferable), but about a specific hit, but it was made at a very large angle, which, in general, almost excluded the possibility of hud's cellars hitting across the deck or armored belts.

According to the table given by Jurens, the middle belt breaks through Bismarck’s main caliber at any angle. And the tests of 1920 showed that through it it was elementary to get into the cellar. What is your evidence?

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

It would be interesting to simulate the hits on the Mikasa with arr. 1911 g.

And if you go even further, then shells from Bismarck))

[Victor Leningradets]

I will decipher the meaning:
Could the most advanced shells save Rozhdestvensky from defeat.
By the way, the armor-piercing shell arr. 1911 is geometrically almost identical to the high-explosive arr. 1907 With known assumptions, they can fire from a 12 "cannon model 1892 with an initial speed of about 660 m / s.

[Andrey Shmelev]

Could the most advanced shells save Rozhdestvensky from defeat.

the topic is cool. it turned out when calculating at least "Mikasa" to sink? even arr. 1911?

[Jura 27]

Quote: Andrei Shmelev

Could the most advanced shells save Rozhdestvensky from defeat.

the topic is cool. it turned out when calculating at least "Mikasa" to sink? even arr. 1911?

No. Bad distribution of hits. Or in another way - few hits to get at least one successful hit.

[Andrey Shmelev]

I have the same opinion

[Demagogue]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Demagogue

What is your evidence?

Fir-trees, do I need to write another article on Hood? :))))

According to Hood, everything has already been written))). It is enough to refer to existing sources. At a minimum, why are you not comfortable with an article by Jurens from the International Navy Research Organization? He considers breaking through the middle belt and diving a projectile as equally possible options. The tablet clearly shows that there are questions in the main belt, and the middle one breaks through in any situation.

[Victor Leningradets]

Since I bit you on Jurens, so please:
Penetration of the 178-mm (or 7 ") belt is indeed possible up to the reduced angle of 60 degrees from the normal. This is when the energy of the projectile is completely depleted and its full normalization. After that, it will not be able to do anything but explode in a destroyed form. The course angle of the projectile will be 58 degrees.
The real heading angle of penetration with the preservation of the projectile in a condition suitable for penetrating a bevel is about 53 degrees. Considering that after penetration it is necessary to have a projectile angle of 13,5 degrees reduced to a cross section, such a projectile should exit normally without loss of speed, which is impossible in principle. The German shell due to its armor-piercing tip has a greater tendency to normalize, which inevitably leads to angles of exit from the armor with a component from negative values ​​to angles of about 7 degrees, depending on the course angles. This is clearly not enough to get into the bevel and safe for the main deck.
By the way, when fighting side-by-side, Hood confidently hits the Bismarck slope from a distance of 23 km through the upper belt or the main deck through the upper. So the choice of tactics of the fastest possible rapprochement with the enemy is a very controversial decision of Holland.

[Andrey Shmelev]

After that, he will not be able to tear apart in a destroyed form.

IMHO he will not be able to burst properly in this case

I always proceeded from the fact that the heading angle is less than 45, for example, in your diagram we read "course 260" and "course 218", of course, in practice this could mean a heading angle of 37 and a heading angle of 50, the laying is approximate, and both accurate for good reasons are lost

in the first case, defeat through the upper belt is quite likely, in the second it is excluded, IMHO, something like this

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

Since I bit you on Jurens, so please:
Penetration of the 178-mm (or 7 ") belt is indeed possible up to the reduced angle of 60 degrees from the normal. This is when the energy of the projectile is completely depleted and its full normalization. After that, it will not be able to do anything but explode in a destroyed form. The course angle of the projectile will be 58 degrees.
The real heading angle of penetration with the preservation of the projectile in a condition suitable for penetrating a bevel is about 53 degrees. Considering that after penetration it is necessary to have a projectile angle of 13,5 degrees reduced to a cross section, such a projectile should exit normally without loss of speed, which is impossible in principle. The German shell due to its armor-piercing tip has a greater tendency to normalize, which inevitably leads to angles of exit from the armor with a component from negative values ​​to angles of about 7 degrees, depending on the course angles. This is clearly not enough to get into the bevel and safe for the main deck.
By the way, when fighting side-by-side, Hood confidently hits the Bismarck slope from a distance of 23 km through the upper belt or the main deck through the upper. So the choice of tactics of the fastest possible rapprochement with the enemy is a very controversial decision of Holland.

Why do you immediately set the angle to 60? Hood spun, as it were, trying to level the superiority of Bismarck's suo. It is believed that before the hit, he turned unsuccessfully.

As for the protection of Bismarck, I personally have more faith in Krupp cemented steel. Not to mention the holy Wotan. And Bismarck's cellars were covered with 100-120 mm of armor. And Hood has 2 times less and is poorly located relative to the main belt.

[Victor Leningradets]

The penetration of armor and the behavior of the projectile behind the obstacle is determined by the quality of the armor, projectile, armor-piercing cap, and most importantly, by the angle of encounter. Geometrically summing up the heading angle (we have 37 - 53 degrees), the angle of inclination of the belt (in our aft sections 12 - 14 degrees), the angle of the lines along the belt (we have 5 - 6 degrees). The German shell is lightweight, durable and agile. The "kopf und ring" projectile tip also contributes to normal agility, which, by the way, significantly increases armor penetration. The actual penetration of the projectile, which retains sufficient energy for actions behind the armor, occurs at a course angle of approach of the projectile of 53 degrees. But at the same time, the agile projectile will come out of the armor almost perpendicularly and then follow with an increasing elevation above the main deck. With a decrease in the heading angle, the normalization drops, but all the same, the projectile does not get the required angle to meet the bevel of the main deck. At the same time, keep in mind that you need a fairly direct blow to avoid a ricochet of a sufficiently blunt-headed projectile without an armor-piercing cap. There is no time to mess around, but it is enough to make a couple of charts according to the rules of the scribe and everything will become clear.
To protect Bismarck. That the upper belt of Hood (178 mm), that Bismarck (145 mm) when fighting side-by-side (at traverse angles) is absolutely permeable. At the same time, from large distances, the bevel above the boilers and machines of Bismarck begins to break through at a distance of about 125 cabins, and the horizontal deck through the upper one is even earlier. However, the ZSM for Bismarck is still wider. Than with Hood.
It turns out that the best tactic for Holland was to enter a parallel course at a distance of about 130 cabs. In this case, the number of hits is small, and having 17 trunks against really 8, the British could have succeeded.

[Jura 27]

[/ quote] With a decrease in the heading angle, normalization decreases, but still the shell does not get the necessary angle to meet the bevel of the main deck. At the same time, keep in mind that you need a fairly direct hit to avoid a ricochet of a dumb enough projectile without an armor-piercing cap. [quote]

If you look spatially, then the projectile is not so much normalized to approach the bevel very gently, especially considering the extremely unfortunate slope of the bevel and the material of its manufacture (soft armor steel). Those. there even an armor-piercing cap is not needed for penetration, because the bevel is, in fact, "cardboard" for a German projectile.
And I agree that it is beneficial for the Angles to fight at the distance you specified, for the reasons you indicated, but the Germans have platoon boards and a deck. the defeat of the entrails, depends on the slowing down of the fuses of the British shells.

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

The penetration of armor and the behavior of the projectile behind the obstacle is determined by the quality of the armor, projectile, armor-piercing cap, and most importantly, by the angle of encounter. Geometrically summing up the heading angle (we have 37 - 53 degrees), the angle of inclination of the belt (in our aft sections 12 - 14 degrees), the angle of the lines along the belt (we have 5 - 6 degrees). The German shell is lightweight, durable and agile. The "kopf und ring" projectile tip also contributes to normal agility, which, by the way, significantly increases armor penetration. The actual penetration of the projectile, which retains sufficient energy for actions behind the armor, occurs at a course angle of approach of the projectile of 53 degrees. But at the same time, the agile projectile will come out of the armor almost perpendicularly and then follow with an increasing elevation above the main deck. With a decrease in the heading angle, the normalization drops, but all the same, the projectile does not get the required angle to meet the bevel of the main deck. At the same time, keep in mind that you need a fairly direct blow to avoid a ricochet of a sufficiently blunt-headed projectile without an armor-piercing cap. There is no time to mess around, but it is enough to make a couple of charts according to the rules of the scribe and everything will become clear.
To protect Bismarck. That the upper belt of Hood (178 mm), that Bismarck (145 mm) when fighting side-by-side (at traverse angles) is absolutely permeable. At the same time, from large distances, the bevel above the boilers and machines of Bismarck begins to break through at a distance of about 125 cabins, and the horizontal deck through the upper one is even earlier. However, the ZSM for Bismarck is still wider. Than with Hood.
It turns out that the best tactic for Holland was to enter a parallel course at a distance of about 130 cabs. In this case, the number of hits is small, and having 17 trunks against really 8, the British could have succeeded.

You have a mistake: the upper Hood belt is not 178 mm, but 125 mm. 178 mm is the middle belt. Tests have shown that after breaking through the middle belt of Hood, a shell calmly penetrates 2-3 inches of armor inside the ship, depending on the penetration point, and explodes when it contacts 2 inches of the cellar, detonating it. Bismarck after the upper belt still has 30 + 100 mm in depth, on which the shell detonates, long before the cellar. That is, on the way to the cellars through the upper belt at Hood, the shell will pierce either 5 + 3 inches or 7 + 2. Depending on the belt. Two inches of cellars can be neglected. And Bismarck has 6 + 5. 11 against 8-9. And steel is much better.
And by the number of trunks - is not relevant. Bismarck is many times better suo, or rather she was there. Hood is an English disposable tin can, like everything they do, which this fight has shown.

[Victor Leningradets]

In the feed, the middle belt is the upper one, but this is the terminology, in principle, you are right, if there is a top one, then the middle one is everywhere average. Top belt - 127 mm + 51 mm STS.
I'm tired of the tests, sorry. The tests were carried out at a right traverse angle with the projectile hitting 20 degrees at the head of the fall (the angle of encounter with the board is 32 - 34 degrees to the normal, the 4-chr greenboy projectile with low normalization), so do not pull the owl over the globe. The German projectile will not pierce anything after leaving the middle belt, and the maximum - the ogival part already without a tip will strike on the lower deck. Lay out the diagrams according to the rules of the sketch and you will see for yourself. You will not see - God is with you, I will not discuss any more.
At Bismarck, after breaking into the upper belt, a bevel of 100 mm and a 45 mm vertical bulkhead in the area of ​​cars. Across the decks there is a 50 mm upper one, playing the role of a normalizer and stripper of an armor-piercing tip, and a lower 80 mm above the boilers. Everything is quite astounding over long distances. Why is it many times better than the Bismarck SUAO? The battle didn’t show much. The German battleship confidently fired on defeat only with strictly rectilinear movement.

[Victor Wolz]

Thanks to Andrey for the next work, it was interesting. Everyone who is very interested in the topic of the Russo-Japanese War in general and Tsushima in particular, of course, mainly schizophrenics, we want at heart to find options where the Russian Empire wins, but unfortunately they are not. If you think about victory or a draw, you need to cast a fishing rod before the war. And this applies to the construction of completely different ships, other shells and other commanders. Obviously not Alekseev and Kuropatkin as commanders. At the expense of Tsushima, I think that the squadron should be divided into two or three detachments. The reconnaissance (Svetlana, Almaz, Ural) detachment, along with part of the transports, had to be launched around Japan even to Kamchatka. But armored units had to bypass the Tsushima islands from two sides and preferably at the same time, whoever slipped through it.

[Victor Leningradets]

I warmly support you, I wrote about this in previous comments to articles.
Rozhdestvensky with new battleships and "Pearls" or "Emerald" and destroyers - a breakthrough squad.
Rem with "Oslyabey", "Oleg" and "Aurora" and, for example, "Svetlana" - cruising distraction around Japan.
Bukhvostov with all the old stuff - a squadron of suicide bombers - to Tsushima and to the south, who will flee.

[anzar]

All those who are strongly interested in the topic of the Russo-Japanese war in general and Tsushima in particular, of course mainly schizophrenics

Yes sir :))

At the expense of Tsushima, I think that the squadron should be divided into two or three detachments

So?

http://alternathistory.com/tsusima-moglo-li-byt-po-drugomu-prodolzhenie-4/

[Victor Wolz]

Something like that, maybe wider so that Togo could not have time to intercept the second detachment.

[anzar]

... so that Togo could not have time to intercept the second detachment

The purpose of these maneuvers is not a "heroic breakthrough")) some of the ships somewhere, but a decisive battle with the Japanese in more favorable conditions. After a while, 1 squad will turn "all of a sudden" to the second ...
This circuit is one of several consistent ones there ... The chances are not high, but we, alternative specialists, are such schizophrenics ...)))

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Victor Wolz

All those who are strongly interested in the topic of the Russo-Japanese war in general and Tsushima in particular, of course mainly schizophrenics

Thank you!

[Demagogue]

Quote: Victor Leningradets

In the feed, the middle belt is the upper one, but this is the terminology, in principle, you are right, if there is a top one, then the middle one is everywhere average. Top belt - 127 mm + 51 mm STS.
I'm tired of the tests, sorry. The tests were carried out at a right traverse angle with the projectile hitting 20 degrees at the head of the fall (the angle of encounter with the board is 32 - 34 degrees to the normal, the 4-chr greenboy projectile with low normalization), so do not pull the owl over the globe. The German projectile will not pierce anything after leaving the middle belt, and the maximum - the ogival part already without a tip will strike on the lower deck. Lay out the diagrams according to the rules of the sketch and you will see for yourself. You will not see - God is with you, I will not discuss any more.
At Bismarck, after breaking into the upper belt, a bevel of 100 mm and a 45 mm vertical bulkhead in the area of ​​cars. Across the decks there is a 50 mm upper one, playing the role of a normalizer and stripper of an armor-piercing tip, and a lower 80 mm above the boilers. Everything is quite astounding over long distances. Why is it many times better than the Bismarck SUAO? The battle didn’t show much. The German battleship confidently fired on defeat only with strictly rectilinear movement.

No emotions needed. In order:
1) Regarding the tests. How do you know that the shell hit the hood not at the same angle as in the tests? Hood constantly maneuvered in order to prevent Bismarck from healing, which, according to many, could ultimately turn against the British. I already wrote that Hood could turn unsuccessfully. This is the question of the inefficiency of Bismarck systems. But even if the angle was different, then up to 50 degrees the Bismarck shell surely hits the Hood cellar. These are very good chances.
2) Through the upper bevel 100 + 45, the protection is much more serious than that of Hood. Do you deny it? If we consider the scenario of getting under 50 degrees in the upper belt, get the hood of the Bismarck cellar? And vice versa? And if we consider the middle belt, then Bismarck has only 2 of them and corresponds to the impenetrable main one. You therefore apparently went on to discuss the reservation of the deck? Which can be pierced at a great distance, only Holland knew that this was a bad idea. Therefore, he went to rapprochement. Choosing the lesser of evils. Again, superiority in suo put Bismarck in advance in a winning position.
Speaking of Bismarck deck armor, you mischievously mention it above the boilers, but the cellars are much better protected: 50 + 30 + 100 mm. And they are placed rationally, the chances of defeat are few. At the same time, 50 is a wotan. And we are discussing exactly the fatal hit in the cellar.

[Victor Leningradets]

1) I do not comment anymore, build schemes.
2) What is more serious is that the shell does not allow the citadel. The boilers are disabled at times, the width of the deck above them is greater than that of Hood, and the loss of progress for Bismarck is death. Getting into the Bismarck cellar is not a guarantee of an explosion. The trajectory of the Hood and Prince of Wales shells is more mounted. A side-by-side battle is considered, an etch angle of zero or so.
Bismarck’s main belt is punched, the main belt + bevel is not.
Rapprochement with Bismarck for the British - getting into the zone of breaking through the main belt, barbets and frontal armor of the towers. About the cabin of the Prince of Wales - I am silent. And this is with the invulnerability of the combination of the main belt + bevel of the enemy! Wow the lesser of evils!
Wotan does not possess any magical properties - it breaks through like any homogeneous armor when meeting with the head of a heavy projectile and reflects it when meeting with a revival. It is plastic and does not give secondary fragments, like the armor of the decks of Great Britain and the USA.
Hood is never stronger than Bismarck, but when fighting at a distance of 120 - 130 cub. the British have a chance to disable the enemy (dramatically reduce the course) and finish off in two new battleships

[Demagogue]

Well, here we come to the first significant conclusions. By booking, Bismarck surpasses Hood. And with the denial of this fact, our dispute with Andrei began. That is, the debate on this can be completed. I will only add that for long-distance combat, you do not correctly give protection to boilers: there will be 50 + 30 + 20 + 80, with vertical sections of armor. It’s hard not to touch them at 30 degrees. Still better than Hood, and Wotan is good for protecting the deck from awnings.

[Victor Leningradets]

No difference at an angle of contact of 30 degrees to the horizontal. Will pierce everything. Actually in the final battle, Bismarck received two penetrations through the upper belt and a bevel due to pitching. And so - Bismarck is a very powerful ship, but ZSM under fire 15 "/ L42 Mk-I extends up to 118 cab., And against 14" / L45 Mk-VII up to 129 cab, which is not enough.

[Demagogue]

At 30 degrees - at Bismarck, at least the cellars were decently protected by their location and armor, but everything could not be protected. Bismarck fought one against two. Yes, there was an outdated suo on Hood and he didn’t get anywhere. But the Prince was modernized, and he ended up in Bismarck three times (which, as it were, hints that modern suo helped significantly). There was also a lucky shot with a broken fuel line, too. But if the alignment were 2 by 2, against Bismarck and Tirpitz, for example, then the British have absolutely no chance.

[Navigator_50]

It can be done to a wide range of opinions of SEVERAL REFINEMENTS presented above:
1. 1TOE differed from 2TOE, as a university graduate differs from a freshman .... I argue - 1TOE already fought and fired live shells, and received hits from both torpedoes and shells .. And she saw the hits of her shells and the adversary .. she saw the death of both her own and others (ships and ships, as well as people)! I hope there is no need to explain the difference between the shelled soldiers and the 2TOE storeroom. And they shot better and hit well too. They left the base and fought back - FIGHTED !! That is why the battle in the Yellow Sea was on an equal footing until the command of the 1TOE died;
2. By the way, the reason for the death of the "Hood" in the battle with the "Bismarck" has long been a secret for specialists .. As soon as it became possible, the wreckage was examined and not only by the British ... By the way, you can search the net. The British themselves are bashfully silent about the causes of death, and it is clear why. Of course, no artillery cellar exploded.. Probably one of the first "volumetric" explosions in history took place. No, there were explosions at gunpowder factories, arsenals, etc. (copper forgings and nails on shoes ..). And the coal dust also exploded.
But oil (light Arab) has not yet been classified as dangerous .. caught fire with difficulty, etc.
Before the war, “Hood” underwent modernization - the fuel supply was increased from 4000 tons to 4600 tons, that is, 600 tons were added - these are 10 railway tanks! Given the weight of the additional tanks themselves, the mass of the increase was 800 tons (pipelines, pumps, etc.). So the speed should have dropped !! I had to facilitate other articles of weight loads. The same fuel tanks were taken into account as additional armor protection. It’s not enough .. Then it was decided to increase the capacity of the steam power plant (COP) - oil burned out faster - to heat it up and feed it to the boiler nozzles hot and under pressure ..
And there, to the fuel preparation and fuel supply, and the shell hit .. and fragments - damage to the fuel infrastructure caused the release of finely atomized oil into the compartment and ignition .. A vacuum explosion destroyed the compartment and Hood began to “develop ..”. Intensive oil burning left marks on the casing .. Here ..

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Shturman_50

SEVERAL REFERENCES:

Better not :)))) Such nonsense ...

[Victor Leningradets]

According to the assessment of the explosion of fuel vapors, some admirals after Jutland were in agreement with you. True, a month later they renounced their words.

[Navigator_50]

I take off my hat to the English admirals ... Just 80 years ago, even they did not know about the destructiveness of thermobaric explosions ..
These are not fuel vapors, but atomized hot fuel. And it is established by the British for sure. Knowledge of this appeared after the appearance of submarines .. not immediately, but after studying accidents, fires, etc. Yes, and hydraulic oil gave that even a cocktail. They began to test the oils, add additives. Vot-ss