Natural and artificial obstacles - the mortal enemy of the cavalry
Description of the fight
But the description of this momentous battle in relation to the 28-th DCT (RGVIA. F. 2007. Op. 1. D. 61. CH 2.):
In 5 hours, a brigade under enemy artillery fire crossed the bridge over the r. Stokhod and concentrated in the village Rudka-Chervishche.
The situation was as follows: the enemy occupied the village. Art. Chervishche and Yuzhn. the edge of the forest, which is south of this village and sowing. zapadn. D. Toboly, then his front went through the forest that is western. G. dv. Chervishche and D. Rudka-Chervysche directly to the south to the provincial border, west of the heights. 78,0 and then a sharp turn not east sowing. D. Gelenin to p. Stokhodu. Our infantry (pivotal corps as part of 27 infantry divisions and 1 brigade 1 Siberian rifle division and 73 infantry brigade ranged between Art. Chervishche-Toboly and the very village Toboly; brick factory and the eastern edge of the forest, which is west of the village of Rudka-Chervishche Khut. Chenchelovo, occupied by a team of 2 consolidated. kaz divisions and further south to the heights. 78,0 inclusive, and then east to the river. Stokhoda was located at the position 4-I Finnish Rifle Division, to the west. bank Stokhoda near the village of Rudka Chervishche stood 1-I Orenburg Kaz. battery, and vost. R. The stand (in 1– 1 ½ ver. South-west. High. 71,7) was a 2 heavy battery. Fighting area from the brick factory, which is south of the village. Tobols to the road Rudka-Chervishche hut. Chenchelovo was commanded by the commander of the brigade of the 2 consolidated Cossack division, General Guslavsky, and further south to the height. 78,0 inclusive and east to r. Stokhoda Head of the 4 of the Finnish Infantry Division, General Selivachev. Around 7 hours in the village of Rudka-Chervishche arrived chief of the 2-th consolidated Cossack division, General Krasnov. The General Chief of the unifying action of all the parts located in the Chervishchensky tete-de-pone was not appointed. The general plan of action was developed by the chief of the 4 of the Finnish division, General Selivachev, and reported to the army commander by telephone, and since the telephone did not work from the 4 division headquarters because of damage to the wires, General Selivachev traveled for the purpose to Stodot for the heavy battalion .
According to General Selivachev, the breakthrough indicated in the order of the army commander was hardly feasible, because the dismounted Austrian cavalry on this front was replaced by the German infantry, which had time to dig in and be covered with wire, so he asked to limit the task while expanding Chervishchensky tet-de - from high. 78,0 to height 76,4 t Lv. Otrina (zap. Der. Toboly).
The army commander agreed with this proposal. Returning from the observation point, General Selivachev informed us of a new, more modest task. In 13 hour. The commander of the brigade, Colonel Yakushov, received a telephone message from the commander of 4 of General Gelenschmidt's cavalry corps that he had to send a rifle regiment of Colonel Mikhailov from the reserve of the Army Commander. This telephone message was compiled in the following expressions: “To enhance your actions, it was sent from the reserve of the Army Commander 4-th Siberian regiment arrived to Griva. Upon arrival, Rudka-Chervishche will definitely require the most active actions to complete the task set by my 8907 number. Your energetic movement on 76,4 and on Chenchelovo will draw the flank of the Finders. Slowness will give the enemy dig in and intensify. General Krasnov with all parts fully support the blow 8914 you are delivering. Gelendshmidt.
From the 27 regiment, the 1 platoon was equipped with workers to arrange the passage in the former Austrian wire fences and trenches located in 150 - 200 steps to the south-west of the southern edge of the village. Rudka-Chervyshche. In the 4 th Siberian rifle regiment from the 27 regiment an officer was sent to communicate with instructions to monitor the development of the advance of the infantry and to report on everything in detail. The commanders of rifle regiments were to inform General Krasnov about the beginning of the attack by telephone. In 15 hours artillery preparation began.
Opponent artillery responded weakly. The brigade was in full readiness for the attack, and the attack had to be carried out by echelon (waves) on 2 hundreds in each echelon in the head of the 27 regiment. At 16 ½, our infantry and squad went on the offensive; from the headquarters of the 4 Infantry Division and the officer of the 27 regiment stationed for communication in the 4 Siberian Infantry Regiment information was received to General Krasnov that the shooters were successfully advancing, the first line of trenches was being taken, machine guns were taken, the number of which had not yet been clarified and then crawled to the barriers and cut the wire.
Subsequent reports did not mention machine guns. In 18 hours of 50 minutes, the artillery fire of an enemy of heavy and light batteries on the advancing chains of our infantry was noticeably weakened. All who are in the village. Rudka-Chervyshche, it was obvious that the moment of the attack was ripe.
At the beginning of the 20 hour, shouts of infantry were heard: “Cavalry Ahead”, picked up by a ribbon of a large number of wounded, returning to the village. Rudka-Chervyshche. The senior adjutant of the 2 consolidated division received a confirmation by telephone that our infantry shouted “cavalry forward” from Chenchelovo. General Krasnov ordered the brigade to quickly advance in the direction of the village of Chenchelovo and develop the success achieved by the infantry.
The first from the village jumped out of the 27 regiment to direct the strike of the brigade, followed by hundreds of reconnaissance 1 Volga Regiment, and then 27 and 28 regiments. Hundreds had to debush out of the southern outskirts of the village. Rudka Chervyshche and a narrow passage made in Austrian wire fences located in 150 - 200 steps southwest. this village.
Before the hundreds of 27 regiments were able to break free, German airplanes discovered our intention and, sending a signal to their batteries, began to drop bombs and bombard the defile we’re debuffing with machine guns. Heavy battery on the same defile opened a fierce fire. At that moment, one of the heavy shells killed a sentry, a denominator and a sentry officer were wounded, and two other sentries and an assistant were seriously contused, and the 8 banner was pierced with fragments of this shell in the 28 field. Despite the fierce fire of the enemy, after just ten minutes, the 6-e echelons deployed to attack, having the 27 regiment to the left, and 28 to the right of the dor. Rudka-Chervishche-Chenchelovo, in the general direction to the khut. Chenchelovo.
Jumping close to the eastern edge of the forest, that zap. der. Rudka-Cervice, the first echelon of the 27 regiment, rested against impassable swamps. 4 hundred 27 regiment located in the last 2-x echelons took to the left and went in the direction of the height 78,0 Ivankovo. 3 hundreds of 28 regiment also rested in the swamp, and the rest went right along the road to Ur. Chase. Hundreds of 27 regiments heading for heights. 78,0 passed through the chains of their infantry, which shouted to them: “wherever you rush, the enemy has not yet been knocked out of the trenches”, but met with strong fire from the enemy’s heavy and light artillery and machine guns, and seeing German trenches entangled in wire, they backed away a little.
Hundreds of 28 regiments marching along the road to Ur. Pogon, passing infantry chains also stumbled upon German trenches with wire obstacles and met with fierce machine-gun fire from the enemy, were forced to go back. Several horses enthusiastic for a rapid attack ahead, having lost their riders hung on the enemy's wire obstacles.
Convinced of the untimely and fruitlessness of the cavalry attack and, in order not to make an unprofitable impression of their infantry with their withdrawal, the brigade was ordered to dismount, joining the chains of infantry, to conduct a firefight, which was done.
About the result of the attack in 19 hour. 30 min. the commander of the brigade was sent a report to General Krasnov, who soon sent him an order to report to him personally. At 21, by the order of General Krasnov, the brigade commander gave orders to his deputy, Colonel Pivovarov, at nightfall, to assemble the entire brigade in small units on foot. Rudka-Chervyshche, to the reserve of General Krasnov. During the day of the loss, the following figures were expressed: 1 officer was contused, 18 was killed by lower ranks, 103 was wounded and contused; horses killed 67, injured 69. "
We see that enemy fire of all kinds could not delay and restrain a Cossack attack (Donts even had to turn around for an attack under artillery fire and an air strike) - it was stopped only by unbroken artificial obstacles, primarily wire obstacles.
And 6 of August of the same year, hundreds of 16 and 17 of the Don Cossack regiments were also there, at Rudka-Chervishche they were deployed under the fire of bombs and machine guns of three German airplanes, which fell so much that they could see the machine guns and the faces of the pilots. But the attack still took place - moreover, over bridges and gatiyam, in a column of three, one and two each. The Cossacks jumped into their own breakthroughs and enemy wire barriers, jumped through the trenches and struck a cruel blow to the Austrians, taking prisoners and a machine gun. But they also stopped in swamps and forests - before the second line of enemy trenches. Esaul 17 General Baklanov Don Cossack Regiment F. Korshunov became Knight of St. George weapons for the fact that “in the 6 battle of August 1916 of the year near the village of Rudka-Chervyshche, commanding hundreds in the equestrian ranks, under the devastating fire of the enemy, attacked the enemy infantry and, despite being wounded, continued to attack, first to break into the enemy trench” .
1 — The Prerequisite for an Effective Mounted Attack — Cavalry-Access Terrain
So, we see that the first most important prerequisite for a successful horse attack is terrain that does not hamper the maneuverability of cavalry - a clean field, the absence of formidable or insurmountable obstacles. The terrain must be under the force of both horses and riders. So, for example, the attack of Kizlyar-combmen and Dagestanis, thrown at the German infantry from a five-kilometer distance in the village of Neple in August 1915, was scattered, and the attackers suffered very heavy losses not because the Germans were fiercely strong, but because the weak exhausted and insufficiently trained horses could not ride 5 km along smelted viscous fields, sometimes swamped, and stood up. The attack barely moved, representing at the last moment not a formidable, but a pitiful sight - and the Germans quietly shot the Cossacks (their own infantry did not support the Cossacks, leaving them to themselves).
An eyewitness observed the field of attack of the New-Mirgorod ulans on the village of Volchetsk, June 24 of 1916, just a few hours after the attack. Ulan corpses and horses lay mainly along two ditches, not wide, but with steep steep banks, dug along houses. Here the horses hardened, it happened that they threw themselves. And these suspended horsemen and their horses were killed from the windows of houses by German infantrymen. Where the field was clear, the attack swept almost without loss.
To be continued ...
- Oleynikov Alexey
- Business card of the imperial cavalry. Russian cavalry attacks in the First World War
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