APKR "Severodvinsk" handed over to the Navy with critical for combat effectiveness
Admiral A.A. Popov
In an interview with K. Drobot, Chief Designer of OAO GNNP Region the newspaper "Izvestia" 24.04.2019 was given evidence to support the author’s earlier assumptions about serious problems with the weapons complex of the newest nuclear submarine cruiser (APCR) “Severodvinsk” (project 885 “Ash”).
- Considering that the problem is solved on a surface ship, it can be solved for a submarine. But it’s too early to disclose the details.
"Cardboard Protection"
Apparently, Mr. Drobot should be reminded that:
According to the statement of execution ... delivery of equipment BKASU "Okrug-L" to ensure SHI Order No. 160", Term - to 30.09.2010 g.
Decision of 04 February 2013 for the case No. А40-145774 / 2012 .
The 160 order is APKR “Severodvinsk” (885 “Ash” project).
The name of the theme “Flipper”, to create active anti-torpedo protection means (PTZ), has been known since the 90s. from the books of the admiral fleet Captain.
Conclusion from the materials of the arbitration case: the 885 project was supposed to have anti-torpedo ammunition. Technically, at the time of 2013-2011. it was absolutely real.
The acceptance act of the AICR “Severodvinsk” was signed on December 30 2013, with the complicity of the then commander-in-chief of the Navy V. V. Chirkova.
Considering the frankly scandalous circumstances of its signing and the “situation” on the 160 order, the rise of the naval flag to the APCRR “Severodvinsk” was delayed, but still 17 took place on June 2014.
APKR "Severodvinsk" in the Navy for five years, however, as follows from the interview with Mr. Drobot "Izvestia", the situation with anti-torpedoes looks like "the task can only be solved" (despite the fact that it began to be solved at the end of 80 ., and the first successful targeting of prototypes of anti-torpedoes took place back in 1998.).
This is confirmed by the latest materials of arbitration courts:
The Ministry of Defense and OAO GNPP Region have concluded a state contract No. X / 01.11.2013 / 1 / 6 / 0577 K-1-DGOZ from 13 for the design and implementation of Lasta.
... the works on stage No. 6 OCD have not been completed and the Customer has not been handed over, the delay is 655 days.
Decision of 27 February 2018 in case No. А40-161729 / 2017.
All this means that the state contract on Laste 1993 was disrupted, and the government contract with the State Research and Production Production Enterprise Region was also renegotiated at the end of 2013 (Krylov I.V., General Director).
There is no active anti-torpedo protection (anti-torpedo) provided for in the Severodvinsk project.
In this case, our submarines actually have no effective passive anti-torpedo protection (means of hydroacoustic counteraction, SGPD), in the sense of effective, against modern torpedoes, SGPD.
Rear Admiral Retired A. Lutsky ("Sea Collection" No. 7 for 2010):
Today, what Lutsky wrote about in 2010 was in the GOZ and delivered to the Navy (at the extremely high cost of the products themselves). “It could happen” only with forgery with tests, for example, holding them against obviously outdated torpedoes. I am sure: there was not a single test of the “newest” PTZ complex developed by the SPPM “Malachite” against new torpedoes.
Does the general director of SPBM Malachite Dorofeyev know about this? Of course.
At the same time, in the mass of advertising publications (and at the budget expense), he tells the society and the leadership how we supposedly “everything is very wonderful” with new submarines.
I emphasize that the author’s opinion on this complex is quite competent, and, moreover, at the request of the head of the marine underwater service weapons The Navy of Taran’s author in January 2015 made a short (literally on 1 sheet in tabular form) analysis of the problems of this complex with suggestions for solving them. The document was also transferred to the Malakhit SPBM, the chief designer for armaments in the city of Nikolaev. Reaction:
Those. what to do is clear. Only for this you need to recognize the problem. But with this the officials are very hard. And today, in addition to the already “plowed up” earlier on the dead-end direction of OCR billions, the same thing is done in the series.
The modern development of the Malakhit SPBM for PTZ is obviously ineffective and preserves the critical lag of the Russian Navy in this extremely important segment of weapons and military equipment (IWT).
Where did the author information? Yes, from the publications of the “technical details” in the special press of SPhMM “Malachite” itself!
We have almost completely destroyed (including under the pretext of pseudo-secrecy) discussions on concepts, development trends of weapons and military equipment, while the mass of “technical information” on special systems (including the latest and under development) is freely available.
What is characteristic, in the USA, the approach to limiting information is just the opposite: they have serious discussions on concepts and directions, but they very tightly close the “technical details”.
All this means that there is no effective anti-torpedo protection of our submarines and in the near future it will not.
In the "tank-land language": the armed forces were surrendered "Tanks”With“ cardboard armor ”, which the country spent just colossal funds on (construction of extremely expensive AIC projects of“ Ash ”and“ Borey ”without elementary protection). The military and those who had handed over industry were well aware of their “cardboard” nature. Moreover, there is no doubt that if the real situation had been brought to the supreme commander in chief, the issue would have been resolved in a year, at most two (because there are no technical problems).
It is very appropriate to recall a similar example in the Army (ended, very differently than in the Navy):
You still need to reach the point of the volley ...
Yes, the 885 project has a powerful missile system. However, it is necessary to objectively understand that its capabilities are at the level of the 2-3 long-range bombers (while the Caliber cruise missiles (CR) are significantly inferior to the X-555 bombers of the Kyrgyz Republic), and are significantly inferior to the 949AM project (and the PLARC "Ohio" US Navy).
However, it is also necessary to reach the point of the volley. And given the fact that the antisubmarine defense of the enemy begins from our bases, the probability of this for us is much closer to zero than to one.
In addition, the problems of protection are not the only problems of our submarine forces.
According to the ancient complex of underwater weapons in our “newest” 4 generation from one of its developers:
And this is only a small part of the real acute problems of our submarine shipbuilding, problems that are vigorously concealed and hidden in reports to the leadership of the country and the armed forces.
In a number of publications on the subject of anti-torpedoes, the author called what happened with "anti-torpedo sabotage." And that was exactly the case!
More specifically, it all started in 2003.
At first, tests were carried out on Ladoga, after which it became obvious to the specialists and the leadership of the Malachite SPBM that the “promising” PTZ complex (the lead developer of the Malachite SPBM) not only “everything is bad” with new torpedoes, but also with old, soft speaking, it is not clear that. For in the ideology of the construction and application of this complex were laid fundamental errors.
Where does the author know all this? From publications in a special open press. Of course, there were no “scary words” like “torpedo”. But even if the technical text and test data "shells" called "cucumbers", experts still understand what is at stake.
I stress once again: what Lutsky wrote about 2010 in “Malachite” (and its contractors) was definitely known from 2003. However, budget billions were actively not only learning about dead-ends, but topics that were left “naked” before our opponent’s weapon
In 2003, the author, while training as part of a crew at the Obninsk Navy Training Center, during the development of a naval combat crew for overcoming mine obstacles from the Keptor mines, thought about the active destruction of its torpedoes with its torpedo salvo (with the corresponding shooting installations).
The study of the question was not abstract, the staff was trained, time was spent, calculations were made (for this it was necessary to go to the native school, to the special department).
With all this, the author arrived at the Directorate of Anti-submarine Weapons (UPV) of the Navy, from where he was sent to the State Scientific Production Enterprise "Region". Prior to this, anti-torpedo knew about our development only from the books of Captain.
With all the primitiveness of the “initial proposals”, the issues of PTZ in them were considered much more extensively, more comprehensively than was done within the framework of “Fins” in the “Region”. Moreover, a number of extremely important issues in general fell out of the attention of the developers (GNNP Region and SPbM Malakhit) and turned out to be just a shock for them.
It was a shock to say about it officially out loud and loudly, it turned out to be just scary.
General Designer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau Baranov I.L., on the same issues, in the author's documents on the complex modernization of 3 generation boats (2006):
To which he was told:
After 2003, Malachite began to “look for a way out” and “take certain measures”. However, the problem is that the matter is not in “certain wrong technical solutions, our mistakes in this regard are inherent in the wrong principled approaches, including approved in the guidelines for the creation of submarines. Those. problems need to be opened to the full depth and by all (all organizations, including those with the Krylovsky State Research Center, central organizations responsible for developing the regulatory framework, etc.).
What do we have in the end?
The country has invested in huge submarines just huge funds. The Borey-Bulava program turned out to be the most expensive in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. There are no technical problems to have effective underwater weapons and countermeasures, and this does not require any exorbitant means.
However, these The “newest” submarines are simply “naked” in front of the enemy’s weapons, while they themselves have a lot of flaws and flaws in their underwater weapons.
What is their combat capability?
Yes, "Onyxes", "Calibres" fly. "Mace" - the same. Periodically.
But back to the "tank analogy." If the “tank” fires a gun (“high-explosive, and at a great distance”), but it has “cardboard armor,” can it be considered “combat-ready”? Obviously not.
Then why are submarine forces of the Navy, having “cardboard” protection and underwater weapons, considered as such?
Должностные лица
The above critical problematic issues of our submarine forces are not versions, but facts. Facts about which the responsible officials both in the Navy and in the military-industrial complex cannot be unaware.
Obviously, there are a number of very serious questions to the ex-director of the Department of the shipbuilding industry and marine engineering of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and now the first vice-president of USC, Mr. Strugov.
And questions to the member of the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation Pospelov V.Ya. (since May 2006, before that, he served as Director General of the Russian Shipbuilding Agency).
It was the “tandem” of Pospelov and Strugov that defined the “technical policy” in our shipbuilding (and the underwater weapons of ships) for the last two decades. Moreover, according to Pospelov, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that he is not just listed on the boards of directors of a whole number of OPK organizations, but very closely monitors all topics and processes and directly affects them.
Those. Pospelov is a person who knows everything perfectly.
Question: where are the solutions to these problems? And especially when solutions do not have technical difficulties, but require only tough organizational measures, which, however, for a long time “for some reason” are not taken, and the “newest” ships surrender or are limited in fighting capacity (or not capable at all)?
Call things by their proper names. The only bright spot of our newest shipbuilding is the frigate “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Pots”, and not only in its characteristics, but also in the principal position of the customer to eliminate the problems of the defense industry.
At the same time, it is necessary to objectively understand that a significant part of Gorshkov’s problems was the result of the terrible underfunding of surface shipbuilding in previous years, which even according to the priority R & D project 22350 forced to shift the “critical” work to the later stages of ship creation.
And one of the main reasons for this underfinancing is the unrestrained “swelling” of funds into the sub-melt, and without solving its critical problems of combat capability.
Not having solved the problems of the 4 generation, we have already begun an active “budget funds utilization” for the fifth!
At the same time, the program of modernization and medium repairs of 3 generation boats was disrupted. And this is after the fleet and the country in the middle of the 2000 were almost lost at the depth of a Kursk boat! The crew’s guilt was not only not in this; moreover, only his quick and professional actions allowed the boat to “get out” from the “other world”. The reason - the failure to carry out repairs (and it is medium repairs).
With high probability, from the Supreme Fleet in the person of the Commander-in-Chief Kuroyedov, he hid it. And what about the defense industry? Yy Strugov and Pospelov reported this to the president (prime minister)?
A separate issue is the figure of the current "chief adviser" to the president of USC JSC, Mr. V. Chirkov. (ex-GK Navy). He knew about all the above problems. Nevertheless, the act on the APCR “Severodvinsk” was signed (as well as a whole series of other gross “errors” of Chirkov at the GK position: patrol ships of the 22160 project, corvettes of the 20386 project, etc.), and now the city of Chirkov is fine feels in the defense system.
Tellingly, the real work on solving the problems of the Gorshkov frigate went after Chirkov left his seat in the Admiralty.
And the current commander in chief Korolev? As they say, “I had the intention to change everything,” and there was a certain positive (the same “Gorshkov”). But…
The man who knew him well:
As Commander-in-Chief, Korolyov completely and unconditionally lost to industry (a small “wagering” was at the expense of Gorshkov and Polimen-Reduta, where the industry was still forced to bring work to an acceptable result, but then it was all lost by the “acceptance” of 22160 ships and epic with highly questionable project 20386).
Apparently, in order not to lose, one still needed to be a “rude”, because tough and decisive actions by the commander-in-chief of the Navy were necessary.
It is appropriate to recall the good Article Rear Admiral Y. Kirillov, retired.
Indeed, and how much the effectiveness of defense depends on the dignity of a commander, general, or admiral. It is not a secret that in these times, about the end of which we have not yet been informed, the majority of even very capable military commanders went into the commanding offices with their opinions, and left with a stranger, his opinion. That is the tragedy.
What is necessary?
Note: The author considers the extremely difficult question of the interaction between the Navy and the Ministry of Defense to be considered in a separate article on the Navy.
It should be noted that the fleet does not have control over defense enterprises through military acceptance (which is not subordinate to it). In this situation, the only way to know the situation, influence it and control it can only be the creation of a system for conducting objective tests of VVT of the Navy.
The key issue of the prospects and relations of the Navy with the military-industrial complex is the creation of a full-fledged test system of weapons and military equipment of the Navy.
What we have now is the profanation of such, generously “seasoned” with deliberate frauds and frauds. And so it is almost everywhere in the Navy, even with relatively prosperous missilemen: at least once the newest Navy air defense systems fired at real simulators of the latest US Navy anti-ship missiles LRASM for such purposes)?
For underwater weapons we have - just dark. Yes, it is not everywhere. There are exceptions, and for the same “Package”, and “Ichthyosaur” ... but these exceptions in fact only confirm the state of the state with the Navy test system.
Development of new torpedoes (their homing systems) and countermeasures should be carried out comprehensively and jointly.
It seems to be the obvious solution. However, the proposals on it, repeatedly and in detail set forth in a number of documents by the author and other initiative officers, cause categorical rejection (up to hysterics, “well, no such tests should be done !!!”).
The reason is simple: the results of objective tests will be simply devastating and scandalous for a number of products and complexes, chiefs and “specialists” who participated in all this.
Here, by the way, an important clarification on anti-torpedoes is needed: the categorical need to conduct real tests with the actual destruction of an attacking torpedo, and not their imitation by “simulators”.
In the defense industry "even more fun." Objectively, the greatest experience today in creating modern CLS torpedoes is in the possession of specialists from GNPP “Region”. The issues of development by them (and people were ready to work initiative and optional) in the "Region" of modern SFGS were raised many times. For a company located at the end of 2000-x - the beginning of 2010-x. in a difficult financial situation, it was a quick and effective solution to many problems. However, the “position” of the chief designer of Drobot was:
I really want to think that such a “strange” position of the chief designer of the enterprise was not related to the fact that he “part-time” was a member of the board of directors of a rival firm, who considered the subject of the CSTD to be “his patrimony”.
Finally, the main thing: Will we have an admiral who can objectively uncover existing problems, toughly raise questions and get them resolved by the defense industry and the structures of the Ministry of Defense and the Navy?
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