The “Grand Fleet” of the USSR: scope and price
Thousands tanks, dozens of battleships. In the previous article, we focused on the fourth shipbuilding program of the USSR, adopted in 1936 and designed for the period 1937-1943. It was distinguished by two characteristic features: it was the first Soviet program for the construction of the "Big fleet"And ... the last program to create a" Big Fleet ", approved in the pre-war USSR.
As mentioned earlier, the reasons that prompted the leadership of the Country of the Soviets to begin creating the most powerful navy are quite understandable and logical. The country was in political isolation, and sea power was a powerful diplomatic argument, because no one could afford to ignore the political views of a first-class maritime power. In addition, the military industry seemed to have reached an acceptable level by 1936 and did not require multiple growth, and the second five-year plan was completed much more successfully than the first. In general, “above” it seemed that a large shipbuilding program was quite capable of us, and at the same time, the country's leadership experienced a real need for a powerful fleet.
Alas, as we now know, the capabilities of the domestic industry turned out to be extremely overvalued, and the construction of 533 warships with a total displacement over 1,3 million tons. For some 10 years it was completely beyond its power. Thus, the execution of the resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (STO) No. OK-95ss “On the shipbuilding program for 1936” has “stalled” literally from the very beginning of its adoption.
This program itself was a common document, and provided for the construction of X-type battleships A and 8 type B battleships, 16 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 17 destroyers, 128 large, 90 medium and 164 small submarines. Its implementation was to be specified by the relevant resolutions of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which set specific tasks for the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and other structures participating in the creation of the fleet for one or two years in advance. And so, the first such resolution was the 90 adopted on July 16, the document “On the Large Marine Shipbuilding Program”, which specified the procedure for creating the “Big Fleet” for the next 1936 of the year. According to him, in 2-1937. the shipbuilding industry had to lay the 38 battleship type "A", four - type "B", 4 light cruisers and leaders, 8 destroyers and 114 submarines. At the same time, all 123 battleships were to be operational already in 8 year!
It is interesting, although this does not apply to the topic of the article, that the SRT attached great importance to the unification of ships under construction. The battleships of projects "A" and "B" were still to be developed, and in the future, "B" was abandoned in favor of the ship of type "A", light cruisers were to be built according to the project "Kirov", the leaders - on the project 20I (the famous "blue cruiser "" Tashkent "), destroyers - project 7, submarines - type" K "of the XIV series, type" C "of the IX series, and" M "of the XII series as large, medium and small submarines, respectively.
Alas, the reality turned out to be extremely far from the expectations of the Soviet leadership, because problems arose literally at every turn. So, for example, from the battleships planned for the construction of 8, 7 was supposed to be laid in 1937 and one more in the next 1938. However, in fact, only two ships of this class were built in the specified period: the “Soviet Union” was laid 15 July, and “Soviet Ukraine” - October 31 1938. The light cruisers were laid in half less than planned, even if “set off” the laid out 20 December 1936, “Maxim Gorky”. Not a single leader was laid: but for the destroyers, the tab in 1936 was as much as the 47 of the “sevens” deliberately surpassed and overwhelmed the capabilities of our industry. A number of these ships were put into operation as early as the war, and some were generally dismantled on the stocks. In general, no destroyer was laid at all in 1937, and in 1938 only 14 ships of this class can be counted, reloaded from the 7 project according to the improved 7 project.
On the one hand, of course, one would like to be surprised by the incompetence of the people responsible for developing the shipbuilding program and “linking” it with the domestic industry. Literally everything was missing, from metal and armor to artillery and turbines. But on the other hand, it should be understood that in addition to the incorrect assessment of the growth prospects of our industry, other factors also played a role, which were quite difficult to foresee initially.
For example, according to the program, it was intended to build type-A battleships with a standard displacement in 35 000 t. This decision was due to the desire to adhere to the existing international agreements regarding maritime arms race restrictions, although, strictly speaking, the USSR was not a participant in such contracts and had no obligations for them. At the same time, in the USSR for a long time no large warships were created or even designed. But, obviously, it was assumed that if the leading world powers have already limited the displacement of 35 battleships, thousand tons, then they know what they are doing, and the creation of balanced ships in such dimensions is quite possible.
However, it quickly became clear that the battleship with 406-mm guns, somehow effectively protected from the effects of artillery of its caliber, and at the same time developing a more or less acceptable speed, categorically does not want to be “rammed” into 35 000 t. So the initial design of the battleship of type “A” in the middle of 1937, was sent back for revision (like the battleship of type “B”), after which, as the RKKF’s requirements were met, the ship’s abruptly “crawled” upward displacement, quickly reaching 45 first, and then and 55-57 KT. But what does this mean for the core an engineering industry?
In 1936, the USSR had all the same 7 stocks, on which Tsarist Russia built its own battleships. At the same time, on the 4 Baltic stocks, on which, before the First World War, Izmail had built battle cruisers in 32 500 tons (true, this was normal, not standard displacement), the tab of battleships in 35 KT was not particularly difficult. Apparently, the same was true of the Black Sea slipways. But the increase in displacement of the battleships led to the fact that all of them turned out to be completely inadequate and began to require extensive upgrades. Moreover, the increase in displacement naturally led to an increase in mass and precipitation of the ship during launching, and it turned out that the new battleships simply do not have enough water area - it was necessary to carry out expensive dredging works ... Thus, even in cases where the problem was solved (in this case, permission to increase the displacement) could be so that it only entailed a whole “heap” of new difficulties.
It would seem that, faced with an obvious failure, the leadership of the USSR would have to temper the appetites and return their shipbuilding programs to the limits of what is really achievable. However, nothing of the kind happened: since 1936, military shipbuilding planning proceeded along two parallel paths. Sailors, under the patronage of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov formed more and more ambitious programs: for example, the “Plan for the construction of warships of the Naval Forces of the Red Army”, submitted to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, who at that time was the chairman of the SNK 7 September 1937, assumed the construction of 599 ships with a total displacement of 1,99 million tons! The corresponding figures for the previous program were surpassed by 12,3% and 52,2%, respectively. According to this document, it was planned to build 6 type A battleships, 14 B type, 2 aircraft carrier, 10 heavy and 22 light cruisers, 20 leaders and 144 destroyers, 375 submarines! The next iteration proposed in 1938 was significantly reduced by ships (424 units), but their total displacement remained at the same level - 1,9 mln. Tons. Finally, 14 June 1939, the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov submits to the SNK the monstrous “10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships”, according to which the country needed to build 1948 ships of main classes and 696 small ships (torpedo boats, minesweepers, submarine hunters, etc.) before the inclusive 903. cumulative displacement over 3 million tons!
At the same time, such plans were approved by the leadership of the country, but ... they were not approved. Unfortunately, many lovers of naval stories misleading the phrase from the source to the source stating that the “10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships” was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov. Nikolai Gerasimovich really endorsed this document, but you need to understand that his signature means only that the People's Commissar of the Navy agrees with this plan and recommends it for approval by higher authorities. But to approve it "for execution" N.G. Kuznetsov, of course, could not, because it was far beyond his authority. Approve documents of this kind could only STO, or, later, the Committee of Defense at SNK of the USSR, well, or the Council of People's Commissars. What to I.V. Stalin, he endorsed these programs, but also did nothing to turn them into a guide to action.
But then on the basis of what were warships laid at all? In essence, this was the case. All the above plans were, if I may say so, some kind of super-goal, which, of course, it would be great to achieve, someday, in a bright socialist future. And the actual construction of warships was carried out (and controlled) on the basis of annual plans, which were drawn up by the Navy Commissariat, agreed with the shipbuilding industry and approved by higher authorities. And these plans were much more realistic than the "software" hundreds of ships and millions of tons of displacement.
Let us explain this with a simple example, namely: we quote the Decree of the Defense Committee at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. XXUMXCC “On approval of the NKVMF order plan for shipbuilding, ship repair, parts and equipment for 21 g” In 1940 g it was planned to transfer to the fleet:
Cruisers - 3 units, including one project 26 and two - 26-bis;
Destroyers of destroyers - 1 units. project 38 "Leningrad";
Destroyers - 19 units, including 1 experimental, 4 project 7 and 14 - 7U;
Submarines - 39 units, including 4 large type “K” XIV series, one underwater mine layer “L” of series XIII bis, 14 medium type “C” series IX bis, 5 - medium type “U” X series, and finally , 15 small type "M" XII series - 15;
Minesweepers - 10 units, including 2 59 project, 2 58 project and 6 53 project.
As well as 39 smaller warships and boats. But this is to transfer from the previously started construction, but for us the most interesting are those that were planned to be laid in 1940. Here is a short list of them:
Battleships - 1 units, project 23;
Cruisers - 2 units, project 68;
Leaderboard - 4 units, 48 project;
Destroyers - 9 units 30 project;
Submarines - 32 units, including 10 medium type “C” series IX bis, 2 - medium type “U” X series, 13 small type “M” XII series and 7 - small type “M” XV series;
Minesweeper - 13 units 59 project;
And also 37 small warships and boats.
In other words, we see that according to the plan for 1940, there is even a slight decrease in the number of ships in the building. Yes, of course, one more (fourth) battleship of the 23 project is added, but it is expected to complete the construction of 3 cruisers, 19 destroyers and 39 PL, and only 2, 9 and 32 ships are laid, respectively.
In general, we can talk about this. The construction program of the “Big Fleet”, approved in 1936, was distinguished by clarity and clarity on the types of ships that should have been built, but otherwise consisted of only minuses. It was unbalanced, impossible for domestic industry, and the types of ships in its composition were not optimal. Already the first steps to implement this program in 1937. faced with insurmountable difficulties. Thus, it became clear that the country needed a completely different program, and it was not at all about “playing around” with the numbers in the “battleships” or “cruiser” columns. It was necessary to determine the future composition of the fleets, the performance characteristics of future ships, to bring them together with the capabilities of the Ministry of Industry, but not those that it currently has, and taking into account the build-up of the latter during the implementation of the shipbuilding program ... In general, if briefly, it turned out that not that execution, but even planning such a program is still too difficult for us. Nevertheless, the country's leadership believed that the ocean fleet of the USSR was necessary, which meant that it should be started to build - even gradually, and not in the quantity that the naval commanders and the leadership of the country would like to see.
And that is exactly what was done. I.V. Stalin fully encouraged the creation of "megalomaniac" military shipbuilding plans in 2-3 mln. Tonnes of aggregate displacement, because during their creation the national naval thought developed, the number of ships and their performance characteristics specified by the fleet, etc., but these the plans were essentially theoretical. But the real shipbuilding after errors 1937 g. Tried as much as possible to tie to the capabilities of our industry. But at the same time, the leadership of the USSR did not at all try to “stretch its legs” according to its clothes and set extremely difficult tasks for domestic shipbuilding, which often turned out to be on the verge of or even beyond its capabilities.
That is, I.V. Stalin, the Council of People's Commissars, etc. in fact, they did the following - on the one hand, they provided the domestic industry with resources for a significant expansion of its capabilities, but on the other hand, they presented it with the most difficult tasks that they had to cope with in a short time, and controlled their execution. I would like to note that this principle of “carrots and sticks” even today represents an excellent development strategy for any single enterprise or industry as a whole, and one can only regret that our modern management has abandoned these generally simple management principles.
Today they say a lot that the construction of battleships and heavy cruisers in the prewar period was a mistake, for a number of reasons, of which there are two main ones. Firstly, this construction was not provided with the capabilities of the industry - for example, there was not enough capacity for armor production, and, for example, the main caliber of the heavy cruisers Kronstadt and Sevastopol existed only in the form of wooden models even when the ships were already in full were built. And secondly, the creation of large surface ships led to the diversion of resources from more important, higher priority programs. After all, for example, the planned cost of the battleship of the project 23 exceeded 1,18 billion rubles. and you can be firmly convinced that if the battleships were completed, then in fact it would be significantly higher than the plan.
We will understand first with the first question. It is known that the battleship in those years was still the most complex engineering structure, perhaps the most complex of all that humanity created at that time. In a series of articles devoted to the T-34 tank, the author repeatedly referred to technical problems that accompanied the production of these combat vehicles and showed how much work had to be applied in order to start production of technically reliable tanks. It took years, but we are talking about a product weighing 26,5 tons - what can we say about a steel monster with a weight of 60 000 tons? In other words, it was not enough to design a perfect battleship and separate weapons systems and mechanisms for it: truly titanic efforts were needed to organize its creation, after all, thousands of tons and names of complex mechanisms had to be produced and supplied for its construction on time. The idea was to link the work of hundreds of different factories and industries into a single whole: neither tsarist Russia nor the USSR built anything of the kind, after all, the battleships of the Russian Empire were much smaller and simpler in design, but there was also more than 20 -year break in their construction ...
In general, there was no point in waiting for everything to be ready, and only then to begin the construction of heavy ships, it should be started as early as possible. Yes, it will, of course, be still unfinished, yes, a lot of “cones” will be “stuffed”, but then, when the technology of similar construction of the USSR is mastered, the creation of a powerful ocean fleet will no longer meet with particular obstacles. Therefore, when evaluating the laying of heavy artillery ships in the pre-war USSR, it should be remembered that the number of such ships (battleships of type “A”, “B”, heavy cruisers) in the 1936-1939 programs. fluctuated at the level of 24 - 31 units, but in fact in 1938-39. Only 6 of such ships were laid - four battleships of the 23 project and two heavy cruisers of the 69 project. And therefore, to say that their laying is premature is still impossible.
The second aspect of the pre-war construction of the fleet is its value. But even here, upon closer inspection, no catastrophe is visible, because the documents show that the expenses for the RKKF during the third five-year plan (1938-1942) were not at all amazing.
To begin, consider the costs of capital construction in the interests of the Commissariats and Commissariats of the USSR
As you can see, shipbuilding expenses did not stand out among the others, and were inferior as a people's commissariat aviationand the production of ammunition. As for the NKVMF, according to the plan, it really did receive a significant share, if we compare its expenses with the People’s Commissariat of Defense - in the total costs of these two commissariats, the fleet accounted for 31% of all investments according to the plan, but NPO is also aviation, and ground forces, etc. But, again, upon the fact of disbursement of funds, we see a different picture, the share of KVMF does not exceed 24%. Thus, the cost of capital construction (factories, enterprises, shipyards, military bases, etc.) of the fleet was not any outstanding, and if we look for opportunities for savings, we should pay attention to the NKVD - its capital construction costs are almost one and a half times exceeded NPOs and NKVMF combined!
Now let's look at the costs of building warships and maintaining the RKKF. In 1939, the country was in full swing creating an ocean fleet, as can be clearly seen from the table below:
While on 1 in January, 1939 had a 181 ship in the building, then at the beginning of 1940 there were already 203, including the 3 battleship and 2 heavy cruisers, and in just 1939 the 143 was laid ship total displacement of almost 227 thousand tons! This was much higher than the bookmarks of the past, 1938, when 89 of ships with a displacement of 159 389 t fell on the stocks, although these figures are quite impressive.
But not a single new construction ... RKKF also carried out large-scale programs for the repair and modernization of warships.
Well, now, of course, the burning question - how much did it all cost the country? In 1939, according to the plan of current military orders for all USSR commissariats, the total defense expenditure should have been almost 22 billion rubles, of which the fleet should have been marketable products from the commissariats worth 4,5 billion. That is, at the peak of the construction of the “Big Fleet”, the country had to spend just 20,35% of all its military spending on this very fleet!
In fact, the plan was not fulfilled, but the NPO failed the plan even more (for 3 billion rubles. The subdepartment for ammunition production was not enough, the Aviation Commissariat of Aviation did not receive production for 1 billion rubles, the rest in detail), but even so, the NKVMF received only 23,57 % of total commercial products. I must say that this ratio is quite typical for the entire period of 1938-40. During these years, the total budget allocations for the fleet amounted to 22,5 billion rubles, but this accounted for only 19,7% of the total defense expenditure of the USSR.
All this in combination suggests that even during the construction of the Big Fleet, the costs of the RKKF were not at all excessive for the country, and moreover - in fact, we can say that the fleet still remained the least funded branch of the Red Army troops! Of course, the rejection of the construction of ocean-going ships and a drastic reduction in shipbuilding programs could free up certain funds, but they are, in effect, lost against the background of what NPOs already consumed. And you need to understand that our armed forces to a certain extent did not have time to absorb the funds allocated for them - not for nothing that the plan for the receipt of marketable products over 17 billion rubles. turned out to be performed on less than 70%.
Of course, many critics say that the USSR embarked on the construction of the ocean fleet at an extremely inopportune time. They say how it was possible to lay the battleships in 1938, when as a result of the “Munich Agreement” Hitler was given over to the mercy of Czechoslovakia! Well, it’s obvious that the war is not far off ...
All this is true, but you need to understand that this very war - it is never far off. As a matter of fact, it was quite obvious that from the moment Hitler came to power, the short epoch of peace in Europe was coming to an end, then Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia ... In general, the world was constantly shaken by some kind of cataclysm, and postponed the construction of the fleet for a more peaceful time, means to postpone it forever. Of course, there comes a time when it is already becoming clear that war is about to come, and then it is necessary to stop the "long-playing" programs, redistributing resources in favor of the most vital - but this was exactly what was done in the USSR.
But only in more detail on this question we will stop already in the following article.
To be continued ...
How did it begin
As mentioned earlier, the reasons that prompted the leadership of the Country of the Soviets to begin creating the most powerful navy are quite understandable and logical. The country was in political isolation, and sea power was a powerful diplomatic argument, because no one could afford to ignore the political views of a first-class maritime power. In addition, the military industry seemed to have reached an acceptable level by 1936 and did not require multiple growth, and the second five-year plan was completed much more successfully than the first. In general, “above” it seemed that a large shipbuilding program was quite capable of us, and at the same time, the country's leadership experienced a real need for a powerful fleet.
Alas, as we now know, the capabilities of the domestic industry turned out to be extremely overvalued, and the construction of 533 warships with a total displacement over 1,3 million tons. For some 10 years it was completely beyond its power. Thus, the execution of the resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars (STO) No. OK-95ss “On the shipbuilding program for 1936” has “stalled” literally from the very beginning of its adoption.
This program itself was a common document, and provided for the construction of X-type battleships A and 8 type B battleships, 16 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 17 destroyers, 128 large, 90 medium and 164 small submarines. Its implementation was to be specified by the relevant resolutions of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which set specific tasks for the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and other structures participating in the creation of the fleet for one or two years in advance. And so, the first such resolution was the 90 adopted on July 16, the document “On the Large Marine Shipbuilding Program”, which specified the procedure for creating the “Big Fleet” for the next 1936 of the year. According to him, in 2-1937. the shipbuilding industry had to lay the 38 battleship type "A", four - type "B", 4 light cruisers and leaders, 8 destroyers and 114 submarines. At the same time, all 123 battleships were to be operational already in 8 year!
It is interesting, although this does not apply to the topic of the article, that the SRT attached great importance to the unification of ships under construction. The battleships of projects "A" and "B" were still to be developed, and in the future, "B" was abandoned in favor of the ship of type "A", light cruisers were to be built according to the project "Kirov", the leaders - on the project 20I (the famous "blue cruiser "" Tashkent "), destroyers - project 7, submarines - type" K "of the XIV series, type" C "of the IX series, and" M "of the XII series as large, medium and small submarines, respectively.
It was smooth on paper ...
Alas, the reality turned out to be extremely far from the expectations of the Soviet leadership, because problems arose literally at every turn. So, for example, from the battleships planned for the construction of 8, 7 was supposed to be laid in 1937 and one more in the next 1938. However, in fact, only two ships of this class were built in the specified period: the “Soviet Union” was laid 15 July, and “Soviet Ukraine” - October 31 1938. The light cruisers were laid in half less than planned, even if “set off” the laid out 20 December 1936, “Maxim Gorky”. Not a single leader was laid: but for the destroyers, the tab in 1936 was as much as the 47 of the “sevens” deliberately surpassed and overwhelmed the capabilities of our industry. A number of these ships were put into operation as early as the war, and some were generally dismantled on the stocks. In general, no destroyer was laid at all in 1937, and in 1938 only 14 ships of this class can be counted, reloaded from the 7 project according to the improved 7 project.
On the one hand, of course, one would like to be surprised by the incompetence of the people responsible for developing the shipbuilding program and “linking” it with the domestic industry. Literally everything was missing, from metal and armor to artillery and turbines. But on the other hand, it should be understood that in addition to the incorrect assessment of the growth prospects of our industry, other factors also played a role, which were quite difficult to foresee initially.
For example, according to the program, it was intended to build type-A battleships with a standard displacement in 35 000 t. This decision was due to the desire to adhere to the existing international agreements regarding maritime arms race restrictions, although, strictly speaking, the USSR was not a participant in such contracts and had no obligations for them. At the same time, in the USSR for a long time no large warships were created or even designed. But, obviously, it was assumed that if the leading world powers have already limited the displacement of 35 battleships, thousand tons, then they know what they are doing, and the creation of balanced ships in such dimensions is quite possible.
However, it quickly became clear that the battleship with 406-mm guns, somehow effectively protected from the effects of artillery of its caliber, and at the same time developing a more or less acceptable speed, categorically does not want to be “rammed” into 35 000 t. So the initial design of the battleship of type “A” in the middle of 1937, was sent back for revision (like the battleship of type “B”), after which, as the RKKF’s requirements were met, the ship’s abruptly “crawled” upward displacement, quickly reaching 45 first, and then and 55-57 KT. But what does this mean for the core an engineering industry?
In 1936, the USSR had all the same 7 stocks, on which Tsarist Russia built its own battleships. At the same time, on the 4 Baltic stocks, on which, before the First World War, Izmail had built battle cruisers in 32 500 tons (true, this was normal, not standard displacement), the tab of battleships in 35 KT was not particularly difficult. Apparently, the same was true of the Black Sea slipways. But the increase in displacement of the battleships led to the fact that all of them turned out to be completely inadequate and began to require extensive upgrades. Moreover, the increase in displacement naturally led to an increase in mass and precipitation of the ship during launching, and it turned out that the new battleships simply do not have enough water area - it was necessary to carry out expensive dredging works ... Thus, even in cases where the problem was solved (in this case, permission to increase the displacement) could be so that it only entailed a whole “heap” of new difficulties.
More ships! More!
It would seem that, faced with an obvious failure, the leadership of the USSR would have to temper the appetites and return their shipbuilding programs to the limits of what is really achievable. However, nothing of the kind happened: since 1936, military shipbuilding planning proceeded along two parallel paths. Sailors, under the patronage of the People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov formed more and more ambitious programs: for example, the “Plan for the construction of warships of the Naval Forces of the Red Army”, submitted to I.V. Stalin and V.M. Molotov, who at that time was the chairman of the SNK 7 September 1937, assumed the construction of 599 ships with a total displacement of 1,99 million tons! The corresponding figures for the previous program were surpassed by 12,3% and 52,2%, respectively. According to this document, it was planned to build 6 type A battleships, 14 B type, 2 aircraft carrier, 10 heavy and 22 light cruisers, 20 leaders and 144 destroyers, 375 submarines! The next iteration proposed in 1938 was significantly reduced by ships (424 units), but their total displacement remained at the same level - 1,9 mln. Tons. Finally, 14 June 1939, the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov submits to the SNK the monstrous “10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships”, according to which the country needed to build 1948 ships of main classes and 696 small ships (torpedo boats, minesweepers, submarine hunters, etc.) before the inclusive 903. cumulative displacement over 3 million tons!
At the same time, such plans were approved by the leadership of the country, but ... they were not approved. Unfortunately, many lovers of naval stories misleading the phrase from the source to the source stating that the “10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships” was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov. Nikolai Gerasimovich really endorsed this document, but you need to understand that his signature means only that the People's Commissar of the Navy agrees with this plan and recommends it for approval by higher authorities. But to approve it "for execution" N.G. Kuznetsov, of course, could not, because it was far beyond his authority. Approve documents of this kind could only STO, or, later, the Committee of Defense at SNK of the USSR, well, or the Council of People's Commissars. What to I.V. Stalin, he endorsed these programs, but also did nothing to turn them into a guide to action.
But then on the basis of what were warships laid at all? In essence, this was the case. All the above plans were, if I may say so, some kind of super-goal, which, of course, it would be great to achieve, someday, in a bright socialist future. And the actual construction of warships was carried out (and controlled) on the basis of annual plans, which were drawn up by the Navy Commissariat, agreed with the shipbuilding industry and approved by higher authorities. And these plans were much more realistic than the "software" hundreds of ships and millions of tons of displacement.
And what in practice?
Let us explain this with a simple example, namely: we quote the Decree of the Defense Committee at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. XXUMXCC “On approval of the NKVMF order plan for shipbuilding, ship repair, parts and equipment for 21 g” In 1940 g it was planned to transfer to the fleet:
Cruisers - 3 units, including one project 26 and two - 26-bis;
Destroyers of destroyers - 1 units. project 38 "Leningrad";
Destroyers - 19 units, including 1 experimental, 4 project 7 and 14 - 7U;
Submarines - 39 units, including 4 large type “K” XIV series, one underwater mine layer “L” of series XIII bis, 14 medium type “C” series IX bis, 5 - medium type “U” X series, and finally , 15 small type "M" XII series - 15;
Minesweepers - 10 units, including 2 59 project, 2 58 project and 6 53 project.
As well as 39 smaller warships and boats. But this is to transfer from the previously started construction, but for us the most interesting are those that were planned to be laid in 1940. Here is a short list of them:
Battleships - 1 units, project 23;
Cruisers - 2 units, project 68;
Leaderboard - 4 units, 48 project;
Destroyers - 9 units 30 project;
Submarines - 32 units, including 10 medium type “C” series IX bis, 2 - medium type “U” X series, 13 small type “M” XII series and 7 - small type “M” XV series;
Minesweeper - 13 units 59 project;
And also 37 small warships and boats.
In other words, we see that according to the plan for 1940, there is even a slight decrease in the number of ships in the building. Yes, of course, one more (fourth) battleship of the 23 project is added, but it is expected to complete the construction of 3 cruisers, 19 destroyers and 39 PL, and only 2, 9 and 32 ships are laid, respectively.
In general, we can talk about this. The construction program of the “Big Fleet”, approved in 1936, was distinguished by clarity and clarity on the types of ships that should have been built, but otherwise consisted of only minuses. It was unbalanced, impossible for domestic industry, and the types of ships in its composition were not optimal. Already the first steps to implement this program in 1937. faced with insurmountable difficulties. Thus, it became clear that the country needed a completely different program, and it was not at all about “playing around” with the numbers in the “battleships” or “cruiser” columns. It was necessary to determine the future composition of the fleets, the performance characteristics of future ships, to bring them together with the capabilities of the Ministry of Industry, but not those that it currently has, and taking into account the build-up of the latter during the implementation of the shipbuilding program ... In general, if briefly, it turned out that not that execution, but even planning such a program is still too difficult for us. Nevertheless, the country's leadership believed that the ocean fleet of the USSR was necessary, which meant that it should be started to build - even gradually, and not in the quantity that the naval commanders and the leadership of the country would like to see.
Battleship project 23 "Soviet Ukraine"
And that is exactly what was done. I.V. Stalin fully encouraged the creation of "megalomaniac" military shipbuilding plans in 2-3 mln. Tonnes of aggregate displacement, because during their creation the national naval thought developed, the number of ships and their performance characteristics specified by the fleet, etc., but these the plans were essentially theoretical. But the real shipbuilding after errors 1937 g. Tried as much as possible to tie to the capabilities of our industry. But at the same time, the leadership of the USSR did not at all try to “stretch its legs” according to its clothes and set extremely difficult tasks for domestic shipbuilding, which often turned out to be on the verge of or even beyond its capabilities.
That is, I.V. Stalin, the Council of People's Commissars, etc. in fact, they did the following - on the one hand, they provided the domestic industry with resources for a significant expansion of its capabilities, but on the other hand, they presented it with the most difficult tasks that they had to cope with in a short time, and controlled their execution. I would like to note that this principle of “carrots and sticks” even today represents an excellent development strategy for any single enterprise or industry as a whole, and one can only regret that our modern management has abandoned these generally simple management principles.
Today they say a lot that the construction of battleships and heavy cruisers in the prewar period was a mistake, for a number of reasons, of which there are two main ones. Firstly, this construction was not provided with the capabilities of the industry - for example, there was not enough capacity for armor production, and, for example, the main caliber of the heavy cruisers Kronstadt and Sevastopol existed only in the form of wooden models even when the ships were already in full were built. And secondly, the creation of large surface ships led to the diversion of resources from more important, higher priority programs. After all, for example, the planned cost of the battleship of the project 23 exceeded 1,18 billion rubles. and you can be firmly convinced that if the battleships were completed, then in fact it would be significantly higher than the plan.
We will understand first with the first question. It is known that the battleship in those years was still the most complex engineering structure, perhaps the most complex of all that humanity created at that time. In a series of articles devoted to the T-34 tank, the author repeatedly referred to technical problems that accompanied the production of these combat vehicles and showed how much work had to be applied in order to start production of technically reliable tanks. It took years, but we are talking about a product weighing 26,5 tons - what can we say about a steel monster with a weight of 60 000 tons? In other words, it was not enough to design a perfect battleship and separate weapons systems and mechanisms for it: truly titanic efforts were needed to organize its creation, after all, thousands of tons and names of complex mechanisms had to be produced and supplied for its construction on time. The idea was to link the work of hundreds of different factories and industries into a single whole: neither tsarist Russia nor the USSR built anything of the kind, after all, the battleships of the Russian Empire were much smaller and simpler in design, but there was also more than 20 -year break in their construction ...
In general, there was no point in waiting for everything to be ready, and only then to begin the construction of heavy ships, it should be started as early as possible. Yes, it will, of course, be still unfinished, yes, a lot of “cones” will be “stuffed”, but then, when the technology of similar construction of the USSR is mastered, the creation of a powerful ocean fleet will no longer meet with particular obstacles. Therefore, when evaluating the laying of heavy artillery ships in the pre-war USSR, it should be remembered that the number of such ships (battleships of type “A”, “B”, heavy cruisers) in the 1936-1939 programs. fluctuated at the level of 24 - 31 units, but in fact in 1938-39. Only 6 of such ships were laid - four battleships of the 23 project and two heavy cruisers of the 69 project. And therefore, to say that their laying is premature is still impossible.
The same "Soviet Ukraine", but from a different angle
The second aspect of the pre-war construction of the fleet is its value. But even here, upon closer inspection, no catastrophe is visible, because the documents show that the expenses for the RKKF during the third five-year plan (1938-1942) were not at all amazing.
So how much did it cost?
To begin, consider the costs of capital construction in the interests of the Commissariats and Commissariats of the USSR
As you can see, shipbuilding expenses did not stand out among the others, and were inferior as a people's commissariat aviationand the production of ammunition. As for the NKVMF, according to the plan, it really did receive a significant share, if we compare its expenses with the People’s Commissariat of Defense - in the total costs of these two commissariats, the fleet accounted for 31% of all investments according to the plan, but NPO is also aviation, and ground forces, etc. But, again, upon the fact of disbursement of funds, we see a different picture, the share of KVMF does not exceed 24%. Thus, the cost of capital construction (factories, enterprises, shipyards, military bases, etc.) of the fleet was not any outstanding, and if we look for opportunities for savings, we should pay attention to the NKVD - its capital construction costs are almost one and a half times exceeded NPOs and NKVMF combined!
Now let's look at the costs of building warships and maintaining the RKKF. In 1939, the country was in full swing creating an ocean fleet, as can be clearly seen from the table below:
While on 1 in January, 1939 had a 181 ship in the building, then at the beginning of 1940 there were already 203, including the 3 battleship and 2 heavy cruisers, and in just 1939 the 143 was laid ship total displacement of almost 227 thousand tons! This was much higher than the bookmarks of the past, 1938, when 89 of ships with a displacement of 159 389 t fell on the stocks, although these figures are quite impressive.
But not a single new construction ... RKKF also carried out large-scale programs for the repair and modernization of warships.
Well, now, of course, the burning question - how much did it all cost the country? In 1939, according to the plan of current military orders for all USSR commissariats, the total defense expenditure should have been almost 22 billion rubles, of which the fleet should have been marketable products from the commissariats worth 4,5 billion. That is, at the peak of the construction of the “Big Fleet”, the country had to spend just 20,35% of all its military spending on this very fleet!
In fact, the plan was not fulfilled, but the NPO failed the plan even more (for 3 billion rubles. The subdepartment for ammunition production was not enough, the Aviation Commissariat of Aviation did not receive production for 1 billion rubles, the rest in detail), but even so, the NKVMF received only 23,57 % of total commercial products. I must say that this ratio is quite typical for the entire period of 1938-40. During these years, the total budget allocations for the fleet amounted to 22,5 billion rubles, but this accounted for only 19,7% of the total defense expenditure of the USSR.
All this in combination suggests that even during the construction of the Big Fleet, the costs of the RKKF were not at all excessive for the country, and moreover - in fact, we can say that the fleet still remained the least funded branch of the Red Army troops! Of course, the rejection of the construction of ocean-going ships and a drastic reduction in shipbuilding programs could free up certain funds, but they are, in effect, lost against the background of what NPOs already consumed. And you need to understand that our armed forces to a certain extent did not have time to absorb the funds allocated for them - not for nothing that the plan for the receipt of marketable products over 17 billion rubles. turned out to be performed on less than 70%.
Of course, many critics say that the USSR embarked on the construction of the ocean fleet at an extremely inopportune time. They say how it was possible to lay the battleships in 1938, when as a result of the “Munich Agreement” Hitler was given over to the mercy of Czechoslovakia! Well, it’s obvious that the war is not far off ...
All this is true, but you need to understand that this very war - it is never far off. As a matter of fact, it was quite obvious that from the moment Hitler came to power, the short epoch of peace in Europe was coming to an end, then Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia ... In general, the world was constantly shaken by some kind of cataclysm, and postponed the construction of the fleet for a more peaceful time, means to postpone it forever. Of course, there comes a time when it is already becoming clear that war is about to come, and then it is necessary to stop the "long-playing" programs, redistributing resources in favor of the most vital - but this was exactly what was done in the USSR.
But only in more detail on this question we will stop already in the following article.
To be continued ...
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