The battle in the northern waters. Time to sum up
A naval battle in northern waters in the fall of 2018 had disastrous results for both sides. The Norwegian missile a frigate, a Russian floating dock and an aircraft carrier. All three have been taken out of action indefinitely.
Drakkar, who did not know defeat, was not obliged to give way to the supertankers of the class LR2.
According to another version, the descendants of Eric Ryzhy neglected modern means of navigation. Like their ancestors, they led the “Drakkar” after the bird released from the board, hoping that the bird will show where the shore is.
According to the third version, the sinking of “Helge Ingstad” is not a mere coincidence. Over the ship of the vital ominous shadow of sarin - in 2013, the frigate participated in the operation to remove the chemical weapons from Syrian Latakia.
The fourth, the most plausible version - on the bridge of the Helge Instad was attended by an American officer for the exchange program (NATO Personal Exchange Program). The American who did not understand Norwegian was entrusted with the authority to control the frigate, which was the cause of the navigational catastrophe.
But now it does not matter.
In fact, this is all that the Norwegian Navy can count on. There were five such frigates. Now there are only four left.
Due to negligence In peacetime, the Norwegians lost a fifth of their Navy!
Tapes News Relished the drowning of Helge Ingstad, but nowhere was it indicated what kind of ship it was.
The five "Nansen" was built in 2003-2011 (from laying the first to commissioning the last), so that the Norwegian nation had at least something to enter the World Ocean. Actually, this happened for the first time. Never before has Norway had such large and sophisticated warships.
At the time of the birth of the project, NATO was in a state of deep anabiosis.
If "Nansen" were built in the current conditions, their technical appearance and composition of weapons would be different.
The fighting capabilities of the frigates were deliberately limited. Of course, "limitation" is a conditional concept. In terms of combat capabilities, Nansen is comparable to fleets many developing countries. Indeed, at the heart of the overgrown frigate lies a very remarkable ship - the American Burke.
On average, 3,5 years from the moment of laying down to the moment of entering service. The pace of construction is not surprising: the Norwegian frigates were built in Spain by Navantia. They were based on the finished project "Alvaro de Bazan" - a reduced copy of "Orly Burke" for the Spanish Navy, with a high degree of unification of systems and weapons between them. Another representative of this "subclass" is the Australian destroyer Defense type "Hobart".
Each of the listed countries has “hammered” the original “Burke” to the best of its ideas about the role and greatness of its own fleets.
The Norwegians got what they wanted: a patrol ship from the far sea zone with very reduced weapons and capabilities even compared to the "Alvaro de Bazan".
Of all the nations exploiting ships with the Aegis, the Norwegians were the only ones who were stingy with a full-fledged radar. For the Norwegian Navy, a smaller version of the SPY-1F was created with the transverse dimensions of the 2,4 antenna antennas (instead of the 3,7 m for the basic SPY-1D).
The number of transceiver elements decreased from 4350 to 1856, and the instrumental detection range decreased by 54%. Of course, even with such limitations, we are talking about 324 km in range and 61 km in height when a “typical target” is detected (as a rule, it means a large radio-contrast object the size of B-52).
Smaller mass-dimensions of the antennas allowed them to be installed at a greater height, which was a consolation bonus for weak energy possibilities.
"Nansen" is equipped with only one launcher on 8 cells - 12 times less than the progenitor of "Burke", with a double difference in displacement of these ships!
Vertical mines occupy ESSM short / medium range anti-aircraft missiles, a total of 32 units. The range of damage to the ESSM (50 km) can pose a threat even to carrier aircraft, however, the capabilities of the frigate's air defense look awkward compared to other Aigis-ships.
Shock armament - small-sized NSM (Naval Strike Missile) anti-ship missiles, developed by the Norwegian company Kongsberg. Total 8 units launched from rails on the upper deck. 400-kilogram "products" with a range of 100 nautical miles, equipped with a relatively weak warhead (125 kg, half of which is the shell weight of the warhead).
Description artillery weapons will take exactly one sentence. The 76 mm caliber "rattle", due to its insignificant power, is suitable only for salutes and warning shots.
"Nansen" is comparable with its progenitor "Burke" only by the capabilities of anti-submarine defense. The explanation is elementary. Air defense weapons are much cheaper than air defense weapons.
The Norwegian frigates turned out to be extremely lightly armed units, given their considerable size (length 135 m, displacement over 5000 tons) and the availability of access to the best world technologies. But the Norwegian Navy has its own priorities.
The Helge Ingstad frigate did not need its defensive armament, nor the retractable thruster for maneuvering in narrow fjords. The only thing that mattered in that situation was the 13 waterproof compartments. But even they did not help.
During the international maritime exercise Trident Juncture 2018, NATO forces lost the frigate. However, by our actions (or inaction) we helped the NATO members to “equalize the score”.
From the information provided, it is still not possible to understand what happened that night at SRH No. XXUMX in Roslyakovo.
According to one version, the SF command decided to prepare the Admiral Kuznetsov TAKR for a short-term launch into the sea in order to respond to the Trident Juncture naval provocation - demonstratively and deliberately conducted maneuvers near the borders of Russia. The floating dock PD-50 was sunk, the aircraft-carrying cruiser was removed from the keel blocks and mooring lines and began to extend from the dock gate. At that moment everything happened. Doc continued to sink with roll and trim, cranes hit, further developments can be found in the media.
According to another version, the non-standard immersion PD-50 occurred without any interference from the plant workers. The only merit was the time to give up the moorings and withdraw the aircraft carrier from the crumbling dock.
In the framework of the current practice of negative breeding, I propose to invite the entire USC leadership to Roslyakovo to present awards and medals for “outstanding contributions to the development of the ship repair industry”.
The cause of emergency is associated with the loss of power supply due to such a rare and unusual phenomenon for the Murmansk region as heavy snowfall and snow sticking to the wires.
The official explanation of the causes of the accident PD-50 is simply monstrous. For such recognition you can go under the tribunal.
The ship repair enterprise carries out docking and repair of the ships with nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons on board, without having reserve energy sources.
No explanation is required as to whether abnormal operation or suspension of equipment operation during repair work when the dock is de-energized is fraught.
Naval story remembers the case: there was also a violation of TB, and the old infrastructure, and the crane in the lead role. Attempting to clean the submarine reactor cover O-ring. As a result, the floating crane floating on the wave ripped off the cover along with the control rods. The reactor immediately went into start-up mode and destroyed all those who were near (see. “Radiation accident in Chazhma bay”).
At that time, the cause was a passing boat close by that raised a wave. This time - the snow stuck to the wires.
USC managers optimized the plant to the maximum, including funds for mandatory backup generators.
Do submarines of the Northern Fleet unload rockets before being docked? Yes, it is an open secret!
In December of the 2011 of the year, the wooden scaffolding erected along the K-84 “Ekaterinburg” rocket carrier’s hull occurred while it was in the same PD-50 dock. Immediately after the emergency, the damaged boat was taken out of the dock and sent to Okolnaya Bay, and then to Yagelnaya Bay. Where are the bases for the storage of submarine ballistic missiles. Hardly a submarine cruiser was preparing to receive ammunition to enter combat patrols: after all, K-84 was to undergo a long three-year repair.
In general, the disregard of unloading ammunition when docking is a well-known global practice, which periodically led to dazzling and deafening consequences.
Well, back to the events of last fall.
“Loss of power supply” due to “sticking of sleet” is the first and not the most successful excuse that came to mind of those in charge. Attempt to shift responsibility for state of emergency on natural cataclysm.
The floating dock due to its age (40 years, half of which were not at the best of times) clearly had leaks in the underwater part of the hull. All allocated funds for repairs were mastered in a different way. It is not excluded that recently PD-50 kept afloat only at the expense of pumps that continuously pumped out water. Finally, October 30 intake of water exceeded the critical value, and the dock drowned. So the idea was born with the loss of electricity. We are not the ones to blame, but the weather.
However, such a description is also poorly suited to the place where atomic ships and SSBNs were repaired with weapons on board.
The injured parties refrain from further comments. Although the consequences were clear from the first day.
The Norwegian frigate was raised in early March and still do not know what to do with the drowned man. Extensive destruction of the starboard, touching the rocky bottom, half a year in salty sea water under the blows of the waves. Repair will be comparable in cost to the construction of a new frigate. Most likely, restore, for reasons of prestige. In history, it was not the same (the incredible resurrection of the Cassin and Downes, the restoration of the burned-down cruiser Belknap).
With the loss of the frigate of the Norwegian Navy significantly weakened, but this loss had little impact on NATO naval forces - there are about 40 of such ships in the fleets of European countries.
Domestic PD-50 still rests on the bottom. It will definitely be raised (otherwise it threatens to slide to a great depth and completely block the harbor of the 82 SRH), the whole question is whether it can be used for its intended purpose. According to Interfax, the divers who surveyed the dock found cracks in its hull. Someone has already hurried to declare that the dock has broken up into several parts. On the one hand, this does not mean anything - any dock represents a complex of pontoons. Connecting them together is a difficult but regular operation.
On the other hand, taking into account the obvious technical condition, age and damage received during the dive (to make it clearer - if the 100-thousand-ton design drops to the bottom), the rise and release times of the PD-50 will be comparable to the construction of the new dock.
PD-50 was built in Sweden, which, under the conditions of the existing sanctions, will not build anything. Assistance in creating a new PD can only be provided by China.
For example, last summer, a floating dock, built by the Chinese company Beihai Shipbuilding within the interests of a consortium of Rosneftegaz, Rosneft and Gazprombank, was delivered to the Far East CVD Zvezda. The main purpose is servicing gas carriers, tankers and oil platforms. The Chinese dock is twice as low as PD-50 (40 thousand tons instead of 80 thousand tons), but the precedent itself with the purchase of the dock demonstrated the possibility of cooperation with China on this issue.
It all comes down to the timing of the decision. Currently, there is no evidence of negotiating the purchase of a replacement for PD-50. Probably, the USC leadership first wants to understand the sunken dock and assess the chances of its returning to service.
The only dock capable of receiving the Admiral Kuznetsov TAVKR is in the Far East. The dock PD-41 tonnage 80 000 tons was built in Japan in 1978 year. The leadership of the Navy is unlikely to decide to transfer the Kuznetsov in its present condition to the Pacific Ocean, where there is no infrastructure for the deployment of the TAVKR and its wing. It is also not known whether the technical condition of the dock will allow docking the aircraft carrier.
Towing the PD-41 across the world to the Northern Fleet is an even more extraordinary task.
The docking of Kuznetsov in the drained Sevmash basin (like Baku-Vikramaditya) can only be considered as a temporary, one-time solution. Continuous and regular maintenance of TAVKR in such conditions is impossible.
If the issue of acquiring a new floating dock is not resolved within a few years, the navy will probably have to say goodbye to a single aircraft carrier.
In short, the consequences of the “sea battle”, in which the naval forces of NATO and the Russian Navy caused themselves serious losses.
The Viking Code read ...
Drakkar, who did not know defeat, was not obliged to give way to the supertankers of the class LR2.
According to another version, the descendants of Eric Ryzhy neglected modern means of navigation. Like their ancestors, they led the “Drakkar” after the bird released from the board, hoping that the bird will show where the shore is.
The fairway is not marked,
Here the day the sun does not set,
Can not see the stars, changing wind ...
Only the oars go against the wind.
O. Khutoryansky
Here the day the sun does not set,
Can not see the stars, changing wind ...
Only the oars go against the wind.
O. Khutoryansky
According to the third version, the sinking of “Helge Ingstad” is not a mere coincidence. Over the ship of the vital ominous shadow of sarin - in 2013, the frigate participated in the operation to remove the chemical weapons from Syrian Latakia.
The fourth, the most plausible version - on the bridge of the Helge Instad was attended by an American officer for the exchange program (NATO Personal Exchange Program). The American who did not understand Norwegian was entrusted with the authority to control the frigate, which was the cause of the navigational catastrophe.
But now it does not matter.
A series of frigates "Fridtjof Nansen"
In fact, this is all that the Norwegian Navy can count on. There were five such frigates. Now there are only four left.
Due to negligence In peacetime, the Norwegians lost a fifth of their Navy!
Tapes News Relished the drowning of Helge Ingstad, but nowhere was it indicated what kind of ship it was.
The five "Nansen" was built in 2003-2011 (from laying the first to commissioning the last), so that the Norwegian nation had at least something to enter the World Ocean. Actually, this happened for the first time. Never before has Norway had such large and sophisticated warships.
At the time of the birth of the project, NATO was in a state of deep anabiosis.
If "Nansen" were built in the current conditions, their technical appearance and composition of weapons would be different.
The fighting capabilities of the frigates were deliberately limited. Of course, "limitation" is a conditional concept. In terms of combat capabilities, Nansen is comparable to fleets many developing countries. Indeed, at the heart of the overgrown frigate lies a very remarkable ship - the American Burke.
On average, 3,5 years from the moment of laying down to the moment of entering service. The pace of construction is not surprising: the Norwegian frigates were built in Spain by Navantia. They were based on the finished project "Alvaro de Bazan" - a reduced copy of "Orly Burke" for the Spanish Navy, with a high degree of unification of systems and weapons between them. Another representative of this "subclass" is the Australian destroyer Defense type "Hobart".
Each of the listed countries has “hammered” the original “Burke” to the best of its ideas about the role and greatness of its own fleets.
The Norwegians got what they wanted: a patrol ship from the far sea zone with very reduced weapons and capabilities even compared to the "Alvaro de Bazan".
Of all the nations exploiting ships with the Aegis, the Norwegians were the only ones who were stingy with a full-fledged radar. For the Norwegian Navy, a smaller version of the SPY-1F was created with the transverse dimensions of the 2,4 antenna antennas (instead of the 3,7 m for the basic SPY-1D).
The number of transceiver elements decreased from 4350 to 1856, and the instrumental detection range decreased by 54%. Of course, even with such limitations, we are talking about 324 km in range and 61 km in height when a “typical target” is detected (as a rule, it means a large radio-contrast object the size of B-52).
Smaller mass-dimensions of the antennas allowed them to be installed at a greater height, which was a consolation bonus for weak energy possibilities.
"Nansen" is equipped with only one launcher on 8 cells - 12 times less than the progenitor of "Burke", with a double difference in displacement of these ships!
Vertical mines occupy ESSM short / medium range anti-aircraft missiles, a total of 32 units. The range of damage to the ESSM (50 km) can pose a threat even to carrier aircraft, however, the capabilities of the frigate's air defense look awkward compared to other Aigis-ships.
Shock armament - small-sized NSM (Naval Strike Missile) anti-ship missiles, developed by the Norwegian company Kongsberg. Total 8 units launched from rails on the upper deck. 400-kilogram "products" with a range of 100 nautical miles, equipped with a relatively weak warhead (125 kg, half of which is the shell weight of the warhead).
Description artillery weapons will take exactly one sentence. The 76 mm caliber "rattle", due to its insignificant power, is suitable only for salutes and warning shots.
"Nansen" is comparable with its progenitor "Burke" only by the capabilities of anti-submarine defense. The explanation is elementary. Air defense weapons are much cheaper than air defense weapons.
The Norwegian frigates turned out to be extremely lightly armed units, given their considerable size (length 135 m, displacement over 5000 tons) and the availability of access to the best world technologies. But the Norwegian Navy has its own priorities.
The Helge Ingstad frigate did not need its defensive armament, nor the retractable thruster for maneuvering in narrow fjords. The only thing that mattered in that situation was the 13 waterproof compartments. But even they did not help.
During the international maritime exercise Trident Juncture 2018, NATO forces lost the frigate. However, by our actions (or inaction) we helped the NATO members to “equalize the score”.
Fleet got hit by the dock
From the information provided, it is still not possible to understand what happened that night at SRH No. XXUMX in Roslyakovo.
According to one version, the SF command decided to prepare the Admiral Kuznetsov TAKR for a short-term launch into the sea in order to respond to the Trident Juncture naval provocation - demonstratively and deliberately conducted maneuvers near the borders of Russia. The floating dock PD-50 was sunk, the aircraft-carrying cruiser was removed from the keel blocks and mooring lines and began to extend from the dock gate. At that moment everything happened. Doc continued to sink with roll and trim, cranes hit, further developments can be found in the media.
According to another version, the non-standard immersion PD-50 occurred without any interference from the plant workers. The only merit was the time to give up the moorings and withdraw the aircraft carrier from the crumbling dock.
In the framework of the current practice of negative breeding, I propose to invite the entire USC leadership to Roslyakovo to present awards and medals for “outstanding contributions to the development of the ship repair industry”.
The cause of emergency is associated with the loss of power supply due to such a rare and unusual phenomenon for the Murmansk region as heavy snowfall and snow sticking to the wires.
The official explanation of the causes of the accident PD-50 is simply monstrous. For such recognition you can go under the tribunal.
Responsible persons at least understand what they confessed to the whole country?
The ship repair enterprise carries out docking and repair of the ships with nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons on board, without having reserve energy sources.
No explanation is required as to whether abnormal operation or suspension of equipment operation during repair work when the dock is de-energized is fraught.
Naval story remembers the case: there was also a violation of TB, and the old infrastructure, and the crane in the lead role. Attempting to clean the submarine reactor cover O-ring. As a result, the floating crane floating on the wave ripped off the cover along with the control rods. The reactor immediately went into start-up mode and destroyed all those who were near (see. “Radiation accident in Chazhma bay”).
At that time, the cause was a passing boat close by that raised a wave. This time - the snow stuck to the wires.
USC managers optimized the plant to the maximum, including funds for mandatory backup generators.
Do submarines of the Northern Fleet unload rockets before being docked? Yes, it is an open secret!
In December of the 2011 of the year, the wooden scaffolding erected along the K-84 “Ekaterinburg” rocket carrier’s hull occurred while it was in the same PD-50 dock. Immediately after the emergency, the damaged boat was taken out of the dock and sent to Okolnaya Bay, and then to Yagelnaya Bay. Where are the bases for the storage of submarine ballistic missiles. Hardly a submarine cruiser was preparing to receive ammunition to enter combat patrols: after all, K-84 was to undergo a long three-year repair.
In general, the disregard of unloading ammunition when docking is a well-known global practice, which periodically led to dazzling and deafening consequences.
Well, back to the events of last fall.
I want to believe
“Loss of power supply” due to “sticking of sleet” is the first and not the most successful excuse that came to mind of those in charge. Attempt to shift responsibility for state of emergency on natural cataclysm.
The floating dock due to its age (40 years, half of which were not at the best of times) clearly had leaks in the underwater part of the hull. All allocated funds for repairs were mastered in a different way. It is not excluded that recently PD-50 kept afloat only at the expense of pumps that continuously pumped out water. Finally, October 30 intake of water exceeded the critical value, and the dock drowned. So the idea was born with the loss of electricity. We are not the ones to blame, but the weather.
However, such a description is also poorly suited to the place where atomic ships and SSBNs were repaired with weapons on board.
It took exactly six months
The injured parties refrain from further comments. Although the consequences were clear from the first day.
The Norwegian frigate was raised in early March and still do not know what to do with the drowned man. Extensive destruction of the starboard, touching the rocky bottom, half a year in salty sea water under the blows of the waves. Repair will be comparable in cost to the construction of a new frigate. Most likely, restore, for reasons of prestige. In history, it was not the same (the incredible resurrection of the Cassin and Downes, the restoration of the burned-down cruiser Belknap).
With the loss of the frigate of the Norwegian Navy significantly weakened, but this loss had little impact on NATO naval forces - there are about 40 of such ships in the fleets of European countries.
Domestic PD-50 still rests on the bottom. It will definitely be raised (otherwise it threatens to slide to a great depth and completely block the harbor of the 82 SRH), the whole question is whether it can be used for its intended purpose. According to Interfax, the divers who surveyed the dock found cracks in its hull. Someone has already hurried to declare that the dock has broken up into several parts. On the one hand, this does not mean anything - any dock represents a complex of pontoons. Connecting them together is a difficult but regular operation.
On the other hand, taking into account the obvious technical condition, age and damage received during the dive (to make it clearer - if the 100-thousand-ton design drops to the bottom), the rise and release times of the PD-50 will be comparable to the construction of the new dock.
PD-50 was built in Sweden, which, under the conditions of the existing sanctions, will not build anything. Assistance in creating a new PD can only be provided by China.
For example, last summer, a floating dock, built by the Chinese company Beihai Shipbuilding within the interests of a consortium of Rosneftegaz, Rosneft and Gazprombank, was delivered to the Far East CVD Zvezda. The main purpose is servicing gas carriers, tankers and oil platforms. The Chinese dock is twice as low as PD-50 (40 thousand tons instead of 80 thousand tons), but the precedent itself with the purchase of the dock demonstrated the possibility of cooperation with China on this issue.
It all comes down to the timing of the decision. Currently, there is no evidence of negotiating the purchase of a replacement for PD-50. Probably, the USC leadership first wants to understand the sunken dock and assess the chances of its returning to service.
And time passes
The only dock capable of receiving the Admiral Kuznetsov TAVKR is in the Far East. The dock PD-41 tonnage 80 000 tons was built in Japan in 1978 year. The leadership of the Navy is unlikely to decide to transfer the Kuznetsov in its present condition to the Pacific Ocean, where there is no infrastructure for the deployment of the TAVKR and its wing. It is also not known whether the technical condition of the dock will allow docking the aircraft carrier.
Towing the PD-41 across the world to the Northern Fleet is an even more extraordinary task.
The docking of Kuznetsov in the drained Sevmash basin (like Baku-Vikramaditya) can only be considered as a temporary, one-time solution. Continuous and regular maintenance of TAVKR in such conditions is impossible.
If the issue of acquiring a new floating dock is not resolved within a few years, the navy will probably have to say goodbye to a single aircraft carrier.
In short, the consequences of the “sea battle”, in which the naval forces of NATO and the Russian Navy caused themselves serious losses.
Information