The night before Tsushima. Why did the hospital ships give out the location of the Russian squadron with lights?
This article began as a continuation of the story of the Pearl and Emerald armored cruisers. But in the course of working with materials on how the last days of Russian squadrons passed before the Tsushima battle, the author first drew attention to some absurdities in our usual interpretation of finding our ships on the night of 14 in May 1905, when the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru ", Finding the burning lights of the hospital ship" Eagle ", went to them and" literally buried in the very center of the squadron. " Therefore, the material offered to your attention is entirely devoted to this episode.
So, the Russian squadron was approaching the Tsushima Strait. But 12 May in 09.00 morning she divided: 6 transports went to Shanghai, and auxiliary cruisers "Rion", "Dnepr", "Kuban" and "Terek" left to perform a special task, which consists of cruising along the Japanese coast and in the Yellow Sea. Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not believe that these weak forces could somehow divert X. Togo’s main forces, but he found it useful that their raiding could force the Japanese to send several armored cruisers to intercept, and thereby weaken the patrols in the area where 2 th and 3 th Pacific Squadron.
Russian ships were moving in a compact marching order.
It was assumed that in the event of the appearance of an enemy, the reconnaissance detachment would retreat to the cruisers in order to guard the transports, the right column, increasing the course and then turning, “all of a sudden” would go around and enter the left column, and Pearls and Emerald with the destroyers will take place from the opposite side of the enemy. In the case of the emergence of commercial ships, these cruisers had to, without additional orders, "drive" them from the course of the squadron. But there were no "contacts", except for the fact that the ships of the squadron were receiving Japanese radiograms. It was clear that the Japanese warships were not too far away, but ZP Rozhestvensky did not order to suppress their negotiations - the very fact of such an attempt, even with her luck, would have warned the Japanese in advance about the approach of the Russian forces.
The night before the battle, that is, from 13 to 14 in May, the squadron was moving with fires extinguished; the light signaling between the ships was not carried out either - the words of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. “The frequent alarms on the Stepanova system often transformed the squadron into some kind of solemn procession of brightly illuminated ships ...” apparently belonged to an earlier time. Other officers of the squadron do not mention any “illumination” or write directly about the lights put out. However, the hospital ships "Eagle" and "Kostroma" came with a full set of side lights, including gaff, which, ultimately, was the cause of the discovery of the Russian squadron.
To understand the reasons for this decision is very difficult, but we will try. As you know, on May 13, the Russian squadron was still undetected, in the sense that there was not a single Japanese combat or auxiliary ship that would come out to our ships in direct visibility. At the same time, the negotiations recorded by our ships became even more numerous and detailed: it was possible to make out the words: "Ten lights ... Like big stars", etc. Approximately in 13.00 on May 13 from “Prince Suvorov” they reported by signals to the rest of the squadron ships: “The enemy makes an alarm by telegraph without wires”. "The enemy scouts see our smoke, they cable a lot among themselves." “We should expect repeated mine attacks tonight” (probably, “repeated” was meant as multiple). Later, after 16.40, by the order of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was given more signals: "Prepare for battle." "I see from telegraph signs that seven enemy ships are talking near us."
Did Z.P. believe? Rozhestvensky to the fact that the Russian squadron was already opened by the Japanese, or did he just want to shake up some commanders before the night, in which you could really expect Japanese mined attacks? Most likely, it’s still the second, since Zinovy Petrovich indicated in his testimony of the investigative commission that the report on the Japanese negotiations “did not quite convince me that the squadron was open the previous night. I, at the present time, cannot say in the affirmative when, exactly, the enemy intelligence officers discovered us. ” Thus, on the night before the battle, the Russian commander did not know for sure whether his squadron was detected, but, of course, admitted such a possibility.
In this situation, a compact marching system without lights and without the avant-garde pushed forward, best fit the wishes of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky evade detection and attacks of the enemy. But such a plan, apparently, made sense only if the blackout was observed by absolutely the entire squadron, but this was not the case.
In some publications, the opinion was expressed that Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not consider it possible to force hospital ships to put out the lights, but this is not true. The fact is that during the squadron's march to Tsushima, he commanded them several times to go without lights, and his order was carried out without question. As for the night from 13 to May 14, the hospital ships directly carried out the order of Z.P. Rozhestvensky, given to them two days ago. The flag signal that 11 took to 15.20 on the Eagle hospital ship, read: “Orel and Kostroma go to the rear of the squadron for the night and turn on the lights” (entry in the Eagle logbook).
Strictly speaking, the situation was complicated by another “innovation” of the Russian commander. As is known, a hospital ship is considered a non-combatant and, according to the international law of those years, the use of military force is prohibited to it. In order to avoid tragic misunderstandings, hospital ships had a lot of differences from ships and vessels for other purposes. Their hull was painted white, with a red or green stripe going on the board, in addition, they carried the flag of the Red Cross and had some other differences.
But all this was clearly visible in the light of day, and at night the hospital ships carried the usual set of lights, just like any other ship. Accordingly, in the dark such a ship was relatively easy to confuse with a transport or auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, in August 1904, the chief doctor of the hospital ship "Eagle" Y.Ya. Multanovsky proposed to install additional gaff signal lights: white-red-white on the mainmast.
This proposal was supported by the Maritime Ministry, and hospital ships were equipped with such lights. The Japanese were notified through diplomatic channels, but they responded very evasively: “Wearing special lights on hospital ships at night is not enough to present to courts with such lights the rights and advantages in the form of many inconveniences that may arise from this.” As a result, the Russian leadership came to the conclusion that the Japanese were against installing additional lights on hospital ships, and wanted to dismantle them already. But here Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. He quite logically stated that international law does not limit the number of lights that a hospital ship can carry, and if so, then there is nothing to consult with the Japanese. Zinovy Petrovich proposed to keep the lights, to notify the Japanese about this - the fact that hospital ships will receive an additional distinction will not be worse, and the Japanese have no right to protest, since international laws do not prohibit this.
All of this was correct, but thanks to these measures, the Russian hospital ships received a clear distinction from all other ships and ships of the world. They could not be confused at night with any commercial steamer. Any observer who discovered white-red-white gaffle lights, now knew exactly what he saw in front of him a Russian hospital ship, and no other. Accordingly, Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, ordering his hospital ships to light all the lights, did not just “light up” the latter, but also, one could say, made every effort to ensure that the Japanese accurately identified them, without confusing “Kostroma” and “Orel”, say, with what some commercial vehicles.
Of course, all of the above sounds highly absurd. However, the whole story Transition 2 th Pacific squadron shows that the Russian commander was not inclined to absurd decisions. He could be mistaken in something, but his orders always had a basis, and were logical.
Let's first ask ourselves the question - why bother with Z.P. Rozhestvensky took with him to the breakthrough and into the battle hospital ships? In the campaign, they certainly were useful to him, serving as such floating hospitals with a large squadron, which was especially valuable in conditions when berthing in the ports was impossible for Russian ships. But Vladivostok was not so far away, and there were doctors of their own, so why would Z.P. Rozhdestvensky did not send "Eagle" and "Kostroma", along with other transports to Shanghai? Or, if we assume that medical facilities in Vladivostok were not sufficient to support the actions of the Russian squadron, then one could send “Orla” and “Kostroma” by another route, for example, around Japan. Their status would allow them to reach Vladivostok much more reliably than they could have done in the squadron, because in the heat of battle they could be mistakenly opened fire.
It is impossible to give an exact answer to this question, but most likely this was the case. As you know, the chances of the Russian squadron to go to Vladivostok without a general battle with the Japanese fleet were minimal, if not illusory. In the testimony of the Investigative Commission, he stated: “I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korean Channel or near the concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that in the afternoon there will be a general battle. ” It is absolutely known that ZP Rozhdestvensky did not count, but did not expect a complete defeat: "... I could not allow myself to think about the complete extermination of the squadron, but, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships." In other words, the Russian commander expected a battle and serious losses, damage to warships, but a large number of wounded always accompanied this. At the same time, the medical assistance that the medical services of warships could provide them was obviously insufficient. Of course, ship's doctors were highly qualified specialists, but they were trite in the state. In addition, various military injuries can greatly interfere with the work of doctors: there are fires in the area of the "hospital", interruptions in clean or hot water, de-energized compartments, etc. including, finally, the death of the ship.
In general, it can be assumed that the presence of hospital ships, even with certain difficulties in transferring the wounded to them after the battle, could save many lives. Or, at least, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. For many dear readers, with a light hand AS Novikov-Priboy and V.P. Kostenko, accustomed to perceive the commander of the Russian squadron as a petty tyrant and a satrap who despises and does not care at all about his subordinates, such a viewpoint may turn out to be too unusual. But you need to understand that this image of the Vice-Admiral was very convenient for explaining the defeat in the Tsushima battle and was great as an allegory for the "rotten Tsarist regime." It is such a Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was in demand - cruel, cowardly and narrow-minded, so Soviet readers got it. Although the real Zinovy Petrovich, of course, was very different from his caricature and popular prints in the same Tsushima of A.S. Novikova-Surf.
But, maybe, the vice admiral could have some other motives to lead hospital ships with him? The author thought a lot about this topic, but did not find anything worthy of attention. Perhaps some versions will be able to offer dear readers?
To the question whether Z.P. Rozhestvensky to separate hospital vessels from the squadron in order to meet them later, on the way to Vladivostok, should be answered in the negative. No one could know how the battle would go, where and at what time the squadron would be after the breakthrough, which means it was almost impossible to assign a rendezvous point.
So, we conclude that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky had reasonable grounds to lead hospital vessels with the squadron. In fact, of course, this was an erroneous decision, because the squadron understood the rout, but the Kostroma and the Eagle did not help the Russian ships, but were intercepted and detained by the Japanese. But it is known today, and then, before the battle, it was not obvious. Yet Z.P. Rozhestvensky assumed that the squadron, although having been defeated, would pass to Vladivostok.
But the decision was made - but how best to do it? It was possible to put hospital ships along with transports under the protection of warships and order them to turn off all the lights. But this created increased risks for them, because if the Japanese had nevertheless discovered the squadron and attacked it, then Kostroma and Oryol could suffer. So, Z.P. Rozhestvensky ordered them to carry absolutely all the lights, but ... at the same time separated them from the squadron.
The fact is that, there is reason to believe that, contrary to popular belief, the Eagle and Kostroma should not have gone directly behind the squadron ships, but had orders to be at a considerable distance from it. So, the commander of the squadron battleship "Sisoy the Great" M.V. In his report, Ozerov pointed out: “At night, the squadron went with reduced to the extreme, light intensity, colored lights, without opening the top ships and only hospital ships lagging behind at night on 40 — the 50 cab., Carried all lights installed for navigation” . The captain of the 2 rank Vl wrote about the same thing. Semenov: “Our squadron was opened for the first time only in 4 hours of 30 minutes in the morning of 14 May, when in the thinning fog of Shinano Maru came across our hospital ships that went 5 miles behind the squadron, and opened a squadron through them.” Moreover, Vl. Semenov argued that "Eagle" and "Kostroma" received a direct order from Z.P. Rozhdestvensky to go at night on 6 miles behind the squadron, although the author of this article did not find documentary evidence of the existence of such an order.
Suppose that “Eagle” and “Kostroma” were not in a squadron formation, but in 4-6 miles behind the squadron. What does this mean? Of course, the burning lights made the ship or vessel more visible at night, but, of course, they did not turn it into the Lighthouse of Alexandria. Unfortunately, the official Japanese historiography does not contain information on how far the Shinano Maru was discovered by the hospital ship Eagle, but V.V. Tsybulko in the “Unread Pages of Tsushima” states that from a distance of 3 miles, that is a little more than 5,5 km. At the same time, according to Japanese reports, the visibility was such that an unlit ship could be seen from approximately 1,5 km — it was from this distance that the Shinano Maru found 2 and 3 Pacific squadrons.
And a very simple conclusion follows from this: the Japanese patrol ship or ship could, of course, detect the main forces of the Russian squadron, or hospital ships — but not both. We will put ourselves in the place of the Russian commander and consider what this could give him.
Suppose that on the day of May 13, the Japanese nevertheless discovered the Russian squadron - this probability should have been taken into account, due to the noticeably increased radio traffic of the Japanese, and ZP Rozhestvensky admitted it. Then the Japanese could well and even should have sent their mine-carrying units into the attack when night fell. Their attacks would have exhausted the crews before the start of the battle, and if successful, they would have been able to torpedo one or more warships, thereby weakening the strength of the Russian squadron.
But if the Japanese destroyers found out the main forces of the Russians, the hospital vessels traveling in the distance would have nothing to do with this, since their lights would not be visible from such a distance. In this case, the battle with the destroyers, of course, would take place, however, the Eagle and Kostroma were not exposed to any danger. And if the Japanese destroyers, on the contrary, found hospital ships, then next to them there were no warships that they could attack. The Japanese would probably have figured out that the Russian squadron was somewhere nearby, but in any case they would have spent some time “clarifying” the hospital courts, they would have to figure out who was likely to follow them in front of them, and all this would take them precious time. And additional gaff lights contributed to the correct identification of the “Eagle” and the “Kostroma”, reducing the likelihood of being confused, for example, with auxiliary Russian cruisers and attacking.
Now consider another option - the Japanese did not see the Russian 13 in May. In this case, again, their patrol ship or vessel would have stumbled upon the main Russian forces, hospital ships had nothing to do with it. Well, if the hospital ships were discovered, well, the Japanese would have to think about where the main Russian forces are.
The presence of two lonely illuminated "Christmas trees" seems like some kind of military trick, to the desire to prompt the Commander of the United Fleet that the Russian squadron is near, but is it really near? There is no doubt that if the Japanese watchman had found the Eagle or Kostroma, he would have spent some time tracking them, perhaps he tried to hold them up for inspection, but he could find out the main forces going 5-6 miles ahead. in theory, he could not. Accordingly, in the event of the discovery of hospital ships, X. Togo should not have yet to withdraw the main forces at sea, fearing some tricks: he should have sent additional cruisers to the area to clarify the situation. But it would be already in the morning or in the morning, and they still need time to establish contact - and the fact that the battle of 14 will take place in the afternoon, ZP Rozhestvensky was absolutely convinced.
Thus, it turns out that the separation of "Eagle" and "Kostroma" from the squadron on the night from 13 to 14 July looks like the best solution in case the Japanese attempt mine attacks. But if the Japanese had not yet seen the Russian squadron, the discovery of hospital ships could have led to the fact that the main forces of the Russian squadron would be discovered a few hours earlier. On the one hand, it would seem that the later the Japanese would have noticed the Russian 14 in May, the better it would have been for ZP. Rozhdestvensky, so for the general battle would be less time left. But ... was the win of several hours so significant? Indeed, from the point of view of the Russian commander, the Japanese could calmly give the battle not at all to 14, but to 15 in May, if, for example, they discovered the Russians of 14 late at night.
It is known that Z.P. Rozhestvensky believed the general battle was inevitable, and from its results he hoped to break through, losing some ships. Apparently (although the vice-admiral did not speak directly about this), he still hoped to inflict such damage on the Japanese that would prevent them from resuming the battle the next day. In this case, a few extra hours did not solve anything, in general. Moreover, oddly enough, but there is no firm conviction that it would be in the interest of ZP to delay the battle with 14 on 15. Rozhdestvensky. On the night from 13 to 14 in May, he had excellent chances to avoid destroyer attacks if they were undertaken, but in the afternoon of 14 in May his squadron should have been noticed with the highest degree of probability. And if this had happened in the evening, when the main forces no longer had time to fight, X. Togo would have sent to the mass of its destroyers in the night from 14 to 15. In this case, the Russians could have suffered sensitive losses even before the start of the battle of the main forces, so that the Russian squadron entered the general battle weakened.
Thus, given the knowledge and data that Zinovy Petrovich had at the time of making the decision, from his point of view, this step could look quite logical and reasonable.
“Well, well,” the respected reader will say: “The author has a great idea of the reasons for the commander, but why did all this not work?”
Let's first take a look at how the Japanese officialdom describes the opening of the Russian squadron. For the convenience of the reader, Russian time will be indicated everywhere, which in the Korean Strait lagged behind the Japanese by 20 minutes.
So, on the night of May 14, on the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, on 02.25, the lights of a steamboat going east were noticed, and this ship was from the Shinano Maru also in the east. In fact, the Russian squadron “slipped” past this auxiliary cruiser, as it was going to the northeast, and if the vessel had not seen the lights, it would not have been noticed by the Shinano Maru.
The captain of the 2 rank, Narikawa, the commander of the Shinano Maru, of course, wanted to find out who he had discovered. But it was not so easy to understand, because the unknown vessel was on the background of the month, and it was difficult to observe it. Therefore, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser set off in pursuit.
According to Japanese historiography, the Shinano-Maru was able to go abreast of an unknown vessel only on 4.10, that is, only 1 an hour 45 minutes after its detection. It looks strange because the Russian squadron on the night of May 14 was on 8 nodes, and the Japanese auxiliary cruiser was a newly built (1900 g) commercial vessel with a maximum speed of 15,4 node.
Assuming that V.V. Tsibulko is right that the Shinano-Maru found the Russian ship approximately 3 miles, that it should have been circumvented in an arc and approached, keeping a distance of more than 1,5 km, and that the Japanese cruiser most likely did not give full speed, but went somewhere on 12 nodes, it would still take him a little less time. However, it is possible that Narikawa just cautious?
Approaching the Russian ship on the left in 04.10, the Shinano Maru identified it as a three-mast and two-tube vessel, similar to the auxiliary cruiser Dnepr. The Japanese came a little closer, but did not see the mounted guns, and therefore correctly assumed that they were seeing a hospital ship in front of them. At the same time, the Russians, in the opinion of the Japanese, noticed the Shinano-Maru and began signaling something with an electric lantern, however, Narikawa was not sure about that. From this it could follow that on the hospital ship they confused the Shinano-Maru with another Russian ship, from which, in turn, it followed that they, these ships, were somewhere nearby. The commander of the Japanese auxiliary cruiser ordered to carefully inspect the horizon, and in 04.25: “I saw several dozen ships ahead of me and from the left side at a distance of no more than 1 500.” Then the "Shinano Maru" turned away, and it is not even clear which way: unfortunately, the official Japanese history does not contain information that allows us to determine with any certainty the further maneuvering of this ship. What is known for sure is that the Shinano Maru, despite its maneuvers, continued to monitor the Russian ships, but 05.00 lost sight of the squadron and was able to restore contact only after 45 minutes, in 05.45.
And what about the Russians? Most likely, on the "Eagle" "Shinano-Maru" all this time remained unnoticed.
It is believed that the Japanese auxiliary cruiser was found around 5 in the morning on the Orel, but the author of this article has great doubts about this. The fact is that midshipman Shcherbachev 4, who is on the Orel, reported that a Japanese steamer was seen from a hospital ship on the right, at a distance of 40 cables, while he was approaching. But if the Shinano-Maru was to the left of the Eagle in 04.25, and no less than the 7-10 cable, then it is extremely doubtful that he could be four miles to the right after half an hour.
Moreover. If we assume that the Shinano Maru approached the Eagle on the left, then where was Kostroma at that time? According to her commander’s report:
What conclusions can be drawn from this extremely fragmented information?
Suppose the commander of the Shinano Maru was not mistaken. But then it turns out that by the time his auxiliary cruiser was abolished by the Eagle, the main forces of the Russian squadron were both from the hospital ship and from the Shinano Maru no more than a mile away. And this suggests that at night our hospital vessels, or at least one of them (it’s still possible that Narikawa didn’t find “Eagle” but “Kostroma”) violated Z.P. Rozhdestvensky and approached the squadron close. In this case, the blame for the discovery of the Russian squadron lies with the commander (s?) Of the hospital ships that violated the order they received.
Option two - both Kostroma and Eagle honestly followed the instructions given to them and followed in 5-6 miles along the stern of the Russian squadron. In this case, it turns out that, going to the traverse of the “Eagle”, Narikawa was mistaken: he considered that he was seeing the Russian squadron, which he could not see physically. The only ship that he could observe, being close to the Eagle, was the hospital ship Kostroma! And then, alas, the tragedy of mistakes began. On the “Kostroma”, “seeing” the 4 of the Japanese cruisers and having lost sight of them, for some reason, they rushed to catch up with the squadron. To be honest, most of all it comes to mind that at Kostroma they were simply frightened and ran under the protection of warships. And “Shinano-Maru”, believing that he was following the Russian squadron, was actually following “Kostroma”, which, ultimately, brought him to the main forces of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky ... Although the Japanese auxiliary cruiser had lost sight of the Kostroma near 05.00, but knowing the course it was following and which coincided with the course of the main forces of Z.P. Rozhestvensky, later managed to catch up with them. Then the real time of the discovery of the Russian squadron is 05.45, and this happened thanks to the illiterate actions of the Kostroma commander.
As for the evaluation of the actions of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, it turns out like this. His decision to take hospital ships with him, although it was erroneous, but at that time looked logical and, apparently, was dictated by concern for the health of the squadron personnel. The risks of premature detection of the main squadron forces, as well as the danger of being subjected to a bearing attack, were minimized by ordering hospital ships to keep behind the squadron. However, the plans of the commander were violated by the wrong actions of the commanders of the "Eagle" and "Kostroma" or Kostroma alone.
And in any case, it can only be stated that the circumstances of the discovery of the Russian squadron on the night from 13 to 14 in May and to this day remain unclear and require additional research.
How it all began
So, the Russian squadron was approaching the Tsushima Strait. But 12 May in 09.00 morning she divided: 6 transports went to Shanghai, and auxiliary cruisers "Rion", "Dnepr", "Kuban" and "Terek" left to perform a special task, which consists of cruising along the Japanese coast and in the Yellow Sea. Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not believe that these weak forces could somehow divert X. Togo’s main forces, but he found it useful that their raiding could force the Japanese to send several armored cruisers to intercept, and thereby weaken the patrols in the area where 2 th and 3 th Pacific Squadron.
Russian ships were moving in a compact marching order.
It was assumed that in the event of the appearance of an enemy, the reconnaissance detachment would retreat to the cruisers in order to guard the transports, the right column, increasing the course and then turning, “all of a sudden” would go around and enter the left column, and Pearls and Emerald with the destroyers will take place from the opposite side of the enemy. In the case of the emergence of commercial ships, these cruisers had to, without additional orders, "drive" them from the course of the squadron. But there were no "contacts", except for the fact that the ships of the squadron were receiving Japanese radiograms. It was clear that the Japanese warships were not too far away, but ZP Rozhestvensky did not order to suppress their negotiations - the very fact of such an attempt, even with her luck, would have warned the Japanese in advance about the approach of the Russian forces.
The night before the battle, that is, from 13 to 14 in May, the squadron was moving with fires extinguished; the light signaling between the ships was not carried out either - the words of Rear Admiral N.I. Nebogatov. “The frequent alarms on the Stepanova system often transformed the squadron into some kind of solemn procession of brightly illuminated ships ...” apparently belonged to an earlier time. Other officers of the squadron do not mention any “illumination” or write directly about the lights put out. However, the hospital ships "Eagle" and "Kostroma" came with a full set of side lights, including gaff, which, ultimately, was the cause of the discovery of the Russian squadron.
To understand the reasons for this decision is very difficult, but we will try. As you know, on May 13, the Russian squadron was still undetected, in the sense that there was not a single Japanese combat or auxiliary ship that would come out to our ships in direct visibility. At the same time, the negotiations recorded by our ships became even more numerous and detailed: it was possible to make out the words: "Ten lights ... Like big stars", etc. Approximately in 13.00 on May 13 from “Prince Suvorov” they reported by signals to the rest of the squadron ships: “The enemy makes an alarm by telegraph without wires”. "The enemy scouts see our smoke, they cable a lot among themselves." “We should expect repeated mine attacks tonight” (probably, “repeated” was meant as multiple). Later, after 16.40, by the order of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was given more signals: "Prepare for battle." "I see from telegraph signs that seven enemy ships are talking near us."
Did Z.P. believe? Rozhestvensky to the fact that the Russian squadron was already opened by the Japanese, or did he just want to shake up some commanders before the night, in which you could really expect Japanese mined attacks? Most likely, it’s still the second, since Zinovy Petrovich indicated in his testimony of the investigative commission that the report on the Japanese negotiations “did not quite convince me that the squadron was open the previous night. I, at the present time, cannot say in the affirmative when, exactly, the enemy intelligence officers discovered us. ” Thus, on the night before the battle, the Russian commander did not know for sure whether his squadron was detected, but, of course, admitted such a possibility.
In this situation, a compact marching system without lights and without the avant-garde pushed forward, best fit the wishes of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky evade detection and attacks of the enemy. But such a plan, apparently, made sense only if the blackout was observed by absolutely the entire squadron, but this was not the case.
In some publications, the opinion was expressed that Z.P. Rozhestvensky did not consider it possible to force hospital ships to put out the lights, but this is not true. The fact is that during the squadron's march to Tsushima, he commanded them several times to go without lights, and his order was carried out without question. As for the night from 13 to May 14, the hospital ships directly carried out the order of Z.P. Rozhestvensky, given to them two days ago. The flag signal that 11 took to 15.20 on the Eagle hospital ship, read: “Orel and Kostroma go to the rear of the squadron for the night and turn on the lights” (entry in the Eagle logbook).
What kind of lights carried "Eagle" and "Kostroma"?
Strictly speaking, the situation was complicated by another “innovation” of the Russian commander. As is known, a hospital ship is considered a non-combatant and, according to the international law of those years, the use of military force is prohibited to it. In order to avoid tragic misunderstandings, hospital ships had a lot of differences from ships and vessels for other purposes. Their hull was painted white, with a red or green stripe going on the board, in addition, they carried the flag of the Red Cross and had some other differences.
Hospital ship "Kostroma"
But all this was clearly visible in the light of day, and at night the hospital ships carried the usual set of lights, just like any other ship. Accordingly, in the dark such a ship was relatively easy to confuse with a transport or auxiliary cruiser. Therefore, in August 1904, the chief doctor of the hospital ship "Eagle" Y.Ya. Multanovsky proposed to install additional gaff signal lights: white-red-white on the mainmast.
This proposal was supported by the Maritime Ministry, and hospital ships were equipped with such lights. The Japanese were notified through diplomatic channels, but they responded very evasively: “Wearing special lights on hospital ships at night is not enough to present to courts with such lights the rights and advantages in the form of many inconveniences that may arise from this.” As a result, the Russian leadership came to the conclusion that the Japanese were against installing additional lights on hospital ships, and wanted to dismantle them already. But here Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. He quite logically stated that international law does not limit the number of lights that a hospital ship can carry, and if so, then there is nothing to consult with the Japanese. Zinovy Petrovich proposed to keep the lights, to notify the Japanese about this - the fact that hospital ships will receive an additional distinction will not be worse, and the Japanese have no right to protest, since international laws do not prohibit this.
All of this was correct, but thanks to these measures, the Russian hospital ships received a clear distinction from all other ships and ships of the world. They could not be confused at night with any commercial steamer. Any observer who discovered white-red-white gaffle lights, now knew exactly what he saw in front of him a Russian hospital ship, and no other. Accordingly, Vice Admiral Z.P. Rozhestvensky, ordering his hospital ships to light all the lights, did not just “light up” the latter, but also, one could say, made every effort to ensure that the Japanese accurately identified them, without confusing “Kostroma” and “Orel”, say, with what some commercial vehicles.
But why then was it to turn on the lights?
Of course, all of the above sounds highly absurd. However, the whole story Transition 2 th Pacific squadron shows that the Russian commander was not inclined to absurd decisions. He could be mistaken in something, but his orders always had a basis, and were logical.
Let's first ask ourselves the question - why bother with Z.P. Rozhestvensky took with him to the breakthrough and into the battle hospital ships? In the campaign, they certainly were useful to him, serving as such floating hospitals with a large squadron, which was especially valuable in conditions when berthing in the ports was impossible for Russian ships. But Vladivostok was not so far away, and there were doctors of their own, so why would Z.P. Rozhdestvensky did not send "Eagle" and "Kostroma", along with other transports to Shanghai? Or, if we assume that medical facilities in Vladivostok were not sufficient to support the actions of the Russian squadron, then one could send “Orla” and “Kostroma” by another route, for example, around Japan. Their status would allow them to reach Vladivostok much more reliably than they could have done in the squadron, because in the heat of battle they could be mistakenly opened fire.
It is impossible to give an exact answer to this question, but most likely this was the case. As you know, the chances of the Russian squadron to go to Vladivostok without a general battle with the Japanese fleet were minimal, if not illusory. In the testimony of the Investigative Commission, he stated: “I expected that the squadron would meet in the Korean Channel or near the concentrated forces of the Japanese fleet, a significant proportion of armored and light cruisers and the entire mine fleet. I was sure that in the afternoon there will be a general battle. ” It is absolutely known that ZP Rozhdestvensky did not count, but did not expect a complete defeat: "... I could not allow myself to think about the complete extermination of the squadron, but, by analogy with the battle on July 28, 1904, I had reason to consider it possible to reach Vladivostok with the loss of several ships." In other words, the Russian commander expected a battle and serious losses, damage to warships, but a large number of wounded always accompanied this. At the same time, the medical assistance that the medical services of warships could provide them was obviously insufficient. Of course, ship's doctors were highly qualified specialists, but they were trite in the state. In addition, various military injuries can greatly interfere with the work of doctors: there are fires in the area of the "hospital", interruptions in clean or hot water, de-energized compartments, etc. including, finally, the death of the ship.
In general, it can be assumed that the presence of hospital ships, even with certain difficulties in transferring the wounded to them after the battle, could save many lives. Or, at least, Z.P. Rozhdestvensky. For many dear readers, with a light hand AS Novikov-Priboy and V.P. Kostenko, accustomed to perceive the commander of the Russian squadron as a petty tyrant and a satrap who despises and does not care at all about his subordinates, such a viewpoint may turn out to be too unusual. But you need to understand that this image of the Vice-Admiral was very convenient for explaining the defeat in the Tsushima battle and was great as an allegory for the "rotten Tsarist regime." It is such a Z.P. Rozhdestvensky was in demand - cruel, cowardly and narrow-minded, so Soviet readers got it. Although the real Zinovy Petrovich, of course, was very different from his caricature and popular prints in the same Tsushima of A.S. Novikova-Surf.
But, maybe, the vice admiral could have some other motives to lead hospital ships with him? The author thought a lot about this topic, but did not find anything worthy of attention. Perhaps some versions will be able to offer dear readers?
To the question whether Z.P. Rozhestvensky to separate hospital vessels from the squadron in order to meet them later, on the way to Vladivostok, should be answered in the negative. No one could know how the battle would go, where and at what time the squadron would be after the breakthrough, which means it was almost impossible to assign a rendezvous point.
So, we conclude that Z.P. Rozhdestvensky had reasonable grounds to lead hospital vessels with the squadron. In fact, of course, this was an erroneous decision, because the squadron understood the rout, but the Kostroma and the Eagle did not help the Russian ships, but were intercepted and detained by the Japanese. But it is known today, and then, before the battle, it was not obvious. Yet Z.P. Rozhestvensky assumed that the squadron, although having been defeated, would pass to Vladivostok.
But the decision was made - but how best to do it? It was possible to put hospital ships along with transports under the protection of warships and order them to turn off all the lights. But this created increased risks for them, because if the Japanese had nevertheless discovered the squadron and attacked it, then Kostroma and Oryol could suffer. So, Z.P. Rozhestvensky ordered them to carry absolutely all the lights, but ... at the same time separated them from the squadron.
The fact is that, there is reason to believe that, contrary to popular belief, the Eagle and Kostroma should not have gone directly behind the squadron ships, but had orders to be at a considerable distance from it. So, the commander of the squadron battleship "Sisoy the Great" M.V. In his report, Ozerov pointed out: “At night, the squadron went with reduced to the extreme, light intensity, colored lights, without opening the top ships and only hospital ships lagging behind at night on 40 — the 50 cab., Carried all lights installed for navigation” . The captain of the 2 rank Vl wrote about the same thing. Semenov: “Our squadron was opened for the first time only in 4 hours of 30 minutes in the morning of 14 May, when in the thinning fog of Shinano Maru came across our hospital ships that went 5 miles behind the squadron, and opened a squadron through them.” Moreover, Vl. Semenov argued that "Eagle" and "Kostroma" received a direct order from Z.P. Rozhdestvensky to go at night on 6 miles behind the squadron, although the author of this article did not find documentary evidence of the existence of such an order.
Suppose that “Eagle” and “Kostroma” were not in a squadron formation, but in 4-6 miles behind the squadron. What does this mean? Of course, the burning lights made the ship or vessel more visible at night, but, of course, they did not turn it into the Lighthouse of Alexandria. Unfortunately, the official Japanese historiography does not contain information on how far the Shinano Maru was discovered by the hospital ship Eagle, but V.V. Tsybulko in the “Unread Pages of Tsushima” states that from a distance of 3 miles, that is a little more than 5,5 km. At the same time, according to Japanese reports, the visibility was such that an unlit ship could be seen from approximately 1,5 km — it was from this distance that the Shinano Maru found 2 and 3 Pacific squadrons.
And a very simple conclusion follows from this: the Japanese patrol ship or ship could, of course, detect the main forces of the Russian squadron, or hospital ships — but not both. We will put ourselves in the place of the Russian commander and consider what this could give him.
Suppose that on the day of May 13, the Japanese nevertheless discovered the Russian squadron - this probability should have been taken into account, due to the noticeably increased radio traffic of the Japanese, and ZP Rozhestvensky admitted it. Then the Japanese could well and even should have sent their mine-carrying units into the attack when night fell. Their attacks would have exhausted the crews before the start of the battle, and if successful, they would have been able to torpedo one or more warships, thereby weakening the strength of the Russian squadron.
But if the Japanese destroyers found out the main forces of the Russians, the hospital vessels traveling in the distance would have nothing to do with this, since their lights would not be visible from such a distance. In this case, the battle with the destroyers, of course, would take place, however, the Eagle and Kostroma were not exposed to any danger. And if the Japanese destroyers, on the contrary, found hospital ships, then next to them there were no warships that they could attack. The Japanese would probably have figured out that the Russian squadron was somewhere nearby, but in any case they would have spent some time “clarifying” the hospital courts, they would have to figure out who was likely to follow them in front of them, and all this would take them precious time. And additional gaff lights contributed to the correct identification of the “Eagle” and the “Kostroma”, reducing the likelihood of being confused, for example, with auxiliary Russian cruisers and attacking.
Now consider another option - the Japanese did not see the Russian 13 in May. In this case, again, their patrol ship or vessel would have stumbled upon the main Russian forces, hospital ships had nothing to do with it. Well, if the hospital ships were discovered, well, the Japanese would have to think about where the main Russian forces are.
The presence of two lonely illuminated "Christmas trees" seems like some kind of military trick, to the desire to prompt the Commander of the United Fleet that the Russian squadron is near, but is it really near? There is no doubt that if the Japanese watchman had found the Eagle or Kostroma, he would have spent some time tracking them, perhaps he tried to hold them up for inspection, but he could find out the main forces going 5-6 miles ahead. in theory, he could not. Accordingly, in the event of the discovery of hospital ships, X. Togo should not have yet to withdraw the main forces at sea, fearing some tricks: he should have sent additional cruisers to the area to clarify the situation. But it would be already in the morning or in the morning, and they still need time to establish contact - and the fact that the battle of 14 will take place in the afternoon, ZP Rozhestvensky was absolutely convinced.
Thus, it turns out that the separation of "Eagle" and "Kostroma" from the squadron on the night from 13 to 14 July looks like the best solution in case the Japanese attempt mine attacks. But if the Japanese had not yet seen the Russian squadron, the discovery of hospital ships could have led to the fact that the main forces of the Russian squadron would be discovered a few hours earlier. On the one hand, it would seem that the later the Japanese would have noticed the Russian 14 in May, the better it would have been for ZP. Rozhdestvensky, so for the general battle would be less time left. But ... was the win of several hours so significant? Indeed, from the point of view of the Russian commander, the Japanese could calmly give the battle not at all to 14, but to 15 in May, if, for example, they discovered the Russians of 14 late at night.
It is known that Z.P. Rozhestvensky believed the general battle was inevitable, and from its results he hoped to break through, losing some ships. Apparently (although the vice-admiral did not speak directly about this), he still hoped to inflict such damage on the Japanese that would prevent them from resuming the battle the next day. In this case, a few extra hours did not solve anything, in general. Moreover, oddly enough, but there is no firm conviction that it would be in the interest of ZP to delay the battle with 14 on 15. Rozhdestvensky. On the night from 13 to 14 in May, he had excellent chances to avoid destroyer attacks if they were undertaken, but in the afternoon of 14 in May his squadron should have been noticed with the highest degree of probability. And if this had happened in the evening, when the main forces no longer had time to fight, X. Togo would have sent to the mass of its destroyers in the night from 14 to 15. In this case, the Russians could have suffered sensitive losses even before the start of the battle of the main forces, so that the Russian squadron entered the general battle weakened.
Thus, given the knowledge and data that Zinovy Petrovich had at the time of making the decision, from his point of view, this step could look quite logical and reasonable.
“Well, well,” the respected reader will say: “The author has a great idea of the reasons for the commander, but why did all this not work?”
What happened after all?
Let's first take a look at how the Japanese officialdom describes the opening of the Russian squadron. For the convenience of the reader, Russian time will be indicated everywhere, which in the Korean Strait lagged behind the Japanese by 20 minutes.
So, on the night of May 14, on the Japanese auxiliary cruiser Shinano-Maru, on 02.25, the lights of a steamboat going east were noticed, and this ship was from the Shinano Maru also in the east. In fact, the Russian squadron “slipped” past this auxiliary cruiser, as it was going to the northeast, and if the vessel had not seen the lights, it would not have been noticed by the Shinano Maru.
The captain of the 2 rank, Narikawa, the commander of the Shinano Maru, of course, wanted to find out who he had discovered. But it was not so easy to understand, because the unknown vessel was on the background of the month, and it was difficult to observe it. Therefore, the Japanese auxiliary cruiser set off in pursuit.
According to Japanese historiography, the Shinano-Maru was able to go abreast of an unknown vessel only on 4.10, that is, only 1 an hour 45 minutes after its detection. It looks strange because the Russian squadron on the night of May 14 was on 8 nodes, and the Japanese auxiliary cruiser was a newly built (1900 g) commercial vessel with a maximum speed of 15,4 node.
"Shinano Maru"
Assuming that V.V. Tsibulko is right that the Shinano-Maru found the Russian ship approximately 3 miles, that it should have been circumvented in an arc and approached, keeping a distance of more than 1,5 km, and that the Japanese cruiser most likely did not give full speed, but went somewhere on 12 nodes, it would still take him a little less time. However, it is possible that Narikawa just cautious?
Approaching the Russian ship on the left in 04.10, the Shinano Maru identified it as a three-mast and two-tube vessel, similar to the auxiliary cruiser Dnepr. The Japanese came a little closer, but did not see the mounted guns, and therefore correctly assumed that they were seeing a hospital ship in front of them. At the same time, the Russians, in the opinion of the Japanese, noticed the Shinano-Maru and began signaling something with an electric lantern, however, Narikawa was not sure about that. From this it could follow that on the hospital ship they confused the Shinano-Maru with another Russian ship, from which, in turn, it followed that they, these ships, were somewhere nearby. The commander of the Japanese auxiliary cruiser ordered to carefully inspect the horizon, and in 04.25: “I saw several dozen ships ahead of me and from the left side at a distance of no more than 1 500.” Then the "Shinano Maru" turned away, and it is not even clear which way: unfortunately, the official Japanese history does not contain information that allows us to determine with any certainty the further maneuvering of this ship. What is known for sure is that the Shinano Maru, despite its maneuvers, continued to monitor the Russian ships, but 05.00 lost sight of the squadron and was able to restore contact only after 45 minutes, in 05.45.
And what about the Russians? Most likely, on the "Eagle" "Shinano-Maru" all this time remained unnoticed.
Hospital ship "Eagle"
It is believed that the Japanese auxiliary cruiser was found around 5 in the morning on the Orel, but the author of this article has great doubts about this. The fact is that midshipman Shcherbachev 4, who is on the Orel, reported that a Japanese steamer was seen from a hospital ship on the right, at a distance of 40 cables, while he was approaching. But if the Shinano-Maru was to the left of the Eagle in 04.25, and no less than the 7-10 cable, then it is extremely doubtful that he could be four miles to the right after half an hour.
Moreover. If we assume that the Shinano Maru approached the Eagle on the left, then where was Kostroma at that time? According to her commander’s report:
“20 minutes past four o'clock in the morning, the 10 cabled stern 4 of enemy cruisers, having a course Zuyd, were detected from the vessel. He waited a few minutes and, as soon as they disappeared into the darkness, he raised the signal of what he had seen; and, making sure that the signal was not seen, the Ural cruiser caught up ahead of me, and the flag waving conveyed this information, which was transmitted further by the Ural. ”
What conclusions can be drawn from this extremely fragmented information?
Suppose the commander of the Shinano Maru was not mistaken. But then it turns out that by the time his auxiliary cruiser was abolished by the Eagle, the main forces of the Russian squadron were both from the hospital ship and from the Shinano Maru no more than a mile away. And this suggests that at night our hospital vessels, or at least one of them (it’s still possible that Narikawa didn’t find “Eagle” but “Kostroma”) violated Z.P. Rozhdestvensky and approached the squadron close. In this case, the blame for the discovery of the Russian squadron lies with the commander (s?) Of the hospital ships that violated the order they received.
Option two - both Kostroma and Eagle honestly followed the instructions given to them and followed in 5-6 miles along the stern of the Russian squadron. In this case, it turns out that, going to the traverse of the “Eagle”, Narikawa was mistaken: he considered that he was seeing the Russian squadron, which he could not see physically. The only ship that he could observe, being close to the Eagle, was the hospital ship Kostroma! And then, alas, the tragedy of mistakes began. On the “Kostroma”, “seeing” the 4 of the Japanese cruisers and having lost sight of them, for some reason, they rushed to catch up with the squadron. To be honest, most of all it comes to mind that at Kostroma they were simply frightened and ran under the protection of warships. And “Shinano-Maru”, believing that he was following the Russian squadron, was actually following “Kostroma”, which, ultimately, brought him to the main forces of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky ... Although the Japanese auxiliary cruiser had lost sight of the Kostroma near 05.00, but knowing the course it was following and which coincided with the course of the main forces of Z.P. Rozhestvensky, later managed to catch up with them. Then the real time of the discovery of the Russian squadron is 05.45, and this happened thanks to the illiterate actions of the Kostroma commander.
As for the evaluation of the actions of Z.P. Rozhdestvensky, it turns out like this. His decision to take hospital ships with him, although it was erroneous, but at that time looked logical and, apparently, was dictated by concern for the health of the squadron personnel. The risks of premature detection of the main squadron forces, as well as the danger of being subjected to a bearing attack, were minimized by ordering hospital ships to keep behind the squadron. However, the plans of the commander were violated by the wrong actions of the commanders of the "Eagle" and "Kostroma" or Kostroma alone.
And in any case, it can only be stated that the circumstances of the discovery of the Russian squadron on the night from 13 to 14 in May and to this day remain unclear and require additional research.
Information