Real threats in the Arctic: from under the water and from the air
The North Ocean is a vast field,
where ... Russian glory may be exacerbated
Russian power will grow
Siberia and the Northern Ocean.
where ... Russian glory may be exacerbated
Russian power will grow
Siberia and the Northern Ocean.
Mv Lomonosov
Today it is obvious that the Arctic will play an increasing role for the economy and military security of Russia every year. And in this regard, we understand the great efforts and investments in the development of the capabilities of the state, the armed forces, the solution of the tasks facing us in Artik
Photo: morvesti.ru
Tasks in the Arctic
At the Army-2018 forum, at a conference held by the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the report of the Navy "Main threats to the military security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region" showed an assessment of the main threats to the military security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and outlined the main activities carried out by the Russian Navy. with this in mind.
Basically, that's right. Questions are caused only by the lack of priorities (the main thing is secondary).
The efforts of the state and the Ministry of Defense in the Arctic are great and, of course, expedient. But the question arises: how effective are they and where are they directed? And in the end, what do performers do and how objective are their reports? Especially in view of external threats and the exacerbation of the military-political situation.
RIA "News":
Commander of the Russian North fleet Admiral Nikolai Evmenov said that the risk of conflicts in the Arctic region is increasing.
Admiral N. Evmenov
Our objectives in the Arctic are objectively:
• control of the general situation, areas of the Arctic possessions of Russia, the Northern Sea Route routes and their provision (navigation, rescue, maintenance, supply, ice wiring, etc.);
• participation in strategic containment through the use of strategic nuclear forces aviation and the forces of the Navy (including non-nuclear) and their support (including the destruction of PLA-hunters and ships of missile defense vehicles of the enemy);
• provision of cargo transportation (including the “duplication” of Transib for special cargoes);
• defense of the territory of the Russian Federation from sea directions.
A grouping of the Northern Fleet was deployed in Artik, on the basis of which in the 2014 was created the joint strategic command of the North Sea Guard (in fact, by status, the district).
Deployed extensive construction of the Arctic bases, the restoration of the airfield network. The mistake of our military withdrawal from the Arctic of previous years began to be corrected.
Long-range plans provide for the deployment of air defense groups:
Six “ground defense units”: C-400 and Pantsir C1 - Severomorsk, Novaya Zemlya, Fr. Middle, about. Boiler, m. Schmidt, village Tiksi.
Arctic airfields (construction and reconstruction): Novaya Zemlya, Fr. Alexandra Land (Franz Josef Archipelago), Fr. Boiler room (with reception support including long-range aircraft), Tiksi village, Naryan-Mar, Norilsk (the last two are dual-use).
To control the route of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) on about. Boiler, m. Schmidt, about. Wrangel provides for the deployment of the “Sunflower” radar (the detection zone of surface targets of each - 400-450 km).
Everything is good? How to say…
The first question arises on the real threats in Artik and what the Northern Fleet is preparing for.
BOD "Fists" with a group of ships and vessels not on the route NSR. In 2018, the city was put out of action due to the ice damage of the antenna of the PJSC Polynom.
It is obvious that (so far) the only adversary in the Arctic is the United States and NATO. At the same time, it is out of the question to carry out, even in the medium term, “amphibious assault operations” and “breakthroughs of ships” along the route of the Northern Sea Route, etc. “Virtual threats” that our Northern Fleet has been so persistently preparing to “repel” in recent years: “search for enemy submarines in the Norwegian Sea with SF cruisers” (who will give them during the war?) deploying SCRC "Bastion" on about. Boiler room. The latter is generally beyond the bounds of common sense and understanding - with whom is Bastion going to “fight” with it? With "groups of Canadian polar bears - violators of the state border of the Russian Federation"?
... the forces of the Northern Fleet, located in the area of the Novosibirsk Islands archipelago, conducted an exercise to protect the Arctic island zone and the sea coast of the Russian Federation with rocket firing ... a coastal missile system "Bastion" was used, carrying combat duty on Kotelny Island (the archipelago of the Novosibirsk Islands).
As Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, commander of the Northern Fleet, summed up the preliminary results of the exercise, “the calculation of the coastal missile complex Bastion successfully performed rocket firing at a sea target position at a distance of more than 60 kilometers, which confirmed its readiness to effectively maintain combat duty in the Arctic and perform tasks for the protection of the island zone and the sea coast of Russia ".
As Admiral Nikolai Evmenov, commander of the Northern Fleet, summed up the preliminary results of the exercise, “the calculation of the coastal missile complex Bastion successfully performed rocket firing at a sea target position at a distance of more than 60 kilometers, which confirmed its readiness to effectively maintain combat duty in the Arctic and perform tasks for the protection of the island zone and the sea coast of Russia ".
Absolutely antique and inoperative anti-mine forces of the Northern Fleet imitate the “combat training” of long outdated “walking on the mines with trawls”.
The minesweepers of the Northern Fleet work out the search and destruction of mines in the Barents Sea as part of three ship trawling groups operating the crews of five trawlers.
The seamen of the North Sea were training the escort of the ship search and strike group of small anti-submarine ships "Jung" and "Snezhnogorsk" behind the trawls, using the whole range of anti-mine armaments - hydroacoustic stations searching for anchor and bottom mines and various types of trawls ...
The base minesweepers “Kotelnich”, “Kolomna” and “Yadrin” as part of the mine-sweeping group worked out maneuvering, setting trawls, searching for sea mines and trawling a certain section of the marine water area.
The seamen of the North Sea were training the escort of the ship search and strike group of small anti-submarine ships "Jung" and "Snezhnogorsk" behind the trawls, using the whole range of anti-mine armaments - hydroacoustic stations searching for anchor and bottom mines and various types of trawls ...
The base minesweepers “Kotelnich”, “Kolomna” and “Yadrin” as part of the mine-sweeping group worked out maneuvering, setting trawls, searching for sea mines and trawling a certain section of the marine water area.
Trawls ... trawls ... trawls. There are no any kind of modern mine ships (PMK) in the Northern Fleet, the existing minesweepers do not have a single submersible vehicle (the only Ketmen on the MSSh Gumanenko with a high probability is not in order, and it does not make sense, t. to. blown up on the very first “smart” mine).
Certainly, a positive moment is the creation of the Arctic 80-th separate motorized rifle brigade with the task of controlling the territories from Murmansk to the Novosibirsk Islands in operational interaction with the units of the Airborne Forces and the Marine Corps of the Northern Fleet. The main thing was that not only the force appeared, ready to act in difficult physiographic conditions, but also having the appropriate equipment, which was regularly checked under these conditions.
However, there are serious problems that significantly impede the use of the Arctic brigade in real conditions.
First of all, they are means of landing (what the Northern Fleet demonstrated at the exercises is just an example of how to do it in a real war), and the limited design capacity of the new Arctic military camps.
Part of the problem of transport can be solved by helicopters, especially the Arctic Mi-8AMTSH-VA, which received the most positive feedback from the troops. However, after disembarking from it, the personnel remains only with what they can carry on their own two. To place snowmobiles and ATVs in the cabin? Then we “throw out” people (and the number of helicopters is limited). The solution could be the possibility of placing cargo and small-scale transport of troops on the pylons of the helicopter, but this simple question, long “hanging in the air”, has not yet received a “technical answer”.
Here the question arises: why “helicopters to landing”? With "bears to fight"?
And then, that the real situation and the balance of forces in the Arctic is far from being beneficial for us.
Enemy
Actual threats in the Arctic are real and emanate from the air and from under the water (ice).
From the air, these are strategic bombers (more than 120 units) and cruise missiles, tactical and carrier-based aircraft, (shock) UAVs of the United States and NATO for long-range airplanes to provide a powerful group of fighters and AWACS.
12 on April 2019, the US Department of Defense issued a contract to Boeing Corporation worth 14,3143 billion to upgrade the weapons systems of the B-1B and B-52H strategic bombers. The contract is for ten years - until April 11 2029.
And this is for us a “direct and clear threat”, and first of all in the Arctic.
From under water (ice) is:
• actions of the US Navy and Great Britain PLA against the Northern Fleet and especially NSNF;
• minefields (aviation, submarine and submarine, in the near future - underwater robotic systems (RTC)).
The US and British Navy have been operating in the Arctic for a long time. Photo: PLA group ascent near the North Pole during the ICEX 1986 exercise.
In addition, we should not forget about the "traditional American occupation in the war" - the seizure of foreign airfields to ensure the most effective use of their aircraft against the enemy.
The loss of the airfield on about. The boiler room (plans for which allow for the use of long-range aircraft) will have extremely serious strategic consequences. This is not only the loss of the NSR for us, obviously (from previous experience of the US wars) that within a few days at the aerodrome hundreds of flights of military transport aircraft will create not only a powerful air force base of the US Air Force, but also in the short term there will be an aerodrome to ensure strikes deep into the territory of the Russian Federation and the "call to Siberia".
Special Operations Forces Helicopter (MTR) US MH-47G
Consider the situation in more detail.
NSNF
The photo that became the scandal a few years ago:
Pictures taken at the beginning of August 2015. As it is easy to see in the pictures, five SSBNs are simultaneously in the Gadzhievo database - four 667BDRM projects (K-51 Verkhoturye, K-84 Ekaterinburg, K-18 Karelia and K-407 Novomoskovsk) and the new K- 535 "Yuri Dolgoruky" of the 955 project (which has not started combat duty so far). Taking into account the fact that X-NUMX Ту Tula SSBN of the 114BDRM project is undergoing average repair at the headquarters enterprise of Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center in Severodvinsk, it can be concluded that only one boat was in the sea at the time of this photo session. this division - K-667 "Bryansk" project 117BDRM.
Thus, it is clear that 80 deployed strategic carriers (ballistic missiles) and 352 deployed nuclear warheads (in other words, 15,5% of the total number of carriers and 22,25% of the number of deployed nuclear warheads of all strategic nuclear forces of Russia) were in a state of fixed aggregation, in an almost unprotected form, in one place and can be guaranteed to be destroyed by one nuclear combat unit of the enemy. This is a clear example of the level of real combat readiness and the overall combat value of the naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) of Russia, on which astronomical resources are spent. It is completely obvious that the guaranteed destruction of the nuclear warheads of ground-based ballistic missiles of the strategic missile forces by a single nuclear warhead of the enemy 352 is impossible in principle.
Thus, it is clear that 80 deployed strategic carriers (ballistic missiles) and 352 deployed nuclear warheads (in other words, 15,5% of the total number of carriers and 22,25% of the number of deployed nuclear warheads of all strategic nuclear forces of Russia) were in a state of fixed aggregation, in an almost unprotected form, in one place and can be guaranteed to be destroyed by one nuclear combat unit of the enemy. This is a clear example of the level of real combat readiness and the overall combat value of the naval strategic nuclear forces (NSNF) of Russia, on which astronomical resources are spent. It is completely obvious that the guaranteed destruction of the nuclear warheads of ground-based ballistic missiles of the strategic missile forces by a single nuclear warhead of the enemy 352 is impossible in principle.
(bmpd.)
The question on this picture is not about the boats in the database (although this is their accumulation, this is certainly an abnormal phenomenon), but about the “missing” “Bryansk”. For if during this period of time it is not monitored (and it is guaranteed not to be tracked) by the enemy, then the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces has already completed its task.
Key factor that makes it necessary to place strategic assets on sea carriers (in the difficult physiographic conditions of their use and the significant superiority of the antisubmarine forces of the enemy), - this is the vulnerability of the NSNS ground component to a sudden nuclear (!) “Disarming” strike. And this is not a “virtual” threat, but a very real one, and it is being worked out by the enemy.
Those. even one, but not guaranteed to be tracked, the SLFM with an SLBM, which excludes the possibility of such a strike, is an extremely important strategic and political factor. And the main thing here is not the "nuclear warheads" of the NSNF, but its combat stability. Ie, figuratively speaking, for the NSNS as the Bulava system is secondary to the issues of secrecy, hydroacoustics, marine underwater weapons etc. As for us, this is turned upside down - according to the “Mace” “dances with a tambourine”, tough decisions, and according to what generally gives “the right to go to sea” and “carry at sea” strategic missiles, ”it’s full.
I repeat: if the NSNF system does not have combat stability at the level of “at least one guaranteed untracked RPLSN capable of delivering a retaliatory nuclear strike on the enemy’s territory under the most adverse conditions of the situation”, it not only has no meaning, but is a weight on the neck of the state and its armed forces, diverting enormous resources.
Let me remind you: the Borey-Bulava program turned out to be the most expensive of our military program, and from the “difficult” years, when the means for its implementation came off from wherever it was possible (and even from which it was impossible).
At the same time, an extremely "sore point" is the possibility of using "Boreyev" in the Arctic. The RPLSN of the 667BDRM project, which had a developed “hump” for rocket mines, due to the ascent and break of ice with trim, ensured the discharge of most of the ice from the mine covers, and accordingly the use of SLBMs
The RPPLN that emerged in the Arctic with the 677BDRM project with a significant trim.
The “Boreas” have practically no hump, and, accordingly, the problem of removing huge amounts of extremely heavy ice simply negates the possibility of firing SLBMs in such conditions. You can shoot only after surfacing into a large and clean polynya (which you still need to find!)
This problem has technical solutions (without details), but at the moment the situation is such that the newest RPPLN have great limitations on the use of (main weapon) in the Arctic (their problems in the Pacific Fleet are a matter for a separate discussion).
It is appropriate to recall that one of the requirements for a closed complex with a Bark SLBM (instead of which an unreasonable choice was made in favor of the Bulava) was to ensure “through the ice” fire, i.e. The “streamlined” RPLSN of the 955 project initially thought about the possibility of firing SLBMs without surfacing, “through the ice”, and this opportunity was “buried” by the Bulava.
Well, the final touch - despite the long-term development, the Bulava SLBM into service has not yet been adopted ...
That is, despite the colossal costs of the Borey-Bulava system, the “backbone” of our NSNF is (and will be for a long time) RPPLS of the 667BDRM project. And here again it is worth remembering the collision of the K-407 and the USS Grailing. The newest (at that time) SSBN of the Navy with a smart commander and a well-trained crew was tracked for a long time by the US Navy SSA 1967.!
At the same time, the "Frontier Line" of the US Supreme Council for many decades has not been located in the Iceland (or O. Medvezhy) region, but actually begins from our bases.
Flagship miner of the 4 squadron PLPL SF Ye.K. Penzine:
Fleet Commander fleet admiral G.M. Yegorov threw an introductory squadron to us - to find areas for patrolling Norwegian submarines. Virtually none of our nuclear submarines could not enter or exit the main base unnoticed by them. We knew about their presence nearby, but it was necessary to find a way to get around their positions. We were asked to search for areas for charging batteries and, clinging to the boat, to trace it before entering the patrol area. The squadron singled out two pairs of submarines operating in the tactical groups. To no avail.
Further (if our RPLSN still successfully left the base, not exploding a mine, and not being torpedoed by the Norwegian “Uloy”), the main problem of the Northern Fleet arises - a narrow deployment front. It is obvious that “to the west” - no one will send to the zone of the overwhelming domination of the enemy anti-submarine forces RPLSN. It remains - “under the ice”, and there are only two, and the relatively narrow “roads” - the “eastern” (through the Karsky Gate) and the “northern”).
Given the relatively shallow depths and new search tools, our submarines on the “northern road” turn out to be due to the massive use by the enemy of low-frequency active “backlighting” in the form of a fly on the glass.
In the West, the transition to joint complex processing of signals from the RGAB field as a single antenna began already from the 1980-ies, that is, the RGAB became a “sensor”. This technical solution has dramatically increased the search performance of anti-submarine aircraft. With the advent of low-frequency RGAB emitters (LFA) at the beginning of the 1990-s, low-noise PLs were detected.
Now the “look” of the low-frequency “backlight” has changed significantly, the power has decreased significantly, the processing (until the appearance of covert (for target detection) modes of multi-position sonars) has become more complicated.
All this is still a “revelation” both for our Navy and for the developers of our anti-submarine anti-aircraft search and targeting systems (“stopped” in distant 70-ies), despite the fact that for the enemy a long time ago “routine” preparation.
The shallow depths of the Barents Sea urgently raise the question of the use by the adversary of "unconventional" search tools (and ensuring the secrecy of our submarines in these conditions). The quotation by the author in one of his articles quotes to Lieutenant-General Sokerin V.N. (Alas, which underwent serious and distorted editorial editing) on the span of the Orion and the discovery of ten Northern Fleet submarines in a short time, caused a great resonance and discussion.
Now we can clarify the timing of this case: around 1996. However, such search methods were not “an American invention”, but ... ours (!).
Another example: in the magazine “Gangut” in the article by A.M. Vasiliev gives an assessment of this issue by the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy in shipbuilding and arming Admiral Novoselov:
... at the meeting he did not give the floor to the head of the institute, who was eager to talk about experiments to detect a submarine's emerging trace using radar. ... Already much later, at the end of 1989, he asked him why he dismissed this question. Fyodor Ivanovich answered this way: “I know about this effect, it is impossible to protect oneself from such detection, so why upset our submariners”?
The question arises: does the principle of “no need to be upset” also apply to the military-political leadership of the country? Including and problems with the secrecy of NSNF?
The question arises: does the principle of “no need to be upset” also apply to the military-political leadership of the country? Including and problems with the secrecy of NSNF?
In fact, on the "northern route" our submarines in a real war will face just a massive execution.
Actually, briefly and comprehensively about the situation said former commander in chief of the Navy Vysotsky :
If in the North we do not have an aircraft carrier, then the combat stability of the RPPLN will be reduced to zero already on the second day, because the main enemy of the boats is aircraft.
"East route"? Yes, it remains ... only now the enemy will have enough squadron - two bombers with mines to completely “plug” it.
Strategic bomber Boeing B-52H Stratofortress from the 49 th test squadron of the 53 th wing of the US Air Force with six pendants on the pylons for test dumping by new American aviation sea ground non-contact mines of high-precision setting Mk 64 Quickstrike-m. In the future, it is planned to modify the drum turret launcher in the B-52H bomb bay, which will allow the aircraft to carry a total of up to 20 mines. Barksdale (c) US Air Force
About the absolutely cave, prehistoric level of the Northern Fleet's anti-mine forces mentioned above.
However, in the "triumphant reports" of our admirals, "everything is wonderful":
The crew of the base minesweeper "Yelnya" conducted the trawling of a minefield to guide the conditional detachment of ships and vessels. Sailors used non-contact depth trawls. All training mines were successfully cleared.
And what about the RPLSN combat service, already deployed "under the ice"?
Due to the narrow deployment front and the lead in detecting US Navy and Great Britain Navy submarines, it doesn’t cause any particular problems, finding our RPPLN on the deployment route, then follow it in secretly and for a long time in readiness for destruction by order.
Considering Russia's presence of powerful strategic nuclear forces, there are two options for the emergence and escalation of large-scale conflict with the United States: “slow escalation”, with extensive involvement of “third countries” and restriction of forms of hostilities (with gradual US involvement and further “nuclear threshold "), or" quick disarming attack "with a massive nuclear defeat of our entire group of strategic nuclear forces. At the same time, before delivering such a strike, the enemy must be sure that the threat from our NSNF is eliminated. Those. RPLSN combat service waiting for "secretive shooting", and even before the formal outbreak of hostilities.
And such actions by the US Navy are not only fulfilled, there are a number of cases of deliberate firing on our boats with “something very similar to a torpedo” (the last case, known to the author, was on the 16 squadron of the submarines in the middle of 2000's).
And now we consider the situation on board our RPLSN. Thirty ... e day combat service, everything is calm, familiar ...
Speech report: "Bearing torpedo !!!"
I will keep silence about the “first reaction”, noting only that at such moments they do not think about the CTR (“Tactical Guide ... Submarines”) (especially since the provisions on anti-torpedo protection in it, to put it mildly, are inadequate and completely divorced from reality) ...
The main question is whether it is a real torpedo (that is, a war) or is it another American provocation (with a simulator with torpedo noises or just a practical (not combat) torpedo). And "do not report ashore" ...
What to do? Shoot back?
First of all, there is almost no chance for the enemy's PLA torpedo detected.
Secondly, our torpedoes, to put it mildly, are very much inferior to the enemy's torpedoes.
Thirdly, in order to quickly shoot, you need to have a torpedo complex in the appropriate readiness. During the Cold War, this was practiced, but in 90's. this is almost forgotten. In 2000's again (after “some events”) they remembered, but at the level of a specific commander. For the general trend - if only it did not work out.
Fourth, the enemy, who organized the provocation, can turn the case (by juggling documents and registration data) with our counterattack as the first attack, already allegedly about our RPLN.
The use of hydroacoustic countermeasures (CRPD)? All of them are ineffective against modern torpedoes.
Rear Admiral Lutsky (“Sea Collection” No. 7 for 2010):
... Subscriber projects “Ash-tree” and “Borey” under construction are proposed to be equipped with PTZ systems, the development specifications of which were compiled as early as 80 years of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these tools against modern torpedoes testify to an exceptionally low probability of non-damaging evading submarines
As it was all in reality (when they were shooting at our submarines), one can say with one short phrase: not according to TRPL. Yes, there were no real (combat) torpedoes of the enemy. Or were they anyway?
Bottom line: our RPLSN combat service, with what we have today, is waiting for execution. And the enemy is preparing for this rigidly and purposefully (including at the ICEX exercises).
The English Astro-type hunting hunter under the ice of the Arctic.
Why admirals Korolev and Evmenov are not preparing for this, I would very much like to hear from them. True, I doubt that they will have something to say worthy and real to the facts cited. And here it is appropriate to recall Confucius:
To send people to war untrained is to betray them.
And more about ICEX. The fact that underwater vehicles (NPA) have been used for a long time on ICEX exercises has long been known. But the scale and depth of these works at the last exercises (ICEX-2018) is just a “knockout” to all our “naval commanders” and the leaders of the corresponding works in the military-industrial complex.
The ICEX 2018 deployed 30 large-size Atom PPA, 18 of which were equipped with the Advanced Sea Warfare (ADSEWA) module, which houses a set of advanced submarine communications technologies and GPA, as well as various sensors for detecting PL, including the installation of a static antenna array on the sea bottom (in the future - its use as a small GPBA).
And what about our “air”?
Is the “arctic air defense shield” as strong as it is broadcast in the media?
Let us begin with an extensive quotation, which, nevertheless, is worthy of being fully cited (including so that its electronic source code is not deleted due to the obvious scandalousness of the issues raised).
Russian air defense problems are surrounded by silence. A. Khramchikhin.
The fact that it is possible to knock down no more than one goal of a single SAM, apparently, does not need anyone at all, this is arithmetic at the first class level. The combat algorithms C-300P and C-400 imply the use of two missiles at the same goal in automatic combat work, you can switch to the option “one missile defense - one goal” only manually. That is, if the 64 regiment is ready for launching the missile defense, then it can knock down the maximum 64 target, really - 32. After that, the regiment "reset." Standard reloading one launcher (PU) for the rating of "excellent" - 53 minutes. That is, it will take at least an hour to restore the regiment’s combat readiness, which is a bit much in the context of a modern war.
However, in reality, the regiment will not be restored in any hour, and in two, too. Just because the composition of the ZRS does not include the charging machines, not in the divisions and at least one spare ammunition. All this should be brought from the bases of storage and preparation of missiles.
The maneuver by forces in relation to the C-300P / 400 SAMs is theoretically possible, but practically unrealizable, given the cumbersome nature of these systems and our vast distances. All this did not matter much when the "three hundred" regiments were part of a powerful echeloned air defense system of the USSR, but it is of very serious importance now.
... The United States has a very real opportunity to “load” Russian SAMs with a huge number of BGM-109 “Tomahawk”, AGM-86, AGM-158 JASSM-LR missiles “and so on and so forth.”
... This problem is becoming increasingly serious, that on a small scale we are already seeing in Syria. But we have turned it into a “silence figure”.
However, in reality, the regiment will not be restored in any hour, and in two, too. Just because the composition of the ZRS does not include the charging machines, not in the divisions and at least one spare ammunition. All this should be brought from the bases of storage and preparation of missiles.
The maneuver by forces in relation to the C-300P / 400 SAMs is theoretically possible, but practically unrealizable, given the cumbersome nature of these systems and our vast distances. All this did not matter much when the "three hundred" regiments were part of a powerful echeloned air defense system of the USSR, but it is of very serious importance now.
... The United States has a very real opportunity to “load” Russian SAMs with a huge number of BGM-109 “Tomahawk”, AGM-86, AGM-158 JASSM-LR missiles “and so on and so forth.”
... This problem is becoming increasingly serious, that on a small scale we are already seeing in Syria. But we have turned it into a “silence figure”.
All this does not mean that C-400 is “bad”, it’s about the fact that only a system with various elements that can compensate for the shortcomings of some means with the advantages of others can be sustainable.
It is obvious that the element of the qualitative and quantitative strengthening of the ground defense component is aviation.
Regardless of the effectiveness of the new ground-based air defense missile systems, the air defense system built only on their basis is already vicious due to geographical factors (the curvature of the Earth and the presence of radio horizon). We need fighters, we need long-range radar detection and control aircraft (AEWS).
But with this in the USC "North" and the Northern Fleet everything is very bad.
The large-scale maneuvers involved 36 warships, submarines and support ships, around 20 aircraft, more than 150 units of weapons, military and special equipment of coastal missile-artillery and ground forces, marines and air defense forces.
These figures are a recognition of the fact that the fleet defeats its own naval aviation.
For reference: the ratio of “ships and airplanes” at the time when the Northern Fleet was indeed the “MOST” fleet: for the 1982 year had 395 warships and boats, 290 auxiliary vessels and ... 380 aircraft, and for the exercises "Ocean 83" 53 ships, 27 submarines, 18 auxiliary vessels, as well as 14 naval aviation regiments and 3 air defense fighter regiments, that is, more than 400 airplanes.
The current grouping of fighter jets, the Sever, is obviously not in a position to solve the tasks facing them. This is exacerbated by the problem with the new aviation means of destruction, which only went to the troops. However, for a very strange reason, despite the mass of official photo exercises, there are practically no photos of airplanes with new air-to-air missiles. Save the resource of new missiles? So you first need to master! So, begin to massively carry and apply (as it was during Soviet times and is happening today in all developed countries)
At the same time, the most acute issue is the R-37М long-range air-to-air missile, firstly, because of the unique and extremely demanded TTX conditions, and secondly, because without this SD, even the upgraded MiG-31BSMM have limited combat value . Taking into account the capabilities of modern EW facilities, the effectiveness of the standard MiG-31B rocket - the P-33 is extremely low. In fact, this rocket today can be effectively used only for low-maneuverable and non-EW cruise missiles.
The only time that the Р-37М was “lit up” in the line was the 80 anniversary of the Kansk air regiment last year.
Screen with the video of the anniversary of the Canadian Aviation Regiment. Source: youtube.com/watch?v=VARVdpxXhxnumx
However, the possibility that the latest combat missiles were put on display to the public raises serious doubts, and with high probability on the MiG-31BSM suspensions were weight and size models.
The scanty number of upgraded DRLOU A-50U aircraft does not allow for the creation of a solid radar field and for ensuring continuous patrols in the theater of operations.
Sad result
What is the result? As a result, we get clear and clear today the complete defeat of the Northern Fleet of the North Sea Transport Corps in the case of real hostilities, and with minimal damage to the enemy.
1. RPLSN combat service destroyed before the outbreak of hostilities.
2. RPLSN in bases - strikes on bases, on mines, submarines, submarines, and US and NATO BPA on the "northern" deployment route ("east" - closed by mines)
3. The decision to use SLBMs from the Barents Sea in the near future may be counterbalanced by deploying missile defense carriers in areas inaccessible for destruction by coastal Bastion command and control panels (and the use of Daggers from aviation requires precise targeting and the presence of an appropriate system in the theater).
4. All the bases of the Northern Fleet, located in close proximity to the border, are destroyed (along with repair facilities and accumulated ammunition and logistics supplies).
5. The remnants of the Northern Fleet retreat to the southeastern part of the Barents Sea, where they are destroyed.
6. Air defense grouping on the Arctic islands is quantified, destroyed, the most valuable bases are captured by helicopter assault forces, to ensure subsequent strikes and advance into the depths of Siberia.
With what we have today (and realized in the form of “long-term plans”), this is a real picture.
But according to the reports of admirals Evmenov and Korolev, there is “full hockey” in the Northern Fleet (which can be easily verified by visiting the North page on the website of the Ministry of Defense, and there are more than “triumphant reports” and hockey there).
Do they know about the real situation? Of course, yes.
And a very good question here: what do the admirals of Evmenov and Korolev report to the supreme commander on the real combat effectiveness of the Northern Fleet and the situation with the military stability of the NSNF?
Is it possible otherwise?
Yes! If you do not hide from the problems and do not pretend that "they are not there," but solve them.
Let's order.
1. MEAS.
The installation of an active anti-torpedo protection complex dramatically increases the combat stability of the RPLSN and, most importantly, gives an effective response tool a sudden torpedo attack (or its imitation). Those. the question “what to do” is no longer necessary here - to destroy a torpedo (or a simulator with torpedo noises) with its anitorpedo.
According to the mind and conscience, it was the RPLSN of the 667BDRM project that should have been (and for a long time) the first to be loaded with AT "Lasta" ammunition.
Carrying out an effective modernization of the torpedo “Physicist”, taking into account the most significant proposals of specialists, will allow even “Ryazan” with it to win a duel against “Virginia”. I repeat: this is not "fiction" and not "theory", but quite specific test results obtained for real PL-targets.
Installation of special automatic long-distance buoys (with the possibility of transferring ice from under the ice), automatically fired upon the death of our submarine (with registration and transfer to the coast of the registration data and the last relevant information).
Of course, much can and should be clarified on this issue, but the open nature of the article excludes “excessive detail”.
However, these three main points: anti-torpedoes, a well-modernized “Physicist” and a long-distance emergency communication buoy - this is something that is not easy and possible, but you need to talk hard and straight! And moreover, about the implementation of this to put before the fact of the United States, because it will be the strongest deterrent for them.
It is impossible to go past the question on the optimal strength of the NSNF. Considering the significant superiority of the antisubmarine forces of the enemy, the difficult physiographic conditions and the limited "capacity" of the theater, where we can ensure the fighting stability of the NSNF, their excessive amount is impractical.
Certainly, in the ice period, one RPFNS should be in military service in the protected zone of the White Sea. At the same time, it should be understood that due to the small depths, it will most likely be impossible to ensure its secrecy in a clean ice-free period (that is, there should be other patrol areas, for example, in the Kara Sea).
2. Creating a "protected area" Karsky Gate ", which excludes the possibility of" blocking "it with mines, and providing all types of defense (including new ones, for example, against underwater vehicles). It is most expedient to accomplish this by recreating the Yokanga naval base abandoned by the fleet (Ostrovnaya settlement).
Its considerable distance from the border (in contrast to all other naval bases) raises the question of moving part of the fleet’s reserves and ammunition there.
Yokanga naval base, 2-I Brigade OVR and TRPKSN project 941. 1985
3. The coastal SCRC, as those possessing the highest combat stability, should have priority in re-equipment on the anti-ship missiles "Zircon". It is necessary to deploy the SCRC on Novaya Zemlya (for example, due to the redeployment of the “Bastion” from Kotelny Island) for the complete closure of the entire Barents Sea (excluding the use of ABM ships in it) and the creation of a permanent threat to the enemy from two directions.
4. Creation in the Northern Fleet of a high-speed transport and airborne group, which provides for the rapid transfer of troops and cargo (including ammunition ZUR), including in ice conditions, on the basis of the upgraded project of the landing ship on the air shelf "Zubr".
Airborne assault ships: Zubr (Russian Navy) and LCAC (US Navy)
5. Priority development of the aviation group
Without a sharp increase in the capabilities of our aviation group, solving problems in the North is impossible.
The main thing: AWACS, new UR "air-to-air" (especially long range), EW facilities and modern radar fighters.
Taking into account the limited rates of delivery of ARLO A-50U and A-100 airplanes, we definitely need a light tactical AEW aircraft (and on its own base - a patrol plane). Taking into account the tight deadlines, the decision can be made in the creation of a radar in the short term according to the type of SAAB “Argus” aircraft based on the serial fighter radar “Irbis” (with a significant increase in its aperture)
SAAB Argus light tactical aircraft
Considering the fact that the supply of medium-range 170-1 missiles a few years ago did go to the VCS, the situation with the Р-37М (its apparent absence in front-line units in a significant amount) is a matter of deep concern. It is very likely that, at the price, the rocket turned out to be very expensive, but it is critically important for us (first of all, “knock out” the enemy’s airborne command and the BPA aircraft). Its deliveries to the air forces of the fleets should be considered as a priority (including for actual shooting).
A powerful and combat-ready aviation group allows not only to strengthen the country's air defense from the north, but also, relying on the unsinkable aircraft carriers, Severomorsk and Rogachevo (Novaya Zemlya Island), to give the combat strength to the forces of the Northern Fleet and ensure the deployment of the NSNF under the ice.
6. The capacity of the Arctic military bases should ensure the deployment of significantly increased in size groups of military personnel with equipment to ensure the deployment of guard units in a threatened period, in size, level of combat training and equipping of Russian military facilities (primarily airfields) with enemy landing forces.
7. For actions in the Arctic, the most appropriate type of multi-purpose submarine is a variant of the new project 677, but equipped with a nuclear main power plant. The 885 project is too expensive, large in size (which greatly complicates its use at shallow depths). The presence of large ammunition ammunition missiles in the CIP under the ice has no advantages.
Submarine Project 677 and French Naval Forces Navy Type "Rubis"
At the same time, the construction of diesel-electric submarines for ocean theaters (the Northern and Pacific Fleets) is inexpedient, and the small-sized atomic reactor is the best anaerobic installation for them.
If problems to solve, but not to hide
Of course, the full list of necessary measures is much more than the above and is a closed document. However, even the implementation of this short list provides a qualitative change in the balance of forces in the Arctic, and ensuring the solution of the tasks of our armed forces there.
However, all this is possible only if the problem is really solved, and not to hide what, alas, is being done now.
- Maxim Klimov
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