Fiery expense. Shooting hunger - a universal disaster
Russian-Japanese War Experience
It is interesting how the experience of the Russo-Japanese War 1904 — 1905 was used. the Germans, the French and the Russians regarding the consumption of ammunition in a general arms battle.
The large consumption of munitions of rapid-fire artillery among the Russians was recognized as nothing more than an abuse that had to be dealt with in every way. During the First World Limit (for objective reasons) the amount of ammunition in Russian field artillery, on the one hand, became a very important factor for increasing the effectiveness of the latter (accuracy, the latest methods of shooting and firing, advanced tactics to some extent compensated for the lack of ammunition) but, on the other hand, they had a very negative effect on the effectiveness of a number of important combat operations that required more abundant artillery support.
And the French and especially the Germans saw this as a new factor in their strength - and they took all measures to ensure that this expenditure was as intense as possible at the right moments of the war.
The power consumption of ammunition did not mean wasting them. The Germans, as a rule, did not spare artillery ammunition - and a hurricane of fire affected the fate of many battles. They did not skimp on the shells (in order to immediately fall asleep the enemy), but fired such shots for a very short time (maximum a few hours) - and then immediately exploited its result, conducting a decisive attack. Condensing the power of artillery defeat in time, the Germans used their powerful and heavily supplied ammunition artillery to achieve tactical surprise. This method was vividly highlighted during the spring offensive of 1918.
When preparing for this offensive, the Germans do not set themselves the goal of systematic destruction and destruction, but want to force the enemy to go into closure - in order to paralyze his defense. They open shooting immediately to defeat, without zeroing, reaching surprise.
But where a special methodic of shooting is needed, as in the shallow of protective curtains, they lead it with remarkable methodicalness.
Almost until the end of the war, the French did not adhere to such a reasonable economy in wasting ammunition: they sought complete destruction of fortifications and wire barriers, preparing the terrain for “mastering” - and often without carrying out the latter. This caused many days of artillery shooting and, consequently, a large waste of ammunition, not completely and not always productive.
In preparing the 1916 breakout, the French artillery even went beyond what was really necessary: it completely destroyed not only the enemy’s defenses, but all the paths and passages through which it was possible to penetrate enemy positions — which made it difficult for the enemy to attack captured terrain, reduced heavy artillery in a chaotic state, could not for some time to establish a connection, or to arrange their artillery ammunition).
Such a system was abandoned by the French only at the end of the war, expressing this in a directive issued by the Supreme Commander from 12 July 1918.
Unproductive waste of ammunition was in the hands of the enemy - and therefore in World War I special measures were taken to involve the enemy in such expenses. Among these measures: the organization of false batteries, towers, observation points, etc. All this was widely used by all parties to the conflict.
Manufacture and delivery of ammunition to the troops
"Snuffy hunger" touched all opponents - but each in its own time period. And each overcame him in his own way.
France launched a war with a large ammunition: for every 75-mm gun there were 1500 shots. But immediately after the battle on Marne 1914 (early September), there was a lack of ammunition for these guns — that is, after 35 — 40 days from the announcement of mobilization and only three weeks after the start of large-scale hostilities.
Already, by virtue of this alone, we had to resort to using the tools of the old models (the Banja system) - after all, they had the same stock of ammunition as the 75-mm guns (for 1500 shots). Only then did the French manage to disguise the shortage of ammunition for 75-mm guns.
At the same time, the Germans also felt the lack of ammunition, which, according to Gascuen, was the main reason for their decision to retreat from the Marne.
The French in 1915 felt such a lack of ammunition that they considered it necessary to resort to using even old-style cast iron grenades for Banja guns.
And although almost from the very beginning of the war, the French launched mass production of ammunition, but in the first months of the war they could produce no more than 20000 gun shells per day. At the beginning of 1915, they tried to increase this number, bringing it to 50000 per day. Production was significantly expanded, which attracted not only factories that had previously manufactured completely different items (moreover, in April 1915, most of the factory workers who had been called up for mobilization were returned to the enterprises), but wider tolerances were also allowed. . e. weakened requirements for acceptance of products. The last circumstance had sad consequences - the gun barrels began to wear out quickly and, in large numbers, tear.
It is noteworthy that at a time when the French found it possible to allow a deterioration in the manufacture of their shells, the Germans, who had shells at the beginning of the war, had worse quality than the French (both in material and workmanship) began to improve with 1915. and material, and dressing.
After the sad results of 1915, which led to a massive rupture of the barrels of 75-mm guns, the French turned to making shells for these guns from the best steel, and also paid attention to dimensional accuracy. And in 1916, the massive rupture of the trunks stopped. At the beginning of the same year, the number of daily manufactured ammunition (and without compromising quality) increased significantly - shells for 75-mm guns were made using 150000 per day. And in 1917 - 1918. volumes climbed to 200000 per day.
In the second half of 1918, ammunition (charges and projectiles) for guns of all calibers were produced daily in quantities of total weight 4000 - 5000 tons, which, as we previously indicated, was on the verge of daily demand (the same 4000 - 5000 tons).
But from the 2 half of 1918, the quality of both the projectiles and explosive compositions deteriorated again. As we noted earlier, the percentage of shrapnel (making shrapnel was more time-consuming compared to a high-explosive grenade) in a field gun ammunition in 1918, compared with 1914, decreased from 50 to 10% - this is despite the fact that shrapnel became again, they are just as necessary as in 1914. After all, in the last military campaign, maneuverable hostilities re-launched - when artillery had to act, mainly, not by closures, but by live targets.
The supply of ammunition is not only in their manufacture. Ammunition must also be delivered to the guns - i.e., by train, and from the latter by truck or horse. If the supply is not sufficiently powerful, even with an abundance of reserves at the bases, the supply of ammunition will not correspond to the level of requests for combat flow.
Gascuen argues that the shells of the French 75-mm cannon were too bulky, heavy and uncomplicated - and therefore for transporting them, both by railways and trucks, then by charging boxes, the unproductive consumption of vehicles was present. The same applied to the ammunition of all the guns of the flat trajectory of fire, as well as to the ammunition of the guns of large caliber.
Moreover, the specialist even defended the need to abandon too much flatness of shooting (less weight of the charge - shorter and lighter projectile), and large caliber, which was relevant for periods of maneuvering war, giving greater effectiveness of destruction (after all, artillery had to hit outside serious closures).
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