Fiery expense. Should there be economical artillery?
A huge amount of artillery (with its rather serious rate of fire) during the First World War 1914 — 1918. gave reason to expect a large consumption of artillery ammunition. But their real expense in that war exceeded all expectations. The expense was enormous - especially for light guns (heavy guns consumed less - due to the difficulty of ammunition and lower rate of fire).
Ammunition consumption figures are impressive.
Thus, in the course of 6-day preparation of the 1916 breakout, only 75-mm guns (444 units) fired over a million grenades - that is, more than 2250 shots per gun (this gives 375 grenades to the gun per day).
Previously, during the Verdun operation in the first half of the same year, the French were not able to spend such amount of ammunition for 75-mm guns - due to the duration of this operation (the supply did not keep up: only occasionally 75-mm batteries could get 250 shells per gun per day). At the same time, the Germans brought a huge amount of ammunition for this operation - and spent them wastefully.
When preparing the artillery part of their 1915, 1916 and 1917 breakthroughs. (lasted for 3, 6 and 11 days, respectively), the French often spent 500000 shots per day on a limited front area (25, 16 and 35 km.).
In the second half of 1918, during their 100-day offensive across the front, they spent daily ammunition volume exceeding the daily rate, which was manufactured by French factories: 4000 - 5000 tons per day.
It is interesting to compare these figures with the consumption of ammunition in the battles of previous wars.
Thus, the Napoleonic artillery fired the following number of shots in the 1813 battle in Leipzig (the figures are only for some of the last days): October 16 - October 84000 and October 18 - 95000. Dividing these numbers by the number of available guns (700), we get that on average each gun had: on the first day on 120 and on the other - on 136 shots.
During the Franco-Prussian War in the Battle of Gravelotte 18 August 1870, the French had an 42 shot per gun at each gun, and the Germans had a 47 shot; in the battle of Mars-Latour 16 August 1870 - from the French on 47, the Germans - on the 72 shot.
During the Russo-Japanese War: in the Liaoyang battle (somewhat in a wider period - 15 - 25 in August 1904), the expenditure of 240 shots at the gun (i.e. average 22 shot every day), in the battle for Shah (period the longest, from 25 September to 15, October 1904, was spent on 230 gunfire, and in the Mukden battle (taken from February 8 to 10 March 1905) shells were spent on 480 shells on the barrel. Finally, in the 5 day battle of Sandepu (January 1905), the 2 Army, having 430 guns, used 75000 shells, which gives an average of one gun per day for 35 shots.
These numbers are striking in their insignificance.
On the one hand, the low consumption of shells per gun per day was due to the fact that many guns remained in reserve and, in effect, were inactive. In addition, not all the days of these multi-day battles were supported by equally intense fighting. The official description of the war says that in the Tashichao battle (11 July 1904), “some batteries used up most of the entire supply of ammunition”. “As one of the main reasons that prompted us to withdraw our army from Liaoyang,” Kuropatkin called the lack of gunfire. During this battle, there was a moment when there was not a single gunshot in the army’s warehouses.
The official description of the war recognizes the expense of gunfire very large.
In the war 1914 - 1918. the parties seemed to have completely abandoned the principle of economy in the use of ammunition. At the same time, the statutes with which the opponents began the war were considered with this principle. Obviously, by virtue of this principle, it was required that artillery firing be conducted only at such distances at which it is considered valid; shooting on squares, on long lines and on invisible objects was also forbidden - due to great wastefulness in waging such a fire.
But in the First World War, and from the very beginning, instead of the principle of economy, the principle of wastefulness in the use of ammunition began to be applied. Germany gave an example of this: due to the excellently organized mass production of ammunition and thanks to a well-organized supply of them to the front, it could be wasteful in spending - believing that the enemy would not hijack her.
The French followed in the footsteps of the Germans - and from the very beginning of the war (in September 1914 in the battle of the Marne) they began to shoot from their 75-mm guns for long distances, and contrary to the rules, and such shooting was legalized in December 1916. (Germans did it even earlier).
Already in the first months of the war, the French began to shoot squares, more or less long lines, at invisible objects. The troops demanded that artillery fired even at night.
At the same time, barrage-shooting, which requires a large expenditure of ammunition, begins, and soon, following the example of the Germans, so wasteful shooting as pilonazh. The latter was widely used by the Germans already in the Verdun operation (the first half of 1916), and since then it has become their general rule during offensive operations.
Already at the beginning of the war, French troops demanded from artillery a long and continuously repeated barrage. They also demanded a long "preparation of land acquisition" by artillery fire, causing a huge expenditure of ammunition - such training, which, as people began to think, would result in an act of land acquisition. They began to say (and from the first weeks of the war): “in this war, the artillery takes possession, and then the infantry occupies”. Often, after such training, they did not even care about the occupation of the corresponding area by infantry. Often (and on the same day) such preparation was repeated.
Is such wastefulness advisable? Was it worth the benefit?
The artillery prestige of the Frenchman Gascuen hardly protests against her. Such wastefulness is legitimate - unless it is useless.
But in the second half of 1918, the extravagance of artillery fire led to a terrible decrease in its productivity - at least in terms of the number of people being put out of action. So, in August 1914, every French artillery shot, on average, incapacitated one German; in the first months of the war, on average, one ton of ammunition incapacitated German 4 - 5 (which was already far from the situation in the very first month of the war); and in the second half of 1918, the French spent every ton of Germans killed from 4 - 5 tons of ammunition.
Having cited these data, Gascuen ascribes them, however, not to the wastefulness of the shooting, but to a number of other reasons, the main of which are the following:
1. A significant decrease in the artillery ammunition to 1918, the proportion of shrapnel: in 1914, they were at least 50%, and in 1918, only 10%.
2. The decrease in the strength of the explosive composition (in qualitative terms) of the explosive charge in projectiles and the deterioration to 1918 of the qualities of the projectile itself.
3. The lack of "long-range" tubes for shells in 1918
4. A significant decrease in the actual composition of the German military units, especially their less dense location in front of the French artillery in the 1918 campaign.
5. Reducing the art of shooting by officers of the French artillery to 1918.
It is interesting that in the final period of the war the French shot more artillery ammunition than the Germans.
However, the Germans also spent their ammunition unproductively at the end of the war. Here are some numbers (we will take into account that 75% of combat losses during the First World War was caused by artillery).
During the offensive of the French troops:
in April – May – June 1915 was killed, went missing and died from the wounds of 143 thousand French, and evacuated from the battle fields of 306 thousand French;
when 22 was broken through September - 7 of October 1915 was killed, went missing and died from the wounds of 120 thousand French, and evacuated from the battle fields of 260 thousand French;
during the victorious offensive of July 18 - November 11 1918 was killed, went missing and died from the wounds of 110 thousand French.
Moreover, if in the first case these are local offensives on different sectors of the front during 3 months, in the second case the results of the offensive for 15 are 16 days on the 25-km front, and the figures of the third heading show us the result of the offensive for 113 days — and French front.
Without protesting against the large waste of ammunition in the battles as a whole, Gasquan considers, at the same time, some of the artillery shooting methods practiced by the French in that war are unproductive. He points to the inexpediency of the doctrine of complete or almost complete destruction of wire obstacles, fortification devices, batteries; he finds that the dogma of destroying everything with heavy artillery led to too long preparation for assaults in producing breakthroughs (3 - 11 days) and to an incredible expenditure of ammunition, which often exceeded 500000 shots per day (and on a limited front area); He condemns the addiction to pilonazh, to shooting at the squares and to the abuse of shooting at long distances - which at the end of the war turned into shooting "from far away", that is, "white light like a penny."
Describing the artillery shooting of the Germans in the final period of the war, he noted signs of some demoralization: “with special urgency the German artillery sometimes squandered its ammunition,” he says.
As a result, Gascuen does not advocate at all for ammunition savings. On the contrary, he puts forward the opposite principle - the power consumption (puissance de debit) of ammunition, which lasts for hours during both defensive and offensive operations. This was what he wished for the French in a future war.
The ending should ...
French consumption
Ammunition consumption figures are impressive.
Thus, in the course of 6-day preparation of the 1916 breakout, only 75-mm guns (444 units) fired over a million grenades - that is, more than 2250 shots per gun (this gives 375 grenades to the gun per day).
Previously, during the Verdun operation in the first half of the same year, the French were not able to spend such amount of ammunition for 75-mm guns - due to the duration of this operation (the supply did not keep up: only occasionally 75-mm batteries could get 250 shells per gun per day). At the same time, the Germans brought a huge amount of ammunition for this operation - and spent them wastefully.
French 75-mm gun. Pataj S. Artyleria ladowa 1881-1970. W., 1975.
When preparing the artillery part of their 1915, 1916 and 1917 breakthroughs. (lasted for 3, 6 and 11 days, respectively), the French often spent 500000 shots per day on a limited front area (25, 16 and 35 km.).
In the second half of 1918, during their 100-day offensive across the front, they spent daily ammunition volume exceeding the daily rate, which was manufactured by French factories: 4000 - 5000 tons per day.
Consumption in past wars
It is interesting to compare these figures with the consumption of ammunition in the battles of previous wars.
Thus, the Napoleonic artillery fired the following number of shots in the 1813 battle in Leipzig (the figures are only for some of the last days): October 16 - October 84000 and October 18 - 95000. Dividing these numbers by the number of available guns (700), we get that on average each gun had: on the first day on 120 and on the other - on 136 shots.
During the Franco-Prussian War in the Battle of Gravelotte 18 August 1870, the French had an 42 shot per gun at each gun, and the Germans had a 47 shot; in the battle of Mars-Latour 16 August 1870 - from the French on 47, the Germans - on the 72 shot.
During the Russo-Japanese War: in the Liaoyang battle (somewhat in a wider period - 15 - 25 in August 1904), the expenditure of 240 shots at the gun (i.e. average 22 shot every day), in the battle for Shah (period the longest, from 25 September to 15, October 1904, was spent on 230 gunfire, and in the Mukden battle (taken from February 8 to 10 March 1905) shells were spent on 480 shells on the barrel. Finally, in the 5 day battle of Sandepu (January 1905), the 2 Army, having 430 guns, used 75000 shells, which gives an average of one gun per day for 35 shots.
These numbers are striking in their insignificance.
On the one hand, the low consumption of shells per gun per day was due to the fact that many guns remained in reserve and, in effect, were inactive. In addition, not all the days of these multi-day battles were supported by equally intense fighting. The official description of the war says that in the Tashichao battle (11 July 1904), “some batteries used up most of the entire supply of ammunition”. “As one of the main reasons that prompted us to withdraw our army from Liaoyang,” Kuropatkin called the lack of gunfire. During this battle, there was a moment when there was not a single gunshot in the army’s warehouses.
The official description of the war recognizes the expense of gunfire very large.
Saving or waste?
In the war 1914 - 1918. the parties seemed to have completely abandoned the principle of economy in the use of ammunition. At the same time, the statutes with which the opponents began the war were considered with this principle. Obviously, by virtue of this principle, it was required that artillery firing be conducted only at such distances at which it is considered valid; shooting on squares, on long lines and on invisible objects was also forbidden - due to great wastefulness in waging such a fire.
But in the First World War, and from the very beginning, instead of the principle of economy, the principle of wastefulness in the use of ammunition began to be applied. Germany gave an example of this: due to the excellently organized mass production of ammunition and thanks to a well-organized supply of them to the front, it could be wasteful in spending - believing that the enemy would not hijack her.
The French followed in the footsteps of the Germans - and from the very beginning of the war (in September 1914 in the battle of the Marne) they began to shoot from their 75-mm guns for long distances, and contrary to the rules, and such shooting was legalized in December 1916. (Germans did it even earlier).
Already in the first months of the war, the French began to shoot squares, more or less long lines, at invisible objects. The troops demanded that artillery fired even at night.
At the same time, barrage-shooting, which requires a large expenditure of ammunition, begins, and soon, following the example of the Germans, so wasteful shooting as pilonazh. The latter was widely used by the Germans already in the Verdun operation (the first half of 1916), and since then it has become their general rule during offensive operations.
French battery during the attack in Champagne
Already at the beginning of the war, French troops demanded from artillery a long and continuously repeated barrage. They also demanded a long "preparation of land acquisition" by artillery fire, causing a huge expenditure of ammunition - such training, which, as people began to think, would result in an act of land acquisition. They began to say (and from the first weeks of the war): “in this war, the artillery takes possession, and then the infantry occupies”. Often, after such training, they did not even care about the occupation of the corresponding area by infantry. Often (and on the same day) such preparation was repeated.
Is such wastefulness advisable? Was it worth the benefit?
The artillery prestige of the Frenchman Gascuen hardly protests against her. Such wastefulness is legitimate - unless it is useless.
But in the second half of 1918, the extravagance of artillery fire led to a terrible decrease in its productivity - at least in terms of the number of people being put out of action. So, in August 1914, every French artillery shot, on average, incapacitated one German; in the first months of the war, on average, one ton of ammunition incapacitated German 4 - 5 (which was already far from the situation in the very first month of the war); and in the second half of 1918, the French spent every ton of Germans killed from 4 - 5 tons of ammunition.
Having cited these data, Gascuen ascribes them, however, not to the wastefulness of the shooting, but to a number of other reasons, the main of which are the following:
1. A significant decrease in the artillery ammunition to 1918, the proportion of shrapnel: in 1914, they were at least 50%, and in 1918, only 10%.
2. The decrease in the strength of the explosive composition (in qualitative terms) of the explosive charge in projectiles and the deterioration to 1918 of the qualities of the projectile itself.
3. The lack of "long-range" tubes for shells in 1918
4. A significant decrease in the actual composition of the German military units, especially their less dense location in front of the French artillery in the 1918 campaign.
5. Reducing the art of shooting by officers of the French artillery to 1918.
It is interesting that in the final period of the war the French shot more artillery ammunition than the Germans.
However, the Germans also spent their ammunition unproductively at the end of the war. Here are some numbers (we will take into account that 75% of combat losses during the First World War was caused by artillery).
During the offensive of the French troops:
in April – May – June 1915 was killed, went missing and died from the wounds of 143 thousand French, and evacuated from the battle fields of 306 thousand French;
when 22 was broken through September - 7 of October 1915 was killed, went missing and died from the wounds of 120 thousand French, and evacuated from the battle fields of 260 thousand French;
during the victorious offensive of July 18 - November 11 1918 was killed, went missing and died from the wounds of 110 thousand French.
Moreover, if in the first case these are local offensives on different sectors of the front during 3 months, in the second case the results of the offensive for 15 are 16 days on the 25-km front, and the figures of the third heading show us the result of the offensive for 113 days — and French front.
Without protesting against the large waste of ammunition in the battles as a whole, Gasquan considers, at the same time, some of the artillery shooting methods practiced by the French in that war are unproductive. He points to the inexpediency of the doctrine of complete or almost complete destruction of wire obstacles, fortification devices, batteries; he finds that the dogma of destroying everything with heavy artillery led to too long preparation for assaults in producing breakthroughs (3 - 11 days) and to an incredible expenditure of ammunition, which often exceeded 500000 shots per day (and on a limited front area); He condemns the addiction to pilonazh, to shooting at the squares and to the abuse of shooting at long distances - which at the end of the war turned into shooting "from far away", that is, "white light like a penny."
Describing the artillery shooting of the Germans in the final period of the war, he noted signs of some demoralization: “with special urgency the German artillery sometimes squandered its ammunition,” he says.
As a result, Gascuen does not advocate at all for ammunition savings. On the contrary, he puts forward the opposite principle - the power consumption (puissance de debit) of ammunition, which lasts for hours during both defensive and offensive operations. This was what he wished for the French in a future war.
The ending should ...
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