Thousands of tanks, dozens of battleships, or features of military construction of the USSR before the Great Patriotic War. Fleet
Let us now try to figure out what place shipbuilding programs occupied in the prewar military construction of the USSR. Unfortunately, in a couple of articles that the author proposes to devote to this issue, it is decidedly impossible to analyze in any detail the evolution of the plans for the construction of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Fleet (RKKF), but still some minimum will be necessary.
As you know, in the 20 of the last century, the young Soviet Union did not have the means to adequately maintain and build its armed forces. The fleet has always been a very expensive weapons system, so no serious shipbuilding programs at that time could not exist by definition. Soviet naval sailors had to confine themselves to a small number of ships left over from Tsarist Russia, for the maintenance of which in the fleet it was still possible to scrape money, gradually building and modernizing something that, again, began to be built during the reign of the king.
Nevertheless, of course, the USSR could not manage only with the ships of the pre-revolutionary construction. Therefore, by the end of the 20s, the first Soviet submarines, watchdogs, etc. began to be developed and built. Without getting into the vicissitudes of the theoretical research of the apologists of the “Big” and “mosquito” fleets, we note that in the specific conditions in which the USSR was in the late 20s and early 30s, there were some significant programs for the construction of heavy ships completely impossible for many reasons. The country had absolutely no resources for this: no money, not enough skilled workers, no machinery, no armor, no metal - in general, nothing. That is why in the first half of the 30s the RKKF could only count on the construction of light surface ships, submarines and sea aviation.
During the 1927-1932 period, that is, during the first five-year plan (five-year plan) of the USSR, the emphasis was on civil shipbuilding - military orders accounted for only 26% of the total construction of ships and ships. But by the next five years, this situation was to change.
The basic document that determined the direction of military shipbuilding during this period was the “Basic Considerations for the Development of the Red Army Naval Forces for the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1935)” (it was not about the five-year plan for the year 3, but about the priorities of shipbuilding 1935 g.). The main task of the fleet at that time was to defend the maritime borders of the USSR, and this could be done, according to the developers, by building a powerful submarine and air fleet. It is interesting that, despite the seemingly purely defensive orientation, even then the developers of the document considered it necessary to focus efforts on the construction of submarines of medium and large displacement, suitable for operation on enemy communications, at a great distance from their shores, but the creation of small submarines to defend their own bases should be limited.
Based on this document, a shipbuilding program for the 1933-1938 was formed. It was approved by the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) 11 July 1933, according to her, it was planned to put into operation 8 light cruisers, 10 leaders, 40 destroyers, 28 sentry ships, 42 minesweepers, 252 torpedo boats, 60 hunters for X submarines, as well as 69 large, 200 medium and 100 small submarines, and all - 503 surface ships and 369 submarines. Naval aviation by 1936 was supposed to increase from 459 to 1 655 units. In general, the adoption of this very ambitious program marked a fundamental reversal in the relevant sectors, since the military shipbuilding sector now occupied 60% in the total cost of new ships and vessels, and the civilian sector only 40%.
Of course, the shipbuilding program on 1933-1938. In no way did she threaten the ocean fleet, especially since most submarines still had to be submarines of the type "Y", which, unfortunately, were not very well suited to combat sea communications, and absolutely on communications. ocean. Also from today's standpoint, the program overloading with submarines and torpedo boats is obvious to the detriment of larger ships, such as cruisers and destroyers, but in the framework of this article we will not go deeper into this either.
So, despite its obviously "coastal" nature, the program 1933-1938. in its original version, it was still unaffordable for the domestic industry, and as early as November 1933, that is, only a month after 4 was adopted, the SRT was significantly adjusted to the lower side, and relatively large surface ships were the first to undergo sequestration. Of the 8 light cruisers, only 4 was left, of the 10 leaders, 8, and of the 40 destroyers, the total of 22, while the submarine construction plans were reduced slightly from 369 to 321 units.
But in a reduced form the program failed to execute. For 1938, inclusive, the RKKF received only one light cruiser from the 4 (Kirov, and then, to a certain extent arbitrarily), from the 8 leaders - 4, from the 22 destroyers - 7, etc. Even submarines, the usefulness of which was never denied by anyone and never, were built substantially less than the plan - inclusive of 1937 g inclusively, and it is clear that under any circumstances ships later laid down could not be put into operation before the start. 151
A small remark: it is possible that some of the esteemed readers will want to draw parallels with the present day - after all, now we also have war shipbuilding programs being disrupted. In fact, looking at the shipbuilding of the USSR of those years, one can see a lot in common - the country also experienced problems literally at every turn. Projects of warships, often, turned out to be suboptimal, or contained serious miscalculations, the industry did not have time to master the creation of the necessary units and equipment, and the fact that it did work out was often of poor quality. The construction period was regularly disrupted, the ships were built for an extremely long time not only in comparison with industrialized capitalist countries, but even in comparison with tsarist Russia. But, nevertheless, there were differences: for example, already in 1936 of the USSR, despite all the above difficulties, it had the world's first submarine fleet. The RKKF by that time included the 113 Submarines, the United States with the 84 submarines were in second place, and the third with the United States with 77 submarines.
The next national shipbuilding program began to be developed in December 1935, when the RKKF command received the relevant orders from the government of the country, and had 2 key differences from the previous one.
1933-1938 program compiled by experts of the Navy and approved after the approval of the leadership of the armed forces and the country, with the amendment to the possibility of shipbuilding. But the new program was formed “in a narrow circle”, it was the head of the Red Forces Naval Forces V.M. Orlov and the head of the Naval Academy I.M. Ludri under the direction of I.V. Stalin. Thus, we can say that the new shipbuilding program reflected, first of all, the vision of RKKF by the top leadership of the USSR.
Well, the second difference was that, despite the rather amusing tactical justification, the new shipbuilding program “aimed” at building a “Big Fleet”, the basis of which was made up of heavy artillery ships - battleships. Why did this happen?
You can, of course, try to explain the change in the principles of the formation of a new shipbuilding program with the voluntarism of Joseph Vissarionovich, who was impressed by the big ships. But in fact, it seems that everything was much more complicated.
It is easy to see how threatening the international situation of those years was. For some time after the First World War in Europe, peace was established, but it, this time, is now clearly coming to an end. In Germany, Adolf Hitler came to power, and his revanchist course was evident with the naked eye. At the same time, England and France, at that time - the guarantors of peace in Europe, looked at the rearmament of Germany through their fingers, despite the fact that the latter clearly and grossly violated the Versailles peace treaty. In fact, it was possible to say that the system of international treaties that existed until recently had already ceased to operate and gradually had to be replaced by something new. Thus, according to the Versailles Treaty, the German navy was strictly limited both qualitatively and quantitatively. But England, instead of (if necessary - by force) insisting on its observance, in fact unilaterally violated this very beneficial agreement for her, having concluded with the Hitler 18 July 1935 the Anglo-German Maritime Agreement, according to which Germany was allowed to build a fleet of in 35% of British. In October, 1935 Mr. Mussolini launched an invasion of Abyssinia, and, again, the League of Nations did not find the tool to prevent bloodshed.
The political situation of the USSR at that time was extremely difficult. Obviously, to ensure peace in Europe and the security of the Land of the Soviets, a new system of international treaties was needed in which the USSR would participate on an equal basis with the rest of the powers, but the threat that Japan represented in the Far East could hardly be countered by what by treaties, only by military force. But in Europe they looked at the USSR with distrust and apprehension. They eagerly traded with him, as the Country of Soviets supplied the bread needed in Europe and regularly paid its obligations, but the USSR remained in political isolation: it was simply not perceived as an equal, no one considered its opinion. A good example of such an attitude was the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, which was very good if we consider it as a declaration of intent. But in order to be of practical importance, this pact should have had an addition, in which the actions of the parties would be concrete if France or the USSR were subjected to an unprovoked attack by a European power. Contrary to the wishes of the USSR, this supplementary agreement was never signed.
In order to declare itself as a strong player in the European arena, the USSR needed to somehow demonstrate its strength, and such an attempt was made: this is about the famous Great Kiev 1935 maneuvers.
Much has been said and said that these maneuvers were thoroughly ostentatious, and had no practical significance, but even in this form revealed many shortcomings in the preparation of the Red Army at all levels. This is of course so. But, in addition to the military, they also had political significance, which should be discussed in more detail.
The fact is that in 1935, the strongest army in Europe was obviously considered the French. At the same time, the concept of its use was purely defensive. France suffered huge losses in the offensive operations of the First World War, and its military leadership believed that defense in future wars would take precedence over the offensive, which should be taken only when the enemy squandered his forces in unsuccessful attempts to break through the French defenses.
At the same time, the Soviet maneuvers of 1935 were supposed to demonstrate to the world a completely different concept of warfare, namely, the theory of deep operation. The “external” essence of maneuvers was to demonstrate the ability of troops saturated with modern military equipment to penetrate enemy defenses, and then, with mechanized and cavalry units, supported by airborne assault forces, to encircle and destroy the enemy. Thus, the Kiev maneuvers “as if hinted” not only at the gigantic military power of the USSR (more than 65 were involved in exercises for 1 thousand personnel of the participating troops tanks and 600 aircraft), but also on a new strategy for the use of ground forces, which leaves far behind the views of the "first European army." In theory, the world should have shuddered when it saw the power and perfection of the army of the Soviet Union, and the leadership of European countries had to seriously think about the benefits of allied relations with the new military giant ...
Alas, in practice, the Kiev maneuvers did not entail anything like that. It cannot be said that they turned out to be underestimated by the military specialists of that era - although today we speak of them as a window dressing, but in terms of the impact on the foreign attaches of window dressing, it was completely successful. Thus, for example, French General L. Loiseau, who was present at the exercises personally, noted: “With regard to tanks, I would consider it correct to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place.” Nevertheless, there were no noticeable changes in the position of the USSR in the political arena of the world - it still remained the “political pariah” that it was before.
All this could well lead the leadership of the USSR and I.V. Stalin suggested that even the most advanced ground and air forces would not give him the necessary political preferences and would not help him to integrate into the new system of international security in positions acceptable to the USSR. Of course, they were extremely important to ensure the security of the country in the event of a war, but they were not an instrument of big politics.
But the mighty "Big Fleet" could well become a similar tool. Soviet tanks and aircraft were still too far away from England, Japan and France, but the fleet was a completely different matter. All story humanity irrefutably testified that the powerful fleet was a gigantic political advantage of the country that has it; no one could ignore such a country in big politics.
In other words, it is very easy to admit that the “Big Fleet” I.V. Stalin needed not at all because of some personal preferences, but as an instrument of foreign policy, designed to provide the USSR with a worthy place in the world, and make it a full participant in international agreements. This assumption well explains a number of absurdities that accompanied the process of creating the shipbuilding program of the “Big Fleet”.
For example, the former People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov, in his memoirs, argued that the construction program for the Big Fleet "was adopted hastily, without sufficient substantiation from the operational point of view, as well as from the point of view of technical capabilities." We will talk about technical capabilities a bit later, but for now let's pay attention to the “operational point of view” - and again, let us recall the words of Admiral N.G. Kuznetsova:
So, it is quite possible to assume that there was in fact no “holy of holies”: if I.V. Stalin needed the fleet as a political tool, then he could not, of course, tell his naval commanders something like: "I need a fleet not for war, but for politics." It was much easier (and politically more correct) to gather the most responsible and competent people in the construction of the fleet, which V.M. Orlov and I.M. Ludri, and to work with them in the style: “We need a linear fleet of just about the size, and you, comrades, think of why we need it, and quickly.”
And if this was the way the author of this article suggests, it becomes quite understandable, for example, a very strange concept of using the linear forces of the USSR Navy, which appeared just about that time. If in almost all the navies of the world at that time, battleships were considered the main force of the fleet, and the remaining ships, in fact, ensured their combat use, then in the USSR everything was exactly the opposite. Light ships were considered the main striking force of the fleet, capable of crushing enemy squadrons by applying a concentrated or combined strike on them, and the battleships had only to ensure the action of light forces and give them sufficient combat stability.
Such views look extremely strange. But if we assume that the leadership of the RKKF simply received instructions to quickly justify the need to build battleships, then what options could they have? Only quickly integrate the use of battleships into the tactical calculations that existed at that time, which, in fact, was done: the concept of a small naval war was "strengthened" by the battleships. In other words, all this does not look like the evolution of views on naval art, but an urgent need to justify the usefulness of heavy ships in the fleet.
So, we see that the construction program of the “Big Fleet” could have been dictated by political necessity, but how timely was it and was realizable in the USSR? Today we know that no matter what: the level of development of the shipbuilding, armor, artillery and so on. enterprises and industries are not allowed to proceed with the creation of powerful fleets. However, in 1935, it all looked completely different.
Let's not forget that the planned economy then took, in general, only the first steps, while the role of the enthusiasm of the workers and employees was excessively exaggerated. As you know, the first and second five-year plans led to a multiple increase in the production of the most important products, such as steel, cast iron, electricity, etc., and for complex industrial products, such as automobiles or metal-cutting machines, growth was achieved even times, but by orders of magnitude. In 1935, of course, the second five-year plan was not over yet, but it was still obvious that the industrialization of the country was carried out very successfully and at a very high rate. All this, naturally, gave rise to a certain "dizziness from success" and overestimated expectations from the development of the domestic industry for the next 7-10 years. Thus, the country's leadership had certain grounds to assume that the further development of the industry at an accelerated pace would make it possible to carry out the construction of the “Big Fleet” in a relatively short time, although, alas, these assumptions were incorrect.
At the same time, in 1935, the military industry of the USSR in terms of production capacity for the land army and air forces reached acceptable indicators sufficient to provide the Red Army with military equipment. The Kirov and Kharkov factories launched a stable production of the main models of battle tanks: T-26, T-28 and BT-5 / 7, while the total production of armored vehicles reached its peak in 1936, later declined: so, in 1935 g it was produced 3 055 tank, 1936 g - 4 804, but in 1937-38 gg. 1559 and 2 271 tank, respectively. As for the aircraft, in the 1935 only the I-15 and I-16 fighters were released 819 machines. This is a very large value, considering that, for example, the Italian Air Force in 1935 had 2 100 aircraft, including those that were in training units, and the number of Luftwaffe even in 1938 g was less than 3 000 aircraft. In other words, the situation with the production of basic types of military equipment in the USSR looked so that it, this production, reached the desired level and did not require significant further expansion - thus further development of the industry could be oriented to something else. So why not to the fleet?
Thus, we conclude that for the construction of the “Big Fleet” by 1936, according to the country's leadership, there were all the necessary prerequisites: it was needed as a political tool to increase the influence of the USSR in the world, and it was assumed that its construction by the forces of Soviet industry is not to the detriment of the army and air force At the same time, the “Big Fleet” did not become the result of the development of Russian naval thought, but was to a certain extent “lowered to the fleet from above,” which, in fact, later arose on the assumption that this fleet was only a consequence of whims I.V. Stalin.
The approval of the construction plan of the “Big Fleet”, of course, went through several iterations. The first of them can be considered the report №12ss, addressed to the USSR People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Yegorov, signed by the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army V.M. Orlova. According to this document, it was planned to build 12 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 26 heavy and 20 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 155 destroyers and 438 submarines, while VM. Orlov assumed that this program could well be implemented in just 8-10 years.
This program was amended by the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense: it has not yet been approved, but it has already been adopted as a guide to action, which was expressed in the 27 adopted by 1936 on April 95 of the STO Resolution No. OK-1936ss "On the program of marine shipbuilding for 27." envisaged an increase in the construction of warships compared with the previous program. At the same time, the program continued to be adjusted: 1936 in May 8. STO adopted a resolution on the construction of 35 large battleships of type “A”, 000 displacement 9 tons with 406 * 24-mm guns and 26 - small type “B” displacements 000 9 tons and the main caliber of 305 * 7-mm guns, and they were supposed to be built in just XNUMX (!) years.
And finally, once again the adjusted program is reviewed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and finally approved by a closed decision of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of 26 June 1936. According to the approved program during 1937-1943. 8 type A battleships, type B battleships, 16 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 17 squadron destroyers, 128 large, 90 medium and 164 small submarines with a total displacement of 90 1 thousand tons should have been built.
Perhaps, a respected reader will have a question - why, wanting to consider the state of the pre-war shipbuilding of the USSR, we spend so much time on the shipbuilding program on 1937-1943? After all, many other documents were created after it: “Construction plan for warships of the Naval Forces of the Red Army”, developed in 1937, “Construction program for combat and auxiliary ships on 1938-1945”, “10-year plan for the construction of ships RKKF” 1939, etc.
The answer is very simple. Despite the fact that the above documents were usually considered by the Politburo and the Defense Committee of the USSR SNK, not one of them was approved. This, of course, did not mean that they were completely useless waste paper, but they were not an official document defining the construction of the USSR Navy either. In essence, the naval shipbuilding program adopted in 1936 on the 1937-1943. It became a fleet program document right up to 1940 itself, when the shipbuilding plan for the 3 Five-Year Plan was approved. In other words, global projects to create a super-powerful military fleet with a total displacement of 1,9, and even 2,5 million tons were never officially approved, although they were approved by I.V. Stalin.
The shipbuilding program of the “Big Fleet”, approved in 1936, represents the point from which it is worth considering what was planned to be built and what was actually ordered for construction.
Продолжение следует ...
As you know, in the 20 of the last century, the young Soviet Union did not have the means to adequately maintain and build its armed forces. The fleet has always been a very expensive weapons system, so no serious shipbuilding programs at that time could not exist by definition. Soviet naval sailors had to confine themselves to a small number of ships left over from Tsarist Russia, for the maintenance of which in the fleet it was still possible to scrape money, gradually building and modernizing something that, again, began to be built during the reign of the king.
Nevertheless, of course, the USSR could not manage only with the ships of the pre-revolutionary construction. Therefore, by the end of the 20s, the first Soviet submarines, watchdogs, etc. began to be developed and built. Without getting into the vicissitudes of the theoretical research of the apologists of the “Big” and “mosquito” fleets, we note that in the specific conditions in which the USSR was in the late 20s and early 30s, there were some significant programs for the construction of heavy ships completely impossible for many reasons. The country had absolutely no resources for this: no money, not enough skilled workers, no machinery, no armor, no metal - in general, nothing. That is why in the first half of the 30s the RKKF could only count on the construction of light surface ships, submarines and sea aviation.
During the 1927-1932 period, that is, during the first five-year plan (five-year plan) of the USSR, the emphasis was on civil shipbuilding - military orders accounted for only 26% of the total construction of ships and ships. But by the next five years, this situation was to change.
The basic document that determined the direction of military shipbuilding during this period was the “Basic Considerations for the Development of the Red Army Naval Forces for the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1935)” (it was not about the five-year plan for the year 3, but about the priorities of shipbuilding 1935 g.). The main task of the fleet at that time was to defend the maritime borders of the USSR, and this could be done, according to the developers, by building a powerful submarine and air fleet. It is interesting that, despite the seemingly purely defensive orientation, even then the developers of the document considered it necessary to focus efforts on the construction of submarines of medium and large displacement, suitable for operation on enemy communications, at a great distance from their shores, but the creation of small submarines to defend their own bases should be limited.
Based on this document, a shipbuilding program for the 1933-1938 was formed. It was approved by the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) 11 July 1933, according to her, it was planned to put into operation 8 light cruisers, 10 leaders, 40 destroyers, 28 sentry ships, 42 minesweepers, 252 torpedo boats, 60 hunters for X submarines, as well as 69 large, 200 medium and 100 small submarines, and all - 503 surface ships and 369 submarines. Naval aviation by 1936 was supposed to increase from 459 to 1 655 units. In general, the adoption of this very ambitious program marked a fundamental reversal in the relevant sectors, since the military shipbuilding sector now occupied 60% in the total cost of new ships and vessels, and the civilian sector only 40%.
Of course, the shipbuilding program on 1933-1938. In no way did she threaten the ocean fleet, especially since most submarines still had to be submarines of the type "Y", which, unfortunately, were not very well suited to combat sea communications, and absolutely on communications. ocean. Also from today's standpoint, the program overloading with submarines and torpedo boats is obvious to the detriment of larger ships, such as cruisers and destroyers, but in the framework of this article we will not go deeper into this either.
So, despite its obviously "coastal" nature, the program 1933-1938. in its original version, it was still unaffordable for the domestic industry, and as early as November 1933, that is, only a month after 4 was adopted, the SRT was significantly adjusted to the lower side, and relatively large surface ships were the first to undergo sequestration. Of the 8 light cruisers, only 4 was left, of the 10 leaders, 8, and of the 40 destroyers, the total of 22, while the submarine construction plans were reduced slightly from 369 to 321 units.
But in a reduced form the program failed to execute. For 1938, inclusive, the RKKF received only one light cruiser from the 4 (Kirov, and then, to a certain extent arbitrarily), from the 8 leaders - 4, from the 22 destroyers - 7, etc. Even submarines, the usefulness of which was never denied by anyone and never, were built substantially less than the plan - inclusive of 1937 g inclusively, and it is clear that under any circumstances ships later laid down could not be put into operation before the start. 151
A small remark: it is possible that some of the esteemed readers will want to draw parallels with the present day - after all, now we also have war shipbuilding programs being disrupted. In fact, looking at the shipbuilding of the USSR of those years, one can see a lot in common - the country also experienced problems literally at every turn. Projects of warships, often, turned out to be suboptimal, or contained serious miscalculations, the industry did not have time to master the creation of the necessary units and equipment, and the fact that it did work out was often of poor quality. The construction period was regularly disrupted, the ships were built for an extremely long time not only in comparison with industrialized capitalist countries, but even in comparison with tsarist Russia. But, nevertheless, there were differences: for example, already in 1936 of the USSR, despite all the above difficulties, it had the world's first submarine fleet. The RKKF by that time included the 113 Submarines, the United States with the 84 submarines were in second place, and the third with the United States with 77 submarines.
"U-207"
The next national shipbuilding program began to be developed in December 1935, when the RKKF command received the relevant orders from the government of the country, and had 2 key differences from the previous one.
1933-1938 program compiled by experts of the Navy and approved after the approval of the leadership of the armed forces and the country, with the amendment to the possibility of shipbuilding. But the new program was formed “in a narrow circle”, it was the head of the Red Forces Naval Forces V.M. Orlov and the head of the Naval Academy I.M. Ludri under the direction of I.V. Stalin. Thus, we can say that the new shipbuilding program reflected, first of all, the vision of RKKF by the top leadership of the USSR.
Well, the second difference was that, despite the rather amusing tactical justification, the new shipbuilding program “aimed” at building a “Big Fleet”, the basis of which was made up of heavy artillery ships - battleships. Why did this happen?
You can, of course, try to explain the change in the principles of the formation of a new shipbuilding program with the voluntarism of Joseph Vissarionovich, who was impressed by the big ships. But in fact, it seems that everything was much more complicated.
It is easy to see how threatening the international situation of those years was. For some time after the First World War in Europe, peace was established, but it, this time, is now clearly coming to an end. In Germany, Adolf Hitler came to power, and his revanchist course was evident with the naked eye. At the same time, England and France, at that time - the guarantors of peace in Europe, looked at the rearmament of Germany through their fingers, despite the fact that the latter clearly and grossly violated the Versailles peace treaty. In fact, it was possible to say that the system of international treaties that existed until recently had already ceased to operate and gradually had to be replaced by something new. Thus, according to the Versailles Treaty, the German navy was strictly limited both qualitatively and quantitatively. But England, instead of (if necessary - by force) insisting on its observance, in fact unilaterally violated this very beneficial agreement for her, having concluded with the Hitler 18 July 1935 the Anglo-German Maritime Agreement, according to which Germany was allowed to build a fleet of in 35% of British. In October, 1935 Mr. Mussolini launched an invasion of Abyssinia, and, again, the League of Nations did not find the tool to prevent bloodshed.
The political situation of the USSR at that time was extremely difficult. Obviously, to ensure peace in Europe and the security of the Land of the Soviets, a new system of international treaties was needed in which the USSR would participate on an equal basis with the rest of the powers, but the threat that Japan represented in the Far East could hardly be countered by what by treaties, only by military force. But in Europe they looked at the USSR with distrust and apprehension. They eagerly traded with him, as the Country of Soviets supplied the bread needed in Europe and regularly paid its obligations, but the USSR remained in political isolation: it was simply not perceived as an equal, no one considered its opinion. A good example of such an attitude was the Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, which was very good if we consider it as a declaration of intent. But in order to be of practical importance, this pact should have had an addition, in which the actions of the parties would be concrete if France or the USSR were subjected to an unprovoked attack by a European power. Contrary to the wishes of the USSR, this supplementary agreement was never signed.
In order to declare itself as a strong player in the European arena, the USSR needed to somehow demonstrate its strength, and such an attempt was made: this is about the famous Great Kiev 1935 maneuvers.
Much has been said and said that these maneuvers were thoroughly ostentatious, and had no practical significance, but even in this form revealed many shortcomings in the preparation of the Red Army at all levels. This is of course so. But, in addition to the military, they also had political significance, which should be discussed in more detail.
The fact is that in 1935, the strongest army in Europe was obviously considered the French. At the same time, the concept of its use was purely defensive. France suffered huge losses in the offensive operations of the First World War, and its military leadership believed that defense in future wars would take precedence over the offensive, which should be taken only when the enemy squandered his forces in unsuccessful attempts to break through the French defenses.
At the same time, the Soviet maneuvers of 1935 were supposed to demonstrate to the world a completely different concept of warfare, namely, the theory of deep operation. The “external” essence of maneuvers was to demonstrate the ability of troops saturated with modern military equipment to penetrate enemy defenses, and then, with mechanized and cavalry units, supported by airborne assault forces, to encircle and destroy the enemy. Thus, the Kiev maneuvers “as if hinted” not only at the gigantic military power of the USSR (more than 65 were involved in exercises for 1 thousand personnel of the participating troops tanks and 600 aircraft), but also on a new strategy for the use of ground forces, which leaves far behind the views of the "first European army." In theory, the world should have shuddered when it saw the power and perfection of the army of the Soviet Union, and the leadership of European countries had to seriously think about the benefits of allied relations with the new military giant ...
Alas, in practice, the Kiev maneuvers did not entail anything like that. It cannot be said that they turned out to be underestimated by the military specialists of that era - although today we speak of them as a window dressing, but in terms of the impact on the foreign attaches of window dressing, it was completely successful. Thus, for example, French General L. Loiseau, who was present at the exercises personally, noted: “With regard to tanks, I would consider it correct to consider the army of the Soviet Union in the first place.” Nevertheless, there were no noticeable changes in the position of the USSR in the political arena of the world - it still remained the “political pariah” that it was before.
All this could well lead the leadership of the USSR and I.V. Stalin suggested that even the most advanced ground and air forces would not give him the necessary political preferences and would not help him to integrate into the new system of international security in positions acceptable to the USSR. Of course, they were extremely important to ensure the security of the country in the event of a war, but they were not an instrument of big politics.
But the mighty "Big Fleet" could well become a similar tool. Soviet tanks and aircraft were still too far away from England, Japan and France, but the fleet was a completely different matter. All story humanity irrefutably testified that the powerful fleet was a gigantic political advantage of the country that has it; no one could ignore such a country in big politics.
In other words, it is very easy to admit that the “Big Fleet” I.V. Stalin needed not at all because of some personal preferences, but as an instrument of foreign policy, designed to provide the USSR with a worthy place in the world, and make it a full participant in international agreements. This assumption well explains a number of absurdities that accompanied the process of creating the shipbuilding program of the “Big Fleet”.
For example, the former People's Commissar of the Navy, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union N.G. Kuznetsov, in his memoirs, argued that the construction program for the Big Fleet "was adopted hastily, without sufficient substantiation from the operational point of view, as well as from the point of view of technical capabilities." We will talk about technical capabilities a bit later, but for now let's pay attention to the “operational point of view” - and again, let us recall the words of Admiral N.G. Kuznetsova:
“There were no clearly defined fleet tasks. Oddly enough, I could not achieve this either in the Defense Commissariat, or in the Government. The General Staff referred to its lack of government directives on this issue, and Stalin personally laughed out or expressed very general assumptions. I realized that he did not want to ordain me to the "holy of holies," and did not consider it convenient to pursue this more persistently. When there was talk of a future fleet in one or another of the theaters, he looked at the map of the sea and only asked questions about the possibilities of the future fleet, without revealing details of his intentions. ”
So, it is quite possible to assume that there was in fact no “holy of holies”: if I.V. Stalin needed the fleet as a political tool, then he could not, of course, tell his naval commanders something like: "I need a fleet not for war, but for politics." It was much easier (and politically more correct) to gather the most responsible and competent people in the construction of the fleet, which V.M. Orlov and I.M. Ludri, and to work with them in the style: “We need a linear fleet of just about the size, and you, comrades, think of why we need it, and quickly.”
And if this was the way the author of this article suggests, it becomes quite understandable, for example, a very strange concept of using the linear forces of the USSR Navy, which appeared just about that time. If in almost all the navies of the world at that time, battleships were considered the main force of the fleet, and the remaining ships, in fact, ensured their combat use, then in the USSR everything was exactly the opposite. Light ships were considered the main striking force of the fleet, capable of crushing enemy squadrons by applying a concentrated or combined strike on them, and the battleships had only to ensure the action of light forces and give them sufficient combat stability.
Such views look extremely strange. But if we assume that the leadership of the RKKF simply received instructions to quickly justify the need to build battleships, then what options could they have? Only quickly integrate the use of battleships into the tactical calculations that existed at that time, which, in fact, was done: the concept of a small naval war was "strengthened" by the battleships. In other words, all this does not look like the evolution of views on naval art, but an urgent need to justify the usefulness of heavy ships in the fleet.
So, we see that the construction program of the “Big Fleet” could have been dictated by political necessity, but how timely was it and was realizable in the USSR? Today we know that no matter what: the level of development of the shipbuilding, armor, artillery and so on. enterprises and industries are not allowed to proceed with the creation of powerful fleets. However, in 1935, it all looked completely different.
Let's not forget that the planned economy then took, in general, only the first steps, while the role of the enthusiasm of the workers and employees was excessively exaggerated. As you know, the first and second five-year plans led to a multiple increase in the production of the most important products, such as steel, cast iron, electricity, etc., and for complex industrial products, such as automobiles or metal-cutting machines, growth was achieved even times, but by orders of magnitude. In 1935, of course, the second five-year plan was not over yet, but it was still obvious that the industrialization of the country was carried out very successfully and at a very high rate. All this, naturally, gave rise to a certain "dizziness from success" and overestimated expectations from the development of the domestic industry for the next 7-10 years. Thus, the country's leadership had certain grounds to assume that the further development of the industry at an accelerated pace would make it possible to carry out the construction of the “Big Fleet” in a relatively short time, although, alas, these assumptions were incorrect.
At the same time, in 1935, the military industry of the USSR in terms of production capacity for the land army and air forces reached acceptable indicators sufficient to provide the Red Army with military equipment. The Kirov and Kharkov factories launched a stable production of the main models of battle tanks: T-26, T-28 and BT-5 / 7, while the total production of armored vehicles reached its peak in 1936, later declined: so, in 1935 g it was produced 3 055 tank, 1936 g - 4 804, but in 1937-38 gg. 1559 and 2 271 tank, respectively. As for the aircraft, in the 1935 only the I-15 and I-16 fighters were released 819 machines. This is a very large value, considering that, for example, the Italian Air Force in 1935 had 2 100 aircraft, including those that were in training units, and the number of Luftwaffe even in 1938 g was less than 3 000 aircraft. In other words, the situation with the production of basic types of military equipment in the USSR looked so that it, this production, reached the desired level and did not require significant further expansion - thus further development of the industry could be oriented to something else. So why not to the fleet?
Thus, we conclude that for the construction of the “Big Fleet” by 1936, according to the country's leadership, there were all the necessary prerequisites: it was needed as a political tool to increase the influence of the USSR in the world, and it was assumed that its construction by the forces of Soviet industry is not to the detriment of the army and air force At the same time, the “Big Fleet” did not become the result of the development of Russian naval thought, but was to a certain extent “lowered to the fleet from above,” which, in fact, later arose on the assumption that this fleet was only a consequence of whims I.V. Stalin.
The approval of the construction plan of the “Big Fleet”, of course, went through several iterations. The first of them can be considered the report №12ss, addressed to the USSR People's Commissar of Defense K.E. Voroshilov and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army A.I. Yegorov, signed by the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army V.M. Orlova. According to this document, it was planned to build 12 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 26 heavy and 20 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 155 destroyers and 438 submarines, while VM. Orlov assumed that this program could well be implemented in just 8-10 years.
This program was amended by the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense: it has not yet been approved, but it has already been adopted as a guide to action, which was expressed in the 27 adopted by 1936 on April 95 of the STO Resolution No. OK-1936ss "On the program of marine shipbuilding for 27." envisaged an increase in the construction of warships compared with the previous program. At the same time, the program continued to be adjusted: 1936 in May 8. STO adopted a resolution on the construction of 35 large battleships of type “A”, 000 displacement 9 tons with 406 * 24-mm guns and 26 - small type “B” displacements 000 9 tons and the main caliber of 305 * 7-mm guns, and they were supposed to be built in just XNUMX (!) years.
And finally, once again the adjusted program is reviewed by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and finally approved by a closed decision of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of 26 June 1936. According to the approved program during 1937-1943. 8 type A battleships, type B battleships, 16 light cruisers, 20 leaders, 17 squadron destroyers, 128 large, 90 medium and 164 small submarines with a total displacement of 90 1 thousand tons should have been built.
Perhaps, a respected reader will have a question - why, wanting to consider the state of the pre-war shipbuilding of the USSR, we spend so much time on the shipbuilding program on 1937-1943? After all, many other documents were created after it: “Construction plan for warships of the Naval Forces of the Red Army”, developed in 1937, “Construction program for combat and auxiliary ships on 1938-1945”, “10-year plan for the construction of ships RKKF” 1939, etc.
The answer is very simple. Despite the fact that the above documents were usually considered by the Politburo and the Defense Committee of the USSR SNK, not one of them was approved. This, of course, did not mean that they were completely useless waste paper, but they were not an official document defining the construction of the USSR Navy either. In essence, the naval shipbuilding program adopted in 1936 on the 1937-1943. It became a fleet program document right up to 1940 itself, when the shipbuilding plan for the 3 Five-Year Plan was approved. In other words, global projects to create a super-powerful military fleet with a total displacement of 1,9, and even 2,5 million tons were never officially approved, although they were approved by I.V. Stalin.
The shipbuilding program of the “Big Fleet”, approved in 1936, represents the point from which it is worth considering what was planned to be built and what was actually ordered for construction.
Продолжение следует ...
Information