What does the US Army in Europe do? To defeat Russia or just hold up?
26 March, the American edition of RealClear Defense has published material on the military-political situation in Europe. The author of the article was a retired US Army officer Sam Kanter, who is currently involved in defense development. His publication received a talking title: “The United States Army in Europe: Roadblock, Speedbump, or Something Else Entirely?” (“US Army in Europe: checkpoint, artificial irregularity or something else?”). As is clear from the title, the topic of the publication was the current state, tasks and prospects of the contingent of the American army in Europe.
At the beginning of his article, S. Kanter notes that in the past century there has been a "vicious cycle" of the development of the armed forces. The US Army was built to fight a certain enemy, triumphed (Pyrrhic or more successful), after which it changed to counter the new threat - but it soon became clear that the old challenges remained relevant. Russia now turns out to be a new repetition of such a cycle.
After the collapse of the USSR in the 1991 year, the United States began to reduce conventional weapons, and then for several decades focused on the fight against illegal armed groups. Only after that the US again noticed the need for armed forces in Europe. After 7 years after the dissolution of two land brigades in European countries, the US Army is again in the old cycle. The Pentagon intends to ensure the possibility of victory over the enemy in the field of conventional weapons. However, S. Kanter doubts the advisability of such a course in the context of the Russian threat.
The author asks important questions. Do the more powerful forces in Europe intend to defeat Russia or are they only going to delay its offensive? Is reinforced grouping a deterrent or political tool? Correct answers to these questions will help in the further planning of the development of the armed forces.
In this case, the author suggests to remember history development of the army after World War II. Historically, the benefit of the American army in Europe was to resolve political issues and deter, but not directly create, a force capable of stopping Russian troops. Instead of the simplest approach, providing for the priority of numbers, S. Kanter proposes to solve problems in Europe by other means, more subtle and less expensive.
After World War II and the New Look Strategy
The author recalls that the victory in World War II came at a great price, but no other country can match the USSR in casualties. At that time, a proposal to use the exhaustion of a former ally was being considered abroad. It was proposed, as Winston Churchill said earlier, "to strangle Bolshevism in its own cradle." General George Patton supported this position and offered to solve the Soviet question by the forces of one army in a few weeks. However, the "cradle" remained strong. In 1945, the Soviet armed forces numbered 11 million people - about the same as the United States. Also, Soviet troops were concentrated in Europe, could withstand heavy losses and quickly fill them. All this was an advantage, and therefore a new war did not occur. However, many believed that this was only a temporary respite.
The US Army remained in Europe and implemented a policy of containment, however, there were doubts about its ability to win the big war. After 1945, the numerical gap between the USSR and the USA increased as the Russians prepared troops and equipment for a major land conflict. But, despite all the gloomy predictions, American troops continued to serve on European lands.
Shortly after taking office, President Dwight Eisenhower realized that large-scale strategies did not coincide with the military-political reality. With extensive experience in the war in Europe, D. Eisenhower criticized the current US European strategy in terms of logic and morality. If the army is unable to repel the land offensive of the USSR, what is the significance of the number of troops in its path? Why sacrifice the lives of soldiers in a war in which they won?
New Eisenhower strategy called New Look was designed to solve both of these problems. The strategy involved the use of non-military means such as covert operations, economic pressure and information warfare. In addition to this, the doctrine of mass retaliation (Massive Retaliation) was proposed. She offered to respond to any attack in Western Europe with a crushing nuclear strike from the United States. In this concept, ground forces remained on the sidelines, and nuclear forces turned out to be the main deterrent.
Any war in Europe could turn into a nuclear one, and this, as S. Kanter notes, kept the USSR from attacking. In addition, New Look gave some new features. The financing of land forces doomed to great losses was reduced in favor of the development of air force and nuclear forces — more convenient means of deterrence. This badly affected the spirit of the army, but created a new strategy, in which it ceased to be a barrier to the path of the USSR troops to Western Europe.
In fact, D. Eisenhower did not indulge in bloody fantasies about a major non-nuclear conflict, which was proposed to prevent a nuclear threat. New Look's plan was to a certain extent a lottery, but it worked.
Later, President Eisenhower continued to criticize the idea of increasing contingent in Europe. He believed that the army in this situation is not a roadblock, but an alarm - in this case, several divisions and one division could display the flag with equal effectiveness. The task of training troops in the event of a major non-nuclear conflict D. Eisenhower assigned to European countries. He argued that "the United States has the right and the obligation to insist that their NATO partners take more responsibility to protect Western Europe." S. Kanter notes that now the same ideas are being promoted by the current US President Donald Trump. Thus, Eisenhower's strategy to counteract the USSR assumed the use of allies to protect their interests. Such a strategy was realistic; nor was it based on the need to stop the Soviet offensive.
Counterweight strategy
The New Look strategy was relevant for the next two decades. Under the rule of John F. Kennedy, she was criticized, but she was not abandoned. The military situation in Europe remained stagnant, since the USSR had a tenfold advantage in active divisions stationed along the future front. This imbalance persisted until the end of the seventies, when the United States decided to use its economic and technological superiority.
In 1947, the transistor was invented, and it opened up new horizons for military equipment. By the seventies, such technologies allowed the creation of high-performance guided weapons. After Vietnam was created so-called. the doctrine of combined weapons, which, together with new samples weapons could become a real means of effectively countering the USSR.
The United States first tested guided weapons in Vietnam. Laser-guided systems made it possible to hit a target, saving ammunition, time and resources, as well as reducing collateral damage. The appearance of such weapons coincided with the development of a new military doctrine for Europe. The new Assault Breaker strategy provided for the widespread use of high-precision systems to destroy key targets of the Soviet army.
The United States believed that the Soviet offensive doctrine provides for the concentration of efforts on a single point of defense of NATO with the organization of several waves of attack. Then erupted tank the fist was to enter a breakthrough and develop an offensive. In 1982, this was answered with the AirLand Battle strategy - one of the results of the Assault Breaker program.
According to the new US plans, parity in the number of conventional weapons was impossible. Instead, it was proposed to get an advantage in quality. "Air-to-ground battle" offered active defense in the area of the enemy offensive with simultaneous destruction of its equipment and objects with high-precision armament. If the advancing "waves" succeed in inflicting damage still in the rear, before reaching the front line, the offensive must fail. Thus, the development of technology for the first time allowed the United States to expect victory in a land clash with the USSR without the use of nuclear weapons. An important feature of AirLand Battle was the fact that the American side did not try to compete with the enemy in the area where he had a significant advantage.
Could the AirLand Battle strategy stop the Soviet offensive? S. Kanter believes that this question does not really matter. More importantly, the command of the Soviet army considered this possible. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff in 1977-1984, believed that the new strategies of the likely adversary could disrupt the implementation of existing plans. New American developments have made obsolete the Soviet approach, based on quantitative superiority. During his tenure as chief of the General Staff, N. Ogarkov promoted ideas designed to be a response to American technology superiority. In fact, he was one of the first Soviet military theorists to recognize the changing nature of modern warfare. At the same time, the General Staff under Marshal Ogarkov understood that an offensive in Europe was extremely dangerous. Thus, the United States managed to create a new deterrent, the effectiveness of which does not depend directly on the victory over the enemy.
Lessons learned and future paths
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the nineties, there was a reduction in American forces in Europe and the expansion of NATO, which did not help maintain a stable environment. Currently, according to S. Kanter, the United States and NATO are once again facing the specter of a land war in Europe - no matter how fantastic such a scenario may seem. Russia's armed forces are seriously different from the USSR army. With less human resources, Russia developed doctrines and technologies, primarily in the field of high-precision systems. For the first time in the history of Russia, the number of contract employees exceeded the number of draftees.
At the same time, in the 21st century, the Russian army begins to move away from the traditions of using quantity and concentrating forces on the main axes. Using regional influence and ethnic "faults", Russia has mastered the so-called. hybrid war. Thus, the author points out, mercenaries, militias and other "irregular persons" operate in Ukraine. In this strategy, servicemen perform the functions of advisers and solve the tasks of artillery support of “proxy forces” from remote positions.
Thus, Russia currently uses the developments on the concepts of New Look and AirLand Battle even more than the United States itself. She learned how to use inexpensive and low-risk ways to solve her tasks, as well as to use the inability of the Western armies to respond effectively to such threats. Any invasion of Europe will almost certainly be based on such approaches, which will reduce the effectiveness of large concentrations of enemy ground forces, suitable for work only in a “normal” conflict.
However, S. Kanter believes that new factors are unlikely to seriously change the fundamental situation of the situation. The history of the last decades clearly shows that the development of American technology, the development of countermeasures, and the transfer of part of the defense tasks to NATO allies can really have the desired effect. All these measures can lead to the same results as a simple increase in the number of troops in Europe.
If the United States intends to demonstrate its determination to defend its interests in Europe in the face of the “Russian threat”, then D. Eisenhower’s theses should be recalled. One team can solve such problems with the same efficiency as several. Russia will always have advantages in that part of Europe, which is traditionally its “backyard”, and where the terrain is optimal for rapid attacks. S. Kanter considers direct competition with such an adversary in areas where he has advantages, as stupidity.
The author believes that the United States should explore less expensive and more developed options for countering Russia before launching a simple build-up of troops in the region. Perhaps, at the same time, the American army will be able to escape from the previously described development cycle, which has been the basis of military planning for the past several decades.
Article "The United States Army in Europe: Roadblock, Speedbump, or Something Else Entirely?":
https://realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/03/26/the_united_states_army_in_europe_roadblock_speedbump_or_something_else_entirely__114285.html
At the beginning of his article, S. Kanter notes that in the past century there has been a "vicious cycle" of the development of the armed forces. The US Army was built to fight a certain enemy, triumphed (Pyrrhic or more successful), after which it changed to counter the new threat - but it soon became clear that the old challenges remained relevant. Russia now turns out to be a new repetition of such a cycle.
After the collapse of the USSR in the 1991 year, the United States began to reduce conventional weapons, and then for several decades focused on the fight against illegal armed groups. Only after that the US again noticed the need for armed forces in Europe. After 7 years after the dissolution of two land brigades in European countries, the US Army is again in the old cycle. The Pentagon intends to ensure the possibility of victory over the enemy in the field of conventional weapons. However, S. Kanter doubts the advisability of such a course in the context of the Russian threat.
The author asks important questions. Do the more powerful forces in Europe intend to defeat Russia or are they only going to delay its offensive? Is reinforced grouping a deterrent or political tool? Correct answers to these questions will help in the further planning of the development of the armed forces.
In this case, the author suggests to remember history development of the army after World War II. Historically, the benefit of the American army in Europe was to resolve political issues and deter, but not directly create, a force capable of stopping Russian troops. Instead of the simplest approach, providing for the priority of numbers, S. Kanter proposes to solve problems in Europe by other means, more subtle and less expensive.
After World War II and the New Look Strategy
The author recalls that the victory in World War II came at a great price, but no other country can match the USSR in casualties. At that time, a proposal to use the exhaustion of a former ally was being considered abroad. It was proposed, as Winston Churchill said earlier, "to strangle Bolshevism in its own cradle." General George Patton supported this position and offered to solve the Soviet question by the forces of one army in a few weeks. However, the "cradle" remained strong. In 1945, the Soviet armed forces numbered 11 million people - about the same as the United States. Also, Soviet troops were concentrated in Europe, could withstand heavy losses and quickly fill them. All this was an advantage, and therefore a new war did not occur. However, many believed that this was only a temporary respite.
The US Army remained in Europe and implemented a policy of containment, however, there were doubts about its ability to win the big war. After 1945, the numerical gap between the USSR and the USA increased as the Russians prepared troops and equipment for a major land conflict. But, despite all the gloomy predictions, American troops continued to serve on European lands.
Shortly after taking office, President Dwight Eisenhower realized that large-scale strategies did not coincide with the military-political reality. With extensive experience in the war in Europe, D. Eisenhower criticized the current US European strategy in terms of logic and morality. If the army is unable to repel the land offensive of the USSR, what is the significance of the number of troops in its path? Why sacrifice the lives of soldiers in a war in which they won?
New Eisenhower strategy called New Look was designed to solve both of these problems. The strategy involved the use of non-military means such as covert operations, economic pressure and information warfare. In addition to this, the doctrine of mass retaliation (Massive Retaliation) was proposed. She offered to respond to any attack in Western Europe with a crushing nuclear strike from the United States. In this concept, ground forces remained on the sidelines, and nuclear forces turned out to be the main deterrent.
Any war in Europe could turn into a nuclear one, and this, as S. Kanter notes, kept the USSR from attacking. In addition, New Look gave some new features. The financing of land forces doomed to great losses was reduced in favor of the development of air force and nuclear forces — more convenient means of deterrence. This badly affected the spirit of the army, but created a new strategy, in which it ceased to be a barrier to the path of the USSR troops to Western Europe.
In fact, D. Eisenhower did not indulge in bloody fantasies about a major non-nuclear conflict, which was proposed to prevent a nuclear threat. New Look's plan was to a certain extent a lottery, but it worked.
Later, President Eisenhower continued to criticize the idea of increasing contingent in Europe. He believed that the army in this situation is not a roadblock, but an alarm - in this case, several divisions and one division could display the flag with equal effectiveness. The task of training troops in the event of a major non-nuclear conflict D. Eisenhower assigned to European countries. He argued that "the United States has the right and the obligation to insist that their NATO partners take more responsibility to protect Western Europe." S. Kanter notes that now the same ideas are being promoted by the current US President Donald Trump. Thus, Eisenhower's strategy to counteract the USSR assumed the use of allies to protect their interests. Such a strategy was realistic; nor was it based on the need to stop the Soviet offensive.
Counterweight strategy
The New Look strategy was relevant for the next two decades. Under the rule of John F. Kennedy, she was criticized, but she was not abandoned. The military situation in Europe remained stagnant, since the USSR had a tenfold advantage in active divisions stationed along the future front. This imbalance persisted until the end of the seventies, when the United States decided to use its economic and technological superiority.
In 1947, the transistor was invented, and it opened up new horizons for military equipment. By the seventies, such technologies allowed the creation of high-performance guided weapons. After Vietnam was created so-called. the doctrine of combined weapons, which, together with new samples weapons could become a real means of effectively countering the USSR.
The United States first tested guided weapons in Vietnam. Laser-guided systems made it possible to hit a target, saving ammunition, time and resources, as well as reducing collateral damage. The appearance of such weapons coincided with the development of a new military doctrine for Europe. The new Assault Breaker strategy provided for the widespread use of high-precision systems to destroy key targets of the Soviet army.
The United States believed that the Soviet offensive doctrine provides for the concentration of efforts on a single point of defense of NATO with the organization of several waves of attack. Then erupted tank the fist was to enter a breakthrough and develop an offensive. In 1982, this was answered with the AirLand Battle strategy - one of the results of the Assault Breaker program.
According to the new US plans, parity in the number of conventional weapons was impossible. Instead, it was proposed to get an advantage in quality. "Air-to-ground battle" offered active defense in the area of the enemy offensive with simultaneous destruction of its equipment and objects with high-precision armament. If the advancing "waves" succeed in inflicting damage still in the rear, before reaching the front line, the offensive must fail. Thus, the development of technology for the first time allowed the United States to expect victory in a land clash with the USSR without the use of nuclear weapons. An important feature of AirLand Battle was the fact that the American side did not try to compete with the enemy in the area where he had a significant advantage.
Could the AirLand Battle strategy stop the Soviet offensive? S. Kanter believes that this question does not really matter. More importantly, the command of the Soviet army considered this possible. Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff in 1977-1984, believed that the new strategies of the likely adversary could disrupt the implementation of existing plans. New American developments have made obsolete the Soviet approach, based on quantitative superiority. During his tenure as chief of the General Staff, N. Ogarkov promoted ideas designed to be a response to American technology superiority. In fact, he was one of the first Soviet military theorists to recognize the changing nature of modern warfare. At the same time, the General Staff under Marshal Ogarkov understood that an offensive in Europe was extremely dangerous. Thus, the United States managed to create a new deterrent, the effectiveness of which does not depend directly on the victory over the enemy.
Lessons learned and future paths
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the nineties, there was a reduction in American forces in Europe and the expansion of NATO, which did not help maintain a stable environment. Currently, according to S. Kanter, the United States and NATO are once again facing the specter of a land war in Europe - no matter how fantastic such a scenario may seem. Russia's armed forces are seriously different from the USSR army. With less human resources, Russia developed doctrines and technologies, primarily in the field of high-precision systems. For the first time in the history of Russia, the number of contract employees exceeded the number of draftees.
At the same time, in the 21st century, the Russian army begins to move away from the traditions of using quantity and concentrating forces on the main axes. Using regional influence and ethnic "faults", Russia has mastered the so-called. hybrid war. Thus, the author points out, mercenaries, militias and other "irregular persons" operate in Ukraine. In this strategy, servicemen perform the functions of advisers and solve the tasks of artillery support of “proxy forces” from remote positions.
Thus, Russia currently uses the developments on the concepts of New Look and AirLand Battle even more than the United States itself. She learned how to use inexpensive and low-risk ways to solve her tasks, as well as to use the inability of the Western armies to respond effectively to such threats. Any invasion of Europe will almost certainly be based on such approaches, which will reduce the effectiveness of large concentrations of enemy ground forces, suitable for work only in a “normal” conflict.
However, S. Kanter believes that new factors are unlikely to seriously change the fundamental situation of the situation. The history of the last decades clearly shows that the development of American technology, the development of countermeasures, and the transfer of part of the defense tasks to NATO allies can really have the desired effect. All these measures can lead to the same results as a simple increase in the number of troops in Europe.
If the United States intends to demonstrate its determination to defend its interests in Europe in the face of the “Russian threat”, then D. Eisenhower’s theses should be recalled. One team can solve such problems with the same efficiency as several. Russia will always have advantages in that part of Europe, which is traditionally its “backyard”, and where the terrain is optimal for rapid attacks. S. Kanter considers direct competition with such an adversary in areas where he has advantages, as stupidity.
The author believes that the United States should explore less expensive and more developed options for countering Russia before launching a simple build-up of troops in the region. Perhaps, at the same time, the American army will be able to escape from the previously described development cycle, which has been the basis of military planning for the past several decades.
Article "The United States Army in Europe: Roadblock, Speedbump, or Something Else Entirely?":
https://realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/03/26/the_united_states_army_in_europe_roadblock_speedbump_or_something_else_entirely__114285.html
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