Soviet battleship K-1000. Do not lie and make fear!
The Union did not boast of what it does not have. Union did not talk about what he has. And this silence, interrupted by a chorus of children's voices singing "May there always be sunshine," made the West numb with horror. Stronger than Hitchcock thrillers.
Without any reliable information, Western experts themselves drew "cartoons about the Soviet super-weapon" and then themselves were amazed at their own work. The scientific and industrial potential of the USSR did not allow to doubt: much of what was drawn could turn out to be true.
The material presented below is dedicated to one of these “horror stories” of the Cold War period. Draft rocket-artillery battleship "Sovetskaya Byelorossia", better known under the designation K-1000.
The primary source of information about the K-1000 project is the directory of naval armaments Jane's Fighting Ships (periodically published catalog with orderly information about all the ships of the world). No further evidence of the existence of such a project was found.
Were there similar domestic developments or is it only the fantasies of Western experts? I think it's the last. The "Stalinist" program of building the "big ships" was curtailed, and any conversations on the topic of battleships were stopped immediately after the leader’s death several years before the first ship-based PKR complexes appeared. In other words, the components of the K-1000 project have no connection in time.
According to the author, the version with deliberate misinformation with the "sink" of secret development to the West looks the least realistic. Union was not seen in cheap productions.
The superlinker Sovetskaya Byelorossia was entirely designed overseas.
“Designed” - loudly said. On the basis of American projects of similar designation and taking into account Soviet ideas about the beautiful, a draft of the ship was made with a total displacement of 65-70 thousand tons with a mixed rocket and artillery weapons. Its main dimensions are presented and possible characteristics are derived.
Taking into account the development of technologies of that era, the following was obtained.
It was assumed that the ship would be armed with two rotary launchers with rail guides, whose appearance resembled installations for launching KSSC missiles. Launchers were covered with armored domes. In terms of protection, rocket weapons were not inferior to the artillery turrets of the main caliber.
The main artillery caliber itself was represented by six 406 guns or even 457 mm in two towers - one each, in the bow and stern parts of the battleship.
Auxiliary equipment consisted of 130-mm universal guns, paired and quadruple anti-aircraft installations caliber 45 and 25 mm.
Like the actually existing battleships, the K-1000 vertical armor protection could be in a wide range of 280-470 mm (belt), the total thickness of the horizontal protection (upper and main armor) was estimated as ≈ 250 mm. Differential defense towers GK and launchers of missiles was estimated at 190-410 mm.
Based on the characteristics of the battle cruisers and high-speed battleships of the late period, the ship’s speed could be within 28-33 knots.
Erudites from among Western analysts, predecessors of National Interest, came up with suitable Soviet names for all the representatives of the series: Sovetskaya Byelorossia, Strana Sovetov, Krasnaya Bessarabiya, Krasnaya Sibir ', Sovietskaya Konstitutsia, Lenin and Sovetsky Soyuz.
The construction of missile battleships was supposed to be conducted (now just do not laugh) at the Siberian shipyards.
What was the meaning of these assumptions? Was there any truth in that surrealism?
If we reject ridicule, all elements of the K-1000 project, in one or another interpretation, existed in practice.
In the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 50's. serial construction of heavy cruisers was carried out - in fact, linear cruisers of the “Stalingrad” type (82 Ave.), with a total displacement of 42 thousand tons. At the head of Stalingrad, by the time the construction was suspended, a building and a citadel had already been formed.
The design of the domestic 406 and 457 mm caliber artillery systems was carried out throughout the 1930-40x. At the time of the events described, there was sufficient experience and working samples of all the necessary elements of the "Tsar Cannons". From the turntables of the thousand-ton towers to the experimental artillery system B-37 (mm 406), which showed itself in the defense of Leningrad.
The most interesting moment is connected with the battleship missile weapon. In its present form, the launchers resembled the design of the CM-59 for the KSST anti-ship missiles (the Shchuka ship projectile, one name could contusion the enemy).
The KSSC missiles were in service with 13 destroyers of the 56-EM Ave., 56-M and 57-bis. The upgraded destroyers of the 56 Ave., originally designed for artillery and mine-torpedo weapons, received one SM-59 with ammunition from 8 missiles each. The 57-bis project was created immediately as a missile carrier ship. Its armament included two CM-59 installations with ammunition of a dozen anti-ship missiles.
The characteristics of the Pike were not impressive - the range of 40 km firing was complicated by the time-consuming prelaunch preparation associated with filling the CRP with liquid fuel.
But the fact that ships with a tonnage of 4000 tons could produce a volley comparable in strength to a volley of naval artillery battleships caused great optimism.
Just a few years before the KSSC, the specified mass was delivered to the target (the Shchuks 620 kg warhead, of which 300 was directly the mass of explosives) required guns having a barrel weight of 70 tons (excluding the breech, pickup mechanisms and ammunition supply) . It was possible to install such guns only on very large ships.
Comparison of KSSch with large-caliber naval artillery is not entirely correct, because each type of weapon had its own specific features.
Surpassing 13,5, the high-explosive projectile quadrupled in terms of explosives (in this sense, the KSSch combat unit is an analogue of the 500-kg high-explosive aerial bomb), the missile was 2 times lower than the projectiles in speed. Even if the warhead of the Pike were entirely cast from metal, it would still not be able to compete with armor-piercing 343-mm projectiles. Not to mention the more powerful calibers.
The armor-piercing abilities of the KSSH were greatly exaggerated in the era of the “rocket euphoria” that began. Most often mention of shooting at the unfinished citadel of the MCT "Stalingrad" with the formation of holes "In the form of" eight "area 55 square. m »... Well, how did a subsonic rocket inflict such damage if it could not be repeated by large-caliber bombs or armor-piercing projectiles flying at supersonic speeds? Nothing even remotely similar to the whole history sea battles.
No less controversy exists in the description of the KSSH firing at the Nakhimov cruiser. A rocket with an inert warhead pierced the ship through, so that the lower edge of the exit hole (8 sq. M) was in 40 cm under water. This was recorded by the rescue team reaching the “Nakhimov” when the damaged ship had already received 1600 tons of water, received a heel and an increased draft. That is, it turns out that its constructive waterline was not at all where the hole was later discovered! The hole was at the top of the board. Later, after hours, the sinking ship tilted and the bottom edge of the hole touched the water. KSSH did not penetrate any armor, it passed above the waist and the main armored deck. Nobody doubted that the blank at 0,9M speed could penetrate thin bulkheads.
(Link to Articlewhere detailed analysis with schemes and calculations is given.)
Artillery, as a rule, is not capable of hitting a target from the first salvo. However, the reliability of target acquisition and noise immunity of the lamp-based seeker "Pikes" also raise doubts about the ability to get somewhere in the first shot in combat conditions.
The KSSH complex required a long recharge between launches, which in the theory of 10 took minutes, and in practice indefinite. Unlike large-caliber artillery systems, which could immediately give a second salvo, and then another and another.
However, the emergence of self-guided anti-ship assets was perceived by all as a new and emerging threat.
It will take several more years before the next generation of Soviet anti-ship missiles can be guaranteed to surpass large-caliber artillery systems in naval combat by offensive power.
But in the 1950s in the West, they knew only about the KJW. Realizing the potential of new weapons, they expected to see similar installations on all the newest ships of the Soviet Navy. Including the promising battlecruisers.
The fact that the construction of the “big ships” of the Stalin era would be so abruptly stopped and they would never see the sea again was not immediately understood by the Americans. The findings of overseas analysts have not kept pace with the logic of the Soviet leadership.
The K-1000 project was born as the quintessence of the Soviet priorities of the early 50's. Armor and missiles.
The design of the battleship itself is surprised by the absence of anti-aircraft missiles. When all overseas ships of that era were necessarily equipped with air defense systems. How did not provide for the imminent appearance of such funds in the Navy of the USSR?
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If you look at the situation in the most impartial form, then the state in the middle of the 50-s. it was the only type of Soviet shipwhich could represent value for the US Navy. The only adversary that created a threat and would require appreciable efforts and means to fight him.
The Anglo-Saxons, who sank the Bismarck, Musashi and Yamato, learned the lesson and understood what kind of ship it was.
To stop the sea fortress, air armies and squadrons are required. But even the local conflict of the Korean War type was no longer similar to the situation in the Philippine Sea in 1945, where 11 aircraft carriers, which they had thrown into battle with Yamato, were idle.
In order to monitor movements and provide the opportunity to deal with K-1000 in a short time, it would be necessary to divert forces from all theaters, “baring” other directions. What would not fail to take advantage of the enemy. This is the main advantage and strategic importance of "sea fortresses".
Leaving it without attention was an even worse idea. First of all, the ship created threats as a possible carrier of nuclear weapons. He could shoot the nearest base (for example, in Japan), the caliber 406 mm opened up broad prospects for the creation of ammunition with specials. CU.
Unfinished building
Project K-1000 did not appear on an empty place. Back in September, the first proposal for the conversion of an unfinished Hawaii battle cruiser and the Kentucky battleship into missile carriers was sounded in the US 1946.
The first project, bearing the designation Study CB-56A, was associated with the deployment on board of the Hawaii (LKR type "Alaska") twelve ballistic missiles - captured German "V-2". Subsequently, these plans were revised in favor of the Triton supersonic long-range cruise missiles. The rapid evolution of rocket weapons has aged this project even at the stage of sketches. The new proposal was connected with the installation of the Polaris BR mines at the site of the third main-caliber tower, combined with two Talos air defense systems and two Tartar short-range air defense systems. The final proposal was the restructuring of the "Hawaii" in the command ship amphibious forces.
For the Kentucky rocket battleship (of the Iowa type), several rearmament options were also discussed. Among them (1956 year) was supposed to create a strike ship with 16 "Polaris". At the same time, the design of an air defense squadron with 4 long-range Talos launchers (320 missiles) or a 12 short-range anti-aircraft missile system Tartar (missile kit - 504) was studied.
A sharp reduction in the military budget of the Navy led to the collapse of both projects by the end of the 50-s. Successful conversion could be carried out only by ships of a lower rank — heavy cruisers of the Baltimore type and light cruisers of the Cleveland type.
Former Albany artillery cruiser, which became a missile carrier (early 60-x). Towers with eight-inch artillery gave way to 4 anti-aircraft systems "Talos" and "Tartarus" with a total ammunition (84 + 102) missiles
However, the resulting units had a very mediocre relationship to earlier projects of highly protected ships with rocket and artillery weapons.
The combat stability of those cruisers was not provided with anything. Their protection scheme, designed for action in artillery battles, did not respond to any of the threats of the new time. And because of the total overload of their armored belt finally went under water, having lost its value. Antenna posts and massive add-ons “Albany” and “Little Rock” did not receive any protection, and no such goal was set at all. Only their rocket cellars had local anti-splinter protection (30 mm).
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Who can know in advance the direction of technical progress?
The story develops in a spiral. According to another version, it is similar to the oscillations of a pendulum. From the extreme positions - to the center, in search of the legendary "golden mean".
Can we expect the emergence of large and survivable ships that can not be disabled in a short time a limited outfit of strength?
The last of the famous missile battleship projects dates back to 2007. The project, bearing the designation CSW (Capital Surface Warship), was proposed by the department of reforming the Pentagon's armed forces. The ship's total displacement is estimated at 57 thousand tons, and the cost is at 10 billion dollars. Weapons control is subordinated to the proven Aegis system. As for operating costs, they, according to the authors, "Much closer to the cost of operating the Ticonderoga cruiser than to the cost of maintaining the aircraft carrier and its wing".
The assignment is said directly - a scarecrow that can attract too much attention and make the enemy divert significant forces to counter.
Ignore the neolinkor will not work - by the number of missiles on board, it is comparable to the mix of missile destroyers.
How much time and effort it takes to ward off such an attack, no one knows. The uncertainty factor plays a role. The last time to fight with sea fortresses had seven decades ago. And the results of all the battles testified that these were "difficult targets." They kept so many hits from which ships of other classes would have disappeared long ago, littering the seabed with debris.
Such combat units are ideal for patrolling in hot spots. CSW is not afraid of any provocations, and it is unlikely to receive significant damage from a sudden attack from several enemy aircraft.
At the same time, the author of the article is convinced that no one has ever conducted an assessment test of modern missiles against such protected targets. And the absolute majority of countries will never be able to create anything that would be able to withstand CSW.
As long as the opportunity remains to launch the Tomahawks with impunity, being hundreds of kilometers from the Syrian coast, there is no need for rocket battleships. But that may change when the fleet meets with an enemy capable of conducting retaliatory naval operations that pose a threat to ships.
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