Brigadier awl on divisional soap?
We entered the century when boundless faith in machine brains led to the fact that on paper, in plans and imagination, everything looks quite different from life. That is why today we will consider the issue not so much from the point of view of “as it should be”, but rather with “it is so”.
Today there is a lot of talk about recreating the "Soviet structure" in the Russian army. Recreation of divisions, we already see firsthand. The next step is the reconstruction of military districts. At least, talk about the need for this has been going on in the military environment for a long time.
Most experts speak quite reasonably about the dangers of large districts, about the complexity of command, supply, control of military units thousands of kilometers from each other.
But we have already spoken about districts, so today we will speak about brigades and divisions. Is the game worth the candle, or is it just another way to “master” the people's money. How thoughtful and expedient is such a step today? And most importantly, how will such an integration affect the combat capability of the ground forces?
You should start with the basics. From what all Soviet officers know, but, alas, not all Russian. Not to mention civilians, far from military service. A platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, a brigade, a division, a corps, an army, a front (district) are perceived by the majority approximately as a similar division occurs at some factory. More quantity, slightly different tasks, but in general it is an enterprise.
Never in the Soviet Army did not compare brigades and divisions. For one simple reason. According to the tasks that they solve. Even the military ranks of the staff of the divisional commander and the brigade commander were different. Kombrig, just like the regiment commander, is a colonel, and the division commander is already a major general.
What difference does it make? From the point of view of the average man no. And from a military point of view? The commander of the unit, even the senior officer, the colonel, in combat resolves tactical tasks. But the division commander should already be a strategist. At the same time continue to solve tactical tasks.
Even in the very name of the division laid down precisely these tasks. Compound! The connection of parts. The mechanism of the various components that perform their own work, but in general, the mechanism is designed for other, more complex labor.
Today it is often possible to meet the definition of "connection" in the materials about the brigades. And even in specialized editions. Sometimes you just want to ask: comrades "military", where did you study at all? And did you study at all? Only in armies, where a couple of regiments are united in brigades, can we speak of a connection.
So, starting from scratch.
A brigade is a tactical military unit in all branches and types of armed forces, which is an intermediate link between the regiment and the division. Along with the regiment is the main tactical formation. The structure of the brigade is similar to the regimental, but includes a larger number of units. Up to two regiments. The total brigade strength varies from 2 to 8 thousand people.
Division - operational-tactical connection of units and divisions. The size of the division (in various armies) varies from 12 to 24 thousand people. These are three motorized rifle regiments, tank, artillery and anti-aircraft missile regiments.
These are the anti-tank battalion, reconnaissance battalion, engineering and sapper, medical, repair and rehabilitation, and engineering and sapper battalions. These are separate companies RHBZ, UAV, EW. This is a curfew company.
These are own arsenals and food warehouses. In general, the compound has a complex rear structure, which ensures the operation of the division, even offline, for a long time.
When measures were taken to eliminate the divisional structure for the brigade, we were told a lot about the mobility of the brigades. On the benefits of just such a system of division of the army. Some experts talked about the possibility of participation of brigades in military operations abroad. That is, in fact, about changing the doctrine of the use of the Russian Armed Forces.
All this is true, but, in our opinion, the main reason for the reorganization was problems in the Russian economy. Moreover, about the same picture was observed in other armies of the world. Probably, except for the US Army and NATO.
Imagine the work that the district headquarters and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces did then? In order to preserve the country's defense in the conditions of the restructuring of the army structure, it was necessary to rebuild almost everything. And these are not words, but the real work of headquarters.
Although it was the headquarters that became the first of those who began to "clean." It was necessary to destroy the old command and control system. At all levels. Destroy and create a completely new, in accordance with the new concept.
Remember, veterans of the Soviet Army, their personal, reaction to this transition. Lomali on living established stereotypes, standards, principles, representations. The very system of training the troops was worked out precisely on the division. Even the system of officer training in the Academy of General Staff had to be changed.
But there were still changes in the principles of mobilization work. There were cuts in a large number of senior officers and generals. Outwardly, it looked like the destruction of the army as such.
Probably the only officers who from the beginning of army restructuring agreed with the brigade system were participants in the Chechen wars. It was thanks to them that they adopted a new concept in the army. But there the army fought not with the army, but with militants, terrorists, and just bandits. This is another war. More precisely, another concept of war.
At the same time, a new concept of war appeared, which even today, in modern conditions and the modern international situation, has quite a few supporters. They began to talk about the impossibility of a big war.
The world is not led by idiots. Everyone understands that a big war is the death of mankind. Consequently, in the new world all wars will be local, sluggish. The big armies of the state are no longer needed. Small but well armed armies are needed.
We somehow stopped noticing the power of the American army and its equipment. We stopped noticing the power of the NATO army in Europe. These armies did not fit into our new concept of war.
And it was here that lurked a wonderful explanation for the liquidation of the divisions. The management team is much more mobile, flexible and efficient. This means that the brigade can be used as soon as possible in emergency cases. At least at that time, it was this opinion that prevailed.
By the way, it was then that the reorganization of the military districts began. Remember what we had in 1991.
8 military districts (Moscow, Leningrad, North Caucasus, Volga, Urals, Siberia, Trans-Baikal Far East). There was also a special area - Kalingrad OR.
Marshal Igor Sergeev began to enlarge. In 1998, in order to save the state. means. Remember the merger of ZabVO and DalVO? Sergey Ivanov continued (2001 year - PrivO and Urals Military District). Well, graduated Serdyukov. Received four huge VO with almost autonomous because of the big distances, parts and connections. Good life officers of the staffs of the Central and Eastern districts. Like a truck driver. Life is a road ...
But back to the beginning of our conversation. Be that as it may, during the years of the breakdown of the structure of the army, we have achieved quite serious successes. Abandoned, no, handed over to local authorities, military camps and warehouses. Abandoned infrastructure in general. Transferred housing in cities and towns.
If today we look at what remains of the once flourishing military camps and places of deployment of military units, then I want to cry. What was in the cities, has long been transferred to private hands, converted and used by businessmen. They will not give it back.
And military camps in the wilderness have been successfully looted by local residents and are in such a state that it is easier to build new ones than to restore the old ones. At least cheaper. In short, a beautiful tale about the speedy restoration of the divisional structure of the Armed Forces will long be just a fairy tale.
Just imagine the newly minted divisional division, which is engaged in the formation of a division somewhere beyond the Urals. Just the algorithm works no more. Why it will deal with the division commander and his officers, we think it is clear. The golden principle "You can not cope - we will appoint another" is valid in the army today.
So. Decide on the location of the division headquarters. At the same time, coordinate everything with local authorities (regional or republican) at all levels. From some land allocation to a water utility and sanitary service.
Further, the same work with regional authorities is already to determine the locations of units and headquarters of regiments and other units. For all items.
Further construction. The division is not a company. It will be necessary to build a small, but a city. With all the consequences. In the sense of not only the storage and preservation of military equipment and weapons, but also the provision of housing for draftees, contract soldiers and officers.
The list of work for the command of the new division can be continued indefinitely. And the work is not related to the provision of combat training. But most importantly, all this will have to take place in the Russian traditional manner: "There is no money, but you hold on!"
From this it becomes clear what is happening in the army today. The military budget can "pull" so far only units of divisions. And exactly where this budget is divided. Closer to Moscow. From here Taman (5-I motorized rifle), and then Kantemirovskaya (4-I tank) divisions. Fortunately, they were not long teams, did not have time to mutilate.
The same divisions that were deployed a little further, but which are widely announced by the MoD, are now doing exactly the work described above. And they will be engaged for more years. Judging by what we know about the cases in some of them.
Recall the new divisions. 152-I MSD in the Rostov region, 42-I division in Chechnya, 19-I and 136-I (as part of the 58-I army) in the Southern District, 3-I MSD in the Belgorod region (ZVO).
Observing the travails during the creation of the 3 MSD in Valuyki, it is safe to say that deploying a brigade (albeit not the most successful) to a division (the same for troeks) is not just bringing three times more soldiers into the field and pour them into the mud. Although there it was, do not hide.
This is a difficult, difficult and slow process. Yes, to sign the order is a matter of three seconds. Three years from now has not passed, but God forbid that for the fourth year in Valuyki there was a full-fledged division deployed from the brigade.
And if we talk about 100% success - time will need twice as much.
So we need a division or not? Do you need huge budget costs and will have to suffer again in the navel area from a tightened belt in exchange for a restful sleep?
It’s a paradox, but we cannot be sure of our own security without reviving the divisions. Moreover, not only in the border areas, where it is caused at least by the theoretical danger of an attack, but also in the depth of the territory as a core for the concentration of mobilization resources.
Probably, you need to give some comparisons or an example? You are welcome. After 2013, the US army (yes!), The experts began to accuse together of the loss of "density". Yes, the appearance on the scene of the brigade was the object of criticism. And when they began to reduce the number ...
The hardest thing we could find was the accusation that today the US Army would never repeat the operation against Iraq. And this is the voice of American experts. And they say that the brigade is a tactical tool, and the division is a strategic one. Hammer and sledgehammer, if simpler.
That is why we have a desire to express such an opinion: a hammer and a sledgehammer are good in a capable hand.
On the most dangerous areas (Baltic States, Poland, Ukraine) to have divisions is a heavier strategic strike tool.
And in the rear it is the brigade staffing - as a more mobile second-line tool. With a focus on the fact that, if necessary (or over time), this brigade can be reorganized into a division.
It is possible that this frontier combination will become the very golden mean necessary for the proper state of the organizational structure of our army.
- Alexander Staver, Roman Skomorokhov
- depositphotos.com
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