Project 941 "Shark". The pride of domestic submarine? Yes!
Trpk SN project 941. Photo: https://vpk-news.ru
"Claims to the project"
1. "Large weight and dimension" of the ballistic missiles of the "941" draft missile system.
Yes, it is precisely the significant mass and dimensional characteristics of the ballistic missiles of a submarine (SLBM) missile complex weapons (KRO) identified and the appearance of the entire project 941. However, at the time of the start of work on the Typhoon system with the CPK SN of the 941 project and the R-39 SLBMs of the D-19 complex (3М65 index, the code under the START PCM-52, according to NATO classification - SS-N-20 Sturgeon) the creation of a liquid-fuel submarine-launched ballistic missile with characteristics of the PCM-54 (with the highest energy-mass perfection) was not clear, it happened much later, when the creation of the Typhoon system was already in full swing. Before my eyes, there was an “American example” with its solid-propellant SSBNs, which had serious operational and combat advantages. The choice of solid fuel for the D-19 was reinforced in 1973. KRO accident in the combat service of the PKK CH K-219 (killed due to a new KRO accident in 1986).
In addition, the issue of the use of solid fuel for the Typhoon SLBMs was put at the highest level
- wrote the deputy commander in chief of the Navy in shipbuilding and armament, Admiral Novoselov.
As it turned out during the development, these hopes were “overly optimistic”, and the problem of the lag of our solid fuel from the US (primarily on the most important characteristic — specific impulse) was not solved until the collapse of the USSR. Accordingly, a large mass of all our rockets on solid fuel (significantly more than the Western counterparts).
2. "Huge displacement" and a large reserve of buoyancy of the project 941 traffic control system.
RPK CH project 941 and 667B. Photo: https://ansokolov39.livejournal.com
Given the source data and high project requirements (primarily for noise and the number of SLBMs and warheads), a unique constructive decision was made on the 941 project - a “catamaran” made of durable hulls, with separate compartments of the torpedo complex, control and rudder drives, and placement The SLBM in 20 mines between sturdy hulls proved to be the only possible and true.
Construction of ppr CH project 941. Photo: http://forums.airbase.ru
Moreover, the volume of robust hulls (surface displacement) was not much higher than that of the American competitor (the Ohio SSBN), the widespread “information” about the alleged 48000 and the full submerged displacement of the 941 project are false, and the actual full underwater displacement of “Sharks” is much less than 48000 tons. At the same time, a significant reserve of buoyancy ensured the possibility of breaking of thick ice.
In addition, when comparing the displacement per average-capacity warhead, the 941 project, which had an 20 SLBM with 10 warheads (of course, given the actual total displacement, rather than the “mythical” 48.000 tons) turns out to be even more economical than the 667DRM project (having 16 SLBMs with 4 warheads).
Later on, at the initial studies of the RPC CH of the 955 project with the Bark KRO (with a similar dimension and weight to the D-19 SLBM complex) they returned to the “classical scheme” of SSBNs, with the placement of the mines in one robust building (but including the depth of the canal in Severodvinsk), this turned out to be possible only with a reduction in the number of SLBMs to 12.
RPK SN project 955 with 12 SLBM Bark KRO D-XNUMHUTTH. Photo: http://forums.airbase.ru
Taking into account the available objective baseline data and the conditions faced by the developers (first of all, the general designer of the RPC CH, Kovalev SN), the adopted design decisions on the 941 project were the only possible ones.
Kovalev Sergey Nikitich, general designer of strategic submarines, chief designer of the traffic control complex of the SN project 941
At the same time, the Rubin TsMKB was able to ensure good handling of the new submarine of a very large displacement.
3. Allegedly "poor manageability" of the project 941.
A number of statements about the allegedly “poor controllability” of the 941 project have nothing to do with reality. It is interesting that at the initial stage of development there really were serious doubts and concerns about this. However, they were all successfully and beautifully resolved, incl. at the expense of pre-empting to the creation of the ship, the development of questions of its controllability on the large-scale Lotsman model (almost ultra-small submarine - a heavy autonomous NLA with a digital control system). This development for those years was simply unique, and only specialists and teachers of the Leningrad Shipbuilding Institute were able to successfully implement it.
4. Allegedly "extremely high cost" of the project.
Of course, the cost of the 941 project's traffic control system was significant. However, it was fully in line with analogs, and there was nothing “exclusive” or “very expensive” for 941 for this project. The very high unification of the equipment of the 3-th generation with other submarines, and the KRO, a significant unification of the first stage with the ICBM for the RVS (BZHRK) railway complexes, worked on the rigid limitation of the cost of the SKPK missile lines.
At the same time, having received a more effective solution (according to the criterion "efficiency - cost") in the form of upgraded RPC CH project 667BDRM with an RSM-54 SLBM, the 941 series was limited to 6 ships
5. Allegedly "high noise" project.
The actual noise level of the 941 was much lower not only of all our RPC CH (before the 955 project), the last 941 project hulls became, in fact, themselves low-noise generation 3 nuclear ships (while driving on low-noise moves). Here it is appropriate to quote (from the RPF forum) 941 hydroacoustical officers of the project:
In the middle of 90's in the White Sea, RTM Alikova clung to us. In the process of tracking, they began to find out: how does he manage to follow us ?! It turned out that the electricians had forgotten to replace the brushes of the potential removal system from the shaft line. The brush holder clicked through the shaft. After installing the brushes, RTM lost contact with us. ”
What do we have in the end? Most of the claims for this project are simply untenable. Yes, from the “point of view of the military economy”, it would be better if, instead of the 941 project, “they immediately began to do” 667BDRM with the Sineva SLBM. With one, but fundamental clarification: at the time of the start of work on the 941 project, and the general designer of the KRO, V. V. Makeev, and the general designer of the RPC CH, S. Kovalev. still did not know that a significant increase in the performance of the 667 project is possible, and in the 80-s it will be possible to create such a complex as "Blue".
Those. some “modern statements” that “better than BDRM instead of 941” are based on “after-knowledge”. Alas, “the time machine does not exist,” and the responsible officials (both in the leadership of the country and the organization of the military-industrial complex and the Navy) who were at the origin of the 941 project made well-founded decisions taking into account the information available to them at that time:
• the problem of low noise that has become extremely acute;
• the example of the US Navy with solid fuel-propelled SLBMs with high performance characteristics;
• the need to ensure subglacial use of the RPK CH;
The fact that as a result of the tremendous work it is possible to significantly reduce the noisiness of the RPK CH of the 667 project, no one has yet imagined, and the data available to the managers clearly required new (modern) requirements for low noise in the implementation of the new project.
In addition, even in a deeply modernized form, the 667BDRM project was significantly inferior in terms of the secrecy of the “likely enemy” PLA. Collision 20.03.1993 of the RPC CH K-407 and the Grayling submarine that monitored it: the newest RPC CH of the Navy was tracked by the US Navy's 1968 SSN (with subsequent upgrades, with a significant decrease in noise, new acoustics and weapons, in the USSR Navy the type had a "semi-official" name "Sturgeon-M").
Collision pattern of the K-407 and the US Navy “Grayling” submarine. Source: https://www.liveinternet.ru/users/3422645/post376110905/
Conclusion: taking into account all the initial difficult conditions, the 941 project turned out, and it is, of course, the pride of domestic shipbuilding.
Here we should not forget about the “status factor” - the rivalry between the two superpowers, and this rivalry was extremely acute not only on the scale of states, but also on officials of different sizes in the USA and the USSR.
An active and relevant response from the rostrum of the XXVI CPSU Congress from the Secretary-General LI Brezhnev to the active public relations of the new submarines of the Ohio was:
The excitement of fierce competition was not only among the leaders, but also the direct performers, to the extent that the youth on the construction of the head "Shark" in Severodvinsk "quietly" listened to the Voice of America (not in terms of "dissidence", but that the competition went practically parallel to the “teams” of the creators of the head bodies “Sharks” and “Ohio” were actively discussed there).
Management issues were resolved quickly and decisively:
- Radiy Vasilyevich! They demand you personally, but you do not come. Here you can enter the office of the director, and leave as the youngest research assistant.
“Maybe we should demand that ...?” I gave the command ...
- Nothing is needed anymore. We were given one month, ... ordered to modify. I said it is unreal. Well, they made it clear to me that if this is unrealistic under the current leadership, they will have to change it.
So, on June 26 of the 1981 of the year, Isakov gathered in his office specialists who, in his opinion, are able to solve the task set by the Minister ...
And you made a [new data entry system in torpedoes]! Not in a month, of course, in two. Maybe a little more. ”
(R.A. Gusev. Such is torpedo life.)
Yes, not everything turned out as they wanted ...
The most serious "failure" occurred in torpedoes and countermeasures (anti-torpedo protection). Our 3 generation did not receive the torpedoes “Tapir” laid on the nuclear-powered ships, and the UST-A torpedoes (USET-80) had a number of critical problems, were not only limited in combat capability, and the torpedoes themselves didn’t last up to the second half of 80's It was.
"Sharks" went to the fleet with outdated and extremely ineffective means of hydroacoustic counteraction (SGPD) such as MG-34M and GIP-1 ...
However, this was not the fault of the developer - Rubin Central Design Bureau. Moreover, they put in projects the application of the most promising protection complexes, which have not lost their relevance today.
There is a lot of sense to return to some “forgotten in 80-ies” development even today - to equip Borey SSBNs (and other Navy submarines).
Admission to the fleet and service 941
The head of the KPP-208 CPA joined the 29.12.1981 Navy, and immediately began to be intensively exploited, according to the actual research program (including performance and combat services), to study the possibilities of the new project and to develop methods for its effective use.
The second building, К-202, entered into operation 28.12.1983, the third, ТК-12, - 26.12.1984, the fourth, ТК-13, - 26.12.1985. The fifth and sixth orders of the 941 project were based on a modernized project, incl. with the installation of a new digital GAK "Skat-3" and entered into service TK-17 15.12.1987, and the last building TK-20, - 19.12.1989,
TRPK CH project 941 in the database (Nerpichye lip). Photo: http://forums.airbase.ru
During the construction of the entire series, noise reduction measures were implemented.
A special direction of the use of the missile system of the 941 project was to carry out combat services under the ice of the Arctic and the White Sea. In 1986, such a long combat service was carried by TK-12 (and with a change in the middle of the life of the crew from the icebreaker). At the same time, the almost absolute invulnerability of our SRP SN was provided (“from above” it was covered with ice cover, and the breakthrough of the US Navy PLA into the White Sea is extremely difficult due to the small depths of the White Sea throat).
The specifics of the use of KROs from under the ice in the Arctic is well described in the memoirs of the commander of the PKK CH K-465 (project 667B) captain 1 rank VM. Bataeva:
In the process of developing the Arctic theater, methods were developed that ensured a sharp decrease in the residual amount of ice on the rocket deck, but this problem was completely resolved and was not.
TK-202 in the Arctic, photo: https://vk.com/@submarineru-tk-202-vtoroi-korpus-akul-eksperimentalnyi-pohod-pervyi-i-po
In May, 1998 was an experimental campaign of the CH K-202 tplk to investigate the possibilities of using the 941 project in severe ice conditions. Remembers one of the crew members:
Damage to the housing TK-202, photo: https://defence.ru
On the fracture
We destroy the nuclear of the Fatherland sword
"Typhoons" will soon die at the pier,
don't shoot us, cut off our heads,
at least it probably won't be enough ...
(Vice Admiral Motsak, 1997 g.)
[media = https: //www.youtube.com/watch? v = J9Ho7P_C9bY || Admiral Motsak speech after the destruction of the P-39 missiles by shooting, 1997 g.]
With the adoption of the KRO D-19, work began immediately on its further improvement, the KRO D-XNUMHUTTH.
Admiral Novoselov:
Given the subsequent upheavals and the collapse of the country, the cessation of the production of SLBMs had fatal consequences for the 941 project. Hoping for a new KRO D-XNUMHUTTH and re-equipment of ships on it ...
Captain 1 rank V.V. Zaborsky:
Now it is obvious that this decision was a mistake, the formal “basis” for which were:
• “unrecoverable dimension problem”;
• “unification of the sea rocket with land complexes” (“interspecific intercontinental ballistic missile).
The thesis on “unification” of the new Bulava SLBM with Topol is still found in our media, although it not only has no technical basis, but simply did not have any sense at that time (we could have new missiles with separable warheads only on marine carriers).
“Dimensional” problems also did not exist: the launch of the P-39 was ensured even with the upgraded diesel-electric submarines of the 629 project (which was used for throwing trials), the first version of the 955 project provided for the deployment of the 12 new SLBMs of the D-19UTX complex. At the same time, in order to evaluate various options, it was correct and objective to compare not the number of missiles, but the warheads (the total throw-in weight).
As a result of the 1998 solution, the development of the practically finished KRO D-19UTTX was discontinued, and the development of a new one, the Bulava, began, which was extremely delayed.
In this situation, the 941 ships were left without ammunition, the service life of which was coming to an end. In addition, the possibilities of extending the timeframe of the existing P-39 missiles were not fully utilized, which became the subject of an unprecedented conflict in 2004:
Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral GA Suchkov:
Commander of the Navy Kuroyedov VI:
In recent years (until the complete elimination in 2012) of the P-39 missiles, the last missile lines of the 941 project were carried with far from complete missile ammunition of the last remaining missiles.
And here the question arises: what have we lost due to this error?
The first is a lot of money and time to create a new AOC.
Obviously, if the P-19UTTH complex continued, by the end of the 2000-s it would have been in service and put into service (on the upgraded traffic controllers of the 941 designation system and on Borey).
Secondly, the modernization of the 941 project automatically took over the modernization of the entire 3 generation of nuclear-powered vessels (due to the very high equipment unification), and the savings on the Bulava ensured the start of such modernization in the mid-to-late 2000's. Obviously, in this case, now we would have had at least a dozen of the 3 generation nuclear ships (949A, 971, 945 (A)) in the Navy ranged past ten or more. It is particularly necessary to emphasize that “some statements” at the enormous cost of such a modernization are unfounded. For the GEM and 941 general ship systems, the project is close to the 949 project (with a more powerful missile system and a weaker torpedo complex).
The large displacement and reserves for the modernization of the 941 project made it very effective options for various special-purpose submarines at its base.
Alas, today the grouping of the CPK CH of the 941 project is lost. The last ship in the ranks (he is the first in construction), the TK-208 "Dmitry Donskoy", today has no combat significance and is used only to ensure the testing of new submarines. In 2017, the “Dmitry Donskoy” took part in the Main Naval Parade.
Summing up
The creation of Project 941 ships was by no means a “mistake” (as stated in a number of works), it was a worthy project created within the strict framework of the objective conditions and capabilities of its time (and timing!). The life of the ships of this project was short, not because of imaginary "shortcomings", but of the shocks that the country suffered during these years.
The heavy cruisers "Peter the Great" and "Dmitry Donskoy" follow on the Main Airborne Forces-2017. Photo: https://dambiev.livejournal.com
And the last. Now the last ship, TK-208 "Dmitry Donskoy", remains in service, and it would be fair and proper after its withdrawal from the Navy to tow it to Kronstadt for deployment in the Patriot fleet. At the same time, taking into account the normal radiation situation on the ship, there is no need to cut the reactor compartments, it will be enough to extract the reactor cores. “Dmitry Donskoy” can and should become a worthy monument to a great country and its creators, and the 941 project is rightly the pride of our shipbuilding industry.
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