Foreign dispute about the Russian C-400. NI vs FOI
Russian weapons and military equipment attract the attention of foreign experts and sometimes become a cause for disputes. A few days ago, the Russian anti-aircraft missile system C-400 became another topic of discussion. At first, the Swedish Defense Research Agency criticized this system, noting its shortcomings and problems. Then the American edition of The National Interest "stepped in" for the Russian development and pointed out the weak points of the Swedish report. Such a controversy - even if it does not receive a continuation - is of particular interest.
In terms of foi
The reason for the exchange of views was the recent report of the Swedish Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI). 4 in March FOI published a document called “Bursting the Bubble? A2 / AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications ”-“ Is the bubble bursting? The Russian system of restricting and preventing access in the Baltic region: opportunities, countermeasures and consequences. ” The topic of the report was the potential of the Russian armed forces in the Baltic Sea area, including anti-aircraft weapons.
The FOI report is of great interest and is recommended for familiarization, but in the context of recent events one should dwell only on its chapter “Russian opportunities in the Baltic region” and the section “Air Defense Systems” (3.1 Anti-air systems, p. 27). In it, Swedish experts give their opinion on C-400, and this particular complex became the main topic of the section.
FOI recalled a brief history C-400 systems, as well as the topic of features and capabilities. Already at this stage followed the conclusions. So, with reference to the foreign press, it is claimed that the 40H6 long-range intercept missile, which has a range of up to 400 km, has repeatedly failed in tests and has not yet been put into the series. From this it is concluded that in the near future, before the advent of serial missiles of the new type, the complexes will have to use products borrowed from older C-300 air defense systems.
The authors of the report indicate that the C-400 radar can handle a large number of air targets. The complex also has medium-range missiles with active homing heads suitable for attacking low-altitude targets - cruise missiles or aircraft weapons. At the same time, it is argued that the limited range of such missiles, combined with the characteristic difficulties of intercepting low-altitude objects, leads to a reduction in performance. The interception range of cruise missiles or other similar targets is reduced to 20-35 km, depending on the nature of the terrain.
From this Swedish experts make a specific conclusion. FOI claims that the C-400 systems, before the advent of the 40H6 serial missiles, cannot create a full-fledged A2 / AD zone in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. However, such air defense missile systems can be considered as a threat to tanker aircraft, transport workers and other large vehicles moving at medium and high altitudes at distances of about 200-250 km from anti-aircraft complexes. Also, the objectives of the air defense system can be fighter-bombers trying to break through to them at low altitudes - within a radius of several tens of kilometers.
The 40H6 rocket will be able to attack targets at altitudes of 3-10 km, but for this the anti-aircraft battery needs to connect third-party surveillance and detection systems. External target designation will allow the anti-aircraft complex to attack targets behind a radio horizon. It is noted that the creation of such an integrated system, including various radar and air defense systems, is an extremely difficult task - even the US Navy was able to build it relatively recently. Swedish analysts believe that Russia, due to the well-known problems of the last decades, is still unable to create a similar system.
The report also provides interesting calculations. If the C-400's firing range reaches the declared 400 km, then the area of responsibility of the complex has an area of 500 thousand square kilometers. When reducing the distance to 250 km, the area of the covered area is reduced to 200 thousand sq. Km - 39% of the maximum possible. The use of missiles with a range of 120 km reduces the area of the region to 9% of the maximum, and the missiles with a range of 20 km cover only 0,25%.
Russian radar areas of responsibility
FOI recalls that the C-400 complex is not without flaws. So, as part of the air defense system there is only one radar control fire. The number of long-range missiles in one battery is limited, and after they are used up, the air defense system needs to be reloaded. These features of the complex can be taken into account by the enemy when organizing an attack.
The authors of the report remind that complexes like C-300 or C-400 in the conditions of war are priority targets for the enemy, and they will try to disable them first. To protect against possible attacks, long-range air defense systems are complemented by short-range systems. The most modern Russian development of this kind is ZRPK "Pantsir-С1". At the same time, incidents involving the destruction of such equipment by enemy rockets are mentioned.
This completes the C-400 review in the “Air Defense Systems” section. In other parts of the “Bursting the Bubble?” Report, Swedish experts are once again examining the identified shortcomings of the Russian air defense system, including in the context of defense construction and the organization of A2 / AD zones.
Considering the Russian anti-aircraft complexes and other weapons, as well as the organization and deployment of compounds, the FOI draws conclusions about the potential of the Russian armed forces as a whole. Analysts believe that the combat potential of the Russian army in the Baltic Sea region is exaggerated. In particular, such errors are based on incorrect estimates of air defense, built using the C-400 air defense system.
The National Interest Answer
The American edition of The National Interest, known for its burden of Russian weapons, could not get past the Swedish report. 9 March, it published an article “Is the S-400 of a Paper Tiger or a Real Air Force Killer?” - “Russian C-400 - a“ paper tiger ”or a real BBC killer?” found weaknesses in it.
First of all, Ch. Gao drew attention to the theses on the use of 40H6 missiles at maximum range. Indeed, when shooting at 400 km, a problem arises in the form of a radio horizon. This problem is solved using over-the-horizon radar or by interacting with other means of detection. The data source for pre-targeting can be airborne early warning and control aircraft.
Responsibility ZRK
The FOI report states that modern over-the-horizon radars cannot effectively interact with the air defense system. Such conclusions are made on the basis of David Aks articles for War Is Boring, as well as publications of the Swedish press. The article by D. Aks 2016 of the year mentioned that early low-frequency over-the-horizon radars had a low resolution, not enough to interact with the missile.
Ch. Gao recalls that even an insufficiently accurate radar can still be used to launch a missile into the target area, after which it must include its own active radar seeker. At a distance of about 30 km from the target, the Zour will be able to start an independent flight and solve the problem. However, the Defense Research Agency believes that such a rocket attack will not be accurate enough. The author of The National Interest, on the contrary, considers this method of work to be a real threat to enemy aircraft.
Aircraft AWACS are more accurate determination of coordinates. The Russian Aerospace Forces have more than 20 airplanes of the A-50 family capable of finding air targets at distances up to 800 km - twice the range of the 40H6 SAMs. Ch. Gao points out that in this case the problem may be the interaction of the AEW plane and the SRA. The Russian side did not openly discuss and did not demonstrate such capabilities of its technology, and the FOI believe that it is extremely difficult to get them.
However, the American author recalls the existence of such systems. So, the MiG-31 interceptors, even during the Cold War, could monitor the air situation and exchange data on targets. Also, the aircraft could send information to ground complexes. This means that Russia has the necessary groundwork and is fully capable of creating new systems of interaction in the field of air defense. Nevertheless, the organization of the interaction of ground complexes and aircraft can indeed be a difficult task.
Ch. Gao believes that FOI exaggerates the ease of disabling C-400. The report states: dozens of missiles and false targets can “overload” the air defense system and force it to spend all the ammunition. However, this does not take into account the fact of interaction of anti-aircraft systems. C-400 always hide behind short-range complexes. Swedish experts reminded of the Pantsir-С1 ZRPK, but they immediately wrote about its low effectiveness.
The National Interest recalls that in Syria, “Armor-С1” acted independently and relied only on its components. When working together with C-400, a short-range complex can receive target designation from it. The development of new missiles for the Pantsir is also under way, with which it will be possible to increase the ready-to-use ammunition. For the direct protection of anti-aircraft batteries, complexes of the “Thor” family can also be used, which have certain advantages.
There is information about the ability of C-400 to identify detected objects and to distinguish real threats from false targets. In this case, the long-range air defense system will be able to identify real planes and weapons of destruction and reduce the consumption of ammunition. Targeting for the "Carapace-C1" should also take into account this factor.
Thus, the "overload" of the C-400 anti-aircraft missile system turns out to be much more complicated than what the FOI writes. However, no system of this kind is immune from a massive attack with a breakthrough defense.
The author of The National Interest criticized the theses of the Defense Research Agency about the C-400 anti-aircraft complex, however, in general, I agree with the general conclusions of his report. According to Ch. Gao, the report presents a good analysis showing how the Russian 2A / AD system in the Baltic region is currently being overestimated. However, the Swedish experts underestimated the Russian air defense system.
Article against the report
The Russian defense potential attracts the attention of specialists from different countries. On the basis of the available data, they are trying to present the real possibilities of the Russian army in various areas. Thus, the Swedish Defense Research Agency recently conducted an analysis of Russia's capabilities in the Baltic Sea area and released its report on this topic.
The authors of the report showed that the generally accepted opinion about the Russian potential may not correspond to the real state of affairs. One of the evidence in favor of this was the reasoning about the potential of the C-400 anti-aircraft complexes. However, the Swedish experts made a number of serious mistakes, which could not fail to attract attention. As a result, The National Interest appeared to analyze the weak points of the FOI report.
The situation around the FOI report and the C-400 air defense system clearly demonstrates several trends. First, it is obvious that the Russian defense power and its individual components remain the subject of interest of foreign analysts and journalists. First of all, it is connected with issues of a military-political nature. Secondly, even serious analytical organizations sometimes make significant mistakes that can lead to wrong conclusions. Fortunately, there are specialists and publications abroad who can point out mistakes.
Report “Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2 / AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications ":
https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE
The article “Is Russia's S-400 a Paper Tiger or Real Air Force Killer?”:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-s-400-paper-tiger-or-real-air-force-killer-46477
In terms of foi
The reason for the exchange of views was the recent report of the Swedish Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI). 4 in March FOI published a document called “Bursting the Bubble? A2 / AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications ”-“ Is the bubble bursting? The Russian system of restricting and preventing access in the Baltic region: opportunities, countermeasures and consequences. ” The topic of the report was the potential of the Russian armed forces in the Baltic Sea area, including anti-aircraft weapons.
The FOI report is of great interest and is recommended for familiarization, but in the context of recent events one should dwell only on its chapter “Russian opportunities in the Baltic region” and the section “Air Defense Systems” (3.1 Anti-air systems, p. 27). In it, Swedish experts give their opinion on C-400, and this particular complex became the main topic of the section.
FOI recalled a brief history C-400 systems, as well as the topic of features and capabilities. Already at this stage followed the conclusions. So, with reference to the foreign press, it is claimed that the 40H6 long-range intercept missile, which has a range of up to 400 km, has repeatedly failed in tests and has not yet been put into the series. From this it is concluded that in the near future, before the advent of serial missiles of the new type, the complexes will have to use products borrowed from older C-300 air defense systems.
The authors of the report indicate that the C-400 radar can handle a large number of air targets. The complex also has medium-range missiles with active homing heads suitable for attacking low-altitude targets - cruise missiles or aircraft weapons. At the same time, it is argued that the limited range of such missiles, combined with the characteristic difficulties of intercepting low-altitude objects, leads to a reduction in performance. The interception range of cruise missiles or other similar targets is reduced to 20-35 km, depending on the nature of the terrain.
From this Swedish experts make a specific conclusion. FOI claims that the C-400 systems, before the advent of the 40H6 serial missiles, cannot create a full-fledged A2 / AD zone in the southern part of the Baltic Sea. However, such air defense missile systems can be considered as a threat to tanker aircraft, transport workers and other large vehicles moving at medium and high altitudes at distances of about 200-250 km from anti-aircraft complexes. Also, the objectives of the air defense system can be fighter-bombers trying to break through to them at low altitudes - within a radius of several tens of kilometers.
The 40H6 rocket will be able to attack targets at altitudes of 3-10 km, but for this the anti-aircraft battery needs to connect third-party surveillance and detection systems. External target designation will allow the anti-aircraft complex to attack targets behind a radio horizon. It is noted that the creation of such an integrated system, including various radar and air defense systems, is an extremely difficult task - even the US Navy was able to build it relatively recently. Swedish analysts believe that Russia, due to the well-known problems of the last decades, is still unable to create a similar system.
The report also provides interesting calculations. If the C-400's firing range reaches the declared 400 km, then the area of responsibility of the complex has an area of 500 thousand square kilometers. When reducing the distance to 250 km, the area of the covered area is reduced to 200 thousand sq. Km - 39% of the maximum possible. The use of missiles with a range of 120 km reduces the area of the region to 9% of the maximum, and the missiles with a range of 20 km cover only 0,25%.
Russian radar areas of responsibility
FOI recalls that the C-400 complex is not without flaws. So, as part of the air defense system there is only one radar control fire. The number of long-range missiles in one battery is limited, and after they are used up, the air defense system needs to be reloaded. These features of the complex can be taken into account by the enemy when organizing an attack.
The authors of the report remind that complexes like C-300 or C-400 in the conditions of war are priority targets for the enemy, and they will try to disable them first. To protect against possible attacks, long-range air defense systems are complemented by short-range systems. The most modern Russian development of this kind is ZRPK "Pantsir-С1". At the same time, incidents involving the destruction of such equipment by enemy rockets are mentioned.
This completes the C-400 review in the “Air Defense Systems” section. In other parts of the “Bursting the Bubble?” Report, Swedish experts are once again examining the identified shortcomings of the Russian air defense system, including in the context of defense construction and the organization of A2 / AD zones.
Considering the Russian anti-aircraft complexes and other weapons, as well as the organization and deployment of compounds, the FOI draws conclusions about the potential of the Russian armed forces as a whole. Analysts believe that the combat potential of the Russian army in the Baltic Sea region is exaggerated. In particular, such errors are based on incorrect estimates of air defense, built using the C-400 air defense system.
The National Interest Answer
The American edition of The National Interest, known for its burden of Russian weapons, could not get past the Swedish report. 9 March, it published an article “Is the S-400 of a Paper Tiger or a Real Air Force Killer?” - “Russian C-400 - a“ paper tiger ”or a real BBC killer?” found weaknesses in it.
First of all, Ch. Gao drew attention to the theses on the use of 40H6 missiles at maximum range. Indeed, when shooting at 400 km, a problem arises in the form of a radio horizon. This problem is solved using over-the-horizon radar or by interacting with other means of detection. The data source for pre-targeting can be airborne early warning and control aircraft.
Responsibility ZRK
The FOI report states that modern over-the-horizon radars cannot effectively interact with the air defense system. Such conclusions are made on the basis of David Aks articles for War Is Boring, as well as publications of the Swedish press. The article by D. Aks 2016 of the year mentioned that early low-frequency over-the-horizon radars had a low resolution, not enough to interact with the missile.
Ch. Gao recalls that even an insufficiently accurate radar can still be used to launch a missile into the target area, after which it must include its own active radar seeker. At a distance of about 30 km from the target, the Zour will be able to start an independent flight and solve the problem. However, the Defense Research Agency believes that such a rocket attack will not be accurate enough. The author of The National Interest, on the contrary, considers this method of work to be a real threat to enemy aircraft.
Aircraft AWACS are more accurate determination of coordinates. The Russian Aerospace Forces have more than 20 airplanes of the A-50 family capable of finding air targets at distances up to 800 km - twice the range of the 40H6 SAMs. Ch. Gao points out that in this case the problem may be the interaction of the AEW plane and the SRA. The Russian side did not openly discuss and did not demonstrate such capabilities of its technology, and the FOI believe that it is extremely difficult to get them.
However, the American author recalls the existence of such systems. So, the MiG-31 interceptors, even during the Cold War, could monitor the air situation and exchange data on targets. Also, the aircraft could send information to ground complexes. This means that Russia has the necessary groundwork and is fully capable of creating new systems of interaction in the field of air defense. Nevertheless, the organization of the interaction of ground complexes and aircraft can indeed be a difficult task.
Ch. Gao believes that FOI exaggerates the ease of disabling C-400. The report states: dozens of missiles and false targets can “overload” the air defense system and force it to spend all the ammunition. However, this does not take into account the fact of interaction of anti-aircraft systems. C-400 always hide behind short-range complexes. Swedish experts reminded of the Pantsir-С1 ZRPK, but they immediately wrote about its low effectiveness.
The National Interest recalls that in Syria, “Armor-С1” acted independently and relied only on its components. When working together with C-400, a short-range complex can receive target designation from it. The development of new missiles for the Pantsir is also under way, with which it will be possible to increase the ready-to-use ammunition. For the direct protection of anti-aircraft batteries, complexes of the “Thor” family can also be used, which have certain advantages.
There is information about the ability of C-400 to identify detected objects and to distinguish real threats from false targets. In this case, the long-range air defense system will be able to identify real planes and weapons of destruction and reduce the consumption of ammunition. Targeting for the "Carapace-C1" should also take into account this factor.
Thus, the "overload" of the C-400 anti-aircraft missile system turns out to be much more complicated than what the FOI writes. However, no system of this kind is immune from a massive attack with a breakthrough defense.
The author of The National Interest criticized the theses of the Defense Research Agency about the C-400 anti-aircraft complex, however, in general, I agree with the general conclusions of his report. According to Ch. Gao, the report presents a good analysis showing how the Russian 2A / AD system in the Baltic region is currently being overestimated. However, the Swedish experts underestimated the Russian air defense system.
Article against the report
The Russian defense potential attracts the attention of specialists from different countries. On the basis of the available data, they are trying to present the real possibilities of the Russian army in various areas. Thus, the Swedish Defense Research Agency recently conducted an analysis of Russia's capabilities in the Baltic Sea area and released its report on this topic.
The authors of the report showed that the generally accepted opinion about the Russian potential may not correspond to the real state of affairs. One of the evidence in favor of this was the reasoning about the potential of the C-400 anti-aircraft complexes. However, the Swedish experts made a number of serious mistakes, which could not fail to attract attention. As a result, The National Interest appeared to analyze the weak points of the FOI report.
The situation around the FOI report and the C-400 air defense system clearly demonstrates several trends. First, it is obvious that the Russian defense power and its individual components remain the subject of interest of foreign analysts and journalists. First of all, it is connected with issues of a military-political nature. Secondly, even serious analytical organizations sometimes make significant mistakes that can lead to wrong conclusions. Fortunately, there are specialists and publications abroad who can point out mistakes.
Report “Bursting the Bubble? Russian A2 / AD in the Baltic Sea Region: Capabilities, Countermeasures, and Implications ":
https://www.foi.se/rapportsammanfattning?reportNo=FOI-R--4651--SE
The article “Is Russia's S-400 a Paper Tiger or Real Air Force Killer?”:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-s-400-paper-tiger-or-real-air-force-killer-46477
- Ryabov Kirill
- FOI / foi..se, Russian Defense Ministry / mil.ru
Information