Israel’s missile-bombing attack on Iran: scenarios, possibilities, consequences
The experience of the last wars shows that only by aerial bombardment it is impossible to resolve the issue of changing the government in the country radically or significantly slow down the implementation of its military programs, it requires a land operation. Therefore, Israel, acting only on its own, can count on achieving only limited military objectives:
1. To provoke a group of other states, primarily the United States, into the military conflict against Iran.
2. Delay for some time the implementation of Iran’s nuclear program.
Geography and Diplomacy
An analysis of the geography of the region shows that the flight of strike groups aviation Israel to the facilities of the Iranian nuclear complex can be carried out on one of three routes:
1. Northern, where Israeli planes will have to fly to the north, and then to the east along the border of Turkish airspace, invading the airspace of Syria and Iraq. The election of this route should be recognized as unlikely, due to its large length (more than 2000 km) and the negative attitude towards Israel from Turkey and Syria, which can put Israeli aviation on the flight route with inevitable violation of the airspace of these countries
2. Central, involving the flight through the territory of Jordan and Iraq. With the shortest length (1500-1800 km), this route involves passage through the airspace of Jordan, which, fearing a negative reaction from the Islamic world (especially after the “Arab spring”), may not allow Israeli aircraft to fly over its airspace. Iraq will not be able to have a significant impact on the possibility of striking Iran, since, without having a viable airspace control system, it is most likely that, with the right route selected by Israeli aircraft, it will not be able to detect Israeli aircraft in its airspace at all.
3. The southern one, which assumes a passage through the airspace of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, has a large length of 2400 - 2600 km. There will also be major diplomatic problems associated with overcoming Egyptian airspace, and also partly Saudi Arabia, which, although very concerned about the growth of Iran’s military power and influence (including its internal political situation, through the Shiite population), nevertheless , claiming to be the leader of the Islamic world, may not provide its airspace to Israeli combat aircraft, realizing that the political losses for it as a result of this step will be much more serious than the ephemeral Infantry from the Israeli attack.
Thus, the most probable routes for the passage of Israeli aviation should be recognized as central and southern. At the same time, for their use, Israel will have to rely on diplomatic support from third countries, first of all, the United States, which will have to reach agreement on the flight of Israeli aircraft from Jordan, and from Saudi Arabia, also consent to provide Israelis with airfields and jump.
If such an agreement is not achieved, then a strike on Iran by Israel will be extremely unlikely. Since the breakthrough of Israeli aviation through the airspace of an Arab country that did not provide Israel with such an opportunity would mean the start of an unmotivated war against it, which could lead to the all-Arab war against Israel, given the Islamization of the Arab world following the Arab Spring.
However, even if all diplomatic problems are resolved successfully, the long-lasting Israeli air operation against Iran will most likely be impossible due to the remoteness of the targets and the need to repeatedly overcome the airspace of neighboring Arab states that do not want to enter into a tough political and military confrontation with Iran.
Therefore, Israel can count on delivering one, in the best case, two strikes on Iran.
Goals, strengths and means
According to most military analysts (in particular, Air Force Military Observer Jonathan Marcus and a staff member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, Douglas Barry), Israel may be selected as likely targets for strikes, primarily those who enrich uranium - the uranium enrichment plant in Natanz. south of Tehran and the underground factory in Fordo.
In addition, strikes can be applied to facilities where heavy water is supposed to be produced, primarily a heavy-water reactor under construction in Arak, and enterprises for processing uranium ore, primarily the plant in Isfahan.
These objects have good engineering protection. For example, uranium enrichment plants at the plant in Natanz are located in a room buried beneath the ground, and the main production facilities of the plant at Fordo are located deep under the base of the mountain range.
Thus, to ensure the destruction of these objects with the use of conventional ammunition will be almost impossible. It will be necessary to use specialized bombs capable of hitting underground structures, in particular, such as laser-guided GBU-28 weighing 2269 kg with laser guidance, having special penetrating warheads, as well as JNAM 2000-pound bombs.
These munitions are capable of striking objects that are at a depth from 10 to 20 meters underground and are protected by reinforced concrete slabs up to 2 meters in thickness.
To achieve maximum effect, aircraft must drop them from a height of 10-12 thousand meters.
However, an analysis of the nature of the protection of the most important facilities of the Iranian nuclear complex, according to the open press, can be concluded that it will be impossible to ensure the destruction of all these facilities with such ammunition. So in particular, the level of protection of the plant in Fordo will not allow even with the use of such ammunition to ensure the destruction of the main production premises. At best, ancillary facilities of such an enterprise with less protection may be affected.
Having a fairly large fleet of aircraft, Israel will be able to attract to strike on Iran, only a relatively limited number of the most modern aircraft with the greatest range - the latest F-15 and F-16.
Judging by the materials of the open press, the Israeli Air Force has F-72 Model A – D Eagle X-NUMX fighters, F-15 Model I F-25 fighter-bomber fighters, Model I “Strike Eagle”, around the 15 F-138 model I.
F-15 fighters Model A – D “Eagle” and F-15 fighter-bombers Model I “Strike Eagle” when flying over a mixed profile with PTB have a combat radius of about 1300 km with the possibility of combat during 5 min.
The F-16 multipurpose fighters of the listed models, in the shock version with conformal tanks and PTB, 2 × 907 kg with bombs flying large-small-small-high, have a combat radius 1 565 km, and in a fighter version with PTB, 2 × AIM-120 and 2 × AIM-9 to 1700 km at high altitudes.
Taking into account the percentage of combat readiness (90%) and the need to allocate a part of aviation to ensure the air defense of Israel’s territory, to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, given the importance attached by the Israeli government to Iran’s nuclear program, F-50 Model A fighters can be allocated –D “Eagle”, X-NUMX F-15 model I fighter-bombers, “Strike Eagle” model and up to X-NUMX F-25 multi-purpose fighters, models C – D and I. Total around 15 aircraft.
Limiting factors
Considering the need to build a battle formation and coordinated flight to the target of such a number of aircraft, the effective combat radius of application of such a group will be significantly less than those indicated above for single machines. This, even when flying along the shortest central route, will require refueling in the air at least once while flying to the target and back. And on the south - either an intermediate landing at the airfields of Saudi Arabia or at least 2-x refueling in the air when flying to the target and back.
Judging by the materials of the open press, Israel has 8-10 refueling aircraft KS-130H, each of which is capable of transmitting up to 20 tons of fuel in the air, providing one 50 maximum attack aircraft.
That is, the grouping of Israel’s tankers will ensure that no more than 25-30 attack aircraft can operate on Iran’s targets while flying along the central route and no more than 12 — when flying along the southern route, which is not enough to cause any noticeable damage to the Iranian nuclear program.
Hence, the second most important limiting factor is the requirement to secure an Israeli strike with American tankers. The United States clearly understands that in the event of an Israeli strike on Iran and a response from the latter, they will most likely be drawn into a war against Iran for which they are not ready today. In addition, it will be impossible to hide the fact of American support for the Israeli rally. Therefore, the likelihood that the United States will provide Israel with the necessary number of tanker aircraft (and this is 20-30 machines), at least in the near future, is small.
Thus, the possibility of a strike on Iran, Israel will receive only in the case of a successful resolution of all diplomatic problems and the receipt of support from the US tanker aircraft. Overcoming these restrictions is also a kind of indicator for the military intelligence of Iran in determining the possibility of an attack.
Tactic
Building a group of Israeli aviation will most likely include three main echelon: air defense breakthrough, shock, and identify the results of the strike.
In the echelon of air defense breakthrough, given the combat strength and condition of the fighter aircraft of Iran and its air defense system, according to the experience of wars and military conflicts of the 21 century, can be included up to 70-80 aircraft, including up to 40 fighters clearing airspace and escorts, and the rest - airplanes of ground defense and additional intelligence suppression groups.
The strike can consist of up to 120 airplanes, of which 80-90 will comprise attack groups designed to destroy objects of the Iranian nuclear complex, and the rest - escort fighters and combat support fighters.
In-flight impact detection can be enabled up to 20-30 reconnaissance aircraft and escort fighters.
In addition to manned aircraft, operational echelons can be used at the echelons of the air defense breakthrough and detection of the impact results.
The depth of the operational construction of the entire group can reach 150-200 km, with a total duration of its operations over the territory of Iran from 30 minutes to an hour. In this case, the battle formation must be echeloned in height, both on the flight route and in the combat area.
The flight of such a mass of aviation on the route in a single line of battle and at high altitudes, concerted actions and refueling in the air over the territory of another state is practically impossible, which makes it extremely difficult for Israel to ensure operational surprise and practical impossibility to ensure tactical surprise of impact.
Counteraction
In terms of fighter aviation, Iran can counter FNGX-20 F-25A planes to Israel, up to MiN-14 fighter jets to 35 and Fantom F-29 fighters to 30.
Among the ground-based air defense systems, the X-NUMX C-10 air defense missile system with a range of up to 200 km may be significant for repelling an Israeli strike, around 240 an improved Hawk medium-range air defense system (the latest upgrade to the Hawk-150 level increased the range to 3-150 kilometers) and 200 mobile multichannel short-range SAM systems (from 29 to 5 km) Tor-M20, as well as 1 modern, highly robust Pantsir C-10 mobile missile-gun systems.
In addition, it is known about the delivery to Iran of Russia of a modern mobile radio-electronic suppression system “Avtobaz”, which is capable of detecting and simultaneously tracking in a passive mode up to 60 targets within 150 radius of kilometers and warning about the approach of air attacks in 20 minutes, as well as disrupting electronic control systems weapons and communication.
Iran has a developed radar surveillance system and an appropriate air defense command and control system, built mainly on fixed control points. Since the basis of the radar surveillance system is obsolete stations and the air defense control system is not automated, in general, the Iranian air defense system is very vulnerable to damage by modern air defense suppression means.
However, given that Israeli aircraft will operate in very unfavorable conditions, determined by a great distance from its bases, it will most likely not be able to ensure full suppression of the air defense system even in a limited area.
Therefore, with proper construction and actions of the Iranian air defense group, it will be able to render significant opposition to Israeli aviation.
An extremely important aspect of this will be the addition of Iran’s radar field with the actions of F-14A aircraft, which, with their powerful radar, are capable of playing the role of early-warning radar aircraft and control fighter aircraft.
In general, with competent and active (including the full use of fighter aviation with the introduction of all its possible forces into battle) the use of air defense forces and equipment, even under conditions of active interference from Israeli aviation, forces and means of Iran’s zonal air defense (long-range, medium-range and air defense missiles) fighter aircraft) can potentially destroy Israeli aircraft before 20 and thwart 30-40 combat missions with machines.
In addition, the presence of modern, mobile and jamming-proof air defense systems, such as Tor-M1 and Pantsir C-1, capable of autonomous operations, will allow Iran to provide object protection for the 10 order of the most important objects from air strikes to 20 (airplanes , cruise missiles, planning bombs) for each of the objects.
In this case, the loss of the Iranian side in fighters can amount to up to 20-30 machines.
Preliminary findings
In total, taking into account the possible active opposition of the Iranian air defense forces and facilities, the Israelis will be able to disable for a very limited time not more than the 2-s enterprises of the Iranian nuclear complex, which will slightly affect its nuclear program.
If the opposition of Iranian air defense is ineffective, Israel will be able to withdraw for quite a long time (from a year to 3-4 years) all the objects planned for destruction (these are 3-5 enterprises) and slow down the development of Iran’s nuclear program by 1-3, which also will not be crucial.
Thus, Israel’s attack on the facilities of the Iranian nuclear complex will most likely not allow it to have a significant impact on the course of Iran’s nuclear program. The military and political leadership of Israel understands this well. Therefore, it must be assumed that the goal of this strike, if it takes place, will be not so much a violation of Iran’s nuclear program, as Israel’s desire to provoke the US and some European and Middle Eastern countries into war against Iran.
- Konstantin Sivkov, 1 Vice-President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems
- http://www.iran.ru/rus/news_iran.php?act=news_by_id&_n=1&news_id=81264
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