Armored decked lightning. Cruiser II rank "Novik". Last fight
Unfortunately, it is not quite clear when and by whom exactly Novik was discovered. As can be understood from the official historiography of both sides, news of the Russian cruiser was received when Novik was bypassing Honshu (in the descriptions indicated the old name of Honshu - Nippon) from the east. At this time, Vice-Admiral H. Kamimura with his cruisers was in the Korean Strait, so it is not surprising that the Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Ito, ordered him to intercept the Novik. H. Kamimura received an order to send off two high-speed cruisers to the Sangar Strait and, of course, he carried out the order, sending two ships from the 4-th combat detachment. Unfortunately, it is not known what kind of cruisers were sent, since the “Naniwa”, “Takachiho”, “Akashi” and “Niitaka” were in the composition of the detachment, and only two of them went to intercept. However, then H. Kamimura received an order from Heihatiro Togo to send for the Novik cruisers Tsushima and Chitose, which was carried out. Previously sent cruisers recalled.
By this time, Tsushima was closer to the Sangar Strait than Chitose, as it was coming from Ozaki Bay (Tsushima) in Sasebo, while Chitose was only approaching Ozaki from the opposite side, from about. Ross. The commander of "Tsushima", Sento Takeo (to know what the name is here and what is the last name) was afraid of missing the Russian cruiser, and therefore immediately, without waiting for the "Chitose", went to Hakodate. While the latter, having come to Ozaki Bay, spent the night to replenish the reserves of coal and water, and only after that went there, so both Japanese cruisers arrived in Hakodate with a time difference of just less than a day.
Having received a message that the Russian cruiser was somewhere nearby, the 5 of August “Tsushima” sailed into the sea, and at midnight it was followed by the “Chitose”: both ships at dawn 6 of August met near the island, which in the Russian translation “Description of hostilities on the sea in 37-38 Meiji "is called" Oshima. On modern maps, the island of that name is located on the other side, not far from Okinawa, but in the diagram given by the respected A.Yu. In his monograph on the Novik cruiser, by Emelin, we see the above islet near Hokkaido.
Around 16.00 on Japanese cruisers, it was reported that Novik 6 passed Kunashir Strait in the morning on August, moving to the north-west. From this it was obvious that the Russian ship would try to go around Japan, passing through the Strait of La Pérouse, that is, between Hokkaido and Sakhalin. The Japanese cruisers immediately took all necessary measures to intercept him there.
The Chitose went immediately to the La Pérouse Strait, and began patrolling, and then, in the evening, when Tsushima joined him, he sent the latter to survey Korsakovsk Aniva Bay, on the bank of which he was located. This decision turned out to be absolutely correct: 7 August, at 16.00, being 10 miles south of Cape Endum (that is, about 14 miles from Korsakovsk), discovered smoke that could only belong to a fairly large ship ... This was the "Novik" .
The Russian cruiser understood the danger of following the Kunashir Strait, because they knew that on one of the islands of the Kuril Ridge there was a Japanese observation station that was connected to Japan. But there was no way out - no other route was possible due to the lack of coal and its high consumption resulting from the running state of the machines. Novik arrived at the Korsakov post on 07.00 in the morning of August 7 and immediately began loading coal.
However, it’s not at all necessary to understand by immediate loading that coal, at 07.00, began to be reloaded onto a ship. The coal prepared for loading was not there, so it had to be delivered first to the dock with supplies, then loaded onto barges, and only then onto the cruiser. I must say that the mood on the cruiser has changed dramatically for the better, as evidenced by the memoirs of Lieutenant A.P. Shter:
Actually, they began to ship it to the cruiser in 09.30, but in 14.30 the “wireless telegraph” began to accept negotiations of Japanese warships, and it became clear that the battle could not be avoided. By this time, almost all of the coal was immersed, it only remained to load two barges: in 15.15, the loading was completed and the couples began to be bred, and in 16.00 Novik was removed from the anchor, having 7 boilers under the pairs. As far as can be understood from the descriptions of the battle, the 3 boiler was introduced before the battle began, and in 2, the others had previously broken the tubes and could not be operated: so, presumably, Novik went to its last fight, having 10 boilers from 12.
What was the reason for this delay? After all, the cruiser went to sea only 1,5 hours after the radio telegraphers spotted the Japanese talks? First, the crew, part of which, including Lieutenant A.P., should have been returned to the ship. Shtera, was on the shore, engaged in the supply of coal. Secondly, and this, apparently, played a key role, the loading of coal should have been completed. The fact is that the commander of the cruiser MF von Schulz had the following plan: he was going to go east of the Strait of La Perouse, in order to confuse the Japanese about his intentions. And only after it gets dark, turn back and try to go through the strait in the night in order to continue to Vladivostok. It is clear that there was almost no chance of success of this enterprise, and Novik would probably have to take the fight before dark. Aniva Bay, if you look at the map, looks more like an inverted glass, and Korsakovsk is located at its very bottom, so it was almost impossible to get out of it, avoiding meeting with Japanese ships. At the same time, Novik no longer had the advantage in speed, and in terms of artillery strength, it was inferior to almost any Japanese cruiser.
But, whether the battle will take place, or by some miracle the cruiser will be able to avoid fire contact, it was obvious that in the evening and at night of August 7 the Novik would have to make a big move. Coal consumption will be appropriate, and yet there was still going to go to Vladivostok, and all this should have been enough available reserves, since it would no longer be possible to return for reloading to the Korsakov post. Mf von Stehr was forced to take into account the fact that even approaching Vladivostok, he could not request help and towing: as we recall, the possibilities of radio telegraph on the cruiser were extremely limited.
Thus, the cruiser needed as much coal as possible, and it made sense to linger a little to maximize its reserves.
Unfortunately, the plan mf. von Schulz did not lead to success. Having left the anchor and having left the raid, the cruiser, as it was intended, turned east, but at that time Tsushima, having reached full speed, was already crossing the line of Noviku. The speed of the latter, according to the logbook, was 20-22 knots. (probably all the same 20 knots., note aut.), that is, MF von Schulz tried to squeeze the most out of his ship’s boilers remaining in the 10 formation.
As soon as the commander of "Tsushima" was convinced that the "Novik" was found, he ordered to give a radiogram on the "Cheeto": "I see the enemy and attack him." This was done, and the guns started talking in 17.15. In this case, the commander of the "Novika" in his report claims that the first shot was made from his cruiser, but Lieutenant A.P. Shter and the Japanese believe that the battle still started "Tsushima". The distance between the opponents at that moment was 40 cables, and when it was reduced to 35 cables, Tsushima lay on the parallel Noviku course. Visibility was excellent: A.P. Shter notes that superstructures were clearly visible to the Japanese cruiser with the naked eye, and people could be seen through binoculars.
The Japanese quickly adjusted themselves, so MF von Schulz "began to describe a number of differently needed coordinates", that is, turned away to the left, then to the right, so that soon he could again be on the same course, parallel to the Japanese cruiser, keeping him from 35- 40 cable. However, already in the 17.20 the cruiser got a hole in the steering compartment.
It must be said that the description of the number and sequence of hits in Novik is still a task, because the available descriptions (the memoirs of A.P. Shter, the logbook cited by him, the report of MF von Schulz) are very contradictory. Even in terms of the number of hits, there are ambiguities: for example, historians' works usually indicate that the ship received three underwater holes, two of which fell in the steering area, and another one - under the cabin of the senior officer, as well as “about 10 hits” into the hull and superstructure cruisers, which were above the water. Thus, the total number of hits seems to be around 13, but according to Novik's watch journal, about 14, and in some publications it is generally indicated that “around 10 hits” Novik received, including including underwater holes . The Japanese “Novik” damage schemes are of little help, but we will return to them later.
The reconstruction offered to your attention does not claim to be absolute truth, and is merely an attempt to somehow “reconcile” the contradictions of the descriptions known to the author of this article.
So, as we have said, the cruiser received the first hit in 17.20, just 5 minutes after the start of the battle: most likely, it caused the most serious damage to the ship. The fact is that the shell hit the joint of the side and armor deck, and although it did not cause rapid flooding, but, according to MF. von Schulz, caused "a number of cracks, spreading from the site of the lesion", which could not be repaired.
Then, in the span of the 17.20-17.30, Novik got into the hull: in the residential deck area and the mess room.
In 17.30, one shell completely smashed the stern bridge, and another - the commander and navigator felling, he also caused the fire of a box with cards, which, in general, was quickly extinguished (for 5 min). "Novik" turned off the move, but the reason for this was not combat damage, but the tube rupture in two boilers - now only 12 is left from 8.
At about the same time, another projectile hit the stern of the ship, killing the commander of the UT 120-mm gun of Anikeev, tearing it almost in half, and seriously injuring two more. The place of the deceased was taken by the 120-mm non-shooting side gunner, who "spread his legs over his corpse, coolly sent one projectile after another, trying to avenge the death of a comrade."
In the interim 17.30-17.35, another projectile hit the stern of the cruiser, which resulted in major crew losses. Lieutenant A.P. Shter described it this way:
“There was a terrible explosion behind my back; at the same second I felt a blow to the head and severe pain in my side, my breath caught and the first impression was that a piece of my side had torn out, so I began to look around where it would be more convenient to fall; after some time the breathing returned and only then did I notice that I was wounded in the head, and my side was only contused; Around me lay dead and moaning wounded; The drummer is close, holding his head, in a deplorable voice, reporting: "Your Excellency, your brains have got out." This made me even laugh: I could hardly have stood if my brain had climbed; just in case I felt my hand; really got into something warm and soft, must have been a blood clot, but since he didn’t feel any particular pain, he pulled his head with a handkerchief and began to pick up the wounded. This shell immediately snatched ten people.
In 17.35, the next projectile made a second hole in the steering compartment, now it was quickly filled with water, and the cruiser sat aft on 2,5 – 3 feet (75 – 90 cm). Around the same time, another projectile hit the area of the biscuit. But the most unpleasant messages received at that time were: reports from the steering department that he was quickly drowned with water and that the steering machine was about to go out of order, and the mechanic reported that the pipes had burst in two more boilers. Now the cruiser had under the pairs of all 6 boilers from 12, its speed dropped dramatically.
In 17.40, the water that continued to flow into the hull flooded the officers' cabins and approached the cartridge chamber. At the same time, another underwater hole was received, apparently, it is about board damage in the cabin area of the senior officer.
In 17.50, Novik continued to sit astern, and the trim reached 1,8 m - there was nothing left but to turn back to Korsakovsk. The Tsushima also turned in pursuit of a Russian cruiser.
In 17.55, Novik received the last hit in this battle - the shell hit the hull above the waterline in the cabin area of the senior officer: this way we listed the 11 hits on the Russian cruiser, but perhaps there were others. And at the same time, according to the observations of our sailors, "Tsushima" stopped.
According to the Japanese description, the Russian projectile struck the cruiser under the waterline, and, although the time was not specified, it happened after the Novik turned back to the Korsakov post. Accordingly, it can be assumed that this happened somewhere between 17.50 and 17.55, when they saw on the Novik that the enemy cruiser stopped. "Tsushima" received a serious flooding and a strong roll, and was forced to retreat and withdraw from the battlefield, pumping out abundantly arriving water. Cruisers dispersed, continuing, however, to fire at each other, apparently - to no avail. The 18.05 on Novik finally failed the steering, and even after 5 minutes, the fight stopped in 18.10.
According to the Novika logbook, the cruiser received 3 underwater holes, through which 250 tons of water entered the ship, another hit a little higher than the waterline and, besides, about a dozen more surface hits. Losses in people: two killed, two mortally wounded and still injured sailors 11 and Lieutenant A.P. Shter.
Descriptions of the damage of the Japanese cruiser in this battle are traditionally different. While the Novika logbook reports: “The enemy was badly damaged by our shells; the hits were in the bridge, in the board, and especially in the stern. ”, the Japanese official recognizes that only one 120-mm projectile hit, which, nevertheless, led to very serious damage to Tsushima.
How accurate is the Japanese Tsushima damage assessment? The author of the “Cruiser II rank“ Novik ”, A.Yu. Emelin, questioning the Japanese data, tending to the fact that a single hit, and even only an 120-mm projectile could not put the Japanese cruiser down. But, arguing impartially, this could well have happened, and here's why.
As we said earlier, 27 July 1904. The 120-mm Japanese projectile hit the waterline, below the armor belt of Retvizan squadron battleship, caused the formation of a hole in 2,1 m, through which 400 tons of water entered the ship's hull. Moreover, it was not even able to fully pump it out (although the design features of the battleship itself were to blame) and as a result of this damage the Retvisan was the only ship to which V.K. Witgeft gave permission, if necessary, to abandon the breakthrough to Vladivostok, and return to Port Arthur.
Let us recall the first and last battle of the Varyag cruiser: one half underwater hole with an area of about 2 sq. M. on the left side caused flooding and a very strong roll, at which the cruiser was not combat-ready.
Apparently, in its high-explosive effect, the Russian 120-mm projectile could not be equal to the Japanese "colleague", but unfortunately, the author does not have accurate data on the content of explosives in the Russian and Japanese high-explosive 120-mm projectiles. But after all, Tsushima was just a small cruiser with a displacement of less than 3 500 t, much smaller than the Varyag, or, especially, Retvizan. Therefore, it is not surprising that the only hit under the waterline led to a strong roll of the Japanese ship, such that he could no longer continue the fight.
Thus, Tsushima could indeed lose its fighting ability from a single, successful Russian hit, but I would like to note the following. Of course, one should not exaggerate the accuracy of the Russian commanders in this battle, but one should not underestimate the significance of the damage of Tsushima.
Of course, possessing post-knowledge, we understand that after the 7 battle of August 1904, Novik could not go anywhere. Three underwater holes, one of which was impossible to make a patch (the very hit of the projectile in the joint of the plating and the armor deck), made the transition impossible. The cruiser sat down heavily astern, and the pumps were either out of order or were under water themselves, so it was not possible to pump out the water. The steering failed, and it remained only to be controlled by machines, but the cruiser could keep only half of its boilers under steam. It is difficult to say how much its speed dropped at the same time, but in any case it was significantly less than 20 nodes, and at any moment it could fall even more.
But the fact is that the commander of “Tsushima” could not have known all this. Yes, he saw that his commanders were successful and that the Russian cruiser, having lowered the course and sailing to the stern, turned back to Korsakovsk. But these observations did not guarantee that Novik was badly hit and would not be able to quickly repair the damage. At the same time, twilight was near, and before darkness it was clearly not enough time to do away with Novik. And in the night everything is possible, so that if the Russian cruiser managed to “heal” its damage, he could well break through the Japanese cruisers towards Vladivostok. It was impossible to admit this, of course, in any case, and it was only possible to prevent a possible breakthrough of Novik from interfering with it.
So, or something like this, Tsushima commander Sento Takeo should have talked about it, and if he didn’t resume the duel, then for one simple reason - he couldn’t do it, even realizing that he was at risk of missing Novik. From which it is obvious that the single hit of the Russian cruiser for some time completely brought the Tsushima out of action.
It would be nice if those who assure us that the Varangian, after the battle with the Japanese squadron, have not yet exhausted all the possibilities for a breakthrough, as this historical fact…
In general, it turns out that the Tsushima commanders were not even many times more, but an order of magnitude more hits: the fact is all the more offensive that the Novik, as we see, did not stand up in the inner harbor of Port Arthur, but constantly went out at sea, conducting these or other combat operations, during which periodically and unsuccessfully fired from Japanese ships. So, July 13 "Novik" achieved at least two hits in the Japanese auxiliary gunboat (alas, the Japanese in their sources are confused about which one - either in "Uvadzima Maru №5", or in "Yoshidagawa Maru") and on July 27, on the day before the breakthrough, most likely “laid” several shells at Itsukushima, while in both cases the cruiser fought against the superior forces of the enemy, but did not receive any damage. What happened this time?
Alas, the author of this article cannot offer an exhaustive answer to this question, but I would like to draw the attention of dear readers to 2 important factors that are usually overlooked when analyzing the latest Novik battle.
The first of these is that the crew of the cruiser from the very morning was engaged in very hard work, loading coal, and even from the moment coal was transferred to the cruiser, even then it took about a quarter to six hours. It can also be assumed that the komendory loaded coal on a par with everyone. Lieutenant A.P. Shter was an artillery officer, and he was sent ashore to organize the loading of coal, it would be logical to assume that with his own subordinates. It may be worth blaming the cruiser commander that he did not free his gunners from this work, but which MF had. Von Schultz were more options? It took place not far from the shores of Japan, including the Kunashir Strait, where it could easily have been, and even had to find it out: then everything would indicate that the cruiser would break through the La Pérouse Strait. If the Japanese had time to send their cruisers, one should have expected a “hot” meeting, but if Novik still managed to pass through the La Perouse Strait, it would have broken into operational space, and it would not be so easy to intercept it in the sea. Nevertheless, it was impossible to reach Vladivostok without coal, and the Korsakov post itself was a giant trap for the ship.
Thus, everything was in order to finish loading as quickly as possible and go to the La Perouse Strait, but if Japanese ships met on the way ... Well, to break through the weary fireman is no better than a tired commander. M.F. von Schulz of the "extra" crew that could load coal, giving rest to those who were needed in case of a battle with the Japanese.
The second factor is the MF maneuvers. von Schultz in battle. As we know from his own report, the commander of the Novik in combat constantly described the coordinators in both directions. Thus, MF. von Schulz tried to shoot down the Japanese, and this was a definite point: in order to break through to Vladivostok, it was necessary to minimize the damage of Novik, and not to try to defeat Tsushima at any cost. The Japanese cruiser had in the side salvo the same 4 guns as the Novik, but of a larger caliber - 152-mm against the Russian 120-mm. Thus, a classic “in line” battle, that is, on parallel courses, did not promise anything good for our ship. Some hope not to receive critical damage and to hold out until darkness gave only constant maneuvering and a good hit in the Japanese cruiser, which would knock him off.
But, as we see today, the decision of M.F. von Schulz, although it was logical, still proved to be erroneous. Constant jerks Novik left and right shot down a tip not to the Japanese, but to the Russian commanders. The Tsushima gunners, in spite of the Russian cruiser’s maneuvers, still managed to quickly fire their guns and achieved their first hit after just 5 minutes after the start of the battle, and then steadily hit Novik. Alas, the Novik commanders managed to hit only in 35-40 minutes after the guns started talking: yes, it was a “golden” projectile, after which Tsushima was forced to stop the fight, but Novik could not help - He had already managed to get too serious damage by this time.
Considering the condition of the cruiser, mf von Schulz decided to flood it. Interestingly, the reasons for such a decision in the sources indicate different. Lieutenant A.P. Shter in his memoirs wrote:
But the commander of the Novik reported in his report that he still wanted to blow up the cruiser, but had no opportunity for this, because the subversive ammunition was stored in the steering compartment that was flooded and there was no possibility to get it from there.
As a result, after the Novik crew was brought ashore at midnight, the cruiser was still scuttled, as reported by the report of M.F. Schultz, "at a depth of 28 feet," while part of its side and superstructure remained above the water.
However, the story of attempts to destroy Novik was just beginning.
In the morning of August 8, the Cheaters approached the Korsakov post, which opened fire on the flooded Novik. It must be said that eyewitnesses to these events were convinced that the Novik was only a pretext, but in fact the Japanese cruiser shot at the village, but it is difficult to say for sure. In any case, it is reliably known that the church, 5 state-owned and 11 private houses suffered as a result of the shelling in Korsakovsk, but the cruiser itself did not receive any significant damage.
On the one hand, the Chitose really did have to disable the Russian cruiser, so that they could not be used even after the war, but on the other, it is obvious that the Japanese could take a position in which civilians would not receive damage . Most likely, however, that the Japanese "combined the pleasant with the useful."
Nevertheless, as we have already said, the cruiser did not receive serious damage, and from it, later, even its artillery was brought to shore, which it was possible to shoot at the Japanese ships, as well as some other stocks of property. As for Novik itself, it continued to suffer damage, since its hull was severely hit by stones during a westerly wind. Interestingly, Warrant Officer Maximov, left with the wounded Novik and part of the team to organize the defense against the Japanese landing, even thought to build a breakwater, but, of course, he had enough worries without such Napoleonic plans.
However, after the defeat of the Russian fleet in Tsushima, it became clear that the Russian Empire could well lose Sakhalin, so in June 1905 the commander of the port of Vladivostok, with whom Korsakovsk had a message, ordered the Novik to be blown up. Alas, it was difficult to do this, because, despite the numerous requests of the defenders of the Korsakovsky post, mines were not sent to them, where did the explosives come from?
Maximov (by that time, already lieutenant) made every possible effort to destroy the cruiser. At first, he used mines captured from the Japanese, having blown up one of them on the port side, in the area of on-board machines, and the second - closer to the stern. Both exploded regularly, having made holes in 10 and 3,6 sq.m. respectively, but, of course, this was not enough to destroy the cruiser. Turning to Colonel I.A. To Artsyshevsky, who commanded the ground defense forces of the Korsakov post, Maksimov also received 18 pounds of black powder. Of this, an enterprising lieutenant built 2 mines: the first of them, in 12 pounds of smoky and 4 pounds of smokeless powder, laid between 1-oh and 2-second stokers. The explosion resulted in a hole in 36 square. m., the next boilers were crushed, the frames - killed.
The second mine, in 5 pounds of smoky and 4 pounds of smokeless powder, was installed on the landing between the onboard vehicles, with the decks being previously destroyed by several small explosions. As a result of its undermining by the assessment of divers: "both cars, armored and upper decks, beams and bulkheads turned into a shapeless mass."
Note that such an abundance of impacts on the flooded Novik makes it difficult to assess the damage it received in combat based on Japanese schemes drawn up during the recovery of the ship.
As for the further fate of the Russian cruiser ... After the southern part of Sakhalin was "yielded" to the Japanese under the terms of the peace treaty, they began to survey and lift the Novik. Either the 12, or the 16 July, the cruiser was able to be raised, and it was towed to dock in Hakodate. Later he was taken to Yokohama, and then, for full restoration, to Ekosuka.
You can say that the efforts of Lieutenant Maximov were not in vain. Yes, the Japanese eventually managed to put the ship into service, but for this they had to carry out a serious repair, which included the installation of 8 boilers of the Miyabar system, but they could not return the main tactical trump card to the ship. Joined the Japanese Imperial fleet in the middle of the 1908 Mr. Suzuya, named as such there are rivers that flowed through South Sakhalin and flowed into the Aniva Bay, developed no more than 19 nodes and did not stand out against the background of the old Japanese 3-class cruisers.
Of course, there is no doubt that if the Japanese were very necessary, they would be able to completely restore the ship, but, apparently, this would require funds in such a size that it would be irrational to invest in a not-so-new cruiser.
During the repair, the cruiser stepped up its armament: 152-mm was put on the tank and the yut, and 4 * 120-mm guns of the Armstrong system were mounted on the sides. Subsequently, however, the 120-mm guns were replaced with 6 * 76-mm, 6 * 47-mm and 2 * 37-mm guns. The rest of the days "Novik" spent in the service in Port Arthur, but it was short - 1 on April 1913, the cruiser was excluded from the fleet lists.
Thus ended the story of the most high-speed, and the most "restless" cruiser of the Port Arthur squadron - but not our series of articles.
To be continued ...
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