From the history of the development of artillery acoustics. H. 2
As noted, the impetus for the use of sound reconnaissance was the Russo-Japanese War. Artillery acquired the ability to shoot at long distances, at invisible targets. At the same time, artillery became invisible to the enemy. That's when the idea came to use sound for reconnaissance of firing guns and for shooting at them. True, during the Russo-Japanese War, no methods or techniques for determining the location of firing guns by sound were developed. However, some officers had already used the principle of the difference in the speed of light and sound. Noticing the gleam of a shot from a gun behind the closure, the observer determined the time it took for the sound to reach him - and judged the distance based on the measured time. Later, as a stopwatch-rangefinder, Boulanger proposed the first simple sound-measuring device based on this principle and allowing one to automatically obtain an approximate value of the range to a gun (Aparin A. A. Sound measurement. Voenizdat, 1931. P. 6.).
A more sophisticated and independent of optical surveillance, the proposal of the Russian officer N. A. Benoit 1909, appeared, which allows to determine the location of enemy batteries by the sound of a shot.
Artillery sound reconnaissance. M., 1993.
In foreign armies, such proposals appeared only at the beginning of the First World War 1914 - 1918. (Esclangon - in France, Paris - in England). In the work already cited Barsukov, we can read the following: “Experiments of the use of sound in Russian artillery arose in 3 - 4 year before the start of World War I, that is, earlier than anywhere else in foreign artillery. Before the war with these instruments (sound-measuring instruments), sound-measuring teams were formed and sent to the theater of war ”(Barsukov, T. I. I, S. 95.)
According to participants of the first experiments using sound intelligence in the 1914 - 1918 war, one of these teams went to the front in August 1914. The team consisting of 6 people first tried to turn around on the Lublin front, participating in the battles near the villages of Bykovo and Golenzovo - but before the end of the battle did not have time to turn around. But the second time, in the battles on the Vistula near the town of Kamen (September 1914), the team turned around and spotted three enemy batteries.
Nevertheless, although already at the beginning of the 1914 campaign, sound reconnaissance teams operated in the Russian army, their work was experienced until the very end of the war. Sound reconnaissance did not come out of the test stage, which was partly due to the imperfection of the material part: the sound stations available in 1916 in the Russian army: 1) VL (named after the designers Volodkevich and Zheltov) and 2) were not the inventor of Levin quite satisfactory. It should be noted that these two stations already at that time had a graphic record, therefore they provided documentation, as opposed to the third station available to the troops - chronographic. The latter (Benoit station) had an imperfect sound receiver - and the results of its work were ineffective. Unfortunately, the work of the first two stations almost did not preserve information.
Already at the end of 1917, the unsatisfactory nature of the organization of detachments of artillery observation stations became clear (as the sonometric detachments were called by that time) and the ineffectiveness of finding them on the fronts - as a result, they had to go to Tsarskoye Selo, to a reserve Heavy brigade - to be reorganized into new ones grounds.
At the same time, the Russian artillerymen widely used (for example, during the 1916 Offensive) the above-mentioned sound-light method of determining the range - for the production of artillery firing.
That is in short story sound reconnaissance in the Russian army until the end of 1917
Some information about the use of sound intelligence in the French army is found only at the beginning of 1915, and in the German army - even later. Abroad, as in Russia, at the beginning of the war, they clearly underestimated the role of this powerful tool.
This is what Academician Eksklangon, who was involved in sound measurement work in 1915, writes about this: “One general answered me that, in his opinion, this question has no practical significance.” And in another case: “In the bureau of the military ministry I was received by his chief, who was attentive to the proposal with kindness, but also skeptical. The young captains present were even ironic. ”
In the German army at the beginning of the war, the view was also dominant that only aerial reconnaissance and a preferential study of aerial photographs provided basic information for the use of artillery. By the end of the war, this view had changed radically. So, one officer, the German Army specialist, noted that in 1918, the use of a division without light and sound reconnaissance was unthinkable. The corresponding means gained recognition in foreign armies - and by the end of the war, sound-reconnaissance intelligence became one of the main assets of the enemy's artillery reconnaissance.
As an illustration, we cite a number of data characterizing the work of sonometric reconnaissance at the end of the war of 1914 - 1918. So, for example, in the 2nd French Army for the period from June 22 to August 13, 1918, from a stable front, of the 159 main positions of the enemy were determined: sound metering - 45 positions (or 28%); light measurement - 54 positions (or 34%); aviation - 60 positions (or 38%).
In the 1 of the French army for the period from April 7 to 8 in August, 1918 g was determined by soundometric intelligence 974 targets, photometric - 794 targets. These goals were identified with errors: when the distance to 50 meters was for 59% sound measurement and 34% photometry, when the distance from 50 to 100 meters was used for 34% sound metric and 48% photometry, and for distances above 100 meters - for 7% sound metric and light metering 18%.
And finally, the 4th French Army, in the period from July 18 to July 31, 1918, in the areas of the 21st and 8th Corps, received the following results for determining the location of targets: sound measurement - 367 targets; light measurement - 177 targets; tethered balloons - 25 targets; aviation - 56 targets; other means - 2 targets.
From the above material it can be seen that by the end of the First World War, sound reconnaissance came in first place in terms of the number of designated targets and in accuracy of work, compared to all other types of artillery reconnaissance. In particular, the French sound meters discovered the location of German ultra-long-range guns (“long Berthas”), who were firing on Paris.
Installation of the Paris cannon on the railway platform
However, there was so much skepticism about the work of sound specialists in the army circles that only after the end of the war the correctness of the information received by sound meters regarding the location of these long-range guns was confirmed.
The ending should ...
A more sophisticated and independent of optical surveillance, the proposal of the Russian officer N. A. Benoit 1909, appeared, which allows to determine the location of enemy batteries by the sound of a shot.
Artillery sound reconnaissance. M., 1993.
In foreign armies, such proposals appeared only at the beginning of the First World War 1914 - 1918. (Esclangon - in France, Paris - in England). In the work already cited Barsukov, we can read the following: “Experiments of the use of sound in Russian artillery arose in 3 - 4 year before the start of World War I, that is, earlier than anywhere else in foreign artillery. Before the war with these instruments (sound-measuring instruments), sound-measuring teams were formed and sent to the theater of war ”(Barsukov, T. I. I, S. 95.)
According to participants of the first experiments using sound intelligence in the 1914 - 1918 war, one of these teams went to the front in August 1914. The team consisting of 6 people first tried to turn around on the Lublin front, participating in the battles near the villages of Bykovo and Golenzovo - but before the end of the battle did not have time to turn around. But the second time, in the battles on the Vistula near the town of Kamen (September 1914), the team turned around and spotted three enemy batteries.
Nevertheless, although already at the beginning of the 1914 campaign, sound reconnaissance teams operated in the Russian army, their work was experienced until the very end of the war. Sound reconnaissance did not come out of the test stage, which was partly due to the imperfection of the material part: the sound stations available in 1916 in the Russian army: 1) VL (named after the designers Volodkevich and Zheltov) and 2) were not the inventor of Levin quite satisfactory. It should be noted that these two stations already at that time had a graphic record, therefore they provided documentation, as opposed to the third station available to the troops - chronographic. The latter (Benoit station) had an imperfect sound receiver - and the results of its work were ineffective. Unfortunately, the work of the first two stations almost did not preserve information.
Already at the end of 1917, the unsatisfactory nature of the organization of detachments of artillery observation stations became clear (as the sonometric detachments were called by that time) and the ineffectiveness of finding them on the fronts - as a result, they had to go to Tsarskoye Selo, to a reserve Heavy brigade - to be reorganized into new ones grounds.
At the same time, the Russian artillerymen widely used (for example, during the 1916 Offensive) the above-mentioned sound-light method of determining the range - for the production of artillery firing.
That is in short story sound reconnaissance in the Russian army until the end of 1917
Some information about the use of sound intelligence in the French army is found only at the beginning of 1915, and in the German army - even later. Abroad, as in Russia, at the beginning of the war, they clearly underestimated the role of this powerful tool.
This is what Academician Eksklangon, who was involved in sound measurement work in 1915, writes about this: “One general answered me that, in his opinion, this question has no practical significance.” And in another case: “In the bureau of the military ministry I was received by his chief, who was attentive to the proposal with kindness, but also skeptical. The young captains present were even ironic. ”
In the German army at the beginning of the war, the view was also dominant that only aerial reconnaissance and a preferential study of aerial photographs provided basic information for the use of artillery. By the end of the war, this view had changed radically. So, one officer, the German Army specialist, noted that in 1918, the use of a division without light and sound reconnaissance was unthinkable. The corresponding means gained recognition in foreign armies - and by the end of the war, sound-reconnaissance intelligence became one of the main assets of the enemy's artillery reconnaissance.
As an illustration, we cite a number of data characterizing the work of sonometric reconnaissance at the end of the war of 1914 - 1918. So, for example, in the 2nd French Army for the period from June 22 to August 13, 1918, from a stable front, of the 159 main positions of the enemy were determined: sound metering - 45 positions (or 28%); light measurement - 54 positions (or 34%); aviation - 60 positions (or 38%).
In the 1 of the French army for the period from April 7 to 8 in August, 1918 g was determined by soundometric intelligence 974 targets, photometric - 794 targets. These goals were identified with errors: when the distance to 50 meters was for 59% sound measurement and 34% photometry, when the distance from 50 to 100 meters was used for 34% sound metric and 48% photometry, and for distances above 100 meters - for 7% sound metric and light metering 18%.
And finally, the 4th French Army, in the period from July 18 to July 31, 1918, in the areas of the 21st and 8th Corps, received the following results for determining the location of targets: sound measurement - 367 targets; light measurement - 177 targets; tethered balloons - 25 targets; aviation - 56 targets; other means - 2 targets.
From the above material it can be seen that by the end of the First World War, sound reconnaissance came in first place in terms of the number of designated targets and in accuracy of work, compared to all other types of artillery reconnaissance. In particular, the French sound meters discovered the location of German ultra-long-range guns (“long Berthas”), who were firing on Paris.
Installation of the Paris cannon on the railway platform
However, there was so much skepticism about the work of sound specialists in the army circles that only after the end of the war the correctness of the information received by sound meters regarding the location of these long-range guns was confirmed.
The ending should ...
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