Military Review

About the great and terrible US missile defense, information war and sea gods

96
Watching how public opinion changes is always interesting. Not long ago, about ten or fifteen years ago, the opinion of the invulnerability of intercontinental ballistic missiles prevailed. That is, they, of course, could have been destroyed before the start, if they succeed in delivering a leading, counter-force strike, but after launching their interception was considered almost impossible.


However, as time goes on, the world is changing, new technologies are developing, and most importantly, information wars do not fall silent. The United States has long been out of the treaty on the limitation of missile defense systems: by announcing their decision on 31 December 2001, they, after a fixed 6-month period, left 12 on June 2002.

The official reason for this behavior of our American friends was the threat of nuclear blackmail from third countries. The fact is that the nuclear bomb continues its triumphal march around the world - in those years, Iran and South Africa were able to assemble it, and Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, was able to independently increase the range of the old Soviet ballistic missiles Scud. All this indicated that not too much time would pass, and nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles could be at the disposal of many countries, including those in whose affairs the United States considered it possible to interfere. Well, you understand: when the United States climbs into the internal affairs of any country, then this is a triumph of democracy, and if suddenly this country finds the courage to defend itself with nuclear power. weapons In the hands of - this, of course, nuclear blackmail.

We will not go deep into history question, let's consider better what the Americans got as a result of their, I must say, very expensive efforts in the field of anti-missile defense.

So, the number one first in the US missile defense system is the “miracle of hostile technology” called Ground-Based Midcourse Defense, or, for short, GBMD. Today, it is the only American system (and probably the only system in the world) capable of intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles and their combat units practically at any point of their extra-atmospheric trajectory. It sounds scary, but let's try to figure out what lies behind it.


GBI interceptor missile used in the GBMD complex


To begin, we recall how the intercontinental ballistic missile actually works. On the first, active part of the trajectory, while the rocket engines are working, it is being accelerated and the message is given to it of kinetic energy sufficient to defeat the target. Then the engine, having fulfilled its own, is discarded as unnecessary, and the rocket leaves the atmosphere. It is here that, as a rule, there is a separation of combat units that fly farther along a ballistic trajectory at an altitude of 1 000-1 200 km above or above the ground. When approaching the target, warheads are reduced, enter the atmosphere (based on video footage of the fall of combat units at the test sites, it can be assumed that the trajectory of the warhead falls approximately at an angle of 35-45 degrees to the surface of the earth) and, in fact, hit its intended target. How does GBMD do this?

Well, firstly, the launch of enemy missiles must be detected. In the US, the Space-Based Infrared System is responsible for this - a space-based infrared system, and if it is even simpler, a network of satellites that should record the launch of ballistic missiles. On the active part of the trajectory, when the ICBM engine is working at its full potential, it is not a particular problem to make it a good infrared sensor. 7 satellites are now deployed in geostationary orbit: thus, Americans are able to detect missiles and find out their trajectories approximately 20 seconds after the launch of the missiles.

However, the capabilities of the US satellite constellation are exhausted at this point - the fact is that after the active site ends, the engine stops working, which means “shining” in the infrared spectrum, and then US satellites cannot control the movement of warheads - radars are needed for this.

Of course, America has them: within the framework of GBMD, as many as three stationary radars are deployed at Cape Cod (Massachusetts), Bial (California) and Clear air bases (Alaska) and two older ones located in Greenland and the UK can also work in its "Interest." True, with all their virtues, they have a significant drawback - their detection range of ballistic missiles and their combat units does not exceed 2 000 km. Thus, it turns out that the United States is capable of receiving initial information about a rocket attack from satellites, it will include the number of launched missiles and information about their trajectory, but then the ICBM "go into the shadows" and the Americans do not observe them until the latter fly up to 2 000 km to one of the above American radar.

I must say that the United States is not very happy about this prospect, so they created a naval mobile radar to detect ICBMs. This cyclopean structure with a displacement of 50 000 t., Built on the basis of the drilling platform and has a length of 116 m, and a height - 85 m, and the draft in the expanded position is 30 m.



This monster is able to detect a target with an 1 ESR apt. m at a distance of 4 900 km, but its main advantage lies in the fact that this radar can always be pushed to a threatening direction in order to be able to control the flight of enemy ICBMs immediately after the latter go beyond the limits of visibility of the space satellite system.

What does it do?

The fact is that the GBMD system is focused on the destruction of ICBMs in the transatmospheric part of their trajectories. To do this, it has GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor) interceptor missiles, which, in essence, are the same ballistic missile that can bring the kinetic interceptor to an altitude of up to 2 000 km. And then, this very interceptor, equipped with its own engines and an electronic-optical guidance system, receiving target designation from ground-based radars, with a cry of “Tenno Hank Banzai !!!” (or without it) must ram the enemy missile or its warhead. Given that the speed of convergence will exceed 15-16 km / s, such a collision, of course, will be absolutely fatal for both devices.

So, in theory, GBI is capable of hitting enemy ICBM anywhere in space - its range is limited only by the speed of the system’s reaction to the detection of an enemy rocket and the flight time. Accordingly, the sooner the ICBM is “in the rays” of the target tracking radar, the better for the United States.

Dear reader, probably already impressed with the irrepressible power of the “gloomy American genius” who created the all-powerful Wondeweff? Well, let's see how it works in practice.

To begin with, the GBMD does not know how to hit ICBMs with separable warheads with blocks of individual guidance (MIRVSH). Such works were carried out, but were abandoned due to the high complexity, as well as the fact that Americans considered RGCH IN too complex technology for the latter to appear in third countries in the foreseeable future. True, in 2015, work on this topic was resumed, but so far has not led to success. Thus, in order to repel the blow of one “Satan” with 8 warheads, Americans need to ensure that their kinetic interceptor hits each warhead.

How many GBI anti-missiles do you need? In total, 17 GBI launches on real targets have been made so far. In one case, the rocket did not hit the target, since the target itself turned out to be defective and failed. In the remaining 16 launches, the targets were hit 8 times. In other words, the complex demonstrated 50% efficiency, but ... in “home” test conditions. As we know, in real combat operations, the efficiency has a bad tendency to decrease by several times, and sometimes by orders of magnitude.

But, let's say, the US GBI is really capable of intercepting the Satan’s combat unit with a 50%. Accordingly, on 8 warheads, 16 interceptor missiles will be needed. But this is only if the domestic ICBM in flight is divided into 8 warheads and ... everything.

Only here our rockets work "a little" wrong. In addition to these warheads, they carry with them a large number of simulators dividing into 2 the main groups - light and quasi-heavy. Light (mesh or inflatable) imitate the flight of warheads in space, there they are almost indistinguishable, but, of course, quickly lose speed and burn when entering the atmosphere. Quasi-heavy (weight reaches several tens of kilograms) manage to portray the warhead even during a significant part of the atmospheric flight, and they have no difference in speed with real warheads. All of the above is not some kind of modern know-how, our ICBMs are equipped with similar systems from the 1974 year, and probably more than one generation of false targets has changed.

So, today, there are no truly reliable means of selecting real combat units among the false ones among the Americans. However, we have too. In the USA, it was considered necessary, in addition to the available satellites, to deploy more 24 special low-orbiting satellites that could carry out such a selection, but ... Firstly, it seemed to them too expensive, and they did not do that. And even if they did, you need to understand that the nuances of the work of our false goals are a secret behind seven seals, and in the United States they can only guess how we realized it. And, for obvious reasons, there will be no time to learn from our mistakes in the case of nuclear missile Armageddon from the Americans.

It turns out that even if hundreds of false targets barely mislead US missile defense and increase the number of potentially dangerous targets, only doubled (that is, if one of Satan is launched, Americans will be able to evaluate potentially dangerous 16 BB, of which 8 will be real combat units) , in order to hit them, the Americans will need GBI 32 antimissiles. We repeat - provided that the accuracy shown on the training launches is achieved, and with the remarkable quality of selection of false targets, despite the fact that neither the one nor the other today can be expected from the American GBMD system.

And the total number of GBI deployed in Alaska until recently did not exceed 30 missiles and another 14 was supposed to be deployed in California. Unfortunately, the author of this article does not have exact information about the amount of GBI, but it is unlikely to exceed fifty and, hand on heart, it is extremely doubtful that all this US ammunition would be enough to reflect only 1 (in words: ONE) intercontinental ballistic missile of the Russian Federation.

What do Americans have?

Next on our list is the THAAD complex.



It must be said that its principle of operation is in many respects similar to GBMD: the same way the defeat of enemy missiles is carried out using a kinetic interceptor, which needs to be “stuck” right into the missile combat unit, and exactly the same direction is carried out according to the radar, but at the final stage The IR of the kinetic interceptor comes into play. But the THAAD complex is made mobile, which is why its characteristics are much more modest than those of the GBMD. If in theory, GBI interceptors can knock down warheads of ICBMs even over another hemisphere of the Earth, then the interception range of THAAD is 200 km, at an altitude of 150 km. If GBMD radars are detected by enemy "ballists" for 2 000 km (and the sea complex - even for 4 900 km), then the mobile radar THAAD is only for 1 000 km.

So, I must say that THAAD demonstrated very good results on tests and exercises - its accuracy was aimed at 100%. But there is one nuance. As targets were used the imitators of the good old Soviet P-17, that is, for a second, all the same "Scud". For obvious reasons, Scud, in terms of speed and other performance characteristics, is well, not at all an intercontinental ballistic missile, which represents a much more complex target. So what - the Americans, it turns out, are engaged in fraud? Yes, it did not happen at all: the fact is that both the developers and the customers of THAAD never positioned this complex as a means of defense against ICBMs. Only against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles: THAAD is officially unable to hit either ICBMs or their combat units. So, generally speaking, we generally have no reason to consider THAAD as an element of missile defense against our heavy missiles.

But let us assume that the Americans do not actually negotiate, and the destruction of combat units of ICBMs is such an “undocumented function” of THAAD. Alas, in this case, the Americans will face all the problems of selecting false targets, voiced above - in fact, they will be able to more or less reliably identify real targets only after our warheads have already very deeply entered the atmosphere, leaving THAAD almost no time for reaction . And before that, US anti-missile defenses would, in fact, be beaten into a white light like a penny, firing mostly false targets.

By the way, an interesting question: why did the Americans concentrate on kinetic interceptors, which require a direct hit into an enemy missile (combat unit)? The fact is that, according to the results of the operation “Desert Storm” in the USA, they came to the conclusion that the remote detonation of the charge does not guarantee the destruction of the ballistic missile warhead, even if we are talking about the old “Scuds” (albeit later, after appropriate modifications, The Patriot missile with a remote fuse destroyed the Scuds very effectively. At the same time, the use of nuclear warheads in antimissiles is undesirable, since their destruction was not blinded by fire control radars for some time ... But bad luck, what if one of the Russian warheads jerks on the approach to the THAAD positions, being "on the edge of the anti-missile strike zone - just to pave the way for the rest?

Are there so many of our missiles that can hit the THAAD complex? As you can see, today the US military has either 2 or 4 batteries of this complex, each of which includes 24 rockets. But basically this complex is being exported - to Japan, South Korea and the United Arab Emirates, which, by the way, fully confirms the version that THAAD is “sharpened” precisely against short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles - ICBMs are not threatened by the aforementioned countries. THAAD is, by the way, not only expensive, but very expensive - one complex costs about 3 billion dollars, and this does not take into account that the cost of its development according to some sources amounted to 15 billion dollars.

And finally, the world famous "Aegis" with its SM-3.


SM-3 IIA - from the manufacturer's website


In essence, the US naval anti-missile system is the same THAAD, somewhat improved, but somewhat worse. Improvements have touched the rocket itself - although the SM-3 is largely unified with the THAAD rocket, but it is a longer arm: the SM-3 is able to shoot down targets at an altitude of 250 km away, according to various sources, 500-700 km. It seems to be great, but there is one caveat - the AN / TPY-2 radar, which provides the THAAD complex, was not delivered to the US Navy ships, so you have to do with either the regular AN / SPY-1, and it is capable of targeting only 350 km, hardly any more. At the same time, there is no chance that the American ships will get something like AN / TPY-2 from the word “absolutely” - firstly, the THAAD radar is worth crazy money (about 600 million dollars), and secondly, it very “narrowly focused” and in the sector of review it loses to the single AN / SPY-1 grid, which a destroyer of the “Arly Burk” type needs to have a 4 thing to provide a circular view ... In other words, equipping American destroyers with such a radar will increase their cost approximately doubled, and even the dimensionless military budget of the USA will go for it.

Today it is rumored that the next version of SM-3 will be closer to GBI interceptors and will have 1500 km of reach in height, 2500-3500 km in range, but even if this is true, the radar equipment of the US Navy ships will "serve" such range can not. All hope for external target designation, but just where to get it from? Yes, in 2008, the US missile cruiser "Lake Erie" struck a failed American emergency satellite according to another satellite, but the trajectory of the latter was known in advance (and evil tongues claim that two-day calculations preceded the attack on the spacecraft) and in the case of a real rocket attack, such opportunities, alas, will not.

What can THAAD anti-missiles and SM-3 modifications currently available to repel an ICBM attack do? Formally, nothing, since both of these missiles are designed to intercept short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. Indeed, the capabilities of these complexes look more or less sufficient to intercept missiles like the Iskander — with a range of 500 km and a maximum height of 100 km, the ballistic missiles of the complex develop on the order of 2,1 km / sec, but for warheads traveling at 16 speed -17 swings in airless space, their capabilities look, let's say, somewhat doubtful. We can recall the case of 2017, when the Khwanson-12 medium-range ballistic missile was launched from North Korea and, flying over the Japanese islands of Honshu and Hokkaido, fell into the waters of the Pacific Ocean.

About the great and terrible US missile defense, information war and sea gods


Strictly speaking, this flight does not testify to the powerlessness of the American air defense system - most likely, Khwansson-12 passed over Japan at a height exceeding the capabilities of SM-3 and THAAD, but the comment of Kingston Rafe, an American expert on arms control, is very interesting:

“... A control shot, when the head part of the rocket re-enters the atmosphere, could be possible, but the SM-3 was never tested in this mode. To bring down a medium-range missile, it actually requires that North Korea tell us where it will land. ”


Thus, there are big doubts that THAAD and SM-3 are generally capable of intercepting the combat units of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, oddly enough, the Americans confirm these doubts by saying that a similar task was not put to these antimissiles. But even if we assume that Americans are cunning, then even on the basis of the well-known TTH complexes it is extremely doubtful that these anti-missiles could do this well. In the Russian-language Internet, much was said about the possibility of destroying launching ballistic missiles in the active, accelerating section of their trajectory, but you need to understand that for ICBMs located in the Russian Federation, it is absolutely impossible, and that theoretically it would be possible to shoot down missiles of our SSBNs. But in this case, the American anti-missile will not have to meet the SLBM, but in pursuit, that is, in order for the interception to take place, the destroyer of the USA needs to be in close proximity to the SSBN - otherwise SM-3 simply will not catch up with our missile.

In other words, in the best case, SM-3 and THAAD will allow Americans to count on the defense of the territory located directly next to the complex (ship). But here a number of difficulties arise:

1. Low probability of defeating the combat units of ICBMs, subject to the use of the latest false targets. Today, all US exercises are based on the fact that the target missile is detected long before approaching the affected area, which is why the complex has enough time for calculations. But in real conditions, the selection of targets will be possible only after the warheads begin to enter the atmosphere (with the quasi-heavy "snag" can be recognized even later), that is, the missile defense calculations will have to operate in conditions of terrible time pressure;

2. Huge solution cost. In order to protect at least 100 of the largest US cities, you need to deploy THAAD 100 batteries, which will not give any guarantees of protection, but will require costs at the level of 300 billion dollars.

In general, even if those approximately 400 of the THAAD and SM-3 missiles, which are currently in service with the US Armed Forces, can generally be used against ICBMs, you should not expect any miracles from them. Even if we assume that the Americans somehow miraculously manage to use all the missiles in repelling our full-scale nuclear missile attack, and in some equally miraculous way, the effectiveness of intercepting real (and not fake) combat units of our ICBMs will be 20-25% (huge assumptions in favor of America), and then the US missile defense system, taking into account GBMD, will be able to intercept 90-110 combat units from the force. This is less than 7,5% of combat units deployed on land-based and sea-based ballistic missiles of the Russian Federation, not counting strategic cruise missile-carrying cruise missiles.

Actually, given the fact that most of these missiles will be "in the wrong place at the wrong time" (for example, in Europe) and that, in addition to passive defenses, such as false targets, the RF strategic nuclear forces will use and active suppression of US missile defense, their real capabilities will be several times lower than those calculated by us.

From the foregoing, it is possible to make a completely unambiguous conclusion. The US missile defense system, in its present form, is capable of fighting only with single monoblock ballistic missiles. With great success, they can, if not completely destroy, then neutralize part of the combat units of a single heavy ICBM with a MIRV IN, if the latter, due to some terrible misunderstanding (you don’t even want to think about this), starts by chance. But this, strictly speaking, all of their capabilities today: in no case will the US missile defense system be able to reflect, but even noticeably weaken, the arsenal of the Russian strategic nuclear forces, if we suddenly have to use it for its intended purpose.

But whether all of the above is a reason to "rest on our laurels"? Not. For, as Winston Churchill said: “Americans always find the only right decision ...” (immediately adding: “... after everyone else has tried”). In other words, if the United States is seriously engaged in missiles that can effectively deal with classical ICBMs, sooner or later they will create such missiles, and we should be ready for this.

What could we oppose American delights? In essence, there are 3 directions, working in which we would completely neutralize the threat of missile defense in the form in which the Americans create it.

1. ICBM power. Interestingly, the START III treaty regulates the number of strategic carriers of nuclear weapons, but does not apply to their performance characteristics. That is, no one bothers us to make a rocket that, say, would hit the United States not through Alaska, but through the same South America, and at a height that the American anti-missile missiles would only be filled with combustible tears of envy. No, of course, if we can make an ICBM flying (exaggerating) at an altitude of 6 000 km above the Earth's surface, then no one bothers the United States to make an antimissile capable of getting it there, that's just ... That's just the cost of today's GBI interceptor is 70 million In order to more or less efficiently intercept only one ICBM from an FGM IN on 8 units, according to our calculations, you need at least 32 GBI. And this pleasure will cost 2,24 billion US dollars, despite the fact that our rocket is hardly worth more than one GBI, that is, 70 million dollars. In order to intercept a higher-altitude ICBM, an even more powerful and expensive interceptor is needed ... B in general, a similar arms race will ruin even the USA;

2. Maneuvering warheads. Everything is clear here - the fact is that the task of “combining, in time and space,” the combat unit of an ICBM and a kinetic interceptor is simple only at first glance. In fact, this task is akin to defeating one bullet with another: it seems that nothing too complicated, if you forget about gravity, the different weight of bullets and the difference in trajectories, that a bullet in the air is influenced by the wind, and it will to influence the “bullet” and “bulletproof” in different ways, depending on the form of ammunition, they will lose the initial velocity in different proportions, etc. etc. In general, the destruction of a warhead flying along a ballistic trajectory is a very difficult task that the Americans have barely learned to cope with. And if the ICBM combat unit also unpredictably changes the flight trajectory ... well, it becomes almost impossible to get into it;

3. Finally, false targets. The more false targets the ICBM carries, the more difficult it is for the enemy to distinguish them from real warheads, the worse for enemy missile defense.

So, no matter how surprising it sounds, the Russian Federation was moving in at least two (or rather, in all three) directions. It was just said that the Sarmat heavy rocket would be capable of attacking US territory from any direction, and not just along the shortest trajectory, as it was before.


"Hello, I have come to all of you!" (PC-28 "Sarmat")


The newest avant-garde units capable of maneuvering at hypersonic speeds are virtually invulnerable to kinetic interceptors. No, theoretically, probably, one can imagine an interceptor, with such energy reserves, that he can, moving at a speed of several kilometers per second, also maneuver with sufficient overload to keep up with the unpredictable Avant-garde trajectory. Here are just the cost of such a miracle, any limits imaginable, here already, perhaps, we should speak about multiple superiority in price over an intercontinental rocket, and in fact it carries several Avangards and some false targets ... In general, the missile defense of such value will be completely overwhelming even for the USA. And finally, although nothing is said about the improvement of our false goals in the open press, one can hardly assume that the work in this direction has been abandoned.

In other words, the US missile defense system does not protect at all from the Russian strategic nuclear forces today, while Sarmat, Avant-garde and the refinement of our false goals ensure that this status quo is preserved in the foreseeable future. Back in Soviet times, much was said that the strategic defense initiative (SOI) program proposed by the R. Reagan administration was extremely expensive, but it was quite easy to reduce its possibilities by spending less money on orders of magnitude.

Work on Sarmat, Avant-garde and false targets make the US missile defense exactly what the Americans officially declared - a means of fighting single and technically obsolete ICBMs that could be created in the third world countries. Indeed, against one or two North Korean missiles with the deadly name “Pukkykson” the American missile defense system will be quite effective.

And everything, of course, could be fine, if it were not for one “but” - alas, both in the USSR and in the Russian Federation one can clearly see the tragic inclination of our leadership to overestimate American capabilities in missile defense. “Sarmat”, “Avant-garde” and false targets - this is an adequate response to the American missile defense system, which is absolutely effective both militarily and economically. But instead of dwelling on this, we begin to invent all sorts of amazing miracles.

Cruise missile with a nuclear engine! Well, why? And she, having an unlimited range, is able to fly around the areas of missile defense that threaten her and the naval formations of Americans. But excuse me, an ordinary heavy ICBM is capable of doing the same thing — its warheads will fly very high above the ship connection, where the radars of the ships simply will not see it. Of course, a cruise missile can sneak up low on the US missile defense radars and destroy them, and if we had some opportunity to clear the way for conventional ICBMs with such missiles ... we just don't have that opportunity. Just because the flight time of a cruise missile, even with a nuclear engine, even without, is much more than that of an ICBM. And if the Americans are using us with their nuclear arsenal, we will have to give an urgent response, so our ICBMs will reach the US much faster than a nuclear-powered rocket. As a result, American radars will still work as intended by their creators - and if so, then it would be more useful for us to hit a large number of ICBMs at once. What is the point to weaken the decisive salvo so that some number of cruise missiles can fly sometime later?

And the same goes for the Poseidon torpedo. In theory, of course, it seems to make sense - the Americans will teach their SM-3 to fight with ICBM warheads, put a destroyer with antimissiles at each port, and repulse all of our rocket attacks, and here we are from under the keeek ... But the fact of the matter is that SM-3 cannot cope with Avangards, which will also hide behind false targets. And if so, then there is no need to fuss with torpedoes and a garden.

We repeat once again - Sarmat, Avant-garde and false targets give an exhaustive answer to the US missile defense program. But cruise missiles with nuclear engines and "Poseidons" are already beyond the limits of adequacy. They add virtually nothing to our ability to break through American defenses, but steal huge amounts of money for development and deployment. Our resources are frankly small, and the decision to develop or deploy a particular weapon system must be carefully weighed by the criterion of “cost / effectiveness”. But even the most cursory analysis shows that these two weapons systems do not fit into them in any way.

And again ... our leadership could be understood if it, tired of the failures of recent years, financed the development of the same Poseidons as alternative means of delivering nuclear weapons in case the Sarmatian and Avant-garde creation programs fail. It was reasonable. But today, when, in general, it is clear that both of these programs can be brought to implementation, the Poseidons should be put on the shelf to the best (more precisely, the worst) times, in case the United States comes up with something completely new, , what to confront the ICBM can not. A kind of ace in the hole, in case of an unexpected situation. But today, in conditions where we cannot afford to build SSBNs under the Borey-B project, because it is “too expensive,” and we manage with boats of early and less sophisticated modifications, when most of the 28 available multi-purpose submarines are laid up when their modernization programs are constantly being reduced and shifted “to the right”, when the construction of just six ICNSPs of the 885М project (Yasen-M) stretches for at least 15 years (Kazan laid down in 2009), and there is almost no hope that all six will go on line before 2025), mass production in the Poseidon and the construction of 4 (!) APL carriers for them is not just overkill.

This is a state crime.
Author:
96 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must to register.

I have an account? Sign in

  1. bmv04636
    bmv04636 23 January 2019 05: 19 New
    +1
    I think the ace up my sleeve is Skiff
    1. Destiny
      Destiny 23 January 2019 07: 29 New
      +1
      I think that the ace in the sleeve of the country's defense is still the good old nuclear submarines, whoever tells me anything. No missile defense system is able to protect the west from them, so are the "partners" ...
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 23 January 2019 09: 13 New
        +3
        Quote: Destiny
        I think the ace in the sleeve of the country's defense is still the good old submarines

        Only if we are going to strike first. They are not particularly effective for a retaliatory counter strike or even a retaliatory strike. For the presence of 100% of nuclear submarines on constant combat duty in position areas is from the category of unscientific fiction.
        1. Destiny
          Destiny 23 January 2019 09: 21 New
          +1
          I allow myself to remain with my opinion, Dear Colleague, but I also very politely inquired with your opinion, mind you. It is always pleasant to have a conversation with you, we sometimes agree with each other, or not always ... hi
          1. Lopatov
            Lopatov 23 January 2019 09: 45 New
            +1
            The most suitable for retaliatory oncoming and retaliatory strike are ICBMs in the silo. Fact. Further, the effectiveness of the components is reduced. Up to almost useless for such tasks "air" components of the triad. Actually being the tool of the first strike.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 23 January 2019 19: 04 New
              +1
              Quote: Spade
              The most suitable for retaliatory oncoming and retaliatory strike are ICBMs in the silo.

              Only under the condition that the time for making a decision on a reciprocal strike is less than the time from the detection of an enemy ICBM to the finish of their warhead.
              As for the retaliatory strike ... remember, back in the 80s, it was believed that progress in reducing the KBO of ICBMs and SLBMs made it possible to count on getting in close enough proximity to the silo to disable it.
              1. Sasha_rulevoy
                Sasha_rulevoy 23 January 2019 22: 01 New
                -1
                it became possible to count on getting in close proximity to the silos to disable it


                Do the Americans all-all Russian missile mines know? It seems they were built in polar nights.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 24 January 2019 10: 39 New
                  +2
                  Quote: Sasha_rulevoy
                  Do the Americans all-all Russian missile mines know? It seems they were built in polar nights.

                  Why don’t they know something? The main areas are known, and further, silos can be identified even in space images - along a relatively straight road leaving the main road, suddenly breaking off at an unremarkable fenced area with a couple of buildings. smile
                  It is the "roads to nowhere" that give silos - because the products standing in the mines have rather large dimensions and weight.
                  1. Sasha_rulevoy
                    Sasha_rulevoy 24 January 2019 17: 58 New
                    -2
                    suddenly breaking off at an unremarkable fenced area with a couple of buildings.


                    They seem to inflict blows on correctional institutions, not silos. Well, seriously, yes, perhaps this is how you can identify places suspicious of silos. But the American president or secretary of defense will require confirmation. You never know what can be built in the taiga. Maybe an oil pipeline, maybe a timber industry farm, or maybe the military part of the Strategic Missile Forces is true, but not just a mine installation, but just a warehouse. Or a weather station. Hundreds of options. Parachute to drop a spy there?
              2. Lopatov
                Lopatov 24 January 2019 08: 31 New
                -1
                Quote: Alexey RA
                as far back as the 80s, it was believed that progress in reducing the KBO of ICBMs and SLBMs made it possible to count on getting in close enough proximity to the silo to disable it.

                It was believed. But at the same time, militant optimists, as always, felt that the enemy would not oppose this by default
                http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/pub/oborona/oborona.shtml
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 24 January 2019 10: 45 New
                  +1
                  Quote: Spade
                  It was believed. But at the same time, militant optimists, as always, felt that the enemy would not oppose this by default
                  http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/pub/oborona/oborona.shtml

                  The systems described in the article by reference, of course, are impressive.
                  But the question is - which of them will be effective against a warhead that is traveling on clean ballistics, designed for penetration into the ground and underground explosion? Because the main scarecrow for silos in the 80s was precisely the SBP penetrator, designed for seismic effects on the PU glass as a whole.
                  1. Lopatov
                    Lopatov 24 January 2019 10: 49 New
                    0
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    But the question is - which of them will be effective against a warhead marching on clean ballistics

                    But here's the question: what will be the accuracy of "walking on pure ballistics." Given the range of application.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 24 January 2019 12: 29 New
                      +1
                      Quote: Spade
                      But here's the question: what will be the accuracy of "walking on pure ballistics." Given the range of application.

                      For the same "Minutemans," optimists write about 200 meters. Pessimists are about 500 meters away.
                      The silos will withstand an underground nuclear explosion of the SBM "Minutmen" in 200-250 meters?
                      1. Lopatov
                        Lopatov 24 January 2019 13: 43 New
                        0
                        Quote: Alexey RA
                        For the same "Minutemans," optimists write about 200 meters. Pessimists are about 500 meters away.

                        On pure ballistics? I think both of them lie.
                      2. Alexey RA
                        Alexey RA 24 January 2019 13: 59 New
                        0
                        Quote: Spade
                        On pure ballistics? I think both of them lie.

                        For R-36M2, ours give a KVO of 220 m. And the "poplar family" generally claims a KVO of 150-200 m. what
    2. Lopatov
      Lopatov 23 January 2019 09: 53 New
      +2
      Quote: Destiny
      No missile defense system is capable of protecting the west from them, the "partners" understand this ...

      Конечно.
      Until a fundamental decision is made on the deployment of interceptors in space. That will allow to shoot down missiles in the initial section of the trajectory. In combination with the first "disarming" strike, this can guarantee the destruction of Russia or China without any consequences.
      1. Destiny
        Destiny 23 January 2019 09: 59 New
        0
        Let's hope that our scientists have already come up with their own threaded bolt for this tricky nut of the damned imperialists. wink
        1. Lopatov
          Lopatov 23 January 2019 10: 06 New
          0
          Quote: Destiny
          Let's hope that our scientists have already come up with their own threaded bolt for this tricky nut of the damned imperialists.

          Yeah 8))) "Poseidon" 8)))
  • mvg
    mvg 23 January 2019 06: 52 New
    +1
    For the article plus, But, Andrey, you would consider the option when it is not necessary to shoot down all 400 ICBMs that we have in the framework of strategic offensive arms, but only a small part of what remains after a preemptive strike. And part of the ICBMs "will leave" to Europe, which states do not care. Then the oil painting is not so tragic.
    And all these avant-gardes, Poseidons, are still posing more in cartoons .. while they also need to be launched from carriers that can be destroyed up to an hour X
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 07: 44 New
      +2
      Quote: mvg
      But, Andrei, you would consider the option when not all 400 ICBMs that we have within the framework of strategic offensive arms need to be shot down, but only a small part of what remains after a preemptive strike.

      Maxim, the problem is that the same "Poseidons" in a preventive strike are much easier to destroy than ICBMs
      Quote: mvg
      And part of the ICBMs "will leave" to Europe, which states do not care.

      Honestly, I did not understand this argument at all. We are now in parity with the United States on deployed nuclear charges, and the Poseidons are not knocking out of it - they will be included in the treaty, that's all. So, whatever the distribution of goals, how can the Poseidons influence it?
      Quote: mvg
      And all these avant-gardes, Poseidons, are still posing more in cartoons .. while they also need to be launched from carriers that can be destroyed up to an hour X

      Vanguards are new warheads for ICBMs
      1. mvg
        mvg 23 January 2019 08: 16 New
        -1
        in a preventive strike it’s much easier to destroy than an ICBM

        Why is it difficult to destroy ICBMs? If the KVO, say Trident, is about 50-100 m, and the KVO of the axes is about 10 m. We do not consider the axes, but the ballistic missile defense is quite capable of opening the silo ICBMs. Even the superfood protected. I don’t know the protection from 150 kt to 50 m. I can’t imagine. That after such an explosion, the most delicate automation dash electronics will take off and work.
        But Poseidon may already be on the database. I really don’t know how this will help him.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 January 2019 08: 22 New
          +2
          Quote: mvg
          Why is it difficult to destroy ICBMs? If KVO, let's say Trident of order 50-100 m, and KVO of axes of order 10 m.

          It’s very simple - this requires a full-scale US strategic nuclear attack, which we can’t oversleep under any circumstances - we will have time for a reaction and the ICBMs will leave the mines before the latter are destroyed. The only question is whether there is enough political will to give a full-scale answer, but the fact is that if it is not enough, then no avant-gardes / poseydons will help
          And as for me - there will be enough will, because Armageddon means the death of our leadership, even if they manage to survive in the first days. Both their way of life and their power will perish, and, most likely, they themselves - physically. So they will have no reason to feel sorry for America.
          Quote: mvg
          That after such an explosion, the most delicate automation dash will take off and work

          Maxim, that’s why we have all the electronics duplicated by mechanics :)))))))
          1. mvg
            mvg 23 January 2019 08: 29 New
            -1
            duplicated by mechanics :))

            I do not know the mechanics that duplicate controllers. And you can’t fly far on gyroscopes alone, immediately accuracy will be in the area of ​​the Second World War. And astro correction without sensors and processing will be useless.

            With regard to the full-scale strike of the strategic nuclear forces, it is possible to launch infantry-launch vehicles from Europe, the approach time of which is less than the strategic nuclear forces response time. The answer will not be very impressive.
            Like us, the Americans became “nervous” when they deployed nuclear weapons in Turkey and Cuba. no one will already give the order for the answer. They’ll decide for them.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
              23 January 2019 08: 48 New
              +2
              Quote: mvg
              I do not know the mechanics that duplicate controllers. And you can’t fly far on gyroscopes alone, immediately accuracy will be in the area of ​​the Second World War. And astro correction without sensors and processing will be useless.

              The fact is that the rocket itself in the mine is well protected from all the damaging factors of a nuclear explosion, it can be killed there only by physical deformation, and for this you need a direct or very close hit. In order to provide it (especially in conditions of active opposition about Mozyr’s OCD, you probably heard?) You need a pair of warheads to mine. But the Americans have not deployed so many, of the 1 500 order as we have, and to spend hundreds of warheads in order to hit the ICBMs, which, with an adequate reaction from the leadership of the Russian Federation, will still not succeed ...
              Quote: mvg
              With regard to the full-scale strike of the strategic nuclear forces, it is possible to launch infantry-launch vehicles from Europe, the approach time of which is less than the strategic nuclear forces response time. The answer will not be very impressive.

              This is not true, because, firstly, there are no SLBMs in the States, and secondly, when they appear, it is not a fact that Europe will agree to their deployment. And thirdly, the flight time of the ballistic missile defense to the Siberian regions, where we have mines, will not be so different from ICBMs starting from the USA
              1. mvg
                mvg 3 February 2019 11: 43 New
                +1
                no BDSD in the States

                Just "on the topic" yesterday an article about increasing the financing of the plant for the design of the BRYMD. And it’s not in 2017, but earlier.
            2. gor999
              gor999 31 January 2019 08: 26 New
              0
              [quote = mvg] [quote] duplicated by mechanics:)) [/ quote]

              With regard to the full-scale strike of the strategic nuclear forces, it is possible to launch infantry-launch vehicles from Europe, the approach time of which is less than the strategic nuclear forces response time. The answer will not be very impressive.
              FOR MVG - Aren't you sick? That is, the complete destruction of Europe - in your opinion, "not a very impressive blow?"
              1. mvg
                mvg 3 February 2019 11: 41 New
                +1
                Are you not sick?

                Heart fools around, but better. Thank you for your interest in my health - the answer: only after you.
                On the issue. Since when have states become interested in the "health" of Europe? Yes, they were sick to follow the Germans and the French, especially for a quarter of their Araps. They are even the closest allies - arrogant Saxons, are interested in so far as. Everything beyond the puddle is uninteresting. Only a source of replenishment of the budget. So it was in the First War and in the Second World War. And hardly anything has changed. You should not count on the kinship of souls.
      2. bk316
        bk316 23 January 2019 19: 02 New
        0
        We are now in parity with the United States in terms of deployed nuclear charges, and Poseidons are not knocking out of it -

        Even as they get out. Andrey read the text. I will prompt you to save time paragraph 6 and 8 of the protocol.
  • bald
    bald 23 January 2019 07: 14 New
    0
    The article is excellent, but at the expense of the Poseidons, it doesn’t convince (finances and senselessness compared to the Vanguards) that there can be a sea of ​​situations and each can take place, and is there only one state territory? The globe is large and at any point a local conflict may arise, where oh how ground and air launches are not needed. Purely my opinion. I repeat the variants of the conflict between the sea and Poseidon, just the sea.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 07: 46 New
      +2
      Quote: bald
      situations the sea and each can take place and is there only one state territory takes place? The globe is large and at any point there may be a local conflict, where oh how land and air launches are not needed

      Are you going to use strategic nuclear forces in a local conflict? :)))))) You don’t need to do this at all, but if you suddenly have such a need, then YES aircraft with cruise missiles with nuclear warheads at our service will reach anywhere in the world.
      1. bald
        bald 23 January 2019 08: 25 New
        -1
        Andrey from Chelyabinsk hello, I am Vladimir from Chelyabinsk smile . Well, albeit a rough, but the situation (for example). On no one, in the ocean island, is a biological laboratory that the edge needs to be destroyed, but the hosts are against. Launches of ground, air, surface missiles - this is the disclosure of plans and their possible neutralization. The island has its own air defense. Conflict should not grow into more. There are many options. "Poseidons" must live and improve. Let the minimum, but they should. But it will not leave us. And air targets are air - they are visible. Yes, to hell with her with one "Northwind" - they pour so much there, but not enough. Something like this.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 January 2019 08: 53 New
          +3
          Quote: bald
          On no one, in the ocean island, is a biological laboratory that the edge needs to be destroyed, but the hosts are against. Launches of ground, air, surface missiles - this is the disclosure of plans and their possible neutralization. The island has its own air defense. Conflict should not grow into more.

          Vladimir, you are now describing a third-rate action movie :)))) Well, there are no such introductory ones.
          Firstly, such a laboratory can be moved forward with conventional weapons, TNW is not necessary for this. Secondly, the level of air defense capable of suppressing our KR from strategists is ... well, there isn’t one :))) The United States, if they want, can cover such an island, but then it will be a completely different conflict.
          What you are talking about is decided by sending a fleet combat group (preferably aircraft carrier) and strategic aviation without any nuclear weapons
          1. bald
            bald 23 January 2019 09: 32 New
            0
            Good. And simply, even as a development, a novelty - after all, will it find application, or under the cloth? That would then come to its senses after N years. Although it will be very soon. We are developing the ocean more and more. Okay, Andrey, we will remain with our opinions, and the article is good.
  • Jerk
    Jerk 23 January 2019 07: 43 New
    0
    As I understand it, Vanguard, and to a large extent Poseidon, is not an answer to the "American missile defense". And the answer to a very bad trend, which is quite realistically promoted - and very consistently - by the United States for quite some time. Namely, the transition to a TACTICAL nuclear weapons and, moreover, the legitimization of its use in any LOCAL conflict. To which the Russian Federation thoughtfully fiddled with a finger and asked, and for tactical nuclear weapons with a cruise missile flying from the south to the Hoover Dam, what shall we say? Is it purely tactical, not strategic? And silence was his answer (s)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 08: 23 New
      +2
      Quote: Jerk
      Namely - on the transition to TACTICAL NW

      The United States does not and never will. By the way, the Russian Federation has a great advantage in tactical nuclear weapons
      1. Jerk
        Jerk 23 January 2019 09: 07 New
        0
        What was previously completely leveled by the possibility of delivery, as I understand it. There are strategic ones, but with tactical ones ... We don’t measure ourselves with the USA, therefore a strike with tactics BEFORE the Vanguard could well be unpunished - WE can not move the Caliber launch platform to the US shores. But to catch God knows where the dangling KR with poison - the United States is unlikely to be able to. A blow to the Hoover Dam - for a minute, it’s 50 million blind men at once, which is clearly unacceptable
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 January 2019 09: 28 New
          +1
          Quote: Jerk
          What was previously completely leveled by the possibility of delivery, as I understand it.

          No, TNW simply has its own tasks.
          Quote: Jerk
          but with tactical ones ... We don’t measure ourselves with the USA, therefore a strike with tactics BEFORE the Vanguard could well be unpunished

          I couldn’t. You look at these things in a strange way, assuming that some limited TNW war is possible. This is impossible, any nuclear attack on the territory of the Russian Federation or the USA is the beginning of Armageddon.
          Well, for example, we recorded a massive launch of the Tomahawks. Do you seriously think that someone will wait and calculate - is there any nuclear weapons on them? Do they fly towards our ICBMs? No one will be.
          Quote: Jerk
          And a blow to the Hoover Dam - for a moment, 50 million blind men at once, which is clearly unacceptable

          Why fantasize what 50 million there? The volume of the reservoir is 35 cubic kilometers, slightly less than nothing
          1. Jerk
            Jerk 23 January 2019 09: 34 New
            0
            But why. The strike by the strategist is clearly armageddon, which is logical if only because the response will be launched BEFORE they find out exactly where the warhead is plunging ... And TNW, what exactly the USA promoted especially in recent years, so three seemingly do not differ in principle from a very powerful bomb ... Such a local conflict ... Scope ... Well, for example, Zapolskis outlined - provoke an attack by China on Taiwan, which seems to be China too, the United States could defeat China ... And the booming Chinese - boom! It is doubtful that strategists will fly in response. And we have the same point - Transnistria. AND?
            According to Hoover, I didn’t think for myself, it was National Interest who estimated that up to 50 million live in a risk zone
          2. vvvjak
            vvvjak 23 January 2019 10: 10 New
            -1
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Well, for example, we recorded a massive launch of the Tomahawks. Do you seriously think that someone will wait and calculate - is there any nuclear weapons on them?

            And if in Syria? You seriously think that the Russian Federation will deliver a global nuclear strike because of this. But to drown the “Poseidon” AUG itself.
            1. Ivanchester
              Ivanchester 23 January 2019 16: 14 New
              +2
              And how can the “Poseidon” generally be guided to AUG, and still so that its carrier remains abroad PLO AUG?
    2. Town Hall
      Town Hall 23 January 2019 18: 31 New
      -2
      As I understand it, Vanguard, and to a large extent Poseidon, is not an answer to the "American missile defense"




      Vanguards, Poseidons and other Dagger-fiction, the answer is not to the American missile defense ... but to the deafening failure of all the more "mundane" projects - Su-57, Armata, destroyers, etc., etc. Since the evidence of failures
      it became difficult to deny, the next batch of projections was thrown in to distract the attention of people. But this time a sphere was chosen where you can feed everyone with "secrecy", faith in words and cartoons for a long time
    3. Sasha_rulevoy
      Sasha_rulevoy 23 January 2019 21: 21 New
      0
      a trend that is quite realistically promoted - and very consistently - by the United States for quite some time. Namely - on the transition to TACTICAL NW


      In fact, the Americans unilaterally abandoned tactical nuclear weapons. There was only a symbolic number of B61 bombs left, and that was only because, according to the NATO charter, if there was a big war, the Americans were obliged to transfer these bombs to the arsenal of Germany, Italy and Belgium with the Netherlands. And the British refused TNW. And the French.
      1. Jerk
        Jerk 23 January 2019 22: 12 New
        +1
        In fact, the Americans unilaterally abandoned tactical nuclear weapons.

        Learn to lie already! Tired of ... What does ALL air bombs belong to, for example, located at bases in Europe, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Italy, and it seems like in Turkey ?!
        The total production volume of all modifications of the B61 is approximately 3155 items, of which about 150 strategic bombs, about 400 non-strategic munitions are in service, and about 200 non-strategic bombs are kept in reserve

        PiSi: to the previous speaker - you will inform the Pentagon that there is no Vanguard, there is no Poseidon, there is no bridge, and there is no Crimea either. But for some reason the Pentagon doesn’t consider this to be fables ...
        1. Sasha_rulevoy
          Sasha_rulevoy 23 January 2019 23: 26 New
          0
          Looks like I discovered America for you.

          about 150 strategic bombs, about 400 non-strategic munitions are in service, and another 200 non-strategic bombs are in reserve


          Something like this.

          400 pieces of non-strategic ammunition are, to be precise, disassembled nuclear ASROKs and anti-aircraft missiles taken into pieces. And these 150 B-61 bombs, which are on duty (and which neither the Germans, nor Italians, nor others can do anything for, will have time for all this: to reach the warehouses, load them in trucks, and onto airfields, and there to the antediluvian " “Tornadoes” should be hooked, because first you still have to ask Americans for permission), Russia has 2000 tactical warheads on combat duty: not only bombs, but also air-to-ground missiles, OTR, SAM and anti-ship. And another 6000 (some estimates of 7000) are put in reserve, i.e. in central storage. Against the American two hundred.
          1. Jerk
            Jerk 24 January 2019 03: 14 New
            0
            What the hell is America ?! What, nafig, to "ask the Americans" if these bombs are ON ARMED (that is, the United States "unilaterally refused" - it’s a lie) the US Army (!) Is not the BASIS of the USA (!!!) And there are delivery vehicles there . including American for them, and in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States regularly arranges for pilots of nuclear-weapon-free quotation marks in Germany to use these nuclear weapons ...
            And generally speaking:
            Recently, the Western press, and then in the domestic media space, has intensified discussion of the seemingly long-closed issue of the degree of danger of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). In particular, in the United States Pentagon officials even launched into circulation the term "nuclear weapons of reduced power" as a necessary tool for America to contain the allegedly growing aggressiveness of Russia in the international arena. The fact that this is no longer just the initiative of individual media is evidenced by the fact that the issue was raised for discussion at the Conference on Disarmament, held on February 28, 2018 in Geneva.

            Who has refused what there? Huh? I can not hear? We look at WIPEDIA even supervised by the Department of State:
            The most popular tactical carrier is the F-16 fighter-bomber with a range of 930 km, equipped with one B61 aerial bomb.

            PiSi: and what anyone has in reserve, so here's the FACT: the USA stupidly does not have the technology for disposing of weapons-grade plutonium, i.e. in fact, not a single warhead has been disposed of by them in principle, and the supposedly mothballed ones are quite combat ready, that is, they can be brought back to life at any time. The truth is in theory, because with the plutonium resuscitation technologies they also have a shit, curved arms are too banderlogs, it’s not for you to launch white light
            1. Sasha_rulevoy
              Sasha_rulevoy 24 January 2019 17: 39 New
              -1
              stupidly does not have weapons plutonium disposal technology


              They have the technology, but there is no factory for mass disposal. Therefore, plutonium removed from the bombs was taken to Russia. To Russia stupidly buried it. And Putin wouldn’t refuse in 2014, and now they would still be lucky (despite all the sanctions). Tell Putin the idea, even if he agrees and collects B61-e on the best and highest quality plutonium.

              not a single warhead is disposed of


              A warhead is not equal to a piece of plutonium, agree?

              Who has refused what there? Huh?


              And where did “Lance”, “SREM”, “Tomahawks”, B-81 bombs, artillery ammunition, minefields, go? There were tens of thousands of tactical ammunition at the beginning of the 90s, 150 remained. Is this not disarmament? You will also be curious to know that these 150 B-61 bombs are included in the START treaty. That is, holding 150 bombs in Europe that are useless and useless there, Americans are depriving themselves of the right to have an additional 150 AGM-86B cruise missiles, or 150 warheads from ICBMs.
              1. The comment was deleted.
                1. The comment was deleted.
                  1. The comment was deleted.
              2. Soho
                Soho 25 January 2019 09: 08 New
                0
                And where did “Lance”, “SREM”, “Tomahawks”, B-81 bombs, artillery ammunition, minefields, go? There were tens of thousands of tactical ammunition at the beginning of the 90s, 150 remained. Is this not disarmament?

                Do not pull the owl on the globe. The reduction of armaments is not "voluntarily unilaterally refused", as you are rubbing us here.
                Sasha_ steering (Sasha_ steering) January 23, 2019 21:21
                In fact, the Americans unilaterally abandoned tactical nuclear weapons.
  • The comment was deleted.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 08: 58 New
      0
      Not serious
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. Alexander Galaktionov
        Alexander Galaktionov 23 January 2019 09: 13 New
        0
        Andrew add video
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Operator
    Operator 23 January 2019 09: 18 New
    -11
    Another Russophobic article "from Chelyabinsk."
  • vvvjak
    vvvjak 23 January 2019 10: 02 New
    0
    Very interesting article, offset. 90 percent coincides with the picture formed in my "head" on the basis of all sorts of different programs and articles. As for the "Petrels" and "Poseidons" - so what, let them be afraid. Yet things are more real than Reagan's SDI. If the United States begins to spend (at the same time and "cut") money to neutralize these threats, the result is already. And a clear counterweight is emerging for the US program of limited tactical nuclear strike.
  • BAI
    BAI 23 January 2019 10: 28 New
    -2
    With tenacity worthy of better use, again kicking Poseidon. All fools, the author is a genius.
    About the uselessness of Poseidon. Suppose I don’t understand anything in military affairs (let’s forget 20 years, we think they aren’t) and look at things from the point of view of simple mathematics. And what do I see?
    The first one. The probability of hitting the target (PROBABILITY rather than defeat - this is very important) is a certain functional of three components: The probability of delivering nuclear weapons to the target (i.e. overcoming missile defense, anti-aircraft defense, air defense), the probability of hitting the target (i.e. carrier characteristics) and enough power to destroy the target (characteristics of nuclear weapons). You can consider something else, but to simplify the problem, we restrict ourselves to these three parameters. Let's consider them in more detail, but again in a simplified version.
    The probability of delivery. To do this, you need to know the characteristics of missile defense, anti-aircraft defense, air defense and media characteristics. To calculate this parameter, it will be necessary to involve scouts, media developers, and (here the PROBABILITY value is discussed, as mentioned above) not combat officers of the Strategic Rocket Forces, VKS and Navy, but the corresponding types of Central Research Institute of the Russian Defense Ministry - there will be a MODEL of overcoming the enemy defense. The probability of hitting the target - you need the characteristics of the target and carrier. Intelligence, media developers, and specific Central Research Institute are involved - again modeling. Defeat of the target - we need intelligence, the developers of nuclear weapons and the Central Research Institute of Nuclear Forces (whose day we celebrate in September) - again, modeling. Based on these data, the General Staff calculates the outfit of forces and means to defeat targets - again, modeling with the help of the corresponding Central Research Institute. The military-political leadership is superimposed on all this - the corresponding department (s) of the military-industrial complex. Those. the author claims that five Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, intelligence, the General Staff, developers and the military-industrial complex are suckers who do not understand anything and are sawing money? Rather, the author, to put it mildly, is not competent.
    The second one. Who told the author that Poseidons will be used against the United States? Suppose, because of the Kuril Islands, we have a military conflict with Japan. What can we oppose it in the Far East? Especially the Pacific Fleet is a special question for the author, as a specialist in the field of fleet. And then Poseidon comes up on stage. What will happen to Japan? In my opinion, the situation is radically changing (this, by the way, applies to China). Further. What happens if Poseidon is delivered to Khmeimim? Will we take all of Southern Europe for Faberge? Warm greetings to France, Italy? You can consider applications in other seas, but against Europe.
    Therefore, at the expense of the need, not the need for Poseidon, I somehow see the situation.
    1. Winnie76
      Winnie76 23 January 2019 12: 29 New
      +1
      The author himself cited the crazy expenses for providing missile defense. Fending off Poseidon’s threat will require no less cost, especially considering the nuclear power plant, diving depth, and crazy speed. Try to find it at a depth of 1000 meters, and then drown 50 nodal torpedo 100 nodal object.
      1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        23 January 2019 15: 08 New
        +3
        Quote: Winnie76
        Parrying Poseidon's threat will require no less expense

        Much smaller, this was stated in the comments to the new articles.
        1. Winnie76
          Winnie76 23 January 2019 15: 26 New
          -2
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Much smaller, this was stated in the comments to the new articles.

          OK. Be your way. You will not mind that deploying 30 Poseidons to Krati is cheaper than defending against them
          1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
            23 January 2019 15: 37 New
            +4
            Quote: Winnie76
            OK. Be your way. You will not mind that deploying 30 Poseidons to Krati is cheaper than defending against them

            Yes, I'm not sure, to be honest. Moreover, protection from Poseidons is also protection against our nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, and protection against ICBMs ... this is only protection against ICBMs
            1. Winnie76
              Winnie76 23 January 2019 15: 52 New
              0
              Pl of Argentina searched the whole world, roughly knowing the coordinates. Found in a year. Find in 10 times a smaller target, in addition moving around the vast oceans. Utopia
              1. arturpraetor
                arturpraetor 23 January 2019 15: 58 New
                +3
                Quote: Winnie76
                Pl of Argentina searched the whole world, roughly knowing the coordinates. Found in a year. Find in 10 times a smaller target, in addition moving around the vast oceans. Utopia

                You yourself somehow strange imagine the issue of detecting nuclear submarines. In your opinion, a "dead" target that does not move, does not make any sounds, is it easier to find than a Poseidon moving and roaring in half the ocean? Do you think a moving target is less noticeable in an aquatic environment?
                1. Winnie76
                  Winnie76 23 January 2019 20: 29 New
                  -1
                  Quote: arturpraetor
                  You yourself somehow strange imagine the issue of detecting nuclear submarines. In your opinion, is it easier to find a "dead" target that does not move, makes no sounds, than a Poseidon moving and roaring into the half ocean?

                  Why did you decide that Poseidon would roar at cruising speed? 100 nodes will be IMHO when exiting to the finish line and apart from the attacking torpedo.
                  The fact is that when you search for a fixed target, you can calmly and consistently check each square. In the case of a moving target, checking a certain square there is no guarantee. After some time, you will have to check again.
                  1. arturpraetor
                    arturpraetor 23 January 2019 20: 46 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Winnie76
                    Why did you decide that Poseidon would roar at cruising speed? 100 nodes will be IMHO when exiting to the finish line and apart from the attacking torpedo.

                    The fact of the matter is that this is your IMHO. And the point now is not even about cruising speed, but that a moving underwater body a priori can in no way be quieter than a static one, like a sunken submarine.
                    Quote: Winnie76
                    The fact is that when you search for a fixed target, you can calmly and consistently check each square.

                    ... spending a lot of time on this, while there is no guarantee that the static object at the bottom will be what you are looking for, and not a cunning rock form.

                    But in general, I don’t want to develop this topic, because there’s a lot to do - the snow pours and continues, the work of the snowplow is already a little pinned, and my nerves are at the limit.
                    1. bk316
                      bk316 24 January 2019 16: 56 New
                      -1
                      in no way can be quieter than static, like a sunken submarine

                      Right a priori? But what about the currents? Careful need .....
              2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                23 January 2019 19: 13 New
                +3
                Quote: Winnie76
                Pl of Argentina searched the whole world, roughly knowing the coordinates

                Just NOT knowing the coordinates. Not to mention the fact that by the time of the search the ship had rested at the bottom with the whole crew and, of course, made no noise
                1. Winnie76
                  Winnie76 23 January 2019 20: 39 New
                  -1
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Just NOT knowing the coordinates.

                  Do you think the adversary will know the coordinates of Poseidon? A year in search is a good time.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Not to mention the fact that by the time of the search the ship had rested at the bottom with the whole crew and, of course, made no noise

                  Of course, he made no noise, but he did not move. And when searching for a moving target, you will have to repeatedly examine the same squares. And the ocean, it’s big ...
                  1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
                    23 January 2019 23: 59 New
                    +2
                    Quote: Winnie76
                    Do you think the adversary will know the coordinates of Poseidon?

                    Naturally. Potential goals are all wrong - they have to look for
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 15: 05 New
      +3
      Quote: BAI
      Those. the author claims that the five Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, intelligence, the General Staff, developers and defense industry are suckers who do not understand anything and are sawing money? Rather, the author, to put it mildly, is not competent.

      You have now drawn some ideal picture from a sphere of spherical vacuum. Alas, often in the modern RF, the order of military equipment occurs completely differently, and it, this technique is in no way justified by any calculations and calculations.
      Quote: BAI
      The second one. Who told the author that Poseidons will be used against the United States? Suppose, because of the Kuril Islands, we have a military conflict with Japan. What can we oppose it in the Far East?

      If we are going to “persuade” Japan nuclear weapons, then any of our strategic nuclear forces to choose from - all of them are the task of hitting the right place with the right probability and power. Poseidon is not needed for this at all.
      Quote: BAI
      Further. What happens if Poseidon is delivered to Khmeimim? Will we take all of Southern Europe for Faberge?

      Europe will not even notice. What difference does it make if they hit them - an ICBM or a torpedo?
      1. Ivanchester
        Ivanchester 23 January 2019 16: 24 New
        +1
        Europe will not even notice. What difference does it make if they hit them - an ICBM or a torpedo?

        Well, of course! The ICBMs are there in the distant cold Siberia, which may not exist at all - not at all scary. A "Poseidon" can boldly emerge right in front of the beaches of the Cote d'Azur and the Costa del Sol, terrifying the local and vacationing Europeans. So for Faberge, we take them so that it does not seem like it. True, I can hardly imagine why. But the apologists of "Poseidon" such a question, apparently, does not occur: (
        1. Sasha_rulevoy
          Sasha_rulevoy 23 January 2019 21: 54 New
          +1
          ICBMs are there in distant cold Siberia, which may not even exist at all - it’s not at all scary.


          The problem is solved by inviting the military attache of the respective state to the control panel at the time of the test firing. To notify everyone: today at h o'clock m minutes we’ll shoot from here and there. Turn on the radar, customize the ships to the borders, watch, watch. And you can bring the attache directly to Kamchatka to Kura. You see a circle with a diameter of one hundred meters. Measure with a tape measure. Make sure? Now we’ll move aside two hundred meters, and such a big piece of iron will fall there from space. A military specialist will quickly understand everything.
          1. Ivanchester
            Ivanchester 23 January 2019 22: 39 New
            +1
            So I’m writing about the same thing: why scare Southern Europe with “Poseidon”, if it should already be fluttering from our ICBMs? )
      2. BAI
        BAI 23 January 2019 16: 33 New
        0
        Alas, often in modern Russia, the order of military equipment is done completely differently, and it, this technique is in no way justified by any calculations and calculations.

        The order has already taken place, the equipment has already been developed. If it were useless, its combat use was not planned. If they had not planned to use it, they would not have developed it. From the experience of developing GPVs, I can say that they are very serious in predicting the development of military equipment.
        Europe will not even notice. What difference does it make if they hit them - an ICBM or a torpedo?

        Very big. How, then, to the States to explain the need for missile defense in Europe?
        If Poseidon is hung under the noses of Europe, it may well turn out that in the event of a military conflict, we will have an adversary not of the USA + NATO, but only the USA.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
          23 January 2019 19: 14 New
          +1
          Quote: BAI
          From the experience of developing GPVs, I can say that they are very serious in predicting the development of military equipment.

          Just from experience in the state defense order I can say the exact opposite
          Quote: BAI
          Very big. How, then, to the States to explain the need for missile defense in Europe?

          They never explained it to them as protection against our missiles.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 23 January 2019 12: 48 New
    +1
    Quote: Spade
    Until a fundamental decision is made on the deployment of interceptors in space. That will allow to shoot down missiles in the initial section of the trajectory. In combination with the first "disarming" strike, this can guarantee the destruction of Russia or China without any consequences.

    1. Interceptors from space will be able to bring down something if they are no worse than the "Death Star" from a familiar film. Kinetic orbital interceptors are not a smart idea. It is much easier to knock down OTP creatures back in the middle of the last century in the initial section, but so far no one succeeds.
    2. The first disarming strike is no better than interceptors in space. Look at how much Israel has succeeded in disarming Hezbollah and Hamas missiles with absolute air supremacy over very small launch areas. And UTB is orders of magnitude easier than disarming the ICBMs of Russia and China.
  • arturpraetor
    arturpraetor 23 January 2019 14: 02 New
    +2
    In other words, equipping American destroyers with such a radar will increase their cost by about half, and even the sizeless US military budget will do that.

    In fairness, it is worth noting that the Americans ate the dog on the complex interaction and development of network-centric control systems, so for SM-3 it is not necessary to issue target designation directly from the radar of the destroyer itself (unless, of course, the Americans have abandoned their concept, which is extremely doubtful), enough control from any ICBM detection system. Another question is how efficiently all this can work, and here, in fact, you yourself said everything: all these missile defense systems give the United States a chance to hit the vigorous loaves flying in them, but they do not guarantee full protection. At least for now.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 15: 05 New
      +2
      Quote: arturpraetor
      so for SM-3 it’s not necessary to give target designation directly from the radar of the destroyer itself

      True, but then everything is limited to GBMD radars
  • Decimam
    Decimam 23 January 2019 14: 23 New
    0
    While reading, I thought that Timokhin was the author. It turns out - Andrew from Chelyabinsk. This article is not characteristic of him. He, usually, meticulously understands the issue. Moreover, specializing in naval issues, the author is very well aware that the creation of new means of attack has always stimulated the creation of effective defenses. And then some kind of uryapatriotism comes through. Or did the general site epidemic overtake ?.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 15: 07 New
      +3
      Quote: Decimam
      And then some kind of uryapatriotism comes through.

      No urapatriotism. The United States has many things whose capabilities are below our understanding of them, and missile defense is one of them.
      1. 3x3zsave
        3x3zsave 23 January 2019 18: 08 New
        +1
        I think this is the case when experience is a criterion of truth, but the Lord did not bring it!
    2. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 23 January 2019 22: 13 New
      +2
      Quote: Decimam
      And then some kind of uryapatriotism comes through.

      In fact, the author reports what the Americans have been saying for thirty years (and that, as it were, is obvious to any sane person) - the missile defense system as it stands It is designed to intercept single ICBMs and intercept relatively mass (93 missiles during a Desert Storm) launches of the BRMD / BRRS at the theater level.
  • Avior
    Avior 23 January 2019 15: 38 New
    0
    There is a quite reasonable explanation for some absurdities and incomprehensions of the last time.
    It lies in the new US nuclear program, adopted last year and posted on the Pentagon website. There are conclusions in Russian, but the full report in "American" is much more informative.
    The motivation part indicates that the United States considers and proceeds from the fact that in Russia, due to the notorious weakness of Russian conventional weapons, a decision was made in the event of a war in Europe that Russia would lose, threaten at first, and, if necessary, deliver targeted attacks with tactical nuclear weapons with a limited number of victims, so that Europe will be scared before it leaves the war, while the United States will be afraid to get involved in a full-blown nuclear conflict.
    The States cannot answer Russia the same, because - thanks to Obama for a good deed - he destroyed the nuclear versions of the Tomahawks and the Americans with tactical weapons (they call it non-strategic nuclear weapons) had only free-falling bombs that would be suitable for striking the rear of the advancing troops, but not suitable for such retaliatory point strikes.
    Under this view, both the rejection of the mass production of Armat and Su-57, and the creation of a very limited and for the purposes of a global nuclear war, nothing changing the circulation of Daggers, Poseidons and other things are quite suitable.
    If, for example, in the port of Rotterdam palut Poseidon, then the effect will be heaps, and the victims, not so much.
    The Americans see a way out in the modernization of nuclear forces, both strategic and in the creation of a new inconspicuous cruise nuclear missile with a range greater than that of Tomahawk.
    And at the first stage, in creating a charge of adjustable power, so that the Americans can reciprocate Russia with the help of submarines. So far, the democrats are resisting, as far as I know, but this is a matter of time.
    1. Ivanchester
      Ivanchester 23 January 2019 16: 28 New
      +1
      If, for example, in the port of Rotterdam palut Poseidon, then the effect will be heaps, and the victims, not so much.

      And why it is impossible to "palnut" a cruise missile with a special CC to achieve the same effect?
      1. Avior
        Avior 23 January 2019 21: 47 New
        0
        can bring down.
        it’s just that all new weapons are being released in very small quantities - precisely for such point strikes
  • Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 23 January 2019 16: 27 New
    +4
    But, let's say, the American GBI is really capable of intercepting the “Satan” combat unit with a 50% probability. Accordingly, 8 interceptor missiles will be needed for 16 warheads.

    No-no-no, David Blaine - theorver doesn't work like that. smile
    With a 50% chance of hitting one warhead with one missile, the probability of hitting all 8 warheads with 16 anti-missiles will be less than 20%.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
      23 January 2019 19: 15 New
      +2
      Quote: Alexey RA
      theorver doesn't work like that.

      I agree :)))) But well, I was also given an accurate calculation according to probability theory? Simplified of course :))))
    2. bk316
      bk316 23 January 2019 19: 39 New
      0
      Of course it doesn’t work, moreover, the probability of hitting one block with two missiles is not 100% at all, but 75% belay
  • voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 23 January 2019 17: 07 New
    +3
    As for quantitative calculations: that's right. The US missile defense is still capable of intercepting single launches of ICBMs and only in certain directions. And it is able to cover single cities in California.
    As for quasi-heavy false targets: they learned to distinguish them from real cones in the chemical spectrum.
    As for maneuvering: it complicates the interception, but increases the possibility of miss warheads on the target - it can be carried away by powerful centrifugal forces. A simple ballistic trajectory is safer to hit.
    1. bk316
      bk316 23 January 2019 19: 41 New
      +3
      It depends on what to shoot, if for silos, then yes. But this is for a preemptive strike, and in response we will shoot at cities, why do we need empty silos? You’ll hardly miss the millionaire.
      1. Avior
        Avior 23 January 2019 21: 48 New
        -1
        there are six blocks replaced by one.
        six certainly wouldn’t be shot down and missed
    2. Cherry Nine
      Cherry Nine 23 January 2019 22: 40 New
      0
      Quote: voyaka uh
      As for quasi-heavy false targets: they learned to distinguish them from real cones in the chemical spectrum.

      Various kinds of enemies of Russia write that Vanguard and Poseidon (for example, they exist) are the greatest achievements of the CIA for the entire existence of this unhelpful organization.

      The vanguard must move in the atmosphere for a relatively long time, albeit sparse, solving for the enemy all the problems with the selection of false targets.

      Poseidon allows you to spend significant resources for Russia on the creation of weapons that threaten only a dozen well-protected harbors, not to mention the fact that the submarine nuclear weapon loses most of the damage factors relative to targets on land.
      1. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 24 January 2019 00: 29 New
        +2
        "Vanguard and Poseidon (for example, they exist) - these are the greatest achievements of the CIA" ////
        ----
        And if they don’t exist (they exist in the form of prototypes and everything will stop there) -
        this is GRU's biggest achievement. lol
  • Pythagoras
    Pythagoras 23 January 2019 17: 51 New
    0
    Good article.
    I wish the author would consider a mirror version. If the NATO bloc strikes first, how will we defend ourselves? Do we have 2000 km interceptors (like GBMD), how will we respond to false targets, how well is our alert system developed? Of course, no one will give exact data, but at least for a general idea.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 23 January 2019 19: 07 New
      +2
      Quote: Pythagoras
      I wish the author would consider a mirror version. If the NATO bloc strikes first, how will we defend ourselves?

      Only retaliatory strike.
      The only defense against a mass launch of an ICBM / SLBM is the inevitability of a retaliatory strike. There are no shields and armor - only a sword against a sword.
      1. garri-lin
        garri-lin 23 January 2019 21: 24 New
        0
        Nunemech against the sword and the sword against the grenade without checks. Rubanesh, the hand will open up and the explosion.
  • bk316
    bk316 23 January 2019 19: 29 New
    +2
    Thank you for the article. I agree with the conclusions in half.

    With regards to the petrel, this is so. It is the petrel in the “Putin six” that is the most amazing and most dubious product.
    Well, firstly, I doubt very much that there really is something flying, but the GDP didn’t say this, but said it was very streamlined. But the main thing is not that.
    Why do we need to
    - expensive, and this is inevitable, inside the reactor;
    - with a healthy EPR and someone doubts that the dimensions of the rocket (which means the EPR) will not be the same as in caliber;
    - theoretically unlimited range of action;
    How does this rocket fit into our doctrine?
    How much time and money will be needed to bring it to adoption?
    Or such a simple question: what is her combat readiness? Does she have a reactor that will be hot all the time? Or does someone think that the reactor can be started like a diesel, then stopped and restarted?
    I can go on like this for a long time.


    But with Poseidon, this is not so.
    Firstly, this is not a torpedo with special warheads — this is the first real unmanned submarine, that is, the future of the entire submarine fleet — we have to go this way.
    Secondly, Poseidons do not fall under START-3, which means do as much as you want.
    Thirdly, apparently he already is.
    Fourth, when the United States does not even deploy interceptors, but nuclear strike forces in orbit, our main (land) component of the strategic nuclear forces and, at the same time, your conclusions about the irresistibility of a retaliatory strike can be safely sent to the trash. Here it is very not bad to have a hundred Poseidons on the battlefield. And by then it is quite possible.
    Fifth, Poseidons are suitable both as a retaliatory strike weapon and as a preemptive strike weapon to destroy the sea and coastal missile defense components.
    Sixth, Poseidons are very suitable for the limited nuclear war that the United States is about to wage. The destruction of the AUG at a distance of 1000-2000 from our shores is a very solvable task.
    Finally, sixth, purely psychologically, Poseidon will restrain the ABM race, because on the argument that the United States will be able to intercept only 7% of our ICBMs there are counter-arguments
    - Well, let's first bring the result to 30%, and then we will deal the first blow with the destruction of the remaining 70%. Our answer AND THIS WILL NOT ALL HELP YOU ANYTHING, because POSEIDON. And that means you do not need missile defense.
    And here I can go on for a long time. bully
    1. garri-lin
      garri-lin 23 January 2019 21: 36 New
      +1
      Why is Poseidon regarded only as a shock? In fact, it is a deep-sea platform with an average payload. Intelligence service. Mining. Ambush. Mapping the bottom. And much more. By carriers. I think that the placement will be external. Conformal fairing on the sides of the ash. Two Poseidons behind the fairings. Control equipment inside the boat. Ready media. I think that is exactly what those several carriers will appear about the uselessness of which they recently said. This is quite suitable for scouts and purely strike options.
      For multifunctionals, everything is more complicated. Special boats are needed there. But they also need less.
    2. Avior
      Avior 23 January 2019 21: 51 New
      0
      SNV-3 action will end soon.
      and Trump has already raised the issue of taking into account all nuclear charges and weapons when signing the next, and not just strategic ones.
      an unmanned submarine with such a range and complexity of the route requires a huge amount of testing the possibility of creating such an "autopilot" in principle.
      have you heard of them?
  • Kostadinov
    Kostadinov 24 January 2019 12: 28 New
    +1
    Quote: voyaka uh
    As for quasi-heavy false targets: they learned to distinguish them from real cones in the chemical spectrum.
    As for maneuvering: it complicates the interception, but increases the possibility of miss warheads on the target - it can be carried away by powerful centrifugal forces. A simple ballistic trajectory is safer to hit.

    1. Chem. the spectrum can not be imitated? What do you think?
    2. In place of quasi-heavy false targets, real non-nuclear, low-focus kinetic warheads can be hit. Do you think they will still find it easier to get into it - for example, in a missile defense radar than an interceptor can get into this very warhead?
    3. Or a heavy ICBM warhead will be divided into several hundred kinetic submunitions, for your missile defense radar and they will not maneuver and centrifugal forces will not carry them away.
  • Mooh
    Mooh 24 January 2019 12: 51 New
    0
    Here I applaud with arms and legs. Weighed, thought out, logical. Without references to experts with a dubious reputation and self-determination of dubious axioms :)
    For complete happiness and 100% agreement with a respected author, I ask myself two questions: How much are the programs that are not liked by the author,
    and do they not have a double bottom, when under the guise of one, the secret of the other is developed?
    Both programs are based on an ultra compact nuclear reactor, characteristics unknown to the general public. Perhaps its creation and application on a dap or orbital / underwater platform instantly pays off both programs?
    Or Poseidon, suddenly not a dumb torpedo, but a reconnaissance and sabotage assault rifle of a wide profile?