"Standard" battleships of the USA, Germany and England. American "Pennsylvania"
And now, finally, we proceed to the description of the American "standard" battleships. As mentioned earlier, for comparison with the British "Rivendzhi" and German "Bayernami" were selected American battleships of the type "Pennsylvania" - mainly due to the fact that the ships of all three of these types were laid almost simultaneously, in 1913, that is, they were designed and created at the same time. In addition, despite the fact that the first “standard” American battleship is considered “Nevada”, it, so to speak, was still “version-light”. Despite the fact that "Nevada" had all the signs of a "standard" US battleship, that is, boilers for oil heating, an all-or-nothing booking scheme and the use of three-gun towers (which the Americans had to refuse only on the Maryland, because they used they are already on the 356-mm, and 406-mm guns), it was significantly smaller than the "Pennsylvania" (about 4 000 t) and less armed. The next series of battleships, although they were larger than the "Pennsylvania", but very slightly and, up to the "Maryland", carried weapons of similar composition.
History designing battleships like "Pennsylvania" is very simple. Despite the fact that the first American battleships that received 356-mm artillery were two ships of the "New York" type, the other constructive solutions did not shine with novelty at all. Then the Americans began to design truly revolutionary battleships of the “Nevada” type, but, unfortunately, the flight of design ideas turned out to be pretty slowed down by financial constraints, which boiled down to the following: the newest ships should be “shoved” into the displacement of the previous type “New York”.
The fact was that the creation of the American linear, and not only linear fleet strongly depended on the political situation in Congress and on the current attitude of the presidential administration towards shipbuilding programs. The fleet wanted to lay 2 battleships annually, but at the same time there were several years when funds were allocated only for one ship of this class. But even in cases when Congress sought funds for the laying of two ships, he could insist on limiting their cost, and in this regard, American sailors and shipbuilders were probably in worse conditions than, for example, the Germans with their “maritime law” .
So in the case of the Nevada, admirals and designers had to make known sacrifices - for example, the number of 356-mm guns had to be reduced from 12 to 10 guns. Some even suggested to leave all 8 of such guns, but the idea to build the newest battleships weaker than the ships of the previous series did not find a positive response at all, even though the displacement saved was proposed to be used to enhance protection. In addition, the speed had to be reduced from the initial 21 knots. to 20,5 knots.
So, when it came time to design the next series of super dreadnoughts, which eventually became the “Pennsylvania” type battleships, the American lawmakers “became generous”, making it possible to increase the cost of building new ships from 6 to 7,5 million dollars. Why did the word “get generous” be quoted? Is it a question of 25-percent increase in funding? The fact is that, firstly, in fact, the cost of building Nevada and Oklahoma cost 13 645 360 dollars, or more than 6,8 million dollars per ship. However, the actual cost of the construction of "Pennsylvania" also exceeded the planned figure, amounting to approximately 8 million dollars. And secondly, the fact is that this is the cost of construction without taking into account armor and armament: for two battleships of the "Nevada" type these items were 9 304 286 dollars. In other words, the total cost of Nevada was 11 401 073, 04 dollars, and “Oklahoma - even more, 11 548 573,28 dollars and permission to design and build“ Pennsylvania ”on 1,5 million. dollars more expensive was just about 13-pr percentage increase in the total cost of the ship.
I must say that with this money the Americans managed to achieve quite a lot - in general, the Pennsylvania type battleships looked more powerful and harmonious than the ships of the previous type. This is not surprising: in fact, the main characteristics of "Pennsylvania" - 12 * 356-mm guns, speed 21 knots. and protection at the “Nevada” level are all that the admirals wanted to see in the project of battleships of the “Nevada” type, but they had to be partially abandoned in order to “shove” the battleships into the required displacement and cost estimate.
Design
We will not describe in detail the ups and downs of this stage in the creation of Pennsylvania type battleships, since they will be more appropriate in the relevant sections on artillery, armor protection and the power plant of the ship. Let us dwell only on a couple of interesting facts of a general nature.
The US Navy had a real risk of getting two more Nevads instead of Pennsylvania. The fact is that the General Council formulated its requirements for the 1913 “9 battleship” on June 1911, just when the Nevada project was almost ready. It is not surprising that the Design and Repair Bureau, which was responsible for the design work, had a considerable temptation to “sell” the newly made project again. They even summed up a tactical justification: after all, the General Council itself was pursuing a line on the construction of battleships by squadrons on the 4 ship, so what's the wise? We take a ready-made project, finish it a little bit here, darn there, and ...
But the General Council judged perfectly sensibly - there is no point, having obtained expanded financial opportunities, to build two more Nevada, with all their weak points resulting from financial compromise. At the same time, the battleships of the requirements declared by the General Council (12 * 356-mm, 22 * 127-mm, 21 knot) are quite capable of making a tactical four with Nevada, although they will be somewhat stronger and more perfect than the latter.
When the design of "Pennsylvania" was already in full swing, the General Council went to Congress with a proposal to build in the financial 1913, already four such battleships. History is silent about whether it was really serious intention, or just responsible persons, inspired by the proverb “You want a lot, you get a little”, seriously counted only on the 2 battleship, leaving the field for trade with congressmen. The fact is that such vast appetites were deemed excessive, but most of all the 1913 program was knocked down by the notorious Senator Tillman, who wondered: why spend a lot of money on a series of gradually improving ships? Let's better get down to the design and construction of the most powerful terminal battleships, which will be impossible to create more and more at the current technological level. According to Tillman, the logic of the development of naval armaments will still lead other countries to build such battleships, which, of course, will immediately obsolete all previous ones, and if so, why wait? In general, the points of view turned out to be too contradictory, the congressmen didn’t have a common understanding of the future linear forces, the ball reigned in doubt, and as a result, in 1913, the USA laid only one ship, the “Pennsylvania”, and its “sistership” (strictly speaking, then it was necessary to write "her") "Arizona" was laid only in the following, 1914.
It is interesting, although it does not relate to the topic of the article, that in the United States with the filing of Tillman did indeed conduct the relevant research. Parameters of the “ultimate” battleship amazed: 80 000 t, 297 m length, speed around 25 knots, armor in 482 mm, main caliber of 15 (!) 457-mm guns in five three-gun turrets or 24 * 406-mm in four six-gun ! However, the first estimations showed that the cost of one such ship would be no less than 50 million dollars, that is, about the same as the division of the 4 battleships of the “Pennsylvania” type, so that the studies on this topic were discontinued (although they resumed later ).
Artillery
The main caliber of the “Pennsylvania” type battleships, without a doubt, was the strangest spectacle among all the heavy marine installations of the world.
“Pennsylvania” and “Arizona” armed themselves with 356-mm / 45 guns (true caliber - 355,6-mm) modifications of the Mk ... but which ones, perhaps, the Americans themselves may not remember, at least it was not possible to find exact data in the Russian-language literature . The fact is that these instruments were placed on US battleships starting from New York and modified a great number of times: there were 12 basic modifications of this gun, but they had other “inside” - they were designated from Mk 1 / 0 to Mk 12 / 10. At the same time, the differences between them were usually quite insignificant, with perhaps two exceptions. One of them concerned the initial series: the fact is that the very first 356-mm / 45 cannons were not lined, but then, of course, they got a liner. The second was made after the First World War and was to increase the charging chamber, so that the gun was able to shoot a heavier projectile with a higher initial speed. At the same time, in the majority of modifications (but still not in all) the ballistics of the guns remained identical, often the whole “modification” was that the gun received a generally identical liner with a slightly modified manufacturing technology, and as the liners were replaced the gun “changed” its modification. Also, the appearance of new modifications could be caused by upgrading, or simply replacing the gun that was shot completely, but I must say that, especially in the 20-30 years of the last century, the Americans were chasing their commanders rather intensively. And so it turned out that for the American battleships it was the norm to have the guns of several modifications on one ship at the same time. So, on the "Oklahoma" at the time of her death there were two guns Mk 8 / 0; five - Mk 9 / 0; one is the Mk 9 / 2 and two more Mk 10 / 0.
At the same time, as we said above, the ballistic qualities of modifications with rare exceptions remained unchanged. Nevertheless, the Americans did not shun to put guns with different ballistics on one ship - it was believed that small deviations were fully capable of compensating for the fire control system. The idea, frankly, is highly dubious, and, presumably, this was not widely practiced.
In general, on the one hand, the update of the main caliber of US battleships looks more or less logical, but due to its complexity, it is unclear what guns of modification the “Pennsylvania” and “Arizona” received when they entered service. It also creates a certain uncertainty in their performance characteristics, because, as a rule, the relevant data in the sources are given for modifications of the Mk 8 or Mk 12 - apparently, earlier models were on the battleships of the “Pennsylvania” type.
Usually, for 356-mm / 45 guns of American battleships the following data is given: before 1923, when the next modification increased the camera, allowing you to shoot more heavy charge, they were designed to fire 635 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 792 m / s. At an elevation angle in 15 hail. shot range was 21,7 km or 117 cables. In subsequent modifications (1923 and later), the same guns were able to shoot the newest, heavier projectile weighing 680 kg with the same initial speed, or, using the old 635 kg projectile, increase its initial velocity to 823 m / s.
Why do we need to describe in detail the situation with post-war modifications, because we obviously will not take them into account when comparing battleships? This is necessary in order to the dear reader, in case he suddenly comes across some calculations of the armor penetration of these 356-mm / 45 American guns, remembers that they can be made for a later, enhanced modification. So, for example, we can see the calculations given in the book by AV Mandel.
Thus, we see that the American gun “mastered” 60 mm armor on the (rounded) 366 cable and the 70 mm cable on the 336 cable. This is clearly more modest than the British 381-mm gun, on the tests of the 350 mm frontal penetrated armor plate of the German Baden tower at a distance of 77,5 cab, but in a footnote to the table it is indicated that the given data were considered for 680 kg of projectile. Which obviously means that the 635 kg indicators of the projectile are even more modest. However, let's not get ahead of ourselves - we will do a comparison of the artillery of the battleships of Germany, England and the USA later.
Ammunition of the Pennsylvania-type battleships made up 100 projectiles per barrel, it included ... exactly 100 armor-piercing projectiles. The American admirals for a long time were convinced that their battleships were designed for one single task: crushing their own kind at the extreme distances of a battle. In their opinion, an armor-piercing projectile was best suited for this purpose, and if so, then why litter the cellars of the battleships with ammunition of other types? In general, high-explosive shells on “standard” 356-mm US battleships appeared only by 1942, and there is no point in looking at them in this series of articles.
As for the 635 kg of armor-piercing projectile, it was completed with 13,4 kg of explosive, namely dannit, later name: Explosive D. This explosive is based on ammonium picrate (not to be confused with picric acid, which became the basis for the famous Japanese shimoza, or liddite, melinita, etc.). In general, this American explosive had a slightly lower potential compared to trinitrotoluene (the TNT equivalent of TNT), but was much calmer and less prone to spontaneous explosion than shimosis. The author of this article, alas, could not figure out whether there was any fundamental difference between the early versions of dannita and the later “D explosion”, which were equipped with 0,95 kg shells: probably, if they were, then it is extremely small.
Interesting fact: the later 680 kg projectile contained only 10,2 kg of explosives, that is, even less than it was in 635 kg. In general, it should be noted that the Americans in their shells apparently "invested" primarily in armor penetration, having increased the walls to the utmost possibility, and, accordingly, the strength of the munition, while sacrificing a mass of explosive. Even in the “mighty” 635 kg projectile, the amount of explosives corresponded, rather to its 305-mm “brethren”: it is enough to recall that the 405,5 kg armored-piercing projectile of the German 305-mm / 50 gun carried 11,5 kg of explosives, and the Russian 470,9 kg of similar-purpose ammunition - 12,95 kg However, in fairness, we note that the British 343-mm “greenboy”, being a full-fledged armor-piercing projectile and having a mass similar to the American fourteen-inch projectile (639,6 kg), was slightly higher than the latter in terms of explosive content — it contained 15 kg of shellite.
American 356-mm / 45 guns withstood 250 shots 635 kg projectile with an initial speed 792 m / s. Not amazing, but not a bad indicator.
In terms of their design, the 356-mm / 45 artillery systems represented, so to speak, a kind of intermediate option between the German and British approaches. The barrel was a bonded construction, like the Germans, but the lock was used by a piston, like the British: the latter was to a certain extent dictated by the fact that the piston, opening downward shutter was probably the most optimal solution in a close three-gun turret. Of course, the use of advanced technology gave the Americans a good gain in the mass of the gun. Japanese 356-mm guns of the battleship "Fuso", which had a wire barrel design and approximately equal muzzle energy, weighed 86 tons, against 64,6 tons of the American artillery system.
In general, the following can be said about the American 356-mm / 45 gun. For its time, and the first model of this gun was created in 1910, it was a very sophisticated and competitive artillery system, definitely one of the best naval guns in the world. It was in no way inferior to the British 343-356-mm cannons made in England for Japan, and exceeded in some ways. But with all this, the potential capabilities of this weapon were largely limited to the only type of ammunition - an armor-piercing projectile, which, moreover, had a relatively small amount of explosives. And, of course, with all its merits, the 356-mm / 45 gun couldn’t compete with the newest 380-381-mm artillery systems.
On the other hand, the Americans on the Pennsylvania-type battleships managed to place a dozen 356-mm / 45, while the ships of the Rivend and Bayern types carried only 8 main-caliber guns. In order to arm the battleship with such a number of trunks, while not extending its stronghold excessively, the American designers used three-gun towers, the construction of which ... well, first things first.
For the first time such towers were used on battleships of the "Nevada" type: forced to "tamp down" the ship into the displacement of the previous "New York", the Americans were very eager to reduce the size and weight of the three-gun towers, if possible, bringing them closer to the two-guns. Well, the Americans achieved their goal: the geometric dimensions of the towers differed little, for example, the inner diameter of the barbat of the Nevada two-gun turret was 8,53 m, and the three-arm one - 9,14 m, and the weight of the rotating part - 628 and 760, respectively. And this, as it turned out , there was still no limit: the Pennsylvania-type battleships received towers, albeit of a similar construction, but even smaller in size, their mass was 736 t, and the inner diameter of the barbet was reduced to 8,84 m. But at what price was it achieved?
The American two-gun turrets had a classical scheme in which each gun was in a separate cradle and equipped with its own set of mechanisms that ensured the delivery of projectiles and charges. In this regard, the US two-tower towers were quite similar to the installations of England and Germany. But for the miniaturization of three-gun towers, American designers had to place all three guns in one cradle and confine themselves to two projectile and charging lifts for three guns!
Interestingly, most sources indicate that there were still three charging lifts, so only shells suffered, but judging by the detailed (but alas, not always clear) description of the tower design given by V.N. Chausov in his monograph "Battleships" Oklahoma "and" Nevada "", this is still not the case. That is, each American tower actually had two projectile and three charging lifts, but the fact is that one of the last delivered charges from the cellars only to the reloading compartment, and from there two other charging lifts delivered the charges to the guns. However, apparently, a single lift to the transshipment compartment did not create a bottleneck - it was a chain, and probably coped well with its task. But here, in the tower itself, only extreme guns (the first and the third) were provided with shell and charging lifts, the average of its own lifts did not have - neither charging nor projectile.
The Americans claim that “with the proper preparation of calculations,” the three-gun turret can, in principle, develop the same rate of fire as the two-gun, but it is very difficult to believe. The technological flaw described above does not allow to expect a similar result with equal preparation of calculations for two- and three-gun towers. In other words, if the calculation of the two-gun turret is trained regularly, and the three-gun one is moreover driven into the tail and into the mane day and night, then maybe they will equal the rate of fire on the barrel. But this will be achieved solely through superior training, and if the same is given to the calculation of the two-gun tower?
Another extremely serious drawback of the American three-gun towers was the small mechanization of their processes. The guns of the main caliber of the battleships of England, Germany and many other countries had fully mechanized loading, that is, the projectile, and the charges, after feeding and to the guns, were fed into them by means of mechanical rammers. But not the Americans! Their rammer was used only when loading the projectile, but the charges were sent manually. How did this affect the rate of fire? Recall that the charge to 356-mm / 45 gun in those years was 165,6 kg, that is, for only one salvo, the calculation should have been moved by hand almost half a ton of gunpowder, and given the fact that the Americans claimed the rate of fire in 1,25-1,175 shots per minute. .. Of course, the loaders did not have to carry charges on their own backs, they had to be rolled from the elevator to a special table, and then, at the “zero” elevation angle of the gun, “push” the charges into the chamber with a special wooden stick-cleaner. In general, probably, 10 minutes at such a pace a physically prepared person could withstand, and then what?
We now return to the "excellent" decision to place all three guns in one cradle. In fact, the disadvantages of this design are greatly exaggerated and could be partially compensated by the organization of the shooting, taking into account this feature. What was the easier way to do it, using the cutting edge “ledge” or “double ledge” advanced at that time, but ... the problem is that the Americans didn’t do anything of the kind. And because of the shortcomings inherent in the “single-faced” scheme, they manifested themselves on their battleships in all their glory.
Strictly speaking, in addition to compactness, there is at least one more advantage - the axes of the guns are on the same line, while the guns in different cradles had a mismatch of trunk lines, which was not so easy to deal with. In other words, because of small backlashes, etc. when installing the guns, say, at the angle of elevation in 5 degrees, it could happen that the right gun of the two-gun turret received the right angle, and the left one - a little smaller, and this, of course, affected the accuracy of fire. “One-man” installations did not have such a problem, but alas, that was the end of their list of advantages.
Ordinary towers (i.e., having guns in different cradles) had the opportunity to shoot with incomplete volleys, that is, while one gun was aimed at the target and fired, the others were charged. Thus, among other things, the maximum fire performance is achieved, since no gun of the turret is idle - at each moment of time it is either pointed, or shot, or lowered to the loading angle, or charged. Thus, delays can occur only “through the fault” of the fireman if the latter delays the transfer of data for firing to the guns. And if necessary, the battleship with 8 guns of the main caliber with a 1 shot rate in 40 seconds per barrel is capable of firing four-guns every 20 seconds. A battleship with 12 with such weapons is capable of producing three four-gun volleys every 40 seconds, that is, the interval between the volleys is only slightly more than 13 seconds.
But in a “single-lumen” system, similar performance is achieved only with salvo firing, when the towers fire a salvo from all the guns at once: in this case, the battleship with a dozen GK guns will give only one salvo in 40 seconds, but if it's a full salvo, then 12 projectiles will be sent, that is, the same amount as will be fired in three four-guns. But if you shoot incomplete volleys, then the fire performance significantly subsides.
But why even shoot incomplete salvos? The fact is that when firing “full board” only one type of shooting is available - the “fork”, when you need to ensure that one volley goes to flight, the second - to undershoot (or vice versa) and then “half” the distance until covering will be achieved. For example, they shot 75 cables - a flight, 65 cables - a shortage, we shoot 70 cables, and we expect what happens. Suppose a flight, then set the sight on the 67,5 cable, and here, most likely, there will be a covering. This is a good, but slow way of shooting, so inquisitive naval thought also invented the shooting with a “ledge” and a “double ledge” when the volleys are given at different distances by the “ladder”, and not waiting for the previous salvo to fall. For example, we shoot three volleys with a step of 5 cables (65, 70 and 75 cables) with a small time interval between each volley, and then we estimate the position of the target relative to several falls. Given a number of nuances of naval firing, such an adjustment, although it may lead to an increased expenditure of projectiles, but allows you to cover the target much faster than the traditional fork.
But if the “single-faced” battleship tries to shoot a double ledge (with an interval of, for example, 10 seconds between volleys), then it will launch 12 shells not for 40, but for 60 seconds, since the waiting time between the first and second and second and third volleys guns will stand idle. Thus, the commander of the American battleship had to choose between fire performance, or modern methods of shooting. The choice was made in favor of fire performance - and before, and on time, and for a long time after the First World War, the US fleet was shot in full salvo. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that this was not the result of “single-arm” towers - the Americans simply thought that at long distances of the battle it would be more convenient to correct shooting at the falls of full volleys.
However, the shooting with full salvos caused other difficulties, which, strangely enough, the Americans simply did not notice on their own. As we have said, the “single-lumen” scheme has a potential advantage over the classical one in accuracy due to the lack of misalignment of the axes of the barrels, but in practice it can be realized only when firing with incomplete volleys. But with full volleys, dispersion, on the contrary, increases sharply with respect to the classical scheme due to the proximity of the axes of the barrels and the effects of expanding gases escaping from the barrels on the projectiles emanating from neighboring guns. For example, in the two-gun towers of the Oklahoma battleship, the specified distance was 2,24 m, and in the three-gun one - only 1,5 m. At the exercises, after the volleys of the three-gun towers, American sailors sometimes observed collisions (!) Of shells fired by them in flight.
Nevertheless, the problem was not realized, but was taken for granted, and so it continued until the USA at the end of the First World War did not send their dreadnoughts to support Britain. Of course, the American ships were both based and trained along with the English, and it was here that the US admirals realized that the shells dispersed in the battleships of the British battleships were much smaller than those of the US - and this was true of the US ships with two-turrets! As a result, in the United States created a special device that introduces a small delay of the guns of one turret in the salvo - they fired with a difference in time 0,06 seconds. It is usually mentioned that the use of this device (first installed on US ships in 1918 g) made it possible to reduce dispersion by half, but for the sake of justice, it was not possible to manage with one device. So, on the battleship "New York" in order to reduce dispersion at the maximum firing distance (alas, cable is not specified) from 730 to 360 m, in addition to the delay of the shot, the initial velocity of the projectiles was also reduced - and again, it is not reported how . That is, the accuracy, and hence the accuracy of the American guns, was improved, but also due to a certain drop in armor penetration.
The rhetorical question: if similar problems with the dispersion had relatively good two-gun towers of the Americans, then what happened to the three-gun?
Nevertheless, a number of authors, for example, such as AV Mandel, undertake to assert that the shortcomings of the towers of American battleships were mostly theoretical in nature and did not manifest themselves in practice. In support of this point of view, for example, the results of the test shooting of the battleship Oklahoma for 1924 / 25 are given ...
But we will discuss this in the next article.
To be continued ...
History designing battleships like "Pennsylvania" is very simple. Despite the fact that the first American battleships that received 356-mm artillery were two ships of the "New York" type, the other constructive solutions did not shine with novelty at all. Then the Americans began to design truly revolutionary battleships of the “Nevada” type, but, unfortunately, the flight of design ideas turned out to be pretty slowed down by financial constraints, which boiled down to the following: the newest ships should be “shoved” into the displacement of the previous type “New York”.
The fact was that the creation of the American linear, and not only linear fleet strongly depended on the political situation in Congress and on the current attitude of the presidential administration towards shipbuilding programs. The fleet wanted to lay 2 battleships annually, but at the same time there were several years when funds were allocated only for one ship of this class. But even in cases when Congress sought funds for the laying of two ships, he could insist on limiting their cost, and in this regard, American sailors and shipbuilders were probably in worse conditions than, for example, the Germans with their “maritime law” .
So in the case of the Nevada, admirals and designers had to make known sacrifices - for example, the number of 356-mm guns had to be reduced from 12 to 10 guns. Some even suggested to leave all 8 of such guns, but the idea to build the newest battleships weaker than the ships of the previous series did not find a positive response at all, even though the displacement saved was proposed to be used to enhance protection. In addition, the speed had to be reduced from the initial 21 knots. to 20,5 knots.
So, when it came time to design the next series of super dreadnoughts, which eventually became the “Pennsylvania” type battleships, the American lawmakers “became generous”, making it possible to increase the cost of building new ships from 6 to 7,5 million dollars. Why did the word “get generous” be quoted? Is it a question of 25-percent increase in funding? The fact is that, firstly, in fact, the cost of building Nevada and Oklahoma cost 13 645 360 dollars, or more than 6,8 million dollars per ship. However, the actual cost of the construction of "Pennsylvania" also exceeded the planned figure, amounting to approximately 8 million dollars. And secondly, the fact is that this is the cost of construction without taking into account armor and armament: for two battleships of the "Nevada" type these items were 9 304 286 dollars. In other words, the total cost of Nevada was 11 401 073, 04 dollars, and “Oklahoma - even more, 11 548 573,28 dollars and permission to design and build“ Pennsylvania ”on 1,5 million. dollars more expensive was just about 13-pr percentage increase in the total cost of the ship.
The battleship "Pennsylvania" (in the lower right corner) next to its predecessors: "Oklahoma" and "Nevada"
I must say that with this money the Americans managed to achieve quite a lot - in general, the Pennsylvania type battleships looked more powerful and harmonious than the ships of the previous type. This is not surprising: in fact, the main characteristics of "Pennsylvania" - 12 * 356-mm guns, speed 21 knots. and protection at the “Nevada” level are all that the admirals wanted to see in the project of battleships of the “Nevada” type, but they had to be partially abandoned in order to “shove” the battleships into the required displacement and cost estimate.
Design
We will not describe in detail the ups and downs of this stage in the creation of Pennsylvania type battleships, since they will be more appropriate in the relevant sections on artillery, armor protection and the power plant of the ship. Let us dwell only on a couple of interesting facts of a general nature.
The US Navy had a real risk of getting two more Nevads instead of Pennsylvania. The fact is that the General Council formulated its requirements for the 1913 “9 battleship” on June 1911, just when the Nevada project was almost ready. It is not surprising that the Design and Repair Bureau, which was responsible for the design work, had a considerable temptation to “sell” the newly made project again. They even summed up a tactical justification: after all, the General Council itself was pursuing a line on the construction of battleships by squadrons on the 4 ship, so what's the wise? We take a ready-made project, finish it a little bit here, darn there, and ...
But the General Council judged perfectly sensibly - there is no point, having obtained expanded financial opportunities, to build two more Nevada, with all their weak points resulting from financial compromise. At the same time, the battleships of the requirements declared by the General Council (12 * 356-mm, 22 * 127-mm, 21 knot) are quite capable of making a tactical four with Nevada, although they will be somewhat stronger and more perfect than the latter.
When the design of "Pennsylvania" was already in full swing, the General Council went to Congress with a proposal to build in the financial 1913, already four such battleships. History is silent about whether it was really serious intention, or just responsible persons, inspired by the proverb “You want a lot, you get a little”, seriously counted only on the 2 battleship, leaving the field for trade with congressmen. The fact is that such vast appetites were deemed excessive, but most of all the 1913 program was knocked down by the notorious Senator Tillman, who wondered: why spend a lot of money on a series of gradually improving ships? Let's better get down to the design and construction of the most powerful terminal battleships, which will be impossible to create more and more at the current technological level. According to Tillman, the logic of the development of naval armaments will still lead other countries to build such battleships, which, of course, will immediately obsolete all previous ones, and if so, why wait? In general, the points of view turned out to be too contradictory, the congressmen didn’t have a common understanding of the future linear forces, the ball reigned in doubt, and as a result, in 1913, the USA laid only one ship, the “Pennsylvania”, and its “sistership” (strictly speaking, then it was necessary to write "her") "Arizona" was laid only in the following, 1914.
It is interesting, although it does not relate to the topic of the article, that in the United States with the filing of Tillman did indeed conduct the relevant research. Parameters of the “ultimate” battleship amazed: 80 000 t, 297 m length, speed around 25 knots, armor in 482 mm, main caliber of 15 (!) 457-mm guns in five three-gun turrets or 24 * 406-mm in four six-gun ! However, the first estimations showed that the cost of one such ship would be no less than 50 million dollars, that is, about the same as the division of the 4 battleships of the “Pennsylvania” type, so that the studies on this topic were discontinued (although they resumed later ).
Artillery
Sistership of Pennsylvania - battleship Arizona
The main caliber of the “Pennsylvania” type battleships, without a doubt, was the strangest spectacle among all the heavy marine installations of the world.
“Pennsylvania” and “Arizona” armed themselves with 356-mm / 45 guns (true caliber - 355,6-mm) modifications of the Mk ... but which ones, perhaps, the Americans themselves may not remember, at least it was not possible to find exact data in the Russian-language literature . The fact is that these instruments were placed on US battleships starting from New York and modified a great number of times: there were 12 basic modifications of this gun, but they had other “inside” - they were designated from Mk 1 / 0 to Mk 12 / 10. At the same time, the differences between them were usually quite insignificant, with perhaps two exceptions. One of them concerned the initial series: the fact is that the very first 356-mm / 45 cannons were not lined, but then, of course, they got a liner. The second was made after the First World War and was to increase the charging chamber, so that the gun was able to shoot a heavier projectile with a higher initial speed. At the same time, in the majority of modifications (but still not in all) the ballistics of the guns remained identical, often the whole “modification” was that the gun received a generally identical liner with a slightly modified manufacturing technology, and as the liners were replaced the gun “changed” its modification. Also, the appearance of new modifications could be caused by upgrading, or simply replacing the gun that was shot completely, but I must say that, especially in the 20-30 years of the last century, the Americans were chasing their commanders rather intensively. And so it turned out that for the American battleships it was the norm to have the guns of several modifications on one ship at the same time. So, on the "Oklahoma" at the time of her death there were two guns Mk 8 / 0; five - Mk 9 / 0; one is the Mk 9 / 2 and two more Mk 10 / 0.
At the same time, as we said above, the ballistic qualities of modifications with rare exceptions remained unchanged. Nevertheless, the Americans did not shun to put guns with different ballistics on one ship - it was believed that small deviations were fully capable of compensating for the fire control system. The idea, frankly, is highly dubious, and, presumably, this was not widely practiced.
In general, on the one hand, the update of the main caliber of US battleships looks more or less logical, but due to its complexity, it is unclear what guns of modification the “Pennsylvania” and “Arizona” received when they entered service. It also creates a certain uncertainty in their performance characteristics, because, as a rule, the relevant data in the sources are given for modifications of the Mk 8 or Mk 12 - apparently, earlier models were on the battleships of the “Pennsylvania” type.
Usually, for 356-mm / 45 guns of American battleships the following data is given: before 1923, when the next modification increased the camera, allowing you to shoot more heavy charge, they were designed to fire 635 kg with a projectile with an initial speed of 792 m / s. At an elevation angle in 15 hail. shot range was 21,7 km or 117 cables. In subsequent modifications (1923 and later), the same guns were able to shoot the newest, heavier projectile weighing 680 kg with the same initial speed, or, using the old 635 kg projectile, increase its initial velocity to 823 m / s.
Why do we need to describe in detail the situation with post-war modifications, because we obviously will not take them into account when comparing battleships? This is necessary in order to the dear reader, in case he suddenly comes across some calculations of the armor penetration of these 356-mm / 45 American guns, remembers that they can be made for a later, enhanced modification. So, for example, we can see the calculations given in the book by AV Mandel.
Thus, we see that the American gun “mastered” 60 mm armor on the (rounded) 366 cable and the 70 mm cable on the 336 cable. This is clearly more modest than the British 381-mm gun, on the tests of the 350 mm frontal penetrated armor plate of the German Baden tower at a distance of 77,5 cab, but in a footnote to the table it is indicated that the given data were considered for 680 kg of projectile. Which obviously means that the 635 kg indicators of the projectile are even more modest. However, let's not get ahead of ourselves - we will do a comparison of the artillery of the battleships of Germany, England and the USA later.
Ammunition of the Pennsylvania-type battleships made up 100 projectiles per barrel, it included ... exactly 100 armor-piercing projectiles. The American admirals for a long time were convinced that their battleships were designed for one single task: crushing their own kind at the extreme distances of a battle. In their opinion, an armor-piercing projectile was best suited for this purpose, and if so, then why litter the cellars of the battleships with ammunition of other types? In general, high-explosive shells on “standard” 356-mm US battleships appeared only by 1942, and there is no point in looking at them in this series of articles.
As for the 635 kg of armor-piercing projectile, it was completed with 13,4 kg of explosive, namely dannit, later name: Explosive D. This explosive is based on ammonium picrate (not to be confused with picric acid, which became the basis for the famous Japanese shimoza, or liddite, melinita, etc.). In general, this American explosive had a slightly lower potential compared to trinitrotoluene (the TNT equivalent of TNT), but was much calmer and less prone to spontaneous explosion than shimosis. The author of this article, alas, could not figure out whether there was any fundamental difference between the early versions of dannita and the later “D explosion”, which were equipped with 0,95 kg shells: probably, if they were, then it is extremely small.
Interesting fact: the later 680 kg projectile contained only 10,2 kg of explosives, that is, even less than it was in 635 kg. In general, it should be noted that the Americans in their shells apparently "invested" primarily in armor penetration, having increased the walls to the utmost possibility, and, accordingly, the strength of the munition, while sacrificing a mass of explosive. Even in the “mighty” 635 kg projectile, the amount of explosives corresponded, rather to its 305-mm “brethren”: it is enough to recall that the 405,5 kg armored-piercing projectile of the German 305-mm / 50 gun carried 11,5 kg of explosives, and the Russian 470,9 kg of similar-purpose ammunition - 12,95 kg However, in fairness, we note that the British 343-mm “greenboy”, being a full-fledged armor-piercing projectile and having a mass similar to the American fourteen-inch projectile (639,6 kg), was slightly higher than the latter in terms of explosive content — it contained 15 kg of shellite.
American 356-mm / 45 guns withstood 250 shots 635 kg projectile with an initial speed 792 m / s. Not amazing, but not a bad indicator.
In terms of their design, the 356-mm / 45 artillery systems represented, so to speak, a kind of intermediate option between the German and British approaches. The barrel was a bonded construction, like the Germans, but the lock was used by a piston, like the British: the latter was to a certain extent dictated by the fact that the piston, opening downward shutter was probably the most optimal solution in a close three-gun turret. Of course, the use of advanced technology gave the Americans a good gain in the mass of the gun. Japanese 356-mm guns of the battleship "Fuso", which had a wire barrel design and approximately equal muzzle energy, weighed 86 tons, against 64,6 tons of the American artillery system.
In general, the following can be said about the American 356-mm / 45 gun. For its time, and the first model of this gun was created in 1910, it was a very sophisticated and competitive artillery system, definitely one of the best naval guns in the world. It was in no way inferior to the British 343-356-mm cannons made in England for Japan, and exceeded in some ways. But with all this, the potential capabilities of this weapon were largely limited to the only type of ammunition - an armor-piercing projectile, which, moreover, had a relatively small amount of explosives. And, of course, with all its merits, the 356-mm / 45 gun couldn’t compete with the newest 380-381-mm artillery systems.
On the other hand, the Americans on the Pennsylvania-type battleships managed to place a dozen 356-mm / 45, while the ships of the Rivend and Bayern types carried only 8 main-caliber guns. In order to arm the battleship with such a number of trunks, while not extending its stronghold excessively, the American designers used three-gun towers, the construction of which ... well, first things first.
For the first time such towers were used on battleships of the "Nevada" type: forced to "tamp down" the ship into the displacement of the previous "New York", the Americans were very eager to reduce the size and weight of the three-gun towers, if possible, bringing them closer to the two-guns. Well, the Americans achieved their goal: the geometric dimensions of the towers differed little, for example, the inner diameter of the barbat of the Nevada two-gun turret was 8,53 m, and the three-arm one - 9,14 m, and the weight of the rotating part - 628 and 760, respectively. And this, as it turned out , there was still no limit: the Pennsylvania-type battleships received towers, albeit of a similar construction, but even smaller in size, their mass was 736 t, and the inner diameter of the barbet was reduced to 8,84 m. But at what price was it achieved?
The American two-gun turrets had a classical scheme in which each gun was in a separate cradle and equipped with its own set of mechanisms that ensured the delivery of projectiles and charges. In this regard, the US two-tower towers were quite similar to the installations of England and Germany. But for the miniaturization of three-gun towers, American designers had to place all three guns in one cradle and confine themselves to two projectile and charging lifts for three guns!
Interestingly, most sources indicate that there were still three charging lifts, so only shells suffered, but judging by the detailed (but alas, not always clear) description of the tower design given by V.N. Chausov in his monograph "Battleships" Oklahoma "and" Nevada "", this is still not the case. That is, each American tower actually had two projectile and three charging lifts, but the fact is that one of the last delivered charges from the cellars only to the reloading compartment, and from there two other charging lifts delivered the charges to the guns. However, apparently, a single lift to the transshipment compartment did not create a bottleneck - it was a chain, and probably coped well with its task. But here, in the tower itself, only extreme guns (the first and the third) were provided with shell and charging lifts, the average of its own lifts did not have - neither charging nor projectile.
The breech 356-mm / 45 guns of the battleship "Oklahoma" in the two-gun turret.
The Americans claim that “with the proper preparation of calculations,” the three-gun turret can, in principle, develop the same rate of fire as the two-gun, but it is very difficult to believe. The technological flaw described above does not allow to expect a similar result with equal preparation of calculations for two- and three-gun towers. In other words, if the calculation of the two-gun turret is trained regularly, and the three-gun one is moreover driven into the tail and into the mane day and night, then maybe they will equal the rate of fire on the barrel. But this will be achieved solely through superior training, and if the same is given to the calculation of the two-gun tower?
Another extremely serious drawback of the American three-gun towers was the small mechanization of their processes. The guns of the main caliber of the battleships of England, Germany and many other countries had fully mechanized loading, that is, the projectile, and the charges, after feeding and to the guns, were fed into them by means of mechanical rammers. But not the Americans! Their rammer was used only when loading the projectile, but the charges were sent manually. How did this affect the rate of fire? Recall that the charge to 356-mm / 45 gun in those years was 165,6 kg, that is, for only one salvo, the calculation should have been moved by hand almost half a ton of gunpowder, and given the fact that the Americans claimed the rate of fire in 1,25-1,175 shots per minute. .. Of course, the loaders did not have to carry charges on their own backs, they had to be rolled from the elevator to a special table, and then, at the “zero” elevation angle of the gun, “push” the charges into the chamber with a special wooden stick-cleaner. In general, probably, 10 minutes at such a pace a physically prepared person could withstand, and then what?
We now return to the "excellent" decision to place all three guns in one cradle. In fact, the disadvantages of this design are greatly exaggerated and could be partially compensated by the organization of the shooting, taking into account this feature. What was the easier way to do it, using the cutting edge “ledge” or “double ledge” advanced at that time, but ... the problem is that the Americans didn’t do anything of the kind. And because of the shortcomings inherent in the “single-faced” scheme, they manifested themselves on their battleships in all their glory.
Strictly speaking, in addition to compactness, there is at least one more advantage - the axes of the guns are on the same line, while the guns in different cradles had a mismatch of trunk lines, which was not so easy to deal with. In other words, because of small backlashes, etc. when installing the guns, say, at the angle of elevation in 5 degrees, it could happen that the right gun of the two-gun turret received the right angle, and the left one - a little smaller, and this, of course, affected the accuracy of fire. “One-man” installations did not have such a problem, but alas, that was the end of their list of advantages.
Ordinary towers (i.e., having guns in different cradles) had the opportunity to shoot with incomplete volleys, that is, while one gun was aimed at the target and fired, the others were charged. Thus, among other things, the maximum fire performance is achieved, since no gun of the turret is idle - at each moment of time it is either pointed, or shot, or lowered to the loading angle, or charged. Thus, delays can occur only “through the fault” of the fireman if the latter delays the transfer of data for firing to the guns. And if necessary, the battleship with 8 guns of the main caliber with a 1 shot rate in 40 seconds per barrel is capable of firing four-guns every 20 seconds. A battleship with 12 with such weapons is capable of producing three four-gun volleys every 40 seconds, that is, the interval between the volleys is only slightly more than 13 seconds.
But in a “single-lumen” system, similar performance is achieved only with salvo firing, when the towers fire a salvo from all the guns at once: in this case, the battleship with a dozen GK guns will give only one salvo in 40 seconds, but if it's a full salvo, then 12 projectiles will be sent, that is, the same amount as will be fired in three four-guns. But if you shoot incomplete volleys, then the fire performance significantly subsides.
But why even shoot incomplete salvos? The fact is that when firing “full board” only one type of shooting is available - the “fork”, when you need to ensure that one volley goes to flight, the second - to undershoot (or vice versa) and then “half” the distance until covering will be achieved. For example, they shot 75 cables - a flight, 65 cables - a shortage, we shoot 70 cables, and we expect what happens. Suppose a flight, then set the sight on the 67,5 cable, and here, most likely, there will be a covering. This is a good, but slow way of shooting, so inquisitive naval thought also invented the shooting with a “ledge” and a “double ledge” when the volleys are given at different distances by the “ladder”, and not waiting for the previous salvo to fall. For example, we shoot three volleys with a step of 5 cables (65, 70 and 75 cables) with a small time interval between each volley, and then we estimate the position of the target relative to several falls. Given a number of nuances of naval firing, such an adjustment, although it may lead to an increased expenditure of projectiles, but allows you to cover the target much faster than the traditional fork.
But if the “single-faced” battleship tries to shoot a double ledge (with an interval of, for example, 10 seconds between volleys), then it will launch 12 shells not for 40, but for 60 seconds, since the waiting time between the first and second and second and third volleys guns will stand idle. Thus, the commander of the American battleship had to choose between fire performance, or modern methods of shooting. The choice was made in favor of fire performance - and before, and on time, and for a long time after the First World War, the US fleet was shot in full salvo. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that this was not the result of “single-arm” towers - the Americans simply thought that at long distances of the battle it would be more convenient to correct shooting at the falls of full volleys.
However, the shooting with full salvos caused other difficulties, which, strangely enough, the Americans simply did not notice on their own. As we have said, the “single-lumen” scheme has a potential advantage over the classical one in accuracy due to the lack of misalignment of the axes of the barrels, but in practice it can be realized only when firing with incomplete volleys. But with full volleys, dispersion, on the contrary, increases sharply with respect to the classical scheme due to the proximity of the axes of the barrels and the effects of expanding gases escaping from the barrels on the projectiles emanating from neighboring guns. For example, in the two-gun towers of the Oklahoma battleship, the specified distance was 2,24 m, and in the three-gun one - only 1,5 m. At the exercises, after the volleys of the three-gun towers, American sailors sometimes observed collisions (!) Of shells fired by them in flight.
Nevertheless, the problem was not realized, but was taken for granted, and so it continued until the USA at the end of the First World War did not send their dreadnoughts to support Britain. Of course, the American ships were both based and trained along with the English, and it was here that the US admirals realized that the shells dispersed in the battleships of the British battleships were much smaller than those of the US - and this was true of the US ships with two-turrets! As a result, in the United States created a special device that introduces a small delay of the guns of one turret in the salvo - they fired with a difference in time 0,06 seconds. It is usually mentioned that the use of this device (first installed on US ships in 1918 g) made it possible to reduce dispersion by half, but for the sake of justice, it was not possible to manage with one device. So, on the battleship "New York" in order to reduce dispersion at the maximum firing distance (alas, cable is not specified) from 730 to 360 m, in addition to the delay of the shot, the initial velocity of the projectiles was also reduced - and again, it is not reported how . That is, the accuracy, and hence the accuracy of the American guns, was improved, but also due to a certain drop in armor penetration.
The rhetorical question: if similar problems with the dispersion had relatively good two-gun towers of the Americans, then what happened to the three-gun?
Nevertheless, a number of authors, for example, such as AV Mandel, undertake to assert that the shortcomings of the towers of American battleships were mostly theoretical in nature and did not manifest themselves in practice. In support of this point of view, for example, the results of the test shooting of the battleship Oklahoma for 1924 / 25 are given ...
But we will discuss this in the next article.
To be continued ...
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