Secrets of deportations. Part of 1. Ingush and Chechens
It is unlikely that anyone will argue that the current situation in interethnic relations in the North Caucasus is difficult, perhaps more than ever before. However, few people will remember that the sources of countless border disputes, tough conflicts between republics and individual ethnic groups go deep into history. Among the main reasons for the monstrous tension of the notorious Caucasian knot are the deportations of many North Caucasian peoples in the middle of the 1940s.
Despite the fact that already in the second half of 1950, a massive return of repressed Caucasian peoples to their native places took place, the consequences of those deportations continue to be felt in all spheres of their lives and their neighbors who have not been affected by the deportations. And we are talking not only about direct human losses, but also about moods, about the so-called social consciousness of both the repatriated people and their descendants.
All this continues to play an important role in the formation of nationalist, and even frankly Russophobic aspirations in the Caucasus. And they, unfortunately, continue to cover not only the local community, but also the power structures of the local regions - regardless of their status, size and national composition of the population.
However, the then Soviet leadership resented not only and not so much undisguised anti-Sovietism of the overwhelming majority of Chechens, Ingushes, Nogais, Kalmyks, Karachais and Balkarians. With this, it could somehow come to terms, but almost everyone had to answer for direct cooperation with the Nazi occupiers. It was active for the benefit of the Reich that became the main reason for the deportations of that time.
Today, few people understand that in the 40s, the fact that deportations, as a rule, were accompanied by redistribution of administrative borders in the region, could not confuse anyone by definition. The introduction of “deported” regions, mainly the Russian population (local and from other regions of the RSFSR) and partly of other neighboring ethnic groups, was also considered the norm. Thus, they have always tried to erode the “anti-Russian” contingent, and at the same time significantly increase the proportion of the population loyal to Moscow.
Subsequently, with the return of thousands of deported locals on this ground, numerous ethnic conflicts occurred, which, as a rule, had to be suppressed by force, about which is slightly lower. In a broader context, the beginning of a long-term process of formation among the “returnees” themselves, and after them and their whole environment, attitudes towards the USSR and Russia as agents of “Russian imperial colonialism”, only slightly camouflaged under international politics, were actually initiated.
It is characteristic that the “Russian imperial colonialism” formula itself, in the 70 years of the last century, literally pulled out of its historical non-existence the head of the Chechen-Ingush editorial board of Radio Liberty Soserko (Syzorko) Malsagov. This native of the Terek region is a man of truly amazing fate. He managed to make war for both the white civilians and the Polish cavalry during World War II, managed to escape from the Solovki, and in the underground in France bore the characteristic nickname Kazbek. It is quite possible to call him one of the main fighters for the rights of repressed peoples.
Camp Memorial Kazbek - Soserko Malsagov
From the point of view of Malsagov, the assessment of the consequences of the deportation policy by the currently functioning Inter-Ethnic Committee on the conduct of the process against the policy of genocide is surprisingly corresponded. The commissaries, who were created together by the CIA and the intelligence services of the Federal Republic of Germany, did not hesitate to voice their position just at the time when there was a thaw in the USSR, and the return process was basically completed:
The problem of moods and sympathies for the Caucasus has never been easy. However, regarding the prevailing sympathies among the North Caucasian peoples to the Nazi invaders, the KGB of the USSR certificate sent to the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 is very characteristic. We give here only a short excerpt from it:
It was also indicated in the certificate that “During the war years, 15 Chechens and Ingush became Heroes of the Soviet Union, orders and medals were awarded more than 1700 to Chechen servicemen and Ingush soldiers. During the war, 2300 Chechens and Ingushs were killed in the ranks of the Red Army. The Chechen and Ingush servicemen, representatives of other peoples deported to 1944, responded from the front first to the labor armies, and after the war ended they were sent into exile to compatriots in remote regions of the country "(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Volga-Vyatsky region, Urals, Trans-Urals).
However, it must be admitted that long before the deportations of the same Chechens and Ingush literally pushed into anti-Soviet ambitious, but absolutely naive appointees from the national policy from Moscow - the leaders of the regions. They did this by conducting, among other things, the notorious collectivization late, but at the same time so hastily and rudely that sometimes there was simply no one in the auls to take charge of the collective farms.
At the same time, the rights of believers, who were sometimes repressed even because they didn’t allow themselves to disperse anywhere at the wrong time, were violated everywhere. It could not fail to set up against the Soviet power and planting party committees everywhere, as if deliberately consisting of non-title party workers sent by Moscow for a given region of nationalities.
Is it any wonder that only in the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic over a decade and a half pre-war years, from 1927 to 1941, 12 of major armed uprisings occurred. According to the most modest estimates of the competent authorities, more than 18 thousand people participated in them in general. There were just hundreds of small skirmishes and shootouts, literally everything was fired and wherever it was possible to find weapon. Add to this for a more complete assessment of the very "sentiments and sympathies" of the frequent facts of economic sabotage, concealment of foreign intelligence agencies, the publication and distribution of anti-Soviet leaflets and literature.
When the war came to the Caucasus, as early as January 1942, an anti-Soviet "Party of Caucasian Brothers" was created in Chechen-Ingushetia under the auspices of the Abwehr and its Turkish colleagues (MITT). She united the representatives of 11 peoples of the region, and with the notorious exception of Russian and Russian speakers. The political declaration of this “party” proclaimed “the achievement of national independence, the struggle against Bolshevik barbarism, atheism and Russian despotism”. In June, 1942, this group was renamed with the participation of the German occupation authorities in the "National Socialist Party of Caucasian Brothers". Apparently, there was no longer any need to hide or somehow camouflage a direct connection with the NSDAP.
Another large anti-Soviet grouping in the territory of Chechen-Ingushetia was the Chechen-Gore National Socialist Organization created by the Abwehr in November 1941 of the year. Under the leadership of Mayrbek Sheripov, the former director of the Forest Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and the first deputy head of the Republican Planning Commission. Of course, before that - a member of the CPSU (b).
Identification and repression against the Soviet cadres, intelligence agents and underground fighters, demonstrative actions of “intimidation”, unbridled xenophobia, and especially Russophobia, forcing “voluntary” collection of values for the German troops, etc. - business cards of both groups. In the spring of 1943, it was planned to unite them into a region-wide "Gorsko-Chechen Administration" under the control of the intelligence services of Germany and Turkey. However, the historic victory at Stalingrad soon led to the defeat of the invaders in the North Caucasus.
It is characteristic that throughout the entire period of partial occupation of the Caucasus, as indeed after that, Berlin and Ankara (although Turkey did not enter the war) vigorously vied for decisive influence in any puppet, but primarily Muslim or pro-Muslim groups both in the North Caucasus and in the Crimea. They even tried to influence the national autonomy of the Volga region, although in reality the hands reached out only to Kalmykia, as is well known, Buddhist.
One way or another, the aforementioned events and facts led to the decision of Moscow to deport Chechens and Ingushs as part of Operation Lentil 23-25 in February 1944 of the year. Although, taking into account the well-known ethno-confessional and psychological specifics of the Chechens and Ingush, it would be more expedient to thoroughly examine the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during the war period. Moreover, bearing in mind the creation of the anti-Russian underground in Chechnya immediately after partial resettlement to other regions of Russia, supporters of Imam Shamil (in 1858-1862). But then the Kremlin preferred the “global” approach ...
Due to an acute shortage of documents, historians from different republics are still arguing over which deportation is depicted in a particular photo.
During the operation, about 650 thousands of Chechens and Ingush were evicted. During the eviction, transportation of deported - 177 echelons of freight cars - and in the first years after it (1944-1946 years) about 100 thousands of Chechens and almost 23 thousands of Ingush were killed - every fourth of both peoples. More than 80 thousand troops participated in this operation.
Instead of a dual Chechen-Ingush autonomy, the Grozny region was created (1944-1956) with the inclusion of a number of areas also former Kalmykia and several regions of Northern Dagestan, which ensured a direct outlet of this area to the Caspian Sea. A number of areas of the former Chechen-Ingushetia were then transferred to Dagestan and North Ossetia. And, although most of them later, in 1957-1961, were returned to the restored Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, other areas remaining in Dagestan (Aukhovsky) and North Ossetia (Prigorodny) still remain in conflict. The first is between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, the second between Chechnya and Dagestan.
At the same time, the Russian and Russian-speaking national elements were massively “infiltrating” into the Grozny region. This almost immediately led to a whole series of inter-ethnic clashes, most of the conflicts happened already at the end of the 50s. In the meantime, the post-Stalinist leadership of the country and fully updated local authorities for some reason believed that it was possible to moderate the political and psychological consequences of the deportation at the expense of the so-called sequestration. Sequestration of the rights and opportunities of local peoples, as well as by increasing the number of Russians and Russian speakers in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
As a result, tensions only grew, and by the end of August 1958, in Grozny, military suppression of mass demonstrations was required. However, the Ingush or Chechen performances were not suppressed at all. It was firmly suppressed that the demonstrators of Russian and Ukrainian nationality, who dared to protest against their socio-economic and housing discrimination in comparison with the returned and returning Chechens and Ingushs, were decided.
Hundreds of demonstrators, blocking the building of the Chechen-Ingush Regional Committee of the CPSU, demanded that party officials should come to them and explain their policies in this region. But in vain: after several warnings, the troops were ordered to shoot to kill, and the "suppression" took place. Due to the use of military force in Grozny, more than 50 people died and went missing.
But the reason for the Russian demonstration was, as they say, literally on the surface. After all, in connection with the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1957, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic began, without any justification for the fact of “returning,” to prescribe Russians and Ukrainians to the city’s apartments and rural houses. In addition, the latter were suddenly dismissed from their jobs and employed under worse conditions, including in other regions of the USSR, and in return - to provide freed up jobs to the Chechens and Ingush.
Excesses of the same orientation in Chechen-Ingushetia, although with a lower degree of confrontation, when there were no troops, occurred in 1963, 1973 and 1983. Workers and engineers of Russian nationality, of whom there was a majority, demanded equal pay for their labor and the same living conditions with Chechens and Ingush. Requirements had to at least partially satisfy.
Note:
1. “Free Caucasus” // Munich-London. 1961. No.7.
Despite the fact that already in the second half of 1950, a massive return of repressed Caucasian peoples to their native places took place, the consequences of those deportations continue to be felt in all spheres of their lives and their neighbors who have not been affected by the deportations. And we are talking not only about direct human losses, but also about moods, about the so-called social consciousness of both the repatriated people and their descendants.
All this continues to play an important role in the formation of nationalist, and even frankly Russophobic aspirations in the Caucasus. And they, unfortunately, continue to cover not only the local community, but also the power structures of the local regions - regardless of their status, size and national composition of the population.
However, the then Soviet leadership resented not only and not so much undisguised anti-Sovietism of the overwhelming majority of Chechens, Ingushes, Nogais, Kalmyks, Karachais and Balkarians. With this, it could somehow come to terms, but almost everyone had to answer for direct cooperation with the Nazi occupiers. It was active for the benefit of the Reich that became the main reason for the deportations of that time.
Today, few people understand that in the 40s, the fact that deportations, as a rule, were accompanied by redistribution of administrative borders in the region, could not confuse anyone by definition. The introduction of “deported” regions, mainly the Russian population (local and from other regions of the RSFSR) and partly of other neighboring ethnic groups, was also considered the norm. Thus, they have always tried to erode the “anti-Russian” contingent, and at the same time significantly increase the proportion of the population loyal to Moscow.
Subsequently, with the return of thousands of deported locals on this ground, numerous ethnic conflicts occurred, which, as a rule, had to be suppressed by force, about which is slightly lower. In a broader context, the beginning of a long-term process of formation among the “returnees” themselves, and after them and their whole environment, attitudes towards the USSR and Russia as agents of “Russian imperial colonialism”, only slightly camouflaged under international politics, were actually initiated.
It is characteristic that the “Russian imperial colonialism” formula itself, in the 70 years of the last century, literally pulled out of its historical non-existence the head of the Chechen-Ingush editorial board of Radio Liberty Soserko (Syzorko) Malsagov. This native of the Terek region is a man of truly amazing fate. He managed to make war for both the white civilians and the Polish cavalry during World War II, managed to escape from the Solovki, and in the underground in France bore the characteristic nickname Kazbek. It is quite possible to call him one of the main fighters for the rights of repressed peoples.
Camp Memorial Kazbek - Soserko Malsagov
From the point of view of Malsagov, the assessment of the consequences of the deportation policy by the currently functioning Inter-Ethnic Committee on the conduct of the process against the policy of genocide is surprisingly corresponded. The commissaries, who were created together by the CIA and the intelligence services of the Federal Republic of Germany, did not hesitate to voice their position just at the time when there was a thaw in the USSR, and the return process was basically completed:
“Deportations for many peoples of the North Caucasus is an unhealing wound that does not have a statute of limitations. Moreover, the return of these peoples to the historical foci of their habitat was not accompanied by compensation for the tremendous deportation damage. Most likely, the Soviet leadership will continue to increase social and economic support to restored national autonomies in order to somehow smooth out the criminal activities of the deportation period. But the national-historical self-consciousness of the affected peoples will not forget what happened, the only guarantee from the repetition of which is their independence ”(1).
The problem of moods and sympathies for the Caucasus has never been easy. However, regarding the prevailing sympathies among the North Caucasian peoples to the Nazi invaders, the KGB of the USSR certificate sent to the presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 is very characteristic. We give here only a short excerpt from it:
“... about half of the adult population of Chechens, Ingush, Balkarians, Karachais, Nogai and Kalmyks sympathized with the arrival of the invaders. Including over half of the deserters of the nationalities remaining in the region. The majority of deserters and a little more than a third of the adult male population, representing the same nationalities, entered the military, security units and administrative bodies formed by the invaders in the North Caucasus. ”
It was also indicated in the certificate that “During the war years, 15 Chechens and Ingush became Heroes of the Soviet Union, orders and medals were awarded more than 1700 to Chechen servicemen and Ingush soldiers. During the war, 2300 Chechens and Ingushs were killed in the ranks of the Red Army. The Chechen and Ingush servicemen, representatives of other peoples deported to 1944, responded from the front first to the labor armies, and after the war ended they were sent into exile to compatriots in remote regions of the country "(Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Volga-Vyatsky region, Urals, Trans-Urals).
However, it must be admitted that long before the deportations of the same Chechens and Ingush literally pushed into anti-Soviet ambitious, but absolutely naive appointees from the national policy from Moscow - the leaders of the regions. They did this by conducting, among other things, the notorious collectivization late, but at the same time so hastily and rudely that sometimes there was simply no one in the auls to take charge of the collective farms.
At the same time, the rights of believers, who were sometimes repressed even because they didn’t allow themselves to disperse anywhere at the wrong time, were violated everywhere. It could not fail to set up against the Soviet power and planting party committees everywhere, as if deliberately consisting of non-title party workers sent by Moscow for a given region of nationalities.
Is it any wonder that only in the territory of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic over a decade and a half pre-war years, from 1927 to 1941, 12 of major armed uprisings occurred. According to the most modest estimates of the competent authorities, more than 18 thousand people participated in them in general. There were just hundreds of small skirmishes and shootouts, literally everything was fired and wherever it was possible to find weapon. Add to this for a more complete assessment of the very "sentiments and sympathies" of the frequent facts of economic sabotage, concealment of foreign intelligence agencies, the publication and distribution of anti-Soviet leaflets and literature.
When the war came to the Caucasus, as early as January 1942, an anti-Soviet "Party of Caucasian Brothers" was created in Chechen-Ingushetia under the auspices of the Abwehr and its Turkish colleagues (MITT). She united the representatives of 11 peoples of the region, and with the notorious exception of Russian and Russian speakers. The political declaration of this “party” proclaimed “the achievement of national independence, the struggle against Bolshevik barbarism, atheism and Russian despotism”. In June, 1942, this group was renamed with the participation of the German occupation authorities in the "National Socialist Party of Caucasian Brothers". Apparently, there was no longer any need to hide or somehow camouflage a direct connection with the NSDAP.
Another large anti-Soviet grouping in the territory of Chechen-Ingushetia was the Chechen-Gore National Socialist Organization created by the Abwehr in November 1941 of the year. Under the leadership of Mayrbek Sheripov, the former director of the Forest Council of the Chechen-Ingush Republic and the first deputy head of the Republican Planning Commission. Of course, before that - a member of the CPSU (b).
Identification and repression against the Soviet cadres, intelligence agents and underground fighters, demonstrative actions of “intimidation”, unbridled xenophobia, and especially Russophobia, forcing “voluntary” collection of values for the German troops, etc. - business cards of both groups. In the spring of 1943, it was planned to unite them into a region-wide "Gorsko-Chechen Administration" under the control of the intelligence services of Germany and Turkey. However, the historic victory at Stalingrad soon led to the defeat of the invaders in the North Caucasus.
It is characteristic that throughout the entire period of partial occupation of the Caucasus, as indeed after that, Berlin and Ankara (although Turkey did not enter the war) vigorously vied for decisive influence in any puppet, but primarily Muslim or pro-Muslim groups both in the North Caucasus and in the Crimea. They even tried to influence the national autonomy of the Volga region, although in reality the hands reached out only to Kalmykia, as is well known, Buddhist.
One way or another, the aforementioned events and facts led to the decision of Moscow to deport Chechens and Ingushs as part of Operation Lentil 23-25 in February 1944 of the year. Although, taking into account the well-known ethno-confessional and psychological specifics of the Chechens and Ingush, it would be more expedient to thoroughly examine the situation in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic during the war period. Moreover, bearing in mind the creation of the anti-Russian underground in Chechnya immediately after partial resettlement to other regions of Russia, supporters of Imam Shamil (in 1858-1862). But then the Kremlin preferred the “global” approach ...
Due to an acute shortage of documents, historians from different republics are still arguing over which deportation is depicted in a particular photo.
During the operation, about 650 thousands of Chechens and Ingush were evicted. During the eviction, transportation of deported - 177 echelons of freight cars - and in the first years after it (1944-1946 years) about 100 thousands of Chechens and almost 23 thousands of Ingush were killed - every fourth of both peoples. More than 80 thousand troops participated in this operation.
Instead of a dual Chechen-Ingush autonomy, the Grozny region was created (1944-1956) with the inclusion of a number of areas also former Kalmykia and several regions of Northern Dagestan, which ensured a direct outlet of this area to the Caspian Sea. A number of areas of the former Chechen-Ingushetia were then transferred to Dagestan and North Ossetia. And, although most of them later, in 1957-1961, were returned to the restored Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, other areas remaining in Dagestan (Aukhovsky) and North Ossetia (Prigorodny) still remain in conflict. The first is between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, the second between Chechnya and Dagestan.
At the same time, the Russian and Russian-speaking national elements were massively “infiltrating” into the Grozny region. This almost immediately led to a whole series of inter-ethnic clashes, most of the conflicts happened already at the end of the 50s. In the meantime, the post-Stalinist leadership of the country and fully updated local authorities for some reason believed that it was possible to moderate the political and psychological consequences of the deportation at the expense of the so-called sequestration. Sequestration of the rights and opportunities of local peoples, as well as by increasing the number of Russians and Russian speakers in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
As a result, tensions only grew, and by the end of August 1958, in Grozny, military suppression of mass demonstrations was required. However, the Ingush or Chechen performances were not suppressed at all. It was firmly suppressed that the demonstrators of Russian and Ukrainian nationality, who dared to protest against their socio-economic and housing discrimination in comparison with the returned and returning Chechens and Ingushs, were decided.
Hundreds of demonstrators, blocking the building of the Chechen-Ingush Regional Committee of the CPSU, demanded that party officials should come to them and explain their policies in this region. But in vain: after several warnings, the troops were ordered to shoot to kill, and the "suppression" took place. Due to the use of military force in Grozny, more than 50 people died and went missing.
But the reason for the Russian demonstration was, as they say, literally on the surface. After all, in connection with the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in 1957, the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic began, without any justification for the fact of “returning,” to prescribe Russians and Ukrainians to the city’s apartments and rural houses. In addition, the latter were suddenly dismissed from their jobs and employed under worse conditions, including in other regions of the USSR, and in return - to provide freed up jobs to the Chechens and Ingush.
Excesses of the same orientation in Chechen-Ingushetia, although with a lower degree of confrontation, when there were no troops, occurred in 1963, 1973 and 1983. Workers and engineers of Russian nationality, of whom there was a majority, demanded equal pay for their labor and the same living conditions with Chechens and Ingush. Requirements had to at least partially satisfy.
Note:
1. “Free Caucasus” // Munich-London. 1961. No.7.
Information