Military Review

Modular virus. The concept of modular ships does not work. Nowhere

There are "fashionable" trends that are frankly idiotic in nature, but to which adults still give in and voluntarily harm themselves. You can see this on the example of a girl who plucked out her “native” real eyebrows, so that they could get tattooed for the same place for money for the same place, on the example of a young man who pumped her biceps and looks like a mutant from a Japanese cartoon for teenagers. In the 1930s, women in the USA massively amputated their little toes on their feet for fashionable narrow shoes. Whole body tattoos are in fashion now. It would seem, because you can simply use common sense and not create problems for yourself, but people still do such things. They look at others, see with a strange example that this is bad, harmful, painful and ugly, but they still put on themselves a silly and painful experiment. With a logical outcome. Understanding that an error occurred, comes pretty quickly, but it is always late.

Modularity looks tempting. In the pictures

In the world of military shipbuilding, modular warships are such a fashionable trend. The peculiarity of this trend is that they did not happen to anyone, nor to some Naval Forces who put such experiments on themselves. But it was enough to count the losses and get out of the disastrous project of a modular warship, as others immediately began such a project. And they started by examining someone else's negative experience, but deciding that they would succeed in everything as it should. Unfortunately, Russia is also in this club. We do not learn anything good, but bad - no problem, immediately and quickly. It makes sense to consider this modular concept in detail.

First, the “modularity” are different. In one case, it’s about weapon or the equipment is simply put on the ship in a block and mounted on bolts, but at the same time it can only be replaced with an analogue and only during construction or repair. Thus, the first ships of the MEKO series were built - thanks to simplified installation, it was possible to put there, for example, any gun, without redesigning anything and without changing the design. This approach has a plus, and it consists in the ability to adapt the ship under construction to the needs of the customer, and then it is easier and easier to upgrade, there is a minus - a separate module with weapons or equipment does not give the ship's body additional strength, and therefore the ship has to be overloaded to maintain strength, compared with the same, but not modular. We are usually talking about 200-350 tons of additional displacement for each 1000 tons that a non-modular ship would have. In the presence of a compact and powerful GEM it is tolerable.

We are also interested in analyzing the approach that the Russian Navy has plunged into - when, instead of the built-in armament or equipment, the ship receives a compartment in which modules of various purposes can be installed — weapons, for example, or equipment. The most "raspiarenny" version of this module in our country is a container launcher for cruise missiles of the "Caliber" family.

At the beginning of the twentieth century 80 in the Royal Danish Navy, someone had a brilliant idea - instead of building specialized, or, on the contrary, multifunctional ships, they need to build ships that carry modular weapons and equipment. The impetus for the emergence of this innovation was that the Danes on budget constraints could not afford to replace all the warships that they would need to replace. There were twenty-two such ships. Approximate estimates showed that if it were possible to reconfigure the ship “for the task”, then sixteen would be enough to replace these ships. By the end of 1984, the solution was already embodied in the form of prototypes — standard container modules of the 3x3,5x2,5 meter size, with the same connection interface, size and shape. The contents of the containers could be different - from guns to anti-mine systems.

Model modules were to be installed in slots and connected to the ship in a matter of hours, and the ship’s full readiness was to be restored within forty-eight hours.

The system of modular equipment and weapons received the name "Standard Flex", or simply Stanflex.

Modular virus. The concept of modular ships does not work. Nowhere

Module with gun Oto Melara Rapid, caliber 76 mm. Notice how much empty space is in the module. This volume will "cost" tens of tons of displacement, if not more

Installing the StanFlex Module.

The first ships equipped with slots for containers were patrol boats "Flyvefisken" ("Flyuvefisken", "Flying Fish").

Immediately revealed the nuances. On the one hand, the boat, as they say, “turned out” - to have an 450-mm cannon, eight Harpun anti-ship missiles, 76 SAM on 12 tonnes of displacement, and, for example, a high-speed boat and a crane for its launching, is worth it. In total, the modular loading options were much larger.

Boat "Flyvefisken" and its modules

But there were also disadvantages. Firstly, the module with the gun turned out to be “eternal” - there was no point in ever touching it. As a result, the gun was removed only before the sale of the ship to Lithuania or Portugal. Secondly - quite right, the majority of the previously built ships of the Danish Navy escaped, “sending” them to Portugal and Lithuania. Modularity was not so demanded. At the moment, Denmark itself has only three units left. Third, with three aft slots история turned out to be similar to the situation with a gun - there was no point in changing them, the ship went on patrol with the usual set of weapons, and all the additional displacement, which turned out to be necessary with modular architecture, had to be “transported” in vain. However, feed modules were sometimes rearranged, but not very often. It also turned out that if the modules with RCC can be simply installed, and they will be used by the main crew, then for other modules, for example, for the lowered GUS, special training is needed, or additional crew members. Also, although replacing twenty-two ships with sixteen was a success, it didn’t save much - the modules required storage infrastructure on the shore, which also cost money.

All this became clear not instantly, and at first the enthusiastic Danes equipped with slots for the installation of modules all of their new ships — the already mentioned patrol boats, the Niels Yuel corvettes, the Tethys patrol ships. True, even there the containers that are called “did not take off” - the installed container weapon simply remained on the ships once and for all. And if the Danes later got rid of the majority of the Fluvefisken boats, then modularity was used on the corvettes for rapid modernization, for example, the module with the C-Sparrow missile defense system was replaced with a new module from the American MUP MUP. 48 for the same missiles. The rest of the modular weapons remained to stand on ships similar to stationary. A modern example is that on Diana class patrol boats made in 2000's, there is only room for one module, and there is no possibility to install a module with a weapon, which limits the use of modules only by the laboratory module for environmental monitoring.

On the "Tetis" there are three places for modules, but this is quite understandable for a ship with a displacement of 3500 tons, which is armed with a cannon and four machine guns. The Danes simply saved on weapons, judging that since they had left behind stacks of modules with anti-ship missiles and missiles, the budget savings for the sake of new ships can simply be left unarmed, and in a threatened period, take modules from warehouses and retrofit ships with at least something.

On the Absalon class ships, which in a sense are the “calling card” of the Danish Navy, there are only two modules for rocket weapons, they are used solely so that in the future it will be possible to update rocket weapons simply and without design work.

Missile deck "Absalon". You can remove the inclined PU missiles "Harpoon" and replace them with vertical PU missiles. Or vice versa. That's all modularity

The newest class of frigates "Iver Huitfeldt" modular cells already six, and they have pre-installed his regular weapons, two guns, PU PKR "Harpoon" and UVP Mk.56. There are no free slots, modularity is used to accelerate the modernization and to balance the number of missiles and missiles on the ship, increasing the number of some and reducing the number of others.

Currently, the epic with modules in the Danish Navy is finished - now the StanFlex system is not used to give the ship multifunctionality, changing the missile module to a diving container, but to accelerate the modernization, in which the gun is changed to a cannon, rockets for rockets, etc. . The price for this was a serious increase in the displacement of the Danish warships - they are really large for the set of weapons that are carried. You have to pay for everything.

Amusingly, it was precisely in those years in which the Danish approach to modularity changed and took modern, complete forms, the USA tried to repeat the Danish idea in their own, on a fundamentally new class of ships - Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).

The history of this giant American cut of budget money is very interesting, confusing and very instructive.

It all started in the 90s, when the United States realized that the oceans turned into their lake, and that no one can stop them from doing what they consider necessary. Since they considered it necessary to "build" everything up to this point in "unbuilt" humanity, the prospects were unequivocal - the United States would need to invade one country after another, and lead the locals "to a common denominator" by force. Since Russia at that moment almost committed suicide, and China did not yet have significant fleet (and there were no signs that he would have it), it could be safely assumed that no one would supply military products to non-Western and unfriendly US countries, especially since the Americans could always push sanctions against anyone. This means that the enemy will be low-tech and weak.

As the first potential victim in those years, the Americans saw Iran, with its hordes armed with missiles of motor boats, dying without spare parts aviation, an abundance of sea mines, and an almost complete absence (then) of substantial coastal defense and fleet.

Thinking about how to deal with Iran gave rise to the concept of "Streetfighter" - a street fighter in Russian, small, about 600 tons, a warship specifically designed for fighting in the coastal zone of the enemy. According to the authors of the concept - Vice Admiral Arthur Tsebrovski, author of the “network-centric war”, so brilliantly demonstrated by Russia in Syria, and the captain of the US Navy, Wayne Hughes, this combat ship was supposed to be cheap, simple, massive and “consumable” - so much that instead of fighting for survivability with the defeat of the enemy, the crews had to throw these ships and evacuate. To make the ship more versatile, Tsebrowski and Hughes decided to use a Danish stunt - a modular weapon that can be replaced, shaping the look of the ship “for the task”.

The idea of ​​a consumable ship did not find support, but in general the Navy and the Pentagon were interested in the possibility of creating a special ship for coastal combat. Especially strongly inspired by the idea of ​​the commander of the naval operations, Admiral Vernon Clark. Tsebrowski in 2001 received the post of head of the Armed Forces Transformation Office from Donald Rumsfeld, and as soon as this happened, Clark closed the project of the missile cruiser DD-21 (in a simplified and reduced version of the Zumvalt class), and opened the program of updating the navy ships of new classes, among which was a new name - "Littoral battleship". From 2005 to 2008, the fleet drove an ugly catamaran with a helipad on the roof — Sea Fighter — on which the concept of using modular weapons and equipment was worked out while stating the requirements for a future new class of ships. The corporations went further.

Usually, the lead ship in the series was built by the winner of the tender for the supply of the ship, whose offer was the best. But there was a war in Iraq, the US military industrial complex, the military and politicians entered into the taste of mastering military budgets, and this time all competitors, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics, received orders for experienced ships of their projects. The Lockheed was moving a single-class ship of the Freedom class, General Dynamics, a trimaran of the Independence class. The Navy played the “party” as if by notes - at first it was announced that the prototypes would be compared with each other after construction, then the experimental series was slightly trimmed to two ships, and then they announced that both classes would be built, since both have irreplaceable capabilities , and choose the best of them is impossible.

It makes no sense to list the course of events further, it is described in a huge number of articles, in English Wikipediain Russian you can read article A. Mozgovogo, in the journal "National Defense". We confine ourselves to the fact that many respected people in the United States, for example, John Lehman, the hero of the Cold War, Admiral James "Ace" Lyons, John McCain and many others, fought against the Pentagon and the American military industrial complex.

Congress fought for every cent that this program promised to master, the US Audit Chamber repeatedly tested this project both from a financial point of view and from the point of view of its feasibility - nothing helped. The only thing the opponents of the project managed to do was to kill twelve ships in the series, and still achieve contracts with fixed prices for a part of the ships (it was planned to build fifty-two units, but in the end they were able to shrink up to forty, thirty six were contracted and the struggle continues). But the rink of the MIC monsters and the politicians and military men bought by them was unstoppable. In 2008, the first Freedom was accepted into service, and in 2010, the first Independence.

Freedom class. Pay attention to the bright light rectangles on the roof of the superstructure, in the back part there are the covers of the compartments for the modules with weapons. Then they were still empty

Concerned about the fate of the Navy sawing project, these ships are thrown everywhere, declaring them to solve the problem with pirates or propagandizing as an instrument to break into the “access prevention” zones, the industry is helping them, it came to the point that Lockheed partner in the Freedom, Northrop series Grumman "spread" the "study" according to which, in the fight against pirates, LCS replaces twenty (!) Ordinary ships. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the JCS, praised the amphibious capabilities of these ships, which are never actually amphibious. According to US Accounting Chamber ReportThe Navy regularly rewrites CONOPS — the operational concept — of using these ships, canceling old demands and tasks that they cannot accomplish, and, inventing new ones, is simpler.

To justify the huge investments in these ships, the Navy decided to make sure that they could perform at least some real combat missions, and after two years of tests, in May 2018 decided to equip them with NSM (Naval Strike Missile) anti-ship missiles Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace. The missiles will be installed in quad launchers, on the nose, between the gun and the superstructure, eight pieces on the ship. This is a good move, the rocket is very serious, and difficult to break. After the installation of these missiles, ships will be able to attack surface targets at a substantial distance, that is, from this point on, they will become limited in combat capability. True, they will never become full-fledged combat units.

LCS-4 USS Coronado, ship class Independence. Below the gun installed inclined PU missiles "Harpoon". "Harpoons" lost the competition to the Norwegian rocket, which will be installed in the same place. It should be understood that at first the Americans did not plan anything like this; in their imagination the war of the future was a simple execution of almost unarmed people.

But in this case we are interested in modularity.

The “base” ships look almost unarmed - the Freedom was initially armed with an 57-mm Mk.110 cannon, a RAM launcher with the RIM-21 116 anti-aircraft missile system, and four 12,7-mm machine guns. There is a hangar for one MH-60 helicopter and one MQ-8 UAV helicopter. There are jamming complexes.

The Independence was (and still is) armed as well, but its SeaRAM launcher is equipped with a radar from the Phalanx artillery, and there are two helicopters on board.

All other weapons, according to the authors of the program, should be interchangeable and modular.

The main options were as follows.

1. Module to fight the boats and boats of the enemy (Anti-Surface warfare module). It included two modular XMUM-mm automatic guns of the Bushmaster, a modular vertical launch system for NLOS-LC missiles with 30 kilometers, a MH-25 helicopter with Hellfire missiles and onboard machine guns, and armed with UAVs. This same “module” included rigid inflatable boats (RHIB) located in the under deck of combat missions (Mission Bay). A little later, the NLOS-LC program was closed along with the Future Combat Systems' mother program, the Navy tried to push a small Griffin rocket with a range of just 60 km into the ship, but due to the obvious absurdity of this step, instead of Griffin, they ended up with vertically starting "Hellfire" with a modified gos. Currently, the "module" of warheads minus weapons aboard the MQ-3,5.

We look at the photo - this is a modular gun.

And on the video below, Hellfire’s modular UVP, 24 missiles. The maximum range of shooting - about 8000 meters, targets on the video are hit at a distance of 7200 meters.

2. Anti-submarine warfare module. It includes a lowered landing force towed by a Thales CAPTAS-4 towed, towed hydroacoustic countermeasure system AN / SLQ-61 / Light Weight Towed Torpedo Defense (LWT), a MH-60S helicopter armed with a light torpedo Mk.54. She is included in the "module" as a weapon of the UAV. Currently, ten years after raising the flag on the lead ship "Freedom" module is not ready. Presumably, the Navy must be put together and tested in the 2021 year.

3. Mine module (Mine clearance module). Laser mine detection systems from a helicopter, data exchange with the “shore”, a GUS search for mines, a crewless boat to search for mines from its GAS, an NPBA to search for mines under water, disposable mine destroyers and a helicopter itself to accommodate the laser system, helicopter trawl, and much more. "Module" neberegotov, tested individual components.

4. The outfit of forces for the landing and "irregular" fighting (Irregular warfare and landing module). Typical forces include warehouses with equipment and weapons of marines, one helicopter landing helicopter, one fire support helicopter, landing boats for high-speed delivery of soldiers to the coast and the Marines themselves. Such forces are supposed to be used for special operations, mainly from Independence class ships carrying two helicopters and having a large flight deck.

The Navy slid into the “Danish path” almost instantly. Having a ship with a displacement of more than three thousand tons, and the price of two-thirds of the new destroyer "Arly Burke", it would be foolish to continue to keep it unarmed. As soon as the modules with thirty-millimeter guns reached readiness for use, they were immediately installed on Freedom-class ships, and were never removed. At present, even a photo of the ship in its original configuration, without guns, with covers over slots is a rarity.

"Guns forever." Could immediately put a stationary!

The modular weapon suddenly appeared permanently installed. Until a certain point, it was unclear whether the same fate awaits other modules, because the ship provides for the simultaneous deployment of some components that are included in different modules.

The Americans remained silent about this for quite a while, but in 2016 year finally recognized - those modules that will be completed will not be used as removable - they will be installed on ships all the time.

In early September 2016, the commander of the surface forces of the Navy, Vice Admiral Tom Rowden stated the following.

All the planned twenty-four (here apparently means still unfinished and not built ships), will be distributed in six divisions. Three divisions for the class "Independence" and the same class "Freedom". Each division will be equipped with “its own” types of modules - anti-mine, anti-submarine, and a module to combat boats and boats. Each division will work only its own tasks - the fight against boats and boats, the fight against mines and anti-submarine defense. There will not be a replaceable crew whose task is to work on modular weapons - the crews will be formed as permanent. At the same time, for each ship will be formed two crews, which will serve on it in turn. This will maximize the participation of ships in combat services.

And so on.

This is the end of the project in its original form. Modularity again failed. Truly, the Americans immediately had to listen to Admiral Lyons, and make LCS based on patrol ship class "Legend", to which all modular subsystems “forced” for LCS would stand up “like relatives”, moreover, all at the same time and without any modularity, faster, better and cheaper than happened in reality. But it must be understood that the priorities of the authors of the LCS program were not cheap and not a benefit for American taxpayers, but completely different things.

It is difficult to say what will happen next. Modules for LCS are not ready, the ships are standing. For 2018 a year there was not a single combat service in which they would participate. Perhaps Rowden’s statements are realized when the anti-submarine and anti-mine modules are ready.

The Americans are joking that when the anti-mine and anti-submarine modules are ready, the head ships will have to be written off by age.

And in this joke there is some truth. Knowingly, the same Rowden said that two crews would be formed for each littoral warship to increase the operating voltage coefficient (KOH). The presence of two crews will naturally "drive" these ships to an unrepairable state, in order to get a reason to write them off due to wear, and finally close this shameful page in the history of the US Navy. So in their time they did it with the frigates "Oliver Perry" to open the way for this very LCS. When the money will be mastered, it will be the turn of the LCS and new projects, new budgets themselves.

I must say that the US Navy has no other options - according to the already mentioned report of the US Audit Chamber, the Navy deceived the public, claiming that replacing the modules and changing the “profile” of ships is a matter of a couple of days. According to the latest data, if necessary, replace the module, the ship, taking into account the time to go to the base and back, change the crew, deliver the module and its installation, is eliminated from the war for the period from 12 to 29 days. With such modularity, you can’t win much, which led to the "freezing" of the configuration of all existing and under construction ships in one version.

True, the main battle ahead. In the coming years, the US Navy plans to acquire frigates. Lobbyists of LCS from Lockheed already claim that LCS is practically a frigate, show export options for Saudi Arabia and Israel that have air defense systems and declare that for the US Navy it’s not necessary to invent anything, LCS, if you change it slightly constructively, this is a frigate. It is only necessary ... to remove the modules! And install weapons constantly. And do not remember the modularity in vain, do not discuss in public what was done before what was done.

Their opponents are already preparing to finish off the program, not even laying the contracted ships, shifting the focus of shipbuilding in the United States to future frigates. Normal, not based on LCS.

But this, of course, is a completely different story.

Naturally, after such a circus, the Americans should have formed a definite opinion about what the modular ships are worth, and what they should (and should) be. And it was formed.

In April, 2018, the already mentioned admiral John Richardson in an interview about his vision of the future warship of the US Navy. According to him, the hull and the main power plant is something that cannot be changed on the ship (for the GEM it is possible, but incredibly difficult), so they must meet the requirements of the future initially. This is especially true of electrical generation, which should produce the maximum possible power so that in the future it will be enough for any consumer, even electromagnetic guns and combat lasers, if they appear.

But everything else should be, according to Richardson, quick-changeable. They took out the outdated radar, quickly replaced a new one in its place, connected it - it works. There is no difference in connection dimensions, electrical voltage, data exchange protocol with digital vehicle tires, and so on - everything should work right away.

In fact, we are talking about a repetition of the Danish version - a modular gun, if it is replaced, then with another modular gun. No substitution of missiles for a diving container, empty slots - modularity, this means to quickly upgrade the ship, upgrade the radar, radio weapons and weapons, without setting up a factory for a couple of years. So they see it now, so they talk about it when they don’t need to lie to Congress and journalists.

Summarize what conclusions can be reached by analyzing the experience of Americans and Danes, and their experiments with modularity:

1. Replacing a module with a module with another weapon or equipment is not a working idea. The modules must be properly stored, they must have crews or calculations, they must somehow be trained while the ships are at sea with other modules, it costs money.

2. The enemy will not allow to change modules in combat and operations. The ship will fight with what is installed on it, it will not be possible to replay it.

3. Ultimately, the modules will be installed on the ship forever.

4. The meaning of modularity in the correct version is not to vary the weapons and equipment on the ship, but to make it easier to modernize when the time comes.

5. A modular ship, in which weapons and equipment conceived as modular, is permanently installed, is worse than the same, but not modular — removable modules not involved in ensuring the strength of the hull require an increase in weight and dimensions of the hull structures, which leads to an irrational increase in displacement, which, in turn, requires a more powerful and expensive GEM.

6. Modules are late - the ships are ready for them earlier than they themselves. For the Danes, this was expressed to a small extent, but for the Americans it is the number one problem in their project.

Did they understand all this in Russia when the scam with the 20386 project and the “patrol” “ships” of the 22160 project began? And how. The link is available article "Modular principles of construction of warships. Some problems and solutions (on page 19), for the authorship of Doctor of Technical Sciences L.P. Gavrilyuk and A.I. Lump.

In it all the problems of modular ships, which are fully manifested in the American projects, are meticulously and in detail disassembled, and to a certain extent can occur in our country. The authors finally make the following conclusion:

"As a prototype of the concept of modular construction of ships, the concept developed by TsNIITS (now JSC TsTSS)) can be used in 90-s ... and based on the achievements of modern measuring equipment, it provides for zonal design and construction of ships with modular principles of assembling weapons systems on welding. Zonal armament units are unified by types, each of which has its own units and mounting technologies for welding, which provide the required mounting accuracy. The joints of the zonal blocks and modules are equipped with positioning systems of increased accuracy. "

We venture to suggest that Richardson had something in mind, just did not finish or did not think. So, according to the views of domestic specialists, naturally honest, not biased, modularity is a means to quickly replace the old ship stuffing with a new one, and in order not to increase the displacement, the modules should be part of the power kit of the hull and superstructure, and therefore be mounted on welding . Naturally, it is impossible to talk about any changes of rockets to pressure chambers under such conditions - we can only talk about providing the ability to quickly modernize the ship.
This article was released in 2011 year, in May. The analysis of foreign experience is made quite at the “level”, the trends of the future are determined objectively and honestly, there is nothing to complain about.

The more surprising were the events that followed.

In 2011-2013, as we know, there was a turn in the views of the Navy command on the future of surface ships. It was then that the Navy refused to improve the 20380 corvettes, to further develop the 20385 line, and decided to build 22160 patrol ships - modular, unarmed and inappropriate to the requirements for warships, and "Corvettes" of the project 20386 - inferior in arms to the previous 20385 project, inferior in anti-submarine capabilities to the old 20380 and IPC 1124 corvette, over-sophisticated, unnecessarily expensive and too large for the BMZ.

In order to assess what rake the Navy comes in (having before it the negative experience of two not the last states in the maritime business), let's take a closer look at the ship of the 20386 project precisely from the point of view of ensuring its modularity and indiscriminately other shortcomings of its design his whole construction is one sheer flaw, but more on that another time).

First, the stupidity is the choice of form factor for modular weapons. What was the point of packing everything into standard shipping containers? This would be “to the point” if it were about the rapid arming of civilian ships and their use in the Navy for mobilization. Then the containers are a big plus. For a combat ship, this is a minus, every kilogram counts on a combat ship, and speed remains an extremely important quality. Containers, because of the large volume, require "to inflate" the ship to an enormous size. For the 20386 project, this applies to the maximum extent.

To accommodate the modules selected feed. In this case, the designers chose a truly insane way of loading modules on board. First, you need to put the module on the helicopter lift with a crane, then lower it into the hangar, horizontally move it through the gate in the rear wall of the hangar to the compartment of the replaceable modules and install it there using lifting equipment. Everything would be fine, but the location of the lifting equipment and the need to transport containers inside the ship require additional height in the feed compartments - otherwise not to lift the container and not to drag. And height is an additional volume. And it generates additional tonnes of displacement. As a result, the 20380 corvettes of the 1007 and 1008 orders possess not only the same weapons as the 20386, but almost the same multifunctional radar complex Zaslon, which is simply mounted not on the superstructure, but on the integrated tower-mast structure. But their displacement at the same time less than a thousand-odd tons, a third!

That's what led the games with the modules-containers. About the fact that for the sake of the module with the Caliber missiles it is necessary to go to sea without a helicopter, it has already been said more than once, and the degree of absurdity of this decision is obvious to any normal person. For some reason, on a smaller, and approximately 900 tons lighter 20385 corvette, there is both a helicopter and eight cells in the vertical missile launch facility, and the same sixteen anti-aircraft missiles, the same gun, the same radar complex, and there is no need to choose - everything is installed at the same time. With a total, absolute superiority of old corvettes in hydroacoustics.

Next, let's try to think - and how will the applicability of new modules? So, the towed sonar station on the 20386 is removable. But given the primitive built-in gas, which commander would agree to go out to sea without being towed? A ship without it is like a “blind (although generally deaf, but oh well) kitten.” In addition, the module in its place is not provided, it has nothing to replace. And there is additional space for transporting and installing the gas, there is no way around it. And that means what? And this means that the GAS will be put in torment once and for all, and no one will take it off from there anymore, there are no suicides among the ship commanders and naval commanders. Why then modularity? Next - container PU.

At first glance, a helicopter can be sacrificed. Do not take it with you, and that's all. But the ship does not have a long-range submarine detection tool, even if using the towed GAS somewhere behind or from the side, the submarine will be spotted (right on the course it will not be spotted on time, there is nothing, the built-in GAS is dead). Torpedoes complex "Package"? But their range is small, and it’s unrealistic to reload the Packet into the sea - the launcher is made so miserable that it can only be reloaded in the base.

If there were a helicopter, there would be chances to urgently raise it with torpedoes for the attack of the discovered submarine, or with torpedoes and buoys for additional search and attack ... actually, that is why he will be on board, and no container launchers. Again, because there are no suicide bombers.

The position remains in the center of the aft compartment, between the side lazportami for boats. Any module can be put there. Diving, for example, or mine. And this is the only "excuse" for the super-expensive ship and the "killed" program of upgrading ships of the near-sea zone, the loss of inter-ship unification, and the loss of time to at least 2025, but rather 2027, when the failure of this scam can no longer be hidden. And this is without taking into account technical risks, because of which this ship may simply not be built. Never.

Great price for one modular container with accessories. Or two.

Loading modules. First, on the lift, then roll on the brackets with wheels through the gate into the compartment of the interchangeable equipment. There using crane girders to mount in place

Pay attention to how much space above the towed gas. But this is all ship steel, displacement. And more expensive GEM to move it all. At the same time, GUS will most likely never be removed.

The launch of rockets from the hangar is an innovation that knows no equal. Nobody has done this before. And, most likely, never will. And if the rocket falls back or detonates immediately after launch? The survivability of a standard UVP in such a situation is several times higher

But more importantly, with the example of 20386, all the problems with the modules that stood in the way of the Danes and Americans seem to be confirmed. And the fact that part of the modules will be installed on the ship forever, and that because of them the ship has a significantly higher displacement and larger dimensions (and more expensive GEM, as a result), and that the modules will need to be stored in special conditions, provide calculations, and calculations provide training ...

And the “lateness” of the modules also seems to us “shining”. At least 20386 was laid out in October 2016 of the year, 2018 really began to build it in November (project supporters - but you didn’t know, did you?), And there is still no rocket module with Calibres. There is a mock-up PU capable of providing the so-called “throwing” test, that is, a start-up “to nowhere”, without guidance, without loading the flight task, that's all. And in general there are no modules yet, except for the final test of the removable GAS “Minotaur” and diving container. It is possible that they will not be in 2027 either. A displacement in 3400 tons of a "corvette" 20386 - in fact already.

But maybe on the patrol ship of the 22160 project, the modules will “register” better? Here we must admit that yes, it is better. On this ship, the location and method of mounting the modules is better at times. There, the modules are placed in "slots" by a crane, through large hatches in the deck, and are combined with the helicopter. This is not to say that it made the ship much more useful. But, at least, its zero efficiency does not turn into a negative value when trying to install a container there. This makes me happy.

Zero more than minus. You can take comfort in even this, although the people's money is very sorry. Well, remember that the container is not yet

But again, if these ships get a meaningful task, the containers will be “registered” there forever. Should these “patrolmen” take over the tasks of non-nuclear deterrence of NATO, and receive (well, all of a sudden!) Containers with “Gauges”, it is unlikely someone will ever remove them from these ships. Tension in relations with the West is not reduced, and, apparently, it will never decrease, which means that the missiles must be ready for use at all times. If some ships suggest that these ships be used to protect the Nord Stream pipeline from terrorists and saboteurs, no one will load the modular load while this task is relevant. And, like the Danes with the Americans, the modularity will be just superfluous. Modules will not be replaced, they will always be on the ship.

We stepped on the same rake, on which others passed before us. We saw these rakes hit them in the forehead. But still made this step. The result will be logical - it will be the same as that of the Americans, and worse than the Danes, who got off with "little blood" with their invention, and the Absalons, due to the rational and extremely limited use of modular technologies, even turned the modularity to theoretically at least.

And it is very disappointing that all this was done when our specialists had already outlined the correct ways to use the modular approach in the future, by disseminating this information in specialized editions of the shipbuilding industry.

But, like the Americans, the authors of our modular ships, priorities are somewhat different from the growth of the combat capability of the Navy and, especially, the saving of public money. Alas, but in the case of modular ships, we repeat not only the mistakes of others, but also the crimes of others.

So does this mean that modularity is an absolute evil? Not really.

As you know, the poison is different from the drug dosage. For a full-fledged warship, the ability to quickly upgrade is very important. And modular models of weapons and equipment installed on warships can accelerate this upgrade. Here only these modules must meet the following conditions:

1. Fastening by welding and "participation" in ensuring the rigidity and strength of the body. This will prevent the growth of the displacement of the ship.

2. Rejection of the idea of ​​having a standard form factor. Use for their guns connecting dimensions, for their own radar, and so on. This will allow upgrading weapons and various equipment without costly reworking the ship, and the displacement, if it grows, is not by a third, like in "ordinary" modular ships, but by a few percent.

Naturally, there will be no talk of any quick replacements of a module with a module. Modules will be replaced only during upgrades, and only with similar ones (cannon on gun, radar on radar). Naturally, as the American Commander-in-Chief Richardson said, electrical power should be installed with an eye to the future, so that later, in the future, to support more energy-intensive equipment.

Yes, and container modules can find their purpose. First of all, when arming non-military ships, or obsolete and not subject to "normal" modernization of ships. So, on a small bulk carrier, it is possible to install four or six container caliber "Caliber" missiles, directly "into the trough" on the floor of the cargo compartment, throw power supply cables along the floor, and install a floor above a part of the cargo compartment to install, for example, a radar module, a mobile monoblock version of the Pantsir or a stand-alone Torah module, container PUs of the Uranus complex, and so on.

PU KR "Club" on a container ship

Here, for example, the Finns put a container mortar caliber 120 millimeters on the boat. For such purposes, modularity will find its full use.

And, most likely, common sense will prevail. No fall is everlasting, at the end it is always a blow. Whether it will be shamefully lost to a third-rate war in the sea, or just all the secret will be revealed, we are not given to know. But the fact that the final will be - for sure. And then, perhaps, common sense and honesty will again be in demand. And we will stop walking around the rake - alien and our own, catching “trendy” viruses from abroad and repeating other people's crimes for the enrichment of a handful of crooks.

In the meantime, we can only watch.
Photos used:
US Navy, Royal Danish Navy, Research Gate, AOS Inc.,, M.Conards, Almaz Central Securities and Design Bureau, AV Karpenko, Concern "Agat".

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  1. Miron
    Miron 4 January 2019 06: 17
    A very long article. Yes. But even she wasn’t enough to figure it out.
    Modules are not a panacea, that's true. But there is another aspect. They are not so expensive to be afraid of price increases.
    That is, if you imagine that there is a certain project in which the modules will be useful, then small ships, where they are "not a minus", is a stand on which the materiel is checked.
    Where you can evaluate the benefits of modules, for example, an aircraft skimmer. These ships are modular in nature. There are modules - airplanes. Many US aircraft, which plowed the oceans until recently, began their lives during the Second World War. During operation, their modules changed from rotor-piston to supersonic turbojets with vertical take-off.
    On such a scale of time, to say that the module which is 2 years old is "not that" is somewhat hasty. In my humble opinion.
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 09: 51
      Modules themselves are not expensive at all. Dear carriers. LCS with a shock power comparable to 22160 (!) Costs about 2 / 3 Arly Burke. Moreover, if a separate module is inexpensive, then the entire set of modules on the ship is another matter. Take a look at the GAO report to which the text has a link, if you read in English.
      1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
        Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 4 January 2019 10: 00
        Another modular ice-breaker patrol ship, Ivan Papanin, of the 23550 project. Pledged at the Shipyard "Admiralty Shipyards" in St. Petersburg 19.04.2017 year. Displacement: about 8500 tons. Autonomy: 60 days. Crew: 60 people + 50 additionally. Armament: one 76-mm gun mount AK-176MA, two 14.5-mm machine guns MTPU. The ship has a take-off and landing pad and a hangar for a helicopter, as well as the possibility of placing the Caliber missile system in a container version. The armament is not thick, a multifunctional hybrid of a warship and an auxiliary vessel. By the way, during the Second World War, ships obtained by installing artillery on icebreakers were called auxiliary cruisers, after all. So in all respects these ice patrols are quite pulling on auxiliary cruisers. Congratulations to all on laying the first surface ship of the first rank in a considerable time, albeit not very formidable drinks
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 10: 10
          On Papanin, at least the diving equipment will be "in place". And there are few of them in the series, only two.
          Let it be for the future.

          In general, before you rejoice at any "auxiliary cruisers", it would be nice to start building real warships. Without them, auxiliary ones are just targets and nothing more.
          1. Lamatinets
            Lamatinets 4 January 2019 13: 09
            Maybe our fleet is somehow thinking about the concept of the Dobroflot from the time of RI?
            1. timokhin-aa
              4 January 2019 17: 09
              It is beyond the capabilities of the navy. Then at least think, though not ...
      2. Sergey-8848
        Sergey-8848 5 January 2019 22: 00
        Mortar on the ship - why? Finns are peculiar guys, there will always be a couple of goals in skerries. But - because of this, to pile and always carry a mortar superstructure ??? !!! (according to chess encryption - very, very in vain!)
  2. Hole puncher
    Hole puncher 4 January 2019 06: 36
    A good article, even if an erroneous opinion is presented, but damn, why so many emotions in a purely technical topic? Did the author decide to imitate Damantsev?
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 09: 52
      Yes, emotions whip over the edge of our stupidity. How could 20386 and 22160 go after all this? And they can cost us a new Tsushima, if that.

      What are the wrong conclusions?
      1. Corn
        Corn 4 January 2019 19: 25
        How can you not understand, only the lazy one did not write to you that there would be no more Tsushima, simply because the impact function of modern warships is secondary.
        Modularity increases the internal volume, but not displacement.
        It turns out that all the equipment of the new generation is several times more expensive than the previous one. Instead of the traditional all-steel hull, the American LSCs were made aluminum-composite, the place of a large crew was maximum atomization, the place of a simple diesel engine was a complex combined power plant. LSC is probably the perfect defense ship of the maritime border of any developed state, 20386 and 22160 is an attempt to repeat the same, but without the presence of an annual trillion military budget.
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 19: 47
          Modularity increases the internal volume, but not displacement.

          It is physically impossible.

          Instead of the traditional all-steel hull, the American LSC made aluminum - composite, the place of a large crew was maximum automatization, the place of a simple diesel engine was a complex combined power plant.

          The massive rejection of aluminum alloys is the result of the Falklands War, which was already in 1982. After that, they try to make the warships steel, "Arlie Burke" for example.
          Regarding the downsized crew, the article contains a link to USNI (with Rowden's statement), as it says in English letters in white that the downsized crews "did not take out" the tasks and it is going to increase the number of the permanent crew to the maximum 98 people, and even a link is given for a study on the number of LCS crews, you are not too lazy to follow the links. If you don’t know English, install google-chrome, there’s some, but there is machine translation.

          The LSC is probably the ideal defense ship for the maritime frontier of any developed country.

          It was created for offensive operations, not for defense. The United States does not consider the possibility of an attack on its territory, with the exception of a hypothetical nuclear war.

          You do not argue with reality.

          20386 and 22160 is an attempt to repeat the same thing, but without an annual trillion-dollar military budget.

          I was in a correspondence with the Deputy Chief of Staff Vice Admiral Bursuk about 20386. So he didn’t tell me why 20386 was needed, wrote that it was a state secret. Is 22160 like anti-piracy patrol?

          Will you share the sources of information, please.
          1. Corn
            Corn 4 January 2019 20: 50
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            It is impossible physically

            Remember the law of Archimedes, the volume of the surface part does not affect the submerged volume (displacement). I strongly doubt that the experience of a war of 40 years ago is at least somehow applicable in modern times. At the same time, the boom in aluminum shipbuilding (first civilian, and then military) occurred only in the late 00s, and this fact cannot be ignored.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            It was created for offensive military operations, not for defense.

            Many copies have already been broken around the LSC program, and everywhere they write that it is a defensive ship with the possibility of escort. Of course, they do not plan to seriously defend their territory, but they patrol defecated and in large numbers. In addition, some American vassals and numerous American bases need protection.
            1. timokhin-aa
              4 January 2019 21: 08
              Remember the law of Archimedes, the volume of the surface part does not affect the volume being submerged (displacement).

              Are you kidding me? The weight of the structure afloat affects the immersion. Archimedes force is pushing, but we also have WEIGHT. Do you understand?
              You have added the volume of steel structures, they have a mass, as a result received an increase in weight.
              Immersion intensified.

              I strongly doubt that the experience of the 40-old war of war is at least applicable in modern times. At the same time, the boom of aluminum shipbuilding (first civil, and then military) occurred only at the end of 00's, and this fact cannot be ignored.

              You ignore the facts. Just the end of the eighties is the transition back to steel. After the burned out English ships. And this is still the case, ask how much aluminum is in the superstructure of the same "Burke".

              LCS is an exception due to insane customer requirements for speed.

              Many copies are already broken around the LSC program, and everywhere they write that this is a defensive ship with the possibility of escorting.

              So in the toilets on the walls they write this sometimes ... Like a ship that does not have ANY means of self-defense from submarines, and a minimum short-range air defense (albeit effective, but capable of repelling exactly one weak attack, no more, and not with the 100% probability ) can someone escort? How will he protect a guarded convoy? Cannon 57-mm? Bushmasters? Anti-hatch missiles with a range of 8 km?
              1. Corn
                Corn 4 January 2019 22: 04
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                You added volume of steel structures

                Specify what kind of designs. Do you consider the payload "useless ballast" or the module frame?
                Pay attention to how much space is towed over.
                Notice how much empty space is in the module. This volume will "cost" tens of tons of displacement

                Like a ship that does not have ANY means of self-defense against submarines, and a minimum near-range air defense
                this minimal air defense is enough to repel most likely threats.
                Do you really think that it’s a big problem to put a torpedo there with such huge redundant volumes and a helicopter? Usually detect a submarine problem, not destroy ...
                1. timokhin-aa
                  5 January 2019 13: 35
                  What kind of designs, specify

                  Corps. A ship with a contour of 20386 but with built-in, rather than modular armament would have a depth of at least one meter below. And this is steel, and it has a mass. I repeat. The 20385 Corvette has a more powerful weapon than the 20386, exactly the same radar complex as the 20386, the same helicopter, heavier diesel power plant, more powerful, larger in size and more efficient GUS, but it is also lighter by 900 tons. This is the price of a modular architecture.

                  this minimal air defense is enough to repel most likely threats.

                  Couple Su-30 with X-35, and goodbye. Any submarine and goodbye. Any ship with 76-mm or more artillery and more - and goodbye. You understand that even 22160 can drown him laughing ?

                  Detect the PL there is nothing, by the way.
              2. venik
                venik 4 January 2019 22: 26
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                Just the end of the eighties is the transition back to steel. After the burned down English ships.

                At the same time, Alexander (or is it Oleg?) Completely ignores or simply does not understand (due to his poor knowledge of materials science) that the problems of the deceased British Sheffield and Coventry, as well as our Monsoon MRK, are not about that light (aluminum) alloys were used in the design, and that they used exactly aluminum magnesium alloy (AMG). It is THIS alloy, with all its remarkable weight and strength characteristics (preserved over a wide temperature range), that has a nasty "habit" to ignite at high temperatures and burn very actively, with the release of pungent smoke ..... However, this does NOT apply to OTHER aluminum alloys !! And there are HUNDREDS of them (if not more !!) ......
                1. timokhin-aa
                  5 January 2019 13: 18
                  Aluminum alloys — any — behave very badly when pozhaoe. Aluminum-magnesium burn, yes.

                  But when inside the ships a few hundred kg of explosives are blown up and the same amount of fuel burns down, then any aluminum is right past the word in general.

                  Therefore, for example Burke - steel.
                2. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 5 January 2019 16: 27
                  Quote: venik
                  At the same time, Alexander (or is it Oleg?) Completely ignores or simply does not understand (due to his poor knowledge of materials science) that the problems of the deceased British Sheffield and Coventry, as well as our Monsoon MRK, are not about that light (aluminum) alloys were used in the design, and that it was aluminum-magnesium alloy (AMG) that was used there.

                  All EM "type 42" had steel hulls and superstructures. Steel-us-mi! The British had enough fires on ships built in the 60s and 70s to understand that light alloys in the construction of a warship are not applicable.

                  The problems of "Sheffield" and EM "Type 42" in general were associated with the fact that low-flammable plastic was widely used in interior decoration. And also with savings on everything during construction - because of which protection, redundancy and redundancy were sacrificed to the budget. As a result, two of the three working Sheffield fire pumps, which did not have sufficient vibration protection, were out of order simply from the impact of an anti-ship missile system. And the main fire line, which did not have shut-off valves and bypass circuits, did not hold pressure after fragmentation of only one section.
              3. venik
                venik 4 January 2019 22: 49
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                The mass of the structure afloat affects immersion. The strength of Archimedes is pushing, but we also have WEIGHT. Do you understand?

                Well, I just understand !!! Do you UNDERSTAND the difference between by weight и weight??? Looks like no!!! Probably with physics at school - there were "disagreements" ?? And this is for a person with an IQ = 140 ??? request
                1. timokhin-aa
                  5 January 2019 13: 16
                  Vladimir, I specifically wrote that with increasing mass, weight increases. You just do not understand the meaning of what you comment.
              4. voyaka uh
                voyaka uh 7 January 2019 00: 17
                "How will he protect the guarded convoy? With a 57mm cannon? Bushmasters?" ////
                With their helicopters. There are three of them. Two manned and one unmanned reconnaissance.
                F-35B can easily land on a large trimaran airfield.
                Think of these trimarans as ocean-borne frigates capable of
                reach a speed of 40 knots. That is, to catch up or vice versa break away from
                any ship of the enemy.
            2. The comment was deleted.
            3. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 5 January 2019 16: 13
              Quote: Corn
              I strongly doubt that the experience of a war of 40 years ago is at least somehow applicable in modern times.

              Physics and chemistry have not changed in 40 years.
              Quote: Corn
              At the same time, the boom in aluminum shipbuilding (first civilian, and then military) occurred only in the late 00s, and this fact cannot be ignored.

              The first boom in light-alloy shipbuilding came in the 70s. And then the fires began. It was because of the fires of the 70s that the British in the EM project "type 42" ("Sheffields") returned back to steel ... however, this did not save them - they forgot to remove the low-combustible plastic of the interior decoration.

              What high technologies on LCS can we talk about if their designersthe phenomena managed to put movers with stainless steel cases on an aluminum casing - and threw out the cathodic protection for the sake of economy! And then they asked for more money to fix their own jamb. belay
              1. frog
                frog 5 January 2019 22: 13
                "They forgot to remove the low-combustible plastic of the interior trim."

                And if it's not a secret, what is "low-flammable plastic"? Because it should be, EMNIP, completely non-combustible ...
                And about the steel parts in an aluminum case ..... Maybe they didn’t forget, maybe it was intended so?)))) I’m not at all sure, but I heard somewhere, there were problems with the same corrosion on the 22nd .... Really a trend ??
          2. Nemchinov Vl
            Nemchinov Vl 5 January 2019 01: 45
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            I was in correspondence with the deputy chairman of the Civil Code Vice Admiral Bursuk about 20386. So he did not tell me why 20386 was needed, he wrote that it was a state secret.

            As for the method "cut the budget" (or - "a good show is more expensive than money"), he could not have answered otherwise. But it is quite possible that 20386 is just a project for "testing" item (1) - a new power plant, with partial electromotion; p. (2) - Interaction of the MF RLK "Zaslon" with the "Redoubt" (in terms of the possibility of providing them with accurate control units for long-range missiles (9M96E2, and this is already 120-135 km., which in fact are "dead" at 20380)!
            The question was just whether it was worth bothering so much? There was an option to "test" the same power plant on pr. 11356 R / M, and "Zaslon" to 20385. The only thing, in this situation, to explain the waste of extra 12-16 billion on R&D and so on. (without the appearance of another, new project 20386), it would be many times more difficult ...
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            And 22160 is he kind of patrol-anti-piracy?
            . And here, most likely, a different goal. They just realized that using BODs or frigates for this, taking big luxury off the 5th squadron, and came up with something simpler and cheaper ...
        2. venik
          venik 4 January 2019 23: 02
          Quote: Corn
          How can you not understand, only the lazy one did not write to you that there would be no more Tsushima, simply because the impact function of modern warships is secondary.

          About the first part of the conclusion (about the impossibility of a "new Tsushima" - good good But the second part - about the fact that modern ships have a "strike function" - secondary - that's forgive me request What about RTOs? What about missile boats? For them, just - precisely the shock function - prevails!
          Here the reason is different: the whole tactics of naval combat (when all the main forces of the squadrons converged in close combat). drinks
          1. Corn
            Corn 4 January 2019 23: 46
            Russia is building MRCs with calibers solely for the purpose of circumventing the INF Treaty, and I strongly doubt that the topic will be developed after the collapse of the treaty, and a pair of blocks with x-35 will be enough for them, just in case. Full-fledged strike functions in the great war rest entirely with the submarine fleet and strike aircraft. Relatively expensive, but effectively and significantly reduces risks. This is even if all sorts of third world countries build a mosquito fleet, take in quantity, and Russia simply cannot afford to risk the lives of sailors.
            1. Newone
              Newone 5 January 2019 00: 25
              Do you also propose fire support for the landing from submarines? Launchers for calibers are not only Caliber-NK (although the more such launchers at the beginning of the war the better)
              1. Corn
                Corn 5 January 2019 01: 44
                Quote: Newone
                support for landing, you also suggest from submarines to carry out

                Landing of whom, where and why? This time. For full expeditionary operations are needed least troughs like Japanese Raisins or British Queen Elizabeth. Without local dominance in the airspace, the landing immediately turns into useless suicide bombers without any chance of success.
                Quote: Newone
                although the more such launchers at the beginning of the war the better
                offer to build a barge for 200 launchers? =)
        3. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 5 January 2019 15: 57
          Quote: Corn
          Instead of the traditional all-steel case, the American LSC made aluminum - composite

          Do you know why? Because it was originally thought. that LCS will work from a distance without going into the zone of destruction of enemy fire weapons.
          And now this alloying is considered the main disadvantage of LCS - since in the current situation of the spread of Sino-Iranian anti-ship missiles it turned out that ships without constructive protection and made of combustible alloys cannot be used without covering them with full-fledged EM URO. But they did LCS in order to release these EM URO.
      2. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 4 January 2019 19: 35
        The general conclusion about the dangers of modularity is incorrect.
        Let's remember what the non-modular approach led to (and many times in history!):
        entire series of ships became obsolete while still on the stocks, and to do something
        it was already late. For example, when the enemy increased the main caliber guns.
        Generations of weapons change faster than generations of ships.
        When building the building today, it’s impossible to even imagine what weapons will be equipped
        ship in 30 years. And those cases in which it will be impossible to place weapons
        of the future, will go to scrap. Only a modular approach can correct the situation.
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 19: 49
          Well, let's take the example of 20386.
          The ship was launched, completed and handed over (this is fantastic, but suddenly!). And now he has outdated SAM.

          What's next?

          The modular approach makes sense as a way to quickly replace a system with a more modern counterpart - radar on radar, air defense system on SAM, etc.

          But not like now.
          1. iConst
            iConst 4 January 2019 21: 40
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            The ship was launched, completed and handed over (this is fantastic, but suddenly!). And now he has outdated SAM.

            What's next?

            The modular approach makes sense as a way to quickly replace a system with a more modern counterpart - radar on radar, air defense system on SAM, etc.

            But not like now.

            So criticize the current approach of the liberal "ilita", and not the very principle of modularity.
            It is known that any sound thought can be reduced to absurdity.

            That's right - modularity, like maintaining a combat unit in accordance with the tasks performed.

            Also, the option of using modularity has not been considered, as a reduction in time costs when designing ships for a range of specific tasks.

            It is clear that there are no universal ship hulls, but if you apply the design method from the reverse (or rather, the correct method) - when the line of hulls are designed with modularity in mind, this should significantly reduce the time for the development and construction of naval warships.

            But, here we come to the main problem - the concept or doctrine of the use of the Navy, which, in turn, is part of the concept or doctrine of all the armed forces of Russia.

            I don’t know that. The Americans have such a concept and do not hide it (but it is impossible to hide it!).
            And if there is no concept, then it is not possible to know what types of weapons are needed in the end.

            If you do not have a project at home, then how can you know how many and what building materials you need to buy? How many workers and in general when this house will be built.
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 5 January 2019 16: 55
          Quote: voyaka uh
          Generations of weapons change faster than generations of ships.

          Tell that to the Ticonderogs and the Burkes. How many years has the standard UVP Mark 41 been in service with the US Navy? wink
          Quote: voyaka uh
          When building the hull today, it is impossible to even imagine what weapons the ship will be equipped with in 30 years.

          That is why, apparently, the Americans continue to build the foundation of their fleet without any modularity. smile As UVP did at the end of the Cold War, they put it on for 30 years in a row. only the number of cells change.
          1. voyaka uh
            voyaka uh 5 January 2019 20: 15
            Standard cell - this is the combat module. smile
            The missiles in it change as they progress, while the cell module remains.
      3. Miron
        Miron 4 January 2019 22: 22
        In fact, Tsushima were not worth the ships, as such, but their absence. So you are fundamentally wrong. This is exactly what confuses. Instead of proposing what it is building and considering the comparison, the author (and you) suggests (e) not building what is produced.
        1. timokhin-aa
          5 January 2019 13: 36
          the author (and you) proposes (e) not to build, what is produced.

          This five!
  3. Strashila
    Strashila 4 January 2019 06: 59
    Another discussion on the topic of pills from everything. Modular design and should not be so. The only question is where to take it. The quick conversion of a civilian ship into an armed one, I emphasize not armed, but armed. Creating the configuration of a support vessel for landing operations, when these same modules can be unloaded ashore and serve as a temporary base.
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 09: 53
      The rapid re-equipment of a civilian ship into an armed one, I emphasize not combat, but armed.

      Well, the article says it.
  4. Lamatinets
    Lamatinets 4 January 2019 07: 02
    I didn’t understand something, the author is for or against. But, in any case, trying to figure it out. Thank.
    1. Dart2027
      Dart2027 4 January 2019 07: 29
      Quote: Lamatinets
      I didn’t understand something, the author is for or against.

      The author believes that everything should be done taking into account the realities of life - in some cases, modularity is useful, but in some it is not.
      1. Lamatinets
        Lamatinets 4 January 2019 07: 30
        Thank you for clarifying the situation.
  5. Reklastik
    Reklastik 4 January 2019 07: 33
    if these ships get a meaningful task, the containers will “be registered” there forever.
    - a tool for the task, and not vice versa))) A specialized tool is unlikely to be more expensive than a universal one.
    1. Errr
      Errr 4 January 2019 08: 32
      A specialized tool, as a rule, is better ...
      1. timokhin-aa
        4 January 2019 09: 53
        And incommensurable.
        1. garri-lin
          garri-lin 4 January 2019 11: 24
          And unambiguously cheaper.
          1. prodi
            prodi 4 January 2019 11: 28
            and there would still be enough money for mass, and he would not be mentally old
            1. timokhin-aa
              4 January 2019 20: 02
              Everything is aging morally. It is necessary to provide a reserve for modernization.
          2. Miron
            Miron 4 January 2019 22: 30
            The most expensive is not the tool itself, but the operation. You want to make products for one-time tasks ... You are so rich ... It's about like buying shoes in a store. You can buy for 500 rubles a year, you can buy for 5 for one day.

            There is an old English proverb that fits very well in this case "we are not rich enough to buy cheap things."
            1. garri-lin
              garri-lin 4 January 2019 23: 30
              Do you understand the difference between single-use and single-tasking? Let the PLO frigate always remain the PLO frigate, serve for a long time and in a peaceful environment.
  6. tlauicol
    tlauicol 4 January 2019 07: 53
    If the MEKO principle (moderate modularity for weapon modernization) were applied in the construction of our BOD, MRK, RKR and EM, they would have long gone out of repair with new missiles and guns. And so - they rot in factories
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 09: 54
      But at the same time IRAs would be under 1800 tons, not 900-1100. It is necessary to work to learn, and not to play LEGO.
      1. tlauicol
        tlauicol 4 January 2019 10: 21
        I meant the old MRK 1234. The new Buyans still do not repair, why?
        for example, we will never put a Dagger instead of a Wasp into them, and our partners would replace the beam Sparrow with ESSM, Harpoons with NSM and forward.
        MEKO is a normal idea, there’s a cannon for a rocket, and a rocket for a torpedo wasn’t changed
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 10: 59
          Well, MEKO is also overweight, to be honest, although there it caused a minimum of problems. You can't put the dagger in, that's right, but the Wasp lends itself to modernization by itself. In addition, it is quite possible to update the electronic warfare systems, with this there are no problems with placement.

          And if there was a module, the ship would have been heavier than tons by one hundred one hundred one hundred and fifty. And this is speed.
          And it is critical for the "classic" RTOs.
          1. tlauicol
            tlauicol 4 January 2019 12: 36
            between the ability to have good (for RTOs) air defense and speed, I would choose air defense. and the ships would soon return to service after modernization. and so, they just rot
            1. timokhin-aa
              4 January 2019 17: 10
              On a small ship "good" air defense cannot be placed. Interference will be the basis in any case.
              1. Miron
                Miron 4 January 2019 22: 33
                On a small ship "old, and without containers", of course, "cannot be accommodated." It's cheaper to make a new one with them. And then, when the best air defense appears, throw it out again and make a new one. And so every 10 - 20 years. Just for a couple of patrol corvettes, the country's budget is enough.
  7. prodi
    prodi 4 January 2019 09: 05
    Probably, "modularity" is all the same in putting very different equipment on a "typical" designed vessel. Other aspects - in the form of hot swapping of modules or insufficient strength of the carrier design - are far-fetched
  8. soul
    soul 4 January 2019 09: 34
    Finally, people chewed on this topic. I hope that pr. 20386 will remain in a single copy. This is an unarmed corvette at the price of a frigate (saved laughing ) Or maybe they specifically pushed this project? What would not be enough funds for more needed projects?
    In this case, all who pushed these ships to the detriment of other, more needed ships, need to be judged and punished. Until confiscation. For some reason, if I messed up at the factory, then I was punished with the ruble, and here billions of people's money was lowered into the toilet, and no one answers angry
    Unfortunately, the cancellation was canceled here. Apparently, all those who commit criminal acts should never be afraid or stop. And in the same States there is a death penalty (though not everywhere, but this is a topic for another conversation)
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 10: 07
      20386 is just a budget.

      Watch your hands.

      According to the legislation, when performing OCD, the experimental design work, the head performer is the design bureau that designed the ship, it already pays for contractors who carry out other OCR, one of which is a shipyard.

      After the decision was made to discontinue production of 20385 (mainly due to sanctions), Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau faced a choice of the following options:

      1. Accompany the ongoing 20380 series, its enhancements and upgrades.

      2. To invent a lightweight version of 20385, capable of walking on domestic diesels at normal speed and without a substantial amount of imported equipment.

      3. Promote a new project while working on 1.

      Option number 3 promised ORDERLY more money. Since the fleet then, for a number of reasons, easily sagged under pressure (why is a separate topic), and Almaz had and still has very influential patrons who are simultaneously present in the Military-Industrial Commission and the Marine Collegium, and have access to the President (he's out of business, it's just an illustration of the power of these people), then Almaz just pushed through a new project, into which they put all the innovations that could be thought of. And electric propulsion, to feed Zvezda and P. Plavnik, and Saturn's new turbines (without them, a ship with such a displacement would be like a cow) and manufacturers of all sorts of different modules, and manufacturers of composite superstructures, propulsion electric motors, and JSC Zaslon, which should was to put a super-innovative (but nowhere previously tested, alas) radar complex.
      The result was one continuous innovation, where each system required ROC. Almaz became the distributor of this money.
      Well, that's all.

      The ship builder, the Northern Shipyard, will receive 29,6 billion for it in 2016 prices of the year, as for two 20380 corvettes. And how much has been spent on OCD on the topic is not precisely known, but it is believed that 20386 has already caught up with the price of the 22350 frigate.

      As for 22160, everything was resolved in a similar way, only the "top" decisive was Commander-in-Chief V. Chirkov, at his level everything was decided.

      The price of the issue is less.
      1. soul
        soul 4 January 2019 12: 05
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        20386 is just a budget.

        Quote: timokhin-aa
        it is believed that 20386 has already caught up to the price of frigate 22350

        That’s what I’m talking about - all those who are interested should be financially responsible. Question: how to do this?
      2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk
        Andrei from Chelyabinsk 4 January 2019 16: 05
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The builder of the ship, Severnaya Verf, will receive 29,6 billions for it in 2016 prices of the year, as for two 20380 corvettes.

        I really didn’t think that 21,8 billion for the corvette of the 20380 project (at prices quoted to 2016 g) is half that of 29,6 billion for the corvette 20386 :))))))))))
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 17: 12
          Will be. When you add the right-hand shift for five years, modules, etc.

          And it is still without OCD.
      3. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 5 January 2019 02: 09
        more here YES than NO,
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The ship builder, the Northern Shipyard, will receive 29,6 billion for it in 2016 prices of the year, as for two 20380 corvettes. And how much has been spent on OCD on the topic is not precisely known, but it is believed that 20386 has already caught up with the price of the 22350 frigate.
        This is not 2, but about 1.55 - 1.7 from the corvettes 20380, - the same, in essence, ensuring their main functions, a mediocre and failed project. Its only plus is the power plant "brought to an acceptable level over time" for corvettes 20385 (or 11661)! The very same project 20380, will receive the "right to rebirth" if the expensive "Redoubt" is thrown out of it, replacing it with "Calm-1" (or even cheaper "Pantsir-M"), and the normal 533 mm will be added. TA. To provide anti-aircraft weapons in BMZ, it is more important to have weapons for an effective anti-aircraft defense, and not an overly expensive air defense system.
        1. Cympak
          Cympak 6 January 2019 03: 00
          Need a cheap mass OVR corvette to replace the IPC 1124 .:
          - expensive air defense system "Redut". Zonal air defense should be provided by aviation, coastal air defense, frigates
          - a helicopter hangar, but leave the helipad, a cellar for arming a helicopter and refueling. The helicopter in solving the tasks of the OVR will be attached from the shore.
          Add / Modify:
          - PLRK in inclined launchers or put 1 UKKS on 8 cells and fill them 4 RCC + PLRK. PLRK will replace TA 533 and give the ship a chance to win in the fight against nuclear submarines.
          - ZRAK self-defense "Pantsir-M" or "Palma" with missiles "Sosna"
          1. timokhin-aa
            6 January 2019 23: 04
            This gentleman's set has long been discussed among enthusiasts, and according to rumors, among professionals. On the 11661 chassis and the 2xDDA12000 GEM.

            But things are there.
        2. timokhin-aa
          6 January 2019 22: 54
          Vladimir, everything works on Gromkom, I already wrote to you. Both radar and Redoubt. Well, yes, there is no SAM correction, but this is solved much cheaper, easier and faster than using the mega-project 20386.

          Plus the timing. According to the head "Daring" flag raising is GUARANTEED to 2025, and probably to 2027.
          At the same time there are no guarantees that it will be accepted into operation.

          A new BMZ ships until the completion of the escapade with the main 20386 will not be laid. That is, from 2021 to 2025-2027 we will not even pawn anything.

          Doesn't this confuse you?
          1. Nemchinov Vl
            Nemchinov Vl 8 January 2019 00: 30
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Doesn't this confuse you?

            My compliments, - Alexander! In this case, I hope that you "exaggerate" too much, and the Navy will still become more reasonable to spend money from the state defense order, and will definitely order approximately what you said
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Although, having designed the 11661E hull with "lettered" serial equipment and the power plant from 20380, you can get a good PLO corvette, and the price will be within ten.
            And for such a ship, instead of 22160, I would "vote"
            1. timokhin-aa
              8 January 2019 19: 22
              Check out the article "Offensive or Defense". There, IMHO, the approach is more correct.
      4. alexmach
        alexmach 5 January 2019 21: 50
        2. To invent a lightweight version of 20385, capable of walking on domestic diesels at normal speed and without a substantial amount of imported equipment.

        Oh, Alesander, so 20385 also has problems besides price? That is, this is not an ideal OVR corvette (as it may seem from your articles, even here you compare it with respect to armament), but it turns out to require redesigning to go on existing domestic diesels?
        I have already said that you write in an interesting and generally logical way. Indeed, the concept of "modernization modularity" is perhaps the most logical and interesting. But he takes seriously the opinion of a person who not only expresses his opinion but plays in "information wars", this is a little strange.
        1. timokhin-aa
          6 January 2019 23: 02
          20385 is WHERE'S BETTER option than 20386. That's what I write about in my articles.

          The rest is up to you, you can treat my articles as you like.

          By the way, think about this. If everything goes as it should, then in four years, the localization of Kolomna D500 will reach such a level that they can be put on warships. And there are several other capacities outlined.

          And in the end, the ability of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau to cram something unpushable into a limited-volume case (20385+), more powerful diesel engines comparable to MTUs and potential full electric propulsion (saving weight on gearboxes) can open some paths.
          1. alexmach
            alexmach 7 January 2019 01: 00
            20385 is WHERE'S BETTER option than 20386. That's what I write about in my articles.

            With the running characteristics of which not everything is clear and it may require redesign for existing engines? I understand if we were talking about 20380 already mastered in production (although there may be nuances with them, too). But here you are comparing with the type of corvettes that simply might not be at the moment possible to produce due to engine sanctions ... well, that.

            By the way, think about this. If everything goes as it should, then in four years, the localization of the Kolomna D500 will reach that level ..

            Well, I think that when it reaches, then it makes sense to talk about it. Although of course it is excellent that the development of promising engines is underway.

            And in the end, the ability of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau to cram something unpushable into a limited-volume case (20385+), more powerful diesel engines comparable to MTUs and potential full electric propulsion (saving weight on gearboxes) can open some paths.

            Speaking of electric movement? That is, theoretically, is there any sense in 20386? Well, the same electric movement to work out? There, I suppose, too, there is something to work out?
  9. Avior
    Avior 4 January 2019 11: 06
    The author is too categorical.
    The era of specialized ships goes away, like the era of specialized aircraft.
    Everyone follows the path of universalization, and modularity is one of the main directions for this.
    Another thing is that the choice of forms is in the process of becoming.
    Or it will be modularity for specific weapons, where in MK41 cells, for example, you can load completely different weapons, missiles, missile defense systems of the most different types, missiles, missiles, anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft missiles.
    Or with modules of types of weapons, the same Stan Flex, which are typical for Denmark, for example.
    It all depends on the size of the fleet and the tasks it faces.
    The Americans can afford more specialized ships, but they are Americans, they have money, like a fool wrappers, there are many different tasks for the fleet.
    And the rest?
    The rest go along the path of universalization — they build UDC for all occasions, including loading residential modules in standard containers, and we get a landing ship — an aircraft carrier — freight — hospital — transport for transporting people or ships with interchangeable modules.
    Here the question is how to approach this.
    In Denmark, they have done these modules for all occasions - more than a hundred.
    They have the whole fleet of such, under the modules.
    In its own way, this is convenient - if you have a towed GAS out of order on one frigate and screws or a rudder on the other, then you will not have two faulty frigates, but only one.
    but, of course, it makes sense to single out what will be fixed and will not be removed.
    but the choice is not as simple as it seems.
    what you will need - boats with anti-ship missiles to protect against a large enemy or artillery - it’s not easy to predict in advance.
    part of the modules should still stand just for training, different frigates are different.
    some modules such as residential can generally be stored for centuries without use.
    Obviously, for the effective use of these modules, there should be a system of training and retraining of specialists, and this is easier to do if you have large volumes of modules.
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 11: 42
      The era of specialized ships goes away, like the era of specialized aircraft.

      Well, the Su-30CM is a multipurpose fighter. How many modules are there?

      In fact, everything is solved without distortions. A ship is a hull, a GEM, a REV, a RTV, a SAC, an aircraft and a weapon. All of the above allows you to close almost any conceivable task without a radical rework of the ship.

      Tritely in the UBP can be put KR, PKR, PLUR, ZUR, or even disposable UAV. Can anti-satellite missile set. Why is there a module?
      The helicopter can be anti-submarine, or it can be a search and rescue, it can be multi-purpose, or even specialized drums, like the Ka-52K. If there are several helicopters on board, then different outfits can be formed. In the torpedo tube can be anti-submarine torpedo, and maybe anti-torpedo.
      In the gun, any type of ammunition, even the most exotic (uncontrolled active-reactive for shooting at the shore, for example, or controlled anti-aircraft). Or supercavitation mine.

      Modules are applicable to a very small extent. Basically, as an opportunity to quickly rebuild the ship and replace part of the REV, RTV and weapons.
      1. Avior
        Avior 4 January 2019 12: 11
        in my opinion, the modules are suitable for converting auxiliary and patrol vessels into conditionally warships.
        Denmark is suitable; they have no direct combat missions, but Greenland needs to be patrolled.
        I get cheap and cheerful, if wisely approach the matter
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 17: 13
          Even Denmark refused it, their StanFleh degenerated into an analogue of MEKO in fact.

          The modules are very good for arming non-military ships.
          1. Avior
            Avior 5 January 2019 01: 11
            But how did you determine that Denmark refused?
            all sources write that they have more than a hundred modules of various types in stock
      2. Pivot
        Pivot 4 January 2019 23: 33
        Dear citizens, by modularity you need to understand the unification of the ship’s design, vehicles with the same displacement should have similar hulls, this is one module, similar power units, similar add-ons, armament for this is the concept of a universal vertical launcher, etc. etc. This is all necessary to ensure mass production of these elements. And to convert a minesweeper quickly into a missile ship is complete nonsense, I can’t even imagine how the personnel of the minesweeper will become rocket men overnight.
        1. Avior
          Avior 5 January 2019 01: 22
          look at the Danish Navy.
          There are different ships.

          And the minesweeper can be converted into an IPC, or into a missile boat.
          how's it going
          More than a hundred modules of various types have been procured.

          1. Pivot
            Pivot 5 January 2019 10: 05
            And the crews, together with the modules, are changing, or are there all the computers doing?
            1. Avior
              Avior 5 January 2019 17: 40
              there management is done by standard consoles.
              as in Windows applications, the interface is the same, which would make at least a difference for staff.
              but I won’t tell you the details of the preparation, I just don’t know.
          2. timokhin-aa
            5 January 2019 13: 39
            Yes, these more than a hundred modules are largely on the ships.

            As for the rest, the Danes are selling "flying fish" for a reason. And on new ships, modules are essentially the same MEKO, only they can be dismantled faster. And they will be used for upgrades. I am not against this approach, on Absalon, it turned out so well in general.

            But this is already "a completely different matter" in comparison with the initial ideas, and especially with amer's and our attempts.
            1. Avior
              Avior 5 January 2019 16: 41
              I think Denmark is not too suitable for global conclusions, too specific fleet with specific tasks
    2. ycuce234-san
      ycuce234-san 18 January 2019 07: 00
      With regard to domestic reality, it is not necessary to put into modules "eternally relevant" guns, but launch missiles and problem areas of ships, for example, electronics and engines, with the expectation of their modernization. True, I have no idea how difficult it will be to encapsulate motors in a module - it is much more difficult than making any other module.
  10. Sahalinets
    Sahalinets 4 January 2019 11: 18
    In fact, LCS are ideal ships for destroying motor boats. Terrorists, drug dealers ... Huge speed allows you to catch up with any motorboat, a 57-mm machine gun will blow any of them to shreds, the Hellflyr can do the same, a decent displacement allows you to stay in rough waters, and a pair of helicopters provides a long arm against the same motorboat.
    Another question is that it is somehow strange to solve such problems for such wild money, but they have a lot of money ...
    But why do we need 22160 - this is a mystery. I will venture to suggest that these troughs are only because they can be built without problems, unlike serious ships that our industry simply does not pull.
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 11: 46
      They were invented for a wonderful new world, where the enemy's motorboats with rockets, coastal cannons and old, not yet deceased Soviet anti-ship missiles 60's are ready.
      They were originally such cracking ships for colonial wars. They burst into the littoral zone, sank an old submarine, went to a distance of a couple of tens of kilometers from the coastal defense, with the help of a UAV and an external control center, they identified Grady, Termites and cannons dug along the coast, covered them with NLOS-LS missiles, then killed the desperate crews of native motorboats, blew up the few mines available to the natives, that's it, the way is open for the landing. Even the advanced air control groups have landed. And all this in one ship.

      But the world did not become what they wanted it to be.
      1. Mikhail Matyugin
        Mikhail Matyugin 4 January 2019 15: 45
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Even advanced groups of aircraft pilots have landed. And all this in one ship.

        As the examples showed - quite a long time in Serbia and relatively recent operations in Raqqa and Mosul - in the event of any more or less serious conflict between the United States and NATO as a whole, aircraft carriers are already in advance on the territory of the target state (and often these are ordinary local residents, not foreign residents , which makes their preliminary identification extremely difficult).
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 17: 13
          Advanced aviation guidance is another.
      2. 072
        072 5 January 2019 18: 42
        But a new beautiful world was drawn at our side .Ukraine, the Baltic states and Georgia.
  11. keleg
    keleg 4 January 2019 13: 25
    It is interesting that the author considers unsuccessful concepts (LCS and Danes) and does not consider, for example, the Dutch SIGMA (Ship Integrated Geometrical Modularity Approach) system from DAMEN, to which the same 22160 is somewhat closer than to the Americans and Danes. For the Dutch, the ship is assembled from ready-made equipment-saturated sections, which ensures quick assembly and project changes according to customer requirements, but at the same time, in the stern, like 22160 there is a place for containers for auxiliary modules (not weapons).
    1. donavi49
      donavi49 4 January 2019 13: 42
      Well, Sigma is closer to the MEKO concept. This is not modularity in the sense - today we go to drive submarines and collect the PLO option, tomorrow we go to drive pirates and put a lot of turret remote control and + 1 helicopter / UAV + prison, the day after tomorrow we pacify a banana country - therefore, we put in anti-ship missiles and air defense systems.

      No, they have a set of specific solutions and on the basis of them they offer the widest (that’s really the best option in the world for a customer in the field of customization) - variability. And it is relatively cheap - because only individual sections change. The bottom line is that even such killers for your money are easy. On the basic architecture of the frigate, for a sane price, with quick construction.

      However, then - no, you can pull out an air defense system or cut off the radar by putting there an ordinary SMART-S. But this is a one-time action - on the disarmament of the ship. Not a design opportunity. And to put everything back will be difficult and long.
      1. keleg
        keleg 4 January 2019 14: 20
        So it is not necessary to lump 22160 (which, like the Dutch, was positioned for export with the possibility of reconfiguration - Zelenodol residents are famous for this) and 20386, which, as far as can be seen now, is positioned as a light frigate with modular weapons. These are different concepts from different PCBs. The container "caliber" 22160 appeared on the wave of hype from the shelling of "Syria", just for advertising purposes. Before that there was a maximum module with "Uranus".
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 17: 52
          Container Caliber as an idea appeared earlier than 22160, this time, and two - 20386 and 22160 have a common feature - the use of modular weapons in the form factor of standard containers. Hence the comparison.
      2. Botanologist
        Botanologist 4 January 2019 14: 25
        I have hope that some new solutions will work out on 20386. HZ, which, but OCD there are not weak.
        As for our patroller, I think that let him be, sobbing over him? They will make 6 ships, roll them back, and then decide which way to move. In any case, this is better than driving a BOD and a cruiser to the Gulf of Aden. Let the boats show that they are standing. And to demand from them a engagement with the aircraft carrier — yes, the whole fleet will not withstand meeting with the AUG, let’s be honest.
        And besides, in case of war, if we measure the fleets with a direct clash, then it’s more profitable for us to have a fleet to deter Turkey or NATO, and we all want to at once - and ensure the deployment of SSBNs, and fight against the ASG, and drive pirates and landings to land on foreign shores. There are a lot of Wishlist, but not enough money.
        Well, I will not write about the nonsense of our naval commanders, so as not to spoil my mood.
      3. keleg
        keleg 4 January 2019 15: 37

        But however, the Dutch patrolmen, along with the modularity of the construction, provide for the installation of such standard containers unloved in the article.
        1. timokhin-aa
          4 January 2019 17: 50
          Well, in vain))))
    2. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 17: 16
      Sigma is what at the end of the article is designated as "correct" modularity.
      But these are not containers at all, if that.
  12. Decimam
    Decimam 4 January 2019 14: 21
    If the author paid more attention to getting to know the topic, and less to fantasies about "mega-saws", a decent article could turn out.
    Indeed, modularity is an instrument of rationalizing modern production, effectively managing its complexity, but it is advisable if technological solutions pursue the goals of optimization rather than radical innovation. At the same moment when the next innovation-technological cycle is launched, the integrated architecture is often preferable to the modular one. And then the cycle of transition to modular designs starts again.
    Therefore, rituals about the "virus of modularity", "saw cuts" and general "modular stupidity" are sliding on the surface.
    If you look deeper, then the truth, as always, is in the middle and it is not in striving for "cuts", but in the correct assessment of the situation.
    The implementation of a modular approach is one of the fundamental reasons for the success of the Swedish company Scania AB.
    At the same time, the implementation of the modular approach is the cause of Boeing's grand fiasco with its Boeing Dreamliner project. Here we are not talking about "cuts", the company suffered very serious losses and image losses.
    By the way, for the information of the author. The first-born in the implementation of the modular principle in shipbuilding were not Danes at all. And the attempt was by no means unsuccessful.
    The most common modular military vessels in the world (more than 50 ships) are the German ships of the MEKO (Mehrzweck-Kombination) series. This series of ships was designed by Blohm + Voss in the late 1970s. MEKO ships had the ability to install various weapons, air defense systems, electronic components, engine components, etc. In variants of frigates and corvettes, ships of this series were delivered to the Navy of many countries.
    So "not everything is so simple" as in the article.
    The author is to work on materials if there is a desire to grow above the level of an ordinary propagandist.
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 17: 18
      You are warm and gentle not to confuse, MECO is quite another - and this is written in the article. This is about the LEGO approach, when we want to be able to unscrew the module with the gun from the ship, and instead put a crane to launch the boat into the water.

      Like the Americans and us. The Danes, by the way, abandoned this approach, and for good reason.

      Regarding the American drinkers, you and the Americans themselves would frankly talk about this topic.
      1. Decimam
        Decimam 4 January 2019 18: 04
        Yes, I talked with them, normal people, although peculiar.
        1. Decimam
          Decimam 4 January 2019 18: 19
          By the way, about mixing warm with soft. Can you imagine the difference between Combat Ship for the Littorals "or MEKO CSL and" Littoral Combatant Ship "?
          1. timokhin-aa
            4 January 2019 19: 52
            Of course. These are completely different concepts.
            1. Decimam
              Decimam 4 January 2019 20: 21
              There is only one concept - a modular ship. It's just that in one case the application is justified, and in the other it is not. This is exactly what I said in my first comment, that applying this concept requires a balanced approach. And the examples when it was applied "out of place" do not yet speak of the viciousness of the principle itself. It's like watching football performed by the Musokhransk championship teams to say that football, as a game, is worthless and is used only for sawing certain amounts.
              1. timokhin-aa
                4 January 2019 20: 31
                Well, about the justification of what they promise in MEKO CSL, I also have questions, there, it's just that the balance between built-in / replaceable weapons and equipment is completely different, the modularity itself is more reminiscent of ordinary MEKO, that is, it is more likely needed to be able to choose a pre-installed weapon than for its subsequent rotation, offensive weapons are offered "by default" (as opposed to) and the ship, albeit limited, is combat-ready without modules.

                Plus, the basic systems that provide for the use of weapons there are preinstalled (GUS for example), etc.

                In general, it is more efficient, more cleverly invented, smaller and cheaper.
  13. 072
    072 4 January 2019 15: 51
    In my opinion, the amateur author contradicts himself. Modules must be mounted and dismantled within a short time during modernization, repair of weapons in the base or at the manufacturer, when transferring from the Black Sea or the Caspian to the Baltic or the North. The availability of diving modules will allow the transfer of necessary equipment and divers to VTA aircraft during emergency rescue operations carriers would be available and it doesn’t matter whether it is a ship or a ship. Although sometimes speed is everything. Moreover, the presence of unfilled volumes will allow the ship to be modernized in the future. With the current level of technological development, the ship becomes obsolete even during design. T-64 limit constructions are ours the economy can’t bear it anymore. Of course, it’s necessary to create specialized ships to solve problems. It’s only necessary to create them on a standard platform to reduce the costs of designing, building, and operating ships. Yes, and training crews will be cheaper. However, you need to understand that different fleets require different count At the same time, the number of ships for various purposes may change after some time. It should be borne in mind that when the United States leaves the INF, some of the fleet's tasks will be taken over by ground systems. In addition, corvettes will mainly operate under the umbrella of air defense of coastal units and aviation. from Tartus to the Baltic, the ships went around Europe , and this is the development of the motor resources of the State Duma, with modular weapons it could be dismantled and the ships moved along the Volga. Although Buyan and the river are sea, but that year the level of the Volga was low. All of the above applies to ships up to 4000 displacement.
    1. timokhin-aa
      4 January 2019 17: 23
      The presence of diving modules will allow the transfer of the necessary equipment and divers by airplanes in the event of rescue operations would be in the presence of carriers and it does not matter whether it is a ship or a ship. Although sometimes the speed decides everything.

      Firstly, rescue forces must be in ready-to-use condition on each of the fleets and without this acrobatics, and secondly, if you have an airborne diving station, I don’t mind, why should a ship spoil it? Put it on any available vessel, and forward. Or even on a warship, such as a helipad. Why swing with spetssekami, layout, etc.?

      With the modern level of development of technology, the ship becomes outdated already in the design.

      Container modules you will not improve it, no way.

      During the redeployment of Buyanov-m from Tartus to the Baltic ships went around Europe , and this is the development of the capacity of the DG, in the presence of a modular weapon it could be dismantled, and the ships transferred along the Volga

      This could be done even without modules on Buyane-M, where the radar mast is removed and the ship goes through GDP without problems, even under the Alexander Bridge passes. Modules here by.
      1. 072
        072 4 January 2019 17: 48
        When using quotes, I ask you to quote in full, and not to pull out part of the text. When relocating Buyanov-m from Tartus to the Baltic, the ships went around Europe выработ and this is the development of the main engine resources, if there were modular weapons it could be dismantled, and the ships transferred along the Volga. Although Buyan and the river is the sea, but that year the level of the Volga was low.
      2. 072
        072 4 January 2019 18: 50
        The necessary new equipment or armament is put into the container module at the manufacturer's factory. By train, by trailer, the ship is delivered to the pier base with a crane by the factory crew, and the ship or vessel is connected to the systems and ready to go to sea without having to put the ship at the shipyard you don’t need to replace the ship’s designs with another。 And as for the patrolman, I’ll say that now he needs to change the 76 mm cannon to 100 mm due to new tasks in the Black and Azov Seas and he also needs modules with 30 mm cannons and modules with ATUR type , The threat of a landing on the coast is the best guarantee that there will be no attempts at provocations. Taking an MBC to escort in the Odessa region at speeds of 20 knots will force you to organize several refueling points at sea, but the Navy will have enough support vessels and tugs. This is a matter for the container to the helipad how will you evacuate the affected
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 5 January 2019 17: 01
          Quote: 072
          The necessary new equipment or armament is put into the container module at the manufacturer's factory. By train, by trailer, the ship is delivered to the pier base with a crane by the factory crew, and the ship or vessel is connected to the systems and ready to go to sea

          Did the crew of the task ship with the new composition of the modules pass? And anyway, where did the somehow prepared crew for the new module come from?
          1. 072
            072 5 January 2019 18: 38
            The tasks of training the crew to work with the new system should be solved at the coastal training complex by the specialists of the manufacturer. All these nuances should be spelled out in the contract for the production of systems and warranty service during the product life cycle.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 5 January 2019 18: 47
              Quote: 072
              The tasks of training the crew to work with the new system should be solved at the coastal training complex by the specialists of the manufacturer.

              Yeah ... coastal sailors are our everything. Why a training course, why exercises - just simulators are enough.
              And then it turns out that the simulators are working under the assumptions made, and in fact the working conditions on a living ship in the present sea are completely different.
              1. 072
                072 5 January 2019 19: 28
                Of course, it’s easier to put the ship into the factory for 5-7 years, then it would turn out that the crew retired halfway by grabbing copper with other useful metals and ship repair helped. Then it turns out that the hull kit has rotted and therefore it’s cheaper to build a new one. But there are no welders from Nikolaev in the shipyards; they all earn money in Europe and in the States. I didn’t serve in the Navy and I don’t know many of the nuances. But I see how the Generel Electric for diesel locomotives is promoting their module. Moreover, it has all the diesel generator compressor shaft of the refrigerator. The module is installed on an old locomotive and a new machine is obtained. When a person wants to solve a problem he is looking for opportunities, when he does not want to look for reasons.
  14. 072
    072 4 January 2019 16: 22
    As for the new beautiful world, it is here that we have formed here, we do not need to go far. Ukraine and the Baltic states.
  15. Viknt
    Viknt 4 January 2019 18: 45
    Wow! What, it turns out, an exciting topic, how the people got involved ... Whatever it was, even if the author is not quite right about something, this is not an academic publication, but the topic was revealed by common efforts. The question turns out to be with a beard in half a century, and even got to the mother of Russia. Those who have shared are essentially plus signs. The next logical step would be useful to share the history of "modularity" in domestic shipbuilding !! If the capitalist ministers and bazaar admiralissimos do not see the problem at close range, even if they lift their eyelids and poke it into the face, it will not go away from it. And since it exists, it is somehow solved. As they decide, it is also known - through the back kyriltso. As far as we know, the terms of reference for Gren were changed several times and, accordingly, how many times the designers changed the design of the "modules". The same can be said for modernization, but not retroactively forcing modularity !? So we are wondering how our craftsmen turn ships into "modular" after?
  16. The comment was deleted.
  17. xomaNN
    xomaNN 4 January 2019 21: 01
    The tradition: to make exactly the same weapon as the enemy's, without even deeply analyzing its usefulness, has come since Soviet times. Most of the samples were made "in response". More often we are with them, sometimes they are with us belay
  18. Operator
    Operator 4 January 2019 22: 08
    The author of the article, criticizing everything and everything, does not offer anything intelligible in return. I didn’t want to, but I have to do it for the author.

    We are talking about the ship of the ocean zone of the lowest possible displacement (to increase the size of the series when limiting the budget).
    case - steel;
    defensive weapons - short-range anti-aircraft complex for hitting missiles and bombs when approaching a ship, short-range torpedo complex for hitting torpedoes, towed underwater BPEA for mine reconnaissance, 30-mm gun mount for hitting small craft;
    offensive weapons - eight "Caliber" launchers in anti-ship and / or ground equipment;
    reconnaissance and landing weapons - two assault motor boats, two vertical take-off / landing UAVs with a payload capacity of 400 kg;
    power plant - two gas turbine engines, two diesel engines of economic progress;
    location equipment - radar with AFAR, conformal GAS.

    All of the above will fit into 2000 tons of displacement.
  19. tigoda
    tigoda 4 January 2019 22: 16
    I liked the article. Only one thing is not clear: what to do when you really want to put the Zircon on the corvette but it is not there, and it will be in five years, and the launching point for it is not completely defined.
    1. timokhin-aa
      5 January 2019 13: 41
      To make rockets under the standard PU (UCSS). That's all.
      To make modernizable CIUS with open architecture. To make a stock of electrical power and cable "for growth."
  20. Newone
    Newone 4 January 2019 23: 08
    The article is a definite plus. Unlike previous articles, the author convincingly and intelligibly brought his position.
    1) The variety of diverse tasks of the Russian Navy requires a very large number of different types of ships. Indeed, in peacetime, the ship will +/- perform the same task and rearranged modules are not needed. But the military always requires the creation of an advantage in the means at a critical site.
    For example, for a large landing operation, the maximum number of landing ships and fire cover ships is necessary. But after its implementation, air defense / anti-aircraft defense ships are much more needed to escort convoys to supply the landing force. Modular ships are capable of performing both functions. And there are a lot of such scenarios for the fleet.
    2) The speed of designing unified weapons, including the dimensions, is significantly higher than the speed of designing large-sized special modules (each for its own ship)
    3) The speed of armament (rearmament) of a ship with standard modules DOES NOT depend on the capacity of the shipyards. Given the lack of shipyards, this is a huge plus.
    4) Based on the constantly changing technical specifications for designing, it can be assumed that the Defense Ministry itself has not yet developed (or has developed but recently) the fleet concept that it wants to receive. The modular ship allows you to modify the ship under the changing requirements of MO MINIMUM efforts.
    5) A part of the armaments necessary for the ships was NOT DESIGNED yet yesterday (according to data from open sources). Accordingly, we either build ships, leaving space for the necessary but not yet ready weapons, or we do not have ships at all.
    6) Well, the ship modules should be as transportable as possible. Obviously, the sea container in this regard is beyond competition.
    7) Replaceable modules create VERY serious difficulties for the enemy in terms of predicting the operational situation and taking countermeasures.
  21. aleks1673
    aleks1673 5 January 2019 01: 45
    Thank God that there are people like Alexander Timokhin without education (shipbuilding) with ambitions and conceit !!! great guru! with such no cover operations are required as with "Poseidon" they themselves will lead the enemies into a fool !!!! Remember !!! nothing is born just like that and other people's mistakes !! thank God !! give Russia a chance to fix them and make a breakthrough !! it's about modules !!!
    1. aleks1673
      aleks1673 5 January 2019 02: 02
      Unfortunately, the lack of basic education prevents most commentators from understanding what they are talking about !! the main asked 22160 to saturate the fleet with inexpensive ships in peacetime !!! gorgeous 1144 can't be alone in ten places !!! if they fight it is aviation and missiles !!! and you are all in tsushima times !! but the (Kerchesky) minesweeper was sent !! in peacetime, ships are needed !!!! so that the range of seaworthiness and people normally served !! and if the time "H" comes with calibers on the command post to fuck (remember how 68 encore went for aircraft carriers) or put a minefield from rocket torpedoes in the deployment zone of the nuclear submarine !!!! like this !!!!!
      1. aleks1673
        aleks1673 5 January 2019 02: 04
        and the effective barrel is 152 !!!!! along the shore or 57 (a new "Baikal" when the ROC is finished) on the air defense system, neither the AK-630 is flexible and they did not stand nearby and the "Pantsir" will not pull!
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 5 January 2019 17: 07
        Quote: aleks1673
        the main set 22160 to saturate the fleet with inexpensive ships in peacetime !!!

        And wartime, they, by pike command, will turn into RTOs and IPCs, with well-trained teams that have passed all the tasks perfectly. smile
        Where are the modules for 22160? How and on what to prepare teams for solving standard wartime tasks? How at 22160 to place the equipment of at least ordinary MPK?
        Quote: aleks1673
        but the strait (Kerk) minesweeper was sent

        In the Kerch Strait, all tasks were solved not by the fleet, but by the FSB. And to cover the ships of BOKHR, a pair of Su-25 and a pair of Ka-52 were enough.
        Cardboard 22160 in the strait would repeat the fate of the Emerald.
    2. timokhin-aa
      5 January 2019 13: 46
      More !! exclamation !!! signs !!!! God !!!!! Exclamations !!!!!! Signs !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! am
  22. Victor Dubrovsky
    Victor Dubrovsky 5 January 2019 08: 55
    The figure for the increase in displacement given by the author raises great doubts "due to the lack of participation of weapon modules in ensuring durability." Considering that all weapons and ammunition make up no more than 20-25% of the total displacement of the NK, then an increase of 20-35% due to "lack of participation in strength" seems completely unrealistic. And in what kind of "strength" do the point weapons, in general, take part? If such an assessment is caused only by an increase in the displacement of the NK, designed as modular, then the reason may be much more trivial: an unsuccessful design in itself ... :(
  23. wooja
    wooja 5 January 2019 10: 38
    naturally everything has a place in the sun ..., the question is optimality and money. Applying the unpopular Marxist thesis about concentration and monopolization, the price-utility ratio will grow in the direction of price, the next marketing move will be successful for a limited time period ..., milking the poor what else to say ....
  24. alex-defensor
    alex-defensor 5 January 2019 15: 34
    Usually, we are talking about 200-350 tons of additional displacement for every 1000 tons that a non-modular ship would have.

    Where is the data from?

    Module with gun Oto Melara Rapid, caliber 76 mm. Notice how much empty space is in the module. This volume will "cost" tens of tons of displacement, if not more

    The author seriously argues that there should not be any free space between different equipment and weapons?
    And then how to carry out maintenance and repair of units? By the way, a modular object can just be removed, replaced with a new one, and repair can be done already in the workshop.

    Danish Navy escaped most of the previously built ships by sending them to Portugal and Lithuania. The modularity was not so popular

    Yes, it’s not at all clear why Denmark warships ... not that modularity, but the ships themselves in Denmark are not very much in demand. So the example of Denmark does NOT channel. And what kind of method of proof is this, through someone’s bad experience? I’ll take, for example, a pancake oven, nothing will come of it, what comes of it, that the concept of pancakes is vicious and futile?

    Northrop Grumman released a “study” according to which, when fighting against pirates, LCS replaces twenty (!) Conventional ships.

    wassat wassat wassat

    "Guns forever." Could immediately put a stationary!

    The author cannot know. Maybe they have already been removed more than once for repair or replaced with new ones. And what is the period of operation in question? What if, after 10 years, they will issue a new cannon to the mountain? Then replacing the modules will be very helpful.

    The Americans remained silent about this for quite some time, but in 2016, they finally recognized that those modules that would be completed would not be used as removable ones — they would be permanently installed on ships.

    But what are the reasons? After all, how can it be that the reasons are not at all in the flaws of the idea of ​​modularity itself.

    For 2018, there was not a single combat service in which they would participate.

    Well, do we have a similar situation? It seems that our ships still go to military service and campaigns.

    The Americans are joking that when the anti-mine and anti-submarine modules are ready, the head ships will have to be written off by age.

    And here is the real reason. The point is not Modularity, but the inability of contractors to develop them. Again, I do not think that Russia has problems with this.

    it was immediately necessary to listen to Admiral Lyons, and make LCS on the basis of a Legend class patrol ship, on which all modular subsystems "tortured" for LCS would get up "like relatives", and all at the same time without any modularity

    But how do you determine how much weapons to put on a combat unit? As I understand it, the author proposes to do according to the principle "as much as it will fit" and "the more, the better."
    1. High-precision self-propelled self-guided jamming missiles, this is an expensive and piece goods. They are not stamped on an assembly line, like bullets for AKM.
    2. It is always necessary to consider not a combat unit separately, but the concept of application. It will NOT fight a ship with another ship, but armies with armies. The battle will go in parallel in space, sky, on water and earth, under water. An important indicator here is the average lifetime of a combat unit, since fire density will be crazy.

    I will not quote further, it makes no sense.

    Suppose that the average life time of a ship, after the start of a volley (which will immediately give the enemy its location, if no one has seen it before) is 15 minutes (taking into account the operation of the missile defense / air defense system).
    Then the stock of missiles on this ship should not greatly exceed the amount that the launchers (PU) of the ship will be able to release in these 15 minutes. Otherwise, the remaining missiles will simply be lost (and this is with their high price and piecework).
    Let's assume that a certain launcher allows 15 missiles to be launched in these 30 minutes.
    So the question arises: is it better to have one ship for 60 missiles, or two ships for 30 missiles? At the same time, small ships (the mosquito fleet that we already have) in coastal defense are generally a priority, and large displacement vessels are needed only to increase the autonomy of navigation in order to be present in the oceans and far from the MTO bases.

    In general, the article is interesting, but the author’s conclusions are NOT convincing.
  25. 072
    072 5 January 2019 20: 31
    In my opinion, the Russian fleet and shipbuilding are in a situation of the end of the 40s. When many new weapons are not ready, changes in technology take on an avalanche-like character, ships approach decommissioning, the industry needs to be loaded with work, and in the end, project 30 bis destroyers were built that are practically immediately went for a joke. It is the modules that will allow you to relatively quickly modernize Project 22160 ships, while the presence of rooms for 60 landing personnel will allow you to place additional equipment in them. The main scourge of any modernization is a lack of space and an increase in crew, which was always decided by the premises for crew. Danish patrol boats “Flyvefisken exist in 3 types of patrol boats, minesweepers, and missile boats. Today, we are questioning the construction of minesweepers and missile boats because of the lack of the required number of diesel engines and minesweepers do not have underwater vehicles. On the 22160 series there is an opportunity to work out all the issues on trawling equipment and to prepare specialists for minesweepers and for a while to insure a series of karakurt
    1. aleks1673
      aleks1673 6 January 2019 00: 59
      Everything is correct! plus the introduced form factor - a 40-foot container will force the developers of weapons to fit into the given dimensions and regardless of whether it is a GAS, a SCRC or a remote-controlled mine action vehicle. Thus, modernization is the replacement of the container and that's it! If you only knew how many of our ships were lost during the "modernization" of the three tsushima! as soon as the cable routes or the internal structure are touched, the new cellar will not fit and the ship will go nuts! how many nakhims are modernizing - toto and it! at the same time, the number of weapons in containers should be less than the ships themselves, since inter-voyage rests are being repaired, etc. and for containers this is a drum, and the combat crew (containers) can be double or triple. this is really a savings and the so-called "alternative" answer am plus every container carrier should be perceived by the Yankees as a vanderwaffe! let the bavlo spread on the counter and so catch the pirates! and for the DShL (assault boat) do not worry there is a mechanism there! at 5 points it is easy to "enter" and "exit" but not everyone is shown! this is for Alexander Timokhin - try to enter Korabelka, maybe they will take it! this is so that at least not to cause laughter, as the Great Peter said - let the boyars in the Duma say themselves - in order to show their stupidity!
  26. 072
    072 6 January 2019 11: 00
    At the same time, when they are talking about OCD, for some reason they forget to say that standard modules can be used to create different classes of ships, which ultimately saves money. This raises a purely philosophical question of a carrier for weapons or weapons for a carrier. Today it is uniquely resolved carrier for arms
    SASHA OLD 7 January 2019 04: 03
    very interesting article, thanks to the author for raising this topic
  28. Saxahorse
    Saxahorse 8 January 2019 20: 10
    "The specialist is like a gumboil, its completeness is one-sided." (c) Kozma Prutkov.

    The author writes interestingly, but here, it seems to me, he is very distorting. The flip side of modularity is narrow specialization. And the most negative example of this is Soviet shipbuilding practice. Even a small modernization of the rocket immediately requires the construction of a completely new nuclear submarine for .. lard dollars .. New anti-ship missiles immediately turn into useless trash all their already built ships. The modularity and the unification directly following from it are close to zero.

    What exactly is the author ready to offer as an alternative to modularity? Is it brilliant to foresee all possible options for the development of weapons for 30-40 years in advance?
  29. 072
    072 9 January 2019 14: 12
    Everything is fine in project 22380, only there are no engines. More than 200 units are installed by TMX on diesel locomotives.