Modularity looks tempting. In the pictures
In the world of military shipbuilding, modular warships are such a fashionable trend. The peculiarity of this trend is that they did not happen to anyone, nor to some Naval Forces who put such experiments on themselves. But it was enough to count the losses and get out of the disastrous project of a modular warship, as others immediately began such a project. And they started by examining someone else's negative experience, but deciding that they would succeed in everything as it should. Unfortunately, Russia is also in this club. We do not learn anything good, but bad - no problem, immediately and quickly. It makes sense to consider this modular concept in detail.
First, the “modularity” are different. In one case, it’s about weapon or the equipment is simply put on the ship in a block and mounted on bolts, but at the same time it can only be replaced with an analogue and only during construction or repair. Thus, the first ships of the MEKO series were built - thanks to simplified installation, it was possible to put there, for example, any gun, without redesigning anything and without changing the design. This approach has a plus, and it consists in the ability to adapt the ship under construction to the needs of the customer, and then it is easier and easier to upgrade, there is a minus - a separate module with weapons or equipment does not give the ship's body additional strength, and therefore the ship has to be overloaded to maintain strength, compared with the same, but not modular. We are usually talking about 200-350 tons of additional displacement for each 1000 tons that a non-modular ship would have. In the presence of a compact and powerful GEM it is tolerable.
We are also interested in analyzing the approach that the Russian Navy has plunged into - when, instead of the built-in armament or equipment, the ship receives a compartment in which modules of various purposes can be installed — weapons, for example, or equipment. The most "raspiarenny" version of this module in our country is a container launcher for cruise missiles of the "Caliber" family.
At the beginning of the twentieth century 80 in the Royal Danish Navy, someone had a brilliant idea - instead of building specialized, or, on the contrary, multifunctional ships, they need to build ships that carry modular weapons and equipment. The impetus for the emergence of this innovation was that the Danes on budget constraints could not afford to replace all the warships that they would need to replace. There were twenty-two such ships. Approximate estimates showed that if it were possible to reconfigure the ship “for the task”, then sixteen would be enough to replace these ships. By the end of 1984, the solution was already embodied in the form of prototypes — standard container modules of the 3x3,5x2,5 meter size, with the same connection interface, size and shape. The contents of the containers could be different - from guns to anti-mine systems.
Model modules were to be installed in slots and connected to the ship in a matter of hours, and the ship’s full readiness was to be restored within forty-eight hours.
The system of modular equipment and weapons received the name "Standard Flex", or simply Stanflex.
Module with gun Oto Melara Rapid, caliber 76 mm. Notice how much empty space is in the module. This volume will "cost" tens of tons of displacement, if not more
Installing the StanFlex Module.
The first ships equipped with slots for containers were patrol boats "Flyvefisken" ("Flyuvefisken", "Flying Fish").
Immediately revealed the nuances. On the one hand, the boat, as they say, “turned out” - to have an 450-mm cannon, eight Harpun anti-ship missiles, 76 SAM on 12 tonnes of displacement, and, for example, a high-speed boat and a crane for its launching, is worth it. In total, the modular loading options were much larger.
Boat "Flyvefisken" and its modules
But there were also disadvantages. Firstly, the module with the gun turned out to be “eternal” - there was no point in ever touching it. As a result, the gun was removed only before the sale of the ship to Lithuania or Portugal. Secondly - quite right, the majority of the previously built ships of the Danish Navy escaped, “sending” them to Portugal and Lithuania. Modularity was not so demanded. At the moment, Denmark itself has only three units left. Third, with three aft slots история turned out to be similar to the situation with a gun - there was no point in changing them, the ship went on patrol with the usual set of weapons, and all the additional displacement, which turned out to be necessary with modular architecture, had to be “transported” in vain. However, feed modules were sometimes rearranged, but not very often. It also turned out that if the modules with RCC can be simply installed, and they will be used by the main crew, then for other modules, for example, for the lowered GUS, special training is needed, or additional crew members. Also, although replacing twenty-two ships with sixteen was a success, it didn’t save much - the modules required storage infrastructure on the shore, which also cost money.
All this became clear not instantly, and at first the enthusiastic Danes equipped with slots for the installation of modules all of their new ships — the already mentioned patrol boats, the Niels Yuel corvettes, the Tethys patrol ships. True, even there the containers that are called “did not take off” - the installed container weapon simply remained on the ships once and for all. And if the Danes later got rid of the majority of the Fluvefisken boats, then modularity was used on the corvettes for rapid modernization, for example, the module with the C-Sparrow missile defense system was replaced with a new module from the American MUP MUP. 48 for the same missiles. The rest of the modular weapons remained to stand on ships similar to stationary. A modern example is that on Diana class patrol boats made in 2000's, there is only room for one module, and there is no possibility to install a module with a weapon, which limits the use of modules only by the laboratory module for environmental monitoring.
On the "Tetis" there are three places for modules, but this is quite understandable for a ship with a displacement of 3500 tons, which is armed with a cannon and four machine guns. The Danes simply saved on weapons, judging that since they had left behind stacks of modules with anti-ship missiles and missiles, the budget savings for the sake of new ships can simply be left unarmed, and in a threatened period, take modules from warehouses and retrofit ships with at least something.
On the Absalon class ships, which in a sense are the “calling card” of the Danish Navy, there are only two modules for rocket weapons, they are used solely so that in the future it will be possible to update rocket weapons simply and without design work.
Missile deck "Absalon". You can remove the inclined PU missiles "Harpoon" and replace them with vertical PU missiles. Or vice versa. That's all modularity
The newest class of frigates "Iver Huitfeldt" modular cells already six, and they have pre-installed his regular weapons, two guns, PU PKR "Harpoon" and UVP Mk.56. There are no free slots, modularity is used to accelerate the modernization and to balance the number of missiles and missiles on the ship, increasing the number of some and reducing the number of others.
Currently, the epic with modules in the Danish Navy is finished - now the StanFlex system is not used to give the ship multifunctionality, changing the missile module to a diving container, but to accelerate the modernization, in which the gun is changed to a cannon, rockets for rockets, etc. . The price for this was a serious increase in the displacement of the Danish warships - they are really large for the set of weapons that are carried. You have to pay for everything.
Amusingly, it was precisely in those years in which the Danish approach to modularity changed and took modern, complete forms, the USA tried to repeat the Danish idea in their own, on a fundamentally new class of ships - Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).
The history of this giant American cut of budget money is very interesting, confusing and very instructive.
It all started in the 90s, when the United States realized that the oceans turned into their lake, and that no one can stop them from doing what they consider necessary. Since they considered it necessary to "build" everything up to this point in "unbuilt" humanity, the prospects were unequivocal - the United States would need to invade one country after another, and lead the locals "to a common denominator" by force. Since Russia at that moment almost committed suicide, and China did not yet have significant fleet (and there were no signs that he would have it), it could be safely assumed that no one would supply military products to non-Western and unfriendly US countries, especially since the Americans could always push sanctions against anyone. This means that the enemy will be low-tech and weak.
As the first potential victim in those years, the Americans saw Iran, with its hordes armed with missiles of motor boats, dying without spare parts aviation, an abundance of sea mines, and an almost complete absence (then) of substantial coastal defense and fleet.
Thinking about how to deal with Iran gave rise to the concept of "Streetfighter" - a street fighter in Russian, small, about 600 tons, a warship specifically designed for fighting in the coastal zone of the enemy. According to the authors of the concept - Vice Admiral Arthur Tsebrovski, author of the “network-centric war”, so brilliantly demonstrated by Russia in Syria, and the captain of the US Navy, Wayne Hughes, this combat ship was supposed to be cheap, simple, massive and “consumable” - so much that instead of fighting for survivability with the defeat of the enemy, the crews had to throw these ships and evacuate. To make the ship more versatile, Tsebrowski and Hughes decided to use a Danish stunt - a modular weapon that can be replaced, shaping the look of the ship “for the task”.
The idea of a consumable ship did not find support, but in general the Navy and the Pentagon were interested in the possibility of creating a special ship for coastal combat. Especially strongly inspired by the idea of the commander of the naval operations, Admiral Vernon Clark. Tsebrowski in 2001 received the post of head of the Armed Forces Transformation Office from Donald Rumsfeld, and as soon as this happened, Clark closed the project of the missile cruiser DD-21 (in a simplified and reduced version of the Zumvalt class), and opened the program of updating the navy ships of new classes, among which was a new name - "Littoral battleship". From 2005 to 2008, the fleet drove an ugly catamaran with a helipad on the roof — Sea Fighter — on which the concept of using modular weapons and equipment was worked out while stating the requirements for a future new class of ships. The corporations went further.
Usually, the lead ship in the series was built by the winner of the tender for the supply of the ship, whose offer was the best. But there was a war in Iraq, the US military industrial complex, the military and politicians entered into the taste of mastering military budgets, and this time all competitors, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics, received orders for experienced ships of their projects. The Lockheed was moving a single-class ship of the Freedom class, General Dynamics, a trimaran of the Independence class. The Navy played the “party” as if by notes - at first it was announced that the prototypes would be compared with each other after construction, then the experimental series was slightly trimmed to two ships, and then they announced that both classes would be built, since both have irreplaceable capabilities , and choose the best of them is impossible.
It makes no sense to list the course of events further, it is described in a huge number of articles, in English Wikipediain Russian you can read article A. Mozgovogo, in the journal "National Defense". We confine ourselves to the fact that many respected people in the United States, for example, John Lehman, the hero of the Cold War, Admiral James "Ace" Lyons, John McCain and many others, fought against the Pentagon and the American military industrial complex.
Congress fought for every cent that this program promised to master, the US Audit Chamber repeatedly tested this project both from a financial point of view and from the point of view of its feasibility - nothing helped. The only thing the opponents of the project managed to do was to kill twelve ships in the series, and still achieve contracts with fixed prices for a part of the ships (it was planned to build fifty-two units, but in the end they were able to shrink up to forty, thirty six were contracted and the struggle continues). But the rink of the MIC monsters and the politicians and military men bought by them was unstoppable. In 2008, the first Freedom was accepted into service, and in 2010, the first Independence.
Freedom class. Pay attention to the bright light rectangles on the roof of the superstructure, in the back part there are the covers of the compartments for the modules with weapons. Then they were still empty
Concerned about the fate of the Navy sawing project, these ships are thrown everywhere, declaring them to solve the problem with pirates or propagandizing as an instrument to break into the “access prevention” zones, the industry is helping them, it came to the point that Lockheed partner in the Freedom, Northrop series Grumman "spread" the "study" according to which, in the fight against pirates, LCS replaces twenty (!) Ordinary ships. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the JCS, praised the amphibious capabilities of these ships, which are never actually amphibious. According to US Accounting Chamber ReportThe Navy regularly rewrites CONOPS — the operational concept — of using these ships, canceling old demands and tasks that they cannot accomplish, and, inventing new ones, is simpler.
To justify the huge investments in these ships, the Navy decided to make sure that they could perform at least some real combat missions, and after two years of tests, in May 2018 decided to equip them with NSM (Naval Strike Missile) anti-ship missiles Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace. The missiles will be installed in quad launchers, on the nose, between the gun and the superstructure, eight pieces on the ship. This is a good move, the rocket is very serious, and difficult to break. After the installation of these missiles, ships will be able to attack surface targets at a substantial distance, that is, from this point on, they will become limited in combat capability. True, they will never become full-fledged combat units.
LCS-4 USS Coronado, ship class Independence. Below the gun installed inclined PU missiles "Harpoon". "Harpoons" lost the competition to the Norwegian rocket, which will be installed in the same place. It should be understood that at first the Americans did not plan anything like this; in their imagination the war of the future was a simple execution of almost unarmed people.
But in this case we are interested in modularity.
The “base” ships look almost unarmed - the Freedom was initially armed with an 57-mm Mk.110 cannon, a RAM launcher with the RIM-21 116 anti-aircraft missile system, and four 12,7-mm machine guns. There is a hangar for one MH-60 helicopter and one MQ-8 UAV helicopter. There are jamming complexes.
The Independence was (and still is) armed as well, but its SeaRAM launcher is equipped with a radar from the Phalanx artillery, and there are two helicopters on board.
All other weapons, according to the authors of the program, should be interchangeable and modular.
The main options were as follows.
1. Module to fight the boats and boats of the enemy (Anti-Surface warfare module). It included two modular XMUM-mm automatic guns of the Bushmaster, a modular vertical launch system for NLOS-LC missiles with 30 kilometers, a MH-25 helicopter with Hellfire missiles and onboard machine guns, and armed with UAVs. This same “module” included rigid inflatable boats (RHIB) located in the under deck of combat missions (Mission Bay). A little later, the NLOS-LC program was closed along with the Future Combat Systems' mother program, the Navy tried to push a small Griffin rocket with a range of just 60 km into the ship, but due to the obvious absurdity of this step, instead of Griffin, they ended up with vertically starting "Hellfire" with a modified gos. Currently, the "module" of warheads minus weapons aboard the MQ-3,5.
We look at the photo - this is a modular gun.
And on the video below, Hellfire’s modular UVP, 24 missiles. The maximum range of shooting - about 8000 meters, targets on the video are hit at a distance of 7200 meters.
2. Anti-submarine warfare module. It includes a lowered landing force towed by a Thales CAPTAS-4 towed, towed hydroacoustic countermeasure system AN / SLQ-61 / Light Weight Towed Torpedo Defense (LWT), a MH-60S helicopter armed with a light torpedo Mk.54. She is included in the "module" as a weapon of the UAV. Currently, ten years after raising the flag on the lead ship "Freedom" module is not ready. Presumably, the Navy must be put together and tested in the 2021 year.
3. Mine module (Mine clearance module). Laser mine detection systems from a helicopter, data exchange with the “shore”, a GUS search for mines, a crewless boat to search for mines from its GAS, an NPBA to search for mines under water, disposable mine destroyers and a helicopter itself to accommodate the laser system, helicopter trawl, and much more. "Module" neberegotov, tested individual components.
4. The outfit of forces for the landing and "irregular" fighting (Irregular warfare and landing module). Typical forces include warehouses with equipment and weapons of marines, one helicopter landing helicopter, one fire support helicopter, landing boats for high-speed delivery of soldiers to the coast and the Marines themselves. Such forces are supposed to be used for special operations, mainly from Independence class ships carrying two helicopters and having a large flight deck.
The Navy slid into the “Danish path” almost instantly. Having a ship with a displacement of more than three thousand tons, and the price of two-thirds of the new destroyer "Arly Burke", it would be foolish to continue to keep it unarmed. As soon as the modules with thirty-millimeter guns reached readiness for use, they were immediately installed on Freedom-class ships, and were never removed. At present, even a photo of the ship in its original configuration, without guns, with covers over slots is a rarity.
"Guns forever." Could immediately put a stationary!
The modular weapon suddenly appeared permanently installed. Until a certain point, it was unclear whether the same fate awaits other modules, because the ship provides for the simultaneous deployment of some components that are included in different modules.
The Americans remained silent about this for quite a while, but in 2016 year finally recognized - those modules that will be completed will not be used as removable - they will be installed on ships all the time.
In early September 2016, the commander of the surface forces of the Navy, Vice Admiral Tom Rowden stated the following.
All the planned twenty-four (here apparently means still unfinished and not built ships), will be distributed in six divisions. Three divisions for the class "Independence" and the same class "Freedom". Each division will be equipped with “its own” types of modules - anti-mine, anti-submarine, and a module to combat boats and boats. Each division will work only its own tasks - the fight against boats and boats, the fight against mines and anti-submarine defense. There will not be a replaceable crew whose task is to work on modular weapons - the crews will be formed as permanent. At the same time, for each ship will be formed two crews, which will serve on it in turn. This will maximize the participation of ships in combat services.
And so on.
This is the end of the project in its original form. Modularity again failed. Truly, the Americans immediately had to listen to Admiral Lyons, and make LCS based on patrol ship class "Legend", to which all modular subsystems “forced” for LCS would stand up “like relatives”, moreover, all at the same time and without any modularity, faster, better and cheaper than happened in reality. But it must be understood that the priorities of the authors of the LCS program were not cheap and not a benefit for American taxpayers, but completely different things.
It is difficult to say what will happen next. Modules for LCS are not ready, the ships are standing. For 2018 a year there was not a single combat service in which they would participate. Perhaps Rowden’s statements are realized when the anti-submarine and anti-mine modules are ready.
The Americans are joking that when the anti-mine and anti-submarine modules are ready, the head ships will have to be written off by age.
And in this joke there is some truth. Knowingly, the same Rowden said that two crews would be formed for each littoral warship to increase the operating voltage coefficient (KOH). The presence of two crews will naturally "drive" these ships to an unrepairable state, in order to get a reason to write them off due to wear, and finally close this shameful page in the history of the US Navy. So in their time they did it with the frigates "Oliver Perry" to open the way for this very LCS. When the money will be mastered, it will be the turn of the LCS and new projects, new budgets themselves.
I must say that the US Navy has no other options - according to the already mentioned report of the US Audit Chamber, the Navy deceived the public, claiming that replacing the modules and changing the “profile” of ships is a matter of a couple of days. According to the latest data, if necessary, replace the module, the ship, taking into account the time to go to the base and back, change the crew, deliver the module and its installation, is eliminated from the war for the period from 12 to 29 days. With such modularity, you can’t win much, which led to the "freezing" of the configuration of all existing and under construction ships in one version.
True, the main battle ahead. In the coming years, the US Navy plans to acquire frigates. Lobbyists of LCS from Lockheed already claim that LCS is practically a frigate, show export options for Saudi Arabia and Israel that have air defense systems and declare that for the US Navy it’s not necessary to invent anything, LCS, if you change it slightly constructively, this is a frigate. It is only necessary ... to remove the modules! And install weapons constantly. And do not remember the modularity in vain, do not discuss in public what was done before what was done.
Their opponents are already preparing to finish off the program, not even laying the contracted ships, shifting the focus of shipbuilding in the United States to future frigates. Normal, not based on LCS.
But this, of course, is a completely different story.
Naturally, after such a circus, the Americans should have formed a definite opinion about what the modular ships are worth, and what they should (and should) be. And it was formed.
In April, 2018, the already mentioned admiral John Richardson in an interview about his vision of the future warship of the US Navy. According to him, the hull and the main power plant is something that cannot be changed on the ship (for the GEM it is possible, but incredibly difficult), so they must meet the requirements of the future initially. This is especially true of electrical generation, which should produce the maximum possible power so that in the future it will be enough for any consumer, even electromagnetic guns and combat lasers, if they appear.
But everything else should be, according to Richardson, quick-changeable. They took out the outdated radar, quickly replaced a new one in its place, connected it - it works. There is no difference in connection dimensions, electrical voltage, data exchange protocol with digital vehicle tires, and so on - everything should work right away.
In fact, we are talking about a repetition of the Danish version - a modular gun, if it is replaced, then with another modular gun. No substitution of missiles for a diving container, empty slots - modularity, this means to quickly upgrade the ship, upgrade the radar, radio weapons and weapons, without setting up a factory for a couple of years. So they see it now, so they talk about it when they don’t need to lie to Congress and journalists.
Summarize what conclusions can be reached by analyzing the experience of Americans and Danes, and their experiments with modularity:
1. Replacing a module with a module with another weapon or equipment is not a working idea. The modules must be properly stored, they must have crews or calculations, they must somehow be trained while the ships are at sea with other modules, it costs money.
2. The enemy will not allow to change modules in combat and operations. The ship will fight with what is installed on it, it will not be possible to replay it.
3. Ultimately, the modules will be installed on the ship forever.
4. The meaning of modularity in the correct version is not to vary the weapons and equipment on the ship, but to make it easier to modernize when the time comes.
5. A modular ship, in which weapons and equipment conceived as modular, is permanently installed, is worse than the same, but not modular — removable modules not involved in ensuring the strength of the hull require an increase in weight and dimensions of the hull structures, which leads to an irrational increase in displacement, which, in turn, requires a more powerful and expensive GEM.
6. Modules are late - the ships are ready for them earlier than they themselves. For the Danes, this was expressed to a small extent, but for the Americans it is the number one problem in their project.
Did they understand all this in Russia when the scam with the 20386 project and the “patrol” “ships” of the 22160 project began? And how. The link is available article "Modular principles of construction of warships. Some problems and solutions (on page 19), for the authorship of Doctor of Technical Sciences L.P. Gavrilyuk and A.I. Lump.
In it all the problems of modular ships, which are fully manifested in the American projects, are meticulously and in detail disassembled, and to a certain extent can occur in our country. The authors finally make the following conclusion:
"As a prototype of the concept of modular construction of ships, the concept developed by TsNIITS (now JSC TsTSS)) can be used in 90-s ... and based on the achievements of modern measuring equipment, it provides for zonal design and construction of ships with modular principles of assembling weapons systems on welding. Zonal armament units are unified by types, each of which has its own units and mounting technologies for welding, which provide the required mounting accuracy. The joints of the zonal blocks and modules are equipped with positioning systems of increased accuracy. "
We venture to suggest that Richardson had something in mind, just did not finish or did not think. So, according to the views of domestic specialists, naturally honest, not biased, modularity is a means to quickly replace the old ship stuffing with a new one, and in order not to increase the displacement, the modules should be part of the power kit of the hull and superstructure, and therefore be mounted on welding . Naturally, it is impossible to talk about any changes of rockets to pressure chambers under such conditions - we can only talk about providing the ability to quickly modernize the ship.
This article was released in 2011 year, in May. The analysis of foreign experience is made quite at the “level”, the trends of the future are determined objectively and honestly, there is nothing to complain about.
The more surprising were the events that followed.
In 2011-2013, as we know, there was a turn in the views of the Navy command on the future of surface ships. It was then that the Navy refused to improve the 20380 corvettes, to further develop the 20385 line, and decided to build 22160 patrol ships - modular, unarmed and inappropriate to the requirements for warships, and "Corvettes" of the project 20386 - inferior in arms to the previous 20385 project, inferior in anti-submarine capabilities to the old 20380 and IPC 1124 corvette, over-sophisticated, unnecessarily expensive and too large for the BMZ.
In order to assess what rake the Navy comes in (having before it the negative experience of two not the last states in the maritime business), let's take a closer look at the ship of the 20386 project precisely from the point of view of ensuring its modularity and indiscriminately other shortcomings of its design his whole construction is one sheer flaw, but more on that another time).
First, the stupidity is the choice of form factor for modular weapons. What was the point of packing everything into standard shipping containers? This would be “to the point” if it were about the rapid arming of civilian ships and their use in the Navy for mobilization. Then the containers are a big plus. For a combat ship, this is a minus, every kilogram counts on a combat ship, and speed remains an extremely important quality. Containers, because of the large volume, require "to inflate" the ship to an enormous size. For the 20386 project, this applies to the maximum extent.
To accommodate the modules selected feed. In this case, the designers chose a truly insane way of loading modules on board. First, you need to put the module on the helicopter lift with a crane, then lower it into the hangar, horizontally move it through the gate in the rear wall of the hangar to the compartment of the replaceable modules and install it there using lifting equipment. Everything would be fine, but the location of the lifting equipment and the need to transport containers inside the ship require additional height in the feed compartments - otherwise not to lift the container and not to drag. And height is an additional volume. And it generates additional tonnes of displacement. As a result, the 20380 corvettes of the 1007 and 1008 orders possess not only the same weapons as the 20386, but almost the same multifunctional radar complex Zaslon, which is simply mounted not on the superstructure, but on the integrated tower-mast structure. But their displacement at the same time less than a thousand-odd tons, a third!
That's what led the games with the modules-containers. About the fact that for the sake of the module with the Caliber missiles it is necessary to go to sea without a helicopter, it has already been said more than once, and the degree of absurdity of this decision is obvious to any normal person. For some reason, on a smaller, and approximately 900 tons lighter 20385 corvette, there is both a helicopter and eight cells in the vertical missile launch facility, and the same sixteen anti-aircraft missiles, the same gun, the same radar complex, and there is no need to choose - everything is installed at the same time. With a total, absolute superiority of old corvettes in hydroacoustics.
Next, let's try to think - and how will the applicability of new modules? So, the towed sonar station on the 20386 is removable. But given the primitive built-in gas, which commander would agree to go out to sea without being towed? A ship without it is like a “blind (although generally deaf, but oh well) kitten.” In addition, the module in its place is not provided, it has nothing to replace. And there is additional space for transporting and installing the gas, there is no way around it. And that means what? And this means that the GAS will be put in torment once and for all, and no one will take it off from there anymore, there are no suicides among the ship commanders and naval commanders. Why then modularity? Next - container PU.
At first glance, a helicopter can be sacrificed. Do not take it with you, and that's all. But the ship does not have a long-range submarine detection tool, even if using the towed GAS somewhere behind or from the side, the submarine will be spotted (right on the course it will not be spotted on time, there is nothing, the built-in GAS is dead). Torpedoes complex "Package"? But their range is small, and it’s unrealistic to reload the Packet into the sea - the launcher is made so miserable that it can only be reloaded in the base.
If there were a helicopter, there would be chances to urgently raise it with torpedoes for the attack of the discovered submarine, or with torpedoes and buoys for additional search and attack ... actually, that is why he will be on board, and no container launchers. Again, because there are no suicide bombers.
The position remains in the center of the aft compartment, between the side lazportami for boats. Any module can be put there. Diving, for example, or mine. And this is the only "excuse" for the super-expensive ship and the "killed" program of upgrading ships of the near-sea zone, the loss of inter-ship unification, and the loss of time to at least 2025, but rather 2027, when the failure of this scam can no longer be hidden. And this is without taking into account technical risks, because of which this ship may simply not be built. Never.
Great price for one modular container with accessories. Or two.
Loading modules. First, on the lift, then roll on the brackets with wheels through the gate into the compartment of the interchangeable equipment. There using crane girders to mount in place
Pay attention to how much space above the towed gas. But this is all ship steel, displacement. And more expensive GEM to move it all. At the same time, GUS will most likely never be removed.
The launch of rockets from the hangar is an innovation that knows no equal. Nobody has done this before. And, most likely, never will. And if the rocket falls back or detonates immediately after launch? The survivability of a standard UVP in such a situation is several times higher
But more importantly, with the example of 20386, all the problems with the modules that stood in the way of the Danes and Americans seem to be confirmed. And the fact that part of the modules will be installed on the ship forever, and that because of them the ship has a significantly higher displacement and larger dimensions (and more expensive GEM, as a result), and that the modules will need to be stored in special conditions, provide calculations, and calculations provide training ...
And the “lateness” of the modules also seems to us “shining”. At least 20386 was laid out in October 2016 of the year, 2018 really began to build it in November (project supporters - but you didn’t know, did you?), And there is still no rocket module with Calibres. There is a mock-up PU capable of providing the so-called “throwing” test, that is, a start-up “to nowhere”, without guidance, without loading the flight task, that's all. And in general there are no modules yet, except for the final test of the removable GAS “Minotaur” and diving container. It is possible that they will not be in 2027 either. A displacement in 3400 tons of a "corvette" 20386 - in fact already.
But maybe on the patrol ship of the 22160 project, the modules will “register” better? Here we must admit that yes, it is better. On this ship, the location and method of mounting the modules is better at times. There, the modules are placed in "slots" by a crane, through large hatches in the deck, and are combined with the helicopter. This is not to say that it made the ship much more useful. But, at least, its zero efficiency does not turn into a negative value when trying to install a container there. This makes me happy.
Zero more than minus. You can take comfort in even this, although the people's money is very sorry. Well, remember that the container is not yet
But again, if these ships get a meaningful task, the containers will be “registered” there forever. Should these “patrolmen” take over the tasks of non-nuclear deterrence of NATO, and receive (well, all of a sudden!) Containers with “Gauges”, it is unlikely someone will ever remove them from these ships. Tension in relations with the West is not reduced, and, apparently, it will never decrease, which means that the missiles must be ready for use at all times. If some ships suggest that these ships be used to protect the Nord Stream pipeline from terrorists and saboteurs, no one will load the modular load while this task is relevant. And, like the Danes with the Americans, the modularity will be just superfluous. Modules will not be replaced, they will always be on the ship.
We stepped on the same rake, on which others passed before us. We saw these rakes hit them in the forehead. But still made this step. The result will be logical - it will be the same as that of the Americans, and worse than the Danes, who got off with "little blood" with their invention, and the Absalons, due to the rational and extremely limited use of modular technologies, even turned the modularity to theoretically at least.
And it is very disappointing that all this was done when our specialists had already outlined the correct ways to use the modular approach in the future, by disseminating this information in specialized editions of the shipbuilding industry.
But, like the Americans, the authors of our modular ships, priorities are somewhat different from the growth of the combat capability of the Navy and, especially, the saving of public money. Alas, but in the case of modular ships, we repeat not only the mistakes of others, but also the crimes of others.
So does this mean that modularity is an absolute evil? Not really.
As you know, the poison is different from the drug dosage. For a full-fledged warship, the ability to quickly upgrade is very important. And modular models of weapons and equipment installed on warships can accelerate this upgrade. Here only these modules must meet the following conditions:
1. Fastening by welding and "participation" in ensuring the rigidity and strength of the body. This will prevent the growth of the displacement of the ship.
2. Rejection of the idea of having a standard form factor. Use for their guns connecting dimensions, for their own radar, and so on. This will allow upgrading weapons and various equipment without costly reworking the ship, and the displacement, if it grows, is not by a third, like in "ordinary" modular ships, but by a few percent.
Naturally, there will be no talk of any quick replacements of a module with a module. Modules will be replaced only during upgrades, and only with similar ones (cannon on gun, radar on radar). Naturally, as the American Commander-in-Chief Richardson said, electrical power should be installed with an eye to the future, so that later, in the future, to support more energy-intensive equipment.
Yes, and container modules can find their purpose. First of all, when arming non-military ships, or obsolete and not subject to "normal" modernization of ships. So, on a small bulk carrier, it is possible to install four or six container caliber "Caliber" missiles, directly "into the trough" on the floor of the cargo compartment, throw power supply cables along the floor, and install a floor above a part of the cargo compartment to install, for example, a radar module, a mobile monoblock version of the Pantsir or a stand-alone Torah module, container PUs of the Uranus complex, and so on.
PU KR "Club" on a container ship
Here, for example, the Finns put a container mortar caliber 120 millimeters on the boat. For such purposes, modularity will find its full use.
And, most likely, common sense will prevail. No fall is everlasting, at the end it is always a blow. Whether it will be shamefully lost to a third-rate war in the sea, or just all the secret will be revealed, we are not given to know. But the fact that the final will be - for sure. And then, perhaps, common sense and honesty will again be in demand. And we will stop walking around the rake - alien and our own, catching “trendy” viruses from abroad and repeating other people's crimes for the enrichment of a handful of crooks.
In the meantime, we can only watch.