The first column is the number of the USSR Navy at the peak of its power - as of 1991. It takes into account the total number of ships on the fleet lists, regardless of the actual state of their combat effectiveness.
The second column is the number of the Russian Navy as of 01.01.2016. At the same time, as in the previous case, it takes into account all the ships of the fleet, including those that will never return to its current composition. Thus, a comparison of the first and second columns perfectly demonstrates what the Russian Federation started at the time of the fall of the USSR and what it came to after a quarter of a century of its existence.
The third column is information about the size of the Russian Navy as of today, 2018 g. The fundamental difference between the data in this column and the previous two is that they are cleared from ships that will never return to the fleet. That is, the ships of the existing fleet are included in this column, as well as those that are under repair or are awaiting repair, from which they will return to the fleet, and will not be scrapped. But the ships that are in reserve or in the sludge, and those that are only formally listed as repairs, were not included here. This column is designed to give an understanding of the actual composition of our Navy.
The fourth column is the forecast for 2030. I would like to note that an optimistic scenario has been taken, in which the author does not believe too much, but ... let's say that what we see in this column is the maximum we can count on.
And finally, the fifth column is the presentation of two military professionals, V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky on the minimum required fleet. Recall that these authors advocated the unification of the ship composition: in their opinion, the nuclear submarine fleet should be represented by two types of ships - SSBNs with ballistic missiles and a universal type of torpedo submarine, non-nuclear submarines should also be of the same type. Instead of missile cruisers, destroyers and BOD, multipurpose ships (MSCs) should be built, and the coastal fleet should be represented by one type of TFR, etc. Accordingly, we ranged warships according to the classes proposed by V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky. At the same time, we did not elaborate on the composition of the USSR Navy by types of ships (it is not only difficult, but will also overload the table top of every measure), but we provide such data on the Russian Navy. And that's what we did.
And now - comments. We will not describe in detail the state of each class and type of ships, since we have already done this in the relevant articles, we will give only a brief reminder.
Everything is more or less clear, by 2030 g the number of ships of this type will remain the same as now, but the old ships of Soviet construction will be replaced by the Borei-A. In principle, this is a completely normal and correct approach, with perhaps one exception - the Ministry of Defense refused to build more advanced Boreev-B in favor of modification “A” because “B” does not meet the “cost-effectiveness” criterion. This decision, in the light of the frank weakness of our fleet, as well as the development of the PLO and the saturation of the US Navy with the multi-purpose 4-generation submarines, does not look reasonable.
Even in the most remarkable (and, alas, extremely unlikely) case, in which the current plans of a large modernization of 4 boats of the 971 project and the same number of Antey SSGNs, moreover, provided that the lead ship of the Husky series is not only laid, but put into operation before 2030, the composition of multi-purpose submarines will continue to decline, while its total number will be half the minimum value. But much more likely is another scenario in which our modernization plans will be thwarted, and the Huskies will still be in construction - in this case, it is realistic to expect a reduction in multi-purpose submarines in the fleet to 14-15 units. Thus, we can safely predict a further decline in the number of this most important class of warships and state the presence in the fleet to 2030 of no more than 39-50% of the minimum sufficient number.
In principle, there is reason to assume that their number will remain at the current level, but this requires the fulfillment of two conditions. The first is that the existing construction program for six “Varshavyanok” for the Pacific Fleet will not be sequestered, and already after the last two “Lads” have been completed, it will be possible to build and commission more 6 boats of this or newer type. Perhaps there is nothing impossible in this, but alas, the situation is quite likely when we wait a long time for the VNEU, then rework a boat for it, or design a new one, then, in 2022, put something in the world that will take years to build. on 10 - and the number of non-nuclear submarines in the fleet will be reduced from today's 22 ships to 15 units. Total -60-85% of the minimum acceptable level.
Aircraft carriers (TAVKR)
It's all clear. Even if the work on the creation of a new ship of this class is really underway, and the lead aircraft carrier will be laid before 2030 G, and this is far from being a fact, then he will not be in time to do so. Thus, at 2030 g, we are left with only one TAVKR “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov”, which is 2030% of the required level. Considering the fact that our only TAVKR does not meet the requirements for aircraft carrier, voiced by V.P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky, in reality, this ratio will be even worse.
Generally speaking, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky saw this ship as a destroyer with a standard displacement in 6 000 t. With missile armament, placed in the OHR. 3 500 - 4 500 T frigates, in their opinion, the Russian Navy is not needed: nevertheless, today we are building them and it would be most reasonable to place them in this “class” of ships.
As can be seen from the table, if everything goes well, then we will be able to keep the total number of ships at the current level by 2030. But this is only if before the 2030 we can not only commission the 3 frigate of the 22350 project, in addition to the Gorshkov, but also build a couple of the same or the newer 22350М project. And if we miraculously manage to keep the number of BOD projects 1155 / 1155.1 at the level of 7 ships.
But even in this case, instead of the minimum required 32 ships, we will have only 20, of which 7 BOD will be completely outdated, both in terms of weapons and ship systems, and in terms of resource mechanisms, and 7 frigates of the 22350 and 11356 project will be much weaker than ships , "Designed" by V.P. Kuzin and V. I. Nikolsky. The two upgraded TARKRs, however, will be much stronger, but it is obvious that this advantage will not be able to compensate for the 14 quality gap of other ships. You can count on the fact that not 2030 frigates of the 5 / 22350М project will have time to enter 22350 r, but more of them, in principle, can be, but you need to understand that there are practically no chances of retaining all existing 1155 BODs in the fleet - by 2030 The resources of their power plants will be developed, and there is nothing to change them with - the situation with the joining Admiral Panteleev will be repeated. Thus, the hope for an increase in the number of frigates, alas, is more than offset by the risks of entering the "perpetual reserve" of the BOD project 1155.
In general, it can be argued that some progress in the structure of the ship’s personnel relative to the planned figures is possible, but the total number of rocket-artillery ships capable of operating in the ocean will be at best about 62% of the minimum required need. And you need to understand that in fact the specified percentage does not show the real state of affairs - V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikol'skii determined the need for such ships based on the fleet aircraft carrier structure - that is, in their view, deck aircraft will take on the task of destroying airborne and surface targets, and the MCC are mainly needed to stabilize "floating airfields". But we do not expect new aircraft carriers before 2030 g, and in order to try to solve the same tasks, the MSC need a much larger number of them than indicated by VP. Kuzina and V.I. Nikol'skii. In other words, by 2030, we would have an ISC 62% of the minimum requirement if we have aircraft carriers, and since they are not there, the indicated percentage automatically becomes much lower.
Their total number on 2030 is calculated from the assumptions that we can:
1. Put into operation all the corvettes that are being built today and at least four more ships of the 20386 project or another project;
2. Increase the 22160 series of patrol ships from 6 to 12 ships.
As for the corvettes, it is hardly possible to expect more - of course, both 8 and 10 keels can lay them out, but given the fact that ships of this class are being built during 5-7 years, we can hardly expect them to enter in operation to 2030 g more than four. Something can change for the better except if the bookmarks of the corvettes of the 20380 project, more or less worked out in construction, will be resumed, but it is hardly possible to rely on this - the ships didn’t like the fleet. But laying another six ships of the project 22160 is quite possible.
In general, the situation seems to be quite good - although the total number of ships in the near-sea zone will decrease from 38 to 31, but this will amount to almost 75% of the minimum demand by V.P. Cousin and V.I. Nikolsky. But this is only if we forget that the patrol ships of the 22160 project do not at all meet the requirements put forth by respected authors to the TFR. Read more about the absurdities of the project 22160 wrote dear A. Timokhin in the article “Suitcases without handles. Navy buys a series of useless ships ", and we also gave these ships the most negative assessment. In short, the 22160 project is practically inapplicable in a conflict of some considerable intensity, its limit is police operations like the detention of Ukrainian armored boats, but for this purpose a better ship could be designed. In other words, although in the graph corresponding to the class "TFR" in the understanding of V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky, we counted the 31 ship, but 12 of them are listed in them only formally, for the simple reason that they do not fit into our classification, but it was necessary to carry them somewhere. At the same time, the 22160 project is completely unable to carry out the TFR functions in the near-sea zone. With this amendment, the composition of our TFR to 2030 g - 19 ships, or 45% of the minimum required.
Small surface ships and boats
Here the situation, oddly enough, is both better and worse than shown in the table. At the beginning of 2016, the Russian Navy had 39 small rocket ships and boats of various projects, the serial construction of which began (and in most cases ended) during Soviet times. So, at present, these ships, which for the most part are rapidly losing their combat significance, are quite successfully replaced by river-sea-class MRKs “Buyan-M” (12 units in service and in construction) and a series of newest “Karakurts” 22800 project - last commissioned, built and contracted 18 units. Thus, the outdated ships are already being replaced by 39 with quite modern RTOs, and this is far from the limit. It can be assumed that, against the background of failures in the construction of larger surface warships, the Karakurt series will be increased to 30 or even 24 units - the last figure was laid down in the table, and it’s quite possible to commission this number of RTOs to 30. Although, of course, it is far from a fact that in addition to the 2030 "Karakurt", which should be replenished by the fleet, an additional, and even such a large-scale series will be contracted.
However, as we see, the total number of ISCs and combat boats will decrease, and by 2030 will not reach the number of 60 units planned by V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky. However, here it is necessary to take into account that dear authors meant the construction of very small ships, up to 60 and displacement, although they assumed to equip them with the same anti-ship missiles. “Buyan-M” and “Karakurt” are much larger and more combat-ready, so it can be stated that the “mosquito fleet” is the only component of our Navy, which by its size and combat capability fully meets its objectives. Another question is that the utility of RTOs in modern conditions is under a very big question ... No wonder that V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky, planning the construction of 25-60 ton boats, suggested, in fact, the construction of river rather than sea boat forces.
As we said earlier, the state of the mine-sweeping forces of the Russian Navy is catastrophic. And this concerns both their numerical composition and equipment - both of which are completely inadequate. But first things first.
So, at the beginning of 2016, the Navy of the Russian Federation included 66 minesweepers, and by now the fleet has been replenished with the newest ship of this class, the “Alexander Obukhov”, and reliable information that some ships with 2016 have left there is no article. Accordingly, it can be assumed that the total number of minesweepers in our fleet today is 67 units. However, of these, the 31 unit is a raider minesweepers, who are completely outdated and are able to fight only the usual anchor mines, which is completely insufficient today. In essence, it can be said that their combat value is zero. All these ships are old-built, and none of them will survive until 2030 r, but today they are completely useless, so that they can safely be ignored. I must say that V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky evidently assumed that it was impossible to create a ship capable of fighting the modern mine threat in the displacement of the raid trawler, and did not plan further construction of ships of this subclass.
This is followed by the basic minesweepers, of which we currently have 23 units, including the already mentioned “Alexander Obukhov”. Here, however, it should be noted the cunning trick of our Ministry of Defense - ships of this type (the 12700 project) have recently been considered not as base, but as sea minesweepers. However, the perch, named by the pike, does not cease to be a perch from this - although the 12700 project was created with a claim to actions at sea, it was the base but not the sea minesweeper that turned out to be the output. At the same time, the ship did not receive French anti-mine complexes with which it was planned to equip it, and the domestic analogue Alexandrite-ISPUM has not yet been created, and it seems that it will replenish an endless list of domestic military development failures. As a result, Obukhov has only unmanned boats from modern anti-mine weapons, which he, moreover, can only carry in tow, and somewhere in the sea he can work only in the old fashioned way - towed by trawls. Well, the rest of the 22 domestic minesweeper of this subclass, never anything else and did not carry.
In general, the situation with the base minesweepers is awkward — the Alexandrites of the 12700 project are expensive, but do not have modern anti-mine warfare equipment, and therefore their massive construction, which has been repeatedly announced by various officials, has never been deployed, and according to the latest data apparently, the series will be limited to 8 cases, or even fewer of them. Thus, to 2030 g, taking into account the natural loss in the base minesweepers, we can not keep their number at the current level. By 2030, the city will remain approximately 15 - less than 47% of the required quantity in these ships according to VP Cousin and V.I. Nikolsky. But what is the use of numbers, if, apparently, they will not be able to deal with the modern mine threat?
As for the sea minesweepers, here we are in a better situation, because of 13 ships of this class, as many as 2 (in words - TWO) of the ship used KIA (complex mine finders), that is, equipment is more modern than towed trawls ! True, it was far from the most modern, in a number of parameters inferior to the Western counterpart, but it was! Alas, it was subsequently removed from one minesweeper. So, to date, the Russian Navy has as much as one ship capable of fighting the modern mine danger - this is Vice-Admiral Zakharyin’s minesweeper.
So, in connection with physical aging, we should expect that from the 13 of the existing MTShch to the 2030 today, the 3 will remain in the ranks. Where did the 8 ships of a new project come from then?
Alas - exclusively from the author’s gigantic optimism. The fact is that a rumor has passed about the development of a certain minesweeper for the Navy, which is being carried out by Almaz Central Design Bureau, and it can be assumed that this is exactly MTShch. And if the developers do not start again to reinvent the bicycle from scratch, if the creators of the mine-sweeping complexes can still offer normal complexes for these ships, then perhaps we can build eight such ships before 2030. Or, perhaps, they will still be able to provide such complexes for the Alexandrite, and then their series will be increased.
Alas, even the most optimistic forecasts do not allow us to expect to reach the lower threshold of the number of mine-trawling forces according to V.P. Cousin and V.I. Nikolsky - instead of 44 BST and MST, we will have 2030 only 26 of such ships, or less than 60% of the minimum requirement.
Amphibious assault ships
With them, everything is quite simple. Of the 19 BDK of two types that we have today, and provided that by 2030, all ships whose age has reached 45 years have left the system, only 8 ships of the 775 project will remain. At the same time, today, the only update of the amphibious fleet (not counting small amphibious boats) is a series of two ships of the “Ivan Gren” type, one of which has recently been commissioned, and the second is in the process of completion, highly ready and expected by the fleet In the following, 2019. I must say that the series of such ships was originally planned in 6, but then it was reduced to two.
As we all remember, the Russian Navy was to receive the 4 UDC of the Mistral type, two of which were to be built in France, but at the last moment the French refused to send us ready-made ships. This, apparently, was the cause of some stupor in updating the Russian amphibious fleet - Russia is fully capable of continuing the construction of BDK of the “Ivan Gren” type, but sailors prefer the UDC. The latter are considerably, almost five times larger than the Ivanov Grenov, and it is completely unknown when they can be started to build them, and given the domestic long-term construction, one can hardly expect that at least one such ship will be commissioned before 2030. the same time, in connection with the collapse in the number of BDK in the next decade, the possibility of laying one or two BDK under the Ivan Gren project is not excluded, but the further this decision is delayed, the less chances that the ships will have time to get up to 2030 Most likely, if you decide And it will be accepted, some “Improved Ivan Gren” will be mortgaged, which will still need to be designed, and which will be very different from the original, then we will build it for a long time ... Thus, the hope that the number of our landing fleet will be The state on 2030 G will be slightly higher than the one shown in the table, but it is not too large. And in any case, if we manage to ensure the presence of 2030 or even 12 BDK by 14, we will not have the basis of the amphibious fleet - four universal amphibious ships - under any circumstances.
Here the situation is as negative as in the naval composition of the fleet. Unfortunately, it is much more difficult to predict the supply of aircraft to the fleet than the ship's personnel, and the data for 2030 are either not predictable at all, or are predictable, but with very large reservations or assumptions.
To date, the MA of the Russian Navy has 119 bombers, fighter-interceptors and multi-purpose fighters, including deck fighters. If the rate of delivery of aircraft of these classes will be slightly increased from the current, then, taking into account the cancellation of outdated vehicles, their number by 2030 g will be about 154 units (for more, see article “Naval Aviation of the Russian Navy. Current status and prospects. H.3 »). V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky believed that the total number of such aircraft in the Russian Navy should have been at least 500 units, which included 200 deck-based aircraft: the calculation was very simple, it was assumed that for successful defense we would need aircraft of 75% of that which could be countered from the sea is our opponent.
I would like to clarify specifically that we are talking about multifunctional fighters, and not about naval aircraft-carrying aircraft (MRA). The fact is that V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky believed that the Russian Federation would not be able to afford the construction and maintenance of an MRA of sufficient size to successfully destroy enemy carrier strike groups. Therefore, in their opinion, naval aviation, first of all, needs fighter jets to combat the means of air attack. Not to try to destroy the AUG, but to knock out a significant part of its carrier-based aviation, thereby lowering its combat stability and forcing them to retreat — this was the task of the naval aviation V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky.
One can argue about their concept of using the air force of the fleet, but one thing is beyond doubt - the country really does not have the capacity to contain numerous MPAs. Now the MPA has been completely abolished, but even if we take into account in the composition of naval aviation, the Tu-22М3, which must be modernized and will be equipped with modern anti-ship missile weapons, it will increase the strength of the latter only on 30 aircraft.
And you need to understand that the fact that we do not have 4 aircraft carriers is not a reason for reducing the total number of aircraft according to VP Cousin and V.I. Nikolsky — we will need them anyway, regardless of whether they are deck or land-based. However, as we can see, the need for naval tactical aircraft today is less than 25% satisfied, and in the future it is hardly 30% of the required values.
Everything is no less difficult with PLO aircraft - today the numerical lag behind the minimum required quantity is not so significant, 50 airplanes instead of 70, however, you need to understand that even such “rarities” as the Be-12 are included in our calculations. At the same time, V.P. Kuzin in V.I. Nikolsky, of course, talked about modern PLO aircraft, which with us, and even with a stretch, can only be considered IL-38H with the Novella complex, and we have exactly 8 units today. Before 2030, 20 aircraft must be upgraded (more precisely, they will pass it much earlier), but then everything is covered with obscurity, because the stocks of old IL-38, which could be modernized, will be exhausted, and God forbid not turned out to be less. But there is no information about the creation of new PLO aircraft, unless at the level of some general wishes - and as practice shows, with such a start, it would be extremely naive to expect that the fleet will receive new aircraft of this class in the coming 10-12 years.
It is still easier with tankers - there are no specialized airplanes of this type in the fleet, and there were no plans for their appearance. There are no data on auxiliary aircraft. As for helicopters, it should be borne in mind that their fleet is rapidly becoming obsolete physically, and the efforts of aircraft manufacturers today are directed mostly at upgrading existing machines, although there are some plans to upgrade anti-submarine helicopters. Thus, one can hardly count on an increase in the number of helicopters - it would be good to at least keep at the current level.
Coastal troops of the Russian Navy
Unfortunately, the data available to the author are very heterogeneous and cannot be reduced to comparable figures. However, I would like to make one important observation: considering the coastal missile and artillery troops of the Russian Navy for their current state and near future, we noted that in their capabilities they are not only not inferior, but will significantly surpass the Soviet Naval Forces - first of all rearmament account for the latest missile systems. However, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky made to some extent a reasonable assumption that, in its current form, GRAVs would not be able to perform the functions assigned to it.
Dear authors rightly doubt that in the event of a large-scale war, NATO countries will conduct large-scale amphibious operations on our territory - such an opportunity is more of a hypothetical threat. On the other hand, the Brav missile systems are unlikely to be able to withstand the US AUG, even if the latter are within their reach. Logic V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky is as follows: the launch of a limited number of anti-ship missiles in the zone of domination of the enemy wing will not be successful, and if this rule is destroyed, then the AUG will leave without waiting for the “benefits” from the RVS. It is impossible not to agree that a certain logic is present in these arguments, but still such a judgment seems overly categorical. AUG, of course, is a tough nut to crack, but it is not invincible and could well be destroyed if it is possible to gather the necessary force for this. If the AUG enters the zone of reach of the Brav, its missiles, of course, will play their part, adding to the air, underwater and other forces that we can gather to destroy it. Understand this in America, therefore, most likely, just will not enter the squadron of surface ships in range of missiles of missiles.
The Unified State System for Lighting Surface and Underwater Situations (EGSONPO) should have been a system of marine intelligence and targeting of surface and underwater targets, which would provide us with a zone of complete control in our coastal (and not very coastal) waters. This system, which made it possible to open the movement of enemy warships at a distance of 1000-2000 km from our coastline, could largely compensate for the insufficient number of ships and aircraft of the Navy. Alas, for the time being, the only more or less working component of the over-the-horizon radar is that the rest (especially the controls of the underwater environment) are in the embryonic state itself and there is no hope that by the 2030 we will have in the Barents or Okhotsk seas something like American SOSUS.
The conclusions of the above are completely disappointing.
On the one hand, formally approaching the matter, the Russian Navy still holds the position of the second most powerful fleet of the world, immediately following the United States, although China is strongly “on the heels” and, perhaps, gains superiority over the Russian Navy to 2030. However, given the fact that the Russian fleet is forced to crush forces between four separate theaters, it is, unfortunately, unable to solve its main tasks in any of them.
The key task of the Russian Navy is to provide massive nuclear and nuclear retaliation in the event of a sudden attack on our country with the use of nuclear weapons. Alas, neither today nor in 2030 the fleet can guarantee the solution of this task. In essence, all that we have for this is SSBNs and ballistic missiles on them. But their withdrawal from bases and deployment in patrol areas will be extremely difficult. We do not have mine-sweeping forces capable of ensuring the safety of SSBNs when leaving the bases. We do not have a sufficient number of modern nuclear and diesel submarines, surface ships, anti-submarine aircraft, able to counteract dozens of enemy atomicines that will search and try to destroy our SSBNs. We do not have ground and deck-based naval aviation of sufficient size to ensure air supremacy and prevent enemy patrol aircraft from pursuing our submarines. The same, alas, also applies to the capabilities of our fleet to repel a non-nuclear attack by NATO squadrons. And it’s sad not even that we have come to this state, but that in the foreseeable future this state of affairs will remain unchanged, and the fleet rearmament plans currently in force will not ensure its ability to effectively solve even its most important tasks.