Who governs Belarus?
It seems to be something to argue about what to discuss? However, not everything is as clear as it seems at first glance. After all, what does “governing the state” mean? Or, for example, a company? As we know, the current activity and current orders can be given by one person / group of public figures, but completely different people can own the whole “enterprise”. Hence the "sudden" decisions and turns. When the smooth flow of the “managerial process” is suddenly interrupted by some powerful “pitfall”. And then it becomes clear “Who is who”. And also quite a sudden.
Taki Lukashenko defiantly steers the country "in manual mode", censors careless officials at the camera, flies over the country in a "blue helicopter" and tracks failures in agriculture ... and everything himself, everything himself. And he regularly speaks speeches and shows activity everywhere. However ... however, with a careful analysis of his policies (on a long stretch), certain serious doubts begin to creep in his absolute and sole reign.
Just "do not beat" certain things, do not hit. Somehow do not fit. Remember the "legendary film" "Godfather"? Why would she "suddenly" appear on television? For the Kremlin such The moves are absolutely uncharacteristic. It was “something with something”. A kind of "political fiction." Why did it happen? Such are the moves? It all started in the 2008 year, at the start of the “Three Eight Wars”. It was then that everything started spinning. Not particularly reflexing, the Kremlin expected full political (at least political) support from the “union Belarus”.
But I did not get it from the word at all, which was for Russia and its leadership a complete and deafening surprise. That is Medvedev a very long time could not believe that Minsk does not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Strongly could not believe. It’s just that the very essence and logic of the Union State almost automatically implied such a move. But no. Confessions did not follow. Moreover, being under the most powerful pressure of the Kremlin, the “dad” wrenched out and turned out for a very long time. And, apparently, indeed, in public in the presence of the heads of the CIS, he promised to perform such an action, but he did not.
That is, before the “war of three eight”, the only thing that was required of Belarus was to receive Russian subsidies and to express assurances of sincere friendship. Then everything was relatively good. Once they demanded that Belarus do something in return, global problems began. When the Belarusians dare to mention the Union State, they somehow kindly forget that it worked very well in the “pump mode for pumping Russian money”, in any other modes it turned out to be unable to work in principle.
That is, Lukashenko was literally “wasted”, but he did not recognize Yu. Ossetia and Abkhazia. Such a gentle friendship. In general, already in the tenth “friendship” of Moscow-Minsk by the Belarusians, it was reduced to constant “trading” scandals and accusations of Moscow that she wants to involve Minsk somewhere in the political sphere. In something bad to embroil. That's the whole "friendship." Once again: everything was relatively cloudless, while Russian money and resources flowed in Minsk in exchange for verbal assurances of "unfailing friendship" (many Belarusians remember this time with nostalgia). As soon as they tried to demand something in return from Minsk, endless scandals began.
And that's just the "break point" - this is the very "non-recognition". Here it is, the starting point of serious mutual differences. And here a serious and quite obvious question arises: why? Why did Lukashenka not do what was demanded of him as an ally? In theory, he had nothing to lose at that time, officially he was “the last dictator of Europe” and the persona “non grata” in the EU. All proceeds from trade thanks to Russia. Grants from the same place. That is, by “recognizing” he did not greatly deteriorate his position in the West, where he was so “unshakeable” and seriously raised his shares in Russia.
No matter how you look, no matter how you analyze, the position of Lukashenka is absolutely incomprehensible. What for? What the hell? Simply by that time a lot of things “hung” on it: the disappearance of opposition leaders, their numerous arrests, beating of the protesters, repressions against the opposition. In the West, he could never forgive anything of this and could not. He is, by their standards, “too bad guy.” That is the “rapprochement with the West”, so beloved in Belarus, inevitably comes up against that gloomy figure of the “chairman of the state farm”. And so every time. That is, the problem is just above all in Lukashenka himself.
Therefore, strictly speaking, he personally had nothing to lose if he recognized South Ossetia. The Nobel Prize, which Gorbachev grabbed, was not the only thing for him. He did not receive any major investment projects, no major assistance from the West, “non-recognition”, did not lose and did not continue ... then why? Few people talk about this, but that's good: Lukashenko did not recognize Ossetia, so as not to violate international law and ... in Europe, he is still persona non grata. Then "sense"? I have been trying to understand for a long time, where, strictly speaking, is the “exhaust” from this decision?
And the "negative consequences" were, and serious. In the 2010 year, the next presidential elections in Belarus are taking place, and it was then that Lukashenko categorically required the support of Russia: both economic and political. The condition for receiving such support was just “it” - recognition. By the way, this was clearly and clearly stated. And publicly. That is, the very thing that Lukashenka never joked about was at stake, his personal, personal power. In order to keep it, the support of Russia is necessary: both financial and political. 2009 is the year of the yard, the war in South Ossetia has recently ended ...
And we have to decide something ... So, he never recognized Ossetia. Of course, Lukashenko made a monstrous effort to get out of the situation, 2010-2011 became crucial years for the Belarusian regime. For some reason, little is written about this, but the crisis was most severe: without a sufficient amount of Russian funding, the Belarusian economy literally “began to break.”
And then there's the “presidential election”, and the election of a man whom many already quietly begin to hate. Good it could not end. It is not over. The events of December 2010 of the year are somehow strangely served here, they say almost 100% -but the pro-Russian Lukashenko against the Maidan inspired by the West. However ... however, even then Lukashenko was never pro-Russian. And absolutely no one in Moscow was going to support him. And did not support.
That is, “the best friend of Russia” was given an ultimatum: either you recognize Yu. Ossetia and everything will continue, or excuse me ... In general, before Belarus 2010-11 there existed a “unique Belarusian socio-economic model”. As a matter of fact, many people do not understand that Lukashenko is essentially a dictator-populist. He liked not only power, but also popularity. Well, basically it all worked. Until 2010 year. Could, in principle, continue to work. But the “stumbling block” was precisely that “recognition / non-recognition”. Moscow "rested its horn", but Lukashenko for some reason also did not want to concede.
Once again: there is some beautiful myth about the “cunning Lukashenko of Shklov and the lop-eared Moscow”. However, this is not the case: in the field of military supplies modern technology cooperation was curtailed a long time ago. All dreams of receiving "Iskander" and "Su-30" which year remain dreams. That is, "boundless friendship" took place only at first glance. The credibility of the Minsk leadership did not disappear yesterday. The point of bifurcation is just the moment of “recognition / non-recognition”.
That is, everything could go either in one scenario or in another way. Once again: the Belarusians somehow very quickly “run through” this moment, they say a patter. Say, and what else is there to talk? Everything is clear: Moscow tried to draw Belarus into the last unnecessary confrontation with the West. But wise Lukashenko avoided this.
Forgive my French, but precisely that “non-recognition”, or rather, its “consequences” became for President Lukashenko a complete political catastrophe, and above all just in relations with the beloved by many Belarusians of the West. Just (successfully coincided in time!) Going to the polls without the support of Moscow de facto meant political isolation of Lukashenka. For the West, he is a stranger / enemy, for very many in Belarus, he was already absolutely unacceptable. Many here do not want to understand that without any “agents of the State Department” already in zero, many Belarusians openly hated Lukashenko.
You say he has a low rating today? What do you mean? And when was he tall? Lukashenko’s superpopularity is largely a product of propaganda (he didn’t spare the money for it!). That is, in fact, his position before the elections was peak, no one supports him, there is no money ... there was only one scenario left - the forceful one, which was realized. Acceleration and severe beating of demonstrators. Arrests and Courts. Such is the "popularity", such is the "people's love." As a result, the EU elections did not recognizeUSA elections did not recognize. (And for some reason, Lukashenka did not recognize Abkhazia for some reason ... why, with such a scenario?)
Belarusian propaganda prefers to openly lie, stating that these sanctions are a consequence of the “pro-Russian policy of Minsk”. A little bit wrong, the sanctions imposed on Belarus are the result of frankly wild methods of holding power by one unique character. That is, having avoided “violation of international law” in the case of South Ossetia, Mr. Lukashenko received an economic crisis, growing dissatisfaction, problems in electing his beloved, violent suppression of this discontent and ... the very “Western sanctions” that he allegedly heroically saved the Belarusian nation "Not going in the wake of Moscow".
By the way, yes: Daniel Ortega recognized Ossetia with Abkhazia almost immediately and had no problems. Yes, because by and large in world politics it was not so important. In the sense of "territorial integrity of Georgia." For some reason, the crisis in the elections of 2010 and the general economic crisis of 2010-11 in Belarus are taken to be completely separate from the issue of recognition / non-recognition. But the trick is precisely that these issues were very closely related: Herr Lukashenko literally until the last moment had a chance to solve everything to everyone's complete pleasure, having made that “recognition”. And then everything is “good” again.
That is, this whole crisis 2010-11 could even go in a much softer form, without reaching the "excesses". No, there were problems in the economy, there was discontent, but the decisive factor was the rift with Moscow. Here it is, and all aggravated. 2010-11 are the years of transition from the “paternalistic-socialist” to the openly “repressive-state capitalist” model in Belarus. Everything has become much more serious. "Sharper, darker and harder."
And now the main question: why? Why was chosen such a version of events? Frankly thrash?
Did Lukashenka have any choice at all? For some reason, by definition, we assume that he had the freedom to choose to act on this issue one way or another. But was it so? One gets the serious impression that this option simply did not exist for Mr. Lukashenko. Once again: it is not necessary about “respecting international law” and “maintaining contacts with Europe.” In December, 2010 Lukashenko trampled all the right into the snow and tamped him with batons of special forces. And the question “by recognition” sounded like this: is there life on Mars? That is, in fact was theoretical and hypothetical.
Recognize Lukashenko Y. Ossetia with Abkhazia, that would change little in the political picture of Belarus. So, little thing. And here it is interesting: there is a direct and simple exit through the door on the stairs, but the individual instead crawls through the window, through the fire department (tearing his pants), then jumps onto the asphalt (smashing his face) ... and all this with risk to life and limb. What for? Meaning? Apparently there were some very serious reasons that prevented Mr. Lukashenko from “passing through the front door”. That is, a man who, for the sake of his own power, systematically violated all and all laws, suddenly stopped before a trifle ... sorry. It's not so simple.
“In 2000, the UN Committee against Torture, having reviewed the periodic report on Belarus, noted continuing concerns about disappearances and called on the authorities to“ consider the possibility of creating an independent impartial governmental and non-governmental national human rights commission with effective powers to, among other things, promote human rights and investigation of all complaints of human rights violations, in particular those relating to the application of the Convention " (wiki).
The only reason for “non-recognition” was not Lukashenko’s decision. That is, the final decision was taken by someone else. No matter how you look at it, no matter how you think about the situation, there is simply no other option. All the rest will have to be discarded. The only reasonable option: someone banned Lukashenko do it. And then Alexander G. was already spinning like in a skillet. In the strangest way, the very war of the "Three Eight" very hard hit on in no way directly into it is not involved Belarus. Yes, the 2010-11 crisis is the most direct consequence of that war.
Lukashenka could very easily “bounce off” by signing a few meaningful documents and closing that question (Belarusian special forces are too valuable to be sent to war). But he acted differently. And this decision dealt a “hardest blow” to the “regime”: all the masks had to be dropped and turned to direct repression. Before 2010, in principle, Alexander Lukashenko had serious support (both in Belarus and in Russia!), And then everything changed. That is, no illusions, fantasies and references to a certain right are needed: the decision on Ossetia was gigantic and monstrous for Lukashenko personally, but the interested parties are looking for a “plus” to this day. But do not find.
But if someone is external banned Lukashenko to make such a decision, then all rises to its place. The picture is folded. It happens in life that your boss makes you act in a very unfavorable way for you. Maximum unprofitable. And no "explanation" does not want to listen. That's an order. This is exactly the case. Sovereign and indestructible Alexander Grigorievich looked as foolish as possible: for the sake of the “continuation of the banquet” of the “socially oriented” state (and his own popularity among the people!), He had to take a small piece of paper. But he could not do this categorically.
As a matter of fact, the Russian-Belarusian discussion has been revolving around this small episode (and for world politics this is exactly the case!) For 10 for years. And it spins endlessly. You must agree that in the “Square” version and Belarus, which does not depend on anyone, it looks more than strange, well, why should you take a decision that is so obviously unfavorable and disastrous in its foreign and domestic policy? What for?
There is no need if you make the most important decisions yourself, but if someone else does it for you, then yes ... this “other” may have completely different interests. The clue to the “non-recognition” lies precisely here: Lukashenko did not have the opportunity to make a “other” decision. Did not have he has no “other” choice. If we take this unexpected point of view, then everything becomes clear very quickly: then just all the actions of the Belarusian leadership look quite logical.
They are simply making monstrous efforts to keep control of the situation in 2010 / 2011. At that moment, when literally everything flies to hell. The guys are working literally around the clock unceasingly. Russian aid has drastically reduced and the economy is pouring in ... dissatisfaction is growing ... ahead of the election of the only and beloved "president". After the election, the financial crisis and in February 2011 (that is, immediately after the election!) The last time in the press mentions the “unique Belarusian model” ... because there is no longer any “unique model”.
That is, 2010 is the “election year” under the most difficult conditions, and 2011 is the year of the financial crisis (immediately after the election). And the “election year” ended in brutal beating of demonstrators, mass arrests (including seven presidential candidates!), That is, the political regime itself completely compromised both in the eyes of Belarusian voters and in the eyes of the West (allegedly for the sake of friendship 2 Republic). This is a flop, bro! And the “victorious” 2011 was characterized by the collapse of the Belarusian financial system ... and the terrorist attack in the Minsk metro.
It was then that Lukashenko was forced to sell Beltransgaz. By the way, we have an “interesting” economic cooperation with the Belarusians: they carried out the only action that Russia needed, in essence being on the edge of an economic abyss. That is, they were "very strongly forced" to do this. There was no other way, and so far they are very sorry about it. Such is the "economic cooperation". Do not agree? Name at least one major successful joint economic project with the Belarusians ... We ask affectionately.
And this is the 25 years of "integration." But, returning to our “non-recognition”, it is impossible not to note the extreme degree of strangeness of this decision from the point of view of Mr. Lukashenko and his entourage. It doesn’t draw on “caprice” or “quirk”, it cost too much, and to this day Lukashenka has to “pay the bills”. For all its "unusual and unusual" - it is a bit too much. The logic “we are your best allies, but in Tskhinval we are for Saakashvili” is “difficult to sell” in Russia.
Well, as if this very logic of “external intervention” fits very well with the “non-placement” of the Russian VKS base. How would the “two captains” meet in Moscow, they discussed everything “in an adult way” (the Belarusians are very fond of this approach, they say, the two presidents will meet and decide everything). After that, there, Mr. Shoigu was already going to prepare a base in the Republic of Belarus ... and then Lukashenko, returning home, suddenly declared that he did not know about any base, he had not heard of it.
Gentlemen, do not you think that this is a little over all boundaries? If the issue of locating the VKS base should not be discussed with Lukashenko, then ... with whom? Or do you really think that, without reaching an agreement with the president of Belarus, Putin rushed to place a base there from the bay-flounder? Does it not seem more logical that, acting from the position of the “most important”, Lukashenka in Moscow “shook hands”, and then ... he was corrected and forced play back?
And (let us put aside the military-strategic moment, which is secondary in this case), the situation turned out to be frankly, defiantly stupid ... the matter is not even “pro-Russian”, the matter is elementary logic: first we have complex and long “mega-talks” with a “strong leader”, then during of the very "difficult negotiations" we reach certain "agreements", and then ... they are canceled unilaterally. Explicit order.
Belarusians like to point out that Moscow has not coordinated “counter-sanctions” with Lukashenka, yes, yes, it is possible. But the base just agreed. And what's the point? I know the following argument - Belarus is "unprofitable." “Interesting” such an approach to international agreements ... But seriously, then somehow there is a strong suspicion that the matter is not Alexander Grigorievich’s difficult and complicated “Karachter”, but something else.
No, the myth of a strict and tough leader who leads humanity with an iron hand, ugh, Belarusians, fortunately, looks beautiful, but the truth is not quite similar. Doubts loom. The domination of the “Litvinsky-Polish” propaganda is in fact not useful for the current regime. If you think about it like this ... A complete ideological-political break with Russia (and that’s what we have today!) Is fatal for Belarus.
If we put emotions aside, then the whole strategic course of the Belarusian state looks rather “technocratically” rather strange ... Who is behind all this? Lukashenko? Are you sure? In the excessive "depth of planning" no one suspected him yet. Or is Lukashenka just a “public figure”? Such a powerful, beautiful, "significant", but ... "figure", and someone else makes a strategic decision? You must agree that for Lukashenka personally it was normal to be re-elected and to avoid the shame of the “Godfather Father” was an order of magnitude more important than any “territorial integrity” of certain “tangerine republics”.
You see, the trouble is that all the “explanations” of Lukashenka’s actions (and this is really Lukashenko?) Practically explain nothing. If he "slyly and cynically" acted to his own advantage - this is one thing. Yes, not quite beautiful but is logical. The trouble is that there is no logic at all. In terms of benefits. It acts somehow crookedly and obliquely. Here is the creation of the very super-powerful pro-Western “opposition” (today most of the youth and intellectuals in Belarus are pro-Western) - do you really believe that it was very profitable for Lukashenko? Do not you think that this is somehow wildly: for Poles Lukashenko is a “non grata” person, as well as for Lithuanians, active subversive work has been and is being conducted from the territory of these countries against the regime of Alexander Grigorievich ... - this is what the doctor prescribed ... (this is how, under Brezhnev, officially agitate for America).
What kind of political suicide? I will say more, Belarus in no way 17 does not celebrate September - “Day of Unification”, which, in theory, should be one of the main holidays. In general, this date of the unification of eastern and western Belarus is defiantly ignored, but in the newspapers they openly write that the Belarusians ... were the victims of the Hitler-Stalin attack (the Belarusians are quite logical to be considered as Polish subjects). In general, the Belarusian press actively promotes the idea of Belarus as “Poland-minus”. Russia has been assigned the role of the enemy ...
What is the “profit” of the current government, it is very difficult to understand, almost impossible. A kind of "Ukraine-2", a chronicle of national suicide. That's just who did it all come up? Lukashenko? Are you seriously? How much we didn’t know about him ... maybe he is still reading Schopenhauer at bedtime? You know, very unlikely. Rather, all this is someone else came up with. Too clear, competent and thoughtful campaign is going in Belarus to promote the "Western values" and spit on Russia. Read the Belarusian press - it is almost all pro-Western.
No, if it were “pro-Belarusian” - this is understandable, but there Belarus is not very good, Poland is fine, Russia is the enemy. And so writes almost the entire Belarusian press. At the same time, Poland does not give the official Minsk anything, it is fighting with it ... As a result, as has already been said, the pro-Western mood in Belarus, relations with Russia are spoiled tightly ... And is this all Lukashenko? What for? We must be able to decipher the “Belarusian political jargon”: “friendship with Russia” is the readiness to live at its expense and nothing more, “protecting the national interests of Belarus” is de facto promoting the interests of Poland ... such things. That is, there is a sign - this is one thing, the reality is always something completely different.
At that moment, when the most severe struggle of Russophobes is going on in the leadership of the Republic of Belarus, it’s ridiculous to talk about some kind of “union”. In general, of course, Lukashenka was “brought under the monastery” simply masterfully: the basis of his strength was Russia's support: financial, political, and economic. But he receives information about the world around him from a very narrow circle of people (environment). He completely depends on this environment in the conditions of popular dislike and powerful opposition (pro-Western!). But, in the end, his surroundings in the strangest way turned out to be completely pro-Western (and, perhaps, someone supervised ...) "Smishno", isn't it? So much for the “almighty dictator” ... That is why all the recent “negotiations” with Putin were absolutely meaningless. And this is precisely why this summer Putin decided to actually abandon the one-on-one negotiation format with Lukashenka, because this format does not work with Belarus. Just “expanded” - an attempt to pull into the light of God Belarusian “gray cardinals”. And yes, there is nothing unique here. Even Stalin ate his favorite device in the end (there is such a version).
- Oleg Egorov
- depositphotos.com
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