How many warships does Russia need? Opinion professionals

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In the series "Russian Navy. A sad look into the future" we talked a lot about the state of the Russian fleet, studied the decline in ship composition and predicted its condition for the period up to 2030-2035. However, only the dynamics of the fleet's numbers will not allow us to assess its ability to withstand an external threat - for this we need to understand the condition of the fleets of our “sworn friends”, or, more likely, the potential opponents.

Therefore, in the proposed article we:



1. We give a brief overview of the current state and prospects of the US Navy.

2. Let us determine the numerical strength of the Russian Navy, capable of representing the interests of Russia in the ocean and in the case of large-scale military actions to participate in repelling aggression from the sea.



We note immediately: the author does not consider himself so competent to independently determine the optimal composition of the Russian Navy. Therefore, he trusts this business to professionals - the authors of the book “Navy 1945-1995 USSR”. Allow me to introduce:

Kuzin Vladimir Petrovich, a graduate of the Leningrad Nakhimov VMU and VVMIOLU them. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, with 1970, who served in the 1 Central Research Institute of Defense. He graduated from the adjuncture at the Naval Academy. Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko AA, defended his thesis and is a specialist in system analysis and forecasting the development of complex systems.

Nikolsky Vladislav Ivanovich, graduate VVMIOLU them. F.E. Dzerzhinsky, served on the EM "Serious" (project 30 bis) and "Sharp-witted" (project 61), graduated from the Naval Academy. Marshal of the Soviet Union Grechko A.A., subsequently served in the 1 Central Research Institute of the Moscow Region, Ph.D., an expert in system analysis and forecasting the development of complex systems.

Their book, dedicated to the conceptual development of the USSR Navy, its shipbuilding programs and the performance characteristics of ships, aircraft and other weapons, is a fundamental work that is one of the most important, basic sources of the Soviet navy. And in it, the authors proposed their own concept of the development of the Russian Navy, as they saw it as of 1996 g (the year of publication of the book).

It must be said that their proposals were very unusual and had cardinal differences from a number of key ideas on which the Soviet Navy developed. In their opinion, the Russian Navy should solve the following tasks:

1. Maintaining strategic stability. For this, the fleet must be a component of strategic nuclear forces and must have a sufficient number of strategic missile submarines (SSBN), as well as the forces ensuring their deployment and use;

2. Ensuring the interests of the Russian Federation in the oceans. For this, according to V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky, the fleet must be able to conduct a successful air-ground operation against a separate third world state (the authors themselves described it as an “active strategy against 85% of potentially dangerous countries that have no common border with us and are not members of NATO”);

3. Reflection of an aggressor's attack from sea and oceanic directions in a global nuclear-missile war, or in a large-scale non-nuclear conflict with NATO.

I would like to dwell on the latter. The fact is that the key tasks of the general purpose forces of the USSR Navy were (apart from ensuring the security of the SSBN, of course), the fight against enemy AUG and the interruption of its maritime communications in the Atlantic. The first was substantiated by the fact that it was AUG that posed the greatest danger as a non-strategic means of attack from oceanic directions, while the second was dictated by the need to prevent, or at least slow down the mass transfer of the US Army to Europe.


"Pike-B"


So V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky took the liberty to assert that the Russian Federation (even with a return to the level of industrial production of 1990 g and exceeding it) does not have, and will not have, the economic potential to solve these problems, or at least one of them. Therefore, they proposed the following:

1. The rejection of the "anti-avian" orientation of our fleet. From the point of view of V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky, the emphasis should shift from an aircraft carrier to his Aviation, and here it is. Attacking the AUG we, in fact, are trying to defeat the most powerful mobile fortified area, which is formed by carrier-based (and base) aircraft, enemy surface ships and submarines, and this is an extremely difficult and resource-intensive task. But against the coast, the AUG can act mainly in the form of an air attack, when its carrier-based aircraft operates outside the limits of air defense systems, naval electronic warfare and other military and radio equipment of aircraft carrier’s guarding ships. Accordingly, it is possible, without attacking the AUG, to focus on the destruction of its aircraft in air battles, leading the last forces of our aircraft both deck and land based “on our terms”, that is, in their own “bastions” formed by ground and ship air defense systems. According to V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky, with the destruction of 40% of the number of decked wing aircraft, the combat stability of the AOG will drop so much that it will be forced to leave the combat area and retreat.

2. The danger posed by cruise missiles deployed on sea carriers, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky is aware of, but it is directly stated that the Russian Federation is unable to build a fleet capable of destroying these carriers. Therefore, it remains only to focus on the destruction of the missiles themselves after their launch - here V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky rely only on the fact that, firstly, the concentration on air power (see the previous paragraph) will allow to destroy a significant part of such missiles on approach, and secondly they remind that even hundreds of such missiles were not enough to destroy air defense and communication systems such a generally not militarily strong country, like Iraq during the “Storm in the Desert”.

3. Instead of interrupting shipping and destroying enemy SSBNs in the ocean, according to V.P. Kuzina and N.I. Nikolsky, you should set the task of constricting actions. In other words, the Russian Federation does not create a fleet of sufficient numbers to solve such tasks, but it is possible to build a fleet that will force the enemy to spend large resources on fending off possible threats. Let us explain with an example - even two hundred submarines do not guarantee victory in the Atlantic, but if the fleet is able to allocate a couple of dozen submarines to solve this task, then NATO will still have to build a complex and expensive anti-submarine defense system in the ocean - and, in the event of war, use on such a defense many resources, many times superior in value, our allocated forces. But otherwise, these resources could have been spent by the US Armed Forces with much greater benefit and greater danger for us ...

In other words, we see that the tasks of the Russian Navy according to V.P. Cousin and V.I. Nikolsky is much more modest than those who set themselves the Navy of the USSR. Dear authors "do not threaten" to defeat the US Navy, or, especially, NATO, limiting themselves to much more modest goals. And so, based on the foregoing, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky determined the number of the Russian Navy. But ... Before we go to specific figures, let's still go back to the first issue of our article.

The fact is that V.P. Kuzin and V.I. In his calculations for the Russian Navy, Nikolsky, naturally, pushed off from the current strength of the American fleet. Of course, in the event that the US Navy grew or shrunk compared to 1996 (the year of publication of the book), the calculations of respected authors could become outdated and require adjustment. So let's see what happened with the US Navy during the 1996-2018 period.

Aircraft carriers


CVN-68 Nimitz


In 1996, the US Navy had 12 ships of this type, of which 8 were atomic (7 ships of the Nimitz type and the firstborn Forrestal), the rest were 3 of the Kitty Hawk type ship and one Independence (representative such as non-nuclear aircraft carriers "Forrestol") had the usual power plant. To date, the United States has 11 nuclear aircraft carriers, including 10 ships of the type "Nimitz" and one of the newest "Gerald R. Ford". Considering the fact that atomic aircraft carriers have significantly greater capabilities than their non-nuclear "brothers", it can be said that the US aircraft carrier component remained at least at the level of 1996 g - even taking into account the "childhood diseases" of "Gerald R. Ford" .

Missile cruisers

In 1996, the US Navy included a total of 31 missile cruisers, including 4 nuclear (2 of the Virginia type and 2 of the California type) and 27 with the usual Ticonderoga power plant. Today, their number has been reduced by almost a third - all four atomic RKRs left the line, and only 27 remained in the 22 Tikonderog, while the United States does not plan to build new ships, except in a very distant future. However, it should be understood that the combat power of the cruisers was reduced to a lesser extent than their number - the fact is that the fleet was left by ships with beam installations capable of using SAM and PLUR, as well as armed with deck launch missiles Garpun. At the same time, all 22 missile cruisers armed with universal launchers Mk.41 remain in service.

Destroyers


Destroyer type "Arly Burke"


In 1996, the US Navy included 50 ships of this class, including 16 destroyers of the Arly Burk type, 4 of the Kidd type, and 30 of the Spruence type. To date, Americans have 68 destroyers, including Zamvolt 2 and Arly Burk 66. Thus, we can only ascertain that this class of ships over the past 22 has experienced a very rapid growth, both quantitative and qualitative.

I would like to draw attention to this. Missile cruisers and destroyers in the US Navy form the basis, the backbone of surface escort forces with their own aircraft carriers. And we see that the total number of such ships in the US Navy in 1996 was 81 units. (4 atomic, 27 conventional RKR and 50 destroyers), while today it makes 90 ships - 22 "Ticonderoga", 2 "Zamvolta", 66 "Arly Berkov". At the same time, the old ships that do not have a BIUS, combining all the weapons and equipment of the ship into a single "organism" and / or armed with outdated beam launchers, are replaced by the newest destroyers with Aegis and the CID. Thus, in general, we can talk about strengthening this component of the American fleet.

Frigates and LSC

Perhaps the only component of the US Navy that has undergone a total reduction. As of 1996, the Americans were keeping 38 frigates of the type “Oliver H. Perry” in the ranks, representing, for their time, quite a decent type of escort ship designed to protect NATO communications in the ocean. But today they all left the line, and they were replaced by extremely vague “littoral kombat spikes”: 5 Freedom type ships and 8 - Independance type, and in total - 13 LSC, which, in the opinion of the author of this article, able to solve any problems in a large-scale military conflict. However, the author does not impose this opinion on anyone, however, even if the LSC is considered an adequate and modern replacement for old frigates, one still has to diagnose an almost threefold reduction in the total number of ships. It should also be noted that the Americans themselves do not consider the 13 figure to be as acceptable as they originally intended to build the 60 LSC.

Multipurpose nuclear submarines


APL "Sivulf"


At the beginning of the 1996 G, the US Navy had a Los Angeles-type 59 submarine, but one boat of this type left the line the same year. To date, the US Navy has 56 submarines: Los Angeles-type 33, Sivulf-type 3, Virginia-type 16 and former Ohio-type SSBNs 4, converted into Tomahawk cruise missile carriers. Accordingly, we see that the US submarine fleet successfully carries out a massive transfer to the 4-generation boats (“Sivulf”, “Virginia”) and increases the possibilities for strikes on the coast (“Ohio”). In general, despite a small decrease in strength, the potential of this class of warships of the US Navy has grown significantly.

As for the rest, we only recall that today the Americans have XHUMX strategic Ohio-type missile carriers and a strong amphibious fleet as part of the 14 universal amphibious assault ships, and the 9 amphibious assault and landing craft docks. Despite a slight decrease in numbers, their combat effectiveness was at least at the same level - for example, from the Ohio 24 18 were withdrawn to the general purpose forces, but the remaining 4 SSBNs were re-equipped with the latest Trident II D14 ICBMs . The same can be said about the deck and base aircraft - new Super-Hornet, Poseidon, E-5D Hokai and other aircraft entered its arsenal, and the older ones were upgraded. In general, the capabilities of the US naval aviation in comparison with 2 have only increased, and the same can be said about their marine corps.

Thus, we can state that in comparison with 1996, the US Navy has not lost its combat power, with the exception, perhaps, of the failure of frigate warships. However, this weakening of the ability to protect ocean communications cannot be compared with the loss of our ability to create a threat to these communications, but the capabilities of American AUG and their submarine fleet have only grown.

This, in turn, means only that the estimate of the necessary number of the Russian Navy, made by V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky, if outdated, only in a smaller direction. That is, the amount determined by them today at best meets only the minimum needs of the fleet for solving the above tasks, and at worst, it needs to be increased. But before turning to the figures, let's say a few words about the classes of ships and the performance characteristics of ships, of which, in the opinion of respected authors, the Russian Navy should consist.

V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky came to the conclusion that it was necessary to have several specialized types of ships in the general-purpose forces. So, instead of TAVKR, they considered it necessary to build ejection aircraft carriers of moderate displacement, but with the possibility of basing on them up to 60 aircraft. Instead of missile cruisers, destroyers and large anti-submarine ships - the universal type of missile-artillery multipurpose ship (MSC) with a displacement of not more than 6 500 t. With a larger displacement, according to V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky RF will not be able to provide their large-scale construction. Also, in their opinion, the Russian Federation required a small (up to 1 800 t) multi-purpose patrol ship (MCR) for operations in the near sea zone.

The submarine fleet was to consist of torpedo submarines of moderate displacement (6 500 t), as well as non-nuclear submarines, intended primarily for the Black and Baltic Seas. In this case, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky did not object to the inclusion of missiles in the submarine’s ammunition, but the creation of specialized submarine missile carriers to fight the enemy’s surface ships was considered unnecessary. As we said earlier, the authors of the USSR Navy 1945-1995 considered the main tasks of the multi-purpose submarines to cover our SSBNs (i.e. anti-submarine warfare) and create a potential threat to the ocean communications of the enemy SSBNs. But the opposition of AUG was removed from the agenda, so the construction of ships like the SSGN of the 949A “Antey” project or “station wagons” similar to “Yasenu” they considered unnecessary. In addition to the above, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky considered the construction of amphibious assault ships and classical BDK, minesweepers, small river-sea rocket and artillery boats, etc. necessary.

And now, actually, to the numbers:

How many warships does Russia need? Opinion professionals


In the notes to the above table, I would like to note several important points. The first is in V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky offered a certain "fork", that is, for example, the number of aircraft carriers they indicated 4-5, but we take the minimum values. The second one - the table does not include military boats of the Russian Federation (according to V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikol'skii - up to 60 t with a displacement) and patrol ships of the US Navy. The third - comparing the desired state of the Russian Navy with the actual number of the US Navy, we must not forget about the failure of the LSC program - the Americans themselves believed that they needed 60 of such ships and, no doubt, they would have delivered them to the fleet, if not in 50 node speeds and modularity weapons. An alternative program for the construction of frigates is being worked out in the US, and, no doubt, they will be implemented much faster than Russia, at least, by half, “tightening” its Navy to the figures of V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky (the latter, in fact, most likely never happens at all). Taking into account the above, the number of ships for action in the near-sea zone will be 70% of the US, and the total number of the Russian navy - 64,8% of the US fleet - as reflected in the table (in parentheses). Fourthly, US naval aviation is actually stronger than that shown in the table, because the reduced number of US aircraft does not include the aircraft of their marines.

And finally, the fifth. The fact is that the above figures V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky may seem excessive to someone. Well, for example, the total number of atomic and non-nuclear submarines must exceed the current number of US multi-purpose submarines. Why is it, can not you do less?

Perhaps, and even for sure, it is possible - but this if we consider a certain "theoretical opposition of the Russian Federation and the United States in a spherical vacuum." But in practice, the situation for us is extremely complicated by the fact that:

1) The Russian Navy must be divided into four isolated theaters, while the inter-theater maneuver is difficult and not one of the theaters can be completely exposed;

2) It is completely impossible to imagine that the United States would engage in an armed confrontation with the Russian Federation alone, without involving any of its potential allies in the conflict.

If only Turkey is on the US side, then the US Navy will receive a sizeable increase in the form of 13 PL, 16 frigates, and 8 corvettes. If England is on the US side, the US Navy will receive support from the 6 NPS, aircraft carrier, 19 destroyers and frigates. If Japan comes forward on the US side, then the fleet against us will intensify 18 PL, 4 helicopter carriers (rather, small aircraft carriers), 38 destroyers and 6 frigates.

And if they all come out against us?

At the same time, the Russian Federation does not have allied states possessing any serious navy. Alas, the most ingenious, albeit completely hackneyed phrase today about Russia's only allies — its army and navy — remains an absolute truth: now, and always. Therefore, it is necessary to understand that the number of the Russian Navy according to V.P. Cousin and V.I. Nikolsky is indeed the minimum for the tasks that we set for our fleet.

The author of this article almost physically feels the storm of righteous indignation of those readers who sincerely believe that the Ash submarines, or several Karakurts with Calibers alone, would easily destroy the US AUG. Well what can we say about this? When these same people read “analysts” from Nezalezhnaya Square, they are quite seriously telling about how several thirty-mit-ton armored type Gurza can surround and tear the Russian Black Sea fleet, they laugh and twist a finger at their heads. The fact that several such boats against the modern frigate “kva” do not have time to say how they will be at the bottom, they understand. That several "Karakurts" put up against the AUG will be absolutely in the same weight category as the Ukrainian "Gyurza" against the Black Sea Fleet ships - alas, no.

There is also no doubt that other readers will say: "Again, aircraft carriers ... Well, why do we need these outdated troughs, if you can invest in their construction in the construction of the same missile-carrying aircraft and submarine missile carriers, which will give us far greater opportunities to resist the US fleet!". There is only one objection. Two military professionals, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky, who specifically worked on this topic, came to the conclusion that the construction of the 4-5 AMG (multi-purpose aircraft carrier group) would cost the country much cheaper than alternative "air-underwater" development options.

That is, according to the calculations of respected authors, the Russian Federation, when the industrial potential returns to the level of 1990, it will be quite capable of building the 4-5 AMG without straining the budget. But instead of creating a naval rocket-carrying aircraft and a fleet of submarines carrying anti-ship missiles of sufficient numbers to repel an attack by the US Navy in the event of a large-scale conflict, it cannot, for the reason that it will cost us much more.
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220 comments
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  1. -9
    11 December 2018 06: 06
    judging by the table, we have FOUR whole !!! an aircraft carrier, and not a single missile cruiser ... belay
    1. +41
      11 December 2018 06: 59
      Judging by the fact that you managed not to understand that the table indicates the required fleet size according to Kuzin and Nikolsky, and not its current number, you did not master the article
      1. +13
        11 December 2018 07: 35
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Judging by the fact that you managed not to understand that the table indicates the required fleet size according to Kuzin and Nikolsky, and not its current number, you did not master the article

        sorry, I beg ... it is, niasilil ... feel
        1. +12
          11 December 2018 07: 42
          Apologies accepted :)))) It's nice to deal with a person who is able to admit his own wrong hi
        2. 0
          12 December 2018 15: 16
          going will overcome the road
          and lying on the couch - he will build roads for inter-theater interaction and dump money in offshore to bribe enemies and friends individually
          ONLY MONEY SHOULD BE ENOUGH FOR PAGE-VA ROADS AND Bribing INSTEAD OF BUILDING-VA AND CONTENT OF THE NAVY AND THE ARMY
          WHERE WE LOVE and not really ...
      2. +11
        11 December 2018 07: 47
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Judging by the fact that you managed not to understand that the table indicates the required fleet size according to Kuzin and Nikolsky, and not its current number, you did not master the article

        The comrade ran through the article in a hurry to put the first comment. There was no time to get into the meaning.
        1. 0
          11 December 2018 07: 54
          Quote: Puncher
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Judging by the fact that you managed not to understand that the table indicates the required fleet size according to Kuzin and Nikolsky, and not its current number, you did not master the article

          The comrade ran through the article in a hurry to put the first comment. There was no time to get into the meaning.

          I corrected myself, and in spite of myself I read it completely ... and I have a question for a fellow countryman from Chelyaba, what can you say for Andrei? https://newsae.ru/nauka_i_tehnika/-11-12-2018/rossiya_utratila_sposobnost_videt_podlodki_ssha/ (the truth about the author, marine people speak very negatively)
          1. +5
            11 December 2018 09: 00
            Quote: Andrey Yurievich
            Andrew say for that?

            Yes, I will not say anything :))) If specifically for buoys, I did not dig them properly. And we already argued about non-classical methods for detecting submarines with Timokhin, https://topwar.ru/149631-o-kollapse-vmf-rf-i-novyh-sposobah-obnaruzhenija-podvodnyh-lodok.html
            As for reconnaissance aircraft, the author is definitely right, she was practically gone in the Navy MA
            1. +1
              11 December 2018 11: 54
              Non-classical methods are still auxiliary in nature.
            2. +1
              12 December 2018 20: 25
              About medium aircraft carriers (possibly with UVVP aircraft), I agree. Yes, and at the "top" it seems to go. Away from the "Storm".
              According to the MCC, 6500 tons are not enough. I am for 7500 tons. A stock on seaworthiness and modernization is needed. And the UKKS-M mines are bigger than MK 41. smile
              There is nothing about submarines with VNEU. In our conditions, they are very useful / necessary.
              For small nuclear submarines - I agree. And the "top" like too. Huskies will be something like that.
              About the multi-purpose protection ships of 1800 tons do not agree. This size corresponded to the times when colleagues conducted the research, but in modern conditions their VI should be in the region of 3000 tons (IMHO 20386, but a lot).
              I agree with everything else. hi
      3. +1
        11 December 2018 15: 09
        So Andrei Yurievich is a famous character ..))
      4. 0
        13 December 2018 18: 02
        As far as I understand, the implementation of these plans implies a significant growth of our economy?
        Is it possible to form our own AUGs from the indicated aircraft carriers for sending them to operations somewhere in Africa, Asia or the Middle East? Will the sailing range of other specified warships be enough for this?
      5. 0
        22 February 2019 11: 00
        The cost of one boat 949a of the project 10% of the cost of Nimitz think for yourself decide for yourself
  2. +7
    11 December 2018 06: 27
    Admirals are always preparing for the last war. The entire US fleet is dispersed throughout the globe, they will not in any way concentrate it in one place for an attack, exposing the rear. Other "competitors" will immediately take these places. The Americans themselves will untie the navel. Another thing in the community with NATO, and this is another question and other figures ... Yet another analyst of the United States v Russia ... TNW nullifies all the advantage, both ours and theirs ... Mutually many times.
    1. -12
      11 December 2018 06: 50
      -These places will immediately be taken by other "competitors". -

      These competitors are known. Squadrons and flotillas of MRK, NPL Lada and Kalina, flotilla of Ashen M, and Leader nuclear destroyers.
    2. +11
      11 December 2018 07: 30
      Quote: Rostovchanin
      The entire US fleet is dispersed throughout the ball, they will in no way focus it in one place for a strike

      Even as they will. More precisely, in several places, such as the DF, the Mediterranean Sea, and the coast of Norway.
      Quote: Rostovchanin
      Other "competitors" will immediately take these places.

      Leave these fantasies. No one will take anything, no one to borrow, nothing and nothing. Yes, this is, in principle, impossible. How do you imagine it? AUG left, say, from the Persian Gulf, Chinese ships sailed, and announced - "The bay is now ours, be-be-be"?
      1. +8
        11 December 2018 12: 21
        Andrei, I want to repeat again, the areas of concentration have long been known, there are few of them, routes for the Kyrgyz Republic are also known from these areas, do you think the General Staff has no plans for this? I say that the number of units against a country with huge stocks of nuclear weapons does not solve the balance in their favor. I'm not saying that everything is rosy with us, but there is something to answer. The Americans understand that the conflict with us will automatically lead China to world leaders in all respects, no one will violate the strategic balance. I am as ardent a supporter of our fleet as you are, I read your articles with pleasure, but I repeat: admirals and generals are preparing for past soldiers ...
      2. +1
        11 December 2018 21: 07
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        More precisely, in several places, such as the DF, the Mediterranean Sea, and the coast of Norway.

        The US Congress was given analytical calculations on the status of the fleets and their prospects.
        Now the United States had 286 ships and vessels of various types. Based on the analysis and requirements of the US Navy, they need 350 ships. That is, let's say so shortage in 64 ship.
        In his election campaign, the 45-th president set himself the task of restoring the country's armed forces and increasing defense spending. And part of his plan, announced in September 2016, was to bring the total number of warships to 350.

        The country's naval forces themselves launched a similar initiative in December 2016: during the 30 years, according to the Navy, it is necessary to increase the number of ships to 355. And this implies additional annual costs for the construction of new ships in $ 25 billion.

        And everything would be fine, but only while these ships are being built, during this time approximately the same number of ships will be written off.
        And even with aircraft carriers, not everything is good and rosy ...
        Of all the naval ship-based multipurpose fighters, only one in three aircraft can take to the skies. The remaining two-thirds cannot for technical reasons (either are under repair or awaiting delivery of spare parts). Trump inherited this systemic problem from the former president.
    3. -5
      11 December 2018 07: 45
      Quote: Rostovchanin
      The entire US fleet is dispersed throughout

      Yes vigorous annihilate them nafig, together with allies.
      1. +2
        11 December 2018 11: 53
        So Khrushchev promised. Until his comrades-in-arms did not annihilate politically.
        1. 0
          11 December 2018 14: 20
          Quote: gunnerminer
          So Khrushchev promised.

          So there was no war, there will be - the Americans will be able to be proud of their superiority in the navy, though not for long.
          1. +9
            11 December 2018 16: 04
            Are you sure that in case of war, our military will rush straight to press the "red button"? Especially if the United States itself is not the first to use nuclear weapons, limiting itself to conventional weapons?
            Personally, I don’t have that kind of confidence.
            1. +2
              14 December 2018 12: 35
              Quote: Trapper7
              Are you sure that in case of war, our military will rush straight to press the "red button"?

              Yes, if we take examples from history, then the whole world before the 2nd World War was preparing for a completely different war - a war using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - that is, chemical weapons ...

              But life has shown that not one of the warring parties has resorted to the use of chemical weapons on a massive scale. And the whole drama is that even without the use of WMD in the 2nd World War, approximately 40 million people were killed !!!

              If this scenario has already been in history, why can't it happen again ???
            2. 0
              28 January 2019 21: 25
              Are you sure that in case of war
              The question is extremely inappropriate, although correct. No one will just click anywhere! The exception is only if you get completely stubborn ... Why? For what? What is the benefit or benefit? Not yourself not people? Sheer stupidity! Actually, this is what the WORLD has been holding for almost a century ... Nobody will benefit! There will be no winners. And the buttons have nothing to do with it. In the 21st century, a total blockade is sufficient, so that the effect would be many times more painful than from a massive nuclear war.
          2. +1
            15 December 2018 16: 23
            -In the Navy, though not for long .-

            They are sad now from squadrons of submarines, nuclear destroyers and promising Russian aircraft carriers armed with Zircon missiles, from ekranoplan regiments.
    4. +2
      11 December 2018 15: 47
      Quote: Rostovchanin
      These places will immediately be taken by other "competitors"

      this is for example who? give examples!
      I directly imagine how the US fleet draws its forces to the shores of the Russian Federation: in the Mediterranean / Black Sea, the Baltic, the Pacific and the Arctic ...
      and at this very time ... "competitors" decided to attack ...
  3. +5
    11 December 2018 06: 49
    -The author of this article almost physically feels the storm of righteous anger of those readers who sincerely believe that the submarine of the Ash type, or several Karakurts with Caliber alone, will easily destroy the US AUG. -

    If the development of the Russian Navy, as well as its infrastructures, training base, and mobile reserves, will continue in the same direction as in 2018, the US Government can safely put at least half of its available forces on conservation.
  4. +4
    11 December 2018 06: 54
    Without modernization. and the rise of the shipbuilding industry, as well as ship repair, gentlemen Kuzin and Nikolsky can be counted as carrots. Without the construction for export of ocean cruisers, chemical carriers of the first class, food carriers, oil tankers Afromaks, gas carriers LPG and LNG, a sufficient amount of funds for the development of the Russian Navy in budget can not be found.
    1. -2
      11 December 2018 08: 39
      Quote: gunnerminer
      Without the construction for export of ocean cruisers, chemical carriers of the first class, food carriers, oil tankers Afromaks, gas carriers LPG and LNG, there is no sufficient amount of funds for the development of the Russian Navy in the budget.

      Even if we fill up the whole world with gas carriers and tankers, how will this affect the budget of the Moscow Region? request
      1. +2
        11 December 2018 09: 30
        With volumes on a scale — we’ll overwhelm — there will remain significant funds for military expenses. Without the sale of civilian products, there will be no new construction for the Navy. For example, South Korea, Japan, Singapore. The truth is that Singapore does not receive income from ship exports.
        1. +1
          11 December 2018 09: 34
          Quote: gunnerminer
          With volumes on a scale - we’ll overwhelm, there will remain significant funds for military spending.

          I repeat once again: how will this affect the military budget? This is different money.
          1. +2
            11 December 2018 09: 52
            -This is different money .-

            Money from raw materials for export is also -other-. With these funds, trying to maintain the fleet becomes harder every half year.
            1. +1
              11 December 2018 10: 33
              Quote: gunnerminer
              With these funds, trying to maintain the fleet is becoming more difficult every six months.

              Then why not export wheat or ravioli? The logic is the same.
              1. +2
                11 December 2018 11: 50
                In this case, wheat should be exported a couple of orders of magnitude more. And dumplings should be exported through pipelines to China and India. Subject for candidate marketing. Wheat is exported soft varieties. Hard wheat is imported. For the production of pasta. Seed fund. mostly imported.
    2. +4
      11 December 2018 11: 42
      Without the construction for export of ocean cruisers, first-class chemical carriers, food carriers, Afromax oil tankers, LPG and LNG gas carriers
      Wonderful words. Just let me be curious, who will build it? Starting from the project and ending with the actual hardware. Not referring to all sorts of "detractors" (regardless of color), a little aware of the state of affairs in the country)) and in "legal proceedings")) ..... And the state of affairs is the same as in the union. What we produce and can produce (at the moment) can only be suitable in the form of humanitarian aid. For a solvent client, this product is not relevant. Starting from price, ending with quality and construction time. What, judging by your comments, you already know. If ships of comparable capabilities cost us "somewhat more expensive")) with unknown quality ..... What funds from commercial activities are we talking about?
      1. 0
        17 December 2018 21: 44
        -That's just let me curiosity, and who will build it? -

        Anyone who promises to build promising aircraft carriers and nuclear destroyers, with zircons and nuclear missiles.

        -What kind of funds from commercial activities are we talking about? -

        If the production of the aforementioned civilian products is just a mirage, then there is nothing to be expected of strengthening the Russian Navy, especially its short-term and coastal infrastructure.
    3. 0
      14 December 2018 12: 44
      there is no sufficient amount of funds for the development of the Russian Navy in the budget.
      In my opinion, Russia (a land power) does not make sense at all to confront the sea on an equal footing with the sea powers (USA, Great Britain, etc.) Tsarist Russia and the USSR have already tried to do this, and have clearly overextended their economic opportunities.

      The shipbuilding capacities of Russia and the USA are simply incommensurable !!! The United States is traditionally located away from global hot spots and conflicts - Russia is traditionally surrounded by conflict regions that will divert the country's resources ... The economic and financial capabilities of Russia and the United States are not comparable ... For the United States, the fleet is vital and the land army is important but secondary - for Russia, the ground army is vital and the fleet is important but secondary ...

      Therefore, Russia, in my opinion, needs to develop the defense strategy of the Navy and the strategy of ONE SCALE strike on the enemy at sea - and do it at the lowest cost to itself ...
  5. 3vs
    0
    11 December 2018 06: 59
    But isn’t it easier to destroy all this iron with missiles with nuclear warheads?
    1. +9
      11 December 2018 07: 05
      Not easier, alas. Nuclear weapons is not a lifesaver for all occasions
      1. +5
        11 December 2018 09: 38
        Can you elaborate on this issue in more detail? If we do not set the task of winning a limited non-nuclear conflict, and what I agree with you is that the Russian Navy and Aerospace Forces will be incredibly expensive to solve such a task, then what exactly is holding us back from the large-scale use of nuclear weapons against troops, navy, territory and population of a potential enemy? The same karakurt with 8 nuclear missiles turns from a generally large boat into a very serious threat. For the AUG it is unlikely, there is too powerful air defense, but for the coastal facilities of NATO countries it is quite. The use in the first minutes of the conflict of 50-100 nuclear missiles against key US allies, with an emphasis on the destruction of naval and aviation bases, as well as populated and industrial centers, can reduce the enemy's offensive potential threefold in 10 minutes, and with a strong demoralizing effect. Please note that it is relatively easy to destroy nuclear weapons, the combat potential of the US allies - the main forces of the fleet and aviation of Turkey, Great Britain, France and Japan are located on only fifty bases that do not have a circular missile defense cover and do not carry out regular service in areas scattered around the world, as forces USA. As for the US AUG, it seems to me that they should not be viewed in a spherical vacuum either. Yes, their air defense is practically insurmountable by the available forces, hypersound is cool, of course, but definitely still very little, unreliable, and untested in combat conditions. But nuclear torpedoes, torpedo-missiles and mines dropped on the way of AUG even by a small submarine are a serious threat. The advantage of the USA in peacetime - we do not know where the US AUG will be tomorrow, in wartime it is not so obvious. It is possible to predict with great confidence the areas of deployment and cover them with charges of 10-30 MT. With such powers, you don't really have to aim. Yes, we will drown the ocean and destroy everything on the shore within a radius of 1000 km, but we are not talking about games in the sandbox. Of course, all of the above is also true for the enemy, thereby creating a non-illusory threat that after the end of the conflict, Antarctica will be the most developed region on the planet. It seems that this was the essence of nuclear deterrence. Or do you think that `` partners '' can take serious risks?
        1. +5
          11 December 2018 13: 28
          Let's just say, for a 1 Mt bomb, there is a table of affected areas on the lurk, sometimes more detailed things are written there than in some Viki thread. "Safe in the tank", there is EMNIP 3.2 km. A charge of 10 Mt will increase the radius of damage by far not 10 times. I doubt that such a makar can cover territories of hundreds of thousands of square meters. kilometers. Yes, and a charge of 10 Mt is a very large thing, it is not a fact that there are such at all. EMNIP standard charges 200 kt and 1 Mt.

          "Destroy everything" humanity's gut is still thin.
          1. +3
            11 December 2018 14: 00
            The radii you have described are true for an aerial explosion. Powerful underwater generates a serious wave height, spreading far beyond the area of ​​direct damage and a cloud of very radioactive vapor. Actually on this principle T4 was developed, and our modern analogues. I’m not saying that we already have everything that is needed for the described scenario — I’m just saying that the development and deployment of such weapons is cheaper and more effective than the large-scale construction of large tonnage ships and aircraft carriers. As for whether the small intestine or not, in the warhead the secondary shell is replaced by uranium 238 or cobalt, and in the explosion area it will be possible to live thousands after 5 years. Pure nuclear weapons were specially developed. If we are not going to seize the territory of the enemy with its help, then this is easily fixed.
            1. +3
              11 December 2018 14: 22
              Let's just say, huge waves generate underwater earthquakes, since this shakes up the entire ocean. Here's how to take a bath with water and push, a lot of water will spill out. The tsunami goes ashore, but the ships in the ocean do not care. Storm waves are generated by the movement of the upper layers of water under the action of the wind. An underwater explosion is supposed to push exactly the water column at a depth of hundreds of meters, i.e., a beautiful MEGA Splash on the surface, and a small tsunami, the energy of even the most powerful thermonuclear ammunition is incomparable with the energy of tectonic processes. It is not comparable at the level of several orders. Ships within a radius of a couple of kilometers, well, not quite do not care, but they are unlikely to be seriously affected.

              U-238 is not particularly radioactive, short-lived fragments are radioactive. And this is not for long. But the devil knows how many things have been scattered over there in Chernobyl, and now there is a gorgeous reserve, life there, in the absence of people, blooms and smells. Don't overestimate the ability of several tons of uranium to turn the Earth into a Fallout world.
              1. +2
                11 December 2018 15: 26
                For example, specify the data on the eruption of Krakatoa. There, the energy was about 100MT. It is comparable with nuclear weapons. The king did not test the bomb at this power for environmental rather than technical reasons. But can not you undermine a charge of such power on a gruff 300-500m below the bottom, so that the bottom surface is a membrane pushing and not evaporating water?
                1. 0
                  11 December 2018 15: 56
                  Quote: oleg123219307
                  For example, specify the data on the eruption of Krakatoa. There the energy was about 100MT.

                  Actually, not 100 MT, but 200 MT, and what is the result? A wave with a height of 36 meters, and even that, formed not by earthquake, but by the fall of part of a split volcano into the ocean.
                  That is, the "exhaust" is near-zero
                  1. 0
                    11 December 2018 16: 33
                    The exhaust was good, on 36k of corpses, but corpses from the tsunami, and not from the explosion itself, which destroyed the mountain to zero. What was the energy tsunami HZ, evaluated the most beautiful part. On Earth during earthquakes, the focal length can reach 1000 km, it no longer works, otherwise it would have shaken much more.
                    1. +2
                      11 December 2018 18: 41
                      Quote: EvilLion
                      The exhaust was good, on 36 corpses,

                      From the ammunition in 200 Mt? Hmm, impartiality nervously smokes on the sidelines ...
                      1. 0
                        13 December 2018 12: 49
                        From the tsunami that arose during the Krakatau eruption.
            2. +3
              11 December 2018 14: 29
              Quote: oleg123219307
              Powerful underwater generates serious wave heights that extend far beyond the direct impact area

              Does not create, alas.
              Quote: oleg123219307
              Actually on this principle T4 was developed, and our modern analogues.

              No, these are only Sakharov’s ravings, which have nothing to do with atomic torpedoes.
              1. +2
                11 December 2018 15: 22
                And why do you think Sakharov’s work is nonsense?
                1. +2
                  11 December 2018 15: 54
                  Quote: oleg123219307
                  And why do you think Sakharov’s work is nonsense?

                  For example, because there is no work by Sakharov devoted to hypertsuns initiated by nuclear weapons. All this game was pulled from a couple of paragraphs of his memoirs, which actually sounded like this "I thought it would be cool to bang nuclear weapons and wash the US off the continent, but the admirals were horrified and we did not discuss this topic anymore."
                  That is, there is no evidence that there was at least some kind of elaboration there. We thought of doing atomic torpedoes, but the meaning there is completely different - these projects belonged to the era when we did not have reliable means of delivering nuclear weapons to the United States.
                  1. +1
                    11 December 2018 16: 37
                    And what is the technical and theoretical complexity of such a project? There is enough energy, if you calculate the optimal point of detonation, then a serious part of the energy of the explosion is not a problem to translate into kinetic. I read several articles on T4, and I did not see the fundamental contradictions.
                    1. +1
                      11 December 2018 17: 51
                      Quote: oleg123219307
                      And what is the technical and theoretical complexity of such a project?

                      The fact that the most elementary estimates indicate that no hypercunami does not work. In the best case, it will be possible to create a wave of several tens of meters, and the game is completely worth the candle - similar in power air explosions will be much more effective
                      1. +1
                        11 December 2018 19: 48
                        And where can I see these estimates with numbers?
                  2. 0
                    12 February 2019 22: 12
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    For example, because there is no work by Sakharov devoted to hypertsuns initiated by nuclear weapons. All this game was pulled from a couple of paragraphs of his memoirs, which actually sounded like this "I thought it would be cool to bang nuclear weapons and wash the US off the continent, but the admirals were horrified and we did not discuss this topic anymore."

                    Oh, do you have access to the Special Store ???
          2. 0
            11 December 2018 15: 01
            Quote: EvilLion
            EMNIP typical charges 200 kt and 1 Mt.

            The unification of ammunition is very good for the cost of their maintenance. And the difference in power is the type of design. The Americans, like us, were switching from plutonium to uranium warheads, because they are much cheaper in long-term maintenance. They would get rid of tritium, but so far there is nothing to replace.
            PS> It is very easy to make 1-2 MT dirty from pure ammunition in 3MT, without fundamentally changing the design of the device.
    2. -1
      11 December 2018 07: 11
      It will remain to be agreed with the commanders of American formations and unions. so that they passively react to the maneuvers of the remnants of the Russian Navy, and disrupt the annual plans for combat training. It will be much more difficult to negotiate with the owners of American shipbuilding and ship repair enterprises, they are greedy for money.
  6. +14
    11 December 2018 07: 13
    The topic is important, but also complex, there will be many and different opinions, from the alleged "Again aircraft carriers ... Well, why do we need these outdated troughs ...", and "we are a land power", to nostalgia for the capabilities of the Soviet Union. What would I personally note, to the article of the author I respect. The first, his scientific work, the book "The USSR Navy 1945-1995", published in 1996, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky was largely guided not by the realities of capitalist Russia, but by the analysis of the Soviet fleet, its prospects and capabilities, including with a different attitude towards aircraft carriers. It is hardly reasonable now to transfer this to our reality, even being an optimist that "the Russian Federation, with the return of industrial potential to the level of 1990, will be quite capable of building 4-5 AMG without straining the budget." Andrei, for this, the president needs to tell the oligarchs, "suitcase, train station, London, otherwise on bunks", and this is fantastic, without changing the social system, without leaving the pole of capitalism, from an alien system, alien rules under the Anglo-Saxons. Yes, okay, let there be alternative or parallel capitalism, independent and productive ... The fleet itself, here, as in the category "what is good for a Russian, then death for a German"? Back in World War I, a light cruiser for the British was primarily a defender of imperial communications, and for the Germans, a raider operating on British communications. Why is it, the US fleet and under the US, is not a mirror for the Russian fleet, and even the USSR. We will never build more of the same aircraft carriers or destroyers than the United States can build (especially the entire alliance with the US allies), and there is no need for it. It is necessary to understand what is good for the Russian here, and what is death for the Yankees. That's the problem. For a long time, schemes have been developed for blocking our fleet, across all seas, from the Marquis puddle, the Black Sea, to the Kuril ridge. If our democrats somehow give the "disputed islands" to the Japanese, the situation in the Pacific will worsen even more. Our everything, this is the "northern facade" of Russia, the Arctic Ocean, through which boats can relatively freely leave, for guaranteed unacceptable damage to the United States. In this sense, as in the case of light cruisers, we hardly need "Atlantic" boats, like the United States, we need "Arctic" submarines for Russia. As for the surface fleet, I have already expressed the opinion that we need a balanced fleet capable of solving all tasks at sea, but not for a wall-to-wall sea battle against the United States, NATO and their allies, but for the prevention of war, suppression of threats, timely political reaction in the prelaunch period, if the war really starts to smell. There is no need to try 1 to 1 to "butt" by the number of aircraft carriers or destroyers, I repeat, you just need a complete set of all "chess pieces", from "pawns to queen", that is, from MCR to multipurpose aircraft carriers. At least two operational AUGs here must be had, but first, I must say goodbye to capitalism.
    1. +11
      11 December 2018 07: 26
      Quote: Per se.
      Andrei, for this the president needs to tell the oligarchs, "suitcase, train station, London, otherwise on bunks", and this is fantastic

      There is no doubt, dear Sergey. The task of the article was, let's say, not to call for the construction of the 5 AMG, but to convey an understanding of where we are now - if someone thinks that we have a maritime border on the castle.
      That is, if we seriously want to defend ourselves against something like the United States at sea, we need a fleet of about this size. If we don’t have it ... it’s not worth building castles in the air.
      1. +4
        11 December 2018 11: 57
        if we want to seriously defend ourselves if something happens against the United States at sea - we need a fleet of about this size.
        Let me clarify a little ... Do we need an economy of approximately the required efficiency? Is a managerial activity of comparable effectiveness at all levels unnecessary?
        Of course, the article is unambiguously +, but ..... The abilities and capabilities of the USSR Navy (incomparable with the current) must be known to you. However, there were some .... misunderstandings. Like, say, in 1982, EMNIP. With intelligence, and by the way, much better, as I understand it, it did not. The conclusion is not very ..... rosy.
        Repeated attempts to compare aircraft carriers and ..... their alternative wink , except for a somewhat curious set of arguments "debating", do not give at least an approximate figure regarding the cost of entertainment. How much money should be invested (and mastered))) to create an air wing capable of relatively reliably covering the areas of SSBN deployment? And how much of the same funds is needed to create and operate the required amount of AUG? Considering that the AUG is not only an aircraft carrier, and aviation is not only an interceptor regiment)))))
        As for the castle and other things, everything is very simple here. It was not very in Soviet times, but now .... How to secure this castle in the North? Given the characteristics of the basin .... And in the Far East .... How many islands of the Kuril ridge have a permanent population?
        And as for the work of KiN .... I think you are aware of how much there was during the Soviet era, and how much of this magnificence was able to carry out combat missions .... Sorry, but the figures given need to grow a little. Or get more efficient management)))))
        1. +1
          11 December 2018 14: 02
          Quote: frog
          But do we need an economy of about the required efficiency? Is a managerial activity of comparable effectiveness at all levels unnecessary?

          They have to do with it, let me ask? That the country's armed forces are derived from the economy, as it were, is a well-known fact, and I don’t understand what you are trying to open my eyes to :)))))
          1. 0
            11 December 2018 18: 38
            All-good Lord .... Why should I open your eyes?)) Especially since they don't seem to be tightly closed with you, like some ... Just without this very "efficiency", it is easy to assume, first of all, managerial , none of this will happen. Not to mention how much it will all cost with our traditional 50% ...
            But about the comparative cost of owning one AUG and a coastal base comparable in terms of capabilities, it would be interesting to read.
            Excuse me for some confusion of thought and tongue-tied))) And .... Given "That the country's Armed Forces are a derivative of the economy" ..... All the calculations .... are fantastic. How fantastic our economy is ...
      2. +2
        11 December 2018 16: 02
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        That is, if we seriously want to defend ourselves against something like the United States at sea, we need a fleet of about this size. If we don’t have it ... it’s not worth building castles in the air.



        Dear Andrey. In 1956-1958, a doctrine was developed in the USSR; it provided for two types of development. The first involved the destruction of the AUG, the second, the destruction of enemy aircraft. The Navy focused on the first part, but was the Soviet Union able to complete the task? No. In addition, one should not forget the strategy of the USSR, which is called in the West "Massive Retaliation" ("massive retaliation"), which is also now used in Russia. Therefore, Russia will not build any fleet comparable to the US Navy.
        1. -1
          11 December 2018 18: 40
          Quote: 27091965i
          In addition, one should not forget the strategy of the USSR, which is called in the West "Massive Retaliation" ("massive retaliation"), which is also now used in Russia.

          Alas, it is not used - the size of our nuclear arsenal has slipped by an order of magnitude, dear Igor
          1. +1
            11 December 2018 20: 37
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Alas, it is not used - the size of our nuclear arsenal has slipped by an order of magnitude, dear Igor


            The question is, we don’t know, Russia adopted the Soviet Union’s strategy of using nuclear weapons on the AUG and other enemy naval units. If accepted, then the existing nuclear arsenal is quite enough.
    2. 0
      11 December 2018 07: 43
      -First, his scientific work, the book "The Soviet Navy 1945-1995", published in 1996, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky was largely focused not on the realities of capitalist Russia, but on the analysis of the Soviet fleet, its prospects and capabilities, including with a different attitude towards aircraft carriers.

      Otherwise, they would not have been able to print scientific work. Some obvious styrons of the development of the Russian Navy would be too convex.
    3. +3
      11 December 2018 07: 45
      -without changing the social system, without leaving the pole of capitalism, from an alien system-

      It’s really fantastic to change the forms of ownership and the social system. It is enough just to steal within the limits acceptable for the dynamic development of the military-industrial complex, and pay taxes.
      1. AAK
        0
        5 February 2019 15: 27
        In the comments to the article about couch reflections on the appearance of the corvette of the Russian Navy, I came across a comment from a colleague about how great and effective fighter against corruption in naval construction was the first of the Petrov. I immediately remembered an episode from the film "Youth of Peter" - "At the beginning of glorious deeds" about the order in the boyar duma for the construction of ships. It is quite applicable at the present time :)
        Imagine, he says somehow Sam-know-who at the economic forum:
        - from the Government of the Russian Federation, "Gazprom", "Sberbank" and from "Rosneft" - on the aircraft carrier, from the legislative assemblies and the governments of Moscow and St. Petersburg - 1 shipyard per 5 million population of each city, from the State Duma and the Federation Council - for the "Leader", from the largest corporations - on the nuclear submarine, from the heads, governments and businesses of the subjects of the federation - on the frigate / BDK / MRK /, from all kinds of poaching crab and salmon kings - on a minesweeper or boat ... but who does not wants to get some air ...
        For such a business, sales can be allowed to assign their own or corporate names to the top patrons of the built ships. Well, for example, ... cutting the ocean surface with foamy breakers, the Gref and Miller are marching in formation ... well, almost like Bismarck and Tirpitz ..., Deripaska, since the surname for the ship name is not sonorous , in general, the nuclear submarine built "RusAl-Coy" can be called, but, for example, instead of a frigate, instead of a frigate, you can build a whole cruiser "Vainakh" on only deferred debts
    4. +4
      11 December 2018 08: 13
      Quote: Per se.
      the president said to the oligarchs - "suitcase, train station, London, otherwise on the bunk"

      You will laugh a lot, but the president said this several times in 2001-2003. He was heard, I assure you. T.N. "oligarchs" of the 90s come to Russia for a week or two, mostly.
      True, recently, partners began to clearly prescribe them under the key, but I think they will sort it out somehow. People are grated, albeit lazy.
      1. +1
        11 December 2018 09: 56
        -You will laugh a lot, but the president said this several times, in 2001-2003 -

        Words hung in the air.

        -It’s true, recently, partners began to clearly prescribe them under the key, -

        It's not just about the oligarchs. They are just a cover. The proceeds from the sale of America Trizuris did not rain on the military-industrial complex of the Russian Federation, but migrated to British offshore. Yes, and notable thieves spend stolen from the budget, not in the territory of the Russian Federation. from American and other NATO thieves.
        1. -1
          11 December 2018 10: 46
          Quote: gunnerminer
          Words hung in the air.

          No. London, the Zug canton, azure, other quiet (until recently) places. Big business has nothing to do in Russia. Has long been.
          In the 00s, a transition was made from oligarchic kronikapitalism to state kronikapitalism.
          1. +1
            11 December 2018 11: 48
            -In the 00s, the transition from oligarchic kronikapitalism to state kronikapitalism was completed.

            This transition did not become obvious to the masses. And it did not serve as a prerequisite for the promised economic breakthrough with 25 million jobs.
    5. +1
      11 December 2018 09: 25
      -Our all, this is the "northern facade" of Russia, the Arctic Ocean, through which boats can go out relatively unhindered, for guaranteed unacceptable damage to the United States.

      Under the ice. The only chance with low probability is to avoid detection by NATO forces. The chances of avoiding the negative effects of fire contact with NATO forces under the ice are higher than on clear water. Unfortunately, the number of Russian SSBN and MAPL commanders admitted to independent maneuvers under the ice is not impressive.
    6. 0
      11 December 2018 09: 27
      - If our democrats somehow give the "disputed islands" to the Japanese, -

      As the first President of the USSR said, the process has begun. For seed Shikotan and Iturup.
  7. 0
    11 December 2018 07: 14
    - Why is it really impossible to do with less? -

    If you dramatically increase the strength of the MA of the Navy of the Russian Federation. Starting primarily with reconnaissance aircraft. Fully damaged. As well as consumables for aircraft defense.
    1. +5
      11 December 2018 07: 27
      Quote: gunnerminer
      You can. If you dramatically increase the strength of the MA Navy of the Russian Federation.

      I understand that the Chukchi is not a reader, the Chukchi is a writer, but still take a look at the number of MAs that Kuzin and Nikolsky offer
      1. +1
        11 December 2018 07: 46
        They can offer a lot of things, but decision makers do not read their recommendations.
  8. 0
    11 December 2018 07: 18
    -2) It is completely impossible to imagine that the United States will engage in an armed confrontation with the Russian Federation alone, without involving any of its potential allies in the conflict .-

    Especially for the Russian Navy, it will be difficult to effectively operate at the Pacific Naval Theater, given the state of the KTOF. The Mediterranean operational group of the Russian Navy will also not last long. Not enough ammunition is used on its ships and ships. to deprive her of the opportunity to replenish the reserves of fuels and lubricants. What is not at all difficult to do.
  9. +2
    11 December 2018 07: 23
    -And if they all oppose us? -

    At a celebration on May 9, 1995, in Severomrrsk, during a banquet aboard the BOD Admiral Levchenko, Novruzh vice admiral Ulsen, who at that time held a certain position in NATO, expressed his satisfaction that he had not spent a single unit of ammunition, CSF It lost its operational and logistical capabilities. It was said after the fifth toast. Redundancy, the performances of the entire NATO-orkestar - will not be required. It is not enough to attack the few old tankers of the Russian Air Force and the Russian Navy. No one will dare to bunker ships and ships of the Russian Navy without the State Department’s command.
  10. +2
    11 December 2018 07: 30
    -Because, you need to understand that the size of the Russian Navy according to V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky - really is the minimum for the tasks that we set for our fleet .-

    No, the number is not even enough to ensure combat training and combat duty. The authors consider only the naval staff. The fleet is a complex complex structure. And the main thing in the fleet is people. And rubbish, wild lack of staff, are completely necessary for them to shut up a personnel hole. thresh for 25 years. With the simultaneous call from the reserve of graduates of seafarers. But they are sucked by a vacuum cleaner from sub-flagged fleets and companies. Where younger assistants and mechanics are offered starting salaries higher, which is the commander of a Russian nuclear submarine. with all poles and odds and allowances for special conditions of service. Plus, a much more expeditious opportunity to purchase your own housing in large cities. And not somewhere beyond the gray Urals. Approximately the same picture in the Russian Air Force. Only personnel are lured by Aeroflot and foreign companies.
  11. -1
    11 December 2018 07: 45
    Well, yes, it would be necessary, but they still understand that these are just dreams that have nothing to do with reality.
    1. +2
      11 December 2018 07: 57
      Dreams about the number of ships and LA.nakak not supported by real technological drying out, and financial drying out possibilities. wassat
  12. 0
    11 December 2018 08: 12
    Actually, the article shows the composition of a balanced fleet, both by type and structure. True, all auxiliary and support vessels are out of brackets here, but the main one is given for the main classes.
    1. +4
      11 December 2018 08: 33
      Quote: jonht
      True, all auxiliary and support vessels are out of brackets here, but the main one is given for the main classes.

      I noticed for a long time that everyone talks about the number of aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines, but they forget about such an important "little thing" as mine action weapons. You can build many, many beautiful and beautiful ships and submarines, but a penny bottom mine will multiply all this splendor to zero. Andrei is dismissive of the American LCS, they say a mistake and a waste of funds, while they are the most important part of the US Navy's mine action forces. Our fleet does not have anything of the kind and in which case it will be locked in bases, the foe has enough bottom mines with a different installation system.
      1. 0
        11 December 2018 09: 01
        Quote: Puncher
        but they forget about such an important "little thing" as mine action.

        Cousin and Nikolsky did not forget, just did not clutter up the table
        1. +1
          11 December 2018 13: 06
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          just did not clutter up the table

          But concluded
          total - 13 LSCs, which, according to the author of this article, are generally not able to solve any problems in the context of a large-scale military conflict.

          One of the main tasks of LCS is to search for and destroy bottom and anchored sea mines. To do this, it can be equipped with the Texton unmanned surface ship CUSV. Having an autonomy of 24 hours, the robot can perform tasks to search for and destroy sea mines by transmitting data from the towed AQS24B sonar online via satellite. Searching for and destroying mines is the most important task "in the conditions of a large-scale military conflict"; the domestic fleet has nothing of the kind.


          1. +1
            11 December 2018 13: 25
            Quote: Puncher
            One of the main tasks of LCS is the search and destruction of bottom and anchor sea mines.

            Yes, they were ordered with these features in mind. But for now, as far as we know, PLO / mine functionality works only at the level of experiments. And this is the main problem of the project.
            1. 0
              11 December 2018 19: 30
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              But for now, as far as we know, PLO / mine functionality works only at the level of experiments. And this is the main problem of the project.

              Not certainly in that way. The problem was not the ship itself, but the equipment. The RMMV mine finder from LM did not provide 24 hours of reliability, and now they are testing Textron CUSV with the AN / AQS-20C and AN / AQS-24B sonar, according to the plan they will make a decision by 2020.
              1. 0
                11 December 2018 20: 45
                Quote: Puncher
                Not certainly in that way. The problem was not the ship itself, but the equipment.

                Sorry, but this is one and the same. The ship could not cope with the functionality that was meant when the program was approved.
          2. 0
            11 December 2018 14: 04
            Quote: Puncher
            But concluded

            Made
            Quote: Puncher
            One of the main tasks of LCS is the search and destruction of bottom and anchor sea mines. For this, it can be equipped with a Texton CUSV unmanned surface ship.

            But in fact - they are not equipped with anything, since this type of modular weaponry has not been entered into service, and, it seems, will not be received, since the US LCS program will still be minimized
            1. -1
              11 December 2018 19: 56
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              doesn't seem to do

              Last year, we bought two CUSVs for 14,8 million, which are being tested in the 5th fleet, testing until 2020. This unmanned system is not only for equipping the LCS, but also for landing ships.
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              because the LCS program in the US will still be minimized

              Where does this information come from? From the latest news:
              In the 2019 Defense Department funding bill that just left the conference committee, the authorities have funded a 33rd, 34th and 35th littoral combat ship, three more than the 32-ship requirement set by the Navy.

              Until they decide on the frigate to reach forty.
      2. -2
        11 December 2018 09: 19
        - but they forget about such an important "little thing" as mine action means-

        Not only they forget, but they forget, it’s a mine deo. A vivid example is the state of the PMO in the Russian Navy. Mines are cheap weapons.
  13. -7
    11 December 2018 08: 33
    aircraft carriers are not needed, the number of submarines needs to be increased .... no one said that kurkurts can destroy AUGs, but with the help of submarines it is possible. It is quite possible to expose the seas, for example, the Baltic and Caspian can be completely disbanded for uselessness leaving only berg bases without ships or with a pair of minesweepers and boats, and with the Black Sea Fleet to withdraw all NK of the second rank and especially cruiser to the oceans. This will result in only three fleets, and one formed from ships of the third rank and NPL, with the possibility of deployment to the Baltic and the Caspian.
  14. +6
    11 December 2018 08: 36
    It seems that the main task that the author was trying to solve with his work was to send at least someone to read Kuzin-Nikolsky. Of course, we won’t get into a lot of reading multi-book, and immediately write our opinion.

    The author, unfortunately, paid too much attention to the alternative historical part of the work that Kuzin and Nikolsk entered there for the Lulz people. As in any bad altistory, this one is built on the original insane and, worse, unwritten by the authors premise.

    The premise is that LeMay's phrase "Our enemy is the fleet" should be taken literally, in the spirit of the Bushido tradition. That in a hypothetical military conflict with the US Navy and the ILC, Russia will be able to count, if not on help, then at least on the neutrality of the US Army and Air Force, as well as civilian agencies: the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department, etc.

    Unfortunately, you shouldn't count on it. In particular, it must be assumed that in the event of a hypothetical conflict (for example, the escalation of the conflict in CADLO to Russian territory with the open participation of "UN forces"), Russian aviation will be somewhat heavily loaded and, possibly, will drastically lose in numbers and combat effectiveness.

    And from the purely technical side, Kuzin’s proposals with Nikolsky are openly harmful. The author of the article, who has some ideas about military history, is aware of what the desire to push Burke at 6,5 thousand tons always led to while having a fine in the level of technology.

    So the only solution to the problem of confronting the NATO fleets is an asymmetric answer.
    1. +2
      11 December 2018 09: 13
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      The author, unfortunately, paid too much attention to the alternative historical part of the work that Kuzin and Nikolsk entered there for the Lulz people.

      Thank God Cherry Nine came and opened our eyes :)))) No offense, but who is Cousin and who are you? :))))
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      In particular, it must be assumed that in the event of a hypothetical conflict (for example, the escalation of the conflict in CADLO to Russian territory with the open participation of "UN forces"), Russian aviation will be somewhat heavily loaded and, possibly, will drastically lose in numbers and combat effectiveness.

      There are really a lot of letters, but alas, there is little sense in them, since Kuzin and Nikolsky have estimated exactly the number of MAs for a hypothetical confrontation. That is, the threat posed by the US fleet can be countered by just such a number of aircraft. What does the US Air Force, I would like to know? They also need to resist, this is understandable, and for this a certain number of aircraft is needed, which, by the way, can be estimated - simplified methods are given by Kuzin and Nikolsky. But this has nothing to do with the topic of the book or the topic of the article.
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      And from the purely technical side, Kuzin’s proposals with Nikolsky are openly harmful

      Wow:)))
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      The author of the article, who has some ideas about military history, is aware of what the desire to shove Burke into 6,5 thousand tons always led to while having a fine in the level of technology.

      Given that the standard berke tonnage is 6 736 metric tons, the value of this statement is difficult to underestimate laughing
      Quote: Cherry Nine
      So the only solution to the problem of confronting the NATO fleets is an asymmetric answer.

      How common, so erroneous is the opinion
      1. +4
        11 December 2018 10: 21
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        No offense, but who is Cousin, and who are you? :))))

        Here on this specific issue - two dreamers. I’m on the Internet, but he’s not. A dwarf on the shoulders of giants, so to speak.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        What does the US Air Force, I would like to know?

        While it is worth avoiding spheroconins. Analysis of counteraction fleet against fleet - it is. It rarely happens at the place of didyvoyale, but you are the fleet of the USSR with the fleets of Germany + Italy + Japan.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Given that the standard berke tonnage is 6 736 metric tons, the value of this statement is difficult to underestimate

        1. Already 7.
        2. You are well aware that the construction of a ship no worse than the American leads to an increase in displacement to the level of Peter, or to the division of one ship into two.
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        How common, so erroneous is the opinion

        It depends on what to keep in mind)))
        1. 0
          11 December 2018 14: 09
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          Analysis of counteraction fleet against fleet - it is.

          No, no, and I answered above. The fleet must confront the fleet, the army - the army, where they can help each other, an appropriate supply of ships and formations is laid. But it makes no sense to contrast the fleet to the entire US military machine
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          Already 7.

          Oh, and what? :)))) Nikolsky and Cousin wrote when it was 6 736.
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          You are well aware that the construction of a ship no worse than the American leads to an increase in displacement to the level of Peter, or to the division of one ship into two.

          I can’t imagine where such fantasies come from.
          1. +3
            11 December 2018 15: 31
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I can’t imagine where such fantasies come from.

            956/1155
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But it makes no sense to contrast the fleet to the entire US military machine

            Naturally. War machine on a war machine. And not in a vacuum, but in a relatively sane scenario.
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Oh, and what? :)))) Nikolsky and Cousin wrote when it was 6 736.

            Nikolsky and Kuzin believed that a ship the size of the 956th can be mass-produced. You know not. You also know that in the 956th and Spruence did not fit, and Burke will not fit even more so.
            1. +1
              11 December 2018 16: 06
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              956/1155

              Cherry nine, I am sincerely amused by your position :)))) That is, the fact that no one tried to make a station wagon a la Spruence passed you by. The fact that the Spruence did not have anything analogous to the "Dagger", "Mosquito", "Trumpet", "Polino", and outright leaked on ABM / PLO issues to Project 1155, and on strike capabilities - Project 956, you did not notice either.
              You write - "an attempt to build a similar ship", and do not see at close range that in this case the Soviet ships were not similar, but had weapons and equipment far superior to what was on the Spruens :))))
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              Naturally. War machine on a war machine.

              Which does not prevent us from doing calculations like Kuzin and Nikolsky. If "machine against machine" is needed, then the calculations of Kuzin and Nikolsky are supplemented by calculations of the required number of air force and ground forces, space grouping, etc., and are not refuted by them
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              Nikolsky and Kuzin believed that a ship the size of the 956-th can be produced in series. You know not

              Can anyone interfere?
              Quote: Cherry Nine
              You also know that in 956 and Spruence did not fit

              It was as if someone shoved him there :))) 956 had shock capabilities and air defense of such power that Sprues could only cry quietly aside, and this was achieved by the victim of PLO.
              1. +1
                11 December 2018 16: 43
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                That is, the fact that no one tried to make a station wagon a la Spruence

                Uh Well, OK.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                but they had weapons and equipment much more superior than what was on the Springs :))))

                Where as superior to half of what was on the Sprouts.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                then the calculations of Kuzin and Nikolsky are supplemented by the calculations of the necessary number of air forces and ground forces, space groupings, etc.,

                Yeah. By the way, your recent attempt to find airplanes seemed less strange, since battles for air supremacy can still be, with some assumptions, presented in isolation from the actions of other forces.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Can anyone interfere?

                Long list.
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                956 had shock capabilities and anti-aircraft defense of such power that Sprues could only cry quietly aside, and this was achieved by the victim of anti-aircraft defense.

                Are you talking about 956 against early spruance? Or about 956a against spruence with Mk41?

                However, the conversation is becoming more insane. A series of 36 ships is discussed, which are not and never will be.
                1. +1
                  11 December 2018 18: 01
                  Quote: Cherry Nine
                  Where as superior to half of what was on the Sprouts.

                  Do not tell my iskenders.
                  Is Sea Sparrow better than a dagger? Is Asrok better than the Bell? 324 mm TA is better than 533 mm?
                  Artillery - 2 * 127-mm and 2 phalanxes are approximately equivalent to 2 acres and 4 AK-630, our air defense is better, along the coast - an American. RCC? They were set after modernization, and given the ability to shoot a bell at the NK - not that global superiority
                  Well, then they set up the UVP, which could fire the Tohmags and the same Sparrows. What is tsimes? Air defense as it was non-existent, and it remains, well, along the shore it became possible to shoot missiles, yes. The 1155 radar and HOOK outperformed the Springs by a head.
        2. +3
          11 December 2018 15: 17
          Quote: Cherry Nine
          1. Already 7.
          2. You are well aware that the construction of a ship no worse than the American leads to an increase in displacement to the level of Peter, or to the division of one ship into two.

          I will support the "nine", although Baba Yaga is usually against. The Americans and we have too different requirements and capabilities to talk about ships of the same displacement.
          The conditions of the North are such that the mass of the hull, whatever one may say, is about 40%. Compare with the American 30-35%. Here almost a thousand tons drew, without any technology and electronics.
          We add the tradition of not putting anything aluminum, Kevlar, fiberglass or titanium, here you have at least another 500-600 tons on top. Disgusting logistics and basing add another 200-300 tons of trash, which you have to carry with you. And now we will discuss, if you wish, the weight of the EU, electronics, weapons and other systems.

          I think that a big discount in 2 times is exactly where Burke is, we will have 12-14 thousand tons.
          1. +2
            11 December 2018 16: 20
            Quote: goose
            The conditions of the North are such that the mass of the hull, whatever one may say, turns out to be approximately 40%. Compare with American 30-35%.

            Where the numbers come from, tell me please.
            Quote: goose
            Add tradition to not put anything aluminum, Kevlar, fiberglass or titanium

            Hmm ... I'm shocked. What was the Komsomolets from? Titanium. Cruisers of project 1164? In the construction of lightweight baffles inside the body, aluminum alloys were used along with steel. Superstructures in the areas affected by the flame are steel, the upper structures are also made of aluminum alloys for relief. Kevlar is generally an extremely dubious thing, it is not known whether it was used here or not, but the whole army was dressed in it, so there are no problems. And what do you understand about fiberglass? :))))
            Quote: goose
            And now we will discuss, if you wish, the weight of the EU, electronics, weapons and other systems.

            Maybe we should not?:)))))))
            Quote: goose
            I think that a big discount in 2 times is exactly where Burke is, we will have 12-14 thousand tons.

            Just compare the weapons and capabilities of the Arleigh Burke and the Project 1164 RRC. Then let's laugh together
            1. +1
              11 December 2018 17: 46
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Just compare the weapons and capabilities of the Arleigh Burke and the Project 1164 RRC. Then let's laugh together

              Burke will lose the cannon battle, just like the F-35. And where should it be funny?
              1. 0
                11 December 2018 17: 54
                Quote: Cherry Nine
                1164 without a single chance.

                I did not expect another answer :))))) Actually, without a single chance there is Arly Burke, but ...
                1. +2
                  11 December 2018 18: 17
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  I did not expect another answer :)))))

                  In vain, I thought and found the right answer.
                  Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                  Actually, there’s no chance Arly Burke is there, but ...

                  Neither I nor you know who there is without any chance of RCC. Since the situation with target designation and electronic warfare is not known to me or you. I have my own thoughts, you have your own.

                  For the remaining components there is nothing to discuss.
            2. 0
              11 December 2018 18: 08
              Kevlar - in general, an extremely doubtful thing, is it used by us or not, is unknown
              SVM, and therlon, have been produced, EMNIP, since the mid 70's. The fleet was used limitedly. But not all because they were not there lol
            3. 0
              12 December 2018 08: 47
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Where are the numbers, please tell me

              These are materials on several of our projects. Ships for the SF must have a strong
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Do you understand fiberglass sub? :))))

              I understand that the hull and superstructure can be made of fiberglass.
              1. 0
                12 December 2018 09: 48
                probably from fiberglass
    2. +3
      11 December 2018 10: 02
      - So the only solution to the task of confronting the NATO fleets is an asymmetric answer .-

      Without modern intelligence. in the broadest sense of the word, without a guaranteed and continuous target designation beyond the horizon, an asymmetric answer will not come out. And reconnaissance and target designation is modern too. Well, personnel, personnel, personnel.
      1. +1
        11 December 2018 10: 47
        Quote: gunnerminer
        Without modern intelligence. in the broadest sense of the word

        Quote: Cherry Nine
        It depends on what to keep in mind)))

        No, that’s not the answer)))
  15. 0
    11 December 2018 08: 36
    Wow, an article by Andrey from Chelyabinsk turns out to be. The article is a plus, the author is respected.
    Another commonplace phrase - the Fleet must be balanced.
  16. +6
    11 December 2018 08: 48
    First of all, you need to understand that the fleet is a standard response to a threat from the enemy. The answer, proven over the centuries by an expensive, complex and very resource-consuming .. Traditional response to the current threats from the world bourgeoisie, we can not give, in principle, 150 million to 1.5 billion of us .. The technological capacities are even sadder to compare .. Suppose we take this path, and who we DUST do it? The bulbs in Mulino didn’t sell us anything more to say, and this is in full agreement with the requirements of the world bourgeoisie .. What are they doing now, squeezing us on all fronts from the Olympics to the flows .. And this raises the question of why do science fiction that NO way ? Can look for another way? The time has passed since the 90s a lot of technology did not stand still, the same hypersound multiplies by zero the enemy fleet, you say that there is no hypersound! Well, is there anything you need for the fleet? Rocket technology actually allows you to abandon the naval component of the nuclear triad because it’s expensive to build both an SSBN and a group to cover them, and all calculations show extremely low efficiency .. Can we transfer the strategic nuclear forces into the vast country under the cover of an air defense missile defense? By reducing the nomenclature of armaments, we can increase both the number and level of these .. We, as a result of mistakes of the past decades, have been driven into our territory, but unlike Japan, we have where and there is something to raise the country from. Second and important remark why Over the past decades there have been no large databases between enemy fleets? Everything is simple, opponents are too seasoned .. the conflict between them will lead to a global war, the US ship cannot take the ship of China or Russia demonstratively and openly to drown the ship, the risk is too great, the same thing from the other side ... Hence all these piles and puffing of cheeks, for it’s like, without the use of weapons, a trivial clash allows the parties to disperse without losing their face .. The last conflict at the Falkland Sea .. And if the Argentines worked at least 50% of their weapons of destruction England would use nuclear weapons .. There were no other options .. And here we come to the most interesting thing, in our situation, the alignment of forces is even worse than that of Argentina and England, no matter how we puff up, but still have to get TNW, and very soon, strategic nuclear forces .. That is, they came to the conclusion that without nuclear weapons in any way .. Then the question is, and why do we have unrealistic plans for the construction of the fleet if nuclear weapons are anyway used? Can we eliminate this resource-consuming / inefficient factor and focus on the other? Space, aviation, rocket science promising ..
    1. +4
      11 December 2018 13: 58
      Quote: max702
      Space, aviation, rocket science promising ..
      Everything is true, but space, aviation, rocketry, to a large extent apply to the world's oceans, being no less a priority task in their development. If Argentina had 50% more efficiency ... The problem is that purely defense from the coast, the absence of significant forces of its own fleet, and did not allow Argentina to have these very additional chances of efficiency, of victory. And, the point here is not that Britain, losing, would use nuclear weapons, on the contrary, against a self-sufficient fleet, no one in their right mind, from Britain, would send their squadron to another part of the world to fight for the Falklands. According to your logic, Argentina should not have fought with Britain, knowing that they have nuclear weapons, and the British, in this situation, did not need to drive the fleet across the seas, it was enough to put forward a nuclear ultimatum, or immediately make a small , a demonstration "Hiroshima" on the coast of Argentina. But, it would have already become not only a "war" between Great Britain and Argentina, but also the case of Brazil, Chile, other countries of South America, with the involvement of the Warsaw Pact countries and the Soviet Union, it would become the business of the entire world community, threatening to move into the global world war. In conclusion, not for that, Peter I built the fleet, pulled Russia out of the land sleep-doze, so that now we would hide behind the Ural mountains, and on our shores the "partners" brazenly deployed this very SPACE, ROCKETS and AVIATION, encircling and sealing Russia.
      1. +2
        11 December 2018 14: 51
        Quote: Per se.
        . If Argentina had 50% more efficiency ... The problem is that purely coastal defense, the lack of significant forces of its fleet, did not allow Argentina to have these extra chances of efficiency, of victory.

        Absolutely not! I mean, if 50% of the effectiveness of the ammunition were those that fell into the British fleet and that would have been enough for him .. But England, so that the whole world would not have laughed at it, would have to use nuclear weapons, and the order for the use of this was done by English sailors for this .. Regarding the self-sufficiency of the Argentinean fleet, the British fleet they could quite successfully multiply by zero because of the one I quoted above, and the fleet did not play a special role there ..
        Quote: Per se.
        not for that Peter I, the fleet was building, pulling Russia out of the land sleep-slumber, so that now we were hiding behind the Ural Mountains,

        If Peter had YaO, I think that no one would ask any questions to Russia at all .. They would quietly piss in their corners and that's all .. And equal in strength "partners" would ceremoniously bow at balls ..
    2. 0
      11 December 2018 18: 46
      Quote: max702
      First of all, you need to understand that the fleet is a standard response to a threat from the enemy. The answer, proven over the centuries by an expensive, complex and very resource-intensive .. In principle, we cannot give a traditional response to the current threats from the world bourgeoisie. 150mln 1.5bln us for them .. Technological capacities are even sadder to compare .. Suppose we take this path, and WHO WILL let us do this? The bulbs in Mulino didn’t sell us anything more to say, and this is in full agreement with the requirements of the world bourgeoisie .. What are they doing now, squeezing us on all fronts from the Olympics to the flows .. And this raises the question of why do science fiction that NO way ? Can look for another way? Time has passed since 90x a lot of technology did not stand still, the same hypersound multiplies by zero the enemy fleet, you say that there is no hypersound! Well, is there anything you need for the fleet? Rocket technology actually allows you to abandon the naval components of the nuclear triad because it’s expensive to build both an SSBN and a group to cover them, and all calculations show extremely low efficiency .. Can we transfer the strategic nuclear forces into the vast country under the cover of an air defense missile defense? By reducing the nomenclature of armaments, we can increase both the number and level of these .. We, as a result of mistakes of the past decades, have been driven into our territory, but unlike Japan, we have where and there is something to raise the country from. Second and important remark why Over the past decades there have been no large databases between enemy fleets? Everything is simple, the opponents are too inveterate .. the conflict between them will lead to a global war, the US ship cannot take the ship of China or Russia in a pointed and open way, the risk is too great, the same from the other side .. Hence all these bulk and puffing of cheeks, for it’s like, without the use of weapons, a trivial clash allows the parties to disperse without losing their face .. The last conflict at the Falkland Sea .. And if the Argentines had worked at least 50% of the means of destruction, England would have used nuclear weapons .. There were no other options .. And here we come to himself and interesting, in our situation, the alignment of forces is even worse than that of Argentina and England, no matter how we puff up, but we still have to get TNW, and very soon, strategic nuclear forces .. That is, we came to the conclusion that without nuclear weapons in any way .. Then the question is, and why do we have unrealistic plans for the construction of the fleet if nuclear weapons are anyway used? Can we eliminate this resource-consuming / inefficient factor and focus on the other? Space, aviation, rocket science promising ..

      The path is only one military alliance with China with all the consequences ...
    3. +2
      12 December 2018 09: 52
      I support in the sense of the development of modern weapons, instead of outdated concepts of surface ships, but many nuclear submarines are needed, because they overcome air defense
  17. +3
    11 December 2018 08: 55
    But against the coast, the AUG can act mainly in the form of an air offensive, when its carrier-based aircraft operates outside the air defense system, shipboard EW and other combat and radio equipment of aircraft carrier escort ships.


    So here all the smart people say the same thing. AUG is the elusive Joe, who will crawl into the database area himself, and we don’t have many points to protect from an air attack from the sea. In essence, these are Primorye and Petropavlovsk in Kamchatka. Maybe Kola Peninsula. Accordingly, it is precisely in these areas that air defense weapons should be concentrated. And there is no such lame goat on which deck aircraft will be able to go round them.

    Two military professionals, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky, who specially worked on this topic, came to the conclusion that the construction of 4-5 AMG (multipurpose aircraft carrier groups) will cost the country much cheaper than alternative "air-submarine" development options


    Something I do not see where they counted it. And where is there anything at all about ships when it comes to the destruction of aircraft wing of aircraft carriers, which is work for C-400 and Su-30 \ 35, in the perspective of 57.

    Proceeding from the same premise, it is not clear what the troughs of 6.5 kt are supposed to be built, when exactly the Orlans and the cheaper Atlanta are intended to fight aviation.

    Universalism in itself presupposes the construction of very large ships, and I involuntarily wonder how, for example, such small ships will be equipped with GAS and helicopters so that buoys can be placed on submarines, air defense missile systems, and any intelligible artillery. "Atlant", as a floating battery of air defense missile systems with 16 heavy anti-ship missiles for one-shots, came out as if in 12 kt.

    Universal here can only be housing.
    1. 0
      11 December 2018 09: 06
      Quote: EvilLion
      Something I don’t see where they counted it

      Page 583, if I am not mistaken
      1. +4
        11 December 2018 13: 36
        That is, the whole calculation fit on one page?
        OK, set aside a banter.
        1) Are the authors professionals in aviation, weapons, tactics, etc., etc.?
        2) How have the values ​​of certain types of weapons changed since the turn of the 1980-1990s?
        3) Are the tasks formulated correctly? An abstract "presence" in the world's oceans is not a factor that will justify the diversion of resources from the Air Force in favor of the Navy.
        1. +1
          11 December 2018 14: 13
          Quote: EvilLion
          That is, the whole calculation fit on one page?

          No, not on one, but in general the authors in the book give conclusions, not methods.
          Quote: EvilLion
          Are the authors professionals in matters of aviation, its weapons, tactics of application, etc., etc.?

          I described their knowledge and skills in the article. As I see, they have all the necessary information and knowledge for this kind of planning.
          Quote: EvilLion
          How has the value of certain types of weapons changed from the turn of the 1980-1990?

          Is growing.
          Quote: EvilLion
          Are the tasks formulated correctly? Abstract "presence" in the world's oceans is not the factor

          Sorry, did you read the article? Where is the abstract, when there, in Russian, is it defined in white the possibility of effective combat operations by the forces of the fleet against 85% of the states that are not friendly to us that are not members of NATO?
          1. +3
            11 December 2018 16: 45
            against 85% unfriendly to us non-NATO countries?


            My favorite joke about Private Smith and 700 enemy soldiers to repeat?

            As I see, they have all the sufficient information and knowledge for this kind of planning.


            And I play lichess blitz 5 + 3 in chess. And I almost always straightforwardly attack the king, since I do not consider it possible to realize other plans within the framework of this time limit, and I understand them worse. So the authors apparently own only one approach, the struggle of ships with ships, although even within the framework of the scenarios they described, the entire burden falls on aviation and air defense.

            We do not need the actions of the fleet, we need to win the war, even with aircraft, even with nuclear weapons, or with the Death Star, if it will be easier to build. And the fleet is just an extremely symmetrical approach, implying overwhelming numbers and skill. In neither one nor the other will we even surpass the United States. The last time our fleet actually fought at Tsushima, where it got used to, and at the United States at least in WWII.

            And yes, I do not like the fleet, I think everyone already understood it, who at least somehow remembered me.
            1. +1
              11 December 2018 18: 05
              Quote: EvilLion
              My favorite joke about Private Smith and 700 enemy soldiers to repeat?

              Better something smart, please. Any argument there ...
              Quote: EvilLion
              We do not need the actions of the fleet, we need to win the war, even by aircraft, even by nuclear weapons, or by the Death Star, if it will be easier to build

              Well, prove that it's easier. So far, you have only common (and often erroneous) remarks and jokes. About "the last time the fleet fought in Tsushima" made a laugh
              1. 0
                12 December 2018 10: 41
                1 Su-35 costs 2 billion. Maybe even less. 1 A frigate can cost 30 billion. How much will a destroyer cost? 60 billion for a small one? Do you really think that a destroyer will solve air defense missions better than a fighter regiment? And this historical property of the fleet is a huge price, "if you want to ruin a small state - present it with a cruiser." Comrade Midnike, for example, tried to evaluate American battleships in Sherman-class tanks "so as not to bother with the course. What kind of" aggressive USSR "is there with its 20 thousand light tanks, one battleship can pull 8000 normal medium tanks, so state crises are always the curtailment of shipbuilding programs The British navy ceased to exist in 25 years, along with the colonies, and in a fight between two bald men for a Falkland comb, British sailors fired at the planes from rifles.

                And I see no reason to believe that the fleet will be stronger than aviation, which has become from the 1960s, as it were, an order of magnitude angrier and more powerful.

                And I'm not teasing about "universal troughs in 6.5 kt". I have before my eyes an example of a really successful project (1164) of a ship focused specifically on countering the AUG, and this ship has a total displacement of 11.4 kt. Why should I believe that within 6.5 kt, it is really possible to build a modern universal combat ship that will replace both the 1164 and the Project 1155 BOD, with a total displacement of 7.5 kt?

                And how is it generally supposed to solve the problem of the practical impossibility of combining at least the Northern and Pacific fleets (to hell with them, with internal puddles that are shot through)? And she again drives us into a quantitative race and forces us to have forces comparable to the enemy in each of these sectors. At the same time, maneuver by an air group, even in hundreds of vehicles, can be carried out for a maximum of several days, and its organization requires relatively simple measures, such as the presence of sealed fuel depots at intermediate airfields and a stockpile of bombs on the ground.
            2. 0
              12 December 2018 10: 02
              Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
              Well, for example, the authors postulate the need to have at least 75% of the attacking aircraft in order to provide protection. Do you think this is outdated? :)))

              completely outdated, for example, for the complete destruction of all attacking enemy aircraft, you may not have your own aircraft at all .... but only your own air defense, but a lot ... is it really new to you? And if airplanes are still needed, then about the ACG this principle works 100 percent, they can and should be destroyed without having their ACG. The very idea of ​​Nikolsky and a cousin is older than 40 years, these are the dreams of Admiral Kuznetsov, outdated when the cousin was not born yet.
  18. +1
    11 December 2018 08: 59
    Dear author, have you carefully read the cover of the book that formed the basis of your article?
    1. 0
      11 December 2018 09: 05
      Quote: crashing
      Dear author, have you carefully read the cover of the book that formed the basis of your article?

      Quite. What bothers you?
      1. 0
        11 December 2018 09: 12
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: crashing
        Dear author, have you carefully read the cover of the book that formed the basis of your article?

        Quite. What bothers you?


        Title of the book.
        1. 0
          11 December 2018 09: 24
          Quote: crashing
          Title of the book.

          Having settled, well, they would have said right away - there’s an error in the text :)))))
          1. +5
            11 December 2018 10: 33
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            Quote: crashing
            Title of the book.

            Having settled, well, they would have said right away - there’s an error in the text :)))))


            Yes, I'm completely different. Judging by the title, the book was written no later than 1990. Monographs at that time were written for about two years, and the authors had to develop ideas and concepts before that.
            Somewhere by the year 1988. And even earlier.

            How applicable they are 30 (!) Years later. In 2018. To be realized in another 10 years.
            Forty years later. Just some kind of Dumas ...

            This is the same as making the 1945 naval doctrines the basis for the development of the fleet in 1975. Yes, during this period (1945-1975) "kings of the oceans" - battleships went into oblivion, ships began to duel at a distance of tens and hundreds of kilometers, and submarines, without surfacing for months, were able to attack the enemy with strategic weapons. Electronics, the atom, and missiles have completely changed the Navy.

            Therefore, your approach, based on the ideas of thirty years ago, does not seem convincing. The development of, for example, hypersonic weapons could well send aircraft carriers after the battleships, and, therefore, once again in history, completely change the navy.
            1. 0
              11 December 2018 14: 17
              Quote: crashing
              Judging by the title, the book was written no later than 1990 of the year.

              No, it was obviously written later, it was just that the USSR collapsed in 1991 and there was nothing to write about in general. I can give evidence.
              Quote: crashing
              How applicable they are 30 (!) Years later. In 2018. To be realized in another 10 years.

              Well, for example, the authors postulate the need to have at least 75% of the attacking aircraft in order to provide protection. Do you think this is outdated? :)))
              Quote: crashing
              This is the same thing that the naval doctrines of 1945 of the year make the basis of the development of the fleet in the 1975 year.

              In fact, the authors proposed a new doctrine that did not exist before.
              Quote: crashing
              The development, for example, of hypersonic weapons may well send aircraft carriers after battleships

              It cannot, as supersonic could not. What is the difference?
  19. +3
    11 December 2018 09: 40
    Andrew!
    I must say right away that I’m not going to argue with you about the fleet and in general I am delighted with your knowledge and readiness to conduct educational activities in this area. But for some reason, people who love and know our fleet always move away from the proposal of an asymmetric response to the strategy for applying AUG.
    Let me explain.

    AUG, as you wrote, is practically a fortified area, slowly (at a speed of not more than a kilometer per minute, but in reality even slower) moving along well-defined paths.
    All that is needed to destroy such objects is a reconnaissance and target designation system and nuclear weapons delivery systems that are not intercepted by modern missile defense systems.
    Both that or another either is or is about to enter service with the Russian Federation.
    It doesn’t matter that the reconnaissance system does not currently cover the entire ball and is not able to directly issue target designations; it is quite enough to give out information every 40 minutes (one turn) in the automated control system of the RF Armed Forces. It does not matter that the Vanguard does not have a homing system, the main thing is that, in principle, it can take target designation directly from the NTSU. It is easy to calculate by TTX available from open information that the target designation error will be of the order of 3-4 km, which with a warhead of about 1 MT will unequivocally disable the entire ACS. In addition, to bring the whole system to mind will cost disproportionately less than 3-5 AMG.
    1. -2
      11 December 2018 10: 05
      The reconnaissance and target designation in the RF Armed Forces is by no means modernized at any noticeable pace. Not to mention the update. This is noticeable in the examples of attempts to demonstrate the MiG-31K with a model dagger demonstrator. Pay attention to the number of new reconnaissance ships, and the absence of a heavy type UAV in the Navy , the lack of reconnaissance aviation units, and other things.


      -it is enough to give out information every 40 minutes (one turn) in the automated control system of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.-

      Only for tracking in peacetime.
      1. +1
        11 December 2018 15: 24
        Quote: gunnerminer
        Pay attention to the number of new reconnaissance ships, and the absence of a heavy type UAV in the Navy, the absence of reconnaissance aviation units, and so on.

        Do not sprinkle salt on the wound. Now intelligence is the main branch of the army. Our primary Wishlist is a heavy UAV (and possibly U) UAV with a built-in conformal headlight capable of taking off from an aircraft carrier, similar submarines are still in deep reserve. The army also needs reconnaissance UAVs and early warning optical reconnaissance.
        1. 0
          11 December 2018 22: 30
          You are right, it is.
    2. 0
      11 December 2018 10: 50
      it is enough to give out information every 40 minutes (one turn)

      You mistakenly think that a satellite is capable of updating information every 40 minutes.
      This is not so, much more time is needed.
      1. +3
        11 December 2018 12: 47
        Modern satellite reconnaissance satellites are able to broadcast a picture continuously, online. It is only in their quantity and in the frequency of passage over a given point. Capsules with a film are thrown off only by Russia. And that is already slowly moving away from this.
        1. +2
          11 December 2018 15: 25
          Quote: Henderson
          Capsules with a film are thrown off only by Russia.

          Already does not throw off, those days are gone. But you are right - there are few reconnaissance satellites, and for the available ones there are not enough repeaters. We have to drive the ships.
        2. 0
          11 December 2018 16: 56
          The satellite does not pass constantly above one point, and its orbit is constantly shifted to the side at each turn. Therefore, it can fly past the observation point after about an hour or more and away for hundreds of kilometers.
          1. 0
            11 December 2018 17: 27
            Naturally. I wrote that the whole question is in the number of satellites.
        3. 0
          11 December 2018 17: 07
          exactly. and the presence of clouds and the ability to recognize an aircraft carrier on the set.
          and he may well slow down and turn on the water curtain, for example
    3. -2
      11 December 2018 11: 10
      Quote: bk316
      Both that or another either is or is about to enter service with the Russian Federation.

      No. Do not go.
      Quote: bk316
      nuclear weapons delivery vehicles not intercepted by modern missile defense systems.

      Cartoons.
      Quote: bk316
      It doesn't matter that the intelligence system does not currently cover the entire ball

      Important.
      Quote: bk316
      it is enough to give out information every 40 minutes

      To give information once a day, about 80 devices are needed.
      Quote: bk316
      It does not matter that the Vanguard does not have a homing system, the main thing is that, in principle, it can take target designation directly from the NTSU

      In 40 minutes AUG will crawl 40 km to the random side. Random, because the start of the carrier of the Vanguard is impossible to hide.
      Quote: bk316
      with a warhead of about 1 MT, it will unambiguously disable the entire AUG.

      1 Mt will definitely not disable the entire AUG, even with a direct hit on an aircraft carrier. Google "Arlie Burke anti-nuclear defense".
      1. +1
        11 December 2018 22: 56
        The easiest way to answer you. Because in the heat of the moment you wrote nonsense.
        Well on points.
        No. Do not go.

        Will they come ready to argue here on kilobax argue?
        Cartoons.

        Oksta do not know how petrels and statuses, and the Vanguard flies for a long time. It was just called differently before.
        1 Mt absolutely certainly will not disable the entire AUG even with a direct hit in an aircraft carrier.

        With a direct hit in an aircraft carrier, it will evaporate; it will not roll; it will not light up; it will not sink; it will simply evaporate. The rhetorical question can be: is the AUG with a destroyed aircraft carrier disabled?

        To give information once a day, about 80 devices are needed.

        No, that would be to probe ALL THE Earth ONE HOUR about 80 satellites are needed, and even as far as I understand it is not 80- but 50. But AUG in the area of ​​the South Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean do not bother us. We are interested in AUGs within a radius of 2000-3000 from our borders. So for reference, Monitor-E scan bandwidth of 890 KM resolution is 40 m. The system is civil.

        In 40 minutes AUG will crawl 40 km to the random side.

        You do not understand 40 minutes, this is the frequency with which the ASUV will receive the coordinates of the AUG, and in 40 minutes the Sarmatian will fly to Washington through San Francisco. The flight time to the AUG is about 8 minutes, and if, as Andrei noted, the Vanguard is corrected before separation, then the time is about 4 minutes. Which gives 4 km.
        1. +1
          12 December 2018 17: 00
          Quote: bk316
          Will they come ready to argue here on kilobax argue?

          I do not support internet scammers, sorry. You have nothing on this topic except the lies of the chief executive officer and nameless "sources in the Ministry of Defense" of TASS and others.
          Quote: bk316
          and the Vanguard flies for a long time. It was just called differently before.

          Frontier. And do not confuse the Vanguard, which flew - the usual long-range ballistic missile / short-range ICBM - and hypersonic maneuvering crap from the cartoon.
          Quote: bk316
          The rhetorical question can be: is the AUG with a destroyed aircraft carrier disabled?

          Of course not. Because there was a word in your post the entire.
          Quote: bk316
          So for reference, Monitor-E scan bandwidth of 890 KM resolution of 40 m.

          If you want the satellite to pass in the afternoon, you will have to choose a polar solar-synchronous orbit. The satellite will pass over the same area once a day (possible more often, but part of the passages will be at night).
          Quote: bk316
          No, it would be to probe ALL THE Earth ONCE AN HOUR about 80 satellites are needed, and even as I understand it, not 80- but 50.

          Not per hour, but per day. And this is not your understanding, but the characteristics of the only group that provides such an update.
          Quote: bk316
          Flight time to AUG about 8 minutes,

          Where are you going to shove them?
          Quote: bk316
          moreover, if, as Andrei noted, the Vanguard is corrected before separation

          Andrei says a lot of different things, but he did not say this specifically. He said that if the warhead had communication, and if there was a system capable of providing global monitoring online, then the warhead could only receive data before entering the atmosphere. With all these "ifs", the flight of a warhead in the atmosphere can be substantially less than 4 minutes.
          Quote: bk316
          adjusted Vanguard before separation

          Therefore, you must launch the rocket strictly at the time when the satellite passes over the AUG. Given the consequences of launching a rocket, it’s rather strange to guess the beginning of armageddon specifically under one out of ten AUGs.
    4. +2
      11 December 2018 14: 25
      Quote: bk316
      All that is needed to destroy such objects is a reconnaissance and target designation system and nuclear weapons delivery systems that are not intercepted by modern missile defense systems.

      Something like that, yes :)))
      Quote: bk316
      Both that or another either is or is about to enter service with the Russian Federation.

      Both are not present, and are not expected. EGSONPO is a complete blockage, the fleet's own funds are below the plinth, hypersound has so far turned out to be fake, and the destruction of the Zircon carriers is quite real.
      Quote: bk316
      It doesn’t matter that the reconnaissance system does not currently cover the entire ball and is not able to directly issue target designations, it is enough to give out information every 40 minutes (one revolution) in the ASUF of the RF Armed Forces.

      Can not
      Quote: bk316
      It does not matter that the Vanguard does not have a homing system, the main thing is that, in principle, it can take target designation directly from the NTSU.

      Can not. The avant-garde is just a sophisticated means of delivering nuclear warheads to stationary objects, and can only be adjusted (even theoretically) only on a high-altitude section of the ballistic trajectory.
      Quote: bk316
      It is easy to calculate by TTX available from open information that the target designation error will be of the order of 3-4 km

      Moving target software? 30-40 km will be much closer to the truth under the most positive assumptions
      1. +2
        11 December 2018 23: 29
        Can not

        What exactly does not know how? Direct to the media? No, I can’t. But you understand that this is a matter of repeaters. How many repeaters are needed at the geostationary station - TWO is correct! And how many of them are ours there right now - FOURTEEN. And that they know how no one knows.
        EGSONPO - full blockage,

        I don’t know, for what I wrote I need ECCC-3, as I understand it, they switched quietly without noise. All satellites in orbit.
        30-40 km will be much closer to the truth

        Well, let's calculate if it’s very approximately at the turn of 2500 km. It will be like the average radius of a missile. Take Pershing-2. As you know, the GRU believed that it was approaching for 2500 km for 5 minutes. The true speed of the order, taking into account the anti-submarine course of the nodes, is no more than 20, that is, a miss of 3.3 km. If the Vanguard is really corrected at the time of separation, then this is at least 2 times less. That is, right on board the aircraft carrier. THE TRUTH IS AMAZING YOU MISTAKE 10 times. For some reason, everyone thinks that the flight time is 30-40 minutes, but this is at the intercontinental range (and even that is exaggerated), but they will be hit at medium.
        And finally, the last - at a distance of 2500 to our coast, the satellite system is not very much and reconnaissance of such massive targets as AOG is successfully carried out by other means. That is, a nuclear power in order to fight AUG at its banks requires one thing - political will.
        1. +2
          12 December 2018 08: 41
          Quote: bk316
          In the ACS of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation through ground stations it is quite capable. But you understand that this is a matter of repeaters. How many repeaters are needed at the geostationary station - TWO is correct!

          This is not a matter of repeaters. It is a matter of time to receive and process information that does not occur in real time.
          Quote: bk316
          THE TRUTH IS AMAZING YOU MISTAKE 10 TIMES.

          Yes, you are right, because if you look at things realistically, then the error in target designation will not be 30-40 km, but 300-400 and even more.
          Quote: bk316
          Take Pershing-2. As you know, the GRU believed that the flight to 2500 km 5 minutes.

          Actually 8-10, but who counts them for you ...
          It will look like this. Ideally. First, the radar reconnaissance satellite will be over a certain region in which there seems to be an AUG. Then it automatically merges the data through the repeaters in the MCC. They analyze the data and conclude that this is precisely AUG, and not a supertanker or some other nonsense. Then the control center for the rocket is formed, transmitted and pumped into it.
          So, during this time, the position of the AUG in space can change by a distance of up to 150 km. These are the real results of the operation of such a Legend system. And that is why ours, designing the R-27K and its successor (work continued after the R-27K), faced the need to correct the rocket directly from space, that is, the GOS should be located on the rocket itself and be able to capture the target of their space. This could not be done, since the only GOS that we managed to cram is passive, and in 95% of cases in a combat situation, the AUG will not see or recognize.
          Americans who tried to give TsU from satellites in real time received nothing. For example, in Yugoslavia, a passenger train banged once, confusing it with a tank column. They were going to create Discovery-2 - a system that can give weapons for weapons with a delay of 1-, 5 hours. This required 42 (FORTY TWO) geostationary satellites with active radars, and the cost of the program was such that the United States abandoned it.
          But in practice it will be so. All our 4 radar satellites (Liana) will be shot down at the very beginning of the conflict and that’s all. We analyze the data from optical satellites, and we obtain a central control unit with a delay of 24-36 hours
          1. 0
            12 December 2018 13: 37
            But in practice it will be so. All our 4 satellites with radar (Liana) will be shot down at the very beginning of the conflict and that’s all

            All that you wrote above has long been outdated and it was not quite like that. I can answer point by point, but in short, 99% of the time was occupied by the last link (entering goals into the carrier and warhead itself). Receiving and analyzing goals for a second. Deciding (see SPRN standards) for tens of seconds. In new media this time will be the same second. The whole chain - a minute or two. OTHERWISE SIMPLY WILL NOT RECEIVE AN INTERVIEW-RESPONSE IMPACT.

            But about the satellites, you are certainly right (I really didn’t write about Liana) - they can be shot down proactively.
            But after all, this is definitely the beginning of a global nuclear war, the AUG after that WILL NOT BE INTERESTED AT ALL. The priority targets are the US satellite constellation, the US strategic nuclear forces, the missile defense system and the command and control centers, large cities, government centers, but this is all well known.
  20. -1
    11 December 2018 10: 48
    In principle, there is a reasonable core in this, but only if there is an attack on our shores. But it’s easier for Americans to block our seas. Black easily overlaps in the Bosphorus and is insured by Gibraaltar and the Suez Canal. The Baltic is blocked by Denmark. The northern seas overlap on the arc of Iceland Farrera. The Sea of ​​Japan is also easily blocked by Japan with the support of South Korea and the United States with their base in Akinawa. The exit from the Sea of ​​Okhotsk in my opinion is possible only through 1 strait which is also not difficult to close. Plus, you can block the Strait of Malacca and the Panama Canal. major transport arteries. And that is all. Now we have to break through the blockade on their terms. And then, without RKR and Anteyev can not do. Yes, and aircraft carriers will be very helpful. And without free sea lanes we cannot survive. You will have to trade only through China given its margin. But it will be beyond the limits and in fact we will become dependent on it both in import and in export. So we need a fleet not only covering the SSBN and the coast, but a fleet of breaking the blockade. Global Maritime Blockade. Which the Americans and their allies can easily establish.
    1. +2
      11 December 2018 16: 52
      Who are you going to trade with during the war? Yes, China is the first chop off the Far East!
    2. 0
      12 December 2018 10: 08
      to solve such a spill, the AUG will not help, they will have to trade only with China, and that we won’t survive without bananas? Eat while blocking everything and everything in the EU, blackouts of heat and electricity will begin, more importantly bananas will be
  21. +3
    11 December 2018 10: 48
    Although Kuzin and Nikolsky published the book in 1996, it actually reflects the state of affairs in 1990.
    And since then, much has changed. This was not so noticeable in 1996, but it is clearly visible now.
    This USSR was a highly self-sufficient country, not very dependent on foreign trade.
    But now this cannot be said about the Russian Federation. Too many critical industries are highly dependent on external relations — electronics, precision mechanics, etc., not only in the civilian sphere, but also in the military.
    The enemy will always use his strengths, and the weaknesses of the enemy.
    And even a stupid adversary will not do the opposite.
    The strategic nuclear forces remained the strong side of the Russian Federation, aviation and ground forces more or less held.
    Weaknesses - fleet and vulnerable international position - almost complete absence of allies and strong dependence on external contacts.
    And therefore, in 2018 it is naive to expect that the U.S. fleet will climb to the Russian coast, where there is still aviation and the probability of an attack on the territory of the Russian Federation to receive a nuclear strike in response, even with tactical charges.
    The enemy will, using political, economic, international advantages, as well as a strong fleet, work to break off foreign relations and weaken the Russian Federation to a level where this will lead to internal unrest by pressure on possible partners of the Russian Federation in all ways, including military direct and indirect. Direct military conflicts, especially on the territory of the Russian Federation, he will in every possible way avoid. In case of exacerbation, it is quite capable of organizing a naval blockade outside the coastal fighter aviation in conjunction with pressure on partners with the land border with the Russian Federation in one way or another, with a whip to someone like China, for example, a carrot.
    And in this case, the carriers of the fleet need the air ...
    1. +1
      11 December 2018 11: 19
      Quote: Avior
      With an exacerbation, it is quite capable of organizing a naval blockade beyond the limits of coastal fighter aviation in combination with

      Lord, why the hell did they organize a blockade?

      Russia supplies 3 million barrels per day to Europe. Oil in the USA costs about $ 30 a barrel. Suppose the United States offers Europe to supply the same amount of oil at $ 10 per barrel, provided that supplies from Russia (hydrocarbons) and to Russia (equipment) are stopped. It will cost them 60 million a day, 21 billion a year. The 3 useless Zumwolts cost more. Physically, this will be possible already in the 20th year, now there is still not enough pipeline capacity.

      Gas? Also a solvable question.

      What a blockade, what are you talking about?
      1. 0
        11 December 2018 11: 32
        In Europe, the light did not converge, it is understandable with Europe.
        But besides Europe, there are other countries.
        And actually, I had in mind a military blockade in urgent need
  22. +1
    11 December 2018 10: 58
    Very contentious article and conclusion to it.
    Objectively, Kuzin and Nikolsky underestimate both scientific and technological progress and the interaction of the military branches as a whole.
    With the efforts and costs (it still blows with the fresh influence of the most militarized country) proposed by the author, one can safely lay claim to the role of a regional center of forces within the framework of one ocean, rather than worrying about how to fight off demonic AUGs.
    The whole article traces the lack of a systematic approach, and therefore the attitude towards the article is appropriate.
    1. +1
      11 December 2018 11: 34
      - underestimated as scientific and technological progress -

      It depends on someone. If someone else’s, then even with the successful illegal acquisition of technology, it becomes increasingly difficult for Russian manufacturers to reproduce every year.
  23. +2
    11 December 2018 11: 03
    Already read, then read again, well done, sober look and reality, and not pompous bragging. Thank you.
  24. +1
    11 December 2018 11: 31
    "The Soviet Navy 1945-1995" by Kuzin and Nikolsky is the most popular book in my home "military" library. The material is presented not boring and with many interesting practical observations of the authors and non-trivial conclusions. As for the possible replenishment of the Russian Navy, the possibilities of the vessel for the next 10 years - BNK displacement no more than 6-7 tons. with USK for "Calibers" (plus the fact that several shipyards can make a dozen or a half a year MRK-class ships) and nuclear submarines of the Severodvinsk assembly, it is good if 1 piece. in year. Realities, however.
  25. +1
    11 December 2018 12: 10
    TW authors cannot function as general staff. And the general staffists are busy with something else. Are they in traffic jams?
  26. -1
    11 December 2018 13: 05
    The situation may change dramatically and become significantly different than in 1996. For example, the Kinzhal anti-ship missiles can easily solve the problem of destroying surface targets, and you just need to increase the required number of Dagger carriers, i.e. Tu-22M3K (4 pcs.). Their range of 2000 km and the Dagger's radius of 1500 km give a "dead zone" / closed access range of 3500 km for surface ships from home airfields. Therefore, state AUG will soon become meaningless.
    Further. If it becomes possible to track submarines in real time, i.e. If the Unified State System for Lighting of Underwater and Underwater Conditions (EGSSONPO) was launched, which started in the early 2000s, then to destroy the submarines, you can again use aviation: 12 Tu-142 (6 missile torpedoes (for example, 91RE1), 3 each one target, or Onyxes with special warheads - apiece for a target) and 24 Su-30s (3 torpedo missiles each) are enough to guarantee the destruction of all submarines.
    1. +2
      11 December 2018 13: 10
      About how easily "Daggers" solve problems, I would not get excited .... Since nothing is known about this at all. And if it is known, then not here wink
      When a system with a hard-pronounced name will be implemented, it does not know, IMHO, even the Creator ... And even more so, how it will be implemented. At the moment - no way.
    2. +5
      11 December 2018 14: 26
      Quote: Tektor
      For example, anti-ship missiles "Dagger" easily solve the problem of destroying surface targets

      RCC Dagger in the form of a hypersonic homing missile in nature does not exist.
  27. +1
    11 December 2018 13: 35
    Confused the Enterprise with Forrestal. Take a closer look.
  28. 0
    11 December 2018 13: 44
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Having settled, well, they would have said right away - there’s an error in the text :)))))

    Quote: irazum

    Confused the Enterprise with Forrestal. Take a closer look.

    They took off the pen.
    A similar bobble ("ochepyatka"?) And in the article about "Admiral Chabanenko". He is there as "Nikolai Chabanenko" in some places.
  29. +4
    11 December 2018 14: 10
    The question to the author is whether you have a desire to sway to a more serious level, moving from particulars to more general questions. How many and which ships to build is determined by the naval doctrine of the country, which, in turn, is a derivative of public policy.
    Therefore, it is very interesting in historical retrospect to see how these very naval doctrines and, accordingly, the fleets built in accordance with them, paid off.
    And here a lot of interesting things will open. It turns out that both the famous British "Naval Defense Act of 1889", which approved the two-state standard, and the last pre-war German shipbuilding program (Plan Z), and the naval plans of Japan, which with colossal efforts rushed into the ranks of the world's leading naval powers, have one the common denominator is that they did not come true and did not justify the funds invested in them.
    The actual wartime situation revealed the complete impossibility of following the principles developed in peacetime.
    And Russia in this regard has something to think about. All their greatest feats (fly over - uriapatrioty), Russian and Soviet sailors performed on land, heroically defending their besieged bases on all sides and crushing the enemy in the Marine Corps.
    Therefore, I suggest that the author leave the ships for a while and swing at a cycle like "Naval doctrine - history, theory, practice." It should be interesting.
    1. +1
      11 December 2018 14: 30
      Quote: Decimam
      And here a lot of interesting things will open. It turns out that both the famous British "Naval Defense Act of 1889", which approved the two-state standard, and the last pre-war German shipbuilding program (Plan Z), and the naval plans of Japan, which with colossal efforts rushed into the ranks of the world's leading naval powers, have one the common denominator is that they did not come true and did not justify the funds invested in them.

      Well, why? Quite justified themselves
      1. +1
        11 December 2018 14: 39
        Yes? Then I remove the question.
        1. +3
          11 December 2018 14: 50
          Quote: Decimam
          Yes?

          Of course. The English program affirmed the advantage of Great Britain and the stability of its colonial system, which was of great importance for the country as a whole, and also made it possible to maintain supremacy at sea in WWII. Japan, without a fleet, in principle, could not claim the role of a somewhat independent power and fell into vassal dependence on the British or the USA. Plan Z entailed the need for significant UK spending on the creation of a counterweight, which otherwise could be used with great benefit to strengthen other arms and anti-submarine forces.
          Imagine for a second that the Germans do not have heavy ships, fettering significant KVMF forces. How long would Africa last? In general, I doubt very much that the Germans would risk sending Rommel there, etc.
          1. +2
            11 December 2018 15: 03
            Well, this approach is also possible. As the saying goes, if the facts do not fit into the concept, this is a problem of facts. So you can trim and fit everything.
            1. +3
              11 December 2018 15: 08
              Quote: Decimam
              As the saying goes, if the facts do not fit into the concept, this is a problem of facts

              For the time being, I do not see facts that do not fit into my concept. No one. If I see, I’m ready to revise the concept, but so far in all the cases you have listed, I have not managed to discern anything that could somehow shake my position
              1. 0
                11 December 2018 18: 25
                "... somehow shake my position"
                Intelligence has shown that the position is greatly strengthened and that at least an article is necessary to shake it. And this is not a matter of minutes. The one that so far does not threaten your position.
                1. +1
                  11 December 2018 19: 43
                  Quote: Decimam
                  The one that so far does not threaten your position.

                  (glancing down from the 40 meter buttress) Let's wait :)))))
  30. 0
    11 December 2018 15: 39
    And why did the author introduce the zumvolts?
  31. 0
    11 December 2018 16: 48
    As for defeating aviation from US aircraft carriers, it is doubtful. If only because of the number of aircraft (3547 units from Russia and 13717 units from the United States), their superiority is almost 4-fold, considering the aviation of their NATO allies. And not to say that Russia is far ahead of the United States in terms of aviation quality. And again, they are bending their line about the construction of aircraft carriers. Not by washing, so by skating. And about 4 fleets, they were bent, although it is known that the Baltic and Black Sea fleets will be destroyed first. This was clear back in World War II, when they showed complete disruption. And there is nothing to spend money on them. So if you strengthen it, then the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet.
    1. 0
      11 December 2018 17: 12
      The Baltic and Black Sea fleets will be destroyed first. This was clear back in World War II, when they showed complete disruption.

      and what, the rest showed combat readiness?
    2. +2
      11 December 2018 18: 03
      3547 pcs from Russia ============== I don’t know where you get these numbers from, if you take open sources, then we have no more than 700 different types of fighters, but we need at least 1200, 1500 is better. Even if we take a total of all planes with transporters and bombers, etc., etc., approximately 1700 planes come out.
    3. +1
      11 December 2018 21: 33
      Do not write nonsense. Both the Black Sea and Baltic Fleet in WWII completed their tasks. If the Baltic Fleet had shown its full fighting capacity in WWII, the German landing force would have been in Leningrad a week after the start of the war. The battleships of the Baltic Fleet formed the basis of the counter-battery artillery of Leningrad. The evacuation of troops from Crimea and the subsequent de-occupation of Crimea is a merit of sea supremacy, which was provided by the Black Sea fleet.
  32. +1
    11 December 2018 18: 05
    Quote: Per se.
    but first, I must say goodbye to capitalism.

    Doesn’t it bother you that capitalism alone is pulling these same aircraft carriers? Where will you get the money for a building without a capitalist system? Capitalism is not an ideal system, but the best (viable) form of being has not yet been invented, alas
  33. 0
    11 December 2018 18: 08
    Notable holivar turned out, the author respect, read with pleasure and the article itself and comments
    In my opinion, statements about the possibility of serial construction of 6500 tons of ships, and by the way about the impossibility of destroying sea carriers of tomahawks - these carriers are a little less than one hundred units, while the total volley of over five thousand tomahawks is exaggerated - and what is easier to destroy?
  34. The comment was deleted.
  35. exo
    0
    11 December 2018 18: 47
    When this work of Kuzin and Nikolsky appeared, it made a strong impression on many. I have this book (first edition) on my shelf. So, only in 1996, it was not yet clear to what depth our shipbuilding would collapse. 956 were also completed for China, Peter the Great for our Navy. That is, there were opportunities to build surface ships of rank 1 and 2.
    Now, at least for 10 years, even talking about it, the meaning is lost. The tasks of the fleet will mainly be echoed with them during WWII: support for ground operations of fronts. And help in deploying SSBNs, at the beginning of the conflict. Although, even with this, this is the situation with us, it does not matter.
    At the same time, one must be a very big optimist, considering that NOT all NATO countries will come into conflict. It’s like sanctions: they explained to the rebellious that they have no choice.
    It is a little consoling that the US aircraft carriers, after the Vikings were decommissioned, reduced their ASW capabilities. But do not forget that the aircraft carrier is one of the best platforms for fighting boats.
  36. 0
    11 December 2018 19: 05
    Any conflict between the Russian Federation and the West will be resolved on the European land TVD and NATO communications in the Atlantic.
    Proponents of the large fleet claim that it is needed to protect the deployment areas of strategists and means of Syas from a sudden strike. This is the main argument. And absolutely not logical. The movement of American Augs is impossible to hide. When they begin to focus for the blow, the time for deploying their forces will be full. It is impossible to achieve surprise here. Rather, it is possible, but a great danger in terms of surprise for us is the enemy apl. They are much easier to stealthily withdraw to shock positions. And it is the creation of a serious aviation system that should be a priority, not aug. Numerous diesel engines in combination with naval aviation can crowd out the adversary on the near approaches. If there are 40 diesels in the Northern Fleet, plus small ships to protect the coast, as well as cruise ships to fight convoys in the Atlantic, this will impress the enemy more than moving targets in the form of augs, which will be like the Bismarck Germans . Once go to sea, inflict some damage to the enemy (small), and to the bottom. Beautiful but not for long.

    And to help any India, you can send a couple of Apple. This is a serious moral impact.
    1. +1
      12 December 2018 02: 05
      What? Cruising DPL in the Atlantic? Kriegsmarine experience will help you. It was because of the presence of a large number of escort aircraft carriers of the Allies submarines Denitsa ceased to be effective
      1. 0
        12 December 2018 13: 50
        Kriegsmarin's experience is just the most intuitive. And most importantly, positive in some places. There is no other positive experience in the struggle on the sea of ​​a continental power with naval powers. The Germans managed to achieve a lot in the Atlantic. And it was not escort aircraft carriers that destroyed them, but the use of asdic in the first place and a huge number of escort ships. But the most important thing is the absence at the beginning of the war of the proper quantity and quality of pl. Have the Germans in 39 at least 120 square with a snorkel, everything could have gone differently. Now, escort ships in the Atlantic, the United States and allies can set a minimum amount, negligible from the volume of shipping. A diesel engine that burst into it can shoot transports in a dash.
        1. 0
          14 December 2018 03: 33
          I advise you to re-read Doenitz
          1. 0
            14 December 2018 10: 25
            If you think that some of Karl Emilevich’s quotes will strengthen your position, then don’t be shy, bring it. Only this figure is a very controversial and big question, did his activity benefit the German submelt or minus.
            What I'm trying to convey here is that building a fleet for a more successful performance in the nuclear apocalypse is a lot of stupidity. There will be no winners. Everyone understands this. Therefore, such a war will not happen. They will impose sanctions on us and begin a remote blockade. No aug will exchange the United States will be off our coast. A maximum of cruise missiles with a pl will hit, and that is not a fact. They will conveniently position the aug on positions that are advantageous for themselves and block our trade. Those situation will be like the Germans in WWII. And how will a strong surface fleet help you in this situation? Nothing. Bring him to the Atlantic as the Germans of Bismarck - so sink. Have to keep at the bases. And the sub-melting can actually conduct counterplay on enemy communications. It will be possible to respond symmetrically to the strangulation of our trade. And apocalyptic nonsense, for which the warriors are preparing and about which everyone here writes from the battle and Augs and Syas ... There is nothing to comment on.
  37. 0
    11 December 2018 19: 20
    Auto RU. Have you ever fought? Situation. You fight, but do not strike, but only parry which strike you. Question will you win? Eternally fend off. The one with higher stamina and strength wins. That is the drawback of the theory of the authors you cited. We must fight with the enemy, and not with his hands.
    1. +3
      11 December 2018 19: 40
      Quote: Letun_64
      Auto RU. Have you ever fought?

      I suppose if so in 100500 more than you. Taking into account almost a decade of practicing a number of hand-to-hand disciplines, many street fights and moonlighting as a bouncer in a private bar in the fun 90 years. However, I could be wrong.
      Quote: Letun_64
      Situation. You fight, but do not strike, but only parry which strike you. Question will you win?

      Invalid analogy. The right one will be ... well, let's say, this: you and your opponent are armed with knives, the enemy is brandishing a blade in your face. You can:
      1) Throw yourself at him, enter the clinch, and try to kill him by hitting his stomach, throat, or something similar
      2) Try to inflict some deep cuts on his hands, which he pulls towards you. And just wait until it weakens, bleeding.
      So, any more or less experienced person in a knife fight will advise you on the second. Because in the first case, if only you are head and shoulders not superior to your opponent in the art of battle, then if you even kill him, you yourself will suffer a little less. And in the second case, you will have good chances to win, if not dry, then with minimal losses for yourself.
      1. 0
        11 December 2018 22: 23
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Try to inflict some deep cuts on his hands, which he pulls to you. And just wait until it weakens, bleeding.
        So any more or less experienced person in a knife fight will advise you on the second

        Perhaps for a knife fight this is acceptable. But in hand-to-hand combat, or in a fight, especially in a group fight, it is necessary to knock out the enemy and immediately the most powerful or dangerous, then his weaker ones, such as comrades, lose pressure.
        oh, if you even kill him, you yourself will suffer a little less. And in the second case, you will have good chances to win, if not dry, then with minimal losses for yourself.
        The question here is not to win on points, but not to substitute yourself under scuffle. To do this, AUGs and KUGs should be under pressure and remain the main goal, both submarine forces, and surface and air. And with a missile strike, you beat off one wave, launch another. Your analogy is aimed at causing damage to the enemy. And this is the proximity of our positions. And comrades naval commanders want to wave away
        100500 more
        And you are a bouncer, dear comrade;))
        1. +3
          12 December 2018 08: 23
          Quote: Letun_64
          And you are a bouncer, dear comrade;))

          Nope. Realist. Moreover, the possibility of error
          Quote: Letun_64
          But in hand-to-hand combat, or in a fight, especially in a group fight, it is necessary to knock out the enemy and immediately the most powerful or dangerous, then his weaker ones, like comrades, lose pressure.

          This analogy would be appropriate if we talked about a priority goal in an AUG attack. Then yes, you have to hit the aircraft carrier :))))
          Quote: Letun_64
          The question here is not to win on points, but not to substitute yourself under scuffle. For this, AUGs and KUGs must be under pressure

          Well, the AUS comes to the coast of Norway, on it - 200 planes (in overload), the part immediately flies to the Norwegian airfields and acts from there, returning to the AB only for maintenance. And the AUS sits under the shore, covered in three layers, not only by its own means, but also by means of lighting the air and surface of Norway, under the umbrella of the NATO Poseidons and Sentry. covered from the flank of Royal Navi
          What should be the strength of the fleet so that it can, with chances of success, exert pressure on this AUS? :))))
          Second example. The AUS of the 6 fleet approaches the coast of Turkey from the Mediterranean Sea. Her planes can plow even Crimea from there, and operate all over our south, using the Turkish airfield network as jump airports, but in order to break through to it, we need to suppress Turkish air defense in the area of ​​Istanbul :))))) What is the largest fleet needed, to perform such a task? :)))))
          In general, your reasoning is good when we discuss some kind of spherical AOG in a vacuum, but if you shift your proposals to the real plans of the American Navy, then it turns out that for their implementation we need a fleet of times 2 superior to the USA
      2. -2
        12 December 2018 07: 26
        and part time bouncer -

        The sensible bouncer of his head and the rest of his clients, he doesn’t substitute. Without bringing the matter to a fight, he carefully and promptly takes the visitor out to the street. Like in good foreign films. Your experience is doubtful.
        1. +2
          12 December 2018 13: 58
          Murad, as I see, in a bouncer you understand even less than in the Navy. And, judging by the fact that you recall Hollywood, in the 90 years you walked under the table on foot
          1. 0
            15 December 2018 16: 26
            -You understand even less than in the Navy .-

            It's nice to hear from a civilian coastal man showing interest in the Navy. Besides the bouncer. Foreign films show entrance control djigits.
  38. 0
    11 December 2018 19: 41
    The opinion of professionals is simply - the more the better laughing -You still ask the Pentagon how many grandmas he needs for complete happiness. laughing
  39. 0
    11 December 2018 21: 11
    Congratulations to all the Mooreans on this memorable date. smile
    http://www.calend.ru/event/4471/
  40. +1
    11 December 2018 21: 35
    Andrey, for the article plus. Cousin and Nikolsky did well and really did a titanic work. But!....
    They are both mechanics! And the first research institute is primarily an institution shipbuilding To the operational plans, combat stability and the calculation of the balance of power, these guys had at most only an indirect relation. And they did their calculations mainly on the basis of shipbuilding capacities and not real dispositions. Therefore, they should be extremely careful ....
  41. 0
    11 December 2018 21: 37
    Quote: Puncher
    The RMMV mine finder from LM did not provide 24-hour reliability, and now they are testing Textron's CUSV with the AN / AQS-20C and AN / AQS-24B sonar, according to the plan they will make a decision by 2020.

    Thus, the likely enemy also has gaps in the equipment of the Navy. Therefore, for a guaranteed retaliatory strike in the 12-mile coastal zone, a positional underwater fortified area can be created to be deployed at depths of 100..500 m ICBMs. attacks with cruise missiles, aerial bombs, SKIF-s position is protected by a thick layer of water. A small flotilla of ships of the coastal zone can be used to guard and protect the perimeter of this underwater coastal fortification.
    The main advantages of the underwater fortified area compared with the placement of ICBMs in ground silos, ground missile systems, and nuclear missile defense systems:
    - The SKIF container is cheaper than APRK Ash.
    - the invisibility of the bottom position from space.
    - Convenience of transporting SKIF large-sized containers to the place of underwater occurrence by water using barges.
    - the ability to quickly change positions.
    - increased survivability of positions under the influence of the damaging factors of explosions due to the higher density of water compared to air. The shock wave and fragmentation fields are more effectively braked in a denser medium.
    - self-healing of the protective layer of water after exposure to nuclear explosives. A funnel does not form on the surface of the water, in contrast to terrestrial explosives near the silos.
    - the dense placement of SKIF positions at the bottom at a distance of 500..700m between the positions creates the effect of joint defense with a massive impact of enemy ICBM combat units in the underwater fortified area. The first nuclear mushroom in the fortified area will reliably protect the fortified area from the effects of subsequent high-precision warheads, increase the range of probable deviations and reduce atmospheric accuracy by disturbing the atmosphere.
    - By the small forces of the Navy, it is easier to defend a small underwater coastal fortified area than extended ocean communications.
    Thus, in retaliation from an underwater fortified area, we destroy the coastal infrastructure for supplying enemy aircraft carriers.
    After which, having lost ground logistics, within ~ 100 days the aircraft carriers turn into iron trash, without jet fuel, spare parts and food.
  42. 0
    11 December 2018 23: 42
    1. The rejection of the "anti-aircraft" orientation of our fleet. From the point of view of V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky, the emphasis should shift from the aircraft carrier to his aircraft, and the point is this. By attacking AUG, we are essentially trying to crush the most powerful mobile fortifications, which form the deck (and base) aircraft, enemy surface ships and submarines, and this is an extremely complex and resource-intensive task. But against the coast, the AUG can act mainly in the form of an air offensive, when its carrier-based aviation operates outside the air defense system, shipboard electronic warfare and other combat and radio equipment of the aircraft carrier escort ships. Accordingly, it is possible, without attacking the AUG, to focus on the destruction of its aircraft in air battles, leading the latter with the help of our aircraft both on deck and land-based "on our conditions", that is, in our own "bastions" formed by ground and ship-based air defense systems. According to V.P. Kuzina and V.I. Nikolsky, during the destruction of 40% of the size of the deck wing, the combat stability of the AUG will drop so much that it will have to leave the combat area and retreat.


    That is, as I understand it, the authors of the concept suggest shooting down bullets, and not killing a shooter. :)

    For all the merits of the concept of "we will meet the enemy in the trenches", there are several things I do not understand.
    First, how it is supposed to force the US fleet to attack our coast in places convenient for us. Even in the 90s, it was known that it was completely unrealistic to hide the locations of the fleet and airfields from satellite reconnaissance. Starting a military operation, the United States will have a large amount of reliable information about the counteraction system and are unlikely to choose sites convenient for us.
    If the authors thought that this would not be so, I would like to understand what they based their conclusions on.

    Secondly. To collect AUG in any form, this means trying to run to catch up with the train. The USA now has 10 AUGs. So the United States is able to put two of its own on each of our 4 AUGs. This means that it is completely pointless to try to meet the US Navy at sea. Just crush the quantity. The whole essence of the aviation-submarine scheme is precisely in asymmetry.


    Thirdly, the logic of the ACG is not clear. Apparently, the authors suggest the AUG operate near bases and ground airfields. But I'm sorry, this contradicts the very concept of an aircraft carrier. What is the point then? Let's think: if an aircraft carrier is pressed to the shore so that it is in the zone of operational influence of coastal aviation, then it is not needed at all, it is simply superfluous. If advanced as an advanced bastion, then 2 by 1 will be crushed by numerical superiority. Even if it is located somewhere in the middle, and not dense to the shore and not far into the sea, its meaning is little understood. It is unlikely that he will really be able to close important objects on the shore from an attack, he himself will be greatly constrained in maneuver. And provided that the ammunition and fuel supply for aircraft on board is limited, he will very soon be forced to leave the battle altogether. And then the coastal systems will deal directly with the USA AUG in the amount of 2 pieces. And this is good if 2. States can concentrate in one place for a breakthrough and three and four aircraft carriers.

    Fourth. I do not understand why the authors consider "trench tactics" to be an action on our terms. In my opinion, all the doctrines and schemes of the US Army are based precisely on the fact that the US is attacking and the enemy is repelling the attacks. If the carriers and territory of the United States are not attacked, any country will sooner or later be defeated according to the Iraqi scenario, since its territory and important objects will be destroyed, albeit gradually, and the territory of the United States will remain intact and the carriers will not suffer losses. What the authors propose is precisely the action on the US terms. The scenarios for such a war are quite obvious and begin with an attack by the CD of air defense facilities and radar stations, then massive attacks by anti-ship missiles on airfields and military bases. And then the gradual destruction of military and civilian infrastructure. The authors of the doctrine essentially offer a giveaway game with the United States. Defend when US AUGs are at their peak of combat form - in a deployed state. It is at the transition that the fate of the AUG can be decided by one multipurpose nuclear submarine that entered the AUG's rear and sunk support vessels or damaged the flight deck with one missile from the entire salvo. And when the AUG unfolds, and even not with one, but with 2-3 aircraft carriers, it will be sour for all branches of the armed forces.


    In the USSR, not stupid people were engaged in military construction. They also considered when and how it is more convenient to suppress AUG. And I understand perfectly why a bet was made on the attack of an aircraft carrier on the high seas. So he is at least theoretically vulnerable to attack by supersonic maneuvering anti-ship missiles from different azimuths.

    3. Instead of interrupting shipping and destroying enemy SSBNs in the ocean, according to V.P. Cousin and N.I. Nikolsky, the task of fettering actions should be set. In other words, the Russian Federation does not create a fleet of sufficient numbers to solve such problems, but it is possible to build such a fleet that forces the enemy to spend large resources on countering possible threats. Let us illustrate with an example - even two hundred submarines do not guarantee victory in the Atlantic, but if the fleet is able to allocate a couple of dozen submarines to solve this problem, then NATO will still have to build a complex and expensive anti-submarine defense system in the ocean - and, in case of war, use on such a defense there are many resources that are many times greater in value than the forces allocated by us.


    And what will it give? Yes, NATO will take the time and effort to patrol communications. She had spent them before. But there are a lot of forces on 20 DPL and it will not be required. The USA will simply spit on this frightened fleet and will calmly carry out transport operations between the USA and Europe with convoys. Even with losses. Neither 20 nor 40 boats are enough to scare the US and NATO in the Atlantic.

    Two military professionals, V.P. Kuzin and V.I. Nikolsky, who specifically worked on this topic, came to the conclusion that the construction of the 4-5 AMG (multi-purpose aircraft carrier group) would cost the country much cheaper than alternative "air-underwater" development options.


    Maybe. And did they calculate the effectiveness of this cheap solution?
    And with the cheapness, not everything is clear. Let's figure out what needs to be developed for their doctrine. The actual aircraft carrier. Ship, avionics, flight control system, catapult. Aircraft AWACS. It is necessary to build four basing systems in different fleets. Create a training system for crews and pilots. It's all "from scratch". Then two or three types of carrier-based aircraft, albeit modernized. In addition to all this, it is necessary to develop and build a series of escort warships. Moreover, since it is assumed that the war must be waged not with ships, but with their shells, it is necessary to build ships equipped with what is now called "air defense units". That is, with a redundant system to protect the ship itself. Wend will have to intercept US and KR AUG aircraft aimed at coastal facilities and anti-ship missiles with which US ships will fire at the RF AUG. Is it logical?
    This is in my, not sophisticated look. It’s not cheap anymore. At least three projects must be completed from scratch.
    And you also need to continue to develop the Air Force and Air Defense at the same pace, since the fleet operates offshore and exposes coastal facilities under attack.
    And the programs of submarines and nuclear submarines are also not being reduced, since although torpedo boats need not be built, they need to be built. And such boats, I think, will be more complicated than missile boats, their battle distance is much less.

    So it turns out that the authors confused something with cheapness in their logic, all current programs are saved, and the aircraft carrier is also added from above.

    That is, according to the calculations of respected authors, the Russian Federation, when the industrial potential returns to the level of 1990, it will be quite capable of building the 4-5 AMG without straining the budget. But instead of creating a naval rocket-carrying aircraft and a fleet of submarines carrying anti-ship missiles of sufficient numbers to repel an attack by the US Navy in the event of a large-scale conflict, it cannot, for the reason that it will cost us much more.


    The authors came up with a very strange calculation. Firstly, it will be necessary to create missile-carrying aircraft in any case. At least because of the INF Treaty. And naval aviation in this case is based on combined arms platforms. Like the Tu-22 or now the Su-34. These are airplanes made for all military branches and are adapted for the fleet. So where is the savings?
    And the very transition from a missile-carrying fleet to a torpedo-bearing and aircraft carrier will require reworking the entire arsenal of the fleet. From torpedoes to rockets.
    But the rejection of heavy anti-ship missiles on the nuclear submarines will radically, multiple times, significantly reduce the striking power of the Russian fleet. And at once it will transfer the zone of possible effective interception from the far sea zone to the coast of our country.

    In fact, experts could have been trusted if their allegations had not been unfounded. On what basis did they decide that 5 AUGs would be cheaper than a series of multipurpose missile boats?
    1. +3
      12 December 2018 08: 12
      Alexei, I am delighted - you managed to make a mistake in almost every point :)))
      Quote: abc_alex
      First, how is it supposed to force the US fleet to attack our coast in places convenient to us

      Look at the map, say, DV - are there many potential targets for attack there? :))))) Or do you think that the AUG will bomb the hills? :))
      The bottom line is that war has its own logic, there are priority goals, etc., and all this is miscalculated. AUGs do not act like a devil from a snuffbox - their strikes are subordinate to the general plan of military operations.
      Quote: abc_alex
      The USA has 10 AUG. So the United States is able to put two of its own on each of the 4 of our AUGs. This means that it is completely pointless to try to meet the US Navy at sea.

      That's right :)))
      Quote: abc_alex
      Apparently, the authors suggest the AUG operate near bases and ground airfields. But I'm sorry, this contradicts the very concept of an aircraft carrier. What is the point then?

      Huge, as an aircraft carrier is a mobile airfield, which due to mobility is difficult to track and destroy. Moreover, you write
      Quote: abc_alex
      In the USSR, not stupid people were engaged in military construction

      And they created the AB precisely for action off their shores.
      Quote: abc_alex
      if an aircraft carrier is pressed to the shore so that it is in the zone of operational influence of coastal aviation, then it is not needed at all, it is simply superfluous. If advanced as an advanced bastion, then 2 on 1 will be crushed by numerical superiority.

      The logic is excellent, but so, for a second, remember the loudest victory of the US Navy in WWII. Midway :)))) Where the Americans were going to meet 6 Nagumo aircraft carriers (that there will be 4, the Americans did not know) with their three :)))) with the support of coastal-based aviation :)))) Well, the American admirals did not know that their actions "contradict the very concept of the aircraft carrier ":)))))) And we won. And then the Americans used their aircraft carriers in conjunction with Guadalcanal aviation, with Henderson Field :)))) And then, in the battle for the Mariana Islands, Ozawa tried to give battle with his aircraft carriers, relying on the base aviation of the Mariana Islands, but, disgusting, the Americans managed to destroy her before the battle of the fleets ...
      In general, if we properly understand the history of WWII, it turns out that the combined use of AB and ground aviation was almost more common than in pure sea battles :)))
      Quote: abc_alex
      If the carriers and the territory of the United States are not attacked, any country will sooner or later be defeated according to the Iraqi scenario.

      Korea? Vietnam? No, have not heard:)))))
      It’s wonderful to fight in someone else’s territory, but we don’t have the strength to do it
      Quote: abc_alex
      But on 20 DPL a lot of strength and will not be required. The USA will simply spit on this frightened fleet and will calmly carry out transport operations between the USA and Europe with convoys. Even with losses. Neither 20 nor 40 boats are enough to scare the US and NATO in the Atlantic.

      Well, two pros think differently. Are you more literate?
      Quote: abc_alex
      Maybe. And did they calculate the effectiveness of this cheap solution?

      What are we talking about
      Quote: abc_alex
      And with cheapness, not everything is clear. Let's estimate what needs to be developed for their doctrine.

      Estimated. But for some reason they forgot to figure out what can be abandoned with such a doctrine
      Quote: abc_alex
      And you also need to continue to develop the Air Force and Air Defense at the same pace, since the fleet operates offshore and exposes coastal facilities under attack.

      Not the same, as part of the aircraft is based on aircraft carriers.
      Roughly speaking, it turns out something like this - to solve the same problem we need either 500 multi-functional fighters according to Kuzin Nikolsky, or 600-700 purely land.
      Quote: abc_alex
      And the programs of submarines and nuclear submarines are also not being reduced, since although torpedo boats need not be built, they need to be built. And such boats, I think, will be more complicated than missile boats, their battle distance is much less.

      Firstly, they are being reduced, because there is no need to confront AUG. In my opinion this is obvious. Secondly, torpedo boats are simpler and cheaper, see 949А and 971 projects
      And there is no longer any need for VERY dear regiments of MPA, their basing system and much more
      Quote: abc_alex
      Firstly, it will be necessary to create missile-carrying aircraft in any case.

      The question is that it will be Long-Range Aviation, which will solve its tasks. If (roughly) you need 120 missile carriers to accomplish the tasks and 120 to counter the AOG, then all of them will have to be built by 240. Cousin and Nikolsky limit this number to 120
      Quote: abc_alex
      But the rejection of heavy anti-ship missiles on the nuclear submarines will radically, multiple times, significantly reduce the striking power of the Russian fleet.

      Will increase. Because the power of the fleet with heavy anti-ship missiles mainly exists only on paper
      Quote: abc_alex
      On what basis did they decide that the 5 AUGs would be cheaper than a series of multipurpose missile boats?

      And so it is. At one time, Exeter considered open sources - it turns out that those funds that the USSR spent on alternative means of opposing the AUG would be enough to build the 10-12 AUG, modeled on American ones. In principle, my estimates give the same thing. Cousin and Nikolsky write about the same. And what do you have, besides general reasoning?
      1. +1
        13 December 2018 04: 16
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Alexei, I am delighted - you managed to make a mistake in almost every point :)))

        No wonder, I said that I do not understand the logic of the authors.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Look at the map, say, DV - are there many potential targets for attack there? :))))) Or do you think that the AUG will bomb the hills? :))
        The bottom line is that war has its own logic, there are priority goals, etc., and all this is miscalculated. AUGs do not act like a devil from a snuffbox - their strikes are subordinate to the general plan of military operations.


        You are certainly right. Only now, unfortunately, it is extremely rare to understand 100% the logic of the enemy, but let's say they were able to understand and created 5 such "fortified areas". With a 2x advantage in the AUG, the United States will always have the ability to maneuver its forces. Do you agree? Conventionally, 5 US AUGs link in battle 5 of our AUGs in 5 "fortified areas, while the remaining 5 US AUGs strike the rear targets of these" fortified areas "while being in complete safety in areas that we recognized as" insignificant ", since all Russian assets And to coordinate the strikes of the AUG in two directions so that after taking off for a meeting of the US AUG, the Russian coastal aviation aircraft will have nowhere to land, with modern communications the US Navy is quite capable of.

        And this, mind you, the authors and you do not consider the political aspect of the beginning of the aircraft carrier program in Russia. Why do the authors believe that the United States will not increase the carrier fleet, seeing how Russia builds it? We are considering a 10 on 5 option. But a 15 on 5 option is possible and real. And with such superiority, no tactics will save our AUGs.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Huge since an aircraft carrier is мобильный an airfield that is difficult to track and destroy due to mobility. Moreover, you write


        Exactly! It is mobile. And the authors propose to make it stationary. :) You yourself really do not see that the authors propose to create fortified areas of the "Molotov line" type. Replace mobile defenses with static ones?
        Why does the US even need these whoppers? Yes, in order to push the hostilities as far as possible from their territory and as close as possible to important enemy targets. And the authors propose to play along with them in this, pushing our fleet to the shore. Tracking an aircraft carrier with the amount of orbital sensing equipment at the disposal of the United States is not so difficult a task. And if we add here reconnaissance from UAVs and other channels, then counting on the ignorance of the state officials about the situation of our AUG is simply strange. Moreover, the authors themselves (themselves!) Make it easier for the staff members by limiting the area of ​​operation of our AUG to "fortified areas."

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And they created the AB precisely for action off their shores.


        ???? How did you decide? The Soviet fleet was still oceanic. Even Kuznetsov and his sister ships were created for operations on the high seas. It is generally accepted that the ships of Project 1143.5 were created for:

        ensuring the security of strategic nuclear missile submarines in combat patrol areas;
        air defense of a ship and (or) a group of ships accompanied by it;
        Search and destruction of enemy submarines as part of an anti-submarine group;
        detection, guidance and destruction of enemy surface forces;
        ensuring the landing of naval landing.

        As you can see, there is nothing that could speak of the "coastal" nature of the domestic TAVKR. Well, if you do not think that the areas of combat patrol of the nuclear submarine or the landing sites are near our shores

        .
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The logic is excellent, but for a second, remember the biggest victory of the US Navy in WWII. Midway:


        Well, firstly, do not forget that you are talking about a battle that took place in the middle of the Pacific Ocean 5,5 thousand kilometers from the United States. And you yourself are promoting the idea of ​​squeezing the battle with the USA AUG to our shore.

        Secondly, the US Navy did not have the task of protecting the coastline several thousand kilometers long from flying by cruise missiles capable of flying more than 1000 km along a difficult route.

        Thirdly, the main work in the battle was done by carrier-based aircraft. On July 27, 1942, Life magazine provided a detailed chronology of the battle. The battle was divided into 12 phases, and for each in the publication a diagram with detailed comments was presented, from which it follows that the decisive contribution to the battle was made by deck diving bombers, who managed to hit 3 Japanese aircraft carriers in one attack. So the availability of coastal aviation did not play a fundamental role.

        Fourthly, it is the Midway fight that clearly shows the incorrect logic of the authors. Remember: on June 4 at 7 am the Japanese strike their first blow at Midway. Their task is to defeat the ground infrastructure (not airfields) they did not plan to attack the fleet. The US attack was discovered 450 (300 miles) kilometers from the atoll. Managed to raise fighters to meet. About 30 miles offshore, the US forces encountered a shockwave and could not contain it. The Japanese went out on target and destroyed the oil storage and power station. These were WW2 bombers with "chugunin".

        Fifth, the United States knew that the Japanese would bring no more than three aircraft carriers, they also had Japanese codes and could read enemy messages.

        In short, this fight is not the best argument in your favor.
        Yes, in general, the entire 2MV performed by the fleets of Japan and the USA is not at all in your favor. Both sides tried to fight as far as possible from their shores. Only the most recent battle for Okinawa was off the coast. And in fact, in itself, it meant the defeat of the Japanese fleet.


        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Korea? Vietnam? No, have not heard:)))))
        It’s wonderful to fight in someone else’s territory, but we don’t have the strength to do it


        Can you describe in paints the consequences of the victories of Korea and Vietnam? Or bring you bare statistics? If you and the authors of the doctrine are ready to defeat the US fleet at the cost of completely destroying the entire infrastructure of Russia, losing all ports, destroying all transport systems, liquidating all large enterprises and costing such casualties among civilians as it was in Korea and Vietnam, then we understand fundamentally different ways defense. Yes and no, we have behind the backs of China and the USSR, as were Korea and Vietnam. No one will push us at the critical moment with an additional number of planes, tanks and Chinese volunteers, like Koreans and Vietnamese.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Estimated. But for some reason they forgot to figure out what can be abandoned with such a doctrine


        Yes, I can't "refuse". History shows that no "linear" fortification will withstand a massive attack, especially if we are talking about aviation operating in three coordinates. I am sure that our AUG will certainly miss the shock wave of the US AUGs, or only partially delay it. And if the enemy is outnumbered, he will soon die bravely and with honor in battle. And the situation will return to today: the coastal air defense system against the US AUG.

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Not the same, as part of the aircraft is based on aircraft carriers.
        Roughly speaking, it turns out something like this - to solve the same problem we need either 500 multi-functional fighters according to Kuzin Nikolsky, or 600-700 purely land.


        Yes, the fact of the matter is that either 500 or 600-700. And provided that the price of one aircraft carrier (only a ship!) Like Nimitz is today $ 6,5 billion (Bush) and the price of one Su-35 is approximately $ 43 million, it turns out that one aircraft carrier costs 150 new aircraft for money. 4-5 Nimitz class aircraft carriers for money will be like 600-750 Su-35. Where is the savings here?

        Do you understand what I mean? Saving in "100 planes" is about nothing. To justify the construction of 5 aircraft carriers (only the construction of the ships themselves!), You need to save 600-700 aircraft. Now we have about 630 of these machines in service. The USSR had three times more. How many aircraft do you think you need for the whole country according to your doctrine? And if there is an attack immediately on land from Poland and the Baltic States and from the sea?
        Arithmetic does not add up already, right? And I have not yet taken into account the price of building bases for aircraft carriers, the price of developing new ships, and the price of developing new aircraft, at least a deck-based AWAC.
        Where am I wrong?
      2. +1
        13 December 2018 04: 18
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Firstly, they are being reduced, because there is no need to confront AUG. In my opinion this is obvious. Secondly, torpedo boats are simpler and cheaper, see 949А and 971 projects
        And there is no longer any need for VERY dear regiments of MPA, their basing system and much more


        You read the story of the battle at Midway strangely. There, I remember the submarines were also marked with something, no? So your "no need to confront AUG" is not at all obvious. Submarines will have to participate in the battle in any case, if only to resist the US AUG submarines. And there can be two of them in each AUG, like "Elk" :) That is, "Los Angeles". Which, by the way, have missile weapons. They do not have missile silos, like ours, but this does not mean that they cannot launch anti-ship missiles through the TA. If we have such anti-ship missiles, why shouldn't the states have them? In any case, they have been talking about the anti-ship Tomahawk for a long time.
        And then, long-range supersonic anti-ship missiles are a means of influencing AUG in the open sea. Why, tell me, an attack of 16 Granit anti-ship missiles is worse than a raid of 16 aircraft with Harpoon anti-ship missiles? Why is it necessary to give up the opportunity to attack the AUG from a distance of 300-500 km and cling to it at the torpedo attack range? If it is possible to damage the US aircraft carrier at Midway, why force yourself to do it at Vladivostok?
        What are "MPA shelves"?

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The question is that it will be Long-Range Aviation, which will solve its tasks. If (roughly) you need 120 missile carriers to accomplish the tasks and 120 to counter the AOG, then all of them will have to be built by 240. Cousin and Nikolsky limit this number to 120


        Well, here the authors of the doctrine simply could not foresee the level of universalization that they have achieved from modern YES aircraft. In 80-90 it was simply not realistic to equip one aircraft with guidance systems for the entire range of missile weapons for the fleet and ground forces. And today the Tu-22M3, in the course of modernization, receives an aiming system similar to the Tu-160M, that is, it will be able to carry both ground-based anti-ship missiles and the X-100 class missile defense system or the new Dagger. And then, I think, the development of YES aircraft will follow this path. So the same aircraft will be used for both the navy and ground forces. But you can't argue with geography and you will have to have strike groups of aircraft in the west and east of the country in any case.
        And actually, where is the economy of manpower and money again? Aircraft of the Su-27 class cannot carry heavy anti-ship missiles of the X-22 \ 32 class. Only light anti-ship missiles, Onyx at best. One. To break through the missile defense / air defense of the AUG order under the Aegis, you need to load it with at least 100 targets. That is, if you exclude YES in each attack on the AUG, you will have to raise 100 aircraft. If you are planning 4-5 "fortified areas" then you will have to keep at least 400-500 aircraft in them, including aircraft of an aircraft carrier. In battle, they will be lost, so you need to have a reserve. It turns out that in the "ukraprayons" it is necessary to keep 600-750 combat vehicles of the Su-27 class, sharpened precisely for the fight against AUG. And we have all naval aviation in the country is a little more than 600 aircraft.
        It turns out that you need to spend money on aircraft carriers comparable to 600 Su-35s and then almost double the number of naval aviation?

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Will increase. Because the power of the fleet with heavy anti-ship missiles mainly exists only on paper


        Like the power of AUG. After WW2 there was not a single war in which AUGi would play not only a decisive, but simply a noticeable role. Always the United States relied on the Air Force. In Iraq, the United States had more than 1000 aircraft. What in comparison with this number of 28 deck aircraft that Nimitz can operate?

        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Well, two pros think differently. Are you more literate?


        "The specialist is like a gumboil - its completeness is one-sided." :)
        I do not know what the authors' calculations were based on. But you, as a lover of 2MB history, should know what forces the Germans tried to stop the Atlantic route between the United States and Britain. How many boats they threw in this direction and how many they lost. I don’t know whether I am more literate than these people or not, but to say that 20 boats will be able to stop convoys across the Atlantic means openly contradicting history. There is a real historical fact. And there is a conclusion of authors. In my opinion it is better to believe the facts.


        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        And so it is. At one time, Exeter considered open sources - it turns out that those funds that the USSR spent on alternative means of opposing the AUG would be enough to build the 10-12 AUG, modeled on American ones. In principle, my estimates give the same thing. Cousin and Nikolsky write about the same. And what do you have, besides general reasoning?


        The same as yours. Estimates. History. Analogies. Data from open sources. I think that you and the authors were too creative in your calculations and did not take into account a large number of factors. Simply put, we adjusted the solution to the answer you want. You just really like the aircraft carrier path of development, perhaps you even sincerely believe that this path will lead to the country's sea greatness. But in my opinion, you are deeply mistaken, being within the framework of the concept imposed by the media "all the best in the US, all that is in the US is right." I believe that a missile-carrying fleet is more effective than an aircraft-carrying one. And the main thing is that you can't give up achievements in the subject of anti-ship missiles simply because someone likes big ships.

        And if I move on to numbers, I’m afraid we don’t have anything to talk about. Since the amount that will need to be spent on the collection and maintenance of 5 AUGs will very quickly exceed the most daring expectations of the budget of our fleet.
  43. 0
    11 December 2018 23: 50
    Well, if the "specialists" do not have a major specialist in the Navy, strategic nuclear forces and alien intelligence, Mr. Capraz and an academician of all academies, Sivkom, then I do not read the article ... Andrey, sorry, I only believe him, like VVP.
  44. -1
    12 December 2018 00: 38
    The article is interesting, but the most useful in it is a link to the work of Kuzin and Nikolsky.
    Unfortunately, the author, Andrei from Chelyabinsk, once again gives his interpretations of this work as the opinion of the authors.
    So Kuzin and Nikolsky, proposing the construction of 4-5 AUGs, indicated that these formations are, in the first place, more suitable as part of the fleet for conflicts of low intensity (in other words, against the Papuans). In a global conflict, they are proposed to be used to repel an AIR ATTACK (as the authors have it) together, and not instead, with coast-based aviation, which at Kuzin and Nikolsky is supposed to be almost twice as large as the air wings of all AUGs themselves (350 versus 200).
    Likewise, the full anti-submarine defense of the coast in their concept does not lie with the AUG, but with coast-based aviation.
    It is also worth noting that Kuzin and Nikolsky did not pass over the opportunity to relocate coastal aviation and consider in their work it is NECESSARY to develop this advantage by creating the necessary number of tanker aircraft.

    Thus, if, logically, the concept is followed, then for counteracting the USA / NATO in the global conflict, the ACG is, in principle, REPLACEABLE for coastal aviation, which, according to the concept of Kuzin and Nikolsky, carries the main burden of repulsing an AIR ACCOUNT (I can not do anything from the original source, this is indicated as such) and anti-submarine warfare. Simply put, if the task is not to drive the Papuans anywhere in the world, but the task is to repel the NATO attack - AUG IS EXTRA.

    Well, I will express my opinion - the work of Kuzin and Nikolsky was nevertheless released 23 years ago and completely does not take into account new characteristics and even classes of weapons (for example, global missile defense systems) that appeared during this time.
    From my point of view, the construction of an ASG with the necessary characteristics should be the final stage in the construction of the armed forces, since at the current stage of development of technology they really had a solvable task in defense in a global conflict that only they can handle.
    1. 0
      12 December 2018 07: 34
      -Well, I will express my opinion - the work of Kuzin and Nikolsky was nevertheless released 23 years ago and completely does not take into account new characteristics and even classes of weapons (for example, global missile defense systems) that appeared during this time .-

      They do not take into account, like the captain of rank 1 of the reserve Sivkov, the complete absence of mobilization opportunities for the command of the Russian Navy. This is clearly shown by the example of the formation of the Mediterranean operational group of the Russian Navy and the Syrian express. There is no personnel reserve at all. And the personnel hole of officers of the midshipmen. With such holes success cannot be achieved.
    2. +3
      12 December 2018 07: 38
      Quote: Newone
      In a global conflict, they are proposed to be used to repel an AIR ATTACK (as the authors have) together, and not instead, with coast-based aviation, which is assumed to be almost twice as large for Kuzin and Nikolsky as the air wings of all AUGs (350 vs. 200).

      Boris, it’s very funny to watch your war with sphero-conical Andrey from Chelyabinsk in a vacuum :)))) Now, please go down from space to earth and quote where in my text you managed to find “aircraft carriers instead of land based aircraft”. Are they not there? Congratulations, and who are you arguing with then? :)))
      Quote: Newone
      Thus, if, logically, the concept is followed, then for counteracting the USA / NATO in the global conflict, the ACG is, in principle, REPLACEABLE for coastal aviation

      I understand that this thesis haunts you, but put up with a discussion itch - the article is a little about the other.
      It indicates the tasks of the Navy, which he must solve according to Kuzin and Nikolsky, as well as the composition of the fleet, which they considered necessary to carry out these tasks.
      Quote: Newone
      Thus, if, logically, the concept is followed, then for counteracting the USA / NATO in the global conflict, the ACG is, in principle, REPLACEABLE for coastal aviation

      Quote: Newone
      Simply put, if the task is not to drive the Papuans anywhere in the world, but the task is to repel the NATO attack - AUG IS EXTRA.

      And here it is - YOUR PERSONAL theses, which are completely nowhere to be heard by Nikolsky and Kuzin. Quite the opposite - they just advocate the creation of AMG So it is you, not I, who give out
      Quote: Newone
      their interpretations of this work for the opinion of the authors.
  45. 0
    12 December 2018 05: 06
    The article is interesting, but it all depends on the tasks assigned to the fleets in the framework of the state military strategy and military doctrine. For the time being, we can only say that the NATO fleets are solving strategic tasks of a global scale that are fully consistent with strategies and doctrines. This compliance is based on an extensive network of full-fledged naval bases. The Russian Navy does not have such bases at all, but the base point ... you can call the base a stretch. The NATO fleets also have strategic goals in the oceans, especially related to the confrontation between China and Iran. The rest can, in principle, not be mentioned. The confrontation with the Russian Navy looks good only in computer games, in reality, such a confrontation is possible only in the event of a full-fledged military conflict, and its probability even today is practically zero. What, in principle, can the Russian Navy even in this unlikely scenario? The Mediterranean Sea with the Straits and Gibraltar is a great mousetrap. The Black Sea with the unsinkable aircraft carrier Crimea is a mouse trap for any fleet except the Black Sea Fleet, primarily due to aviation and coast-based missile units. To go into this trap, and even flavored with a fleet, can only be insane. The Baltic Sea does not even deserve comments - this is the water area of ​​the Marquise Puddle. In principle, it is possible to launch the Kyrgyz Republic without leaving the Marquise Puddle, Ladoga, Neva, the Sea of ​​Azov, the Caspian Sea, the Sevastopol Bay, etc. These AUGs are not needed on the Black Sea Fleet, nor on the Baltic Fleet, nor on the Caspian Sea. If, according to the Doctrine of the Russian Federation, the task is to provide protection and retaliation, then on the Northern Fleet and on the TF the role of the AUG is reduced only to ensuring the release of shock submarines from the territories of the Russian Federation and the subsequent protection of airspace together with coastal aviation. There is nowhere and no need to solve independent tasks. Where and against whom to cover the landing in the North? the protection of the North Sea Path remains - a worthy task. T e full AUG is needed on the SF and not one. On TF, everything can develop in two completely different scenarios - a conflict with NATO and a conflict with China, and I think the probability of the second is much higher. Here, a full-fledged AUG is also needed, although landing in China is most likely from the realm of fantasy. Hence it’s worth dancing - which and how many ships to have in each fleet and which classes. For the Northern Fleet - these ships are completely different than for the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet - primarily of the reinforced ice class, preferably with nuclear power plants. For TF - with an enhanced set of buildings that can withstand weather conditions. In both cases, it is important to take into account the living conditions and work of the crews. Te ships need to be built not just in series, but for the needs of each fleet individually, depending on the tasks assigned.
    1. +1
      12 December 2018 07: 22
      You are right. By tasks and fleet.
  46. 0
    12 December 2018 10: 10
    Quote: Avior
    And in this case, the carriers of the fleet need the air ...

    overt sarcasm
    1. 0
      13 December 2018 03: 38
      Short-range escort aircraft carriers, those that can be built using the capacities for the construction of container ships, icebreakers, etc. Aircraft carriers of operational cover for the deployment of strategic strike submarines, covering caravans and fields in the SevMorPuti area. I see no other tasks in the light of the quite reasonable defensive doctrine of the Russian Federation. here it is important to understand and accept that the Russian Federation is not the USSR and accordingly it is not worth driving a wave to compare the fleets and the tasks they perform.
  47. +2
    12 December 2018 10: 24
    In the first lines of his opus, the author outlined the goals and pointed out the impossibility for the Russian Navy to fulfill at least one of them. Then he cited the minimum desired figures for the number of naval personnel and other equipment. Moreover, the discussion was not about any specific goals, but about a full-scale military conflict with almost the whole world at once. Only a fleet will not participate in such a war. We still have an army and aviation, including a long-range one, as well as a Strategic Missile Forces. I think this should also be taken into account. As for the fleet and the goals identified by the author, it is necessary to correctly prioritize. The main task of the fleet is to ensure the operation of the strategic component of the submarine fleet. In any case, strategists will operate from the northern seas and DMZ in the east. Accordingly, we are talking about KSF and KTOF. What is needed for this? In DMZ - strategic and multipurpose submarines themselves (12 + 16), aircraft carriers of the Kuznetsov type (displacement, and completely remove all weapons from them except self-defense air defense and missile defense) (4 pcs.), Escort frigates of the Gorshkov type (24 pcs. ), support ships), anti-submarine aviation (12 pcs.); BMZ ships with the capabilities of PLO (16 pcs.), diesel-electric submarines (12 pcs.). The numbers are for two fleets. With these numbers, the Russian Federation will be able to ensure the constant presence in the oceans of 4 strategic missile carriers with a total ammunition load of 64 missiles and ensure their guaranteed use without the ability to shoot down missiles in their active acceleration area. At the expense of BMZ ships and submarines, a safe exit of submarine forces will be provided in the DMZ, where the missile carrier coverage area will be covered by an ASG consisting of 1 anti-aircraft carrier, 4 frigates with anti-aircraft missile defense, long-range missiles and anti-aircraft defense (helicopters, Package-NK), and two multipurpose submarines. Even if all aircraft carriers and destroyers of all NATO members are pulled in there, our missile carriers will be able to shoot back until they are sunk with all the cover. And that means there will be no conflict. The first goal is solved.
    1. 0
      15 December 2018 16: 21
      - at the expense of ships and submarines BMZ will be provided safe-

      Quite the same: combat-ready ships of the near sea zone are barely enough in peacetime to equip duty KPUGs at the disposal of the operational service of the fleets. There are not enough helicopters even to protect water areas near the main basing points. Stationary systems for monitoring the underwater situation are in the stories about their construction plans.
  48. +1
    15 December 2018 13: 47
    I liked the article.
    But it is a pity that there is only one phrase about the basis from which the concept should proceed: "the construction of 4-5 AMG (multipurpose aircraft carrier group) will cost the country much cheaper alternative. "This is me about the connection of the fleet with the country's economy. About, for example, the replacement of Dolphins from Sineva with Boreyev with Bulava, which is very beneficial to naval (and about) officials, but not at all beneficial to the country.
    I will try to explain the benefits, or rather the efficiency. The dolphin has a throw weight in a salvo of 16 * 2,8 = 44,8 tons at 11500 km, and Borey 16 * 1,150 = 18,4 tons at 9300 km. If translated into ton-kilometers (multiplied by the distance), then the efficiency of the delivered cargo of old Dolphins is almost three times higher with a displacement of 30% less. Those. old submarines and their missiles provide 2,4 times more destructive cargo 2200 km further to a potential enemy at a lower cost to the country than new ones. In other words, to deliver the same destructive cargo that was old, on the heads of "partners", now the country, producing Borei with Maces, must have almost three times more submarines, missiles, sailors, piers, fuel, support forces, infrastructure, factories producing all this, preparing specialists, institutes, etc. to work for them.
    I understand that sailors do not give a damn about this nationwide effectiveness, they have a different task and they are more interested in their salaries. But should a country have national guidelines? And, please, do not engage in casual studies, replacing the cast weight with the number of warheads and the like, since nothing prevents filling the cast weight with the necessary contents. And the distance matters, it’s one thing when you barely reach two protected (relatively of course) water areas - the Barents and Okhotsk Seas, another when the area of ​​dangerous (and therefore requiring protection costs) ocean areas for the enemy is twice as large.
  49. 0
    16 December 2018 17: 12
    Yes, the articles (and the topics of questions I raise in them) Andrei succeed, there is no dispute. But as for the construction of aircraft carriers by Russia now, there is probably a big question for now. Well, if today, the Navy (for the same reasons as Kuzin and Nikolsky) doesn’t have 36 MCCs and 61 multi-purpose submarines, then, for starters, construction priorities should have been given to replenishing ships of precisely these classes. But the trouble is, it would seem that there have been mastered projects 22350 (at worst 11356 R / M) or 971-M, but there are no plans to build and sooner build series of these ships ?! Then what kind of aircraft carriers can we talk about?
    1. 0
      17 December 2018 21: 41
      - regarding the construction of aircraft carriers by Russia now, -

      Currently, with a big squeak, RTOs are transferred to the customer.

      -61 multipurpose submarine-

      Of these, the most promising morally obsolete Varshavyanki.
      1. 0
        17 December 2018 22: 44
        [quote] / Of these, the most promising morally obsolete Varshavyanki.quote]. No.
        Of these [quote] 61 multipurpose submarines [/ quote], it would be most logical to order at least 4-5 units. project 971-M in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (for the Pacific Fleet), and a couple more (as the boats of the project 885M go into operation, and vacancies become available) in the shops of the Northern Shipyard (for the Northern Fleet). This is desirable for the next two years ... Given that the "Ash" would replenish both the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Fleet, but alas, much slower, given their high cost and longer construction time.
        1. 0
          18 December 2018 09: 24
          at least 4-5 units. 971-M pr. in Komsomolsk-on-Amur (for Pacific Fleet) -

          This enterprise has lost the possibility of building even the morally obsolete Varshavyanka. SCR. masterpieces of shipbuilding do not mumble for several years.

          - commissioning of boats pr 885M-


          It’s at a teaspoonful pace. Until K-561 is handed over to the customer, the K-560 will need to be urgently put on an average repair, which will last eight years.

          - preferably within the next two years .-

          Desirable. The desire does not coincide with the capabilities of shipbuilders.

          - alas, much slower, given their high cost and longer construction time.

          High cost is not the biggest problem.
  50. 0
    19 January 2019 23: 55
    All this is good, but only possible if the government has national interests in power. And without this, no one should be attacked. Enough to control banks and industry. In this case, the economy will have growth near zero, and the army will be needed more to maintain the integrity of borders than to defend the interests of the state in the international arena.
  51. 0
    20 January 2019 22: 14
    Andrey, why did you keep silent about the fact that “On the ships of the IIA series, the Harpoon anti-ship missile systems were abandoned due to the requirement to reduce the cost of the ship.” There are no other anti-ship missiles on destroyers yet. And this is 24 ships, i.e. 40% of the total composition. They do not participate in naval combat. They only protect themselves from missiles and 40 km from submarines.
  52. 0
    20 January 2019 22: 30
    The advantages of UVP and vertical launch are quite controversial: during any shelling of a ship, vertically launched missiles end up in the affected area and, if they fail, are guaranteed to fall on the ship and are guaranteed to damage it. During an inclined launch, 3/4 of the damaged missiles fall outside the ship's hull.
    For MRKs, a vertical launch allows you to fire at high pitching speeds, compared to an inclined launch, and this is a significant advantage. But for ships of 9-10 thousand tons. pitching has less effect.
  53. 0
    27 January 2019 15: 37
    Fundamental article. I express my deep gratitude to the author. There would be more of this.

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