Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. A little more about cruisers
In this series of articles, we described the state of affairs in the field of submarine shipbuilding, marine aviation, Coastal Forces, a unified state system for lighting surface and underwater conditions (EGSONPO). They touched mine-sweeping forces, "mosquito" fleet and other surface ships including missile cruisers. Have a great excursion into history design, construction and service of our only Kuznetsov TAVKR. However, we didn’t say anything about the prospects of the aircraft carrier component of our fleet either in the materials devoted to TAWR or in the article about domestic missile cruisers. In addition, some news regarding our RKR and nuclear destroyers of the project "Leader", which entailed the need for this article on domestic cruisers of all classes. So we will briefly repeat their description once again, adding additional data on their performance and latest news.
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAVKR) project 1143.5 "Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" - 1 units.
Standard displacement (data in the sources differ) 45 900 - 46 540 t, full - 58 500 - 59 100 t., But in addition, the “largest” displacement is also referred to - 61 390 t. Speed (theoretically) 29 knots. at the power of the boiler-turbine power plant 200 000 hp The course range at a speed of 18 knots should have been 8 000 miles. The autonomy of stocks, provisions and drinking water - 45 days. Armament - up to 50 airplanes and helicopters, 12 PKR "Granit", 192 Zur "Dagger", 8 ZRAK "Dirk" and 8 30-mm installations AK-630М, jet defense system "Udav". Crew size - 2 600 people, including 500 people. Air Group.
In detail, the features of this ship were considered by us in three cycles devoted to the deck aircraft of this ship, the history of its construction and service, and comparing it with NATO aircraft carriers (the last article, where there are links to all the previous ones), so here we will not repeat, but we will immediately turn to the prospects of this class of ships in the Russian Navy.
Our only TAVKR was commissioned in 1991, thus, in 2018, it turned 27 on. This is not too old for large ships intended for home-based horizontal take-off and landing aircraft. So, for example, the US nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, being introduced into the fleet in 1961, left the system only in 2012, that is, it served the 51 year. Among non-nuclear aircraft carriers there are also long-livers. Take, for example, the Midway CV-41 — comparing its service life with the Kuznetsov TAVKR is all the more interesting because ships have similar sizes — the Midway's standard displacement was 47 219 T, the full one is 59 901 T. So, Midway became part of the US Navy in 1945 and was only decommissioned in 1992. Thus, its service life reached 47 years. The much smaller aircraft carrier Foch joined the French fleet in 1963, and left it only after 37 in years, in 2000. But that’s the story, it could be said, was just beginning, since the ship didn’t leave for recycling , and, as appropriate, repaired, was transferred to Brazil, in the fleet of which remained the next 17 years.
Of course, our domestic TAVKR operated in much more difficult conditions than the American or French aircraft carriers. The North is not a joke, and the quality of operation (especially during the 90-s and the beginning of the 2000-s) was extremely far from American standards. But still, when carrying out the appropriate repairs, Kuznetsov TAVKR is quite capable of serving at least 45 years, that is, at least until 2036, or maybe even more.
However, this, of course, does not mean that we have reason to give up on the TAVKR and postpone the decision to build a new ship of this type for another 10 years. And there are at least three reasons for this.
The first of these is that the aircraft carrier today is one of the most important factors providing cover for the deployment areas of our SSBNs - the marine component of the nuclear triad. The TAVKR carrier-based aviation is able to provide the best response time to attempts by NATO patrol aircraft to approach and enter these areas. But in its present form, TAVKR has rather limited possibilities of air and surface lighting. In fact, it can only rely on reconnaissance carried out with the help of its radio engineering complex and deck fighters, of which the Su-33 have a good range, but outdated avionics, and the MiG-29K is still limited in range. And in any case, the use of reconnaissance multifunctional fighters not only weakens the capabilities of TAWS, "pulling" combat aircraft to perform tasks not inherent to them, but does not provide the quality of reconnaissance that can be provided by the DRLO and EW deck aircraft. In other words, one of the most important functions of a modern aircraft carrier is informational, but here in this very question, the capabilities of a TAVKR “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov” are very weak. And the absence of a catapult launch, unfortunately, does not allow to base on it aircraft capable of effectively controlling the sea and airspace.
The second reason is that, having only one aircraft carrier, it is almost impossible to conduct systematic training for deck aviation pilots. Yes, in the Russian Federation there is a very high-quality “simulator of air decks” NITKA, but it, with all its advantages (and if it is repaired, of course) cannot be replaced by an aircraft carrier. It provides only the initial training of pilots, making it easier for them to adapt to the deck and reduce the risk of accidents for them, but that’s basically all. And it turns out that any long-term repair of a ship leads to the loss of its wing, so that when returning to service TAVKR to restore its combat capability takes long months, resulting in periods of time in which TAVKR is really effective, are significantly reduced.
The third reason largely follows from the second. The aircraft carrier in peacetime has a value that is almost more than in the military, being an excellent political argument and a means of projecting power in areas remote from our borders. One can argue with this thesis for a long time, one can ignore it, but its truth does not change at all. One can argue for a long time that one or two TAVKRs are no match for the top ten American supercarriers, that our fleet is not capable of equal resistance to the US Navy even at our borders, let alone in remote areas. But even small forces can make a big difference by being deployed in the right place at the right time. So, for example, at the beginning of the 70 of the USSR Navy, it was also strongly inferior to the American, not to mention the combined power of the NATO fleets, and our detachment of ships in the Indian Ocean could not pose a particular threat to American forces. But, nevertheless, when the next Indo-Pakistani conflict began, the active support of the warships of the USSR brought us great political dividends. Vice Admiral V.S. Kruglyakov later recalled:
Of course, someone can say that at that time, in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy did a good deal without aircraft carriers, and, of course, he would be right. But keep in mind that a modern aircraft carrier with multifunctional fighters on board is able to exert power not only on the fleet of “potential friends”, but also on land, which is extremely important today. Therefore, it is highly desirable for the Russian Federation to be able at any time to form a detachment of ships (albeit very small) headed by TAVKR, including aircraft capable of operating as drums, and direct the resulting aircraft carrier multipurpose group to where its presence is necessary. But today, having only one TAVKR in the fleet, we cannot count on it - the likelihood is that the TAVKR itself will be under repair, or its wing will not be fully operational at the time of such circumstances. This, in fact, happened during the last campaign of Kuznetsov to Syria, when "out of the blue" two planes were lost. Not that the event was very out of the ordinary (the same Americans had accidents and worse), but this could have been avoided if we had a fully operational flight group.
In general, the construction of a second TAVKR would largely solve these problems and minimize the time when there is not a single aircraft carrier at the disposal of the Navy. And ideally (hardly achievable in today's economic situation), the RF should have had a fleet of 3 TAVKRs, of which one will be under repair, one - of combat, and one more - either in the process of restoring combat readiness after repair, or in combat-ready state . As a matter of fact, it was these considerations that were once used to justify the need for 6 of such ships in the fleet, which would ensure that at least one (and for most part of the time are two) fully operational TAVKRs in the Pacific Fleet and SF, but of course, today a fleet of such numbers looks perfect fiction.
In order to avoid talking about the extremely high cost of building an aircraft carrier: there is no reason to believe that the creation of a TAVKR is somehow overwhelming for the national budget. Here are a couple of numbers: 2014, the general director of Nevskoye PKB, Sergei Vlasov, estimated the cost of building an aircraft carrier (depending on the performance characteristics) in 100-250 billion rubles, and the maximum assessment of the implementation of an aircraft carrier program (the entire program, the aircraft carrier itself should it was to be much cheaper) in open sources estimated at 400 billion rubles. maximum. In terms of prices at the end of 2018, even 400 billion are converted into 559 billion rubles. As you know, HPV 2011-2027 provides for the allocation of 19 trillion. rub. The fleet share, according to some data, will make 3,8 trillion. rub. But these funds, of course, will be allocated not all at once in 2018, but during all the 10 years of the program. Assuming that inflation in the period 2018-2027. will remain at the level of 4% per year (2017% was officially 2,72, 2018 was officially 2,89% from January to November) and money to the fleet will be issued evenly, then 3,8 trillion. rub. in prices 2018 g will be approximately 3,16 trillion. rub. and financing half of the aircraft carrier program (and no one is going to finance it entirely in the HPN 2018-2027) will total 8,83% of the total fleet re-equipment costs, including the construction of the aircraft carrier (more precisely, half of it) - 5,5%. Once again we will pay attention - not the total cost of maintaining the fleet, but only those allocated for the purchase of new military equipment and maintaining it in combat readiness.
Nevertheless, the prospects for building an aircraft carrier today are very vague, and the Ministry of Defense continues to "keep the intrigue." Back in 2014, reports began to appear on the resumption of work on the electromagnetic catapult: it must be said that in the USSR these works advanced so far that the question of replacing the steam catapults on the Ulyanovsk under construction with electromagnetic ones was raised. It seems that the supporters of the construction of the Russian aircraft carrier should have been happy, but alas - the news was not accompanied by news of the development of aircraft that could start with these catapults.
Our admirals no longer speak of aircraft carriers as "weapons aggression ”, on the contrary, their necessity for a balanced fleet is mentioned. The construction of a ship of this class is said to be a settled matter. For example, Viktor Bursuk, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy for Armaments, said at the end of November 2017 that: "We will begin the creation of a new generation aircraft carrier in the second program period of the state armament program." And he clarified that the second program period is from 2023 to 2028. You can also recall the words of the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Yuri Borisov: "Speaking specifically about aircraft-carrying cruisers, then (their development and tab are scheduled for) the end of the program." Alas, such promises have been heard for more than a dozen years, and if they were all fulfilled, today Russia would have much more aircraft carriers than tanks.
In fact, for the time being, there is no clarity as to whether any work on this ship (at least preparatory) is included in the new LG of 2018-2027. True, TASS 16 of this year, citing an unnamed source in the military-industrial complex, said that: "USC was instructed to submit its revised proposals (for an aircraft carrier - TASS note) before the end of the year) to the Russian Defense Ministry. One of the options, in particular, involves the construction of an aircraft carrier with a displacement of 75 thousand tons. " At the same time, if a positive decision is made on one of these projects, then the technical design of the ship will begin in 2019 g, and the bookmark may take place in 2021-2022. The source also confirmed that in the HPV 2018-2027's. laid the "seed funding" program to create a new aircraft carrier.
It seems that an unnamed source fully confirms the words of B. Bursuka, but there is very little specifics: “if you like ... then ... maybe”, and the USC answered the direct question about aircraft carriers with silence, not confirming, but not disproving this information. Also completely unknown is the type of new aircraft carrier, and the wildest rumors are circulating - from the monstrous supercarrier “Storm” in the 90-100 thousand tonnes of displacement to the carrier of the vertical take-off and landing aircraft, the development of which allegedly will also be financed under the LG-2018-2027. . There is an opinion that the ship will still be atomic, but it is based on the fact that once the draft design of the battleship Yamato ... Sorry, the destroyer Leader was approved from the nuclear power plant, then the aircraft carrier will be built with it. But this is just a consideration based on logical analysis, not a hard fact.
Thus, it can turn out in a very different way. On the one hand, an aircraft carrier is a status thing, and our president loves status things, and this inspires some optimism. On the other hand, it can easily happen that in the period from 2018 to 2023. work on an aircraft carrier will not go beyond the scope of pre-sketch design, or even go out, but then either the LG will be revised, or the president will go on a well-deserved rest (VV Putin may not go on 5 term, as in 2024. he will be 72 of the year), and even what will happen in the country after the change of power in the Kremlin, even Nostradamus could not have predicted.
Heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARKR) project 1144.2 - 3 units. (and 1 project 1144)
In the article devoted to missile cruisers, we already presented the characteristics of ships of this type, but still briefly recall the performance characteristics of the most modern TARKR Peter the Great: standard displacement 24 300 t, full - 26 190 t (according to other data - up to 28 000 t) , maximum speed 31 knots. with 140 000 horsepower, 14 000 miles on 30 knots. (limited by provisions stocks, as the cruiser is equipped with a nuclear power plant). Armament - 20 SIC "Granite", 94 heavy missiles (48 in the composition of the S-300F "Fort" and 46 in the composition of the S-300FM) 16 PU SAM "Dagger" (128 SAM), two-gun mount AK-130, 6 SPORT "Dirk", 10 * 533-mm TA (20 torpedoes or rocket-torpedoes "Waterfall"), 1 RBU-12000, 2 RBU-1000, 3 helicopter Ka-27. The crew consists of 744 people including 18 people. as part of the air group.
The remaining two ships differ slightly in displacement (presumably they are smaller by 200-300 t) and the composition of weapons. For example, on Admiral Nakhimov, the number of heavy missiles was not 94, but 96 missiles, since the ship was completed with two C-300F SAMs, moreover, instead of 12 “Daggers” launchers, 2 * 2 SAM systems “Osa-M” (40 launchers ). An even older “Admiral Lazarev”, in addition to the above, had 8 * 30-mm AK-630 rapid-response installations instead of 6. The Dirk “Dirk” and RBU-6000 instead of RBU-12000.
In contrast to the overwhelming majority of modern warships in general, and from all rocket-artillery ships, on TARKR, in addition to powerful weapons, there is also a constructive protection from the effects of enemy ammunition. Alas, the information about her is too scanty to get an idea of what exactly and how much it protects. According to some data (possibly incomplete) armor reserved:
1. Launcher PKR "Granit" - walls 100 mm (below the waterline - 70 mm) roof - 70 mm;
2. ГКП and БИП - side walls 100 mm, traverses 75 mm, roof 75 mm;
3. Helicopter hangar, fuel storage, ammunition cellars - walls 70 mm, roof 50 mm.
In total, four TARKRs were part of the national fleet. At the same time, the head Kirov entered service in 1980 and left it relatively young - in 2002, after which it began to be prepared for recycling. Then, however, they came to their senses, returned to the fleet (the ship was in a state of disrepair, but still) and were going to modernize. Alas, as often happens, good intentions were not enough, and in 2015, the final decision was made to dispose of the cruiser.
The second and third TARKR - “Frunze” (later - “Admiral Lazarev”) and “Kalinin” (“Admiral Nakhimov”) were commissioned, respectively, in 1984 and 1988. Alas, in the era of “wild 90-x” money for their maintenance and timely repair was not found, and the ships stopped at berths. At the same time, “Admiral Lazarev”, closer to the 2000 years, was wanted to be completely utilized, and “Admiral Nakhimov” in 1999 g was formally sent for modernization, but in fact - in sludge. At about the same time (1998), it was finally possible to finish building the fourth TARKR, Peter the Great - that was the only representative of nuclear cruisers in the Russian Navy and the "calling card" of our Northern Fleet.
In the first decade of the 2000-s, the status quo described above was preserved, but then the era of the HPVs of the 2011-2020 years came. The political need for large ships capable of displaying the flag and representing the interests of the Russian Federation in the oceans was realized very well, but the number of cruisers, destroyers and BOD capable of going to sea was reduced not by day but by hour. Therefore, it is not surprising that the question of modernization at that time of not so old TARKR was on the agenda. In spite of the fact that the return of all four TARKRs to the existing fleet was formally considered, the decision that the third ship of the Admiral Nakhimov series will be the first to be upgraded spoke of quite a lot. When in 2013 there were reports of a contract for the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov, it was also announced that repairs and modernization would take 5 years, and that Nakhimov would return to the existing fleet in 2018. However, by this time the fourth TARKR, “Peter the Great”, would have already served 20 years, and, obviously, would require serious repair, which would make sense to combine with the modernization in the image and likeness of “Admiral Nakhimov”.
Since it was decidedly impossible to imagine that the country would be able to simultaneously conduct a deep modernization of two TARKRs, it turned out that even if the five-year modernization period was strictly observed, work on Admiral Lazarev could be started no earlier than 2023. And this, right let's say, could not have much meaning.
The fact is that the weapons installed on the TARKR according to the initial project are rapidly becoming obsolete both morally and physically. The same Granit anti-ship missiles are still quite formidable weapons, but they haven’t been manufactured for a long time, and those that have remained in warehouses have by no means endless expiration dates. The S-300F SAM was very good in the last century and has not lost its relevance today, but nevertheless it is the analogue of the land S-300PMU-1, which is significantly inferior to the new, more modern modifications of the S-300, and the S-400 has already been adopted in service 2020 ... In other words, it does not make sense to engage in simple restoration of the TARKR technical readiness after the 64, without a radical renewal of the composition of weapons. And to modernize it according to the Nakhimov type (with the installation of at least 80, and most likely 300 launchers for missiles of the Onyx, Caliber, Zircon families, the modernization of the S-2012F and the replacement of Daggers with Polyment- Redoubt ”) will be very expensive. The cost of upgrading Nakhimov was announced in 50 in the amount of 885 billion rubles, and this amount exceeded (not much, but nonetheless) the cost of building the newest nuclear submarine of the XNUMXM project Yasen-M.
So, if we evaluate on the scale of “cost / efficiency in a spherical vacuum,” then, instead of modernizing TARKR, it would be better to build nuclear submarines - if only because “Admiral Nakhimov” and “Peter the Great” will serve after the passage of years of 20-25, hardly more, but the same "Ash-M" may well "depart" under water years of 40. But we must understand that the fleet requires not only submarines, but also surface ships - carriers of long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles and powerful means of electronic reconnaissance. Thus, within the framework of the concept of a balanced fleet and in conditions of an extreme shortage of surface ships of the 1 rank, the modernization of two or three TARKR still seemed quite a reasonable decision.
However, according to recent data, the modernization of "Nakhimov" "left" right up to 2022 r - this "good news" was reported by the company's general director Mikhail Budnichenko at the Army-2018 forum. Thus, instead of the original 5 years, the cruiser will be upgraded for at least 9 - from 2013 to 2022. And even if shipbuilders, having “filled their hands” on Nakhimov, will be able to modernize Peter the Great in 6-7 years, in this case, the opportunity to start Lazarev will appear no earlier than 2028-2029, and By this time, his age will reach 44-45 years! Of course, there are advantages to the fact that the overwhelming part of this time the ship was preserved, but even if its modernization is technically possible (the hull does not collapse during the dismantling of old weapons), then there will be no point in it anymore.
This means that the information about maintaining “Admiral Lazarev” in a more or less good condition (2014 d dock repair) does not indicate that the ship will ever return to service, but only to prevent it from being flooded before the start of disposal ( which in itself is not a simple matter, requiring a separate project and a lot of money). Today, unfortunately, there are no other options left for Lazarev.
Missile cruisers (RKR) project 1164 - 3 units.
Displacement (standard / full) 9 300 / 11 300 t., Speed - 32 kn., Armament: 16 RCC "Basalt", 8 * 8 ZRK C-300F "Fort" (64 ZR), 2 * 2 -MA ”(48 ZUR), 1 * 2 130-mm AK-130, 6 30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533 torpedo tubes, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for Ka-27 helicopter.
In the previous article on missile cruisers, we expressed confidence that with proper care, all ships of this type would remain in service until their 45 anniversary. Considering the fact that Moscow "joined the fleet in 1983," Marshal Ustinov "- in 1986, and" Varyag "- in 1989, we assumed that these cruisers would plow the sea to 2028, 2031 and 2034. respectively. Alas, the latest news suggests that our forecasts turned out to be overly optimistic.
The first thing that needs to be said is that the equipment of the ships transferred to the fleet in the 80s of the last century is obviously outdated and does not meet today's requirements of naval combat. Accordingly, the RNR of the 1164 project in order to maintain combat capability requires a most serious modernization - and not to change the C-300F to "Redoubts", and "Volcanoes" to "Caliber" (they and the Vulkan anti-ship missiles will not find it so much), and to replace radar and radio equipment, communications, EW, etc. So, today, only Marshal Ustinov has undergone such modernization - and it is not too surprising that it lasted for five years (2011-2016).
The oldest of the three "Atlants", as the RNR of the 1164 project is called, the cruiser "Moscow" is now in very poor condition, with almost no speed. In an amicable way, the ship needs modernization in the volumes received by Marshal Ustinov, but a hitch came out.
The fact is that such modernization can be carried out only in the north, Moscow cannot get there by its own power, and nobody wants to tow it from the Black Sea in half the world. Of course, you can take and "patch up" the ship at the Sevastopol SRZ, returning his turn, which takes time from six months to a year, and a lot of money, since the 13-th SRH is simply not ready for such large-scale repairs for it - you will have to bring it to mind factory itself, and, of course, all this will cost more, and then still go to the "star", and ... what? If even a cruiser can arrive there in 2019, and its modernization will take, by analogy with Marshal Ustinov, 5 years, it turns out that he will finish it in 2024 g when he turns 41 year!
In general, the conduct of large-scale modernization of "Moscow" is a big question. And most likely things will be like this - the restoration of the technical readiness of “Moscow” at the Crimean enterprises will drag on for three years, after which it will be meaningless to talk about some kind of modernization, and they will pay for the ship moderately, that is, very soon it will require repair again. And either all this will turn into the next “repair epopee”, from which the ship will go to the scrap, or else it immediately, without torturing before dying, will be let into needles. Moreover, the other and newer cruiser of this project, the Varyag, is in dire need of modernization under the Marshal Ustinov scheme today.
Thus, if in the 2015 year we had 7 missile cruisers, of which TARKR (Kirov) had already decided to dispose, another 1 TARKR (Lazarev) was in a sludge, one TARKR (Nakhimov) and one RKR (“Marshal Ustinov”) were being repaired, and three missile cruisers — TARKR Peter the Great, Varyag, and Moscow — were in combat service, then the situation began to deteriorate as early as 2016 g - Ustinov went out of repair, but Here "Moscow", already practically incapable, did not get up for repairs. And now the fate of "Moscow" is not defined, "Varyag", in an amicable way, must be put on modernization, and it is very likely that only one of the 3 RRC project 1164 will remain in the lineup. And with the TARKR the situation will not improve, since as the Admiral Nakhimov is commissioned, the Peter the Great will immediately be upgraded, that is, we, as before, will have only one TARKR as part of the active fleet. That is, the situation is quite real, in which, formally having 6 missile cruisers (the Kirov should not be counted), we will have instead of three only two such ships in service.
But in fact, even worse options are possible. For example, in the news it was repeatedly said about the desire of our admirals to put "Peter the Great" on repairs even before Admiral Nakhimov came out of it - in 2020. This idea as a whole seemed to make sense, because, generally speaking, repair of "Peter the Great" oh how needed and they were going to start no later than 2018, when, according to initial estimates, "Nakhimov" was to return to the fleet. However, the timing of its transfer to the fleet left first before 2020-2021. - even in this case, the production of "Peter the Great" in 2020 would still make sense, because he could conduct much of the preparatory work for the repair in parallel with the finishing of "Nakhimov". But now the output of "Admiral Nakhimov" was transferred to 2022 g, and maybe further ... Will Peter the Great be able to serve before this date? Or is his technical condition such that he will be laid up in 2020 g no matter how long the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov will last? And then for several years in the structure of our fleet there will not be a single TARKR, and taking into account that Moscow will also be under repair, we will have exactly 4 2 cruisers on the 1164 fleet - all the other atomic and the only aircraft carrier will be stand in repairs or in sludge.
It may also happen that “Moscow” will go into long-term repair, and Varyag will not find money for a deep modernization (especially since in the situation described above, it will also be sent to upgrade it, reducing the number of cruisers in the fleet to only one). “Marshal Ustinov.” The scenario described above is good at least in the fact that with a general reduction in the number of our missile cruisers, we will still have four deeply modernized and fully combat-ready ships — the two TARKRs (Peter the Great and Admir l Nakhimov "and two RKRs (" Marshal Ustinov "and" Varyag "), although the last two will be close to the deadlines. But if there is no money for the" Varyag ", then with the same amount one of our ships as part of the fleet will be a museum rarity with radio-electronic systems half a century ago.
By the way, according to the latest data, they still undertook to repair "Moscow" in Sevastopol ... As for the money, it should be understood that the death of the floating dock PD-50 punched a huge hole in our military budget - this building was extremely necessary for the repair of ships of all classes (Often, several ships were driven there at the same time!) and now, left without this grand engineering structure, we will need to somehow compensate for its absence. This, of course, cannot but affect our other shipbuilding and ship repair plans.
As for the new ships of the class "missile cruiser", today destroyers of the type "Leader" appear as such. It is assumed that ships of this type will have a displacement occupying an intermediate position between the TARKR and RKR of the 1164 project, and in terms of the composition of their weapons they will only slightly concede to the modernized Nakhimov. According to recent news, the Russian Defense Ministry finally decided on the type of power plants for these ships - they will be nuclear.
By and large, the creation of such ships for the domestic fleet looks extremely dubious event, since the construction of a series of such "Yamato battleships" is quite comparable in cost to the implementation of the aircraft carrier program, while their combat effectiveness will be significantly less. Therefore, information that the creation of a technical project has been postponed to 2019-2022, after which the first ship of this type can be laid out ... Let's say that if our designers were now working hard on the 22350M project, which is the transformation of a frigate 22350 into a full-fledged 8 000 destroyer with a full displacement or even more, the news about the next shift to the right along the "Leaders" could only please. Building a series of ships on the project 22350M looks much more efficient investment, and much more useful fleet than a few "Leaders". However, according to recent data, all the rumors about 22350M remain rumors, the order for the development of this ship has not been heard, and the “Leaders” remain the only surface ships of 1 rank for which some work is being done. And although it can be stated with confidence that the destroyer program of the type “Leader” will end in a fiasco (the ship’s 2-3 will turn into an epic and extremely expensive unfinished), but ... We don’t seem to expect anything else.
To be continued ...
Heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser (TAVKR) project 1143.5 "Admiral of the fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" - 1 units.
Standard displacement (data in the sources differ) 45 900 - 46 540 t, full - 58 500 - 59 100 t., But in addition, the “largest” displacement is also referred to - 61 390 t. Speed (theoretically) 29 knots. at the power of the boiler-turbine power plant 200 000 hp The course range at a speed of 18 knots should have been 8 000 miles. The autonomy of stocks, provisions and drinking water - 45 days. Armament - up to 50 airplanes and helicopters, 12 PKR "Granit", 192 Zur "Dagger", 8 ZRAK "Dirk" and 8 30-mm installations AK-630М, jet defense system "Udav". Crew size - 2 600 people, including 500 people. Air Group.
In detail, the features of this ship were considered by us in three cycles devoted to the deck aircraft of this ship, the history of its construction and service, and comparing it with NATO aircraft carriers (the last article, where there are links to all the previous ones), so here we will not repeat, but we will immediately turn to the prospects of this class of ships in the Russian Navy.
Our only TAVKR was commissioned in 1991, thus, in 2018, it turned 27 on. This is not too old for large ships intended for home-based horizontal take-off and landing aircraft. So, for example, the US nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise, being introduced into the fleet in 1961, left the system only in 2012, that is, it served the 51 year. Among non-nuclear aircraft carriers there are also long-livers. Take, for example, the Midway CV-41 — comparing its service life with the Kuznetsov TAVKR is all the more interesting because ships have similar sizes — the Midway's standard displacement was 47 219 T, the full one is 59 901 T. So, Midway became part of the US Navy in 1945 and was only decommissioned in 1992. Thus, its service life reached 47 years. The much smaller aircraft carrier Foch joined the French fleet in 1963, and left it only after 37 in years, in 2000. But that’s the story, it could be said, was just beginning, since the ship didn’t leave for recycling , and, as appropriate, repaired, was transferred to Brazil, in the fleet of which remained the next 17 years.
Of course, our domestic TAVKR operated in much more difficult conditions than the American or French aircraft carriers. The North is not a joke, and the quality of operation (especially during the 90-s and the beginning of the 2000-s) was extremely far from American standards. But still, when carrying out the appropriate repairs, Kuznetsov TAVKR is quite capable of serving at least 45 years, that is, at least until 2036, or maybe even more.
However, this, of course, does not mean that we have reason to give up on the TAVKR and postpone the decision to build a new ship of this type for another 10 years. And there are at least three reasons for this.
The first of these is that the aircraft carrier today is one of the most important factors providing cover for the deployment areas of our SSBNs - the marine component of the nuclear triad. The TAVKR carrier-based aviation is able to provide the best response time to attempts by NATO patrol aircraft to approach and enter these areas. But in its present form, TAVKR has rather limited possibilities of air and surface lighting. In fact, it can only rely on reconnaissance carried out with the help of its radio engineering complex and deck fighters, of which the Su-33 have a good range, but outdated avionics, and the MiG-29K is still limited in range. And in any case, the use of reconnaissance multifunctional fighters not only weakens the capabilities of TAWS, "pulling" combat aircraft to perform tasks not inherent to them, but does not provide the quality of reconnaissance that can be provided by the DRLO and EW deck aircraft. In other words, one of the most important functions of a modern aircraft carrier is informational, but here in this very question, the capabilities of a TAVKR “Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov” are very weak. And the absence of a catapult launch, unfortunately, does not allow to base on it aircraft capable of effectively controlling the sea and airspace.
The second reason is that, having only one aircraft carrier, it is almost impossible to conduct systematic training for deck aviation pilots. Yes, in the Russian Federation there is a very high-quality “simulator of air decks” NITKA, but it, with all its advantages (and if it is repaired, of course) cannot be replaced by an aircraft carrier. It provides only the initial training of pilots, making it easier for them to adapt to the deck and reduce the risk of accidents for them, but that’s basically all. And it turns out that any long-term repair of a ship leads to the loss of its wing, so that when returning to service TAVKR to restore its combat capability takes long months, resulting in periods of time in which TAVKR is really effective, are significantly reduced.
The third reason largely follows from the second. The aircraft carrier in peacetime has a value that is almost more than in the military, being an excellent political argument and a means of projecting power in areas remote from our borders. One can argue with this thesis for a long time, one can ignore it, but its truth does not change at all. One can argue for a long time that one or two TAVKRs are no match for the top ten American supercarriers, that our fleet is not capable of equal resistance to the US Navy even at our borders, let alone in remote areas. But even small forces can make a big difference by being deployed in the right place at the right time. So, for example, at the beginning of the 70 of the USSR Navy, it was also strongly inferior to the American, not to mention the combined power of the NATO fleets, and our detachment of ships in the Indian Ocean could not pose a particular threat to American forces. But, nevertheless, when the next Indo-Pakistani conflict began, the active support of the warships of the USSR brought us great political dividends. Vice Admiral V.S. Kruglyakov later recalled:
“Later, Attache A. Popov told me that when the American unit led by Enterprise appeared near India, the Indian Defense Minister asked him to connect with the USSR Minister of Defense and expressed concern about the presence of Americans. A.A. Grechko immediately invited the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to his office. The one on the map talked about the forces and actions. After that, Grechko handed over to the Minister of Defense of India through our attache Popov: “The Enterprise” is our business, and let the Indians do their own work. ”This, of course, was a great support for India. The consequences of such a noble step towards us were very favorable for us. authority in India has grown immensely. ”
Of course, someone can say that at that time, in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy did a good deal without aircraft carriers, and, of course, he would be right. But keep in mind that a modern aircraft carrier with multifunctional fighters on board is able to exert power not only on the fleet of “potential friends”, but also on land, which is extremely important today. Therefore, it is highly desirable for the Russian Federation to be able at any time to form a detachment of ships (albeit very small) headed by TAVKR, including aircraft capable of operating as drums, and direct the resulting aircraft carrier multipurpose group to where its presence is necessary. But today, having only one TAVKR in the fleet, we cannot count on it - the likelihood is that the TAVKR itself will be under repair, or its wing will not be fully operational at the time of such circumstances. This, in fact, happened during the last campaign of Kuznetsov to Syria, when "out of the blue" two planes were lost. Not that the event was very out of the ordinary (the same Americans had accidents and worse), but this could have been avoided if we had a fully operational flight group.
In general, the construction of a second TAVKR would largely solve these problems and minimize the time when there is not a single aircraft carrier at the disposal of the Navy. And ideally (hardly achievable in today's economic situation), the RF should have had a fleet of 3 TAVKRs, of which one will be under repair, one - of combat, and one more - either in the process of restoring combat readiness after repair, or in combat-ready state . As a matter of fact, it was these considerations that were once used to justify the need for 6 of such ships in the fleet, which would ensure that at least one (and for most part of the time are two) fully operational TAVKRs in the Pacific Fleet and SF, but of course, today a fleet of such numbers looks perfect fiction.
In order to avoid talking about the extremely high cost of building an aircraft carrier: there is no reason to believe that the creation of a TAVKR is somehow overwhelming for the national budget. Here are a couple of numbers: 2014, the general director of Nevskoye PKB, Sergei Vlasov, estimated the cost of building an aircraft carrier (depending on the performance characteristics) in 100-250 billion rubles, and the maximum assessment of the implementation of an aircraft carrier program (the entire program, the aircraft carrier itself should it was to be much cheaper) in open sources estimated at 400 billion rubles. maximum. In terms of prices at the end of 2018, even 400 billion are converted into 559 billion rubles. As you know, HPV 2011-2027 provides for the allocation of 19 trillion. rub. The fleet share, according to some data, will make 3,8 trillion. rub. But these funds, of course, will be allocated not all at once in 2018, but during all the 10 years of the program. Assuming that inflation in the period 2018-2027. will remain at the level of 4% per year (2017% was officially 2,72, 2018 was officially 2,89% from January to November) and money to the fleet will be issued evenly, then 3,8 trillion. rub. in prices 2018 g will be approximately 3,16 trillion. rub. and financing half of the aircraft carrier program (and no one is going to finance it entirely in the HPN 2018-2027) will total 8,83% of the total fleet re-equipment costs, including the construction of the aircraft carrier (more precisely, half of it) - 5,5%. Once again we will pay attention - not the total cost of maintaining the fleet, but only those allocated for the purchase of new military equipment and maintaining it in combat readiness.
Nevertheless, the prospects for building an aircraft carrier today are very vague, and the Ministry of Defense continues to "keep the intrigue." Back in 2014, reports began to appear on the resumption of work on the electromagnetic catapult: it must be said that in the USSR these works advanced so far that the question of replacing the steam catapults on the Ulyanovsk under construction with electromagnetic ones was raised. It seems that the supporters of the construction of the Russian aircraft carrier should have been happy, but alas - the news was not accompanied by news of the development of aircraft that could start with these catapults.
Our admirals no longer speak of aircraft carriers as "weapons aggression ”, on the contrary, their necessity for a balanced fleet is mentioned. The construction of a ship of this class is said to be a settled matter. For example, Viktor Bursuk, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy for Armaments, said at the end of November 2017 that: "We will begin the creation of a new generation aircraft carrier in the second program period of the state armament program." And he clarified that the second program period is from 2023 to 2028. You can also recall the words of the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Yuri Borisov: "Speaking specifically about aircraft-carrying cruisers, then (their development and tab are scheduled for) the end of the program." Alas, such promises have been heard for more than a dozen years, and if they were all fulfilled, today Russia would have much more aircraft carriers than tanks.
In fact, for the time being, there is no clarity as to whether any work on this ship (at least preparatory) is included in the new LG of 2018-2027. True, TASS 16 of this year, citing an unnamed source in the military-industrial complex, said that: "USC was instructed to submit its revised proposals (for an aircraft carrier - TASS note) before the end of the year) to the Russian Defense Ministry. One of the options, in particular, involves the construction of an aircraft carrier with a displacement of 75 thousand tons. " At the same time, if a positive decision is made on one of these projects, then the technical design of the ship will begin in 2019 g, and the bookmark may take place in 2021-2022. The source also confirmed that in the HPV 2018-2027's. laid the "seed funding" program to create a new aircraft carrier.
It seems that an unnamed source fully confirms the words of B. Bursuka, but there is very little specifics: “if you like ... then ... maybe”, and the USC answered the direct question about aircraft carriers with silence, not confirming, but not disproving this information. Also completely unknown is the type of new aircraft carrier, and the wildest rumors are circulating - from the monstrous supercarrier “Storm” in the 90-100 thousand tonnes of displacement to the carrier of the vertical take-off and landing aircraft, the development of which allegedly will also be financed under the LG-2018-2027. . There is an opinion that the ship will still be atomic, but it is based on the fact that once the draft design of the battleship Yamato ... Sorry, the destroyer Leader was approved from the nuclear power plant, then the aircraft carrier will be built with it. But this is just a consideration based on logical analysis, not a hard fact.
Thus, it can turn out in a very different way. On the one hand, an aircraft carrier is a status thing, and our president loves status things, and this inspires some optimism. On the other hand, it can easily happen that in the period from 2018 to 2023. work on an aircraft carrier will not go beyond the scope of pre-sketch design, or even go out, but then either the LG will be revised, or the president will go on a well-deserved rest (VV Putin may not go on 5 term, as in 2024. he will be 72 of the year), and even what will happen in the country after the change of power in the Kremlin, even Nostradamus could not have predicted.
Heavy nuclear missile cruisers (TARKR) project 1144.2 - 3 units. (and 1 project 1144)
In the article devoted to missile cruisers, we already presented the characteristics of ships of this type, but still briefly recall the performance characteristics of the most modern TARKR Peter the Great: standard displacement 24 300 t, full - 26 190 t (according to other data - up to 28 000 t) , maximum speed 31 knots. with 140 000 horsepower, 14 000 miles on 30 knots. (limited by provisions stocks, as the cruiser is equipped with a nuclear power plant). Armament - 20 SIC "Granite", 94 heavy missiles (48 in the composition of the S-300F "Fort" and 46 in the composition of the S-300FM) 16 PU SAM "Dagger" (128 SAM), two-gun mount AK-130, 6 SPORT "Dirk", 10 * 533-mm TA (20 torpedoes or rocket-torpedoes "Waterfall"), 1 RBU-12000, 2 RBU-1000, 3 helicopter Ka-27. The crew consists of 744 people including 18 people. as part of the air group.
The remaining two ships differ slightly in displacement (presumably they are smaller by 200-300 t) and the composition of weapons. For example, on Admiral Nakhimov, the number of heavy missiles was not 94, but 96 missiles, since the ship was completed with two C-300F SAMs, moreover, instead of 12 “Daggers” launchers, 2 * 2 SAM systems “Osa-M” (40 launchers ). An even older “Admiral Lazarev”, in addition to the above, had 8 * 30-mm AK-630 rapid-response installations instead of 6. The Dirk “Dirk” and RBU-6000 instead of RBU-12000.
In contrast to the overwhelming majority of modern warships in general, and from all rocket-artillery ships, on TARKR, in addition to powerful weapons, there is also a constructive protection from the effects of enemy ammunition. Alas, the information about her is too scanty to get an idea of what exactly and how much it protects. According to some data (possibly incomplete) armor reserved:
1. Launcher PKR "Granit" - walls 100 mm (below the waterline - 70 mm) roof - 70 mm;
2. ГКП and БИП - side walls 100 mm, traverses 75 mm, roof 75 mm;
3. Helicopter hangar, fuel storage, ammunition cellars - walls 70 mm, roof 50 mm.
In total, four TARKRs were part of the national fleet. At the same time, the head Kirov entered service in 1980 and left it relatively young - in 2002, after which it began to be prepared for recycling. Then, however, they came to their senses, returned to the fleet (the ship was in a state of disrepair, but still) and were going to modernize. Alas, as often happens, good intentions were not enough, and in 2015, the final decision was made to dispose of the cruiser.
The second and third TARKR - “Frunze” (later - “Admiral Lazarev”) and “Kalinin” (“Admiral Nakhimov”) were commissioned, respectively, in 1984 and 1988. Alas, in the era of “wild 90-x” money for their maintenance and timely repair was not found, and the ships stopped at berths. At the same time, “Admiral Lazarev”, closer to the 2000 years, was wanted to be completely utilized, and “Admiral Nakhimov” in 1999 g was formally sent for modernization, but in fact - in sludge. At about the same time (1998), it was finally possible to finish building the fourth TARKR, Peter the Great - that was the only representative of nuclear cruisers in the Russian Navy and the "calling card" of our Northern Fleet.
Submarine in the steppes of Ukraine, you say? (In fact, "Peter the Great" is the Suez Canal, but the photo angle is such that the channel itself is not visible)
In the first decade of the 2000-s, the status quo described above was preserved, but then the era of the HPVs of the 2011-2020 years came. The political need for large ships capable of displaying the flag and representing the interests of the Russian Federation in the oceans was realized very well, but the number of cruisers, destroyers and BOD capable of going to sea was reduced not by day but by hour. Therefore, it is not surprising that the question of modernization at that time of not so old TARKR was on the agenda. In spite of the fact that the return of all four TARKRs to the existing fleet was formally considered, the decision that the third ship of the Admiral Nakhimov series will be the first to be upgraded spoke of quite a lot. When in 2013 there were reports of a contract for the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov, it was also announced that repairs and modernization would take 5 years, and that Nakhimov would return to the existing fleet in 2018. However, by this time the fourth TARKR, “Peter the Great”, would have already served 20 years, and, obviously, would require serious repair, which would make sense to combine with the modernization in the image and likeness of “Admiral Nakhimov”.
Since it was decidedly impossible to imagine that the country would be able to simultaneously conduct a deep modernization of two TARKRs, it turned out that even if the five-year modernization period was strictly observed, work on Admiral Lazarev could be started no earlier than 2023. And this, right let's say, could not have much meaning.
The fact is that the weapons installed on the TARKR according to the initial project are rapidly becoming obsolete both morally and physically. The same Granit anti-ship missiles are still quite formidable weapons, but they haven’t been manufactured for a long time, and those that have remained in warehouses have by no means endless expiration dates. The S-300F SAM was very good in the last century and has not lost its relevance today, but nevertheless it is the analogue of the land S-300PMU-1, which is significantly inferior to the new, more modern modifications of the S-300, and the S-400 has already been adopted in service 2020 ... In other words, it does not make sense to engage in simple restoration of the TARKR technical readiness after the 64, without a radical renewal of the composition of weapons. And to modernize it according to the Nakhimov type (with the installation of at least 80, and most likely 300 launchers for missiles of the Onyx, Caliber, Zircon families, the modernization of the S-2012F and the replacement of Daggers with Polyment- Redoubt ”) will be very expensive. The cost of upgrading Nakhimov was announced in 50 in the amount of 885 billion rubles, and this amount exceeded (not much, but nonetheless) the cost of building the newest nuclear submarine of the XNUMXM project Yasen-M.
So, if we evaluate on the scale of “cost / efficiency in a spherical vacuum,” then, instead of modernizing TARKR, it would be better to build nuclear submarines - if only because “Admiral Nakhimov” and “Peter the Great” will serve after the passage of years of 20-25, hardly more, but the same "Ash-M" may well "depart" under water years of 40. But we must understand that the fleet requires not only submarines, but also surface ships - carriers of long-range anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles and powerful means of electronic reconnaissance. Thus, within the framework of the concept of a balanced fleet and in conditions of an extreme shortage of surface ships of the 1 rank, the modernization of two or three TARKR still seemed quite a reasonable decision.
However, according to recent data, the modernization of "Nakhimov" "left" right up to 2022 r - this "good news" was reported by the company's general director Mikhail Budnichenko at the Army-2018 forum. Thus, instead of the original 5 years, the cruiser will be upgraded for at least 9 - from 2013 to 2022. And even if shipbuilders, having “filled their hands” on Nakhimov, will be able to modernize Peter the Great in 6-7 years, in this case, the opportunity to start Lazarev will appear no earlier than 2028-2029, and By this time, his age will reach 44-45 years! Of course, there are advantages to the fact that the overwhelming part of this time the ship was preserved, but even if its modernization is technically possible (the hull does not collapse during the dismantling of old weapons), then there will be no point in it anymore.
This means that the information about maintaining “Admiral Lazarev” in a more or less good condition (2014 d dock repair) does not indicate that the ship will ever return to service, but only to prevent it from being flooded before the start of disposal ( which in itself is not a simple matter, requiring a separate project and a lot of money). Today, unfortunately, there are no other options left for Lazarev.
Missile cruisers (RKR) project 1164 - 3 units.
Displacement (standard / full) 9 300 / 11 300 t., Speed - 32 kn., Armament: 16 RCC "Basalt", 8 * 8 ZRK C-300F "Fort" (64 ZR), 2 * 2 -MA ”(48 ZUR), 1 * 2 130-mm AK-130, 6 30-mm AK-630, 2 * 5 533 torpedo tubes, 2 RBU-6000, hangar for Ka-27 helicopter.
In the previous article on missile cruisers, we expressed confidence that with proper care, all ships of this type would remain in service until their 45 anniversary. Considering the fact that Moscow "joined the fleet in 1983," Marshal Ustinov "- in 1986, and" Varyag "- in 1989, we assumed that these cruisers would plow the sea to 2028, 2031 and 2034. respectively. Alas, the latest news suggests that our forecasts turned out to be overly optimistic.
The first thing that needs to be said is that the equipment of the ships transferred to the fleet in the 80s of the last century is obviously outdated and does not meet today's requirements of naval combat. Accordingly, the RNR of the 1164 project in order to maintain combat capability requires a most serious modernization - and not to change the C-300F to "Redoubts", and "Volcanoes" to "Caliber" (they and the Vulkan anti-ship missiles will not find it so much), and to replace radar and radio equipment, communications, EW, etc. So, today, only Marshal Ustinov has undergone such modernization - and it is not too surprising that it lasted for five years (2011-2016).
The oldest of the three "Atlants", as the RNR of the 1164 project is called, the cruiser "Moscow" is now in very poor condition, with almost no speed. In an amicable way, the ship needs modernization in the volumes received by Marshal Ustinov, but a hitch came out.
The fact is that such modernization can be carried out only in the north, Moscow cannot get there by its own power, and nobody wants to tow it from the Black Sea in half the world. Of course, you can take and "patch up" the ship at the Sevastopol SRZ, returning his turn, which takes time from six months to a year, and a lot of money, since the 13-th SRH is simply not ready for such large-scale repairs for it - you will have to bring it to mind factory itself, and, of course, all this will cost more, and then still go to the "star", and ... what? If even a cruiser can arrive there in 2019, and its modernization will take, by analogy with Marshal Ustinov, 5 years, it turns out that he will finish it in 2024 g when he turns 41 year!
In general, the conduct of large-scale modernization of "Moscow" is a big question. And most likely things will be like this - the restoration of the technical readiness of “Moscow” at the Crimean enterprises will drag on for three years, after which it will be meaningless to talk about some kind of modernization, and they will pay for the ship moderately, that is, very soon it will require repair again. And either all this will turn into the next “repair epopee”, from which the ship will go to the scrap, or else it immediately, without torturing before dying, will be let into needles. Moreover, the other and newer cruiser of this project, the Varyag, is in dire need of modernization under the Marshal Ustinov scheme today.
Thus, if in the 2015 year we had 7 missile cruisers, of which TARKR (Kirov) had already decided to dispose, another 1 TARKR (Lazarev) was in a sludge, one TARKR (Nakhimov) and one RKR (“Marshal Ustinov”) were being repaired, and three missile cruisers — TARKR Peter the Great, Varyag, and Moscow — were in combat service, then the situation began to deteriorate as early as 2016 g - Ustinov went out of repair, but Here "Moscow", already practically incapable, did not get up for repairs. And now the fate of "Moscow" is not defined, "Varyag", in an amicable way, must be put on modernization, and it is very likely that only one of the 3 RRC project 1164 will remain in the lineup. And with the TARKR the situation will not improve, since as the Admiral Nakhimov is commissioned, the Peter the Great will immediately be upgraded, that is, we, as before, will have only one TARKR as part of the active fleet. That is, the situation is quite real, in which, formally having 6 missile cruisers (the Kirov should not be counted), we will have instead of three only two such ships in service.
But in fact, even worse options are possible. For example, in the news it was repeatedly said about the desire of our admirals to put "Peter the Great" on repairs even before Admiral Nakhimov came out of it - in 2020. This idea as a whole seemed to make sense, because, generally speaking, repair of "Peter the Great" oh how needed and they were going to start no later than 2018, when, according to initial estimates, "Nakhimov" was to return to the fleet. However, the timing of its transfer to the fleet left first before 2020-2021. - even in this case, the production of "Peter the Great" in 2020 would still make sense, because he could conduct much of the preparatory work for the repair in parallel with the finishing of "Nakhimov". But now the output of "Admiral Nakhimov" was transferred to 2022 g, and maybe further ... Will Peter the Great be able to serve before this date? Or is his technical condition such that he will be laid up in 2020 g no matter how long the modernization of Admiral Nakhimov will last? And then for several years in the structure of our fleet there will not be a single TARKR, and taking into account that Moscow will also be under repair, we will have exactly 4 2 cruisers on the 1164 fleet - all the other atomic and the only aircraft carrier will be stand in repairs or in sludge.
It may also happen that “Moscow” will go into long-term repair, and Varyag will not find money for a deep modernization (especially since in the situation described above, it will also be sent to upgrade it, reducing the number of cruisers in the fleet to only one). “Marshal Ustinov.” The scenario described above is good at least in the fact that with a general reduction in the number of our missile cruisers, we will still have four deeply modernized and fully combat-ready ships — the two TARKRs (Peter the Great and Admir l Nakhimov "and two RKRs (" Marshal Ustinov "and" Varyag "), although the last two will be close to the deadlines. But if there is no money for the" Varyag ", then with the same amount one of our ships as part of the fleet will be a museum rarity with radio-electronic systems half a century ago.
By the way, according to the latest data, they still undertook to repair "Moscow" in Sevastopol ... As for the money, it should be understood that the death of the floating dock PD-50 punched a huge hole in our military budget - this building was extremely necessary for the repair of ships of all classes (Often, several ships were driven there at the same time!) and now, left without this grand engineering structure, we will need to somehow compensate for its absence. This, of course, cannot but affect our other shipbuilding and ship repair plans.
As for the new ships of the class "missile cruiser", today destroyers of the type "Leader" appear as such. It is assumed that ships of this type will have a displacement occupying an intermediate position between the TARKR and RKR of the 1164 project, and in terms of the composition of their weapons they will only slightly concede to the modernized Nakhimov. According to recent news, the Russian Defense Ministry finally decided on the type of power plants for these ships - they will be nuclear.
By and large, the creation of such ships for the domestic fleet looks extremely dubious event, since the construction of a series of such "Yamato battleships" is quite comparable in cost to the implementation of the aircraft carrier program, while their combat effectiveness will be significantly less. Therefore, information that the creation of a technical project has been postponed to 2019-2022, after which the first ship of this type can be laid out ... Let's say that if our designers were now working hard on the 22350M project, which is the transformation of a frigate 22350 into a full-fledged 8 000 destroyer with a full displacement or even more, the news about the next shift to the right along the "Leaders" could only please. Building a series of ships on the project 22350M looks much more efficient investment, and much more useful fleet than a few "Leaders". However, according to recent data, all the rumors about 22350M remain rumors, the order for the development of this ship has not been heard, and the “Leaders” remain the only surface ships of 1 rank for which some work is being done. And although it can be stated with confidence that the destroyer program of the type “Leader” will end in a fiasco (the ship’s 2-3 will turn into an epic and extremely expensive unfinished), but ... We don’t seem to expect anything else.
To be continued ...
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