The cruiser "Varangian". Fight at Chemulpo January 27, 1904. Part 21. Conclusion
In the final article of the cycle, we will bring together all the basic facts and conclusions that we have made in previous materials.
History the cruiser "Varyag" began in a highly strange way: the contract with C. Crump (from our side was signed by the head of the GUKiS, Vice Admiral V. P. Verhovsky) was signed on April 11 on April 1898, outside of the official competition competitive projects of other foreign firms. At the same time, in essence, C. Crump did not submit any draft cruiser at all: the contract implied that the American industrialist would create such a project based on the specification, which, however, should be agreed upon after the contract was signed. The contract itself contained only a preliminary specification of the most general nature, while it contained a lot of shortcomings: discrepancies in the English and Russian texts of documents, vague wording, arithmetic errors, and - most strangely - the document contained direct violations of the requirements of the Maritime Technical Committee (ITC). And finally, the cost of the contract and the procedure for determining supercontract payments were unprofitable for Russia and, subsequently, raised questions from the state controller, senator T. I. Filippov, which the Maritime Office could not answer in any satisfactory manner. In general, it can be stated that the contract with the American industrialist was drafted extremely illiterate.
One of the major violations was the permission to use Nikloss system boilers on the new cruiser, while the MTK insisted on Belleville boilers. In fact, the requirements of the Maritime Department for the latest cruisers could not be met with Belleville boilers, and, subsequently, the MTK was forced to abandon this requirement - both Askold and Bogatyr were equipped with boilers of other systems (Schulz-Tonikroft, Norman) , but MTK strongly objected to Nikloss's boilers, considering them unreliable. Unfortunately, experts were late, and the ban on the use of Nikloss boilers in the Russian imperial navy It was signed three days later than the contracts for the construction of Retvisan and Varyag. In this matter, Vice Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky acted on his own initiative and contrary to the requirements of the MTK: however, in fairness it should be noted that at that time there was no reliable evidence of the flawed design of Nikloss boilers. MTK came to its conclusions not from operating experience, but based on a theoretical analysis of the design.
In fact, the history of operation of the Nikloss boilers is very peculiar, because individual ships that received boilers of this type went quite successfully to the seas (at least - at first) - in other cases, the operation of such boilers led to numerous accidents. This usually makes a conclusion about insufficient qualifications of machine teams, but our analysis shows that another interpretation is possible - the Nicloss boilers required such a jewelery fitting of parts (removable tubes to the collectors), which if could be ensured, only at the best enterprises in the world . At the same time, the Varyag boilers were produced by an American enterprise, which had not been engaged in Nicloss boilers before. This, and the fact that the American fleet immediately abandoned the Nikloss boilers immediately after obtaining a minimum operating experience, and subsequently converted five of the seven ships, originally built with Nikloss boilers, to other brands, indicates that the problems nevertheless, they are much more connected with the boilers of Russian ships not with the professionalism of the crew, but with their low quality, boilers, and manufacturing. Well, in those cases where the boilers of Niklossa were manufactured at first-class European factories, at least at first they worked quite stably.
The design flaws of the Varyag boilers, unfortunately, were complemented by the unsuccessful adjustment of its machines. They worked stably only at high vapor pressure (15,4 of the atmosphere), otherwise the low pressure cylinders did not perform their function - instead of rotating the crankshaft, which set the ship's propellers, they themselves were set in motion by the crankshaft. Naturally, similar stresses were not foreseen by the structure, which is why the bearings and other structural elements of the cruiser steam engines quickly loosened. As a result, a vicious circle was formed - it was dangerous to operate the Nicloss boilers, creating a large vapor pressure, and with a small car, it gradually destroyed itself. According to the opinion of the most experienced engineer I.I. Gippius, who studied in detail the Varyag cars in Port Arthur:
Unfortunately, all these circumstances were not revealed when the ship was handed over to the fleet. It is difficult to say whether this was due to the mistakes of the selection committee, or the result of the pressure of Charles Krump, who was striving not to stick to the spirit, but to the letter of the contract. The other “six thousand meter” cruiser “Askold” was not accepted by the commission until it had developed the speed set by the contract, without having any damage in the car, but in the case of “Varyag” it was not done: the fact of achieving a contract speed, despite the fact that after that his power plant needed substantial repairs.
As a result, the service of the cruiser Varyag turned into endless torment with a power plant: so, during the transition from Philadelphia to Russia and further, the cruiser had 102 running days for Port Arthur, but it took at least 73 of the day to provide them repairs at parking lots and in ports, and this is not counting the repair that was carried out at sea during the crossings (and that was done, the cruiser went to the part of the boilers, the rest were repaired). Nothing like this was observed on the ships of the national fleet of French or Russian construction. After arriving in Port Arthur, the cruiser immediately got up for repair: in 1902, after leaving the armed reserve, the squadron of the Pacific Ocean was engaged in combat training for 9 months, and Varyag spent almost half of this time in repairs and as a great personal yacht Prince Kirill Vladimirovich (who decided to visit Taku). In 1903, the situation was even worse - while the squadron during 7 months (from March to September) was intensively trained, Varyag underwent various tests for the first 3,5 months to determine the success of winter repairs, as well as the endless overhaul of mechanisms (engineer II Gippius was working on the cruiser just at this time). The following 3,5 of the month the cruiser stood in the repair, which ended, alas, as unsuccessfully as the previous ones - Varyag could consistently maintain speeds no higher than 16-17 nodes, could briefly develop 20, but with the risk of boilers crashing or damage to the machines. When "Varyag", finally, came out of repair, the review started, which the vicegerent EI gave the squadron Alekseev: there were many boat exercises during the last, but there was almost no combat training. As if all this was not enough, at the end of 1903 from the cruiser (as well as from other ships of the squadron), many old servicemen were demobilized, including almost half of the gunners.
In general, it can be stated that by the time of leaving Chemulpo, the cruiser Varyag was a low-speed (even Pallada and Diane lost) cruiser with a rastrenirovannym crew. Despite the fact that V.I. Rem, and who replaced him as commander of the Varyag cruiser VF Rudnev, made great efforts to prepare the commanders, the endless downtime in repairs, especially during the 1903 campaign, in which the cruiser practically did not participate, led to the fact that the Varyag, in terms of the quality of the training of the artillerymen, was much inferior to the other squadron ships.
Unlike most of the remaining ships of the squadron, the cruiser was not withdrawn to an armed reserve and at the end of 1903 he was sent as stationary to the Korean port of Chemulpo, where he arrived on December 29 - less than a month remained before the famous battle.
Having come to Chemulpo VF Rudnev landed in the information vacuum. Politically, and at the highest level, the situation was as follows: Russia was not ready to start the war in 1904, and this was realized by everyone, including the tsar and his governor Alekseev. Korea was considered not as an independent state, but only as a battleground of Japanese and Russian interests — and also other European and Asian powers saw it. Therefore, if the Japanese began annexing Korea without declaring war on Russia, it was decided to put up with it and not hinder it — such instructions were received by the commander of the cruiser Varyag, which was directly forbidden from interfering with the Japanese landing.
Soon after the arrival of VF Rudnev discovered numerous evidences that the Japanese are going to land the troops in Chemulpo, and regularly reported on the authorities, without, however, receiving any additional instructions. He did not even bother to report the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, although such rumors reached, but the Russian envoy to Korea, A.I. Pavlov did not confirm them. V.F. Rudnev seemed much better than the envoy felt the danger of the situation and offered to leave Korea, but A.I. Pavlov did not agree to this either, dissuading the lack of instructions.
Since, due to the absence of orders to the Russian commanders and diplomats, there was a feeling that the Japanese were intercepting VF’s telegrams. Rudnev and A.I. Pavlov, a Korean was sent to Port Arthur with a report. By chance, the gunboat moved to the sea just when the Japanese squadron approached Chemulpo with a landing force - they collided at the exit from the territorial waters, which caused some confusion among the Japanese who did not know what to do - they would have sunk the Korean, he would meet they are at sea, but because of the raid, foreign stationary officers did not do this. "Asama" failed, maneuvering so as to be between the "Korean" and the transport with the landing force, which, apparently, was perceived by the commander of the cannon-ship, GP Belyaev as an attempt to block his access to the sea. “Korean” turned on the raid, and at that time was attacked by Japanese destroyers, operating without orders - during a short skirmish (two torpedoes were fired, the cannon boat responded with two projectiles) the Japanese destroyer “Tsubame” suffered, not calculating the maneuver and taking off for the stones , as a result of which its screws were damaged, limiting the speed of the ship to 12 units.
The charges V.F. Rudnev in that he did not support the “Korean” with fire and did not prevent the landing of the Japanese landing force by force, are completely groundless. The cruisers could not see the use of torpedoes by the Japanese and could only hear the shots of the “Korean”, and this was not a significant reason for the immediate opening of fire: if the “Korean” had entered the battle, he would continue to shoot, but that wasn’t not threatened. A pair of small-caliber shots could be warning, or even made by mistake. The Varyag commander simply did not have the right to interfere with the Japanese landing - he was instructed not to interfere with the landing party. In addition, he did not have the physical ability to do this - by the time GP G. arrived at the Varyag. Belyaev reported on the torpedo attack, four Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad had already entered the raid and were stationed in close proximity to the Russian ships.
In other words, it was not required to open fire to protect the "Korean", since by that time, as it could be done, the gunboat was not in danger. But if the "Varyag" still started shooting, it would lead to the violation of V.F. Rudnev received the order, the violation of the neutrality of Korea and the war with Japan, which was absolutely not profitable for Russia, moreover, was fraught with complications in international politics, since it threatened the foreign stationary on Chemulpo raid. In addition, in the case of the discovery of fire, both Russian ships would have been very quickly destroyed without any benefit, since they were under the gun of the destroyers and the squadron of S. Uriou entering the raid.
Of course, shooting torpedoes at a Russian warship should not go unpunished, but in this case, the leadership of the Russian Empire, but not the commander of the 1 cruiser, should determine the “penalty”.
The battle between “Varyag” and “Koreyets” with the Japanese squadron took place the next day - in fact, with V.F. Rudnev still remained evening and night in order to take some action. However, he had no choice - he could not attack the Japanese transports for the reasons mentioned above, and he could not leave the raid, as he was under the gun of the Japanese destroyers who could sink Russian ships immediately, or escort them to the exit from international waters in order to immediately destroy them as soon as the latter leave neutral territory. Numerous alternative scenarios of the night breakthrough of the “Varyag” “sin” by one assumption - that such a breakthrough will take the Japanese squadron by surprise, and it will not be ready for battle. Today, from the reports and orders of the Japanese commanders, we know for sure that there was nothing like this - Sotokichi Uriu feared not only and not so much Russian stationary as the possibility of an approach of additional Russian forces from Port Arthur and was ready for anything.
In other words, it turned out that if the Japanese were not ready to start the war and destroy the Russian ships, then the flight from the raid was completely unnecessary, and would have looked like cowardice, and if the Japanese were ready to fight, it would lead to the death of the Russian ships with a minimum chance of causing damage to the enemy. And yes, most likely, when trying to break through, the Russians would be accused of violating neutrality in the roadstead. It must be said that Commodore Bailey quite unequivocally brought Vsevolod Fyodorovich the position of England in this matter - he considered landing troops as an internal matter of the Japanese and Koreans, which should not be interfered with by the third powers, but was ready to immediately shoot at any ship that violated neutrality on the roadstead.
In this situation, V.F. Rudneva, in essence, had no choice but to wait for the dawn, but he brought the unkind news. The commander of the French cruiser Pascal, Victor-Baptist Senees, arrived in 08.00 on board the Varyag, with a notification from the Japanese admiral about the start of hostilities, which also contained a proposal to foreign ships to leave Chemulpo to 16.00 to avoid misunderstandings. If before the end of this period, "Varyag" and "Korean" do not come out on a breakthrough, S. Uriu assumed to attack and destroy them right in the raid.
The similar decision of the Japanese admiral did not leave V.F. Rudnev other choice, just go into battle.
Having studied the combat plan drawn up by S. Uriu, we understand that it was completely pointless to stay on the roadstead. In this case, the Japanese were going to enter "Asamu", "Akashi" and "Niytaku" on the fairway, and, stopping a few kilometers from the "Varyag", shoot both Russian ships as exercises. It was all the more simple because the Russian cruiser and gunboat could not maneuver in a narrow roadstead, and at a distance of more than two miles the armor of the “Assam” would remain completely invulnerable for the 152-mm guns of the Varyag and for the eight-inch Korean. At the same time, if Varyag tried to rush to the fairway for rapprochement with the enemy, it was met by a detachment of destroyers accompanying the Japanese cruisers — obviously, it would not be difficult for them to undermine the cruiser, which by that time would have been badly damaged by artillery fire.
But S. Uriu could not get involved in an artillery battle at all, but wait until dark, and then send Chemulpo destroyers to the raid. The statistics of night battles shows that few ships on an alien raid without covering the coastal defense (the absence of stationary searchlights was especially important) and not having the ability to maneuver while moving at least along the middle course would have become easy targets for Japanese mines sailors in the reflection of the mine attacks of the Japanese at Port Arthur, etc. are due to the factors listed above). In other words, by taking a day battle in the roadstead, Varyag lost its ability to maneuver, without gaining anything in return, and there was practically no chance of surviving the night mine attack. Thus, there was absolutely no point in staying on the raid - it was necessary to go out and fight.
The Japanese squadron had a huge advantage in strength, only the "Asama" was stronger than the "Varyag" and "Korean" combined, despite the fact that "Varyag", that with a gunboat, that without it had no advantage in speed. Thus, with some correct actions of the Japanese, a breakthrough into the sea was impossible. Analyzing the actions of V.F. Rudnev in battle, we can assume that, declaring that the cruiser will go for a breakthrough, the commander of the "Varyag" decided not to make "an attempt to break at any cost", but to join the battle and continue to act according to circumstances, having the main goal to go into the open the sea past the Japanese squadron, and if it is impossible to do so, inflict maximum damage to the Japanese.
V.F. Rudnev could not throw in the Chemulpo gunboat "Korean", despite the fact that the latter had the speed of all 13,5 nodes. It was not in the tradition of the Russian fleet to leave comrades in a similar situation, and besides, one should not forget that the two 203-mm guns of the gunboat were, in fact, the only trump card of VF Rudnev, especially since the Korean, in contrast to his cruiser, had already taken part in the battle (Taku forts). It was to be feared that the Japanese could block the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), maneuvering at a slow pace near the island, and in this case, if you could bring the canlarok at a sufficiently close distance, you could hope to inflict considerable damage on the Japanese. Strictly speaking, if in the hands of the Russians there was some kind of means that would give at least a shadow of a chance to force the Japanese to retreat, giving access to the fairway (if they had blocked it), then they were eight-inches of "Korean".
"Varyag" and "Koreyets" left the raid and entered the battle. V.F. Rudnev led his ships at a low speed, which many people blame for him today (they don’t go at such a speed with that speed!), But thanks to that the Varyag commander secured serious tactical advantages. First, he covered himself about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) from the main forces of the Japanese squadron, so that during the first quarter of an hour the fight, in fact, boiled down to the bout of “Assam” and “Varyag”. Secondly, not allowing the fire to focus on their ships, he led the island to “Koreyets”, where his eight-inch began to reach the enemy. And, thirdly, going at low speed, he provided the “most favored mode” to his gunners, because before the Russian-Japanese war, artillery exercises were usually carried out on 9-11 nodes.
Strangely enough, the release of the Russian stationaries took the Japanese by surprise, but in a matter of minutes they broke the anchor and went into battle. According to the plan of the cruiser S. Uriu, having divided into 3 squadron, they were to disperse over the water area towards the Eastern Channel and, thus, create a layered defense against a breakthrough in this direction - while (apparently) u o Phalmido (Yodolmi) will not let Varyag pass to the western channel. However, the small move "Varyag" played a cruel joke with the Japanese - they are too drawn to the Eastern channel, opening the passage to the Western channel, and V.F. Rudnev, apparently tried to take advantage of this. Having traversed the island, he turned to the right - not that this maneuver gave him real chances for a breakthrough, but the Japanese, in order to intercept the Varyag, would have to intercept, shutting and interfering with each other, while some of them ships could only fire from the nose-guns, while the Varyag could respond to them with undamaged guns, which had not participated in the starboard before that time.
However, it was here that an unfortunate incident intervened, crumpling the plans of the Russian commander. We, unfortunately, will never know what exactly happened in reality. According to VF Rudneva, a Japanese projectile broke the pipe where the steering gears were passing, but the Japanese, who had inspected the cruiser during its rise, claimed that the drives were in perfect order. We presented two versions of what is happening. Perhaps the cruiser did get damaged, but not the steering gears, but the steering column installed in the ship's cabin, or a pipe leading from the steering columns to the central post, from where the steering was actually carried out, received such damage. That is, the cruiser lost the ability to be controlled from the wheelhouse, although the steering gears were not damaged - this does not contradict the Japanese data. According to the second version, the steering from the wheelhouse remained intact, but due to a torn shell that killed several sailors and wounded the helmsman and cruiser commander, the Varyag was lost for a short time, while the steering wheel was turned to the right.
Be that as it may, but as a result, regardless of VF. Rudnev, his cruiser, instead of turning right and making a breakthrough towards the Western Canal, turned almost on 180 hail. and went straight to oh. Phalmido (Yodolmi). The revisionist version that this turn was made as a result of a sensible decision of the commander of the Varyag in order to get out of the battle as soon as possible does not hold water. A turn to the right brought Varyag into close proximity to the island. The cruiser went with a relatively low speed, but turned against the current, taking into account the inevitable loss of speed when turning as it was completed, the speed of the ship dropped to 2-4 nodes, while the current carried it to the rocks o. Phalmido (Yodolmi).
In other words, the turn to the right was not enough that it turned the Varyag into a sitting duck, the ship lost its course because of the enemy, making it easier for the Japanese to fire on the cruiser, and also created an emergency situation out of the blue. Such a maneuver was contrary to the basics of the science of navigation and it is inconceivable that the captain of the 1 rank could make such a mistake. Had vf Rudnev was really going to get out of the battle, he would have turned to the left - such a maneuver would not only break the distance from the “Asama” turning toward rapprochement, but also rule out the possibility of landing on the rocks near Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). References to the fact that V.F. Rudnev allegedly panicked, completely pointless - when a person succumbs to panic, he runs away from the enemy (turning left) and does not turn in the direction of the enemy cruiser.
As a matter of fact, it was the short-term loss of control of the Varyag cruiser (regardless of the reasons for which caused it) and put an end to the attempt to break through, because at that time the ship was almost without a turn under the concentrated fire of the Japanese cruisers, which caused a strong fire at the stern, and , a large hole at the waterline, through which flooded one of the Varyag stokers. The cruiser received a roll of the order of 10 degrees to the port (although it is difficult to establish at what point it reached the maximum value, but the fact that the ship was tilting, and quickly enough, was, of course, noticeable), and all this was the reason for V.F. . Rudneva go for about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in order to assess the damage, but they were such that the ship had to interrupt the battle and retreat to the Chemulpo raid. Contrary to popular belief, “Varyag” did not run at all on the 20 raid - its speed was only slightly higher than the speed with which it went on the breakthrough and, apparently, did not even make 17 nodes that it could develop without building.
In essence, we can say that in the first quarter of an hour the cruiser suffered almost no damage (except for the crew members killed and wounded by shrapnel), but then, in the next 15 minutes, from 12.00 to 12.15, Russian time, the ship received almost all he had direct hits in that battle, as a result of which the cruiser was completely incapacitated.
A total of 11 shells got into the hull, pipes and spars of the cruiser, according to other Japanese data - 14, but, according to the author, the first digit is much more realistic. It seems to be not so much - however, we should not forget that getting into strikes is different, and that in the 27 battle of January 1904, Varyag lost more killed and fatally wounded than the crews of Oleg and Aurora together, all the time Tsushima battle. Given the previously described damage and the fact that the cruiser lost 45% of people on the upper deck killed and seriously wounded (and this fact is confirmed, including by an English doctor who assisted the wounded Varyag directly on board the cruiser), the ship is certainly lost combat capability.
Varyag itself spent no more than 160 shells of 152-mm caliber and the 50-75-mm order in combat. Based on the statistics of the effectiveness of the shooting of Russian ships in the battle of Shantung, such an expenditure of shells could provide no more than one hit of a projectile with an 152-mm caliber in Japanese ships. Whether it was achieved or not is a debatable question, since if this hit did not cause any damage (for example, by ricocheting from the Assam armor plate), the Japanese could not have reflected it in the reports. Officially, the Japanese deny the existence of damage to their ships or victims among their crews, and although there is indirect evidence that this is not the case, they are not so significant that you can catch the Japanese historians in a lie.
Decision V.F. Rudnev destroy cruiser was correct. In retrospect, we understand that it was best to blow it up, but the commander of the Varyag had significant reasons not to do this (evacuation of the wounded, the need to divert the cruiser away from hospitals in time pressure, as the arrival of his squadron was expected on the raid, etc.). Given the information available to VF Rudnev, the decision to flood the Varyag can be assessed as correct.
As you know, reports and memoirs V.F. Rudnev on the 27 January January 1904 bout contain many inaccuracies. However, the main ones are quite explicable. Thus, information about the total failure of Varyag’s guns seems to be refuted by the fact that the Japanese subsequently found all 12 152-mm guns available and transferred them to their arsenals, but in fact the damage could have been caused not by the guns themselves, and not combat, but operational, associated with design flaws (problems of lifting arches, and vykraivshayuschiesya teeth of lifting mechanisms) - the Japanese did not indicate such damage. The gun mounts could have minor damage (for example, seizure), which were easily fixed at an artillery plant, but made it impossible to conduct fire in a combat situation.
The high consumption of projectiles (1 105 units) seems to have landed in VF reports. Rudnev from the logbook, where this expense was signed by Lieutenant E. Behrens and is the result of a counting error: the consumption of shells was most likely calculated as the difference between the actual shells in the cellars and their number, and it was impossible to count so - the cruiser spent ammunition on before the arrival in Chemulpo, some of the ammunition was supplied to the upper deck, but not “spent” by the Japanese, etc.
V.F. Rudnev pointed out the ultra-high losses of the Japanese, but stipulated that he was guided by second-hand information in the assessment of the damage to the enemy, which is quite acceptable immediately after the battle (report to the Vicar). As for the later report to the Marine Department Manager, as well as the memoirs of the Varyag commander, at the time of writing there were absolutely no reliable data on Japanese losses - domestic sources were not written (not to mention the publication), while foreign sources cited the most polar points of view, from the complete absence of losses to the death of the Asama. It is not surprising that these conditions V.F. Rudnev just repeated the data of the first report. In addition, one cannot ignore the possibility that, even if he had learned from somewhere precisely about the absence of Japanese casualties, he was simply forbidden to publish updated loss data (as, for example, this happened to Vl. Semenov, who fought on 1 and 2 th Pacific Squadron, which was banned from publishing on the topic of the Tsushima battle until the end of the work of the historical commission).
Much has been said about some agreements between the commanders of the Varyag and the Koreyts in order to embellish the reports on combat, but a comparison of these reports completely refutes this point of view. The fact is that the same (and key ones) events of the 27 battle of January 1904 of V.F. Rudnev and G.P. Belov expounded in very different ways, which is quite understandable by the usual discrepancies in the eyewitness accounts, but which are completely inexplicable if we consider the version of the preliminary agreement between the commanders.
Revisionists argue that V.F. Rudnev deliberately lied in a report on damage to the steering gears, and this was done in order to justify a premature exit from the battlefield. In fact, there is a completely rational explanation that this is not a lie, but an error, and that in fact either the steering column or the data transmission from it to the central post had damage. But even if we assume that VF Rudnev still lied, the most likely reason for his deception, most likely, is not at all the desire to leave the battlefield, but the desire to justify the unsuccessful turn of "Varyag" in Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) technical reasons. As we said above, V.F. Rudnev clearly did not plan and did not order this reversal, and if this maneuver was not the result of damage to the rudders, then it could have happened only because of a temporary loss of control when the Varyag commander received a blow to the head with a fragment. However, this reversal led to the creation of an emergency, a loss of speed and the receipt of critical damage, precluding further breakthrough, and V.F. Rudnev could fear the role of the scapegoat for all this.
Here, in fact, that's all.
Concluding our cycle, which almost became infinite, we can state that Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev showed himself to be most worthy as a cruiser commander. Having taken a ship that is technically out of order and does not crawl out of repairs, he made great efforts to prepare his crew "for the march and battle", and if he did not achieve great success in this, it was only because this task had no solution in principle - standing near the wall for repair or during the review of the Steward, the ship is not prepared for war. Arriving in Chemulpo, in the conditions of lack of information, V.F. Rudnev made reasonable and balanced decisions: until the last moment he followed the letter and spirit of the orders he received and did not provoke the Japanese, but when it became known about declaring war, he acted decisively and bravely.
The output of the Varyag and Koreans to the battle with the Japanese squadron consisting of (in fact) six cruisers and three destroyers should be considered a heroic act that glorified the commanders and crews of Russian ships. Actions V.F. Rudnev in battle should be recognized tactically literate. "Varyag" fought to the full exhaustion of opportunities for a breakthrough: we should not be misled by the fact that the ship had exhausted these possibilities in just 30 minutes after the start of the battle and a quarter of an hour after the first shell hit it. This is not the fault of the commander or crew, because the cruiser, who did not have onboard armor and armor protection of artillery, was extremely vulnerable to the effects of high-explosive lead projectiles and could not withstand the shelling for some long time.
Perhaps the feat of "Varyag" hurts someone's eye ... let's say, incompleteness. Indeed, the destroyer “Steregushchy”, the armored cruiser “Rurik”, the battleship of the coastal defense “Admiral Ushakov”, the flagship battleship 2 of the Pacific squadron “Prince Suvorov” fought to the last shell and died in battle, but the “Varyag” did not die. But we must understand that not a single commander will condemn his crew to senseless death, if it is possible to avoid it without prejudice to honor. In other words, Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev had a neutral port where he could retreat after his cruiser lost its combat capability, and the commanders of the other Russian ships listed above did not have such a port at hand.
The commander and crew of the Varyag, without any doubt, accomplished a military feat, and this feat caused a great resonance and admiration in Russia and in the world. He became, if I may say so, the "calling card" of the Russian Imperial Navy during that war - and one can only regret that many other, much brighter deeds of the Russian sailors turned out to be "in the shadow" of the Varangian. After all, there is no doubt that the sailors of the same armored cruiser Rurik had a far more terrible ordeal - they fought for five and a half hours with the superior forces of the enemy without hope of victory, losing only those killed and dead from wounds above 200 people. Nevertheless, there were no mass awards and honors for his crew, and only those who care about the history of the fleet are aware of the feat of “Rurik”, while practically everyone knows about the feat of “Varyag” .
This, of course, is unfair to many undeservedly forgotten heroes of the Russo-Japanese war. But such an injustice cannot serve as an excuse for belittling the valor of the commander and crew of the Varyag - they fully deserve their laurels. In order to restore historical justice, we should not dethrone the feat of “Varyag”, but pay tribute to other heroes of this, unhappy for the Russian weaponsthe war.
This is where our story about the Varyag cruiser and the 27 battle of January 1904 ends. The author expresses his deep respect and gratitude to the readers, whose interest in the subject did not fade away over the course of half a year, during which this cycle was laid out. Separately, I would like to thank everyone who with their comments, questions and argued objections helped to work on these materials and made it more interesting and complete than it could be.
Thank you for attention!
References
1. A.V. Polutov. "The landing operation of the Japanese army and navy in February 1904 in Inchon."
2. Logbook of the cruiser 1 rank "Varyag"
3. Logbook of the seaworthy gunboat Korey
4. V. Kataev. "Korean in the glory of" Varyag ". All about the legendary gunboat. ”
5. V. Kataev "Cruiser" Varyag ". The legend of the Russian fleet.
6. V.Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
7. M. Kinai. “The Russo-Japanese War: Official Reports of the Japanese Commanders of the Ground and Naval Forces”.
8. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo. T.1.
9. The report of the British naval attache on the battle in Chemulpo. Flotomaster 2004-01.
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11. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905, the first book. The actions of the fleet in the southern theater from the beginning of the war until the interruption of communications with Port Arthur.
12. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905. Fleet action. Documents. Division III. 1 Pacific squadron. Book One. Actions on the Southern maritime theater of war. 1-1 Release. The period of command of the fleet of Vice Admiral Stark.
13. T. Austin "Cleaning and placement of the wounded in a modern cruise battle (battle of the cruiser" Varyag "). Flotomaster 2004-01.
14. Surgical and medical description of the sea war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of Maritime department in Tokyo.
15. FA McKenzie «From Tokyo to Tiflis: Uncensored Letters from the War»
16. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. Reports from naval attachés.
As well as materials sites http://tsushima.su and http://wunderwaffe.narod.ru and much, much more.
History the cruiser "Varyag" began in a highly strange way: the contract with C. Crump (from our side was signed by the head of the GUKiS, Vice Admiral V. P. Verhovsky) was signed on April 11 on April 1898, outside of the official competition competitive projects of other foreign firms. At the same time, in essence, C. Crump did not submit any draft cruiser at all: the contract implied that the American industrialist would create such a project based on the specification, which, however, should be agreed upon after the contract was signed. The contract itself contained only a preliminary specification of the most general nature, while it contained a lot of shortcomings: discrepancies in the English and Russian texts of documents, vague wording, arithmetic errors, and - most strangely - the document contained direct violations of the requirements of the Maritime Technical Committee (ITC). And finally, the cost of the contract and the procedure for determining supercontract payments were unprofitable for Russia and, subsequently, raised questions from the state controller, senator T. I. Filippov, which the Maritime Office could not answer in any satisfactory manner. In general, it can be stated that the contract with the American industrialist was drafted extremely illiterate.
One of the major violations was the permission to use Nikloss system boilers on the new cruiser, while the MTK insisted on Belleville boilers. In fact, the requirements of the Maritime Department for the latest cruisers could not be met with Belleville boilers, and, subsequently, the MTK was forced to abandon this requirement - both Askold and Bogatyr were equipped with boilers of other systems (Schulz-Tonikroft, Norman) , but MTK strongly objected to Nikloss's boilers, considering them unreliable. Unfortunately, experts were late, and the ban on the use of Nikloss boilers in the Russian imperial navy It was signed three days later than the contracts for the construction of Retvisan and Varyag. In this matter, Vice Admiral V.P. Verkhovsky acted on his own initiative and contrary to the requirements of the MTK: however, in fairness it should be noted that at that time there was no reliable evidence of the flawed design of Nikloss boilers. MTK came to its conclusions not from operating experience, but based on a theoretical analysis of the design.
In fact, the history of operation of the Nikloss boilers is very peculiar, because individual ships that received boilers of this type went quite successfully to the seas (at least - at first) - in other cases, the operation of such boilers led to numerous accidents. This usually makes a conclusion about insufficient qualifications of machine teams, but our analysis shows that another interpretation is possible - the Nicloss boilers required such a jewelery fitting of parts (removable tubes to the collectors), which if could be ensured, only at the best enterprises in the world . At the same time, the Varyag boilers were produced by an American enterprise, which had not been engaged in Nicloss boilers before. This, and the fact that the American fleet immediately abandoned the Nikloss boilers immediately after obtaining a minimum operating experience, and subsequently converted five of the seven ships, originally built with Nikloss boilers, to other brands, indicates that the problems nevertheless, they are much more connected with the boilers of Russian ships not with the professionalism of the crew, but with their low quality, boilers, and manufacturing. Well, in those cases where the boilers of Niklossa were manufactured at first-class European factories, at least at first they worked quite stably.
The design flaws of the Varyag boilers, unfortunately, were complemented by the unsuccessful adjustment of its machines. They worked stably only at high vapor pressure (15,4 of the atmosphere), otherwise the low pressure cylinders did not perform their function - instead of rotating the crankshaft, which set the ship's propellers, they themselves were set in motion by the crankshaft. Naturally, similar stresses were not foreseen by the structure, which is why the bearings and other structural elements of the cruiser steam engines quickly loosened. As a result, a vicious circle was formed - it was dangerous to operate the Nicloss boilers, creating a large vapor pressure, and with a small car, it gradually destroyed itself. According to the opinion of the most experienced engineer I.I. Gippius, who studied in detail the Varyag cars in Port Arthur:
“Here, a self-suggestion suggests itself that the Crump plant, in a hurry to hand over the cruiser, did not have time to verify the steam distribution; The car quickly got upset, and on the ship, naturally, they began to fix the parts that suffered more than others in the sense of heating, knocking, without eliminating the root cause. In general, straightening the vehicle, originally released from the factory with ship's means, is undoubtedly an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. ”
Unfortunately, all these circumstances were not revealed when the ship was handed over to the fleet. It is difficult to say whether this was due to the mistakes of the selection committee, or the result of the pressure of Charles Krump, who was striving not to stick to the spirit, but to the letter of the contract. The other “six thousand meter” cruiser “Askold” was not accepted by the commission until it had developed the speed set by the contract, without having any damage in the car, but in the case of “Varyag” it was not done: the fact of achieving a contract speed, despite the fact that after that his power plant needed substantial repairs.
As a result, the service of the cruiser Varyag turned into endless torment with a power plant: so, during the transition from Philadelphia to Russia and further, the cruiser had 102 running days for Port Arthur, but it took at least 73 of the day to provide them repairs at parking lots and in ports, and this is not counting the repair that was carried out at sea during the crossings (and that was done, the cruiser went to the part of the boilers, the rest were repaired). Nothing like this was observed on the ships of the national fleet of French or Russian construction. After arriving in Port Arthur, the cruiser immediately got up for repair: in 1902, after leaving the armed reserve, the squadron of the Pacific Ocean was engaged in combat training for 9 months, and Varyag spent almost half of this time in repairs and as a great personal yacht Prince Kirill Vladimirovich (who decided to visit Taku). In 1903, the situation was even worse - while the squadron during 7 months (from March to September) was intensively trained, Varyag underwent various tests for the first 3,5 months to determine the success of winter repairs, as well as the endless overhaul of mechanisms (engineer II Gippius was working on the cruiser just at this time). The following 3,5 of the month the cruiser stood in the repair, which ended, alas, as unsuccessfully as the previous ones - Varyag could consistently maintain speeds no higher than 16-17 nodes, could briefly develop 20, but with the risk of boilers crashing or damage to the machines. When "Varyag", finally, came out of repair, the review started, which the vicegerent EI gave the squadron Alekseev: there were many boat exercises during the last, but there was almost no combat training. As if all this was not enough, at the end of 1903 from the cruiser (as well as from other ships of the squadron), many old servicemen were demobilized, including almost half of the gunners.
In general, it can be stated that by the time of leaving Chemulpo, the cruiser Varyag was a low-speed (even Pallada and Diane lost) cruiser with a rastrenirovannym crew. Despite the fact that V.I. Rem, and who replaced him as commander of the Varyag cruiser VF Rudnev, made great efforts to prepare the commanders, the endless downtime in repairs, especially during the 1903 campaign, in which the cruiser practically did not participate, led to the fact that the Varyag, in terms of the quality of the training of the artillerymen, was much inferior to the other squadron ships.
Unlike most of the remaining ships of the squadron, the cruiser was not withdrawn to an armed reserve and at the end of 1903 he was sent as stationary to the Korean port of Chemulpo, where he arrived on December 29 - less than a month remained before the famous battle.
Having come to Chemulpo VF Rudnev landed in the information vacuum. Politically, and at the highest level, the situation was as follows: Russia was not ready to start the war in 1904, and this was realized by everyone, including the tsar and his governor Alekseev. Korea was considered not as an independent state, but only as a battleground of Japanese and Russian interests — and also other European and Asian powers saw it. Therefore, if the Japanese began annexing Korea without declaring war on Russia, it was decided to put up with it and not hinder it — such instructions were received by the commander of the cruiser Varyag, which was directly forbidden from interfering with the Japanese landing.
Soon after the arrival of VF Rudnev discovered numerous evidences that the Japanese are going to land the troops in Chemulpo, and regularly reported on the authorities, without, however, receiving any additional instructions. He did not even bother to report the severance of diplomatic relations with Japan, although such rumors reached, but the Russian envoy to Korea, A.I. Pavlov did not confirm them. V.F. Rudnev seemed much better than the envoy felt the danger of the situation and offered to leave Korea, but A.I. Pavlov did not agree to this either, dissuading the lack of instructions.
Since, due to the absence of orders to the Russian commanders and diplomats, there was a feeling that the Japanese were intercepting VF’s telegrams. Rudnev and A.I. Pavlov, a Korean was sent to Port Arthur with a report. By chance, the gunboat moved to the sea just when the Japanese squadron approached Chemulpo with a landing force - they collided at the exit from the territorial waters, which caused some confusion among the Japanese who did not know what to do - they would have sunk the Korean, he would meet they are at sea, but because of the raid, foreign stationary officers did not do this. "Asama" failed, maneuvering so as to be between the "Korean" and the transport with the landing force, which, apparently, was perceived by the commander of the cannon-ship, GP Belyaev as an attempt to block his access to the sea. “Korean” turned on the raid, and at that time was attacked by Japanese destroyers, operating without orders - during a short skirmish (two torpedoes were fired, the cannon boat responded with two projectiles) the Japanese destroyer “Tsubame” suffered, not calculating the maneuver and taking off for the stones , as a result of which its screws were damaged, limiting the speed of the ship to 12 units.
The charges V.F. Rudnev in that he did not support the “Korean” with fire and did not prevent the landing of the Japanese landing force by force, are completely groundless. The cruisers could not see the use of torpedoes by the Japanese and could only hear the shots of the “Korean”, and this was not a significant reason for the immediate opening of fire: if the “Korean” had entered the battle, he would continue to shoot, but that wasn’t not threatened. A pair of small-caliber shots could be warning, or even made by mistake. The Varyag commander simply did not have the right to interfere with the Japanese landing - he was instructed not to interfere with the landing party. In addition, he did not have the physical ability to do this - by the time GP G. arrived at the Varyag. Belyaev reported on the torpedo attack, four Japanese destroyers of the 9 squad had already entered the raid and were stationed in close proximity to the Russian ships.
In other words, it was not required to open fire to protect the "Korean", since by that time, as it could be done, the gunboat was not in danger. But if the "Varyag" still started shooting, it would lead to the violation of V.F. Rudnev received the order, the violation of the neutrality of Korea and the war with Japan, which was absolutely not profitable for Russia, moreover, was fraught with complications in international politics, since it threatened the foreign stationary on Chemulpo raid. In addition, in the case of the discovery of fire, both Russian ships would have been very quickly destroyed without any benefit, since they were under the gun of the destroyers and the squadron of S. Uriou entering the raid.
Of course, shooting torpedoes at a Russian warship should not go unpunished, but in this case, the leadership of the Russian Empire, but not the commander of the 1 cruiser, should determine the “penalty”.
The battle between “Varyag” and “Koreyets” with the Japanese squadron took place the next day - in fact, with V.F. Rudnev still remained evening and night in order to take some action. However, he had no choice - he could not attack the Japanese transports for the reasons mentioned above, and he could not leave the raid, as he was under the gun of the Japanese destroyers who could sink Russian ships immediately, or escort them to the exit from international waters in order to immediately destroy them as soon as the latter leave neutral territory. Numerous alternative scenarios of the night breakthrough of the “Varyag” “sin” by one assumption - that such a breakthrough will take the Japanese squadron by surprise, and it will not be ready for battle. Today, from the reports and orders of the Japanese commanders, we know for sure that there was nothing like this - Sotokichi Uriu feared not only and not so much Russian stationary as the possibility of an approach of additional Russian forces from Port Arthur and was ready for anything.
In other words, it turned out that if the Japanese were not ready to start the war and destroy the Russian ships, then the flight from the raid was completely unnecessary, and would have looked like cowardice, and if the Japanese were ready to fight, it would lead to the death of the Russian ships with a minimum chance of causing damage to the enemy. And yes, most likely, when trying to break through, the Russians would be accused of violating neutrality in the roadstead. It must be said that Commodore Bailey quite unequivocally brought Vsevolod Fyodorovich the position of England in this matter - he considered landing troops as an internal matter of the Japanese and Koreans, which should not be interfered with by the third powers, but was ready to immediately shoot at any ship that violated neutrality on the roadstead.
In this situation, V.F. Rudneva, in essence, had no choice but to wait for the dawn, but he brought the unkind news. The commander of the French cruiser Pascal, Victor-Baptist Senees, arrived in 08.00 on board the Varyag, with a notification from the Japanese admiral about the start of hostilities, which also contained a proposal to foreign ships to leave Chemulpo to 16.00 to avoid misunderstandings. If before the end of this period, "Varyag" and "Korean" do not come out on a breakthrough, S. Uriu assumed to attack and destroy them right in the raid.
The similar decision of the Japanese admiral did not leave V.F. Rudnev other choice, just go into battle.
Having studied the combat plan drawn up by S. Uriu, we understand that it was completely pointless to stay on the roadstead. In this case, the Japanese were going to enter "Asamu", "Akashi" and "Niytaku" on the fairway, and, stopping a few kilometers from the "Varyag", shoot both Russian ships as exercises. It was all the more simple because the Russian cruiser and gunboat could not maneuver in a narrow roadstead, and at a distance of more than two miles the armor of the “Assam” would remain completely invulnerable for the 152-mm guns of the Varyag and for the eight-inch Korean. At the same time, if Varyag tried to rush to the fairway for rapprochement with the enemy, it was met by a detachment of destroyers accompanying the Japanese cruisers — obviously, it would not be difficult for them to undermine the cruiser, which by that time would have been badly damaged by artillery fire.
But S. Uriu could not get involved in an artillery battle at all, but wait until dark, and then send Chemulpo destroyers to the raid. The statistics of night battles shows that few ships on an alien raid without covering the coastal defense (the absence of stationary searchlights was especially important) and not having the ability to maneuver while moving at least along the middle course would have become easy targets for Japanese mines sailors in the reflection of the mine attacks of the Japanese at Port Arthur, etc. are due to the factors listed above). In other words, by taking a day battle in the roadstead, Varyag lost its ability to maneuver, without gaining anything in return, and there was practically no chance of surviving the night mine attack. Thus, there was absolutely no point in staying on the raid - it was necessary to go out and fight.
The Japanese squadron had a huge advantage in strength, only the "Asama" was stronger than the "Varyag" and "Korean" combined, despite the fact that "Varyag", that with a gunboat, that without it had no advantage in speed. Thus, with some correct actions of the Japanese, a breakthrough into the sea was impossible. Analyzing the actions of V.F. Rudnev in battle, we can assume that, declaring that the cruiser will go for a breakthrough, the commander of the "Varyag" decided not to make "an attempt to break at any cost", but to join the battle and continue to act according to circumstances, having the main goal to go into the open the sea past the Japanese squadron, and if it is impossible to do so, inflict maximum damage to the Japanese.
V.F. Rudnev could not throw in the Chemulpo gunboat "Korean", despite the fact that the latter had the speed of all 13,5 nodes. It was not in the tradition of the Russian fleet to leave comrades in a similar situation, and besides, one should not forget that the two 203-mm guns of the gunboat were, in fact, the only trump card of VF Rudnev, especially since the Korean, in contrast to his cruiser, had already taken part in the battle (Taku forts). It was to be feared that the Japanese could block the exit from the fairway at about. Phalmido (Yodolmi), maneuvering at a slow pace near the island, and in this case, if you could bring the canlarok at a sufficiently close distance, you could hope to inflict considerable damage on the Japanese. Strictly speaking, if in the hands of the Russians there was some kind of means that would give at least a shadow of a chance to force the Japanese to retreat, giving access to the fairway (if they had blocked it), then they were eight-inches of "Korean".
"Varyag" and "Koreyets" left the raid and entered the battle. V.F. Rudnev led his ships at a low speed, which many people blame for him today (they don’t go at such a speed with that speed!), But thanks to that the Varyag commander secured serious tactical advantages. First, he covered himself about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) from the main forces of the Japanese squadron, so that during the first quarter of an hour the fight, in fact, boiled down to the bout of “Assam” and “Varyag”. Secondly, not allowing the fire to focus on their ships, he led the island to “Koreyets”, where his eight-inch began to reach the enemy. And, thirdly, going at low speed, he provided the “most favored mode” to his gunners, because before the Russian-Japanese war, artillery exercises were usually carried out on 9-11 nodes.
Strangely enough, the release of the Russian stationaries took the Japanese by surprise, but in a matter of minutes they broke the anchor and went into battle. According to the plan of the cruiser S. Uriu, having divided into 3 squadron, they were to disperse over the water area towards the Eastern Channel and, thus, create a layered defense against a breakthrough in this direction - while (apparently) u o Phalmido (Yodolmi) will not let Varyag pass to the western channel. However, the small move "Varyag" played a cruel joke with the Japanese - they are too drawn to the Eastern channel, opening the passage to the Western channel, and V.F. Rudnev, apparently tried to take advantage of this. Having traversed the island, he turned to the right - not that this maneuver gave him real chances for a breakthrough, but the Japanese, in order to intercept the Varyag, would have to intercept, shutting and interfering with each other, while some of them ships could only fire from the nose-guns, while the Varyag could respond to them with undamaged guns, which had not participated in the starboard before that time.
However, it was here that an unfortunate incident intervened, crumpling the plans of the Russian commander. We, unfortunately, will never know what exactly happened in reality. According to VF Rudneva, a Japanese projectile broke the pipe where the steering gears were passing, but the Japanese, who had inspected the cruiser during its rise, claimed that the drives were in perfect order. We presented two versions of what is happening. Perhaps the cruiser did get damaged, but not the steering gears, but the steering column installed in the ship's cabin, or a pipe leading from the steering columns to the central post, from where the steering was actually carried out, received such damage. That is, the cruiser lost the ability to be controlled from the wheelhouse, although the steering gears were not damaged - this does not contradict the Japanese data. According to the second version, the steering from the wheelhouse remained intact, but due to a torn shell that killed several sailors and wounded the helmsman and cruiser commander, the Varyag was lost for a short time, while the steering wheel was turned to the right.
Be that as it may, but as a result, regardless of VF. Rudnev, his cruiser, instead of turning right and making a breakthrough towards the Western Canal, turned almost on 180 hail. and went straight to oh. Phalmido (Yodolmi). The revisionist version that this turn was made as a result of a sensible decision of the commander of the Varyag in order to get out of the battle as soon as possible does not hold water. A turn to the right brought Varyag into close proximity to the island. The cruiser went with a relatively low speed, but turned against the current, taking into account the inevitable loss of speed when turning as it was completed, the speed of the ship dropped to 2-4 nodes, while the current carried it to the rocks o. Phalmido (Yodolmi).
In other words, the turn to the right was not enough that it turned the Varyag into a sitting duck, the ship lost its course because of the enemy, making it easier for the Japanese to fire on the cruiser, and also created an emergency situation out of the blue. Such a maneuver was contrary to the basics of the science of navigation and it is inconceivable that the captain of the 1 rank could make such a mistake. Had vf Rudnev was really going to get out of the battle, he would have turned to the left - such a maneuver would not only break the distance from the “Asama” turning toward rapprochement, but also rule out the possibility of landing on the rocks near Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi). References to the fact that V.F. Rudnev allegedly panicked, completely pointless - when a person succumbs to panic, he runs away from the enemy (turning left) and does not turn in the direction of the enemy cruiser.
As a matter of fact, it was the short-term loss of control of the Varyag cruiser (regardless of the reasons for which caused it) and put an end to the attempt to break through, because at that time the ship was almost without a turn under the concentrated fire of the Japanese cruisers, which caused a strong fire at the stern, and , a large hole at the waterline, through which flooded one of the Varyag stokers. The cruiser received a roll of the order of 10 degrees to the port (although it is difficult to establish at what point it reached the maximum value, but the fact that the ship was tilting, and quickly enough, was, of course, noticeable), and all this was the reason for V.F. . Rudneva go for about. Phalmido (Yodolmi) in order to assess the damage, but they were such that the ship had to interrupt the battle and retreat to the Chemulpo raid. Contrary to popular belief, “Varyag” did not run at all on the 20 raid - its speed was only slightly higher than the speed with which it went on the breakthrough and, apparently, did not even make 17 nodes that it could develop without building.
In essence, we can say that in the first quarter of an hour the cruiser suffered almost no damage (except for the crew members killed and wounded by shrapnel), but then, in the next 15 minutes, from 12.00 to 12.15, Russian time, the ship received almost all he had direct hits in that battle, as a result of which the cruiser was completely incapacitated.
A total of 11 shells got into the hull, pipes and spars of the cruiser, according to other Japanese data - 14, but, according to the author, the first digit is much more realistic. It seems to be not so much - however, we should not forget that getting into strikes is different, and that in the 27 battle of January 1904, Varyag lost more killed and fatally wounded than the crews of Oleg and Aurora together, all the time Tsushima battle. Given the previously described damage and the fact that the cruiser lost 45% of people on the upper deck killed and seriously wounded (and this fact is confirmed, including by an English doctor who assisted the wounded Varyag directly on board the cruiser), the ship is certainly lost combat capability.
Varyag itself spent no more than 160 shells of 152-mm caliber and the 50-75-mm order in combat. Based on the statistics of the effectiveness of the shooting of Russian ships in the battle of Shantung, such an expenditure of shells could provide no more than one hit of a projectile with an 152-mm caliber in Japanese ships. Whether it was achieved or not is a debatable question, since if this hit did not cause any damage (for example, by ricocheting from the Assam armor plate), the Japanese could not have reflected it in the reports. Officially, the Japanese deny the existence of damage to their ships or victims among their crews, and although there is indirect evidence that this is not the case, they are not so significant that you can catch the Japanese historians in a lie.
Decision V.F. Rudnev destroy cruiser was correct. In retrospect, we understand that it was best to blow it up, but the commander of the Varyag had significant reasons not to do this (evacuation of the wounded, the need to divert the cruiser away from hospitals in time pressure, as the arrival of his squadron was expected on the raid, etc.). Given the information available to VF Rudnev, the decision to flood the Varyag can be assessed as correct.
As you know, reports and memoirs V.F. Rudnev on the 27 January January 1904 bout contain many inaccuracies. However, the main ones are quite explicable. Thus, information about the total failure of Varyag’s guns seems to be refuted by the fact that the Japanese subsequently found all 12 152-mm guns available and transferred them to their arsenals, but in fact the damage could have been caused not by the guns themselves, and not combat, but operational, associated with design flaws (problems of lifting arches, and vykraivshayuschiesya teeth of lifting mechanisms) - the Japanese did not indicate such damage. The gun mounts could have minor damage (for example, seizure), which were easily fixed at an artillery plant, but made it impossible to conduct fire in a combat situation.
The high consumption of projectiles (1 105 units) seems to have landed in VF reports. Rudnev from the logbook, where this expense was signed by Lieutenant E. Behrens and is the result of a counting error: the consumption of shells was most likely calculated as the difference between the actual shells in the cellars and their number, and it was impossible to count so - the cruiser spent ammunition on before the arrival in Chemulpo, some of the ammunition was supplied to the upper deck, but not “spent” by the Japanese, etc.
V.F. Rudnev pointed out the ultra-high losses of the Japanese, but stipulated that he was guided by second-hand information in the assessment of the damage to the enemy, which is quite acceptable immediately after the battle (report to the Vicar). As for the later report to the Marine Department Manager, as well as the memoirs of the Varyag commander, at the time of writing there were absolutely no reliable data on Japanese losses - domestic sources were not written (not to mention the publication), while foreign sources cited the most polar points of view, from the complete absence of losses to the death of the Asama. It is not surprising that these conditions V.F. Rudnev just repeated the data of the first report. In addition, one cannot ignore the possibility that, even if he had learned from somewhere precisely about the absence of Japanese casualties, he was simply forbidden to publish updated loss data (as, for example, this happened to Vl. Semenov, who fought on 1 and 2 th Pacific Squadron, which was banned from publishing on the topic of the Tsushima battle until the end of the work of the historical commission).
Much has been said about some agreements between the commanders of the Varyag and the Koreyts in order to embellish the reports on combat, but a comparison of these reports completely refutes this point of view. The fact is that the same (and key ones) events of the 27 battle of January 1904 of V.F. Rudnev and G.P. Belov expounded in very different ways, which is quite understandable by the usual discrepancies in the eyewitness accounts, but which are completely inexplicable if we consider the version of the preliminary agreement between the commanders.
Revisionists argue that V.F. Rudnev deliberately lied in a report on damage to the steering gears, and this was done in order to justify a premature exit from the battlefield. In fact, there is a completely rational explanation that this is not a lie, but an error, and that in fact either the steering column or the data transmission from it to the central post had damage. But even if we assume that VF Rudnev still lied, the most likely reason for his deception, most likely, is not at all the desire to leave the battlefield, but the desire to justify the unsuccessful turn of "Varyag" in Fr. Phalmido (Yodolmi) technical reasons. As we said above, V.F. Rudnev clearly did not plan and did not order this reversal, and if this maneuver was not the result of damage to the rudders, then it could have happened only because of a temporary loss of control when the Varyag commander received a blow to the head with a fragment. However, this reversal led to the creation of an emergency, a loss of speed and the receipt of critical damage, precluding further breakthrough, and V.F. Rudnev could fear the role of the scapegoat for all this.
Here, in fact, that's all.
Concluding our cycle, which almost became infinite, we can state that Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev showed himself to be most worthy as a cruiser commander. Having taken a ship that is technically out of order and does not crawl out of repairs, he made great efforts to prepare his crew "for the march and battle", and if he did not achieve great success in this, it was only because this task had no solution in principle - standing near the wall for repair or during the review of the Steward, the ship is not prepared for war. Arriving in Chemulpo, in the conditions of lack of information, V.F. Rudnev made reasonable and balanced decisions: until the last moment he followed the letter and spirit of the orders he received and did not provoke the Japanese, but when it became known about declaring war, he acted decisively and bravely.
The output of the Varyag and Koreans to the battle with the Japanese squadron consisting of (in fact) six cruisers and three destroyers should be considered a heroic act that glorified the commanders and crews of Russian ships. Actions V.F. Rudnev in battle should be recognized tactically literate. "Varyag" fought to the full exhaustion of opportunities for a breakthrough: we should not be misled by the fact that the ship had exhausted these possibilities in just 30 minutes after the start of the battle and a quarter of an hour after the first shell hit it. This is not the fault of the commander or crew, because the cruiser, who did not have onboard armor and armor protection of artillery, was extremely vulnerable to the effects of high-explosive lead projectiles and could not withstand the shelling for some long time.
Perhaps the feat of "Varyag" hurts someone's eye ... let's say, incompleteness. Indeed, the destroyer “Steregushchy”, the armored cruiser “Rurik”, the battleship of the coastal defense “Admiral Ushakov”, the flagship battleship 2 of the Pacific squadron “Prince Suvorov” fought to the last shell and died in battle, but the “Varyag” did not die. But we must understand that not a single commander will condemn his crew to senseless death, if it is possible to avoid it without prejudice to honor. In other words, Vsevolod Fyodorovich Rudnev had a neutral port where he could retreat after his cruiser lost its combat capability, and the commanders of the other Russian ships listed above did not have such a port at hand.
The commander and crew of the Varyag, without any doubt, accomplished a military feat, and this feat caused a great resonance and admiration in Russia and in the world. He became, if I may say so, the "calling card" of the Russian Imperial Navy during that war - and one can only regret that many other, much brighter deeds of the Russian sailors turned out to be "in the shadow" of the Varangian. After all, there is no doubt that the sailors of the same armored cruiser Rurik had a far more terrible ordeal - they fought for five and a half hours with the superior forces of the enemy without hope of victory, losing only those killed and dead from wounds above 200 people. Nevertheless, there were no mass awards and honors for his crew, and only those who care about the history of the fleet are aware of the feat of “Rurik”, while practically everyone knows about the feat of “Varyag” .
This, of course, is unfair to many undeservedly forgotten heroes of the Russo-Japanese war. But such an injustice cannot serve as an excuse for belittling the valor of the commander and crew of the Varyag - they fully deserve their laurels. In order to restore historical justice, we should not dethrone the feat of “Varyag”, but pay tribute to other heroes of this, unhappy for the Russian weaponsthe war.
This is where our story about the Varyag cruiser and the 27 battle of January 1904 ends. The author expresses his deep respect and gratitude to the readers, whose interest in the subject did not fade away over the course of half a year, during which this cycle was laid out. Separately, I would like to thank everyone who with their comments, questions and argued objections helped to work on these materials and made it more interesting and complete than it could be.
Thank you for attention!
References
1. A.V. Polutov. "The landing operation of the Japanese army and navy in February 1904 in Inchon."
2. Logbook of the cruiser 1 rank "Varyag"
3. Logbook of the seaworthy gunboat Korey
4. V. Kataev. "Korean in the glory of" Varyag ". All about the legendary gunboat. ”
5. V. Kataev "Cruiser" Varyag ". The legend of the Russian fleet.
6. V.Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
7. M. Kinai. “The Russo-Japanese War: Official Reports of the Japanese Commanders of the Ground and Naval Forces”.
8. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 Meiji / Maritime General Headquarters in Tokyo. T.1.
9. The report of the British naval attache on the battle in Chemulpo. Flotomaster 2004-01.
10. R.M. Melnikov. The cruiser "Varyag" (editions 1975 g and 1983 g.).
11. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905, the first book. The actions of the fleet in the southern theater from the beginning of the war until the interruption of communications with Port Arthur.
12. Russian-Japanese War 1904-1905. Fleet action. Documents. Division III. 1 Pacific squadron. Book One. Actions on the Southern maritime theater of war. 1-1 Release. The period of command of the fleet of Vice Admiral Stark.
13. T. Austin "Cleaning and placement of the wounded in a modern cruise battle (battle of the cruiser" Varyag "). Flotomaster 2004-01.
14. Surgical and medical description of the sea war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of Maritime department in Tokyo.
15. FA McKenzie «From Tokyo to Tiflis: Uncensored Letters from the War»
16. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 1904-1905. Reports from naval attachés.
As well as materials sites http://tsushima.su and http://wunderwaffe.narod.ru and much, much more.
- Andrei from Chelyabinsk
- The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 2. But why Crump?
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 3. Boilers niklossa
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 4. Steam engines
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. Part of 5. Supervisory Commission
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 6. Across the oceans
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 7. Port arthur
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 8. Korean neutrality
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 9. Out "Korean"
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 10. Night
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 11. Before fight
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 12. About shooting accuracy
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 13. First shots
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 14. First damage
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 15. Reports V.F. Rudneva
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 16. Climax
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 17. On collusion and lies in Russian reports
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 18. The end of the battle
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 19. After battle
The cruiser "Varyag". Fight Chemulpo 27 January 1904 of the Year. CH 20. Under the canopy of Sakura
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