Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Coastal troops. findings

In two previous articles, we described the state of affairs in the coastal forces of the Russian Navy, including coastal missile and artillery troops and marines. In the article that is brought to your attention, we will summarize and try to draw general conclusions about the state of this kind of force. fleet.

On the whole, perhaps, it can be stated that against the background of the frankly bleak picture of the gradual death of the fleet (today's rates of its “recovery”, in fact, only delay the inevitable, and not nearly compensating for the decline in ships), the current state and prospects of the BV of the Russian Navy are moderately optimistic . On the part of the BRAV, this optimism is based on large-scale re-equipment of the troops from the old “Bounds” and “Redoubts” to fully modern “Bastions” and “Balls”, while, apparently, the construction pace will provide us with reasonable missile forces within a reasonable timeframe. brigades, half of which will be armed with "Bastions" (with the missile Onyx, and, perhaps, in the future, "Zircon"), and the second half - "Balami" with X-35 and X-35У. No matter how surprising it may sound, but in the case of the implementation of such a program, the Brav of the Russian Navy in terms of the quantity and quality of its missile weapons will definitely surpass those of the Soviet era.

Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Coastal troops. findings

Unfortunately, the quantity and quality of the missiles is far from the only component of the combat power of the Brav. As we said earlier, although the Onyx flight range is unknown, it’s almost impossible that it exceeded 500 km, since in this case, by deploying the Bastions, Russia massively violates the INF Treaty, which, in general, is not interest. Thus, the “long arm” of the GRAVE is still far from being reachable, and in order to be able to hit the enemy, it must be deployed in the right place in a timely manner. Which once again brings us back to the problems of over-the-horizon intelligence and target designation, and they, as we know, have not been resolved to date.

Formally, the Russian Federation has all the necessary equipment to create an EGSONPO (a unified state system for lighting surface and underwater environments) that would provide total control over surface (with underwater — more complicated) objects at a distance of at least 1 500 km from our coastline. We also have reconnaissance satellites, there are over-the-horizon radar stations, there are early-warning radar aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft, as well as radio intelligence equipment and much more. But all this is either insufficient in quantity, or (as, for example, DRLO planes, specialized reconnaissance aircraft) is not part of the Navy and is “not tied” to obtaining the necessary information, since it is intended for solving other tasks and will be used in other areas. In general, EGSONPO does not work today, and, alas, it is unclear when it will work - if we evaluate the pace of its construction, we are unlikely to get it not by 2030, but also by 3030 year.

On the other hand, to say that everything is completely hopeless - it is impossible, because at least two elements of EGSONPO are very well developed today. The first is over-the-horizon radar systems, currently capable of detecting surface targets at a distance of 3 000 km or more.

Reception part of the radar ZGO 29B6 "Container", Kovylkino, Mordovia

These stations do a good job of controlling the air and surface situation, but they cannot carry out a “friend or foe” check, and most importantly, they are massive stationary objects that can be completely incapacitated or destroyed with the onset of a conflict. The second element is the presence in the composition of our coastal forces numerous units of electronic warfare, which also carry out including electronic intelligence.

Of course, the Coastal Forces are one of the most important components of the Navy, but it should be understood that even if we had a fully operational EGSONPO, BV of the Russian Navy in its present form still would not be an absolute defense against strikes from the sea. Of course, missiles capable of hitting targets at a distance of 300 (500?) Km are an extremely dangerous threat to any amphibious operations. But "Bastions" and "Balls" cannot completely impede the actions of the AUG (only make them stay at a certain distance from the coast, which, in general, is already quite a few) and enemy surface ships equipped with cruise missiles, like "Tomahawks", with a range of flight to 2 500 km. For example, Bala and Bastions, deployed in the Crimea, are able to “finish” almost to the Turkish coast, but they are powerless against an aircraft carrier deployed in the Aegean Sea and using the Turkish airfield network as hopping aerodromes.

As for the number of rocket launchers, then, on the one hand, the very real possibility of “catching up” to the level of the USSR is wonderful. But one should not forget that the USSR BRAV had to ensure the safety of our shores in the presence of the most powerful Soviet Navy, which practically nothing left today. And if we reach, and even surpass the GRAV of the Soviet Union, then ... will this be enough?

As for the marines, of course, it should be noted that in recent years the growth of its capabilities is quite obvious. Keeping the highest standards of personnel training, the Marines are armed with new military equipment (the same armored personnel carriers), ammunition ("Warrior"), controls ("Sagittarius") and much more. Marines return to the brigades Tanks, although not T-90 or “Almaty”, but only T-80BV and T-72B3, but any tank is better than its absence, etc.

Nevertheless, the ability of the domestic marines to carry out the key tasks of this type of troops today is questionable. As we said earlier, the main tasks of the Marines are:

1. the landing of tactical amphibious assault forces to solve independent tasks and to assist ground forces formations;

2. defense of basing points and other objects from airborne and naval assault forces, joint participation with ground units in antiamphibious defense.

We will return to the first point a little later, but for now we will pay attention to the second. Here the problem lies in the fact that Russia is a happy owner of a very long coastline: for example, the Black Sea coast of the Russian Federation extends over 1 171 km. And to ensure its protection by the marines alone is not possible simply because of the relative small size of the latter.

It is necessary to say that this problem was realized back in the USSR; therefore, during the formation of the Coastal Forces, in addition to the existing Brav and MP formations, four motorized rifle divisions and four artillery brigades taken from the Ground Forces were also included. Thus, each fleet received one reinforced motorized rifle division, which had, in addition to the state-ordered tank regiment and three separate tank battalions (one for each regiment), also an additional tank battalion comprising the 5 company (51 tank T-80, T -72, T-64, T-62). As for the artillery brigades, each of them had 120 guns in 152-mm caliber. In total, the Coastal Forces of the USSR numbered about 1500 tanks, more than 2500 armored combat vehicles (BTR, BRDM), more than 1000 guns of 100 caliber mm, etc.

Something from the former glory remains today. So, the Coastal Forces of the Black Sea Fleet have a 126-th separate coastal defense brigade, the Baltic Fleet has a motorized rifle brigade and a separate regiment, the Northern Fleet has two Arctic motorized rifle brigades. But, of course, even after equipping the naval infantry units with tanks (as expected - with 40 tanks per brigade), they would not even reach the level of the BV of the USSR Navy. Perhaps of particular concern is the Pacific Fleet. In the years of the USSR, its Coastal forces had a division of marines, a motorized rifle division as a separate artillery brigade, today they are two brigades of marines.

You can, of course, assume that the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation intends to solve the tasks of the defense of the coast, attracting ground forces for this. But you need to understand that today the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation have about 280 thousand people in their structure. and the order of 2 300 tanks (by state, with the revival of the divisions, perhaps their number has increased, but, of course, not by orders of magnitude). In terms of numbers, this roughly corresponds to what the Turkish armed forces have (260 000 people and, approximately, 2 224 tanks in the army). Of course, in terms of their qualities and armament, Russian troops are far superior to Turkish, but compare the territory of Turkey and Russia ... In other words, the Russian land army is not large at all and, to admit, it is not even clear how to achieve a similar number scale conflict. And certainly there are no “extra” units in them to assist the Coastal forces.

Thus, it can be stated that, despite the traditionally high training of the marines and the continued equipping of them with new equipment, the capabilities of the antiamphibious defense are limited simply because of the small number of units of the Coastal Forces.

As for the landing, there, alas, is still worse. The first thing I would like to draw attention to is the deplorable state of the amphibious assault ships of the Russian Navy. We listed in detail the types and main performance characteristics of amphibious ships and boats in the previous article, so we will not repeat: we only note that today the basis of the amphibious forces of the fleets are 15 large amphibious assault ships of the 775 project.

It seems to be a significant amount, but the youngest BDK of this project (Subseries III) - Korolev and Peresvet this year turned 27 years, Azov 28, and they are far from young, although with proper care they are quite capable serve another years 12-15.

BDK "Korolev"

But the age of other 9 ships of this type (II sub-series) today ranges from 30 to 39 years, so they obviously need to be replaced in the next 10 years. The oldest BDK in the domestic fleet are three ships of the first sub-series of the 775 project (one is forty years old, two more ships were commissioned 42 a year ago) and, of course, the 4 ship of the 1171 project, which today has "knocked" from 43 to 52 years - these seven BDK require replacement "yesterday." And what is going to replace them?

Yes, in general, almost nothing. In the Russian Federation, two BDKs of the 11711 “Tapir” project were laid, of which the first, “Ivan Gren”, which was started in 2004, was finally incorporated into the fleet in June of this year. The second ship of this type, “Peter Morgunov”, is promised to be delivered in the next, 2019. Even ignoring the national custom to shift the deadlines for delivering ships to the fleet “to the right”, we get 2 BDK instead of 7, which in the very near future should be removed from the fleet. Even taking into account the fact that ships of the type “Ivan Gren” are perhaps twice as good as the BNS of the 775 project in terms of their amphibious assault capability, this does not look like an equivalent replacement. And no more BDKs in the Russian Federation have been pledged and built, and than we are going to make up for leaving 9 with another. BDK of the 775 project, which will gradually leave the system, is totally unclear.

It must be said that according to GPN 2011-2020. It was intended to solve this issue radically - it was planned to build four universal landing ships of the Mistral type, of which two were to be built for us by France, and two more by ourselves, according to the license granted by the French.

We will not consider in detail the issues of the expediency of ordering such ships abroad: apparently, in addition to the corruption component, this decision played the role of "repaying" the French for their loyal position in relation to the 08.08.08 war, but other reasonable considerations were also possible. In any case, this was a big mistake, and here life put everything in its place: having spent time and money, Russia did not receive the ships she needed. The money, however, then returned.

However, it should be recognized (irrespective of the merits and demerits of a specific French project) that a reorientation from BDK to UDC would certainly be the right step in updating our airborne fleet. The fact is that the main way of landing with BDK is ramp, in which BDK must come close to the shore.

It is clear that far from everywhere the sea coast allows you to do this - for example, in the BNC project 1174 “Rhino”, which had a full displacement over 14 000 t, the length of the ramp exceeded 30 meters, but they could land only the 17% of the world coast . There was another way of landing, which did not require the BDK to come close to the coast: the nose gate was opened, and then the armored personnel carrier reached land for its course, but it is clear that this method is only available with a slight agitation and surf, and also for floating armored vehicles - tanks do not unload in this way.

In the USSR, this problem was understood, so the BNC of the 1174 project, in addition to the usual ramp, also had a dock chamber that contained either the 6 landing craft of the 1785 or 1176 projects, or three hovercraft of the 1206 project, which allowed them to be transported and landed on unequipped coast heavy armored vehicles - tanks T-64 and T-72. Still, the “Rhinos” were not considered successful ships in the USSR, and they were replaced by the universal landing ships of the 11780 “Ivan Rogov” project, also known under the nickname “Ivan Tarava” (for substantial similarity with the American UDC). With a displacement of about 25 000 and T, these ships were to receive a full flight deck (air group - X-NUMX Ka-12 transport helicopters in the landing variant, it was possible to use the VTs Yak-29) and a sufficiently capacious dock chamber for four landing craft of the 38 or 1176 landing landing craft on an air cushion pr 2., despite the fact that, according to some sources, "Ivan Tarava" was able to carry up to 1206 tanks and 40 paratroopers (probably for relatively short distances).

Model "Ivan Rogov"

Of course, UDC had significant advantages over traditional Soviet BDK. This and the ability to land landings on the coast, where the BDK could not come close to the shore, this is the excellent logistical capabilities provided by the air group of transport helicopters, and the ability of over-horizon assault landing, when the UDC itself is not exposed to the threat of fire weapons from the coast. Perhaps, the only advantage of the BDK was only the speed of the landing of the landing force - it is clear that in places where it was possible to disembark from the ramp, unload the marines and their equipment with the BDK would be faster than through helicopters and landing craft, which would have to make many flights in order to transport all the equipment on the beach.

It should also be noted that the UDC can be much better suited for combat services that the Soviet fleet conducted - when the landing ships "in full combat" and with the marines on board went to the same Mediterranean Sea and were there in constant readiness for disembarkation. The fact is that UDC is significantly larger than the BDK (“Ivan Gren” - 5 000 t, full displacement of the same ships of the 775 project are of the order of 4 000 t, but the same “Ivan Rogov”, as we said above - 25 000 t ), so that they can create much better conditions for the landing - both in terms of accommodation and medical care, etc. In general, there is no doubt that the same Mistrals, for all their shortcomings, would be much better designed for such combat services than the BDK project 775 or even the newest "Ivan Gren."

But ... there is an important nuance. The fact is that the landing operation is not only the marines and the ships transporting them. Landing in a modern large-scale conflict is a very complicated operation, requiring the allocation of diverse forces of large numbers: it is necessary to “clean up” the coast, which should be carried out to a state of complete non-survival of the forces defending it, warships to form an amphibious assault, cover on the transition from the influence of the fleet and aviation the enemy ... And, let's be frank, the current state of the naval personnel and aviation of the Navy is such that it completely excludes the possibility of conducting any major landing operations in a full-scale war with NATO, or in armed conflict with any of the developed countries. In other words, we simply do not have enough funds to ensure the conditions for the landing, and the safety of the landing ships. As an example: you can, of course, talk for a long time about the "landing on the Kuril Islands", that is, the transportation of reinforcements to the "disputed" islands using the same "Mistral" in the event of a hypothetical conflict with Japan. But the truth of life lies in the fact that our entire Pacific Fleet, in its entirety, is unable to provide air defense of the landing assault within the range of the Japanese Air Force, which number about 350 attack aircraft, including about 200 F-15 of various modifications. We have nothing to oppose to the submarine fleet of Japan, which numbers nearly two dozen (18, to be exact) very modern submarines. Recall that in the Pacific Fleet there are 4 BODs, one nuclear multipurpose submarine of the Schuka-B type and six old Halibuts. Four Pacific Fleet strike surface ships - two Anteya submarines, the Varyag missile cruiser and the Project 956 Fast destroyer are clearly no match for 4 Japanese helicopter carriers, 38 destroyers and 6 frigates.

In fact, in an armed clash with one of the developed countries or in a global conflict, the possibility of landing in enemy territory is reduced almost to the landing of reconnaissance and sabotage groups. By the way, high-speed amphibious assault boats of the “Dugong” and “Serna” types, which have entered service, are just right for such actions.

Thus, it turns out an interesting conflict. If to argue from the point of view of the development of domestic landing ships, then, of course, it is necessary to design and build full-fledged UDC. But this is a very expensive thing, and we can create them only to the detriment of other fleet forces: in the event of a serious conflict, we will not be able to use these ships for their intended purpose. In its current state, such ships of the Russian Navy can be used only in “police” operations, like the same Syria, but even there they are more likely to have the status “desirable” rather than “necessary”. Therefore, the creation of the UDC today (the project "Surf" and the like), with all its usefulness for the Russian amphibious forces, should be considered harmful and untimely for the fleet - today naval aircraft, minesweepers, submarines, corvettes and frigates are more important to us.

On the other hand, it is impossible to completely forget the amphibious forces of the fleet, or to limit yourself exclusively to high-speed amphibious assault boats. Perhaps we should continue the “Ivan Gren” series, laying several more such ships to replace the aging BDK project 775. Or to go a little different way: the fact is that the Syrian operation revealed another weakness of the fleet (as if there were few of them already) - the ships at the disposal of the Navy could not ensure the timely delivery of cargo to our military contingent in Syria in the volumes it needed. BDKs are able to perform the role of military transports, but, of course, the relatively small displacement of the 775 project ships played a negative role here - they could not carry a sufficient amount of cargo. "Ivan Gren" is noticeably larger, and, perhaps, would be better suited to the role of military transport. And if not, then it may be worthwhile to consider the idea of ​​creating a ship – vehicle, which, “concurrently” could play the role of a landing ship: such ships will not lose their value even if we ever become sufficiently wealthy to build UDC.

On the whole, concluding the short series devoted to our Coastal Forces, I would like to note that, despite the fact that their condition today causes the least concern in comparison with other kinds of forces of the fleet, we see that today they still cannot solve their tasks are fully implemented, albeit for reasons not directly connected with the BV of the Russian Navy. The coastal missile and artillery troops strongly lack EGSONPO, which could uncover the movement of enemy ships in our waters and ensure timely deployment of mobile missile systems, as well as target designation for them. In addition, by virtue of the INF Treaty, the BRAV does not really have a “long arm” to counter the carrier strike groups of our “sworn friends”. The marines lack the numbers for the antiamphibious defense of the coast, and besides, due to the physical aging of the amphibious ships and the inability of the fleet to isolate the forces to cover them, carrying out some large-scale amphibious operations becomes extremely risky and hardly justified in the conflict with some serious opponent.
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  1. +15
    22 November 2018 06: 56
    The article, like other articles in this cycle, is very interesting and controversial. Turning to the conclusions at the end of the article, I want to remind the author that the Soviet Navy had a very high-quality reserve of transport vessels, supply vessels, and potential landing ships from the merchant fleet. Then each even the smallest boat was designed and built taking into account the requirements of naval acceptance. there were foundations for gun installations, gun cellars, etc. + the installations themselves and the PSU for them also existed and were stored in the right place. The acute problem of large-capacity military transports as such did not exist.
    1. +2
      22 November 2018 06: 59
      what was, then passed ... hi
      1. +3
        22 November 2018 07: 00
        Alas and ah ... And now they are going to privatize the remnants of Sovcomflot ...
      2. -5
        22 November 2018 07: 21
        People! I appeal to the "nervous and impressionable": skip this article. How am I going to do it! Otherwise I won't sleep the night and drink "bitter" for a day! That is, undermine the family budget and their own health! crying
        1. +8
          22 November 2018 07: 25
          Well, if you have a reason for disappointment is only this article, then it’s better to skip kanesh, otherwise everything in your country seems to be just fine .... I wonder what kind of country it is? ...
    2. +9
      22 November 2018 07: 05
      Quote: LeonidL
      Turning to the conclusions at the end of the article, I want to remind the author that the Soviet Navy had a very high-quality reserve of transport vessels, supply vessels, and potential landing ships from the merchant fleet.

      That's right. Alas, today everything is at the mercy of the invisible hand of the market
  2. +6
    22 November 2018 07: 03
    I completely forgot - the photo on the main page (it is not in the article itself) is the "Frontier" setting, but not ours, but Romanian. The photo is beautiful, that's why I inserted it
    1. +4
      22 November 2018 08: 06
      Andrey, a definite plus for the article good
      Tanks are returned to the Marine Corps brigades, although not T-90 or “Almaty”, but only T-80BV and T-72Б3, but any tank is better than none, etc.

      The modernized T-80BV tanks equipped with the Sosna-U multi-channel gunner's sight and the Relikt built-in reactive armor were demonstrated at the parade in Murmansk. Tanks formed as part of the 61st separate Kirkenes Red Banner Marine Brigade of the Northern Fleet of a separate tank company. From 30 minutes they are visible.

  3. +5
    22 November 2018 08: 52
    Thus, the "long arm" of the BRAV is still far from inaccessible, and in order to be able to hit the enemy, it must be deployed in the right place in a timely manner. Which once again brings us back to the problems of over-the-horizon reconnaissance and target designation, and they, as we know, have not yet been resolved.
    The Bastion battery includes the Monolit-B mobile ZGRLS. Quite a secret thing, for which the over-the-horizon target detection range is declared. There is a liability and an asset. In passive, it can ideally ensure the detection of enemy NK at ranges of 200-300 km by its radiation, while not unmasking itself in any way. In principle, the very thing is against the aggressor who came to bomb our coast, because in such a situation he cannot not shine with his radio equipment.
    1. 0
      22 November 2018 09: 26
      Quote: Alex_59
      The Bastion battery includes the Monolit-B mobile ZGRLS. Quite a secret thing, for which the over-the-horizon target detection range is declared.

      I didn’t know :))) Generally speaking, ships are being monitored by the Monolith for quite some time. In general, these stations have a problem - they function acceptable only under certain atmospheric conditions, and nothing else.
      In addition, in order to timely deploy a division, the Monolith, alas, is not enough. BUT! In any case, the fact that he is and attached to HRAV is personally great news for me!
      1. +5
        22 November 2018 10: 13
        Here is a lot of everything tasty:
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In general, these stations have a problem - they function acceptable only under certain atmospheric conditions, and nothing else.
        I was interested in these radars, since we did not have a frail cut on their account with Kaptsov. I, unlike Oleg, have the opportunity to refer not only to articles on the Internet, but also to relatives, one of whom served his whole life at RTOs, etc. 1234.1. And on this RTO there is a similar device, but more ancient radar. Actually, I carefully asked a relative about the weatherproofness of the over-horizon component of this RLC. And he assured me that everything works there as it should, and in general they say a bad question - in Soviet times, fakes did not put on combat duty. Of course, as with all radars, this complex depends on the state of the atmosphere, and in the worst conditions its MH capabilities subside by 30-40 percent, and that’s all. And this is mainly, as I understand it, concerns the active channel, and the passive one is even more stable. True, one caveat - all this relates to the climate of the Black Sea.
  4. +2
    22 November 2018 09: 12
    IMHO, about the BDK, helicopter carriers and the like, everything is already clear.
    Really fast they will not be.

    The priority is for small boats that can hide in the river, enter Caliber, and themselves fight off a helicopter or reconnaissance group.
  5. +1
    22 November 2018 09: 14
    And if not, then maybe it’s worth considering the idea of ​​creating a transport ship, which, “part-time” could play the role of a landing ship: such ships will not lose their significance even if someday we prove to be wealthy enough for construction UDC.

    Alternatively, something like the Rotterdam.
  6. -1
    22 November 2018 09: 28
    .... and they were to be replaced by the universal landing ships of the project 11780 "Ivan Rogov", also known by the nickname "Ivan Tarava" (for significant resemblance to the American UDC). With a displacement of about 25 tons, these ships were supposed to get a solid flight deck .....

    The author did not even bother to look at this Ivan Tarava himself, where a huge superstructure covers the entire deck and divides it into two unequal parts .....
    1. +3
      22 November 2018 10: 18
      Quote: Dzungar
      where a huge superstructure overlaps the entire deck and divides it into two unequal parts .....

      This is 1174. 1178 has an island-like superstructure like an aircraft carrier, or American UDC "Tarawa"
      1. +1
        22 November 2018 10: 40
        Ivan Rogov .... What do you mean ..? In the USSR there were landing ships with the same name ..?
        1. +1
          22 November 2018 10: 57
          Quote: Dzungar
          Ivan Rogov ....

          This is 1174.
          And the author writes about 1178 when he talks about UDC with a continuous flight deck. 1178 was not built.
          Most likely the author has a typo where 1178 is named "Ivan Rogov", that's all. It happens. )))
        2. +1
          22 November 2018 11: 28
          Quote: Dzungar
          Ivan Rogov .... What do you mean ..?

          The photo shows a large landing craft of project 1174 "Rhino". And I meant 1178, which was called "Ivan Tarava", but about the fact that I called the 1178 project "Ivan Rogov" - this is a mistake, I reported
  7. +1
    22 November 2018 10: 09
    Isn't "Ivan Rogov" a project 1174 large landing craft? And here "Ivan Tarava"?
    1. +1
      22 November 2018 11: 04
      The author was wrong. Horn - head 1174.
      1. 0
        22 November 2018 11: 29
        Yes, absolutely right.
  8. +5
    22 November 2018 11: 16
    Everything is intelligently and correctly laid out on the shelves. If you read the entire cycle of articles by the author, it becomes very sad. For in fact, in 5-7 years, Russia will no longer have a fleet as such.
  9. 0
    22 November 2018 11: 25
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk again pleased with a balanced and objective study, he wanted to argue with respected Andrei about UDC, but it turns out that without me he himself made a very logical and wise conclusion that Russia does not need them, at least for the coming decades. As for the landing ships, you don’t have to exaggerate, they will be written off 5-10 years later than Andrei indicates, this is a transport ship with simple equipment and weapons that can undergo repairs of all kinds many times and not so quickly become obsolete as a combat strike ship. Andrei rightly notes that there are not enough landing support ships, at the same time it is not worthy and generally surface ships of the far zone, but they are not needed, Russia does not have colonies and there is no need and ability to maintain a large surface fleet. For all such necessities like Syria, a few frigates are enough. Moreover, there is no need to land a large landing force over long distances. Landing operations are only support for the actions of the ground forces, and therefore only within the reach of coastal aviation, that is, no more than 2000 km, but in reality it is much closer. Therefore, UDK and BDK on the seas are not needed, but the MDK landing facilities themselves are quite capable of reaching any desired point without UDC, what to speak about the weather, in any case, landing is limited by the weather, no matter which ships carry it out. Thus, we do not need BDKs, but MDKs (in the air cavity), all the more so as they pass through the GDP between the fleets, which is convenient. Thus, the fleet only needs 8 BDK for the oceans. There are already almost two completely new ones, 6 pieces younger than 1986, and three including trophy 1985, that is, with a service life of 60 years, a new BDK will be needed in 2046, and with a service life of 55 years in 2040, the truth is before this period gradually replace marine BDK with 3-4 MDK each,
    1. -2
      22 November 2018 11: 38
      unless of course you listen to those sailors who are afraid of pitching so much that they think they’ll intimidate their opponents by pitching
  10. -2
    22 November 2018 11: 50
    Andrei's articles are constantly pissimism. When will there be optimism?
    1. +14
      22 November 2018 12: 07
      When will there be optimism?

      When there will be even the slightest reason for him
  11. +1
    22 November 2018 12: 16
    The nuance is that by the methods by which we land landings, it is generally impossible to achieve success in a modern war, except for situations where there is no resistance on the coast, including at the stage of delivery to the shore of rear units.
    1. +3
      22 November 2018 12: 22
      Quote: timokhin-aa
      The nuance is that by the methods by which we land, in modern war it is not possible to succeed at all, except in situations where there is no resistance on the shore at all

      So in a modern war no landing can be landed if there is at least a minimally organized resistance :))))))
      1. 0
        22 November 2018 12: 54
        No, it's not true.
        1. 0
          22 November 2018 20: 30
          I understand that the landing is possible 1 very secretively when the enemy does not know about it 2 after artillery bombardment, temporarily eliminating the enemy’s resistance 3 during artillery bombardment of missile and other strikes and suppressing enemy resistance, without one of the above conditions, it really makes no sense to land landing ... by the way, that's why UDC is meaningless, because any of the three conditions allows you to get a very limited period of time for the landing, that is, the landing should be massive parallel with armored vehicles to capture and hold the bridgehead, which can only be provided by the BDK and MDK, and not the UDC with their leisurely platoon crossing (flight) to the shore.
          1. 0
            22 November 2018 20: 50
            UDC are not meaningless, UDC or their "younger brothers" DVKD is the most effective way to carry out a combined landing according to the scheme: over-the-horizon landing + vertical coverage, based on a small number of ships. Then the Mistral was bought. For the second day I have an article about this on moderation.
            1. 0
              23 November 2018 08: 23
              the UDC concept is suitable for landing in a colony with a knowingly weak enemy and very far away. Russia does not need them.
  12. +1
    22 November 2018 14: 01
    Quote: faiver
    what was, then passed ... hi

    The monstrous capitalist system, in which the colonial government kneelingly obeys the orders of the IMF and the Committee of 300, as well as fiercely defends the interests of world-eaters, cannot maintain the country's defense capability at the minimum necessary, modern level.
    But there is a great opportunity to rectify the situation!
    To force the oligarchs (at least those who have not yet managed to escape over the hill), to equip their super yachts for military needs: to establish foundations for art or rocket launchers, equip each yacht with a crew of glamorous sailor paratroopers.
    Well, send the entire blue squadron to the South Baltic Fleet (southern coast of France), to conduct exercises.

    "The first 20 superyachts of Russian oligarchs surpassed in value all combat frigates built for the Russian Navy in the current decade"
    1. 0
      22 November 2018 16: 41
      There was an article by Oleg Kaptsov about this at the Military Review recently.
  13. +1
    22 November 2018 20: 16
    UDC is inactive, a good target for missiles and torpedoes of opponents. It would be better if the Eagles were done, as it was intended in the USSR: they will quickly reach the desired point and are less noticeable to enemy radars.
  14. +3
    22 November 2018 22: 49
    Andrey, thanks for the article!
    In 2014, Vilyuchinsk is visited by the "Transshelf", which was Soviet for many years, and in 2014 - under the Dutch flag, takes on board 2 submarines and transports them to Severodvinsk for repairs by the Northern Sea Route. That's for sure - the invisible hand of the market has put everything in its place ... This is how I recall at the press conference the remark of our Minister of Foreign Affairs: "Morons, five!"
    LeonidL (Leonid), respected, and now the spectacular fleet managers as such do not need either the military, the merchant, or the fishing. Last year, my husband's cousin (and he was over 55 years old) was persuaded for a long time on a barge to haul loads in the autumn White Sea in tow, and from Mezen to transfer the barge to Arkhangelsk for the winter. In Arkhangelsk, in the city where centuries of sailors were prepared, there were no specialists to walk along the autumn White Sea ... Although ... there are honey and ped in Arkhangelsk, and in Severodvinsk with branches of the Arkhangelsk and honey and ped, there is not enough teachers, no doctors ...
  15. 0
    27 November 2018 11: 59
    As we said earlier, although the flight range of the Onyx is unknown, it is practically impossible to exceed 500 km
    laughing What, dear inland sailor-in Wiki about this is not a word ????
  16. 0
    5 January 2019 01: 31
    Why does the author stubbornly ignore the presence of amphibious assault ships, pr. 12322?
  17. 0
    5 January 2019 01: 43
    "Russia is massively violating the INF Treaty" the author kindly notes.
    And are the Americans pink and fluffy?

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