Roast Roast
A werewolf from Lubyanka stole more than 10 000 secret documents.
He was taken directly to the Lubyanka. Immediately after duty. In the eyes of astonished colleagues who have not seen anything like this, for half a century they have not already taken security officers in the workplace.
Another portion of the "goods" lay in his diplomat. He was so self-confident that, knowing even about the last series of arrests and searches, he did not consider it necessary to lie low, to lie on the bottom. This primordially Russian hope would probably cost him much later - to the personnel security officer, former intelligence officer, FSB lieutenant colonel Alexander Mezhov ...
About this detective story stories You will not find in the print a single line. Even after the verdict of the court, the "competent" authorities prefer to remain silent: so calmer,
Meanwhile, the case of Lieutenant Colonel Mezhov is one of the most prominent pages in the history of modern counterintelligence. Bright - and at the same time shameful.
Good five years in the heart of Lubyanka with impunity acted "mole." During this time, he stole more than 10 thousands of secret documents. And even - the holy of holies - the reports that the FSB leadership prepared for the Kremlin. These papers, telling about the secret operations of the Lubyanka, were to be read only by a person: the president. But in parallel, they lay down on the table to completely strangers ...
By reading - burn
Spring 2000 th. The Kremlin declares war on Gusinsky. The oligarch himself falls on prison bunks. In his empire - a series of searches.
The main loot is waiting for the prosecutor's office in the security service of Most, a mysterious, all-powerful structure created by former KGB generals.
Decrypt telephone conversations of the best people of the country. Surveillance reports. Lovingly collected dirt. (Subsequently, by the way, part of the “Most” database went to the side, and anyone can get to know it through the “Internet”.)
Among this espionage opulence, the attention of operatives was also attracted by the selection of weekly bulletins about the most notable events in the country, which were prepared by the Information Administration of Most. "To be returned or destroyed on the spot" - was listed on each of them.
Why such mystery? After all, such reviews are preparing any large holding. But it was enough to scroll through them, and this question was dropped by itself.
The bulletins had something that the newspapers did not write about. Stories about the most delicate operations of the special services. Analysis of the situation in the army and the country. Details of counter-terrorism actions.
Even at first glance it was clear that most of this information is secret. People outsiders access to them ordered.
But where could such valuable information come from in a commercial structure? This question had to be answered, and as soon as possible. Who could guarantee that the “source” (or sources) of “Most” in parallel does not spy on anyone else? For example, on the CIA or BND?
The secret of the iron safe
When the FSB received the papers seized in Most, all doubts disappeared. Leaks could only be from here - from Lubyanka. .
Most of the materials found were almost identical to secret reports and FSB inquiries: Gusinsky’s people did not even bother to rewrite them.
It only remained to establish which of the Chekists had access to the missing materials.
Circle outlined quickly. Everything that was found in "Most" passed through the Information and Analytical Department of the FSB. More precisely, the operational information group (GOI).
This non-staff unit was created specifically to prepare materials for reports to the leaders of the state and the FSB. All the most valuable, important and secret accumulated here.
Lubyanka sounded the alarm. If someone from the GOI staff "merges" documents on the side, this is tantamount to death. It is impossible to even imagine the extent of the damage that such a traitor could inflict.
All GOI workers were taken under the hood. The main suspicions were caused by two - Major F. and the head of one of the departments of the IMU, Colonel S. (for obvious reasons, we do not give a last name). Both were searched. Straight
let's say no avail. Major F. found a Mauser with cartridges. In the working safe of Colonel S. - 110 thousand dollars. In cash.
Unlucky KGB detained. But, alas: their sins had nothing to do with the "Bridge" - they had no files ...
Since we will not return to these people anymore, I will immediately say that during the investigation other, no less dramatic circumstances came to light. Colonel S. — he was Kazakh by nationality; he soon admitted that he had transferred official documents to his fellow tribesmen from the “competent” bodies of Kazakhstan: mainly of an economic nature. He dismissed the mercenary intent: he said that he acted out of patriotic feelings alone.
But the witness found by the prosecutor's office - Lieutenant-Colonel GUBOP MIA - told the exact opposite. According to him, the Kazakh KGB officer did more than once to him, as they call it in the special services, recruiting approaches. The lieutenant colonel was also from Kazakhstan; aero brother also held a solid post in the analogue of our FSB. These circumstances and tried to take advantage of Colonel S.
However, the scandal was not needed by anyone. Formally, the CIS special services do not spy against each other. 10 years ago, they all signed a corresponding agreement: ironically, just in Almaty.
Raising noise meant worsening the already difficult Russian-Kazakh relations. The Kremlin could not go for it. The history of Colonel S. did not receive logical development. The criminal case against him was stopped under an amnesty ...
At some point, counterintelligence seemed to be at an impasse. Through a fine sieve, they sifted all GOI employees. Anyone who had access to the missing materials. .
To no avail. But the bill was not for weeks - for a day. Every day of delay could cost the state too much.
. Good luck came in the guise of one of the employee of the Security Service "Bridge". During a search, files with similar documents were found in his computer.
There was no point in unlocking. The man was forced to give the name of the person who supplied him with secret materials.
Having heard the long-awaited surname, the operatives finally understood why their previous searches were in vain. The fact is that the consultant of the 7 department of the Information and Analytical Department of the FSB, Alexander Mezhov, was not part of the operational information group. He just ... sat in the next room.
He was arrested immediately: June 1. Immediately after duty. In his portfolio were already prepared for sale diskettes with the next secret documents. There were no more questions left. Yes, and in Mezhov’s home computer, they found countless files stolen from the Lubyanka (most, he managed to erase most, but experts from the FSB research institute completely restored them).
At the first interrogations, it became clear: Lieutenant Colonel Mezhov successfully trades state secrets more ... from 96.
Night thief
The road to treason - each has its own. For the personnel security officer Mezhova, it began in the autumn of 96.
State security officers were then paid pennies. Money was sorely lacking. And then came back the deadline for a bank loan.
Of course, Mezhov could easily find earnings on the side. But he didn’t want, or was too lazy. Where it was easier (and more profitable) was a different way for him.
In the office next to him sat a group of operational information. The materials that flocked here were of undoubted interest for any special services: whether it was a private intelligence agency or foreign intelligence.
It turned out to be quite easy to find a buyer: the information market was established in Moscow a long time ago, and one of its most active players, the retired KGB officer Vladimir Grigoriev, Mezhov was well acquainted.
With the autumn of 96, the spy odyssey of Mezhov begins. Several times a month - mostly at night - he goes into the GOI room.
In general, it is not supposed to let outsiders here, but Mezhov is his own. Even leaving the office, the attendants leave in his care a computer, where all the secret information is accumulated.
The rest is a matter of technique. Professional analytics have only a few minutes to find the most interesting things in the car and copy them to floppy disks. If they find him at a computer, he explains that he is writing ... a book of recipes.
And the very next day the floppy disk goes into the hands of Grigoriev. The calculation takes place on the spot: for each Grigoriev he paid 100 — 200 dollars. (As the investigation established, not less than 13 thousands had passed through all of Mezhov.) Subsequently, these materials were resold by Grigoriev to Media-Most.
But, as you know, the appetite comes with eating. Entering into the taste, the "cook" Mezhov finds another client; Head of Inkombank Inkombank Mikhail Ponomarenko.
Now, in addition to the Grigoriev's "fees", he gets a monthly salary — 500 dollars. (Subsequently, Ponomarenko will switch to Norilsk Nickel, but this will have no effect on their relationship, because the leaders. Nickel also wanted to be aware of the latest events. First of all
Reviews prepared on the basis of inter-Choi diskettes were laid on the table of the future Krasnoyarsk Governor Khloponin.)
I call only two channels of information leakage: only what the prosecutor's office was able to prove. In fact, there were undoubtedly more of them. One of the buyers said during the interrogation that there were always several floppy disks in the diplomat of the Inter-Va. “This is not for you, and this is not for you,” he said, going over the “goods,” but yours.
But not caught - not a thief. I did not hurry to extend my term to Mezhov. He confessed only to the obvious crimes. And although the investigation suspected him of many sins, most of them remained behind the scenes. Including the mysterious history of his relationship with ... one English spy.
Her Majesty's Secret Service
Former employee of the SVR, Valeriy Oyamäe, was hooked by the British four years ago. In Tallinn.
They placed great hopes on their agent. No wonder he was recruited by the resident SIS himself. Regular meetings were held by the Director General of Estonian counterintelligence Jüri Pihl.
In intelligence assignments that the FSB later deciphered, Oyamäe was instructed to collect information about prominent political figures and possible approaches to them; on the leadership and operational staff of Lubyanka. And many many others.
He was arrested in March 2000. Three months before the exposure of Mezhov ...
I combined these two names not by chance. Mezhov and Oyamäe were long and familiar with each other: they once worked together in foreign intelligence. After his dismissal, Oyamäe did not lose touch with his former colleague. The investigation had data that they continued to meet.
I will never believe that a foreign agent, a professional spy would not use this exceptional opportunity.
The list of documents stolen by Interowe occupies more than one page in a criminal case. Weekly reports for the president on the most important issues of national security. The ciphertegram of the territorial bodies of the FSB. Reports of the Office of counterintelligence operations. Secret information key divisions of the FSB. Reports on the situation in the Caucasus.
The vast majority of the stolen was classified as "secret". Much - "Sov. Secret". Thanks to Mezhov, the results of dozens of counterintelligence operations, hundreds of developments and operational accounting have become the property of "publicity".
He did not disdain anything. Pulling all that tuck under the arm. And theses of speeches of the director of the FSB at various meetings. And lists of Lubyanka personnel. Even the results of the clinical examination, which were employees of his department.
Without exaggeration, it can be said that modern counterintelligence hasn’t yet known a “mole” of a similar scale ...
Alexander Mezhov surrendered to the victor immediately after his arrest. He did not deny his guilt. Moreover, he wrote a penitential letter to the director of the FSB, in which he asked his sad colleagues to use his sad example as a warning to
The court took into account these circumstances. The unlucky "cook" Mezhov was given a relatively mild sentence: 3 of the year and 1 month of the correctional colony. It happened just recently ...
He was taken directly to the Lubyanka. Immediately after duty. In the eyes of astonished colleagues who have not seen anything like this, for half a century they have not already taken security officers in the workplace.
Another portion of the "goods" lay in his diplomat. He was so self-confident that, knowing even about the last series of arrests and searches, he did not consider it necessary to lie low, to lie on the bottom. This primordially Russian hope would probably cost him much later - to the personnel security officer, former intelligence officer, FSB lieutenant colonel Alexander Mezhov ...
About this detective story stories You will not find in the print a single line. Even after the verdict of the court, the "competent" authorities prefer to remain silent: so calmer,
Meanwhile, the case of Lieutenant Colonel Mezhov is one of the most prominent pages in the history of modern counterintelligence. Bright - and at the same time shameful.
Good five years in the heart of Lubyanka with impunity acted "mole." During this time, he stole more than 10 thousands of secret documents. And even - the holy of holies - the reports that the FSB leadership prepared for the Kremlin. These papers, telling about the secret operations of the Lubyanka, were to be read only by a person: the president. But in parallel, they lay down on the table to completely strangers ...
By reading - burn
Spring 2000 th. The Kremlin declares war on Gusinsky. The oligarch himself falls on prison bunks. In his empire - a series of searches.
The main loot is waiting for the prosecutor's office in the security service of Most, a mysterious, all-powerful structure created by former KGB generals.
Decrypt telephone conversations of the best people of the country. Surveillance reports. Lovingly collected dirt. (Subsequently, by the way, part of the “Most” database went to the side, and anyone can get to know it through the “Internet”.)
Among this espionage opulence, the attention of operatives was also attracted by the selection of weekly bulletins about the most notable events in the country, which were prepared by the Information Administration of Most. "To be returned or destroyed on the spot" - was listed on each of them.
Why such mystery? After all, such reviews are preparing any large holding. But it was enough to scroll through them, and this question was dropped by itself.
The bulletins had something that the newspapers did not write about. Stories about the most delicate operations of the special services. Analysis of the situation in the army and the country. Details of counter-terrorism actions.
Even at first glance it was clear that most of this information is secret. People outsiders access to them ordered.
But where could such valuable information come from in a commercial structure? This question had to be answered, and as soon as possible. Who could guarantee that the “source” (or sources) of “Most” in parallel does not spy on anyone else? For example, on the CIA or BND?
The secret of the iron safe
When the FSB received the papers seized in Most, all doubts disappeared. Leaks could only be from here - from Lubyanka. .
Most of the materials found were almost identical to secret reports and FSB inquiries: Gusinsky’s people did not even bother to rewrite them.
It only remained to establish which of the Chekists had access to the missing materials.
Circle outlined quickly. Everything that was found in "Most" passed through the Information and Analytical Department of the FSB. More precisely, the operational information group (GOI).
This non-staff unit was created specifically to prepare materials for reports to the leaders of the state and the FSB. All the most valuable, important and secret accumulated here.
Lubyanka sounded the alarm. If someone from the GOI staff "merges" documents on the side, this is tantamount to death. It is impossible to even imagine the extent of the damage that such a traitor could inflict.
All GOI workers were taken under the hood. The main suspicions were caused by two - Major F. and the head of one of the departments of the IMU, Colonel S. (for obvious reasons, we do not give a last name). Both were searched. Straight
let's say no avail. Major F. found a Mauser with cartridges. In the working safe of Colonel S. - 110 thousand dollars. In cash.
Unlucky KGB detained. But, alas: their sins had nothing to do with the "Bridge" - they had no files ...
Since we will not return to these people anymore, I will immediately say that during the investigation other, no less dramatic circumstances came to light. Colonel S. — he was Kazakh by nationality; he soon admitted that he had transferred official documents to his fellow tribesmen from the “competent” bodies of Kazakhstan: mainly of an economic nature. He dismissed the mercenary intent: he said that he acted out of patriotic feelings alone.
But the witness found by the prosecutor's office - Lieutenant-Colonel GUBOP MIA - told the exact opposite. According to him, the Kazakh KGB officer did more than once to him, as they call it in the special services, recruiting approaches. The lieutenant colonel was also from Kazakhstan; aero brother also held a solid post in the analogue of our FSB. These circumstances and tried to take advantage of Colonel S.
However, the scandal was not needed by anyone. Formally, the CIS special services do not spy against each other. 10 years ago, they all signed a corresponding agreement: ironically, just in Almaty.
Raising noise meant worsening the already difficult Russian-Kazakh relations. The Kremlin could not go for it. The history of Colonel S. did not receive logical development. The criminal case against him was stopped under an amnesty ...
At some point, counterintelligence seemed to be at an impasse. Through a fine sieve, they sifted all GOI employees. Anyone who had access to the missing materials. .
To no avail. But the bill was not for weeks - for a day. Every day of delay could cost the state too much.
. Good luck came in the guise of one of the employee of the Security Service "Bridge". During a search, files with similar documents were found in his computer.
There was no point in unlocking. The man was forced to give the name of the person who supplied him with secret materials.
Having heard the long-awaited surname, the operatives finally understood why their previous searches were in vain. The fact is that the consultant of the 7 department of the Information and Analytical Department of the FSB, Alexander Mezhov, was not part of the operational information group. He just ... sat in the next room.
He was arrested immediately: June 1. Immediately after duty. In his portfolio were already prepared for sale diskettes with the next secret documents. There were no more questions left. Yes, and in Mezhov’s home computer, they found countless files stolen from the Lubyanka (most, he managed to erase most, but experts from the FSB research institute completely restored them).
At the first interrogations, it became clear: Lieutenant Colonel Mezhov successfully trades state secrets more ... from 96.
Night thief
The road to treason - each has its own. For the personnel security officer Mezhova, it began in the autumn of 96.
State security officers were then paid pennies. Money was sorely lacking. And then came back the deadline for a bank loan.
Of course, Mezhov could easily find earnings on the side. But he didn’t want, or was too lazy. Where it was easier (and more profitable) was a different way for him.
In the office next to him sat a group of operational information. The materials that flocked here were of undoubted interest for any special services: whether it was a private intelligence agency or foreign intelligence.
It turned out to be quite easy to find a buyer: the information market was established in Moscow a long time ago, and one of its most active players, the retired KGB officer Vladimir Grigoriev, Mezhov was well acquainted.
With the autumn of 96, the spy odyssey of Mezhov begins. Several times a month - mostly at night - he goes into the GOI room.
In general, it is not supposed to let outsiders here, but Mezhov is his own. Even leaving the office, the attendants leave in his care a computer, where all the secret information is accumulated.
The rest is a matter of technique. Professional analytics have only a few minutes to find the most interesting things in the car and copy them to floppy disks. If they find him at a computer, he explains that he is writing ... a book of recipes.
And the very next day the floppy disk goes into the hands of Grigoriev. The calculation takes place on the spot: for each Grigoriev he paid 100 — 200 dollars. (As the investigation established, not less than 13 thousands had passed through all of Mezhov.) Subsequently, these materials were resold by Grigoriev to Media-Most.
But, as you know, the appetite comes with eating. Entering into the taste, the "cook" Mezhov finds another client; Head of Inkombank Inkombank Mikhail Ponomarenko.
Now, in addition to the Grigoriev's "fees", he gets a monthly salary — 500 dollars. (Subsequently, Ponomarenko will switch to Norilsk Nickel, but this will have no effect on their relationship, because the leaders. Nickel also wanted to be aware of the latest events. First of all
Reviews prepared on the basis of inter-Choi diskettes were laid on the table of the future Krasnoyarsk Governor Khloponin.)
I call only two channels of information leakage: only what the prosecutor's office was able to prove. In fact, there were undoubtedly more of them. One of the buyers said during the interrogation that there were always several floppy disks in the diplomat of the Inter-Va. “This is not for you, and this is not for you,” he said, going over the “goods,” but yours.
But not caught - not a thief. I did not hurry to extend my term to Mezhov. He confessed only to the obvious crimes. And although the investigation suspected him of many sins, most of them remained behind the scenes. Including the mysterious history of his relationship with ... one English spy.
Her Majesty's Secret Service
Former employee of the SVR, Valeriy Oyamäe, was hooked by the British four years ago. In Tallinn.
They placed great hopes on their agent. No wonder he was recruited by the resident SIS himself. Regular meetings were held by the Director General of Estonian counterintelligence Jüri Pihl.
In intelligence assignments that the FSB later deciphered, Oyamäe was instructed to collect information about prominent political figures and possible approaches to them; on the leadership and operational staff of Lubyanka. And many many others.
He was arrested in March 2000. Three months before the exposure of Mezhov ...
I combined these two names not by chance. Mezhov and Oyamäe were long and familiar with each other: they once worked together in foreign intelligence. After his dismissal, Oyamäe did not lose touch with his former colleague. The investigation had data that they continued to meet.
I will never believe that a foreign agent, a professional spy would not use this exceptional opportunity.
The list of documents stolen by Interowe occupies more than one page in a criminal case. Weekly reports for the president on the most important issues of national security. The ciphertegram of the territorial bodies of the FSB. Reports of the Office of counterintelligence operations. Secret information key divisions of the FSB. Reports on the situation in the Caucasus.
The vast majority of the stolen was classified as "secret". Much - "Sov. Secret". Thanks to Mezhov, the results of dozens of counterintelligence operations, hundreds of developments and operational accounting have become the property of "publicity".
He did not disdain anything. Pulling all that tuck under the arm. And theses of speeches of the director of the FSB at various meetings. And lists of Lubyanka personnel. Even the results of the clinical examination, which were employees of his department.
Without exaggeration, it can be said that modern counterintelligence hasn’t yet known a “mole” of a similar scale ...
Alexander Mezhov surrendered to the victor immediately after his arrest. He did not deny his guilt. Moreover, he wrote a penitential letter to the director of the FSB, in which he asked his sad colleagues to use his sad example as a warning to
The court took into account these circumstances. The unlucky "cook" Mezhov was given a relatively mild sentence: 3 of the year and 1 month of the correctional colony. It happened just recently ...
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