Broken wings. Will naval aviation revive?
Aircraft made their way into the fleet for a long time and not easy. The relationship between aviators and sailors was not easy to build. Prim people in beautiful strict form, accustomed to proudly drive large and beautiful warships across the seas, looked cautiously at the desperate people in leather jackets who disappeared in gasoline and threw their flimsy flying machines towards the heavenly elements, realizing that these shelves are now capable of sending to the bottom of their huge armored cruisers and battleships, but not wanting to admit it.
And then the war broke out in the world, completely changing the fleets, aircraft, and the relationship between them.
The aircraft proved to be deadly enemies for surface ships. The list of heavy armored ships sent to the bottom by deck or land based aircraft is very long. But in our country they underestimate the role that aviation played in the war at sea in fact. Usually aircraft carrier battles in the Pacific come to mind, but in reality the role of aviation was greater at times.
It was the aircraft that defeated the German fleet in the battle for the Atlantic. Do not think up the British to launch fighters directly from transport ships using powder accelerators, communication between the United States and Britain would have been broken by "Condors", also by airplanes, by the way. And then escort aircraft carriers, which the USA built more than one hundred units, base patrol aircraft equipped with radar stations and flying boats, entered the business.
Of course, the corvettes and destroyers of the Allies also contributed, but they dealt with the fact that somehow survived air strikes. And Germany also lost surface ships from aviation. The Bismarck received a torpedo from a torpedo carrier, and only then did the ships finish it off. "Tirpitz" sank heavy bombers. The list is long.
But the Axis countries did not lag behind. The Germans did not have exactly naval aviation, but the Luftwaffe effectively operated over the seas. Both the huge losses of our Baltic Fleet, and the sunk destroyers and cruisers on the Black Sea, ships in the Arctic from the polar convoys who died in the Arctic - all this or only aircraft, or, in some cases, mostly they. Then the Allies suffered from the German pilots in the Mediterranean, and the Italians "received" them "at the end of the battle" in the region. There is no talk about the Japanese, they and the Americans became the founders of the new naval doctrines and ideas implicated in air power, starting with Pearl Harbor and drowning Kuantan's Connection Z. The Americans, in addition to the broadest scale carrier-based battles, fought against the Japanese fleet with their army aircraft in New Guinea, and the scale of that war was not much inferior to the carrier-based battles. The strikes of coastal aircraft on convoys and the mining of land bomber harbors cost the Japanese almost more casualties in men than all aircraft carrier battles combined.
And what are we? And the same thing: the USSR was "in trend" here. Of all the German ships sunk on the Soviet-German front, more than 50% were drowned by Navy aircraft, and more than 70% by armed ships.
It was aviation that became the decisive force of the war at sea during that war. The force that determines the winner, and is able to level the lack of warships.
After the war, the USSR intensively developed naval aviation, and also practiced the use of air force against naval targets. Torpedo bombs were built, in the subordination of the Navy there were destructive units. For hunting submarines created flying boats with a long range.
Immediately there was a lag. First, for political reasons, deck aviation did not develop - the USSR did not build aircraft carriers, not even light air defense aircraft carriers. And this is despite the fact that back in 1948, the commission of Rear Admiral V.F. Chernyshev concluded that there are almost no tasks at sea that could be performed without aviation, and that coastal aviation will always be late for the call of surface forces. So it turned out.
Secondly, when the Americans acquired the George Washington-class submarines equipped with ballistic missiles, and when in response to this threat, work began on creating an anti-submarine aircraft capable of finding submarines in a submerged position, it turned out that the domestic radio-electronic industry was unable create a search and targeting system of the desired efficiency. Anti-submarine IL-38, Be-12 and Tu-142 that appeared in the USSR never became a truly effective PLO aircraft.
At the same time, reconnaissance aviation of the Navy was, as they say, at the world level and above, and the sea-launched missile carrier was an unprecedentedly powerful tool that gave the USSR, who did not have large surface forces, the ability to conduct massive attacks by enemy naval formations, and, importantly, to maneuver forces and equipment between fleets - an opportunity that the Navy ships would not have in wartime.
Up to a certain point, the Navy also had its own fighter aircraft, which could prevent enemy aircraft from attacking Soviet ships in the near-sea zone. But even in the Soviet years that were blessed for combat might, the problem that was destined, in the post-Soviet years, to grow into completely ugly forms began to grow.
The pilots, whose planes were the main striking force of the Navy in a non-nuclear war, and the "eyes" of the fleet, and its "fire brigade" capable of arriving on command anywhere in the country in a matter of hours, did not become "their own" in the fleet. The psychological problem suddenly became organizational.
Naval pilots had general military ranks. Their career opportunities were limited in comparison with the crew. On the whole, naval aviation was treated as a subsidiary of the troop of forces with respect to surface and underwater forces. While the Soviet government could “flood” the armed forces with all the resources necessary for them, it was tolerable. But in 1991, the year of Soviet power was gone, and the abscess burst.
That's what писал former commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet, Lieutenant-General V. N. Sokerin:
... After celebrating their 60 anniversary, in 2002, the real forge of naval aviation personnel and the last in the Navy aviation, 5-I Kirkenes Red Banner Naval Rocket-bearing Air Division, which had been brought to destruction, was disbanded, because before the disappearance of its personnel from 24 the commanders of the ships did not carry out a single one, not even an export flight, and that was on the Tu-22М3 aircraft. In fact, due to the absence of kerosene, it did not exist for many years at the “zero” level of pilot training. Back in the beginning of the 90s, there were plans for its transfer to the 37 th VAHK, if they were realized, I am sure that the division, which included some of the newest (by production years) Tu-22М3 aircraft, did not disappear would go to oblivion.
Or this fragment:
So it was everywhere, in all fleets, all the long 90-e, which in fact did not end for naval aviation. While in VKS such problems went into non-existence even in 2000-s, then for aviation units of the fleet, similar episodes were the norm in 2015-th year. Perhaps this is the norm now.
The Navy practically “killed” its main thing with its own hands weapon.
The second misfortune was a break in the development of technology for naval aviation. Even in the 90-s, some money was allocated for research on promising ships, and the construction of combat ships began with the 2000-s. But almost nothing was invested in the development of naval aviation. With the exception of updating several assault air regiments and a certain amount of research and development by means and methods of anti-submarine warfare, no major work was done to create new aircraft for the fleet in Russia.
This hit was especially hard on anti-submarine aviation, which was "unlucky" even under the USSR.
On this issue, we dwell in more detail.
As you know, our chips were the largest in the world. The unpleasant truth was hidden behind this joke: the domestic electronics industry was lagging behind the enemy in the element base, and this was all for it - the lag in mass-dimensional characteristics, the lag in communication, in the reliability of electronics, in information processing media.
It began to relate to antisubmarine aviation as soon as it became necessary to begin using radiohydroacoustic buoys (RGAB), receive signals from them, process them and record. And our buoys, and signal transmission, and methods and means of processing were very far behind the Americans. As a result, “contacts” with foreign submarines were a whole event in the life of the anti-submarine aircraft crew. This problem was never solved, until the beginning of the work on the topic “Window” mentioned earlier.
Another one has never been solved - a vicious approach to the design of aircraft in general.
A passive buoy reacts to noise. But the sea has a natural level of noise, which also depends on the excitement. He is variable. And if the buoy is adjusted to noise, corresponding to, for example, two points, and the excitement at sea turned out to be four, then the buoy will respond to the natural sound of the sea, and not to the sound of the submarine that exceeds it. The search will be thwarted.
And in the IL-38, and Tu-142 crew access to the buoys in flight is absent. Having set up buoys on the ground, then nothing can be changed. Buoys are fixed in the weapons bay horizontally, like bombs. And if the weather turned bad, that's all. Disruption operation
In contrast to our planes, in the American Orion, the buoys are located in a separate compartment, in inclined launch pits communicating with the inhabited compartment, and the crew members have the opportunity to tune them during the performance of the combat mission. This alone multiplied the effectiveness of the combat departure of the aircraft.
In the USSR, something similar could be done in the Be-12, which has the ability to pass through the entire aircraft, including the weapons compartment, through, through the bulkhead doors. Of course, this would require a recomposition of the compartment, and a finalization of the airframe. But no one has been puzzled by it so far.
Also in Orion, the crew retains its combat effectiveness much longer - there are places for rest (even cots) in the plane, low noise, more comfortable working conditions. For comparison, in the Be-12, the noise level in the cockpit over time leads to hearing impairment. The computers on board, used to process the signals from the buoys, were superior to ours by the era.
In total, with the best LTH and significantly better buoys in design, it was still in the late seventies that ensured the total superiority of the Orions in search operations on domestic machines. And then the Americans introduced a radar search for perturbations of the water surface caused by a submerged submarine, introduced the possibility of setting the field from the buoys and ensuring their joint operation, low-frequency buoys that increased the detection distance of the underwater object at times, and the gap was simply endless. So he now remains.
Modernization of aircraft in Soviet times gave a minimal effect. R & D “Window” could be a breakthrough, but in the late USSR innovations found a place for themselves under the Sun with great difficulty, and as a result, nothing really happened, although it was easier to find American submarines on retrofit planes hundreds of times (!) to accumulate "several" contacts "per week, and in a month of combat work to find more foreign submarines than during the whole previous life.
And finally, a tactical question: NATO and the Americans almost always knew that the Russians had sent their anti-submarine to a sortie. The location of the radar in Europe and Japan, as well as sophisticated means of RTR always allowed them to detect the fact of the departure of the aircraft in "their" direction in advance. And almost always, when in the Sea of Okhotsk, the Barents or the Mediterranean, our crews had something to look for, they had enemy fighters on their tail. In fact, the crews of PLO planes were suicide bombers - in the event of a real clash, there would be no one to protect them during the combat departure - the USSR fighter aircraft did not have planes with sufficient range, or an in-flight refueling system to escort the anti-submarine, and could not they protect it in the absence of their DRLO aircraft.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the anti-submarine aircraft came a timelessness. Work stopped on the amphibian A-40. Somehow, work was carried out on the new Novella complex, the possibility of building a PLO aircraft on the basis of the Tu-204 was discussed sluggishly, some kind of research was being carried out ... This did not give a practical result, and the fleet of aircraft was continuously decreasing. Less and less IL-38, Be-12 and Tu-142М remained, and the new aircraft were not even really designed. Meanwhile, the United States and its allies made a breakthrough as a submarine, making it even less noisy, and in the case of its allies - Germany and Japan - by introducing air-independent power plants onto their diesel-electric submarines.
The situation in our aviation PLO would be very sad if the complex "Novella" had not appeared. However, it must be understood that it would not exist if it were not for the export contract with India for the modernization of the IL-38 previously supplied to IL-38SD Sea Dragon.
In the 2010s, a ray of light flashed in the gloomy dying realm of naval aviation - the modernization of the Tu-142М3 in the М3М version and the Il-38 in the Il-38Н version with the Novella complex began. But the number of planes remaining in the ranks is such that they can be safely "put out of the brackets" in any serious conflict.
We will not speculate on how effective the Novella complex is and what is installed on board the Tu-142М when it is turned into the M3M variant. This topic is very sensitive. Let's just say - we are still very far from the USA and Japan.
But anti-submarine aviation is critical to protect the country. The United States and the Allies have a huge submarine, and most importantly, it is precisely on the submarines of the United States and Great Britain that most of the Anglo-Saxon nuclear arsenal is located. Neither the defense of the country from a hypothetical nuclear strike, nor a preventive nuclear blitzkrieg, if it turns out to be necessary, is possible without destroying at least some of the strategic submarines of the United States, because otherwise the losses of the Russian civilian population are simply prohibitively large. But, even bypassing (so far) the question of finding these submarines in the ocean, it must be admitted that even part of them cannot be destroyed without modern anti-submarine aviation. And it is not. It is hard to believe in this, but the lack of a submarine hunter in Russia may eventually cost the lives of most of our people. Such is the reality, unfortunately.
And this is all the more insulting because all the technologies needed to create a modern anti-submarine are already in Russia today ...
At present, Russian naval aviation is an extremely strange conglomeration of various combat and transport squadrons, often brought together in regimental regiments, which, due to different even for the purpose of the planes in the composition, even really will not be able to command. The number of aircraft of each type in service with the Navy is calculated in units of aircraft, but the types of aircraft are greater than those of the US Navy (minus their carrier-based aircraft). This is similar to the naval aviation of some Third World country, but interspersed with anti-submarines and interceptors left over from the dead civilization, which, however, are rapidly becoming obsolete.
Attack aircraft is represented by old Su-24МР and new Su-30СМ, which are reduced to two assault regiments, where they replaced Su-24. MRA with its missile carriers remained in the past forever. Coast-based fighter aviation is represented by a modest number of Su-27 and MiG-31, approximately two regiments in size. Anti-submarine - less than fifty machines of all types - IL-38, IL-38H, Tu-142M, MR, M3M, Be-12, of which at least seven can be used to combat submarines, and, possibly, , twelve Tu-38. But it is at least something and somehow.
For comparison: Japan has more than ninety aircraft, each of which simply infinitely surpasses any of ours in efficiency - this also applies to the Orions assembled in Japan, and to the monstrous Kawasaki P-1, which, apparently, are the most advanced aircraft PLO in the world at the moment.
The fleet does not have its own aircraft aircrafts and DRLO airplanes, if they are needed, they will have to be “asked” from the VKS through the General Staff or higher command in the theater, and it’s not a fact that they will be given in a big war.
For reconnaissance, there is only the same low-speed and defenseless Tu-142М and a handful of Su-24МР, which cannot fly far without tankers.
In general, the Navy does not show any particular interest in having naval aviation, and news that it will be transmitted in the army of the Air Force and Air Defense, did not cause any response in the naval environment.
As if they don't need airplanes at all.
Separately, it should be said about the ship aviation. Kuznetsov's campaign in the Mediterranean Sea to the glorious pages of the military stories can not be attributed. But, at least, the naval aviation gained at least some experience, albeit a negative one. We will immediately say that the experts had warned in advance that the air group was not ready to carry out combat missions, and the ship itself was not constructively designed to perform percussion missions. So, before Syria, even the weapons cellars had to be refined to ensure there is the possibility of storing bombs in large quantities.
Nevertheless, in comparison with reconnaissance or anti-submarine aviation, ship in some gains. If in Russia it is now impossible to produce an anti-submarine aircraft at all (there is no design that could be put into production), then aircraft for ship-based aviation, MiG-29K, are produced for themselves. But, unfortunately, the Ka-27 and Ka-29 helicopters are not produced. Just as with anti-submarine aircraft, with radio intelligence aircraft and jammers, the loss of each unit will be irrecoverable.
As for the ship fighters, the 279-th cruiser is still limited in combat capability. Perhaps sometime when the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is restored, and the deck crews are equipped and trained as they should (for example, they will have a cutting tool for quickly dismantling the torn arrestor cable and will be trained to replace it quickly), we will see and training drums with the maximum possible number of combat missions per day to attack missions, flights to the tasks of armed air reconnaissance over the sea, working out air defense tasks of ship formations, hitting the entire air group (as the Americans say “alpha a-strike "), the work of the aviation regiment's headquarters to organize long and continuous combat missions in different" modes ", and the interaction of shipboard aircraft with the coastal ... so far there is nothing like that. Nevertheless, at least the lost aircraft can be repaid, which is already good, whatever they may be. Still aircraft carrier "to compensate" ...
At the moment, the situation in naval aviation is as follows.
1. Specialized reconnaissance aviation. In fact, almost absent, there are several Su-24МР. The long-range exploration tasks are carried out by airplanes of various classes, mainly Tu-142M.
2. Specialized coast attack aircraft. Two regiments on the Su-30CM and Su-24M, modern and trained connections, but do not have long-range CRPs. Against the same US Navy, these regiments will last for a couple of sorties. But they can even sink someone in a fight with the US Navy. The best part of AI in its state and combat capability; dangerous for any opponent.
3. Anti-submarine aircraft. About forty cars, somehow capable of performing anti-submarine missions. Of these, about twenty are completely outdated and, prior to the upgrade, their combat value against a full-fledged enemy is strictly zero. New aircraft in the Russian Federation are not made, any loss of the PLO aircraft is irreparable.
4. Ship aviation. Small: one incomplete fighter regiment and several dozen helicopters. Resides in an incomprehensible status after the start of repair of the aircraft carrier. It is limited in combat effectiveness precisely as a ship. Anti-submarine and amphibious assault helicopters are not mass-produced, the loss of each such helicopter is irreparable. Also, ship training aircraft are not produced, although their production can be restored. Ka-52K naval attack helicopters are being produced, but their role in the naval weapons system is unclear.
5. Fighter aircraft. About two regiments, one each in the Northern and Pacific fleets. On the 2015 year, the attitude towards the shelves as a suitcase without a handle, no fuel was allocated for flights. In 2018, press reports were published in the press about the transfer of naval fighter aircraft to the newly created Air Force and Air Defense armies. At 2018, the year has increased the number of reports of flights of the MiG-31 from Yelizovo to Kamchatka, while the aircraft carry symbols of the Navy.
6. Transport Aviation. About fifty aircraft belonging to eight different types (An-12,24,26 different modifications, Tu-134, 154 in passenger variants, IL-18, An-140). It is combat-ready, but mainly consists of airplanes that are discontinued. The tasks of parachute landing of parts of the Special Forces and Marine Corps are only possible on a limited scale.
There are several new Mi-8 helicopters of various modifications and several training aircraft.
This is not the naval aviation with which you can defend the country in a big war, not the aircraft with which the fleet can call itself combat-capable, and not the aircraft with which the navy can be an instrument of foreign policy influence that can be used in countering the enemy. And, worst of all, no one sounds the alarm about this.
There have been rumors lately that the situation with anti-submarine aircraft may straighten out somewhat. Back in 2017, Major General I. Kozhin, commander of naval aviation, said the following: ““ Work on the creation of anti-submarine patrol aircraft of the new generation for naval aviation of the Russian Navy is nearing completion ”. Observers are unanimous in that the Major General had in mind a patrol and anti-submarine aircraft based on the IL-114.
The layout of the aircraft was shown at the exhibition of weapons and military equipment KADEX-2018 In Kazakhstan.
It is noteworthy that the portholes go along the entire side, and, perhaps, the problem of adjusting the sensitivity of the RGAB during a combat departure on this aircraft can be solved. Also noteworthy is that in the drawings the plane carries the anti-ship missile X-35. Earlier, the Navy refused to install them both on the Tu-142 and on the IL-38Н (although they cost on an Indian export aircraft). Photos of the IL-114 flying laboratory with a fairing under the fuselage radar "Kasatka-S", produced NGO "Radar-MMS".
The network immediately appeared alternative fantasies on the future development of combat aircraft on this platform.
Is the IL-114 a good plane if we consider it as a base for PLO aircraft? Do not say that much. Far from ideal. But bezrybe and cancer fish. Even such a plane to infinity is better than none, and if such planes are really built, then this should only be welcomed.
At the same time, we must not forget that the future of such a platform as IL-114, basically questionable.
Also at the beginning of 2018, the expert community was stunned news on the preparation of the modernization of the Be-12. These planes are less than ten units, and presumably about ten boards can be found in storage. As a result, you can get 14-16 machines. We must immediately say that this is an extremely irrational and expensive solution that makes sense only in one case - if the need to massively use anti-submarine aircraft will arise before the new aircraft is ready. Similar thoughts arise from news of a similar impending (supposedly) revitalization of the PLO Mi-14 helicopters. Do you really have any data on a war that is about to start soon? Or is the new plane so "zero" that it came to the "resurrection of the dead"?
Anyway, in the field of anti-submarine aviation, some behind-the-scenes movements clearly began, and God forbid that they end up with something good, because the situation is truly intolerable.
In general, with the current attitude of the Navy to naval aviation, it is not possible to expect any dramatic changes for the better. Neither in anti-submarine aviation, nor in shock, nor in reconnaissance, nor in auxiliary. Timelessness in naval aviation continues.
- Alexander Timokhin
- NGO "Radar MMS", Navy Recognition, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
- Fleet without ships. Russian Navy on the verge of collapse
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