Russian Navy. Sad look into the future. Marines
This article is devoted to the current state of the Russian Marine Corps. Honestly, the author pondered for a long time whether it was worth undertaking because, alas, he did not seriously study the development of this kind of troops of the Russian Navy. However, considering the state of the Russian naval fleet, it is absolutely impossible to lose sight of such an important component of it, which is our marines.
We will not consider in detail history the emergence of this kind of troops in our Fatherland, we note only that the marines in one form or another periodically created, then abolished back. Peter I introduced it on a constant basis - today there are polar points of view on the role of this sovereign in Russian history, but there can be no dual opinions about the usefulness of organizing marines as a separate branch of troops. For "cutting through the window to Europe" by conquering outlets to the Baltic Sea and securing its positions on the Black Sea coast, the marines, of course, was absolutely necessary.
Then, at the beginning of the 19 century (in anticipation of the invasion of Napoleon), the marines were abolished. Not that the Russian Imperial Navy considered the actions on land to be unnecessary and no longer characteristic of the fleet, but it was believed that the crew members of warships armed on land could cope with it, and if their forces were not enough, then the Cossacks or ordinary infantry. Of course, such an approach cannot be considered as something sensible. A sailor, even an ordinary sailor, requires quite a long and serious preparation for service on a ship where, in general, land combat skills are not needed. Accordingly, its use in land operations can be justified unless in some exceptional, atypical cases, but not on a permanent basis. As for the Cossacks, they, of course, did a lot of things on land as scouts, but they did not know the sea specifics.
Understanding that something was going wrong came only at the beginning of the twentieth century, when they tried to revive the marines in 1911. Several battalions were created, but still it didn’t work out and it can be said that the USSR did not inherit this branch, but had to create it independently and, in general, from scratch. In fact, the birth of the Marine Corps in the USSR took place during the Great Patriotic War, where it covered itself with unfading glory.
However, after the war, before the 1956 g, all marines were gradually disbanded. It was only in 1963 that the revival began - the 336 th guards motorized rifle regiment of the 120 th guards motorized rifle division was reorganized into the 336 th guards separate marine regiment of the Baltic Fleet.
Probably, we can say that it was then that the view on the marine corps was finally formed, as on the troops with special training and specialized amphibious landing equipment, while the military equipment was to a certain extent standardized with the land, and with the one that was used aerially -landing troops. The brigade was considered the main formation of the Marine Corps, there were three of them in the USSR - in the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern Fleets, but the Pacific Fleet was equipped with a division. The states of the brigades could vary significantly, on average, with 2 men, they were in service with up to 000 tanks T-55, 160-265 armored personnel carriers, 18 122-mm self-propelled self-propelled guns Gvozdika, 24 self-propelled mortar and artillery mounts Nona-S and, of course, 18 Grad MLRS systems. As for the small arms, as far as the author could figure it out, it did not differ too much from what was laid down in the state by ordinary motorized rifles.
The Marines took direct part in the combat services of the Soviet Navy. For the Marines, it looked like this: amphibious ships were sent to the same Mediterranean Sea with the Marines unit and, of course, their equipment, which was put in place by the state. There they were in constant readiness to disembark on someone’s coast.
I must say that the Soviet marines have never been analogous to the American. The United States Marine Corps (USMC), in fact, is an expeditionary force of more than 180 thousand people. able to independently conduct major military operations outside the United States. Hence the divisional structure of the USMC, the presence in its composition of its own wing, etc. At the same time, the Soviet marines had more local tasks, such as:
1. the landing of tactical amphibious assault forces to solve independent tasks and to assist ground forces formations;
2. use as a first echelon of the assault force during the landing of operational assault forces;
3. defense of basing points and other objects from airborne and naval assault forces, joint participation with ground units in antiamphibious defense.
Accordingly, the number of Soviet marines was, according to some data, no more than 17 000 people. as of 1988. Without a doubt, the marines in both the USSR and the USA was an elite branch of the military, but, comparing their numbers, one should not think that the USSR treated such troops with disdain. It’s just that within the framework of the concept of a global nuclear-missile war, for which Soviet military leaders were preparing, the airborne troops played an extremely important role, and it was on them that they relied - 1991 divisions and 7 individual brigades were assigned to the 11 of the Airborne Forces. The Americans Airborne were practically underdeveloped (one division).
After the collapse of the Union, almost all parts of the marines were on the territory of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, even the elite status of one of the most combat-ready troops of the Russian Federation did not save them from various kinds of “optimizations”. Although ... the first, rather dubious organizational event for the marines was taken back in the USSR in 1989 - the formation of the Navy Coastal troops. On the one hand, it seemed logical to withdraw all forces involved in the defense of the coast, that is, the RAV and the Marines (we will talk about additional reinforcement later) under a single command, but on the other, according to some sources, led to the marines offshore rocket and artillery troops, which, in general, did not understand very well the specifics and needs of the marines. It is believed that the first problems in equipping the Marines began precisely after their inclusion in the Coastal Forces.
And then came the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed on November 19 1990, according to which the USSR, which remained for a little more than a year, had to (together with other ATS countries and NATO) significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons. In fact, the 1990 20 tanks and 694 29 armored vehicles (BBMs), 348 13 mm artillery systems 828 mm and more were deployed on the territory from our western borders to the Ural Mountains, the Ural River and the Caspian Sea on the territory from our western borders. According to the CFE Treaty, it had to be reduced to 100 13 tanks, 150 20 BBM and 000 13 artillery units. But ... as we have said, it was a quota for the USSR, and it soon collapsed - as a result of this, the total number of weapons was divided between the newly formed states. The share of the Russian Federation went to 175 6 tanks, 400 11 armored vehicles, 480 6 artillery systems. In general, it was necessary to decline ...
It would seem that if a country is forced, for whatever reason, to abandon a part of its armed forces, then the least professional and weakest military connections should be cut first. After all, it is obvious that in this case the overall combat effectiveness of the armed forces, although it will decrease, is not at all proportional to the reduction of its strength. But no - we in Russia, as we know, are not looking for easy ways. In an effort to fulfill the provisions of the CFE Treaty, we undertook to cut off the equipment of the marines - one of the most combat-ready families of our armed forces. We managed to transplant part of the MP battalions from armored personnel carriers to MTLB and ... GAZ-66 vehicles. At the same time, they also carefully cut down the mounts for mounting machine guns with MTLB, so that, God forbid, nobody took them for an armored fighting vehicle ...
The tanks were taken from the marines. Apparently, guided by the principle: "Guys and so can, with their bare hands, an Abrams cannon tie the cannon to the Abrams, why do they need tanks of some kind?" The author of this article, unfortunately, no longer remembers and could not find what the responsible persons were saying about this, but such an "rationale" figured on the Internet - they say, a tank, this is a very hard thing, it does not know how to swim independently, respectively , can be unloaded on the coast only from the ramp of the landing ship. And the areas where this amphibious assault ship can approach the coast are not so many, so it turns out that the marines do not need a classic tank, but a floating combat vehicle, maybe something like a self-propelled anti-tank cannon 2C25 “Sprut”.
What can be said about this?
The first thing to be understood is that a tank is by far the most powerful and best protected land combat vehicle. He is not some kind of invincible vundervaffe, of course, and it can be destroyed, but at the same time, in battle, the side that has tanks will have an indisputable advantage over the one that does not have. In general, everything is in full accordance with the famous lines of Heeler Bellock (often mistakenly attributed to R. Kipling):
That is, the presence of tanks gives the Marines tremendous advantages, and even if the tanks can be used not in all landings, but only in part of them, this is more than enough reason to leave them as part of the Marine Corps.
Secondly, in fact, the fleet has the means, although there are not as many of them as we would like, with the help of which heavy armored vehicles can be landed, even where the displacement tank landing ship will not be able to approach the coast. For example - "Bison"
This small landing ship "in one sitting" can transport three main battle tanks.
Third. For some reason, those who are campaigning for "only floating equipment" for the marines, forget that the amphibious assault is an important but far from the only task of the marines. And that the marines must not only disembark, but also participate in anti-amphibious defense, as well as protect important naval and other coastal objects of the country, and for these tasks, of course, there are no restrictions on the use of tanks and is not foreseen.
And finally, the fourth. For example, for all the previous points, the author is completely wrong and, in fact, classic tanks are not needed by the Marines, but are needed ... but the same "Sprut", for example. Well, where are they, let me ask? After all, it is absolutely obvious that in this case it would make sense to remove the tanks from the Marines' armament only when lighter combat vehicles begin to flow to them. That is, in this case, it was necessary not to reduce tank units within the MP, but to re-equip them with new equipment. Everything is as usual with us: the tanks were taken away, but they did not give anything in return.
In the period of the wild 90's 2000-s and the beginning of the XNUMX-s, which is not much different from them, the marines appeared to be in the “stepsons” of the fleet, which included in the fleet and which chronically did not receive at least a quarter of the funds that he needed normal combat training, not to mention the procurement of weapons. That is, for the leadership of the Navy, obviously, the priority turned out to be ships, not marines, and, probably, our admirals cannot be blamed for this. Still, the fleet is part of the triad of our strategic nuclear forces, and ensuring the action of the SSBN is still a top priority. To the credit of the marines, one can only say that, despite the obvious lack of funding, they showed themselves excellently in the battles in Chechnya.
But then it seemed to be easier, money was found, and, on the threshold of re-equipment of the army and navy, the marines, which had just confirmed their high professionalism, could finally breathe a sigh and get ready for the best. But no - the "crazy hands" of Mr. Serdyukov, who miraculously became Minister of Defense, reached the Pacific Ocean itself. In his indestructible desire to optimize everything that is possible, and what cannot be - doubly optimize, he managed to disband our only Marine Division 55, reducing its staff and turning it into 155-th separate Marine Corps.
Just think for a second. Far East. Billionth China at hand. Japan, with which our peace treaty has not yet been signed. USA, whose AUG and other fleet forces in Japanese bases are at home. And we, who, even during the Soviet times, had ground forces in the Far East, frankly, did not hit the imagination with their numbers, and even during the years of the Russian Federation, they were reduced to regrettably small values. But the 55 Division of the Marine Corps is still with us. Although heavily battered, dashing between times, but still elite, which confirmed its high fighting qualities in the Chechen wars. And what are we doing? Restoring its combat capability? Will we use her frames, which have gained invaluable combat experience, to form new units? No, we are reducing it to the size of a brigade ... Well, we decided then that we did not need divisions, that the brigade structure of the armed forces was our everything. But who prevented turning the 55-nd division into at least two brigades, and not into one?
And this is against the background of the experience just gained at a high price. Still fresh was the memory of how the Marines "pushed" in terms of funding and equipment to the background, they say, the specific kind of troops, not to fat, and all that. And then, when the trouble came - the first Chechen one - who had to be sent into battle? It would seem that just in their own skin they could see how important the highly professional, well-trained troops were, and that they might well have to be sent into battle not at all there and not in the way that was originally planned.
Of course, we must be fair, something useful for Serdyukov was nevertheless done. For example, in 2008, the 810 regiment of the marine corps (the Black Sea Fleet) was again reformed into a brigade (which it was before 1998). This is certainly a good and necessary thing, but why was it necessary to simultaneously dismantle the Marine Corps brigade of the Caspian Flotilla, leaving two battalions from it ?!
Well, today ... Today, I want to believe, the worst for our marines is over. Numerically, it includes five brigades, one each in the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic fleets and two brigades in the Pacific Fleet, in addition, there are other, separate units, from the battalion and below. The total number of Russian marines is unknown, presumably it is of the order of 12 000 people.
At the beginning of 2018, finally, common sense prevailed as regards equipping marines with tanks — the Ministry of Defense announced the inclusion of a tank battalion in each brigade. This decision was made according to the results of the experiment - in December, a crew of a marine company received a tank company from 2017 in Kamchatka. As a result of the exercise, it became quite obvious that with the tanks, the capabilities of the marines increased significantly (who would doubt ...).
Marines received new equipment. This and new BTR 82A
According to some reports, as of 2017, the Marines received 600 of such armored personnel carriers. Almost all of the personnel received equipment "Warrior", while the difference from the military kit is that for the Marines, it is equipped with a floating (!!) body armor "Corsair"
Not forgotten and means of communication and control. So, for example, the complex of tactical level of reconnaissance, control and communications (KRUS) "Strelets" was entered into service with the Marine Corps. It consists of the commander’s personal computer, satellite communications radio station, VHF radio, distance meter-goniometer, Fara-BP portable short-range radar, unified data transmission equipment, an individual and group navigation system capable of operating in GLONASS and GPS .
The commander, whose connection is equipped with the “Sagittarius” at any moment knows where his fighters are, and for any of them in order to mark the enemy equipment (automatically falling on the commander’s tablet), “two clicks” of the finger are enough. "Sagittarius" identifies detected objects, checks them for "friend or foe", calculates their coordinates and movement parameters (if the target is moving), and also gives target designation for any means of destruction, starting from the receiver artillery, both land and ship, and ending with tactical aircraft aviation and Caliber and Onyx cruise missiles. "Sagittarius" is universal because it is capable of interfacing with all domestic reconnaissance equipment, radar, sights, UAVs, etc.
In general, the Sagittarius KRUS is a network-centric control unit of a battalion-tactical group with any soapy amplification tools that the latter can receive. At the same time, the creators of the Sagittarius did not forget about ergonomics either - if the first products had a mass over 5 kg and interfered in overcoming the obstacle course, then modern, modernized individual complexes have a mass 2,4 kg and their operation in the military (and the KRUS was adopted in 2007 g and since then is constantly being improved) did not reveal any significant complaints.
But, of course, one should not think that all the problems of military equipment of the Marine Corps have been solved. In fact, in terms of equipping with military equipment, the marines turned out to be approximately in the same position as the rest of the ground forces - it seems to be supplies and they go, but ... very often it turns out that the new military equipment is “better than nothing, but many worse than what is actually required. "
Here, for example, the same BTR-82A. Yes, this is a new technique, but in fact it is nothing more than a modernized BTR-80, the serial production of which began in 1984. And no upgrades are able to fix the extreme vulnerability of the design of this BTR to the effects of virtually any means of destruction and mines. About "Boomerangs", alas, while you can only dream. Or, for example, the decision to equip brigades of marines with tanks. He can only be welcomed, yes, but not the newest modifications of the T-90 will come into service with the MP (we are already silent about the “Armata”, although it would seem, where else can you run in the newest and most sophisticated armored vehicles, like in elite troops?) just the “modern” T-72B3 and T-80BV, the latter will go into service with brigades operating in low temperatures (Northern Fleet, Kamchatka).
As we said earlier, in the USSR, the Nona-S self-propelled mortar and artillery mounts were in service with the Marines. Today, their place, in theory, would have to take the 2C31 "Vienna", an 120-mm self-propelled self-propelled gun based on the BMP-3, but ... so far only the installation batch of such vehicles has entered service. And about the BMP-3 themselves ... The author does not in any way position himself as an expert on armored vehicles, and heard a lot of critical reviews about this car, but in any case, it should be assumed that the BMP-3 is much better and more capable than the BMP-2 , which to this day is in service with the Marine Corps. As for the BMP-3, then it, if it came into service with the MP, then in small quantities.
Now let's see how things are with the main means of delivery of the Marine Corps to the battlefield: amphibious ships and boats.
Large landing ships
BDK project 11711 ("Ivan Gren") - 1 units.
Displacement - 5 000 tons, speed - 18 knots, range - 3 500 miles, weapons - 2 * AK-630М, 1 * AK-630М-2 "Duet", two helicopters. Airborne capability - 13 main battle tanks weighing up to 60 t, or up to 36 airborne / BMP and 300 paratroopers.
The only newest BDK of the Russian Navy, well-known long-term construction, was laid in 2004, but was adopted by the fleet only 20 June 2018, that is, actually 14 years later. The assault landing is supposed to take place through the ramp, but, unlike the previous types of BDK, the “Ivan Gren” is capable of doing it in a “non-contact” way. The fact is that the landing through the ramp requires a coast slope of not less than 3-5 degrees, otherwise the technique can only be planted by swimming. So, the new method involves the use of specialized engineering pontoons, similar to those used by the ground forces for transporting military equipment - they become a link between the coast and the ramp of "Ivan Gren". Thus, the requirements for the coast slope disappear, and the BDK itself does not necessarily have to go directly to the coastline. It also draws attention to the fact that with a larger displacement than the BNC of the 1171 project, the “Ivan Gren” has a somewhat lower airborne capability, but it should be borne in mind that helicopters are based on the “Green”, and, besides, much more attention is paid to the comfort of the crew and landing.
BDK project 1171 - 4 units.
Displacement - 3 400 t (normal), travel speed - 17 knots, range - 4 800 miles to 16 knots, armament - 1 * 57-mm ZIF-31B, 2 * 25-mm 2-3MXMXMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXYYYY -2 "Grad-M", MANPADS "Strela". Landing capacity - up to 215 units of armored vehicles (50 tank or 22 BTR), as well as 50 paratroopers (on the "Vilkovo" and "Filchenkovo" - up to 313 people.).
The history of the creation of this type of warships is not quite common. The fact is that simultaneously with the order of the Navy BDK project with a nasal ramp, the Ministry of the Navy ordered the development of a civilian bulk carrier of similar dimensions and characteristics, which, in the event of war, could be used as a warship. As a result, the ships tried to unify, so the BN of the 1171 project was a compromise between a civilian and a warship. Alas, nothing sensible came of it - meeting the demands of the military led to the fact that civilian traffic on such a ship became unprofitable. As a result, the Ministry of the Navy was forced to abandon this ship, and thus did not receive the cargo ship they needed, and the military received a ship that was not as good as it could be if it were not for an attempt to unify it with a civilian ship.
BDK of this type entered into service in 1966-1975. and today, obviously, serve the last days.
BDK project 775 - 15 units.
In fact, we are talking about the ships of the three “subprojects” - 775 (3 units), 775 / II (9 units) and 775 / III (3 units). All of them were built on Polish shipyards, in the framework of cooperation of the ATS countries. But their main characteristics are quite similar, so we allowed ourselves to combine them into one type.
Displacement - 2 900 T standard, speed - 17,5 knots. range - 3 500 miles on 16 knots, armament - 2 * AK-725 (or 1 * 76-mm Ak-176 on 775 / III), 2 * 30-mm AK-630М (only on project 775 / III) , 2 installation of the MLRS "Grad-M", 2 MANPADS "Strela" or "Needle". Airborne capability - up to 13 medium tanks or 20 BTR, as well as 150 paratroopers.
Interestingly, 2 ships of this type took part in the fighting for their intended purpose: during the war 08.08.08, the Black Sea Yamal and Saratov, under the guise of the Suzdalets MPC, landed troops in the Georgian port of Poti.
All BDKs of this type are quite “adults” - three ships of the 775 subtype entered service in 1976-1978, nine 775 / II - in 1981-1988. and only three ships 775 / III are relatively young - joined the fleet in 1990-1991.
To date, it is the BDK of this type that is the backbone of the amphibious assault ships of the Russian Navy. But I would like to note that all ships of this class have demonstrated their extraordinary usefulness in the daily service of the fleet. BDK, in addition to its main function, turned out to be quite capable of performing the role of naval supply transport, and in this aspect they became indispensable, for example, for supplying domestic forces fighting in Syria.
Small landing ships and boats
MDK of the 1232.2 project ("Bison") - 2 units.
Displacement 555 tons, speed - 63 node, range - 300 miles full speed. Armament - 2 * 30-mm AK-630М, 2 launchers NURS MS-227 “Fire”, 4 PU ZRK “Igla”. Landing capacity - 3 tank, 10 armored personnel carriers, up to 140 paratroopers. In case of refusal to transport vehicles, the number of paratroopers may be increased to 500 people.
This type of ships causes very contradictory feelings. On the one hand, it is the world's largest hovercraft, and its ability to travel at speeds in excess of 116 km / h and the ability to "go" to the coast provides tremendous tactical capabilities. On the other hand, such equipment is rather expensive and, what is more important, fragile - the Bison case is made of aluminum alloy. Accordingly, such a ship has minimal combat stability — some serious combat damage, and even at speeds above 100 km / h can lead to the death of the entire crew and landing force. Airborne forces, on the other hand, are not less at risk during landing.
In general, such ships are unlikely to ever become the main landing craft of any fleet of the world, but they certainly have their own tactical niche.
Ships entered service in 1990 and 1991 g, respectively.
FDA of the 21820 project (“Dugong”) - 5 units.
Displacement (full) 280 tons, speed up to 35 knots (with wave height up to 0,75 m), range of travel - 500 miles, armament - 2 * 14,5-mm machine gun. Airborne capability - 2 tank or 4 BMP / BTR or up to 90 paratroopers.
Modern ships that use the principle of an air cavern when moving, which is to create an artificial air layer with excess pressure under the bottom of the boat. Entered 2010-2015
DKA of the 11770 project (“Serna”) - 12 units.
Displacement (full) 105 t., Speed to 30 nodes, range - 600 miles, armament - no. Airborne capability - 1 tank or 2 BMP / BTR or up to 90 paratroopers.
Modern members of their class, in motion, as well as the Dugongs, use the principle of the air cavern. Coming into operation in the period from 1994 to 2010.
DKA of the 1176 project ("Shark") - 13 unit.
Displacement (full) - up to 107,3 t, speed 11,5 knots., Range of 330 miles, weapons - no. Airborne capability - 1 tank or 1 BMP / BTR or up to 50 paratroopers.
These boats were commissioned in the USSR and the Russian Federation in the period from 1971 to 2009. They were supposed to be used both independently and as landing craft of large landing ships of the 1174 “Rhino” project and unrealized project of the universal landing ship of the 11780 project, also known as “Ivan Tarava” (received a nickname for its similarity to the American ship of similar purpose).
Продолжение следует ...
We will not consider in detail history the emergence of this kind of troops in our Fatherland, we note only that the marines in one form or another periodically created, then abolished back. Peter I introduced it on a constant basis - today there are polar points of view on the role of this sovereign in Russian history, but there can be no dual opinions about the usefulness of organizing marines as a separate branch of troops. For "cutting through the window to Europe" by conquering outlets to the Baltic Sea and securing its positions on the Black Sea coast, the marines, of course, was absolutely necessary.
Then, at the beginning of the 19 century (in anticipation of the invasion of Napoleon), the marines were abolished. Not that the Russian Imperial Navy considered the actions on land to be unnecessary and no longer characteristic of the fleet, but it was believed that the crew members of warships armed on land could cope with it, and if their forces were not enough, then the Cossacks or ordinary infantry. Of course, such an approach cannot be considered as something sensible. A sailor, even an ordinary sailor, requires quite a long and serious preparation for service on a ship where, in general, land combat skills are not needed. Accordingly, its use in land operations can be justified unless in some exceptional, atypical cases, but not on a permanent basis. As for the Cossacks, they, of course, did a lot of things on land as scouts, but they did not know the sea specifics.
Understanding that something was going wrong came only at the beginning of the twentieth century, when they tried to revive the marines in 1911. Several battalions were created, but still it didn’t work out and it can be said that the USSR did not inherit this branch, but had to create it independently and, in general, from scratch. In fact, the birth of the Marine Corps in the USSR took place during the Great Patriotic War, where it covered itself with unfading glory.
However, after the war, before the 1956 g, all marines were gradually disbanded. It was only in 1963 that the revival began - the 336 th guards motorized rifle regiment of the 120 th guards motorized rifle division was reorganized into the 336 th guards separate marine regiment of the Baltic Fleet.
Probably, we can say that it was then that the view on the marine corps was finally formed, as on the troops with special training and specialized amphibious landing equipment, while the military equipment was to a certain extent standardized with the land, and with the one that was used aerially -landing troops. The brigade was considered the main formation of the Marine Corps, there were three of them in the USSR - in the Baltic, Black Sea and Northern Fleets, but the Pacific Fleet was equipped with a division. The states of the brigades could vary significantly, on average, with 2 men, they were in service with up to 000 tanks T-55, 160-265 armored personnel carriers, 18 122-mm self-propelled self-propelled guns Gvozdika, 24 self-propelled mortar and artillery mounts Nona-S and, of course, 18 Grad MLRS systems. As for the small arms, as far as the author could figure it out, it did not differ too much from what was laid down in the state by ordinary motorized rifles.
The Marines took direct part in the combat services of the Soviet Navy. For the Marines, it looked like this: amphibious ships were sent to the same Mediterranean Sea with the Marines unit and, of course, their equipment, which was put in place by the state. There they were in constant readiness to disembark on someone’s coast.
I must say that the Soviet marines have never been analogous to the American. The United States Marine Corps (USMC), in fact, is an expeditionary force of more than 180 thousand people. able to independently conduct major military operations outside the United States. Hence the divisional structure of the USMC, the presence in its composition of its own wing, etc. At the same time, the Soviet marines had more local tasks, such as:
1. the landing of tactical amphibious assault forces to solve independent tasks and to assist ground forces formations;
2. use as a first echelon of the assault force during the landing of operational assault forces;
3. defense of basing points and other objects from airborne and naval assault forces, joint participation with ground units in antiamphibious defense.
Accordingly, the number of Soviet marines was, according to some data, no more than 17 000 people. as of 1988. Without a doubt, the marines in both the USSR and the USA was an elite branch of the military, but, comparing their numbers, one should not think that the USSR treated such troops with disdain. It’s just that within the framework of the concept of a global nuclear-missile war, for which Soviet military leaders were preparing, the airborne troops played an extremely important role, and it was on them that they relied - 1991 divisions and 7 individual brigades were assigned to the 11 of the Airborne Forces. The Americans Airborne were practically underdeveloped (one division).
After the collapse of the Union, almost all parts of the marines were on the territory of the Russian Federation. Unfortunately, even the elite status of one of the most combat-ready troops of the Russian Federation did not save them from various kinds of “optimizations”. Although ... the first, rather dubious organizational event for the marines was taken back in the USSR in 1989 - the formation of the Navy Coastal troops. On the one hand, it seemed logical to withdraw all forces involved in the defense of the coast, that is, the RAV and the Marines (we will talk about additional reinforcement later) under a single command, but on the other, according to some sources, led to the marines offshore rocket and artillery troops, which, in general, did not understand very well the specifics and needs of the marines. It is believed that the first problems in equipping the Marines began precisely after their inclusion in the Coastal Forces.
And then came the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed on November 19 1990, according to which the USSR, which remained for a little more than a year, had to (together with other ATS countries and NATO) significantly reduce the number of conventional weapons. In fact, the 1990 20 tanks and 694 29 armored vehicles (BBMs), 348 13 mm artillery systems 828 mm and more were deployed on the territory from our western borders to the Ural Mountains, the Ural River and the Caspian Sea on the territory from our western borders. According to the CFE Treaty, it had to be reduced to 100 13 tanks, 150 20 BBM and 000 13 artillery units. But ... as we have said, it was a quota for the USSR, and it soon collapsed - as a result of this, the total number of weapons was divided between the newly formed states. The share of the Russian Federation went to 175 6 tanks, 400 11 armored vehicles, 480 6 artillery systems. In general, it was necessary to decline ...
It would seem that if a country is forced, for whatever reason, to abandon a part of its armed forces, then the least professional and weakest military connections should be cut first. After all, it is obvious that in this case the overall combat effectiveness of the armed forces, although it will decrease, is not at all proportional to the reduction of its strength. But no - we in Russia, as we know, are not looking for easy ways. In an effort to fulfill the provisions of the CFE Treaty, we undertook to cut off the equipment of the marines - one of the most combat-ready families of our armed forces. We managed to transplant part of the MP battalions from armored personnel carriers to MTLB and ... GAZ-66 vehicles. At the same time, they also carefully cut down the mounts for mounting machine guns with MTLB, so that, God forbid, nobody took them for an armored fighting vehicle ...
The tanks were taken from the marines. Apparently, guided by the principle: "Guys and so can, with their bare hands, an Abrams cannon tie the cannon to the Abrams, why do they need tanks of some kind?" The author of this article, unfortunately, no longer remembers and could not find what the responsible persons were saying about this, but such an "rationale" figured on the Internet - they say, a tank, this is a very hard thing, it does not know how to swim independently, respectively , can be unloaded on the coast only from the ramp of the landing ship. And the areas where this amphibious assault ship can approach the coast are not so many, so it turns out that the marines do not need a classic tank, but a floating combat vehicle, maybe something like a self-propelled anti-tank cannon 2C25 “Sprut”.
What can be said about this?
The first thing to be understood is that a tank is by far the most powerful and best protected land combat vehicle. He is not some kind of invincible vundervaffe, of course, and it can be destroyed, but at the same time, in battle, the side that has tanks will have an indisputable advantage over the one that does not have. In general, everything is in full accordance with the famous lines of Heeler Bellock (often mistakenly attributed to R. Kipling):
Each question has a clear answer:
We have “maxims”, they don't have it.
We have “maxims”, they don't have it.
That is, the presence of tanks gives the Marines tremendous advantages, and even if the tanks can be used not in all landings, but only in part of them, this is more than enough reason to leave them as part of the Marine Corps.
Secondly, in fact, the fleet has the means, although there are not as many of them as we would like, with the help of which heavy armored vehicles can be landed, even where the displacement tank landing ship will not be able to approach the coast. For example - "Bison"
This small landing ship "in one sitting" can transport three main battle tanks.
Third. For some reason, those who are campaigning for "only floating equipment" for the marines, forget that the amphibious assault is an important but far from the only task of the marines. And that the marines must not only disembark, but also participate in anti-amphibious defense, as well as protect important naval and other coastal objects of the country, and for these tasks, of course, there are no restrictions on the use of tanks and is not foreseen.
And finally, the fourth. For example, for all the previous points, the author is completely wrong and, in fact, classic tanks are not needed by the Marines, but are needed ... but the same "Sprut", for example. Well, where are they, let me ask? After all, it is absolutely obvious that in this case it would make sense to remove the tanks from the Marines' armament only when lighter combat vehicles begin to flow to them. That is, in this case, it was necessary not to reduce tank units within the MP, but to re-equip them with new equipment. Everything is as usual with us: the tanks were taken away, but they did not give anything in return.
In the period of the wild 90's 2000-s and the beginning of the XNUMX-s, which is not much different from them, the marines appeared to be in the “stepsons” of the fleet, which included in the fleet and which chronically did not receive at least a quarter of the funds that he needed normal combat training, not to mention the procurement of weapons. That is, for the leadership of the Navy, obviously, the priority turned out to be ships, not marines, and, probably, our admirals cannot be blamed for this. Still, the fleet is part of the triad of our strategic nuclear forces, and ensuring the action of the SSBN is still a top priority. To the credit of the marines, one can only say that, despite the obvious lack of funding, they showed themselves excellently in the battles in Chechnya.
But then it seemed to be easier, money was found, and, on the threshold of re-equipment of the army and navy, the marines, which had just confirmed their high professionalism, could finally breathe a sigh and get ready for the best. But no - the "crazy hands" of Mr. Serdyukov, who miraculously became Minister of Defense, reached the Pacific Ocean itself. In his indestructible desire to optimize everything that is possible, and what cannot be - doubly optimize, he managed to disband our only Marine Division 55, reducing its staff and turning it into 155-th separate Marine Corps.
Just think for a second. Far East. Billionth China at hand. Japan, with which our peace treaty has not yet been signed. USA, whose AUG and other fleet forces in Japanese bases are at home. And we, who, even during the Soviet times, had ground forces in the Far East, frankly, did not hit the imagination with their numbers, and even during the years of the Russian Federation, they were reduced to regrettably small values. But the 55 Division of the Marine Corps is still with us. Although heavily battered, dashing between times, but still elite, which confirmed its high fighting qualities in the Chechen wars. And what are we doing? Restoring its combat capability? Will we use her frames, which have gained invaluable combat experience, to form new units? No, we are reducing it to the size of a brigade ... Well, we decided then that we did not need divisions, that the brigade structure of the armed forces was our everything. But who prevented turning the 55-nd division into at least two brigades, and not into one?
And this is against the background of the experience just gained at a high price. Still fresh was the memory of how the Marines "pushed" in terms of funding and equipment to the background, they say, the specific kind of troops, not to fat, and all that. And then, when the trouble came - the first Chechen one - who had to be sent into battle? It would seem that just in their own skin they could see how important the highly professional, well-trained troops were, and that they might well have to be sent into battle not at all there and not in the way that was originally planned.
Of course, we must be fair, something useful for Serdyukov was nevertheless done. For example, in 2008, the 810 regiment of the marine corps (the Black Sea Fleet) was again reformed into a brigade (which it was before 1998). This is certainly a good and necessary thing, but why was it necessary to simultaneously dismantle the Marine Corps brigade of the Caspian Flotilla, leaving two battalions from it ?!
Well, today ... Today, I want to believe, the worst for our marines is over. Numerically, it includes five brigades, one each in the Northern, Black Sea and Baltic fleets and two brigades in the Pacific Fleet, in addition, there are other, separate units, from the battalion and below. The total number of Russian marines is unknown, presumably it is of the order of 12 000 people.
At the beginning of 2018, finally, common sense prevailed as regards equipping marines with tanks — the Ministry of Defense announced the inclusion of a tank battalion in each brigade. This decision was made according to the results of the experiment - in December, a crew of a marine company received a tank company from 2017 in Kamchatka. As a result of the exercise, it became quite obvious that with the tanks, the capabilities of the marines increased significantly (who would doubt ...).
Marines received new equipment. This and new BTR 82A
According to some reports, as of 2017, the Marines received 600 of such armored personnel carriers. Almost all of the personnel received equipment "Warrior", while the difference from the military kit is that for the Marines, it is equipped with a floating (!!) body armor "Corsair"
Not forgotten and means of communication and control. So, for example, the complex of tactical level of reconnaissance, control and communications (KRUS) "Strelets" was entered into service with the Marine Corps. It consists of the commander’s personal computer, satellite communications radio station, VHF radio, distance meter-goniometer, Fara-BP portable short-range radar, unified data transmission equipment, an individual and group navigation system capable of operating in GLONASS and GPS .
The commander, whose connection is equipped with the “Sagittarius” at any moment knows where his fighters are, and for any of them in order to mark the enemy equipment (automatically falling on the commander’s tablet), “two clicks” of the finger are enough. "Sagittarius" identifies detected objects, checks them for "friend or foe", calculates their coordinates and movement parameters (if the target is moving), and also gives target designation for any means of destruction, starting from the receiver artillery, both land and ship, and ending with tactical aircraft aviation and Caliber and Onyx cruise missiles. "Sagittarius" is universal because it is capable of interfacing with all domestic reconnaissance equipment, radar, sights, UAVs, etc.
In general, the Sagittarius KRUS is a network-centric control unit of a battalion-tactical group with any soapy amplification tools that the latter can receive. At the same time, the creators of the Sagittarius did not forget about ergonomics either - if the first products had a mass over 5 kg and interfered in overcoming the obstacle course, then modern, modernized individual complexes have a mass 2,4 kg and their operation in the military (and the KRUS was adopted in 2007 g and since then is constantly being improved) did not reveal any significant complaints.
But, of course, one should not think that all the problems of military equipment of the Marine Corps have been solved. In fact, in terms of equipping with military equipment, the marines turned out to be approximately in the same position as the rest of the ground forces - it seems to be supplies and they go, but ... very often it turns out that the new military equipment is “better than nothing, but many worse than what is actually required. "
Here, for example, the same BTR-82A. Yes, this is a new technique, but in fact it is nothing more than a modernized BTR-80, the serial production of which began in 1984. And no upgrades are able to fix the extreme vulnerability of the design of this BTR to the effects of virtually any means of destruction and mines. About "Boomerangs", alas, while you can only dream. Or, for example, the decision to equip brigades of marines with tanks. He can only be welcomed, yes, but not the newest modifications of the T-90 will come into service with the MP (we are already silent about the “Armata”, although it would seem, where else can you run in the newest and most sophisticated armored vehicles, like in elite troops?) just the “modern” T-72B3 and T-80BV, the latter will go into service with brigades operating in low temperatures (Northern Fleet, Kamchatka).
As we said earlier, in the USSR, the Nona-S self-propelled mortar and artillery mounts were in service with the Marines. Today, their place, in theory, would have to take the 2C31 "Vienna", an 120-mm self-propelled self-propelled gun based on the BMP-3, but ... so far only the installation batch of such vehicles has entered service. And about the BMP-3 themselves ... The author does not in any way position himself as an expert on armored vehicles, and heard a lot of critical reviews about this car, but in any case, it should be assumed that the BMP-3 is much better and more capable than the BMP-2 , which to this day is in service with the Marine Corps. As for the BMP-3, then it, if it came into service with the MP, then in small quantities.
Now let's see how things are with the main means of delivery of the Marine Corps to the battlefield: amphibious ships and boats.
Large landing ships
BDK project 11711 ("Ivan Gren") - 1 units.
Displacement - 5 000 tons, speed - 18 knots, range - 3 500 miles, weapons - 2 * AK-630М, 1 * AK-630М-2 "Duet", two helicopters. Airborne capability - 13 main battle tanks weighing up to 60 t, or up to 36 airborne / BMP and 300 paratroopers.
The only newest BDK of the Russian Navy, well-known long-term construction, was laid in 2004, but was adopted by the fleet only 20 June 2018, that is, actually 14 years later. The assault landing is supposed to take place through the ramp, but, unlike the previous types of BDK, the “Ivan Gren” is capable of doing it in a “non-contact” way. The fact is that the landing through the ramp requires a coast slope of not less than 3-5 degrees, otherwise the technique can only be planted by swimming. So, the new method involves the use of specialized engineering pontoons, similar to those used by the ground forces for transporting military equipment - they become a link between the coast and the ramp of "Ivan Gren". Thus, the requirements for the coast slope disappear, and the BDK itself does not necessarily have to go directly to the coastline. It also draws attention to the fact that with a larger displacement than the BNC of the 1171 project, the “Ivan Gren” has a somewhat lower airborne capability, but it should be borne in mind that helicopters are based on the “Green”, and, besides, much more attention is paid to the comfort of the crew and landing.
BDK project 1171 - 4 units.
Displacement - 3 400 t (normal), travel speed - 17 knots, range - 4 800 miles to 16 knots, armament - 1 * 57-mm ZIF-31B, 2 * 25-mm 2-3MXMXMXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXYYYY -2 "Grad-M", MANPADS "Strela". Landing capacity - up to 215 units of armored vehicles (50 tank or 22 BTR), as well as 50 paratroopers (on the "Vilkovo" and "Filchenkovo" - up to 313 people.).
The history of the creation of this type of warships is not quite common. The fact is that simultaneously with the order of the Navy BDK project with a nasal ramp, the Ministry of the Navy ordered the development of a civilian bulk carrier of similar dimensions and characteristics, which, in the event of war, could be used as a warship. As a result, the ships tried to unify, so the BN of the 1171 project was a compromise between a civilian and a warship. Alas, nothing sensible came of it - meeting the demands of the military led to the fact that civilian traffic on such a ship became unprofitable. As a result, the Ministry of the Navy was forced to abandon this ship, and thus did not receive the cargo ship they needed, and the military received a ship that was not as good as it could be if it were not for an attempt to unify it with a civilian ship.
BDK of this type entered into service in 1966-1975. and today, obviously, serve the last days.
BDK project 775 - 15 units.
In fact, we are talking about the ships of the three “subprojects” - 775 (3 units), 775 / II (9 units) and 775 / III (3 units). All of them were built on Polish shipyards, in the framework of cooperation of the ATS countries. But their main characteristics are quite similar, so we allowed ourselves to combine them into one type.
Displacement - 2 900 T standard, speed - 17,5 knots. range - 3 500 miles on 16 knots, armament - 2 * AK-725 (or 1 * 76-mm Ak-176 on 775 / III), 2 * 30-mm AK-630М (only on project 775 / III) , 2 installation of the MLRS "Grad-M", 2 MANPADS "Strela" or "Needle". Airborne capability - up to 13 medium tanks or 20 BTR, as well as 150 paratroopers.
Interestingly, 2 ships of this type took part in the fighting for their intended purpose: during the war 08.08.08, the Black Sea Yamal and Saratov, under the guise of the Suzdalets MPC, landed troops in the Georgian port of Poti.
All BDKs of this type are quite “adults” - three ships of the 775 subtype entered service in 1976-1978, nine 775 / II - in 1981-1988. and only three ships 775 / III are relatively young - joined the fleet in 1990-1991.
To date, it is the BDK of this type that is the backbone of the amphibious assault ships of the Russian Navy. But I would like to note that all ships of this class have demonstrated their extraordinary usefulness in the daily service of the fleet. BDK, in addition to its main function, turned out to be quite capable of performing the role of naval supply transport, and in this aspect they became indispensable, for example, for supplying domestic forces fighting in Syria.
Small landing ships and boats
MDK of the 1232.2 project ("Bison") - 2 units.
Displacement 555 tons, speed - 63 node, range - 300 miles full speed. Armament - 2 * 30-mm AK-630М, 2 launchers NURS MS-227 “Fire”, 4 PU ZRK “Igla”. Landing capacity - 3 tank, 10 armored personnel carriers, up to 140 paratroopers. In case of refusal to transport vehicles, the number of paratroopers may be increased to 500 people.
This type of ships causes very contradictory feelings. On the one hand, it is the world's largest hovercraft, and its ability to travel at speeds in excess of 116 km / h and the ability to "go" to the coast provides tremendous tactical capabilities. On the other hand, such equipment is rather expensive and, what is more important, fragile - the Bison case is made of aluminum alloy. Accordingly, such a ship has minimal combat stability — some serious combat damage, and even at speeds above 100 km / h can lead to the death of the entire crew and landing force. Airborne forces, on the other hand, are not less at risk during landing.
In general, such ships are unlikely to ever become the main landing craft of any fleet of the world, but they certainly have their own tactical niche.
Ships entered service in 1990 and 1991 g, respectively.
FDA of the 21820 project (“Dugong”) - 5 units.
Displacement (full) 280 tons, speed up to 35 knots (with wave height up to 0,75 m), range of travel - 500 miles, armament - 2 * 14,5-mm machine gun. Airborne capability - 2 tank or 4 BMP / BTR or up to 90 paratroopers.
Modern ships that use the principle of an air cavern when moving, which is to create an artificial air layer with excess pressure under the bottom of the boat. Entered 2010-2015
DKA of the 11770 project (“Serna”) - 12 units.
Displacement (full) 105 t., Speed to 30 nodes, range - 600 miles, armament - no. Airborne capability - 1 tank or 2 BMP / BTR or up to 90 paratroopers.
Modern members of their class, in motion, as well as the Dugongs, use the principle of the air cavern. Coming into operation in the period from 1994 to 2010.
DKA of the 1176 project ("Shark") - 13 unit.
Displacement (full) - up to 107,3 t, speed 11,5 knots., Range of 330 miles, weapons - no. Airborne capability - 1 tank or 1 BMP / BTR or up to 50 paratroopers.
These boats were commissioned in the USSR and the Russian Federation in the period from 1971 to 2009. They were supposed to be used both independently and as landing craft of large landing ships of the 1174 “Rhino” project and unrealized project of the universal landing ship of the 11780 project, also known as “Ivan Tarava” (received a nickname for its similarity to the American ship of similar purpose).
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